feat(detection): close out T5 — latency consequence, property gates, audited injection vectors by unclesp1d3r · Pull Request #281 · EvilBit-Labs/DaemonEye

unclesp1d3r · 2026-09-29T03:19:09Z

Closes out ticket T5 · M3 — Detection Phase 1, whose main body merged as #272. An audit of the ticket line by line against main found four gaps; this closes all four. Along the way review found four ways past the guard the first unit added, and closing those is most of the diff.

What the audit found

Ticket line	State before this PR
Regex cache: size limits, LRU, latency flag/disable	knob validated at config load, then dropped — `with_config` never stored it
proptest: SQL validation, depth, pushdown lowering, conformance fallback, regex bounds	last two had zero property tests
SQL-injection vectors "rejected and audited"	vectors refused; no test tied one to its audit record
—	dependabot proposing `sqlparser` 0.63 weekly against a build that cannot take it

Everything else the ticket asks for was already delivered by #272, including all nine acceptance examples.

The guard, and the four ways past it

DetectionEngine::observe_pattern_latency is the consequence T6 calls with a measured duration: on a breach the rule stops running until an operator reloads it. Implementing it surfaced a fail-open, and review then found three more. Each was found by a different reviewer:

Catalog re-validation re-armed it. revalidate re-healed any rule whose references resolved, regardless of why it was unhealthy, and plan_and_record never consulted enabled. Any new collector's first registration silently restored a disabled rule and erased the breach reason.
An operator-disabled rule skipped the disable entirely. The guard used rule.enabled as its own idempotency check, but that flag also means "an operator turned this off" — a state that leaves the plan and health untouched.
execute_rules never knew. The path the agent's collection loop calls every cycle gated on enabled alone, so set_rule_enabled(id, true) resumed alerting for a breached rule.
mark_unhealthy could downgrade the verdict. A later TaskExpiry mark replaced the resisting cause with a recoverable one. Not reachable today — renewal_cycle prunes before it expires — but that is statement order, not policy.

The common cause: the verdict was written into rule.enabled, a flag that already had an owner and a meaning. UnhealthyCause::resists_auto_recovery now states the policy once as an exhaustive match with no wildcard, so a future cause that forgets to declare itself is a build break. revalidate, track, plan_and_record, execute_rules, set_rule_enabled, and mark_unhealthy all consult it; load_rule forgets the health first, which is what makes a reload the single clearing point rather than a claim in a doc comment.

That is the same rule ADR-0009 already enforces for sqlparser enums, applied inward.

Behaviour changes a reviewer should weigh

set_rule_enabled(id, true) now returns an error for a latency-disabled rule instead of silently succeeding. Public API change. Disabling is always allowed.
execute_rules consults health, not just enabled — specifically, whether the cause resists auto-recovery. A TaskExpiry rule deliberately still runs: expiry concerns only the pushed half, so local alerting must continue. That boundary is now pinned by a test, because widening the check to any Unhealthy would black out detection for every rule whose renewal lapsed.
sqlparser is held at 0.62. DataFusion 55.1.0 requires ^0.62.0 and ADR-0006 binds DataFusion for T6, so taking 0.63 now buys a second parser copy or a downgrade. The one-arm fix a future bump needs is recorded in the T4 gate decision, beside the compatibility fact it extends.

Verification

just ci-check green. 1997 tests pass (1991 before), 39 skipped, zero clippy warnings across --all-targets --all-features.

Every behavioural fix here was written test-first and observed failing before the fix landed. Those reds are the point, so they are quoted rather than summarised:

the plan must not reappear after an unrelated collector's first registration
a breach on an operator-disabled-but-healthy rule must still drop the compiled plan
the breach verdict must not be laundered into a compiled plan by the drain
re-enabling a latency-disabled rule must be refused
the resisting cause must survive a later recoverable mark
U4's audit test, verified by suppressing a rejection write: u4-drop's refusal must write exactly one record — left: 0, right: 1

Three assertions that were measuring nothing were also repaired: an expiry check that ran at the 100s renewal interval when the TTL is 300s; a conformance property comparing against a corpus count no generated input can falsify; and a pre-existing test that called set_rule_enabled(true) after a breach and asserted only what had not changed — documenting bypass 3 instead of catching it.

