From bcdf338ebffbf766e0b3d0d7cf024f46e6c43a34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 19:10:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 001/273] feat(aiac): add inception requirements and ignore generated issues Add PRD and component specifications for the AIAC (AI-as-Code) component. Gitignore aiac/inception/issues/ as it contains regenerated breakdown artefacts, not durable source. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .gitignore | 3 + aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md | 232 ++++++++++++++++++ .../requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md | 210 ++++++++++++++++ .../PRD/components/keycloak-service.md | 69 ++++++ .../requirements/PRD/components/library.md | 174 +++++++++++++ .../PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md | 79 ++++++ .../PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md | 29 +++ .../Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml | 186 ++++++++++++++ .../components/keycloak-service.yaml | 52 ++++ .../Specification/components/library.yaml | 86 +++++++ .../components/rag-ingest-service.yaml | 83 +++++++ .../components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml | 30 +++ .../Specification/specification.yaml | 64 +++++ 13 files changed, 1297 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 1d7ebf8a8..49d20b6b9 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -67,3 +67,6 @@ __pycache__/ .mypy_cache/ test-jwt-rotation.sh kagenti-webhook/bin/ + +# AIAC working artefacts (regenerated; not source of truth) +aiac/inception/issues/ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f4f04ba13 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +# PRD: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) for Keycloak + +## 1. Purpose + +Automate Keycloak RBAC management using a natural-language access control policy enforced by an AI agent. The system has three concerns: + +1. **Configuration accessor** — a REST service and Python library that expose Keycloak user, role, client, and role-mapping data for both read and write operations. +2. **Policy knowledge base** — a ChromaDB RAG store holding the access control policy in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located ingest service. +3. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Keycloak state-change events. It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live Keycloak state, and applies the required role assignments and revocations immediately. + +## 2. Architecture Overview + +Six components across three Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.14. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. + +### Deployment topology + +``` +┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Keycloak Configuration Service Pod │ +│ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ Keycloak Configuration│ :7070 ClusterIP │ +│ │ Service (FastAPI) │ aiac-keycloak-service │ +│ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ + │ +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod | │ +│ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) │ :7071 ClusterIP │ +│ │ LangGraph-based │ │ +│ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ + │ +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ RAG Pod │ │ +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ ChromaDB :7080 │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ +│ │ collections: │ │ (FastAPI) :7072 │ │ +│ │ aiac-policies │ │ │ │ +│ │ aiac-domain-knowledge │ │ │ │ +│ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ +│ ClusterIP: aiac-rag-service (7080 + 7072) │ +└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ + +┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Python library (aiac/src/) │ +│ │ +│ aiac.library.models — Pydantic only │ +│ aiac.library.api — HTTP client → │ +│ Keycloak Configuration Service │ +└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +``` + +### Call flow + +``` +Policy / domain knowledge ingestion (operator-driven): + + Developer ──(kubectl port-forward)──► RAG Ingest Service ──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [policy rules] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [org/business context] + └──► Embedding API (external) + +Role enforcement (event-driven): + + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] + ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] + │ + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] + └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply diff] +``` + +### Component dependencies + +| Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | +|-----------|-----------|-------|---------| +| Keycloak Configuration Service | `aiac.library.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON | +| `aiac.library.models` | `aiac.library.api`, AIAC Agent, other agents | — | Pydantic model definitions | +| `aiac.library.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts, LangGraph agents | Keycloak Configuration Service (HTTP) | Pydantic model instances | +| ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | +| RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API | — | +| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers, orchestrators | `aiac.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API | Applied/revoked role diff | + +### Key architectural decisions + +- **Keycloak Configuration Service binds to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as a Kubernetes ClusterIP Service (`aiac-keycloak-service`) so that the Agent Pod can reach it over the cluster network. Also accessible via `kubectl port-forward`. +- **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as a Kubernetes ClusterIP Service (`aiac-rag-service`) on ports 7080 (ChromaDB) and 7072 (RAG Ingest Service). Developer ingestion is done via `kubectl port-forward`. +- **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. +- **`aiac.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. +- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.library.__init__`, and `aiac.service.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.library.models import User`, `from aiac.library.api import get_users`. +- **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** The legal collection set is governed by `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` on the RAG Ingest Service (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. + +--- + +## 3. Component: Keycloak Configuration Service + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies the Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes 8 endpoints (6 reads + assign + revoke). Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. + +**Full spec:** [components/keycloak-service.md](components/keycloak-service.md) + +--- + +## 4. Component: Library + +Python package at `aiac/src/`. Two submodules: + +- **`aiac.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all Keycloak entities (`User`, `RealmRole`, `Client`, `ClientRole`, `ClientScope`, `RoleMappings`). +- **`aiac.library.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the Keycloak Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. + +**Full spec:** [components/library.md](components/library.md) + +--- + +## 5. Component: AIAC Agent + +LangGraph `StateGraph` (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Six `/apply/*` endpoints trigger a conditional workflow: three-way parallel fan-out (policy fetch from `aiac-policies` + domain knowledge fetch from `aiac-domain-knowledge` + Keycloak state fetch) → LLM propose diff → LLM validate diff → apply or abort. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. + +**Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) + +--- + +## 6. Component: RAG Knowledge Base + +ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. + +**Full spec:** [components/rag-knowledge-base.md](components/rag-knowledge-base.md) + +--- + +## 7. Component: RAG Ingest Service + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. + +**Full spec:** [components/rag-ingest-service.md](components/rag-ingest-service.md) + +--- + +## 8. Deployment + +### Kubernetes manifests + +Three separate manifest files: + +| File | Contents | +|------|----------| +| `aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-keycloak-config` ConfigMap + Keycloak Configuration Service Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/rag-deployment.yaml` | RAG Pod Deployment (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | + +The Keycloak Configuration Service Pod mounts `aiac-keycloak-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. + +### Docker images + +Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. + +```bash +# Build Keycloak Configuration Service +docker build -t ac-configuration-service:latest aiac/service/ + +# Build Agent +docker build -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/agent/ + +# Build RAG Ingest Service +docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ +``` + +### `aiac-keycloak-config` ConfigMap template + +```yaml +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-keycloak-config +data: + KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" +``` + +Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before applying. + +--- + +## 9. Testing + +Tests live in `tests/` alongside the existing client-registration and keycloak_sync tests. + +### Unit tests + +| Target | What to mock | What to assert | +|--------|-------------|----------------| +| Keycloak Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 204 on write success, 502 on Keycloak error | +| `aiac.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | +| `aiac.library.api` functions | Keycloak Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| AIAC Agent | TBD | TBD | + +### Integration tests + +Require a live Keycloak instance. Controlled by env vars: + +| Variable | Description | +|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Keycloak base URL | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Realm to query | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Admin username | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Admin password | + +Integration tests call the live Keycloak Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. + +Use a pytest marker (e.g. `@pytest.mark.integration`) so unit tests and integration tests can be run independently: + +```bash +pytest tests/ -m "not integration" # unit only +pytest tests/ -m integration # integration only +``` + +--- + +## 10. Conventions and constraints + +- Python version: 3.14 +- Base Docker image: `python:3.14-slim` +- Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) +- Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` +- No auth on Keycloak Configuration Service or RAG Ingest Service — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism +- Keycloak Configuration Service, Agent, and RAG Ingest Service are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- The `aiac` directory is a namespace package — do not create `aiac/__init__.py` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc3c3e29e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +# Component PRD: AIAC Agent + +## Description +A LangGraph-based AI agent that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live Keycloak state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or a full rebuild request. On each invocation the Agent: + +1. In parallel: retrieves policy chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-policies`), retrieves domain context chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-domain-knowledge`), and reads the relevant Keycloak state via `aiac.library.api`. +2. Interprets the policy and domain context against the current state using an LLM, producing a typed `ProposedDiff`. +3. Validates the diff (existence check, safety guard rails, LLM re-confirmation, scope check). +4. On validation pass: applies changes immediately via `assign_client_roles` and `revoke_client_roles`. On failure: returns a structured error with no changes applied. + +## Graph design + +Structured conditional workflow (`StateGraph`) — not ReAct. LLM is confined to `propose_diff` and `validate_diff` nodes only. A single compiled graph instance is shared by all six endpoints; trigger type and entity ID are passed as initial state. + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → [apply_diff | abort] → format_response → END +``` + +### State schema (`AgentState`) + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `trigger` | `TriggerContext` | Endpoint type + entity ID | +| `realm` | `str` | Keycloak realm (from `KEYCLOAK_REALM`) | +| `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection | +| `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Org/business context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; `[]` when the collection is empty — non-fatal | +| `keycloak_snapshot` | `KeycloakSnapshot` | Scoped Keycloak data for this trigger | +| `proposed_diff` | `ProposedDiff \| None` | LLM output | +| `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from `validate_diff` | +| `applied` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed assignments | +| `revoked` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed revocations | +| `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation (from LLM `reasoning` field) | + +### State types (`state.py`) + +`KeycloakSnapshot` is a Pydantic `BaseModel` that reuses model classes from `aiac.library.models`. All fields are optional with empty defaults — each trigger type populates only the relevant subset: + +```python +class KeycloakSnapshot(BaseModel): + users: list[User] = [] + realm_roles: list[RealmRole] = [] + clients: list[Client] = [] + client_roles: dict[str, list[ClientRole]] = {} # client_id → roles + client_scopes: list[ClientScope] = [] + user_role_mappings: dict[str, RoleMappings] = {} # user_id → mappings +``` + +### LLM output schema (`ProposedDiff`) + +```python +class RoleAssignment(BaseModel): + user_id: str + client_id: str + role_id: str + role_name: str + +class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): + assign: list[RoleAssignment] + revoke: list[RoleAssignment] + reasoning: str +``` + +LLM is called via `llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff)` using `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`). Target endpoint must support tool calling. + +**Planner prompt** (`propose_diff` node): +- System message (stable, cacheable): role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing + output instructions ("enforce {AC_MODEL} policy, compute minimal role diff, be conservative"). +- User message (per-request): trigger description + policy chunks (from `aiac-policies`) + domain knowledge section (from `aiac-domain-knowledge`; omitted or rendered as empty section when `domain_knowledge_chunks` is `[]`) + scoped Keycloak snapshot summary (structured text, not raw JSON). + +**Auditor prompt** (`validate_diff` re-confirmation): +- System message: auditor role ("verify this diff correctly implements the policy"). +- User message: proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks (auditor receives the same context as the planner to enable full re-confirmation). + +### `fetch_policy` and `fetch_domain_knowledge` — RAG query strings per trigger type + +Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings. The query is derived from the **trigger TYPE only** (not the entity ID). + +| Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | +|---------|--------------------------| +| `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | +| `user/{id}` | `"user role assignment rules"` | +| `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | +| `client/{id}` | `"client access control rules"` | +| `client/{id}/role/{id}` | `"client role assignment rules"` | +| `client-scope/{id}` | `"client scope access control rules"` | + +- `fetch_policy` queries `aiac-policies` and stores results in `AgentState.policy_chunks`. +- `fetch_domain_knowledge` queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` and stores results in `AgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when the collection is empty — non-fatal, the agent continues with empty domain context. +- Both nodes share `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` (tenacity retry policy) and return HTTP 503 when ChromaDB is unavailable. + +Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`), shared across both nodes. + +### `fetch_keycloak_state` — Keycloak data scope per trigger type + +| Trigger | Fetches via `aiac.library.api` | +|---------|----------------------------------------| +| `rebuild` | All users; all clients + their roles; all realm roles; all role mappings for all users | +| `user/{id}` | That user's current role mappings; all clients + their roles | +| `realm-role/{id}` | All users; all realm roles | +| `client/{id}` | All users; that client's roles; all role mappings for all users | +| `client/{id}/role/{id}` | All users; that client's roles; all role mappings for all users | +| `client-scope/{id}` | All client scopes; all clients; all users | + +### `validate_diff` — validation checks (binary abort on any failure) + +1. **Existence check** — every `user_id`, `client_id`, `role_id` in the diff exists in `keycloak_snapshot`. +2. **Safety guard rails** — total changes (`assign` + `revoke`) ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. +3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call (same `ChatOpenAI` instance, auditor system prompt) with diff + policy chunks; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved: