Security Audit: Input Validation & Privacy Gaps in v2.1.0

[CheswickDEV]

Security Audit: Input Validation & Privacy Gaps in v2.1.0

Hi @xtditom,

I ran a full security review of YourDynamicDashboard v2.1.0 and wanted to share my findings. Overall the codebase is well-built — consistent use of textContent over innerHTML, minimal permissions, and a solid GPS consent flow. That said, I found a few issues worth addressing.

---

Medium Severity

1. Backup Restore Writes Arbitrary Data to localStorage Without Validation

File: src/modules/settings.js — Lines 1840–1856

The restore() function parses a user-provided JSON file and writes every key-value pair directly into localStorage without any validation:

const data = JSON.parse(event.target.result);
Object.keys(data).forEach((key) =>
  localStorage.setItem(key, data[key]),
);
location.reload();

A crafted backup file can inject arbitrary state — including malicious URLs in userShortcuts, oversized values that exhaust the storage quota, or manipulated settings that alter extension behavior.

Suggested fix:

const ALLOWED_KEYS = new Set([
  'todos', 'userShortcuts', 'searchProvider', 'darkMode', 'clockFormat',
  'clockType', 'tempUnit', 'quotePosition', 'showTodo', 'showApps',
  'showShortcuts', 'showAiTools', 'hiddenTools', 'yd_city', 'yd_lat',
  'yd_lon', 'backgroundImage', 'savedBgUrl', 'randomBgMode', 'keyMap',
  'linkTargets', 'normalThemeId', 'gradientThemeId', 'gradientModeActive',
  'transparencyActive', 'userSavedThemes', 'userName', 'welcomeText',
  'autoTheme', 'glowEffect', 'tempDisplayMode', 'showDate',
  'aiToolsOrder', 'socialToolsOrder', 'googleAppsOrder',
  // ... add any other legitimate keys
]);
restore(e) {

const file = e.target.files[0];

if (!file) return;

const reader = new FileReader();

reader.onload = (event) => {

try {

const data = JSON.parse(event.target.result);

Object.keys(data).forEach((key) => {

if (ALLOWED_KEYS.has(key)) {

localStorage.setItem(key, data[key]);

}

});

location.reload();

} catch (err) {

showCustomModal("Invalid Backup File");

}

};

reader.readAsText(file);

}

Additionally, after restoring, any URL fields (especially in userShortcuts) should be validated against an allowlist of safe schemes (see next finding).

---

2. javascript: URI Scheme Not Blocked in Shortcuts

Files:

• src/modules/keyboard.js — Line 90
• src/modules/shortcuts.js — Line 52
• src/modules/settings.js — Lines 1789–1809

The keyboard shortcut launcher sets window.location.href directly from the stored URL:

// keyboard.js
window.location.href = shortcuts[index].url;

While addShortcut() prepends https:// when no protocol is present, this check is bypassed when URLs are injected via a manipulated backup file (see finding #1) or direct localStorage manipulation. A javascript: URL would execute script in the extension's origin.

Suggested fix — centralized URL sanitizer:

// Add to utils.js
export function sanitizeUrl(url) {
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(url);
    if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) {
      return 'https://example.com'; // fallback
    }
    return url;
  } catch {
    return 'https://example.com';
  }
}

Then use it in:

• addShortcut() and updateShortcut() in settings.js
• launchShortcut() in keyboard.js
• render() in shortcuts.js when setting link.href
• The restore() function for all URL fields in userShortcuts

---

3. CSS Injection via Unsanitized Background URL

File: src/modules/settings.js — Lines 406, 419, 1650, 1869

Background URLs from state are interpolated directly into style.backgroundImage:

document.body.style.backgroundImage = `url(${state.get("savedBgUrl")})`;

A crafted value like x); color: red; background-image: url(y could inject arbitrary CSS properties via a manipulated backup or direct localStorage edit.

Suggested fix:

function applyBackgroundUrl(url) {
  if (!url) return;
  // Allow .test(url);
  const isHttpsUrl = /^https:\/\//.test(url);
  if (isDataUrl || isHttpsUrl) {
    document.body.style.backgroundImage = `url("${CSS.escape ? url : encodeURI(url)}")`;
  }
}

Alternatively, wrapping the URL in quotes inside the template literal already mitigates most injection vectors:

document.body.style.backgroundImage = `url("${url}")`;

---

Low Severity / Informational

4. web_accessible_resources Matches <all_urls> — Enables Extension Fingerprinting

Files: manifest.json (Lines 17–28), firefox-manifest.json (Lines 26–37)

All image assets are accessible to every website via "matches": ["<all_urls>"]. Any site can probe for these resources to detect whether this extension is installed (browser fingerprinting).

Since the extension only runs on the new tab page, these resources don't need to be web-accessible at all. Consider removing the web_accessible_resources block entirely, or restricting matches to the extension's own origin.

5. Incomplete Privacy Policy — Missing Third-Party Disclosures

Files: privacy-policy.html, src/modules/settings.js, src/utils.js, index.html

The extension communicates with several external services not mentioned in the privacy policy:

Service	Data Sent	Disclosed?
Open-Meteo	GPS coordinates	✅ Yes
BigDataCloud	GPS coordinates	✅ Yes
Google Fonts	IP address, User-Agent	❌ No
picsum.photos	IP address, screen resolution (screen.width * devicePixelRatio)	❌ No
Google Favicons	Domains of user shortcuts	❌ No

Findings 1–3 can all be addressed with a single sanitizeUrl() utility function plus a key whitelist in the restore logic. No remote exploit is possible without user interaction (social engineering via a crafted backup file), but hardening these paths would be good defense-in-depth.

Great work on the extension overall — the consistent DOM API usage over innerHTML, minimal permissions, and the GPS consent modal are all really solid security practices. 👍

[xtditom]

@CheswickDEV Thank you so much for this incredible audit. I genuinely appreciate you taking the time to stress-test the v2.1.0 architecture and providing the exact remediation logic.

You are completely right about the restore() function being a massive blind spot for injection. I was so focused on stripping innerHTML that I overlooked the payload potential of a socially engineered JSON backup.

I agree with all 5 of your remediation steps (sanitizing URLs, strict allowed-keys filtering, background URL wrapping, restricting web-accessible resources, and updating the privacy policy).

The reality for me now: I am a student and I am stepping away from active development for the next few months to focus strictly on my upcoming final exams. I am putting this on the absolute top of my to-do list for when I return to the codebase, and I will tag you when the PR is officially merged.

Thanks again for helping me harden this project!

[LeastSaneDeveloper]

AI written security audit?

Ironic.

[CheswickDEV]

@LeastSaneDeveloper Yes, because it's easy to do, and as u can see, it's working. AI powered security audits can help identify vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and supply chain risks at a scale and speed that manual code review alone can't match especially critical given that many projects are maintained by small teams with limited security expertise. So why not use a tool that can filter out roughly 90 to 95% of the obvious security risks without costing a single cent? It's just a win for everybody.

[LeastSaneDeveloper]

@CheswickDEV

[it] filters out 90–95% of obvious security risks.

unsubstantiated.

all LLMs do is pattern-match code tokens against vulnerabilities it was trained on.

from what the AI generated here, all it's doing is heuristic scanning.

[silverwings15]

@CheswickDEV and how do you know any of this isn't just AI hallucination?