Known limits and follow-ups

"Fail-closed" is bounded by the TTL on the wire. A task already dispatched to a collector keeps running there for up to PUSHDOWN_TASK_TTL (5 min) after a breach. The engine revokes its own state immediately but does not recall in-flight work. Inherent to the push/renew design; not changed here.
Close dependabot chore(deps): bump sqlparser from 0.62.0 to 0.63.0 #264 after this merges, not before. The ignore entry only suppresses once it is on the default branch. chore(deps): bump sqlparser from 0.62.0 to 0.63.0 #264 is also red against a stale base that predates feat(detection): T5 M3 — rule load becomes the decision point (SQL planner, regex bounds, schema catalog, pushdown) #272, so its failure names code that no longer exists.
T6 decision: should the threshold bound the in-flight match, or only later runs? This PR assumes the latter.
execute_rules still runs a TaskExpiry-disabled rule (expiry never flips enabled). Pre-existing, now visible.
execute_rules' resisting branch has no reachable test — no public API can construct enabled == true alongside a resisting cause — so it stays defence-in-depth. Its recoverable branch is reached every cycle after a task lapses and is now covered.
~~remove_rule leaves a stale health row behind~~ — fixed in this PR. Worth recording why it was not merely pre-existing: a stale row used to self-heal through revalidate, and a resisting verdict does not, so this change is what would have made it permanent. It now clears compiled, health, tasks and deferred.
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/mod.rs is 801 lines, up from 728. Its #[cfg(test)] module starts at 456, so production code is ~455 lines and stays inside AGENTS.md rule 09's 500-600 band; the inline test module is what pushes the file total. Moving it to daemoneye-lib/tests/ is the cheap cure if the total matters.
~40 lines of near-identical test fixtures duplicated with detection_task_renewal.rs.

Second review round

Reviewed again after the PR opened, with five agents on aspects the first round did not cover (comments, type design) or covered differently. It found four behaviour issues, four structural improvements, and fourteen comments that claimed things the code does not do — including a test doc asserting the pre-fix behaviour in the present tense.

Most consequential: nothing pinned that a recoverable cause still alerts. Widening one match to Unhealthy { .. } — the most natural simplification a future reader would make — would have stopped alerting for every rule whose pushed task lapsed, with no error and no log. Now red, verified against two spellings.

Also fixed: the reason string truncated 10.4ms to 10 ms against a 10 ms budget, reading as a non-breach in the only record an operator sees; the refusal shared an error variant with "rule not found"; and the policy check was copy-pasted seven times, reproducing the exact ungreppable audit surface this branch's own learning doc blames for the original bug.

Four findings were refuted rather than applied — a claimed fail-open on an unknown id that the existing guard already prevented, a claimed missing test that already existed in the in-crate module, my own mischaracterisation of the rejection log as durable when its header says bounded and lossy, and a file-size rule cited to a repo file that does not contain it. Recorded because a review round that cannot be wrong is not checking anything.

Review coverage

Seven reviewers on the plan, three on the simplification pass, seven on the code, then five more after the PR opened. The cross-model adversarial peer did not start — it skipped before egress, so no content left the machine and no finding here has independent cross-model corroboration. The adversarial lens ran in-process only.

Durable learning captured in docs/solutions/security-issues/a-guard-must-be-audited-against-every-reader-of-the-state-it-writes.md, cross-linked to its sibling from the same ticket. CONCEPTS.md's "Unhealthy rule" entry was corrected — it said "an enabled rule" and treated all three causes alike; both became untrue here.

AI usage

Used Claude Code (Opus 5) for the audit, planning, implementation, and review orchestration. All findings were verified against the tree before acting, and every behavioural fix carries a witnessed failing test. Reviewed and tested per the AI Usage Policy.