bool, reason: str)` via `with_structured_output`. +4. **Scope validation** — diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Description | +|--------|------|-------------| +| POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Full rebuild — recompute all mappings from current Keycloak state and policy RAG, apply immediately | +| POST | `/apply/user/{user_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a user addition or removal | +| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a realm role addition or removal | +| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a client addition or removal | +| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}/role/{role_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a client role addition or removal | +| POST | `/apply/client-scope/{scope_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a client scope addition or removal | + +Success response: + +```json +{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "..." } +``` + +Abort response (validation failure): + +```json +{ "applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...] } +``` + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|----------|---------|--------| +| `AC_SERVICE_URL` | `http://aiac-keycloak-service:7070` | ConfigMap | +| `CHROMA_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7080` | ConfigMap | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-keycloak-config`) | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `LLM_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `LLM_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | +| `AIAC_AC_MODEL` | `RBAC` | ConfigMap (accepted: `RBAC`, `ABAC`, `REBAC`) | +| `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` | `10` | ConfigMap | +| `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN` | `50` | ConfigMap | +| `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | `3` | ConfigMap | + +ChromaDB collections queried: `aiac-policies` (policy fetch) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (domain knowledge fetch). + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` +- State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required +- Base image: `python:3.14-slim` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/agent/ +├── __init__.py ← empty +├── service/ +│ ├── __init__.py ← empty +│ ├── main.py ← FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint +│ ├── routes.py ← all six /apply/* route handlers +│ ├── Dockerfile ← Docker image (build context: aiac/src/) +│ └── requirements.txt ← Python dependencies +└── agent/ + ├── __init__.py ← empty + ├── state.py ← AgentState, TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, + │ ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict + ├── prompts.py ← planner system prompt template, + │ auditor system prompt template + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge, fetch_keycloak_state, + │ propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response + └── graph.py ← StateGraph definition, edge wiring, compiled graph instance (singleton); + per-trigger helpers: run_rebuild, run_user, run_realm_role, + run_client, run_client_role, run_client_scope +``` + +Docker build command (run from repo root): + +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-agent:latest \ + aiac/src/ +``` + +## Error handling + +All upstream calls (`fetch_policy`, `fetch_keycloak_state`, `propose_diff`, `validate_diff`) are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. + +| Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | +|----------|------------------------------| +| ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | +| Keycloak Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +langgraph +langchain-openai +chromadb +tenacity +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +requests +python-dotenv +``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b1fdaf3e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# Component PRD: Keycloak Configuration Service + +## Location +`aiac/service/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns raw Keycloak JSON unchanged for read operations; forwards write operations directly. Stateless — no caching. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | +|--------|------|------------------------|-------------| +| GET | `/users` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All users in realm | +| GET | `/realm-roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | +| GET | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and client role mappings for a user | +| GET | `/clients` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All clients | +| GET | `/client-scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All client scopes | +| GET | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles` | Roles defined for a specific client | +| POST | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | Assign client roles to a user | +| DELETE | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | Revoke client roles from a user | + +Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. + +The GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `clientMappings` fields. The POST and DELETE endpoints accept a JSON array of role representation objects in the request body and return `204 No Content` on success. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. + +## Configuration + +Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Yes | Realm name, e.g. `kagenti` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7070` +- Base image: `python:3.14-slim` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +``` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/ +├── Dockerfile +├── requirements.txt +└── main.py +``` + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. +- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. When `realm` is `None` it returns the startup singleton; when `realm` is set it returns a new `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm. +- Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)` — no per-route changes needed for realm routing. +- Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. +- POST `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}`: assign the provided roles and return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- DELETE `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}`: revoke the provided roles and return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a1697a56 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +# Component PRD: Library + +## Location +`aiac/src/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/ +└── aiac/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── library/ + │ ├── __init__.py # empty + │ ├── models.py # Pydantic model definitions only + │ └── api.py # HTTP client functions + └── service/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── main.py # FastAPI app + ├── Dockerfile + └── requirements.txt +aiac/test/ +└── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.keycloak.library.models +aiac/pyproject.toml # pytest config: testpaths=["test"], pythonpath=["src"] +``` + +`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.keycloak`, `aiac.keycloak.library`, and `aiac.keycloak.service` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.keycloak.library.models` + +### Description +Data structures and schema library. Contains only Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing Keycloak entities. No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. + +### Dependencies +``` +pydantic +``` + +### Pydantic models + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown Keycloak fields, ensuring stability across Keycloak version upgrades. + +#### `User` + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | +| `username` | `str` | `username` | +| `email` | `str \| None` | `email` | +| `firstName` | `str \| None` | `firstName` | +| `lastName` | `str \| None` | `lastName` | +| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | + +#### `RealmRole` + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | +| `name` | `str` | `name` | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | +| `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | +| `clientRole` | `bool` | `clientRole` | + +#### `RoleMappings` + +Represents the Keycloak Admin REST API response from `GET /users/{id}/role-mappings`. + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | +|-------|------|----------------|---------| +| `realmMappings` | `list[RealmRole]` | `realmMappings` | `[]` | +| `clientMappings` | `dict[str, Any]` | `clientMappings` | `{}` | + +`realmMappings` is a typed list of `RealmRole` instances. `clientMappings` is kept as a raw dict (structure varies by Keycloak version). `RoleMappings` is defined after `RealmRole` in the module. + +#### `Client` + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | +| `clientId` | `str` | `clientId` | +| `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | +| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | +| `protocol` | `str \| None` | `protocol` | +| `publicClient` | `bool` | `publicClient` | + +#### `ClientScope` + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | +| `name` | `str` | `name` | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | +| `protocol` | `str \| None` | `protocol` | + +#### `ClientRole` + +Represents a Keycloak client role. Used as both the return type of `get_client_roles` and the payload element for assign/revoke operations. + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | +| `name` | `str` | `name` | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | +| `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | +| `clientRole` | `bool` | `clientRole` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.keycloak.library.models import User + +raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list +users = [User.model_validate(u) for u in raw] +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.keycloak.library.api` + +### Description +HTTP client library that wraps the Keycloak Configuration Service REST API and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.keycloak.library.models`. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +All eight functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter, forwarded to the Service as `?realm=`. + +```python +def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: ... +def get_realm_roles(realm: str) -> list[RealmRole]: ... +def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, realm: str) -> RoleMappings: ... +def get_clients(realm: str) -> list[Client]: ... +def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: ... +def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: ... +def assign_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: ... +def revoke_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: ... +``` + +Each read function: +1. Issues `GET {AC_SERVICE_URL}/` (with path parameters substituted as needed), always appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Parses the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). + +`assign_client_roles` and `revoke_client_roles`: +1. Issue `POST` / `DELETE {AC_SERVICE_URL}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` with the serialised role list as JSON body, always appending `?realm=`. +2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Return `None` on success. + +### Configuration + +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AC_SERVICE_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.keycloak.library.api import get_users, get_realm_roles + +users = get_users(realm="kagenti") +for u in users: + print(u.username, u.email) +``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bee256334 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +# Component PRD: RAG Ingest Service + +## Description +A FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Accepts knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunks and embeds them, and writes the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance in the same Pod. Supports both access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. Developer-driven ingestion is performed via `kubectl port-forward`. + +## Endpoints + +The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Unknown slug → 404. + +### Replace — wipe and reload the named collection + +| Method | Path | Body | Description | +|--------|------|------|-------------| +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/text` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "text": "..."}]}` | Replace entire named collection from a JSON body of text documents | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/file` | multipart upload (one or more files) | Replace entire named collection from uploaded files; `doc_id` = filename without extension | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/url` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "url": "..."}]}` | Replace entire named collection from a JSON body of URLs; service fetches each URL | + +**Replace semantics:** drops the ChromaDB collection and recreates it, then ingests all provided documents. Atomic at the collection level — partial failures roll back to an empty collection. An empty `docs` list wipes the collection. + +### Update — document-level upsert (additive, never deletes) + +| Method | Path | Body | Description | +|--------|------|------|-------------| +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/update/text` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "text": "..."}]}` | Upsert documents by `doc_id`; absent `doc_id`s in the collection are left untouched | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/update/file` | multipart upload (one or more files) | Upsert documents from uploaded files; `doc_id` = filename without extension | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/update/url` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "url": "..."}]}` | Upsert documents from URLs; only named `doc_id`s are affected | + +**Update semantics:** for each incoming `doc_id`, deletes existing chunks for that `doc_id` then inserts new chunks. All other `doc_id`s in the collection are untouched. An empty `docs` list is a no-op. + +### Delete — explicit removal + +| Method | Path | Description | +|--------|------|-------------| +| DELETE | `/ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}` | Remove all chunks belonging to `doc_id` from the named collection. `doc_id` not found → 404 | + +**Delete** is the only path that removes content from a collection. `/update/*` endpoints never delete as a side effect. + +## Collection slug → ChromaDB name mapping + +| Slug | ChromaDB Collection Name | +|------|--------------------------| +| `policy` | `aiac-policies` | +| `domain-knowledge` | `aiac-domain-knowledge` | + +## Ingest conventions + +- Chunking and embedding are applied uniformly across all operations and both collections. +- `doc_id` is stored in ChromaDB chunk metadata on every write to enable document-level update and deletion. +- `/text` and `/url` endpoints take a JSON body `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "text/url": "..."}]}`. +- `/file` endpoints use multipart upload; `doc_id` is derived from the filename (extension stripped). Filename collisions within one call → 400. + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|----------|---------|--------| +| `CHROMA_URL` | `http://localhost:7080` | ConfigMap | +| `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` | `policy,domain-knowledge` | ConfigMap | +| `EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `EMBEDDING_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `EMBEDDING_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | + +Adding a third collection is a configuration-only change: add a new slug to `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` and a corresponding entry in the slug→name map. No code modification required. + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` +- Base image: `python:3.14-slim` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +chromadb +httpx +``` + +(Embedding model client TBD — depends on chosen embedding provider) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..127fe29fd --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Component PRD: RAG Knowledge Base + +## Description +A ChromaDB vector store that holds two named collections in a single instance: AIAC access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`). Deployed in a dedicated Kubernetes Pod alongside the RAG Ingest Service. The AIAC Agent retrieves relevant chunks from both collections at runtime via similarity search. + +## Technology +ChromaDB + +## Collections + +| Slug (wire) | ChromaDB Collection Name | Content | Written by | Read by | +|-------------|--------------------------|---------|------------|---------| +| `policy` | `aiac-policies` | Access control policy rules in natural language | RAG Ingest Service | Agent `fetch_policy` node | +| `domain-knowledge` | `aiac-domain-knowledge` | Org/business context — team rosters, application ownership, department mappings, who-does-what | RAG Ingest Service | Agent `fetch_domain_knowledge` node | + +The legal collection set is an open extension point governed by `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` on the RAG Ingest Service. Adding a new collection is a configuration-only change (new slug + ChromaDB name in the slug→name map) with no code modification required. + +## Deployment +Kubernetes Deployment in the RAG Pod, co-located with the RAG Ingest Service container. Exposed via the `aiac-rag-service` ClusterIP Service on port 7080. + +## Access patterns + +| Consumer | Operation | Collection | +|----------|-----------|------------| +| RAG Ingest Service | Write (replace / upsert / delete) | Either collection, selected by `{collection}` slug in the request URL | +| AIAC Agent `fetch_policy` | Read (similarity search, top-N chunks) | `aiac-policies` | +| AIAC Agent `fetch_domain_knowledge` | Read (similarity search, top-N chunks) | `aiac-domain-knowledge` | + +Each chunk written to ChromaDB stores `doc_id` in its metadata to enable document-level upsert and targeted deletion. