ci: pin sigstore/cosign-installer@main to a full commit SHA - #1759
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docker-publish.yml and docker-publish-v4.yml referenced this third-party action by the mutable @main branch inside the build job that holds packages: write + id-token: write and logs in to ghcr.io with GITHUB_TOKEN. Pinning to a full commit SHA (v4.1.2) removes the mutable-ref supply-chain exposure. The installed cosign version is unchanged (cosign-release input stays v2.2.3).
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Thanks for the careful writeup and for verifying every line yourself — the risk framing (OIDC + packages write on a |
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Hi, and thank you for pgloader.
Small supply-chain hardening. Both
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml(line 42) and.github/workflows/docker-publish-v4.yml(line 30) use the third-party actionsigstore/cosign-installer@main.@mainis a mutable branch, and in both files thebuildjob declarespermissions: packages: write+id-token: writeand logs in to ghcr.io withGITHUB_TOKEN. If that upstream branch were repointed or compromised (thetj-actions/changed-filesclass of risk), it would run with the job's write-scoped token and OIDC identity on push/tag builds.This PR pins the action to a full commit SHA (
v4.1.2). The installed cosign version is unchanged — thecosign-release: v2.2.3input is untouched — so this only removes the mutable reference. The other actions in these jobs are already version-pinned.For transparency: I used AI assistance to help identify this and draft the change; I verified every line against the live workflows myself.