…es revalidation `pattern_latency_threshold_ms` was validated at config load and then dropped — `with_config` copied only `max_subquery_depth`, so the operator's budget reached nothing. T5 owes the threshold and its defined consequence; T6 owes the measurement. `DetectionEngine::observe_pattern_latency` is that consequence: on a strict breach it flips `enabled`, drops the compiled plan, and marks the rule unhealthy, three unconditional steps so no one of them failing leaves the rule running. Writing the guard exposed a fail-open in the path it depends on. `revalidate` re-healed any rule whose references resolved, with no regard for why it was unhealthy, and `plan_and_record` reinserts a plan without consulting `enabled`. Since `is_first_registration` is true for any collector that has not registered before, a second collector joining silently re-armed a rule the latency guard had just stopped and erased the breach reason — no operator action involved. The regression test was written first and observed failing on exactly that path before the fix landed. `RuleHealth::Unhealthy` now records which mechanism disabled the rule, and `revalidate` skips a `LatencyBreach` unconditionally, before the first-registration and touches checks. A `Reference` failure keeps the blanket re-heal, so task expiry recovers exactly as it did. Refs R2, R3, R4, R8; ADR-0009 unaffected. Sibling of docs/solutions/security-issues/a-guard-that-fails-open-is-worse-than-no-guard.md, which this repeats one layer over. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

Dependabot proposes sqlparser 0.63.0 weekly and the PR cannot go green. DataFusion 55.1.0, the latest release, requires `^0.62.0`, and ADR-0006 binds DataFusion for T6, so taking 0.63 now buys a second parser copy or a DataFusion downgrade. The bump also trips the ADR-0009 gate working as designed: 0.63 adds `TableFactor::UnpivotExpr`, and `check_table_factor` is deliberately exhaustive because it decides what is permitted, so a new variant is a build break rather than a silent admission. The fix is one arm. It cannot land here — the variant does not exist in 0.62, so the arm would not compile — which is why the hold and the fix travel together rather than separately. The reason and the arm are recorded in the T4 gate decision beside the sqlparser/DataFusion alignment fact they extend, because whoever bumps this arrives via the compile error and that decision record, not via bot config. Patch updates keep flowing; only semver-minor is ignored. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

The T5 quality gate names four proptest areas. SQL validation, depth, and pushdown lowering had properties; regex bounds and conformance fallback had none, so two of the four gates were asserted rather than exercised. Regex bounds get three: an unsupported construct is named wherever it sits in an otherwise legal pattern, a valid pattern is resident or `CompiledTooBig` and never both, and residency after any lookup sequence matches an LRU model. The size property draws a deliberately narrow repeat range — compilation succeeds only for the first few values under the production limits, so a wide range would look like it covered both arms while almost always exercising one. Each property was checked for the branches it claims: both outcomes fire, all six construct spellings fire, and eviction happens in roughly a fifth of cases. Conformance fallback gets two: the planner pushes exactly the conjuncts whose operation conformance-passed and keeps the rest residual, match-equivalent to the whole predicate over the fixture rows; and a collector disagreeing on one corpus case fails the operation while one that merely cannot represent it does not. No test text states a byte total for the cache — the constants are named instead, per the standing learning that an unmeasurable ceiling is not a bound. Refs R5, R6. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

… writes The gate requires injection vectors rejected *and* audited. The vectors were refused, but no test tied one to its rejection record — the validation tests asserted the refusal and deferred the audit half to a file that did not cover them. A refusal that stopped recording would have passed everything. Nine vectors now run through `load_rule` against one engine: DDL and DML, a stacked statement, a set operation at top level and inside a CTE, and two function calls. Each asserts the specific gate that fired, never the outer variant alone, per the standing learning that a test can sit on the wrong branch when two paths return the same error. Each also binds `payload_hash` to the rendered reason, because `verify_integrity` recomputes the chain from the stored hash and never re-derives it from the record, so chain acceptance alone does not prove the audited id and gate are what the chain protects. Verified by suppressing one rejection write and observing the test fail, then restoring it. Two nested-position cases join the validation tests: a table-valued call inside a derived table and inside a CTE. Both already rejected — `check_table_factor` is reached through the unskipped subquery traversal — but nothing proved it. Refs R7. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