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0dee020bb --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +- Title: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) Agent +- Description: > + LangGraph-based agent that configures Keycloak access rules from a policy written in + human language. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or a full rebuild + request. Retrieves the standing policy from the RAG knowledge base, reads current + Keycloak state via aiac.library.api, interprets the policy against the changed + state, computes the required RBAC diff, validates it, and applies role assignments and + revocations immediately. +- Graph: + - Type: Structured conditional workflow (LangGraph StateGraph) — not ReAct. + LLM is confined to propose_diff and validate_diff nodes only. + - Single compiled graph: one graph.compile() instance (module-level singleton exported from graph.py) + shared by all six FastAPI endpoints. Trigger type and entity ID are passed as initial state; + nodes branch internally on trigger type. + - State schema (AgentState TypedDict): + - trigger: TriggerContext — endpoint type (rebuild | user | realm-role | client | client-role | client-scope) + entity ID + - realm: str — Keycloak realm, from KEYCLOAK_REALM env var + - policy_chunks: list[str] — policy text chunks retrieved from aiac-policies ChromaDB collection + - domain_knowledge_chunks: list[str] — org/business context chunks retrieved from + aiac-domain-knowledge ChromaDB collection. Empty list when the collection has no + content — non-fatal, agent continues with empty domain context. + - keycloak_snapshot: KeycloakSnapshot — scoped Keycloak data fetched for this trigger + - proposed_diff: ProposedDiff | None — LLM output from propose_diff node + - validation_errors: list[str] — errors from validate_diff node + - applied: list[RoleAssignment] — role assignments executed + - revoked: list[RoleAssignment] — role revocations executed + - summary: str — human-readable explanation (from LLM reasoning field) + - Nodes: + - fetch_policy: queries ChromaDB aiac-policies collection using a trigger-scoped + similarity search query derived from trigger type (not entity ID). + Query strings by trigger type: + rebuild → "all access control rules" + user → "user role assignment rules" + realm-role → "realm role assignment rules" + client → "client access control rules" + client-role → "client role assignment rules" + client-scope → "client scope access control rules" + Number of results capped by CHROMA_N_RESULTS (default 10). + Stores results in AgentState.policy_chunks. + - fetch_domain_knowledge: queries ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge collection using the + same trigger-type-keyed query strings as fetch_policy (trigger TYPE only, not entity ID). + Number of results capped by CHROMA_N_RESULTS (same env var as fetch_policy). + Returns [] when the collection is empty — non-fatal. + Stores results in AgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks. + Shares UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES tenacity policy and 503-on-ChromaDB-down contract + with fetch_policy. + - fetch_keycloak_state: reads Keycloak state via aiac.library.api; + scope is determined by trigger type: + rebuild → all users, all clients + their roles, all realm roles, + all role mappings for all users + user/{id} → that user's current role mappings, + all clients + their roles + realm-role/{id} → all users, all realm roles + client/{id} → all users, that client's roles, + all role mappings for all users + client/{id}/role → all users, that client's roles, + all role mappings for all users + client-scope/{id}→ all client scopes, all clients, all users + - propose_diff: LLM node — builds scoped text summary (policy chunks + + Keycloak snapshot + trigger context) and calls LLM via with_structured_output(ProposedDiff) + - validate_diff: validates proposed diff with four checks (see Validation below) + - apply_diff: calls assign_client_roles / revoke_client_roles from aiac.library.api + - format_response: builds final response dict + - Edges: + - START → fetch_policy (parallel branch) + - START → fetch_domain_knowledge (parallel branch) + - START → fetch_keycloak_state (parallel branch) + - fetch_policy → propose_diff + - fetch_domain_knowledge → propose_diff + - fetch_keycloak_state → propose_diff + - propose_diff → validate_diff + - validate_diff → apply_diff (validation passed) + - validate_diff → format_response (validation failed — binary abort, no changes applied) + - apply_diff → format_response + - format_response → END +- Validation node: + - Existence check: every user_id, client_id, role_id in proposed diff exists in keycloak_snapshot + - Safety guard rails: abort if total changes (assign + revoke) exceed MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN + - LLM re-confirmation: second LLM call (same ChatOpenAI instance, auditor system prompt) + with proposed diff + policy chunks; output via with_structured_output(ValidationVerdict) + where ValidationVerdict has approved (bool) and reason (str) + - Scope validation: diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger (no over-reach on partial updates) + - Failure outcome: binary abort — zero changes applied; returns structured error response +- LLM: + - SDK: langchain-openai (ChatOpenAI) + - Endpoint configured via LLM_BASE_URL — any OpenAI-compatible endpoint (vLLM, Ollama, Azure, etc.) + - Target model must support tool calling (required for with_structured_output) + - Output: structured via with_structured_output(ProposedDiff) + - ProposedDiff schema: + - assign: list[RoleAssignment] + - revoke: list[RoleAssignment] + - reasoning: str (propagated as summary in the HTTP response) + - RoleAssignment schema: + - user_id: str + - client_id: str + - role_id: str + - role_name: str + - Prompt structure (prompts.py): + - System message (stable, cacheable): role definition + AIAC_AC_MODEL framing + + output instructions ("enforce {AC_MODEL} policy, compute minimal role diff") + - User message (per-request): trigger description + + policy chunks (from aiac-policies via fetch_policy) + + domain knowledge chunks (from aiac-domain-knowledge via fetch_domain_knowledge; + omitted or rendered as empty section when domain_knowledge_chunks is []) + + scoped Keycloak snapshot summary (structured text, not raw JSON) + - Auditor prompt (validate_diff re-confirmation): + - System message: auditor role ("verify this diff correctly implements the policy") + - User message: proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks + (auditor receives the same context as the planner to enable full re-confirmation) +- Configuration: + - AC_SERVICE_URL: Base URL of the Keycloak Configuration Service. + Default: http://aiac-keycloak-service:7070 + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - CHROMA_URL: Base URL of the ChromaDB instance in the RAG Pod. + Default: http://aiac-rag-service:7080 + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - KEYCLOAK_REALM: Keycloak realm targeted by all agent operations. + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (aiac-keycloak-config ConfigMap). + - LLM_BASE_URL: Base URL of the externally deployed LLM API endpoint. + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - LLM_MODEL: Model name to use for policy interpretation and diff validation. + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - LLM_API_KEY: LLM API access token. + Source: Kubernetes Secret mounted as environment variable. + - AIAC_AC_MODEL: Access control model type used to frame the LLM system prompt. + Affects system prompt framing only — not data fetching or output schema. + Default: RBAC + Accepted values: RBAC, ABAC, REBAC (uppercase) + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - CHROMA_N_RESULTS: Maximum number of policy chunks retrieved per ChromaDB query. + Default: 10 + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN: Maximum total role changes (assign + revoke) allowed per invocation. + Default: 50 + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). + - UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES: Number of retry attempts (with exponential backoff) before + failing on upstream errors (ChromaDB, Keycloak Configuration Service, LLM API). + Default: 3 + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). +- Invocation: HTTP endpoint +- Endpoints: + - POST /apply/rebuild: full rebuild — recompute all mappings from current Keycloak + state and Policy RAG, apply immediately + - POST /apply/user/{user_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a user addition or removal + - POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a realm role addition or removal + - POST /apply/client/{client_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a client addition or removal + - POST /apply/client/{client_id}/role/{role_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a client role addition or removal + - POST /apply/client-scope/{scope_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a client scope addition or removal + - Success response: {"applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "..."} + where applied/revoked are arrays of RoleAssignment objects and summary is the LLM reasoning + - Abort response: {"applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...]} +- State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Port: 7071 +- Error handling: + - All upstream calls are retried up to UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES times with exponential backoff + using the tenacity library before the error is propagated. + - ChromaDB unavailable → HTTP 503 Service Unavailable + - Keycloak Configuration Service error → HTTP 502 Bad Gateway + - LLM API failure → HTTP 504 Gateway Timeout +- Dependencies: langgraph, langchain-openai, chromadb, tenacity, fastapi, uvicorn[standard], requests, python-dotenv +- File structure: + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/main.py: FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/routes.py: all six /apply/* route handlers + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile: Docker image definition + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/requirements.txt: Python dependencies + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/state.py: AgentState, TriggerContext, + KeycloakSnapshot (Pydantic BaseModel reusing User, RealmRole, Client, ClientRole, + ClientScope, RoleMappings from aiac.library.models), + ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/prompts.py: planner system prompt template, + auditor system prompt template + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/nodes.py: fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge, + fetch_keycloak_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response node functions + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/graph.py: StateGraph definition, edge wiring, + compiled graph instance (module-level singleton), + per-trigger helper functions exported as public API: + run_rebuild(realm), run_user(user_id, realm), + run_realm_role(role_id, realm), run_client(client_id, realm), + run_client_role(client_id, role_id, realm), run_client_scope(scope_id, realm) +- Location: aiac/src/aiac/agent/ +- Docker build context: aiac/src/ +- Deployment: Kubernetes Pod diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4b0f6edf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +- Title: Keycloak Configuration Service +- Description: Web service providing read and write access to Keycloak configuration data via the Keycloak Admin REST API. +- Common query parameter: + - realm (str, optional): when supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm + instead of the service default (KEYCLOAK_REALM). Omit to use the service default. + When provided, a new KeycloakAdmin bound to that realm is instantiated per request. +- Methods: + - Get users: + - Description: Retrieves current users from Keycloak server. + - Endpoint: /users + - Get realm roles: + - Description: Retrieves current realm roles from Keycloak server. + - Endpoint: /realm-roles + - Get user role mappings: + - Description: Retrieves realm and client role mappings for a specific user from Keycloak server. + - Endpoint: /users/{user_id}/role-mappings + - Path parameter: user_id (Keycloak user UUID) + - Keycloak Admin API: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings + - Returns: raw JSON object with realmMappings and clientMappings fields + - Get clients: + - Description: Retrieves current clients from Keycloak server. + - Endpoint: /clients + - Get client scopes: + - Description: Retrieves current client scopes from Keycloak server. + - Endpoint: /client-scopes + - Get client roles: + - Description: Retrieves roles defined for a specific client. + - Endpoint: /clients/{client_id}/roles + - Path parameter: client_id (Keycloak client UUID) + - Keycloak Admin API: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles + - Returns: raw JSON array of role objects + - Assign client roles to user: + - Description: Assigns one or more client roles to a user. + - Endpoint: /users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} + - Path parameters: user_id (Keycloak user UUID), client_id (Keycloak client UUID) + - Keycloak Admin API: POST /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} + - Body: JSON array of role representation objects + - Returns: 204 No Content on success + - Revoke client roles from user: + - Description: Revokes one or more client roles from a user. + - Endpoint: /users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} + - Path parameters: user_id (Keycloak user UUID), client_id (Keycloak client UUID) + - Keycloak Admin API: DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} + - Body: JSON array of role representation objects + - Returns: 204 No Content on success +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Bind: 0.0.0.0 (exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Service for inter-Pod access; also reachable via kubectl port-forward) +- Implementation: Python +- Port: 7070 +- Location: aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/ +- Image: Built independently via its own Dockerfile in aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/. +- Deployment: Docker container in the Keycloak Service Pod, exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Service. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fd62805bd --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +- Models: + - Title: Keycloak configuration accessor Models + - Description: > + Data structures and schema library containing Pydantic BaseModel subclasses + representing Keycloak entities. Importable standalone — no HTTP client dependency. + Used by the API library, AI agents, and LangGraph agents to parse and validate + raw Keycloak JSON. + - Module: aiac.keycloak.library.models + - Schemas: + - User: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak user. + - RealmRole: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak realm role. + - RoleMappings: > + Pydantic BaseModel representing the Keycloak Admin REST API response from + GET /users/{id}/role-mappings. Fields: realmMappings (list[RealmRole], default []), + clientMappings (dict[str, Any], default {}). Defined after RealmRole. + - Client: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak client. + - ClientScope: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak client scope. + - ClientRole: > + Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak client role. + Fields: id (str), name (str), description (str | None), composite (bool), clientRole (bool). + Used as the payload element for assign/revoke client role operations. + - Model config: extra='ignore' on all models to stay stable across Keycloak version changes. + - Dependencies: pydantic + - Implementation: Python + - Location: aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/ + - Deployment: Python module distributed as part of the repository. + +- API: + - Title: Keycloak configuration accessor API + - Description: > + Python API library wrapping the Keycloak Configuration Service. + Exposes its REST endpoints as typed Python functions returning Pydantic model + instances from aiac.library.models. Intended for Python scripts and LangGraph agents. + - Module: aiac.keycloak.library.api + - Common parameter: + - realm (str, mandatory): passed to the Service as ?realm= so the request + targets the named Keycloak realm. All eight functions require this parameter. + - Functions: + - Get users: + - Description: Retrieves current users from Keycloak server. + - Function: get_users + - Parameters: realm (str) + - Returns: list[User] + - Get realm roles: + - Description: Retrieves current realm roles from Keycloak server. + - Function: get_realm_roles + - Parameters: realm (str) + - Returns: list[RealmRole] + - Get user role mappings: + - Description: Retrieves realm and client role mappings for a specific user from Keycloak server. + - Function: get_user_role_mappings + - Parameters: user_id (str) — Keycloak user UUID; realm (str) + - Returns: RoleMappings + - Get clients: + - Description: Retrieves current clients from Keycloak server. + - Function: get_clients + - Parameters: realm (str) + - Returns: list[Client] + - Get client scopes: + - Description: Retrieves current client scopes from Keycloak server. + - Function: get_client_scopes + - Parameters: realm (str) + - Returns: list[ClientScope] + - Get client roles: + - Description: Retrieves roles defined for a specific client. + - Function: get_client_roles + - Parameters: client_id (str) — Keycloak client UUID; realm (str) + - Returns: list[ClientRole] + - Assign client roles to user: + - Description: Assigns one or more client roles to a user. + - Function: assign_client_roles + - Parameters: user_id (str), client_id (str), roles (list[ClientRole]), realm (str) + - Returns: None + - Revoke client roles from user: + - Description: Revokes one or more client roles from a user. + - Function: revoke_client_roles + - Parameters: user_id (str), client_id (str), roles (list[ClientRole]), realm (str) + - Returns: None + - Configuration: + - AC_SERVICE_URL: Base URL of the Keycloak Configuration Service. + Default: http://127.0.0.1:7070 + Source: .env file consumed via python-dotenv, with fallback to default. + - Dependencies: requests, pydantic, python-dotenv, aiac.library.models + - Implementation: Python + - Location: aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/ + - Deployment: Python module distributed as part of the repository. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..06f07dfe1 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +- Title: AIAC RAG Ingest Service +- Description: > + FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Exposes ingest endpoints + that accept knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunk and embed them, and + write the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance running in the same Pod. Supports + both access control policies (aiac-policies collection) and org/business domain context + (aiac-domain-knowledge collection) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. + Accessible from outside Kubernetes via kubectl port-forward for developer-driven ingestion. +- Endpoints: + Replace (wipe + reload named collection): + - POST /ingest/{collection}/text: + Replace the entire named collection from a JSON body. + Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "text": ""}, ...]} + Empty docs list is allowed — wipes the collection. + - POST /ingest/{collection}/file: + Replace the entire named collection from one or more uploaded files. + Multipart upload; each file becomes one document. + doc_id = filename without extension. Multiple files → multiple docs. + Filename collisions within one call → 400. + - POST /ingest/{collection}/url: + Replace the entire named collection from a JSON body of URLs. + Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "url": ""}, ...]} + Service fetches each URL; response body becomes the document text. + Caller assigns doc_id independent of the URL. + + Update (document-level upsert — additive, never deletes): + - POST /ingest/{collection}/update/text: + Upsert documents into the named collection from a JSON body. + Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "text": ""}, ...]} + New doc_id → add; matching doc_id → replace that doc's chunks. + doc_ids in the collection but absent from the body are KEPT (additive semantics). + Empty docs list → no-op. + - POST /ingest/{collection}/update/file: + Upsert documents into the named collection from one or more uploaded files. + Same multipart conventions as POST /ingest/{collection}/file. + Existing docs with matching doc_id are replaced; others are left untouched. + - POST /ingest/{collection}/update/url: + Upsert documents into the named collection from a JSON body of URLs. + Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "url": ""}, ...]} + Additive: only named doc_ids are affected. + + Delete (explicit removal — the only path that removes content from the collection): + - DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}: + Remove all chunks belonging to doc_id from the named collection. + doc_id not found → 404. + + Collection validation (all endpoints): + - {collection} must be a member of AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS (default: policy,domain-knowledge). + - Unknown collection slug → 404. + - Collection slug to ChromaDB collection name mapping: + policy → aiac-policies + domain-knowledge → aiac-domain-knowledge + +- Ingest semantics: + - Replace: drops the ChromaDB collection and recreates it, then ingests all provided docs. + Atomic at the collection level — partial failures roll back to empty collection. + - Update: document-level upsert keyed on doc_id stored in chunk metadata. For each + incoming doc_id: delete existing chunks with that doc_id, then insert new chunks. + All other doc_ids in the collection are untouched. + - Delete: removes all chunks whose metadata.doc_id equals the given doc_id. + - Chunking and embedding applied uniformly across all operations and both collections. + doc_id is stored in ChromaDB chunk metadata on every write to enable update and delete. + +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Configuration: + - CHROMA_URL: Base URL of the ChromaDB instance co-located in the same Pod. + Default: http://localhost:7080 + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. + - AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS: Comma-separated list of legal collection slugs. + Default: policy,domain-knowledge + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. + Adding a third slug here (and a corresponding ChromaDB collection name in the + slug→name map) is a config-only change requiring no code modification. + - EMBEDDING_BASE_URL: Base URL of the embedding model API endpoint. + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. + - EMBEDDING_MODEL: Embedding model name (shared across all collections). + Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. + - EMBEDDING_API_KEY: Embedding API access token (shared across all collections). + Source: Kubernetes Secret mounted as environment variable. +- Port: 7072 +- Dependencies: TBD (chromadb client, embedding model client, fastapi, uvicorn, httpx for URL fetching) +- Location: TBD +- Deployment: Docker container co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9a14db0a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +- Title: AIAC RAG Knowledge Base +- Description: > + Vector store knowledge base that holds two collections in a single ChromaDB instance: + (1) AIAC access control policies and (2) org/business domain context. The Agent retrieves + relevant chunks from both collections at runtime via similarity search. Deployed as a + Kubernetes Deployment in a dedicated Pod, co-located with the RAG Ingest Service. +- Technology: ChromaDB +- Collections: + - aiac-policies: access control policy rules in natural language. + Written by the RAG Ingest Service via the "policy" collection slug. + Read by the AIAC Agent's fetch_policy node. + - aiac-domain-knowledge: org/business context — team rosters, application ownership, + department mappings, who-does-what. Written by the RAG Ingest Service via the + "domain-knowledge" collection slug. Read by the AIAC Agent's fetch_domain_knowledge node. + The legal collection set is an open extension point governed by AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS + on the RAG Ingest Service. ChromaDB itself imposes no constraint on the collection set. + Collection slug (wire) → ChromaDB collection name mapping: + policy → aiac-policies + domain-knowledge → aiac-domain-knowledge +- Access patterns: + - RAG Ingest Service: writes — replaces, upserts, or deletes documents in either + collection via collection-parameterized endpoints. Each chunk stored with + doc_id in its metadata to support document-level upsert and deletion. + - AIAC Agent fetch_policy: reads aiac-policies (similarity search, top-N chunks) + - AIAC Agent fetch_domain_knowledge: reads aiac-domain-knowledge (similarity search, + top-N chunks, same query keying as fetch_policy: trigger TYPE only) +- Port: 7080 +- Dependencies: TBD +- Location: TBD +- Deployment: Kubernetes Deployment, dedicated RAG Pod, co-located with RAG Ingest Service diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8b2164236 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +- Title: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) for Keycloak +- Deployment: + - Topology: + - Keycloak Configuration Service Pod: aiac-service container (FastAPI :7070). Exposed as Kubernetes + ClusterIP Service to allow inter-Pod access from the Agent Pod. + - RAG Pod: chromadb container (:7080) + aiac-rag-ingest container (FastAPI :7072). Exposed as + Kubernetes ClusterIP Service for Agent (RAG query) and for ingest access via + kubectl port-forward. ChromaDB hosts two collections: aiac-policies (policy rules) + and aiac-domain-knowledge (org/business context). The legal collection set is governed + by AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS on the Ingest Service container. + - Agent Pod: aiac-agent container (FastAPI :7071). Calls Keycloak Configuration Service Pod and RAG Pod + over the cluster network. + - Manifests: + - aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-deployment.yaml: Keycloak Configuration Service Pod + ClusterIP Service + - aiac/k8s/rag-deployment.yaml: RAG Pod (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service) + ClusterIP Service + - aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml: Agent Pod + ClusterIP Service + - ConfigMap: aiac-keycloak-config carrying KEYCLOAK_URL and KEYCLOAK_REALM. + Reuses keycloak-admin-secret for admin credentials. + RAG-specific configuration (AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS, EMBEDDING_*) lives in the RAG Pod's + own ConfigMap/env block, not in aiac-keycloak-config. + - Note: Keycloak Configuration Service Pod previously bound to 127.0.0.1 only. Now binds to 0.0.0.0 + and is exposed as a ClusterIP Service to allow the Agent Pod to reach it. +- Testing: + - Unit tests: Mock the web service in library tests; mock Keycloak in configuration service tests. Located in tests/. + - Integration tests: Hit a live Keycloak instance. Located in tests/. Require KEYCLOAK_URL, + KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD to be set. +- Components: + - Keycloak Configuration Service: + - Description: FastAPI service (:7070) proxying the Keycloak Admin REST API (8 endpoints). + - spec: components/keycloak-service.yaml + - Library: + - Description: Python package — dependency-free Pydantic models (models.py) + HTTP client returning typed instances (api.py). + - spec: components/library.yaml + - Agent: + - Description: LangGraph StateGraph (:7071) — six /apply/* endpoints, parallel RAG + Keycloak fetch, LLM propose/validate, immediate apply. + - spec: components/aiac-agent.yaml + - RAG Knowledge Base: + - Description: ChromaDB vector store (:7080) holding the aiac-policies collection in the RAG Pod. + - spec: components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml + - RAG Ingest Service: + - Description: FastAPI service (:7072) accepting policy documents and writing vectors into co-located ChromaDB. + - spec: components/rag-ingest-service.yaml +- Package structure: + - aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py: absent (namespace package) + - aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py: empty (callers must use explicit submodule paths) + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py: Pydantic model definitions + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py: HTTP client functions + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py: FastAPI app + uvicorn entrypoint + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile: Docker image (build context aiac/src/) + - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt: Python dependencies + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/main.py: FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/routes.py: all six /apply/* route handlers + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile: Docker image (build context aiac/src/) + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/requirements.txt: Python dependencies + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/__init__.py: empty + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/state.py: AgentState, TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/prompts.py: planner and auditor system prompt templates + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/nodes.py: all node functions + - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/graph.py: StateGraph definition, edge wiring, compiled graph instance From f9b8551731d4e846ebebcc84846598740f2089e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 19:11:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 002/273] feat(aiac): add initial component (src, k8s, tests, packaging) Add Keycloak library/service modules under aiac/src/, initial k8s manifest, test suite, and pyproject.toml + uv.lock so the package is installable from this branch. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml | 52 ++++ aiac/pyproject.toml | 3 + aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py | 74 ++++++ aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py | 61 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile | 12 + aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md | 160 ++++++++++++ aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py | 103 ++++++++ .../aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt | 4 + aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py | 93 +++++++ aiac/test/test_library_api.py | 183 ++++++++++++++ aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py | 113 +++++++++ aiac/test/test_models.py | 198 +++++++++++++++ aiac/test/test_service.py | 238 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/uv.lock | 3 + 18 files changed, 1297 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/pyproject.toml create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_library_api.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_models.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_service.py create mode 100644 aiac/uv.lock diff --git a/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..890c19e25 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Namespace +metadata: + name: aiac-system + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-keycloak-config + namespace: aiac-system +data: + KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" + +--- +# Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: +# +# kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ +# -n aiac-system \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Secret +metadata: + name: keycloak-admin-secret + namespace: aiac-system +type: Opaque +stringData: + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME: "admin" + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "admin" + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Pod +metadata: + name: aiac-keycloak-service + namespace: aiac-system + labels: + app: aiac-keycloak-service +spec: + containers: + - name: aiac-keycloak-service + image: localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local + imagePullPolicy: Never + ports: + - containerPort: 7070 + envFrom: + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-keycloak-config + - secretRef: + name: keycloak-admin-secret diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0a583115b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +[tool.pytest.ini_options] +testpaths = ["test"] +pythonpath = ["src"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2fcc451c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import requests +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from .models import User, RealmRole, Client, ClientScope, ClientRole, RoleMappings + +load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") + + +def _base_url() -> str: + return os.getenv("AC_SERVICE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7070") + + +def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: + return {"realm": realm} + + +def _check(resp) -> None: + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + + +def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/users", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [User.model_validate(u) for u in resp.json()] + + +def get_realm_roles(realm: str) -> list[RealmRole]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/realm-roles", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [RealmRole.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] + + +def get_clients(realm: str) -> list[Client]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/clients", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Client.model_validate(c) for c in resp.json()] + + +def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/client-scopes", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [ClientScope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + + +def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, realm: str) -> RoleMappings: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return RoleMappings.model_validate(resp.json()) + + +def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/clients/{client_id}/roles", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [ClientRole.