…d clear it Review found three ways to re-arm a rule the latency guard had disabled, which together falsified the claim that only `load_rule` restores one. An operator-disabled rule took the `!was_enabled` early return, so a breach on it skipped both safety steps and left the plan resident. A rule still deferred was absent from the health registry, so `mark_unhealthy` returned false into a discard and the later drain re-planned it as healthy. And `execute_rules`, the path the agent's loop calls every cycle, gated on `enabled` alone, so `set_rule_enabled(id, true)` resumed alerting for a rule the engine had just stopped. Each was found by a different reviewer; a test even called `set_rule_enabled(true)` after a breach and asserted only what had not changed, documenting the bypass instead of catching it. The common cause was reading `enabled` as the authority when the verdict lives in the rule's health. `UnhealthyCause::resists_auto_recovery` now states that policy once, as an exhaustive match with no wildcard, so a future cause that forgets to declare itself is a build break rather than silently recoverable — the posture ADR-0009 already requires of `sqlparser`'s enums and this code had not applied to its own. `revalidate`, `track`, `plan_and_record`, `execute_rules`, and `set_rule_enabled` all consult it, and `load_rule` forgets the rule's health first, which is what makes a reload the one thing that clears the verdict. `mark_unhealthy` now records a resisting cause for an untracked rule instead of refusing; with re-planning no longer laundering the verdict, such an entry is safe. A breach it still cannot record logs at error rather than vanishing. The conformance property compared against a `count > 1` that no generated input can falsify; it now proves what it actually covers and pins the corpus assumption, leaving the zero-case half to the test that constructs it directly. Expiry keeps its own cause and its unchanged recovery. Refs R3, R8; AE3 and AE5 now assert the contract rather than around it. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

The latency-breach disable was bypassable three ways, each found by a different reviewer, and the code now shows only the fixed state. What it cannot show is why `enabled` was the wrong place to put a verdict: that flag already meant "an operator turned this off", so writing a second meaning into it inherited every path that read or wrote it for the first. Records the audit that would have found all three in one pass — list every reader that decides whether work runs, not just the writer you are adding — and the test shape that let the third one through: a test exercising a mutating call while asserting only on the fields that call does not touch. Cross-links the sibling learning from the same ticket rather than restating it. That one is a guard whose failure path disabled its own control; this one is a guard whose scope missed sibling readers. CONCEPTS.md's "Unhealthy rule" entry said "an enabled rule" and treated the three causes alike. Both are now wrong: a latency-breached rule is disabled, and its verdict is the only one catalog re-validation cannot clear. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

Adversarial review found a fourth way past the latency guard, in the one writer the previous round did not audit. `mark_unhealthy` overwrites a tracked rule's health in place with no regard for the cause already there, so a later `mark_unhealthy(.., TaskExpiry)` on a breached rule downgrades the verdict to a recoverable cause and the next re-validation clears it. It is not reachable today, and the reason is worth stating: `renewal_cycle` prunes uncovered rules from the ledger before calling `expire()`, so a breached rule's task is gone before expiry can name it. That is statement order, not policy. Reordering those two lines, or adding a second caller when T6 lands, re-opens it with no compiler or runtime signal — which is the same shape as the three bypasses this branch already closed. A resisting cause now survives a later recoverable mark; a breach still displaces an expiry, because a breach is the stronger verdict. Both directions are pinned, and the guard was removed to watch the test fail before it went in. Two test assertions were measuring nothing. The expiry check ran at the renewal interval, where the TTL cannot have elapsed, so it would have passed whatever the disable did; it now runs past the TTL, where the expiry path is live, and also asserts the breach verdict survived it — which is what pins the statement-order dependency above. The conformance property compared against a corpus count that no generated input can falsify. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

coderabbitai · 2026-09-29T03:19:28Z

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daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_regex_cache.rs

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Summary by CodeRabbit

New Features
- Rules are disabled and marked unhealthy when reported pattern execution exceeds the configured latency threshold. A latency-breached rule must be reloaded before it can be enabled again.
- Reference and task-expiry health issues can clear when a registration revalidates the rule; identical re-registration does not clear them.
Documentation
- Clarified rule health, recovery behavior, and pattern-latency handling.
Tests
- Expanded coverage for detection behavior, SQL validation, pattern caching, and rejection logging.

Walkthrough

The detection engine now applies configured pattern-latency thresholds and records latency breaches as rule-health causes. The changes also add property tests for planner conformance and regex caching, SQL validation and rejection-log tests, and a Dependabot exclusion for semver-minor sqlparser updates.

Changes

Latency breach handling

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Cause-aware rule health `daemoneye-lib/src/detection/rule_health.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/src/detection/task_renewal.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_rule_health.rs`, `CONCEPTS.md`	Rule health records `Reference`, `TaskExpiry`, or `LatencyBreach` causes. Latency breaches resist automatic recovery, while reference and task-expiry health remain eligible for revalidation.
Latency observation and enforcement `daemoneye-lib/src/detection/mod.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/src/detection/pattern_latency.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/src/config.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/src/detection/regex_cache.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_pattern_latency.rs`, `spec/daemon_eye_spec_sql_to_ipc_detection_architecture.md`	The engine carries the configured threshold and handles observations. An over-threshold observation disables the rule, removes its plan, and records its health cause. Planning, execution, and re-enabling respect resistant health; reload clears prior health. Tests cover these behaviors, and documentation describes the enforcement path.

Planner conformance tests

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Planner and verifier properties `daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_conformance.rs`	Property tests check predicate pushdown and residual evaluation against full SQL results. Additional tests check verifier behavior when a conformance case disagrees or is skipped.

Regex cache tests

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Regex cache properties `daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_regex_cache.rs`	Property tests cover rejection of unsupported constructs, size-limit outcomes, and LRU residency and statistics.

SQL validation and rejection-log tests

Layer / File(s)	Summary
SQL rejection and log verification `daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_sql_validation.rs`, `daemoneye-lib/tests/rejection_log.rs`	Tests cover disallowed `readfile` calls in derived tables and CTEs. Rejection-log tests check SQL validation gates, payload hashes, and chain integrity.

sqlparser update policy

Layer / File(s)	Summary
sqlparser update exclusion `.github/dependabot.yml`	Dependabot ignores semver-minor updates for `sqlparser`.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes

Change: Feature

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant DetectionEngine
  participant RuleHealthRegistry
  participant CollectorRegistration
  DetectionEngine->>RuleHealthRegistry: Record LatencyBreach
  DetectionEngine->>DetectionEngine: Disable rule and remove compiled plan
  CollectorRegistration->>DetectionEngine: Register collector
  DetectionEngine->>RuleHealthRegistry: Revalidate rule health
  DetectionEngine->>RuleHealthRegistry: Clear health after valid rule reload

Suggested labels: rust, core-feature, data-models, testing, integration, documentation, dependencies, type:feature, type:bug, breaking_change

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 4796e

The latency breach message now preserves the observed duration’s precision, avoiding a misleading display that appears equal to the exceeded budget. No actionable merge risk remains in the reviewed changes.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5

✅ Passed checks (5 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check	✅ Passed	The title follows the required Conventional Commits format with the valid type `feat`, scope `detection`, and a clear summary of the latency, property-test, and audit changes.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description directly explains the detection changes, recovery policy, added tests, dependency constraint, verification results, and known limits.
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	Docstring coverage is 94.52% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 73 functions across 12 files.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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_{A threshold marks the measured time
A rule is held when limits climb
Its cause is saved; its plan is cleared
A valid reload resets what’s stored
Tests trace each branch from start to end
Cache and planner properties extend
Minor parser updates wait their turn}

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mergify · 2026-09-29T03:19:48Z

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @daemoneye-lib/src/detection/pattern_latency.rs:
- Around line 79-84: Update the breach-reason formatting to preserve
sub-millisecond precision: replace the observed duration’s millisecond
conversion with microseconds and label it accordingly, while keeping the
threshold in milliseconds. Remove the now-unused millisecond binding.