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] + + +def assign_client_roles( + user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str +) -> None: + url = f"{_base_url()}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}" + resp = requests.post(url, json=[r.model_dump() for r in roles], params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + + +def revoke_client_roles( + user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str +) -> None: + url = f"{_base_url()}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}" + resp = requests.delete(url, json=[r.model_dump() for r in roles], params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0261feb76 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +from typing import Any + +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict + + +class User(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + username: str + email: str | None = None + firstName: str | None = None + lastName: str | None = None + enabled: bool + + +class RealmRole(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + composite: bool + clientRole: bool + + +class RoleMappings(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + realmMappings: list[RealmRole] = [] + clientMappings: dict[str, Any] = {} + + +class Client(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + clientId: str + name: str | None = None + enabled: bool + protocol: str | None = None + publicClient: bool + + +class ClientScope(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + protocol: str | None = None + + +class ClientRole(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + composite: bool + clientRole: bool \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24c89d827 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +FROM python:3.14-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY main.py . + +EXPOSE 7070 + +CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7070"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d59967839 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +# Keycloak Service — Installation Guide + +FastAPI proxy over the Keycloak Admin REST API. Stateless, no caching. +Binds to `0.0.0.0:7070`. + +## Prerequisites + +- Python 3.13+ (local) or Docker/Podman (container) +- A running Keycloak instance with admin credentials +- `kubectl` + a Kind cluster (Kubernetes deploy only) + +--- + +## 1. Local (uvicorn) + +### Configure + +Copy or edit `.env` in the service directory: + +``` +src/aiac/service/.env +``` + +```dotenv +KEYCLOAK_URL=http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/ +KEYCLOAK_REALM=kagenti +KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin +KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin +``` + +OS environment variables override `.env` values when both are present. + +### Install dependencies + +```bash +pip install -r src/aiac/service/requirements.txt +``` + +### Run + +```bash +uvicorn aiac.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 +``` + +Run from the `aiac/` directory (the `src/` directory must be on `PYTHONPATH`): + +```bash +cd aiac +PYTHONPATH=src uvicorn aiac.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 +``` + +### Smoke test + +```bash +curl http://localhost:7070/users +``` + +--- + +## 2. Docker / Podman + +### Build + +```bash +docker build -t aiac-keycloak-service:local \ + src/aiac/service/ +``` + +### Run + +```bash +docker run --rm -p 7070:7070 \ + -e KEYCLOAK_URL=http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/ \ + -e KEYCLOAK_REALM=kagenti \ + -e KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ + -e KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin \ + aiac-keycloak-service:local +``` + +--- + +## 3. Kubernetes (Kind) + +### Build and load into Kind + +```bash +docker build -t aiac-keycloak-service:local \ + src/aiac/service/ + +kind load docker-image aiac-keycloak-service:local --name kagenti +``` + +> **Podman note:** `kind load` tags images with a `localhost/` prefix. +> The manifest at `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` already uses +> `localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local` to match this. + +### Deploy + +```bash +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +``` + +This creates, in namespace `aiac-system`: + +| Resource | Name | Purpose | +|----------|------|---------| +| Namespace | `aiac-system` | Isolation namespace | +| ConfigMap | `aiac-keycloak-config` | `KEYCLOAK_URL`, `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | +| Secret | `keycloak-admin-secret` | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME`, `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | +| Pod | `aiac-keycloak-service` | The service, port 7070 | + +The ConfigMap uses the in-cluster Keycloak DNS name: + +``` +KEYCLOAK_URL=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080 +``` + +### Verify + +```bash +kubectl get pod aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system +``` + +Expected: `STATUS = Running`, `READY = 1/1`. + +### Smoke test (port-forward) + +```bash +kubectl port-forward -n aiac-system pod/aiac-keycloak-service 7070:7070 +curl http://localhost:7070/users +``` + +--- + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Returns | +|--------|------|---------| +| GET | `/users` | JSON array of users | +| GET | `/realm-roles` | JSON array of realm roles | +| GET | `/clients` | JSON array of clients | +| GET | `/client-scopes` | JSON array of client scopes | +| GET | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | JSON object with `realmMappings` and `clientMappings` | +| GET | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | JSON array of client roles | +| POST | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | 204 No Content | +| DELETE | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | 204 No Content | + +All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on Keycloak errors. + +--- + +## Running tests + +From `aiac/`: + +```bash +.venv/bin/pytest test/test_service.py -v +``` + +No live Keycloak required — `KeycloakAdmin` is mocked. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c4bf2e61d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +import os +from contextlib import asynccontextmanager +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + +from dotenv import load_dotenv +from fastapi import Body, Depends, FastAPI, Query +from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError +from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response + +def get_admin(realm: str = Query(...)) -> KeycloakAdmin: + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=realm, + username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +@asynccontextmanager +async def _lifespan(application: FastAPI): + load_dotenv(Path(__file__).parent / ".env") + yield + + +app = FastAPI(lifespan=_lifespan) + + +@app.get("/users") +def list_users(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_users() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/realm-roles") +def list_realm_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_realm_roles() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/clients") +def list_clients(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_clients() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/client-scopes") +def list_client_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client_scopes() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/users/{user_id}/role-mappings") +def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_all_roles_of_user(user_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/clients/{client_id}/roles") +def list_client_roles(client_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client_roles(client_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}", status_code=204) +def assign_client_roles( + user_id: str, + client_id: str, + roles: list[Any] = Body(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + admin.assign_client_role(user_id, client_id, roles) + return Response(status_code=204) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.delete("/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}", status_code=204) +def delete_client_roles( + user_id: str, + client_id: str, + roles: list[Any] = Body(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + admin.delete_client_roles_of_user(user_id, client_id, roles) + return Response(status_code=204) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0464cb432 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +python-dotenv diff --git a/aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2af72d79b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +"""Print live Keycloak data via aiac-keycloak-service, exercising all api methods. + +Usage: + python test/show_keycloak_data.py + +Requires the service to be reachable at AC_SERVICE_URL (default: http://localhost:7070). +""" + +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent / "src")) + +from aiac.keycloak.library import api +from aiac.keycloak.library.models import ( + Client, + ClientRole, + ClientScope, + RealmRole, + RoleMappings, + User, +) + +REALM = "kagenti" + + +def main() -> None: + # --- Users --- + print("=== Users ===") + users: list[User] = api.get_users(realm=REALM) + for u in users: + full_name = " ".join(filter(None, [u.firstName, u.lastName])) or "—" + status = "enabled" if u.enabled else "disabled" + print(f" {u.username:<20} {full_name:<25} email={u.email or '—'} [{status}]") + print(f"Total: {len(users)} user(s)\n") + + # --- Realm roles --- + print("=== Realm Roles ===") + realm_roles: list[RealmRole] = api.get_realm_roles(realm=REALM) + for r in realm_roles: + composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" + print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") + print(f"Total: {len(realm_roles)} realm role(s)\n") + + # --- Clients --- + print("=== Clients ===") + clients: list[Client] = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) + for c in clients: + visibility = "public" if c.publicClient else "confidential" + status = "enabled" if c.enabled else "disabled" + print(f" {c.clientId:<40} protocol={c.protocol or '—'} [{visibility}] [{status}]") + print(f"Total: {len(clients)} client(s)\n") + + # --- Client scopes --- + print("=== Client Scopes ===") + scopes: list[ClientScope] = api.get_client_scopes(realm=REALM) + for s in scopes: + print(f" {s.name:<30} protocol={s.protocol or '—'} desc={s.description or '—'}") + print(f"Total: {len(scopes)} scope(s)\n") + + # --- Client roles per client --- + print("=== Client Roles ===") + for c in clients: + roles: list[ClientRole] = api.get_client_roles(c.id, realm=REALM) + if not roles: + continue + print(f" {c.clientId}:") + for r in roles: + composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" + print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") + print() + + # --- Role mappings per user --- + print("=== User Role Mappings ===") + for u in users: + mappings: RoleMappings = api.get_user_role_mappings(u.id, realm=REALM) + realm_roles_list: list[str] = [r.name for r in mappings.realmMappings] + client_map: dict[str, list[str]] = { + client_name: [r["name"] for r in mapping.get("mappings", [])] + for client_name, mapping in mappings.clientMappings.items() + if mapping.get("mappings") + } + print(f" {u.username}:") + if realm_roles_list: + print(f" realm : {', '.join(realm_roles_list)}") + for client_name, role_names in client_map.items(): + print(f" {client_name:<20}: {', '.join(role_names)}") + if not realm_roles_list and not client_map: + print(" (no roles)") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/aiac/test/test_library_api.py b/aiac/test/test_library_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8d22d46fd --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_library_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + +import pytest + +from aiac.keycloak.library.models import ( + User, + RealmRole, + Client, + ClientScope, + ClientRole, + RoleMappings, +) + +BASE = "http://test-service" +REALM = "kagenti" + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def service_url(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AC_SERVICE_URL", BASE) + + +def _ok(payload): + m = MagicMock() + m.ok = True + m.json.return_value = payload + return m + + +def _err(status=400): + m = MagicMock() + m.ok = False + m.status_code = status + m.text = "bad request" + return m + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 1: get_users +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_get_users_returns_typed_list(): + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "email": "a@x.com", "enabled": True}] + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.get_users(realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/users", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result == [User(id="u1", username="alice", email="a@x.com", enabled=True)] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 2: get_realm_roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_get_realm_roles_returns_typed_list(): + payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.get_realm_roles(realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/realm-roles", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result == [RealmRole(id="r1", name="admin", composite=False, clientRole=False)] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 3: get_clients +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_get_clients_returns_typed_list(): + payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-client", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False}] + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/clients", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result == [Client(id="c1", clientId="my-client", enabled=True, publicClient=False)] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 4: get_client_scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_get_client_scopes_returns_typed_list(): + payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email", "protocol": "openid-connect"}] + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.get_client_scopes(realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/client-scopes", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result == [ClientScope(id="s1", name="email", protocol="openid-connect")] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 5: get_user_role_mappings +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_get_user_role_mappings_returns_role_mappings(): + payload = { + "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}], + "clientMappings": {}, + } + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.get_user_role_mappings("user-123", realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE}/users/user-123/role-mappings", params={"realm": REALM} + ) + assert isinstance(result, RoleMappings) + assert len(result.realmMappings) == 1 + assert result.