Review comments at @daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_regex_cache.rs:
- Around line 394-397: Update the generated-lookup test’s stats assertions to
compare hits and compiles separately with counts derived from the LRU model. For
each lookup, determine whether its index is already in model before updating
model, increment the corresponding expected counter, then assert stats.hits and
stats.compiles against those expected counts.

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.github/dependabot.yml
CONCEPTS.md
daemoneye-lib/src/config.rs
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/mod.rs
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/pattern_latency.rs
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/regex_cache.rs
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/rule_health.rs
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/task_renewal.rs
daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_conformance.rs
daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_pattern_latency.rs
daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_regex_cache.rs
daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_rule_health.rs
daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_sql_validation.rs
daemoneye-lib/tests/rejection_log.rs
spec/daemon_eye_spec_sql_to_ipc_detection_architecture.md

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codecov · 2026-09-29T03:36:53Z

Codecov Report

❌ Patch coverage is 96.52778% with 5 lines in your changes missing coverage. Please review.

Files with missing lines	Patch %	Lines
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/rule_health.rs	93.61%	3 Missing ⚠️
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/mod.rs	98.27%	1 Missing ⚠️
daemoneye-lib/src/detection/pattern_latency.rs	96.87%	1 Missing ⚠️

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mergify · 2026-09-29T03:41:45Z

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…ying A second review round found the guard correct where it acts and unconstrained where it must not. Nothing asserted that a recoverable cause still runs: a task-expired rule reaches `execute_rules` with `enabled` untouched, so widening one match to any `Unhealthy` would have stopped alerting for every rule whose renewal lapsed — silently, on the transient IPC loss the renewal margin exists to survive. That regression is now red, verified against two spellings of it. The reason string truncated. A 10.4 ms observation against a 10 ms budget read "10 ms observed against a 10 ms budget", and it is the only record an operator ever sees of why a rule stopped. Durations now render themselves, which also retires both saturating conversions. The refusal has its own error variant, so a caller can tell "latched" from "no such rule" without matching on a message, and the tests now name the branch they expect rather than accepting any error. `remove_rule` clears compiled, health, tasks and deferred — this change is what made a stale health row permanent, since a resisting verdict no longer self-heals. The policy check was copy-pasted seven times, which is the same ungreppable audit surface this branch's own learning says caused the original bug. It is one predicate now. `Unhealthy` gained `#[non_exhaustive]` so its next field is not a breaking change, `forget` is `pub(crate)` so the single clearing point is a compiler fact, and `unhealthy()` carries the cause so an operator surface can tell "retry later" from "reload required" without parsing prose. Fourteen comments claimed things the code does not do, including a test doc asserting the pre-fix behaviour in the present tense and a module doc crediting expiry with one step where it takes two. History narration moved to the learning doc, which is its home. That doc cited `file:line`; two citations were stale before this branch merged, broken by its own next commit. It cites symbols now, records the fourth bypass it had omitted, and says plainly that fail-closed bounds the engine and not the wire — a dispatched task runs out its TTL, because nothing revokes it. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

The LRU property asserted only that hits plus compiles equalled the lookup count, which holds just as well if the cache reports every hit as a compile and every compile as a hit. The model already tracks residency, so the expected split costs one check per lookup: residency before the lookup decides whether it could have been a hit. Narrower than it first appears — two deterministic fixtures in the same file already catch a straight swap of the counters. What the sum could not constrain is a miscount that only appears under generated sequences long enough to evict, which those fixtures never reach. Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

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Copilot review overview

🟡 Changes recommended

Runtime latency breaches are incorrectly classified in the audit chain as rule-load rejections.