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 6: get_client_roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_get_client_roles_returns_typed_list(): + payload = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.get_client_roles("client-456", realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/clients/client-456/roles", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result == [ClientRole(id="cr1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=True)] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 7: assign_client_roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_assign_client_roles_posts_and_returns_none(): + roles = [ClientRole(id="cr1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=True)] + with patch("requests.post", return_value=_ok(None)) as mock_post: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.assign_client_roles("user-1", "client-1", roles, realm=REALM) + expected_url = f"{BASE}/users/user-1/role-mappings/clients/client-1" + expected_body = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "viewer", "description": None, "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] + mock_post.assert_called_once_with(expected_url, json=expected_body, params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result is None + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 8: revoke_client_roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_revoke_client_roles_deletes_and_returns_none(): + roles = [ClientRole(id="cr1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=True)] + with patch("requests.delete", return_value=_ok(None)) as mock_delete: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + result = api.revoke_client_roles("user-1", "client-1", roles, realm=REALM) + expected_url = f"{BASE}/users/user-1/role-mappings/clients/client-1" + expected_body = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "viewer", "description": None, "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(expected_url, json=expected_body, params={"realm": REALM}) + assert result is None + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 9: non-2xx raises RuntimeError +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("fn,patch_target,kwargs", [ + ("get_users", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), + ("get_realm_roles", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), + ("get_clients", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), + ("get_client_scopes", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), + ("get_user_role_mappings","requests.get", {"user_id": "u1", "realm": REALM}), + ("get_client_roles", "requests.get", {"client_id": "c1", "realm": REALM}), + ("assign_client_roles", "requests.post", {"user_id": "u1", "client_id": "c1", "roles": [], "realm": REALM}), + ("revoke_client_roles", "requests.delete", {"user_id": "u1", "client_id": "c1", "roles": [], "realm": REALM}), +]) +def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn, patch_target, kwargs): + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + with patch(patch_target, return_value=_err(503)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + getattr(api, fn)(**kwargs) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Cycle 10: AC_SERVICE_URL fallback to http://127.0.0.1:7070 +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("AC_SERVICE_URL", raising=False) + with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as mock_get: + from aiac.keycloak.library import api + api.get_users(realm=REALM) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with("http://127.0.0.1:7070/users", params={"realm": REALM}) diff --git a/aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py b/aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..85affdb5d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +"""Integration tests against a live aiac-keycloak-service (port-forwarded to localhost:7070). + +Run with: + AC_SERVICE_URL=http://localhost:7070 pytest test/test_library_api_integration.py -v +or simply ensure .env contains AC_SERVICE_URL=http://localhost:7070 and run pytest. + +Skip automatically when the service is unreachable. +""" + +import pytest +import requests as _requests + +from aiac.keycloak.library import api +from aiac.keycloak.library.models import ( + Client, + ClientRole, + ClientScope, + RealmRole, + RoleMappings, + User, +) + +REALM = "kagenti" + + +def _service_reachable() -> bool: + try: + _requests.get("http://localhost:7070/users", timeout=2) + return True + except Exception: + return False + + +live = pytest.mark.skipif(not _service_reachable(), reason="aiac-keycloak-service not reachable on localhost:7070") + + +@live +def test_get_users_returns_users(): + users = api.get_users(realm=REALM) + assert len(users) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(u, User) for u in users) + usernames = {u.username for u in users} + assert "admin" in usernames + + +@live +def test_get_realm_roles_returns_roles(): + roles = api.get_realm_roles(realm=REALM) + assert len(roles) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(r, RealmRole) for r in roles) + + +@live +def test_get_clients_returns_clients(): + clients = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) + assert len(clients) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(c, Client) for c in clients) + client_ids = {c.clientId for c in clients} + assert "account" in client_ids + + +@live +def test_get_client_scopes_returns_scopes(): + scopes = api.get_client_scopes(realm=REALM) + assert len(scopes) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(s, ClientScope) for s in scopes) + + +@live +def test_get_user_role_mappings_returns_role_mappings(): + users = api.get_users(realm=REALM) + user_id = users[0].id + mappings = api.get_user_role_mappings(user_id, realm=REALM) + assert isinstance(mappings, RoleMappings) + + +@live +def test_get_client_roles_returns_roles(): + clients = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) + client = next(c for c in clients if c.clientId == "account") + roles = api.get_client_roles(client.id, realm=REALM) + assert len(roles) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(r, ClientRole) for r in roles) + + +@live +def test_assign_and_revoke_client_roles_roundtrip(): + users = api.get_users(realm=REALM) + user = next(u for u in users if u.username == "alice") + + clients = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) + client = next(c for c in clients if c.clientId == "account") + roles = api.get_client_roles(client.id, realm=REALM) + + role = roles[0] + + api.assign_client_roles(user.id, client.id, [role], realm=REALM) + mappings_after = api.get_user_role_mappings(user.id, realm=REALM) + client_role_names = { + r["name"] + for mapping in mappings_after.clientMappings.values() + for r in mapping.get("mappings", []) + } + assert role.name in client_role_names + + api.revoke_client_roles(user.id, client.id, [role], realm=REALM) + mappings_revoked = api.get_user_role_mappings(user.id, realm=REALM) + client_role_names_after = { + r["name"] + for mapping in mappings_revoked.clientMappings.values() + for r in mapping.get("mappings", []) + } + assert role.name not in client_role_names_after diff --git a/aiac/test/test_models.py b/aiac/test/test_models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d88227a86 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_models.py @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +import pytest +from aiac.keycloak.library.models import User, RealmRole, RoleMappings, ClientRole, Client, ClientScope + + +class TestRoleMappings: + def test_full_payload(self): + rm = RoleMappings.model_validate( + { + "realmMappings": [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False} + ], + "clientMappings": { + "account": {"id": "a1", "client": "account", "mappings": []} + }, + } + ) + assert len(rm.realmMappings) == 1 + assert rm.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" + assert "account" in rm.clientMappings + + def test_defaults_to_empty(self): + rm = RoleMappings.model_validate({}) + assert rm.realmMappings == [] + assert rm.clientMappings == {} + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + rm = RoleMappings.model_validate({"realmMappings": [], "unknownField": "dropped"}) + assert not hasattr(rm, "unknownField") + + +class TestUser: + def test_full_payload(self): + user = User.model_validate( + { + "id": "u1", + "username": "alice", + "email": "alice@example.com", + "firstName": "Alice", + "lastName": "Smith", + "enabled": True, + } + ) + assert user.id == "u1" + assert user.username == "alice" + assert user.email == "alice@example.com" + assert user.firstName == "Alice" + assert user.lastName == "Smith" + assert user.enabled is True + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + user = User.model_validate({"id": "u2", "username": "bob", "enabled": False}) + assert user.email is None + assert user.firstName is None + assert user.lastName is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + user = User.model_validate( + {"id": "u3", "username": "carol", "enabled": True, "unknownField": "garbage"} + ) + assert not hasattr(user, "unknownField") + + +class TestRealmRole: + def test_full_payload(self): + role = RealmRole.model_validate( + { + "id": "r1", + "name": "admin", + "description": "Administrator role", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": False, + } + ) + assert role.id == "r1" + assert role.name == "admin" + assert role.description == "Administrator role" + assert role.composite is False + assert role.clientRole is False + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + role = RealmRole.model_validate( + {"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} + ) + assert role.description is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + role = RealmRole.model_validate( + { + "id": "r3", + "name": "editor", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": False, + "containerId": "master", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(role, "containerId") + + +class TestClient: + def test_full_payload(self): + client = Client.model_validate( + { + "id": "c1", + "clientId": "my-app", + "name": "My Application", + "enabled": True, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "publicClient": False, + } + ) + assert client.id == "c1" + assert client.clientId == "my-app" + assert client.name == "My Application" + assert client.enabled is True + assert client.protocol == "openid-connect" + assert client.publicClient is False + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + client = Client.model_validate( + {"id": "c2", "clientId": "bare-client", "enabled": False, "publicClient": True} + ) + assert client.name is None + assert client.protocol is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + client = Client.model_validate( + { + "id": "c3", + "clientId": "extra-client", + "enabled": True, + "publicClient": False, + "surplusField": "ignored", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(client, "surplusField") + + +class TestClientScope: + def test_full_payload(self): + scope = ClientScope.model_validate( + { + "id": "s1", + "name": "email", + "description": "Email scope", + "protocol": "openid-connect", + } + ) + assert scope.id == "s1" + assert scope.name == "email" + assert scope.description == "Email scope" + assert scope.protocol == "openid-connect" + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + scope = ClientScope.model_validate({"id": "s2", "name": "profile"}) + assert scope.description is None + assert scope.protocol is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + scope = ClientScope.model_validate( + {"id": "s3", "name": "roles", "unknownAttr": "dropped"} + ) + assert not hasattr(scope, "unknownAttr") + + +class TestClientRole: + def test_full_payload(self): + role = ClientRole.model_validate( + { + "id": "cr1", + "name": "view-clients", + "description": "View clients role", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": True, + } + ) + assert role.id == "cr1" + assert role.name == "view-clients" + assert role.description == "View clients role" + assert role.composite is False + assert role.clientRole is True + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + role = ClientRole.model_validate( + {"id": "cr2", "name": "manage-clients", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} + ) + assert role.description is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + role = ClientRole.model_validate( + { + "id": "cr3", + "name": "query-clients", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": True, + "containerId": "master", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(role, "containerId") \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/test/test_service.py b/aiac/test/test_service.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..39ae60353 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/service/main.py FastAPI application.""" + +import os +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + +from aiac.keycloak.service.main import app, get_admin + +REALM = "kagenti" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _make_client(admin_mock: MagicMock) -> TestClient: + app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm: admin_mock + return TestClient(app) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /users +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetUsers: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_users.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.get(f"/users?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + + +class TestGetRealmRoles: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.get(f"/realm-roles?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + + +class TestGetClients: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_clients.return_value = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app"}] + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.get(f"/clients?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app"}] + + +class TestGetClientScopes: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.get(f"/client-scopes?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] + + +class TestGetUserRoleMappings: + def test_returns_json_object_with_realm_and_client_mappings(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.return_value = { + "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}], + "clientMappings": {"account": {"id": "a1", "mappings": []}}, + } + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.get(f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert "realmMappings" in body + assert "clientMappings" in body + + +class TestGetClientRoles: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.get(f"/clients/client-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + + +class TestAssignClientRoleMappings: + def test_post_returns_204(self): + admin = MagicMock() + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.post( + f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], + ) + + assert resp.status_code == 204 + + def test_delete_returns_204(self): + admin = MagicMock() + client = _make_client(admin) + + resp = client.request( + "DELETE", + f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], + ) + + assert resp.status_code == 204 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Realm query parameter: KeycloakAdmin instantiated with the supplied realm +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRealmQueryParam: + def test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin(self): + """Every request instantiates a KeycloakAdmin bound to the supplied realm.""" + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + admin_mock = MagicMock() + admin_mock.get_users.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + + env = { + "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", + } + with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ + patch("aiac.keycloak.service.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.get(f"/users?realm={REALM}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + mock_cls.assert_called_once_with( + server_url="http://keycloak:8080/", + realm_name=REALM, + username="admin", + password="admin", + ) + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# KeycloakError → 502 on all endpoints +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _keycloak_error(): + return KeycloakError(error_message="connection refused", response_code=503) + + +class TestKeycloakErrorProduces502: + def test_get_users(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_users.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/users?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_get_realm_roles(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/realm-roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_get_clients(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_clients.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/clients?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_get_client_scopes(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_scopes.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/client-scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_get_user_role_mappings(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_get_client_roles(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/clients/client-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_post_client_role_mappings(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.assign_client_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_delete_client_role_mappings(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.delete_client_roles_of_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).request( + "DELETE", + f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() diff --git a/aiac/uv.lock b/aiac/uv.lock new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bda020730 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/uv.lock @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version = 1 +revision = 3 +requires-python = ">=3.13" From 4af54c31089a7d25c75dca1f6babe18a1ee23d05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 20:00:49 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 003/273] docs(aiac): fix stale path and module references in PRD and INSTALL MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Update module names (aiac.library.* → aiac.keycloak.library.*), service paths (aiac/service/ → aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/), Docker build commands, and test paths (tests/ → aiac/test/) to match the actual implementation layout under src/aiac/keycloak/. Correct the namespace package claim — aiac/__init__.py exists, making it a regular package. Assisted-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md | 36 +++++++++---------- .../PRD/components/keycloak-service.md | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md | 16 ++++----- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md index f4f04ba13..28b145b78 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ Six components across three Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imp ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ -│ aiac.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.library.api — HTTP client → │ +│ aiac.keycloak.library.models — Pydantic only │ +│ aiac.keycloak.library.api — HTTP client → │ │ Keycloak Configuration Service │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` @@ -80,20 +80,20 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| Keycloak Configuration Service | `aiac.library.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON | -| `aiac.library.models` | `aiac.library.api`, AIAC Agent, other agents | — | Pydantic model definitions | -| `aiac.library.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts, LangGraph agents | Keycloak Configuration Service (HTTP) | Pydantic model instances | +| Keycloak Configuration Service | `aiac.keycloak.library.