Review effort: Balanced
Findings: 1 · 1

Open (2)

Record runtime latency breaches with a dedicated reason · New
Clarify predicate semantics for unhealthy task expiry · New

What changed in this PR

Completes T5 detection hardening by wiring latency thresholds into rule health, expanding property coverage, and auditing SQL rejection paths.

Changes:

Adds latency-breach latching and recovery policy.
Adds conformance, regex-bound, injection, and lifecycle tests.
Pins compatible sqlparser updates and updates documentation.

File	Description
`spec/daemon_eye_spec_sql_to_ipc_detection_architecture.md`	Documents latency enforcement boundary.
`docs/solutions/security-issues/a-guard-must-be-audited-against-every-reader-of-the-state-it-writes.md`	Records guard-scope lessons.
`docs/decisions/2026-09-19-t4-datafusion-gate.md`	Documents parser compatibility constraint.
`daemoneye-lib/tests/rejection_log.rs`	Tests injection rejection records.
`daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_sql_validation.rs`	Covers nested injection vectors.
`daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_rule_health.rs`	Tests health-cause precedence.
`daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_regex_cache.rs`	Adds regex-bound properties.
`daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_pattern_latency.rs`	Covers latency-latch lifecycle.
`daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_conformance.rs`	Adds conformance fallback properties.
`daemoneye-lib/src/detection/task_renewal.rs`	Classifies task expiry as recoverable.
`daemoneye-lib/src/detection/rule_health.rs`	Introduces cause-aware health policy.
`daemoneye-lib/src/detection/regex_cache.rs`	Updates latency documentation.
`daemoneye-lib/src/detection/pattern_latency.rs`	Implements breach consequences.
`daemoneye-lib/src/detection/mod.rs`	Integrates latency and cleanup behavior.
`daemoneye-lib/src/config.rs`	Documents threshold propagation.
`CONCEPTS.md`	Clarifies unhealthy-rule recovery.
`.github/dependabot.yml`	Holds incompatible parser updates.

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+        self.rejections
+            .record(RejectionReason::rule_other(rule_id, &reason));



 impl RuleHealth {
-    /// Whether the rule is currently plannable.
+    /// Whether the rule is currently trusted to run.


unclesp1d3r added 7 commits September 28, 2026 21:29

Merge branch 'main' into T5-part2

ef0b4e4

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 29, 2026

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Comment thread daemoneye-lib/src/detection/pattern_latency.rs Outdated

Comment thread daemoneye-lib/tests/detection_regex_cache.rs Outdated

unclesp1d3r self-assigned this Sep 30, 2026

coderabbitai Bot added crypto Cryptographic functionality and hashing priority:normal process-monitoring Process monitoring and enumeration features labels Sep 30, 2026

Copilot AI balanced review requested due to automatic review settings October 1, 2026 01:51

Copilot started reviewing on behalf of unclesp1d3r October 1, 2026 01:52 View session

Copilot AI reviewed Oct 1, 2026

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unclesp1d3r enabled auto-merge (squash) October 1, 2026 01:57

unclesp1d3r merged commit 00c4008 into main Oct 1, 2026
18 checks passed

unclesp1d3r deleted the T5-part2 branch October 1, 2026 02:12

unclesp1d3r mentioned this pull request Oct 1, 2026

chore(deps): bump sqlparser from 0.62.0 to 0.63.0 #264

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feat(detection): close out T5 — latency consequence, property gates, audited injection vectors - #281

feat(detection): close out T5 — latency consequence, property gates, audited injection vectors#281
unclesp1d3r merged 10 commits into
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T5-part2

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		self.rejections
		.record(RejectionReason::rule_other(rule_id, &reason));

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What the audit found

The guard, and the four ways past it

Behaviour changes a reviewer should weigh

Verification

Known limits and follow-ups

Second review round

Review coverage

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Summary by CodeRabbit

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Merge Protections

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unclesp1d3r commented Sep 29, 2026 •

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