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON | +| `aiac.keycloak.library.models` | `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, AIAC Agent, other agents | — | Pydantic model definitions | +| `aiac.keycloak.library.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts, LangGraph agents | Keycloak Configuration Service (HTTP) | Pydantic model instances | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API | — | -| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers, orchestrators | `aiac.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API | Applied/revoked role diff | +| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers, orchestrators | `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API | Applied/revoked role diff | ### Key architectural decisions - **Keycloak Configuration Service binds to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as a Kubernetes ClusterIP Service (`aiac-keycloak-service`) so that the Agent Pod can reach it over the cluster network. Also accessible via `kubectl port-forward`. - **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as a Kubernetes ClusterIP Service (`aiac-rag-service`) on ports 7080 (ChromaDB) and 7072 (RAG Ingest Service). Developer ingestion is done via `kubectl port-forward`. - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. -- **`aiac.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. -- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.library.__init__`, and `aiac.service.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.library.models import User`, `from aiac.library.api import get_users`. +- **`aiac.keycloak.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. +- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.keycloak.__init__`, `aiac.keycloak.library.__init__`, and `aiac.keycloak.service.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.keycloak.library.models import User`, `from aiac.keycloak.library.api import get_users`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** The legal collection set is governed by `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` on the RAG Ingest Service (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. --- @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies the Keycloak Admin REST API. Expos Python package at `aiac/src/`. Two submodules: -- **`aiac.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all Keycloak entities (`User`, `RealmRole`, `Client`, `ClientRole`, `ClientScope`, `RoleMappings`). -- **`aiac.library.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the Keycloak Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. +- **`aiac.keycloak.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all Keycloak entities (`User`, `RealmRole`, `Client`, `ClientRole`, `ClientScope`, `RoleMappings`). +- **`aiac.keycloak.library.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the Keycloak Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. **Full spec:** [components/library.md](components/library.md) @@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash # Build Keycloak Configuration Service -docker build -t ac-configuration-service:latest aiac/service/ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile -t ac-configuration-service:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent -docker build -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/agent/ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ # Build RAG Ingest Service docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ @@ -188,15 +188,15 @@ Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before app ## 9. Testing -Tests live in `tests/` alongside the existing client-registration and keycloak_sync tests. +Tests live in `aiac/test/`. ### Unit tests | Target | What to mock | What to assert | |--------|-------------|----------------| | Keycloak Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 204 on write success, 502 on Keycloak error | -| `aiac.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | -| `aiac.library.api` functions | Keycloak Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.keycloak.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | +| `aiac.keycloak.library.api` functions | Keycloak Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | AIAC Agent | TBD | TBD | ### Integration tests @@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ Integration tests call the live Keycloak Configuration Service (running locally Use a pytest marker (e.g. `@pytest.mark.integration`) so unit tests and integration tests can be run independently: ```bash -pytest tests/ -m "not integration" # unit only -pytest tests/ -m integration # integration only +pytest aiac/ -m "not integration" # unit only +pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only ``` --- @@ -229,4 +229,4 @@ pytest tests/ -m integration # integration only - Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` - No auth on Keycloak Configuration Service or RAG Ingest Service — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism - Keycloak Configuration Service, Agent, and RAG Ingest Service are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes -- The `aiac` directory is a namespace package — do not create `aiac/__init__.py` +- `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md index b1fdaf3e8..ba3cb963a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Component PRD: Keycloak Configuration Service ## Location -`aiac/service/` +`aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/` ## Description A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns raw Keycloak JSON unchanged for read operations; forwards write operations directly. Stateless — no caching. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md index d59967839..c4bc22e02 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Binds to `0.0.0.0:7070`. Copy or edit `.env` in the service directory: ``` -src/aiac/service/.env +src/aiac/keycloak/service/.env ``` ```dotenv @@ -33,20 +33,20 @@ OS environment variables override `.env` values when both are present. ### Install dependencies ```bash -pip install -r src/aiac/service/requirements.txt +pip install -r src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt ``` ### Run ```bash -uvicorn aiac.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 +uvicorn aiac.keycloak.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 ``` Run from the `aiac/` directory (the `src/` directory must be on `PYTHONPATH`): ```bash cd aiac -PYTHONPATH=src uvicorn aiac.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 +PYTHONPATH=src uvicorn aiac.keycloak.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 ``` ### Smoke test @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ curl http://localhost:7070/users ### Build ```bash -docker build -t aiac-keycloak-service:local \ - src/aiac/service/ +docker build -f src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-keycloak-service:local src/ ``` ### Run @@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ docker run --rm -p 7070:7070 \ ### Build and load into Kind ```bash -docker build -t aiac-keycloak-service:local \ - src/aiac/service/ +docker build -f src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-keycloak-service:local src/ kind load docker-image aiac-keycloak-service:local --name kagenti ``` From 633289b55d29d2e811b838b9c3edcfbcc46f8667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 20:15:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 004/273] docs(aiac): fix diagram box boundary alignment in Architecture Overview Pad three content lines in the Python library box and replace an ASCII pipe with the box-drawing character in the Agent Pod label row so all right-side boundaries align at column 60. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md index 28b145b78..74db57ff0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Six components across three Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imp └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod | │ +│ Agent Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) │ :7071 ClusterIP │ @@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ Six components across three Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imp └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Python library (aiac/src/) │ +│ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ -│ aiac.keycloak.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.keycloak.library.api — HTTP client → │ +│ aiac.keycloak.library.models — Pydantic only │ +│ aiac.keycloak.library.api — HTTP client → │ │ Keycloak Configuration Service │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` From 8e4703ca82d4220168985c855bc90a158f0e2b50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 18:09:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 005/273] initial agent Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .gitignore | 1 + aiac/pyproject.toml | 5 +- aiac/src/agent/__init__.py | 13 + aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py | 121 ++++ aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py | 18 + aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py | 12 + aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE | 63 ++ aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py | 291 +++++++++ aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py | 17 + aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 566 ++++++++++++++++ aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py | 41 ++ aiac/src/agent/prompts/__init__.py | 0 .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 343 ++++++++++ aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt | 18 + aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 18 + aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py | 618 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py | 40 ++ aiac/src/agent/utils/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py | 120 ++++ aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py | 104 +++ .../aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py | 111 ++++ aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml | 47 ++ .../fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml | 23 + .../fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml | 18 + .../fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt | 2 + .../test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt | 2 + aiac/test/test_llm_config.py | 136 ++++ aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py | 342 ++++++++++ 28 files changed, 3089 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/prompts/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/utils/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt create mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_llm_config.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 49d20b6b9..015b22237 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ secrets.json secrets.env kubeconfig *.kubeconfig +llm_conf.yaml # Python __pycache__/ diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml index 0a583115b..5ad77b211 100644 --- a/aiac/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ [tool.pytest.ini_options] testpaths = ["test"] -pythonpath = ["src"] +pythonpath = ["src", "src/agent"] +markers = [ + "integration: tests that call real LLM endpoints", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..39ce602e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +""" +Access Control Policy Builder Package + +AI-powered access control policy builder using LangGraph. +Converts natural language descriptions into structured YAML policies. +""" + +from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder + +__version__ = "1.0.0" + +__all__ = ["PolicyBuilder"] + diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0735d5ae7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""AIAC CLI — orchestrate end-to-end policy update against Keycloak. + +Usage: + python aiac_cli.py + +The first form runs the full Keycloak pipeline. The `generate` subcommand only +runs the agent's text->YAML step (no Keycloak interaction). +""" + +import argparse +import os +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +# Add current directory to path to allow importing local modules +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent)) + +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder +from config import create_llm + +load_dotenv(dotenv_path="aiac.env", override=True) + + +class Colors: + RED = "\033[0;31m" + GREEN = "\033[0;32m" + YELLOW = "\033[1;33m" + BLUE = "\033[0;34m" + NC = "\033[0m" + + +def print_step(message: str) -> None: + print(f"{Colors.BLUE}{'=' * 51}{Colors.NC}") + print(f"{Colors.BLUE}{message}{Colors.NC}") + print(f"{Colors.BLUE}{'=' * 51}{Colors.NC}") + + +def print_success(message: str) -> None: + print(f"{Colors.GREEN}✓ {message}{Colors.NC}") + + +def print_error(message: str) -> None: + print(f"{Colors.RED}✗ {message}{Colors.NC}") + + +def print_info(message: str) -> None: + print(f"{Colors.YELLOW}ℹ {message}{Colors.NC}") + + +def generate_policy_only( + policy_file: Path, config_path: Path, output_file: str +) -> None: + """Run only the agent's natural-language → YAML step (no Keycloak).""" + if not policy_file.exists(): + raise FileNotFoundError(f"Policy file not found: {policy_file}") + + with open(policy_file, "r") as f: + policy_text = f.read().strip() + + # Load default model name from llm_conf.yaml + import yaml + llm_models_path = Path(__file__).parent / "config" / "llm_conf.yaml" + with open(llm_models_path) as f: + llm_config = yaml.safe_load(f) + default_model = llm_config.get("default_model", "gpt-oss") + + # Create LLM instance from llm_models.yaml using default model + llm = create_llm(model_name=default_model, verbose=False) + + # Create PolicyBuilder with the LLM instance + builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_path, llm=llm) + + print("=" * 80) + print("Generating access rule from textual policy...") + print("=" * 80) + print(f"\nPolicy file: {policy_file}") + print(f"\nDescription:\n{policy_text}\n") + + result = builder.generate_policy(description=policy_text) + + if result["success"]: + print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") + print("Generated YAML:") + print("-" * 80) + print(result["yaml_output"]) + print("-" * 80) + builder.save_policy(result["yaml_output"], output_file) + else: + print("✗ Policy generation failed with errors:") + for error in result["errors"]: + print(f" - {error}") + + print("\n" + "=" * 80) + print("Parsed Role-to-Client-Role Mappings:") + print("=" * 80) + for role_mapping in result["parsed_scopes"]: + realm_role = role_mapping["role"] + client_roles = role_mapping.get("client_roles", []) + print(f" {realm_role}:") + for cr in client_roles: + print(f" - {cr['client']}: {cr['role']}") + +def main() -> None: + gen_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + prog="aiac generate", + description="Run only the policy generation step (no Keycloak).", + ) + gen_parser.add_argument("policy_file", help="Path to natural-language policy description") + gen_parser.add_argument("config", help="Path to realm config YAML") + gen_parser.add_argument("output", help="Output YAML path") + gen_args = gen_parser.parse_args(sys.argv[2:]) + generate_policy_only( + Path(gen_args.policy_file), Path(gen_args.config), gen_args.output + ) + return + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py b/aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c1c7af986 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +""" +Configuration Module + +Contains configuration utilities, constants, and LLM setup. +""" + +from .llm_config import create_llm, load_llm_config_from_env, LLMConfig, get_default_llm +from .constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + +__all__ = [ + "create_llm", + "load_llm_config_from_env", + "LLMConfig", + "get_default_llm", + "MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES", +] + +# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py b/aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a81911ab1 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Constants for Policy Builder + +This module defines constants used throughout the policy builder system. +""" + +# Maximum number of retry cycles from validate_policy back to parse_and_extract +# This prevents infinite loops while allowing the LLM to self-correct +MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES = 3 + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE b/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12b7fe2ae --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# LLM Models Configuration Template +# Multiple model configurations for testing and production use +# Each model entry contains connection details and generation parameters + + +models: + # Claude Haiku + claude-haiku: + model: claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 + endpoint: + api_key: + temperature: 0.0 + max_tokens: 8192 + timeout: 360 + max_retries: 2 + description: "Claude Haiku 4.5 via IBM ete-litellm gateway" + + # Azure GPT-5 Nano via ete-litellm + gpt-nano: + model: Azure/gpt-5-nano-2025-08-07 + endpoint: + api_key: + temperature: 0.0 + max_tokens: 8192 + timeout: 360 + max_retries: 2 + description: "Azure GPT-5 Nano via IBM ete-litellm gateway" + + # GCP Gemini 2.0 Flash via ete-litellm + gemini: + model: GCP/gemini-2.0-flash + endpoint: + api_key: + temperature: 0.0 + max_tokens: 8192 + timeout: 360 + max_retries: 2 + description: "GCP Gemini 2.0 Flash via IBM ete-litellm gateway" + + # OpenAI GPT-OSS 120B via RITS + gpt-oss: + model: openai/gpt-oss-120b + endpoint: + api_key: + temperature: 0.0 + max_tokens: 8192 + timeout: 360 + max_retries: 2 + description: "OpenAI GPT-OSS 120B via IBM RITS" + + # Ollama local models + ollama-llama: + model: phi4 + endpoint: + api_key: + temperature: 0.0 + max_tokens: 8192 + timeout: 720 + max_retries: 2 + description: "Llama 3.2 via local Ollama" + +# Default model to use if not specified +default_model: ollama-llama diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py b/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5faf2f37b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +""" +LLM Configuration Module + +This module provides a global LLM instance configured for the document generation system. +The LLM is initialized once and can be imported by other modules. + +Configuration is read from llm.env file. +Supports multiple backends: RITS, ete-litellm, Ollama, and other OpenAI-compatible endpoints. +""" + +import os +import warnings +import yaml +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Optional, Dict, Any +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from dotenv import load_dotenv +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel +from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI +from pydantic import SecretStr + + +# Default generation parameters +DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE = 0.0 +DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS = 8192 +DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 360 +DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES = 2 + + +@dataclass +class LLMConfig: + """Configuration for LLM.""" + model: str + endpoint: Optional[str] + api_key: Optional[str] + temperature: float + max_tokens: int + timeout: int + retries: int + + +def load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]: + """ + Load LLM models configuration from YAML file. + + Args: + yaml_path: Path to llm_conf.yaml file (optional, defaults to llm_conf.yaml in config dir) + + Returns: + Dict containing models configuration + + Raises: + FileNotFoundError: If YAML file doesn't exist + ValueError: If YAML is invalid + """ + if yaml_path is None: + config_dir = Path(__file__).parent + yaml_path = config_dir / "llm_conf.yaml" + + if not yaml_path.exists(): + raise FileNotFoundError(f"LLM models configuration file not found: {yaml_path}") + + with open(yaml_path, 'r') as f: + config = yaml.safe_load(f) + + if not config or 'models' not in config: + raise ValueError(f"Invalid LLM models configuration in {yaml_path}") + + return config + + +def load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name: str, yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> LLMConfig: + """ + Load LLM configuration for a specific model from YAML file. + + Args: + model_name: Name of the model to load (e.g., 'claude-haiku', 'gpt-nano') + yaml_path: Path to llm_conf.yaml file (optional) + + Returns: + LLMConfig: Configuration object + + Raises: + FileNotFoundError: If YAML file doesn't exist + ValueError: If model not found in configuration + """ + config = load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path) + + if model_name not in config['models']: + available = ', '.join(config['models'].keys()) + raise ValueError(f"Model '{model_name}' not found in configuration. Available models: {available}") + + model_config = config['models'][model_name] + + return LLMConfig( + model=model_config['model'], + endpoint=model_config.get('endpoint'), + api_key=model_config.get('api_key'), + temperature=model_config.get('temperature', DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE), + max_tokens=model_config.get('max_tokens', DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS), + timeout=model_config.get('timeout', DEFAULT_TIMEOUT), + retries=model_config.get('max_retries', DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES) + ) + + +def load_llm_config_from_env(env_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> LLMConfig: + """ + Load LLM configuration from environment file (llm.env) or environment variables. + + Supports multiple backends: + - RITS (IBM): Uses RITS_API_KEY header + - ete-litellm: Standard OpenAI-compatible + - Ollama: Local OpenAI-compatible API + + Args: + env_path: Path to llm.env file (optional, defaults to llm.env in config dir) + If the path doesn't exist, will read from environment variables only. + + Returns: + LLMConfig: Configuration object + + Raises: + FileNotFoundError: If default llm.env file doesn't exist (when env_path is None) + ValueError: If required configuration is missing + """ + # Determine env file path + if env_path is None: + config_dir = Path(__file__).parent + env_path = config_dir / "llm.env" + # Only raise error for default path + if not env_path.exists(): + raise FileNotFoundError(f"LLM configuration file not found: {env_path}") + + # Load environment variables from llm.env if file exists + if env_path.exists(): + load_dotenv(dotenv_path=env_path, override=True) + + # Read configuration from environment variables + model = os.getenv("LLM_MODEL", "").strip() + endpoint = os.getenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "").strip() or None + api_key = os.getenv("LLM_API_KEY", "").strip() or None + + if not model: + raise ValueError("LLM_MODEL not set in environment") + + # Read generation parameters with defaults + temperature_str = os.getenv("LLM_TEMPERATURE", "").strip() + max_tokens_str = os.getenv("LLM_MAX_TOKENS", "").strip() + timeout_str = os.getenv("LLM_TIMEOUT", "").strip() + retries_str = os.getenv("LLM_MAX_RETRIES", "").strip() + + temperature = float(temperature_str) if temperature_str else DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE + max_tokens = int(max_tokens_str) if max_tokens_str else DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS + timeout = int(timeout_str) if timeout_str else DEFAULT_TIMEOUT + retries = int(retries_str) if retries_str else DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES + + return LLMConfig( + model=model, + endpoint=endpoint, + api_key=api_key, + temperature=temperature, + max_tokens=max_tokens, + timeout=timeout, + retries=retries + ) + + +def is_rits_endpoint(endpoint: str) -> bool: + """Check if endpoint is a RITS endpoint based on hostname.""" + return "rits.fmaas" in endpoint.lower() + + +def create_llm( + model_name: Optional[str] = None, + env_path: Optional[Path] = None, + yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None, + verbose: bool = True +) -> BaseChatModel: + """ + Create and configure a LangChain LLM instance from configuration. + + Supports two configuration methods: + 1. YAML-based: Pass model_name to load from llm_conf.yaml + 2. ENV-based: Pass env_path to load from .env file (legacy) + + If neither is specified, defaults to llm.env in config directory. + + Automatically detects backend type (RITS, litellm, Ollama) and configures accordingly. + + Args: + model_name: Name of model from llm_conf.yaml (e.g., 'claude-haiku', 'gpt-nano') + env_path: Path to llm.env file (optional, for legacy .env-based config) + yaml_path: Path to llm_conf.yaml file (optional, defaults to config dir) + verbose: If True, print initialization messages. If False, suppress output. + + Returns: + BaseChatModel: Configured LangChain LLM instance + + Raises: + ValueError: If required configuration is missing + FileNotFoundError: If configuration file doesn't exist + """ + # Load LLM configuration + if model_name: + # Load from YAML + llm_config = load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name, yaml_path) + else: + # Load from .env (legacy) + llm_config = load_llm_config_from_env(env_path) + + # Validate required fields for create_llm + if not llm_config.endpoint: + raise ValueError("LLM_ENDPOINT is required to create an LLM instance") + if not llm_config.api_key: + raise ValueError("LLM_API_KEY is required to create an LLM instance") + + if verbose: + print(f"🤖 Initializing LLM") + print(f" Model: {llm_config.model}") + print(f" Endpoint: {llm_config.endpoint}") + print(f" Temperature: {llm_config.temperature}") + print(f" Max Tokens: {llm_config.max_tokens}") + print(f" Timeout: {llm_config.timeout}s") + print(f" Max Retries: {llm_config.retries}") + + # Detect if this is a RITS endpoint + is_rits = is_rits_endpoint(llm_config.endpoint) + + # Create ChatOpenAI instance with appropriate configuration + # Suppress the UserWarning about max_tokens in model_kwargs + with warnings.catch_warnings(): + warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="Parameters .* should be specified explicitly", category=UserWarning) + + if is_rits: + # RITS uses custom header for API key + if verbose: + print(f" Backend: RITS (using RITS_API_KEY header)") + llm = ChatOpenAI( + model=llm_config.model, + temperature=llm_config.temperature, + max_retries=llm_config.retries, + timeout=llm_config.timeout, + api_key=SecretStr("none"), # Not used, RITS uses header + base_url=llm_config.endpoint, + default_headers={'RITS_API_KEY': llm_config.api_key}, + model_kwargs={"max_tokens": llm_config.max_tokens}, + ) + else: + # Standard OpenAI-compatible endpoint (litellm, Ollama, etc.) + if verbose: + backend_type = "Ollama" if "ollama" in llm_config.api_key.lower() else "OpenAI-compatible" + print(f" Backend: {backend_type}") + llm = ChatOpenAI( + model=llm_config.model, + temperature=llm_config.temperature, + max_retries=llm_config.retries, + timeout=llm_config.timeout, + api_key=SecretStr(llm_config.api_key), + base_url=llm_config.endpoint, + model_kwargs={"max_tokens": llm_config.max_tokens}, + ) + + if verbose: + print(f"✅ LLM initialized successfully") + return llm + + +# Note: No global LLM instance created here to avoid "Already borrowed" errors +# Each PolicyBuilder should create its own LLM instance by calling create_llm() +# or by not passing an llm parameter (which will call create_llm() internally) + +# For backward compatibility with code that imports llm directly, +# we create it on demand, but this should be avoided in favor of +# creating fresh instances per PolicyBuilder +llm = None # Will be created on first use + +def get_default_llm() -> BaseChatModel: + """ + Get the default LLM instance, creating it if needed. + Note: For better isolation, prefer creating new instances with create_llm(). + + Returns: + BaseChatModel: Default LLM instance + """ + global llm + if llm is None: + llm = create_llm() + return llm + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e335ebe2f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +""" +Agent Module + +Contains the LangGraph-based policy builder agent implementation. +""" + +from .graph import PolicyBuilder, PolicyBuilderConfig, create_policy_builder_graph +from .state import PolicyState + +__all__ = [ + "PolicyBuilder", + "PolicyBuilderConfig", + "create_policy_builder_graph", + "PolicyState", +] + +# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..757b1796d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,566 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Policy Builder - Main Module + +This module provides the main PolicyBuilder class that orchestrates the +AI-powered generation of Keycloak access control policies from natural +language descriptions using LangGraph workflows. + +Refactored to follow official LangGraph patterns: +- Separation of graph definition from business logic +- Pure node functions for better testability +- Proper type hints and annotations +- Configuration as a separate concern +- Support for graph visualization + +The PolicyBuilder has been refactored into multiple modules for better +organization and maintainability: +- state.py: State definitions +- config_utils.py: Configuration loading and parsing +- constants.py: Constants +- prompt_builder.py: LLM prompt construction +- parsers.py: Response parsing utilities +- validators.py: Policy validation logic +- cli.py: Command-line interface + +Key Features: + - Natural language to YAML policy conversion + - Automatic role mapping and validation + - Call chain analysis and enforcement + - Retry mechanism with semantic verification +""" + +from typing import Dict, Any, Optional +from pathlib import Path +import os +import sys +import yaml +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel + +from config import create_llm +from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from aiac.keycloak.library import api_from_config +from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper +from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure + + +@dataclass +class PolicyBuilderConfig: + """ + Configuration for PolicyBuilder agent. + + Following LangGraph best practices, configuration is separated from + the agent logic for better testability and flexibility. + + Attributes: + llm: LangChain LLM instance + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + llm: BaseChatModel + verbose: bool = True + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + + +# ============================================================================ +# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS (Following LangGraph Best Practices) +# ============================================================================ +# These functions are pure and stateless, making them easier to test and reason about + +def _parse_and_extract_scopes( + state: PolicyState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + realm_roles: list, + client_roles_map: dict, + verbose: bool +) -> PolicyState: + """ + Map each client role to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate + results into the parsed_scopes format expected by _build_policy. + + For every client role across all clients, SingleRoleMapper determines which + realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that + parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, client_roles: [...]}. + + Args: + state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field + llm: LLM instance for processing + realm_roles: List of available realm roles + client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + + Returns: + Updated PolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation + """ + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) + + explanations = [] + # realm_role_name -> list of {"client": X, "role": Y} dicts + realm_role_to_client_roles: dict = {} + + for client_name, client_roles in client_roles_map.items(): + for client_role in client_roles: + result = mapper.map_role( + policy_description=state['description'], + client_name=client_name, + client_role=client_role, + realm_roles=realm_roles, + ) + + if result.get('explanation'): + explanations.append( + f"{client_name}/{client_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}" + ) + + for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): + realm_role_to_client_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( + {'client': client_name, 'role': client_role['name']} + ) + + parsed_scopes = [ + {'role': realm_role, 'client_roles': client_roles} + for realm_role, client_roles in realm_role_to_client_roles.items() + ] + + return { + **state, + "explanation": "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", + "parsed_scopes": parsed_scopes, + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), + "validation_passed": True + } + + +def _build_policy(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + """ + Build structured policy dictionary from extracted role mappings. + + This is the second node in the workflow. + + Args: + state: PolicyState with 'parsed_scopes' field + + Returns: + Updated PolicyState with 'policy_structure' field + """ + policy = {} + + # Transform parsed scopes into policy structure + for role_info in state["parsed_scopes"]: + role_name = role_info.get("role", "") + client_roles = role_info.get("client_roles", []) + policy[role_name] = client_roles + + # Wrap in policy structure + policy_structure = {"policy": policy} + + return { + **state, + "policy_structure": policy_structure + } + + +def _generate_yaml(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + """ + Generate YAML output from the policy structure with comprehensive comments. + + This is the third node in the workflow. + + Args: + state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure', 'description', and 'explanation' + + Returns: + Updated PolicyState with 'yaml_output' field + """ + # Create header comments + header = """# Access Control Policy +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific client roles +# Format: user_role_name -> list of client role mappings +# Each entry specifies: client (client name) and role (role name from that client) + +""" + + # Add original policy description as comment + if state.get("description"): + description_lines = state["description"].strip().split('\n') + header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in description_lines: + header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + header += "#\n" + + # Add LLM explanation as comment + if state.get("explanation"): + explanation_lines = state["explanation"].strip().split('\n') + header += "# LLM Mapping Explanation:\n" + for line in explanation_lines: + header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + header += "\n" + + # Generate YAML from policy structure + yaml_content = yaml.dump( + state["policy_structure"], + default_flow_style=False, + sort_keys=False, + allow_unicode=True + ) + + # Add footer + footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" + + # Combine all parts + yaml_output = header + yaml_content + footer + + return { + **state, + "yaml_output": yaml_output + } + + +def _validate_policy( + state: PolicyState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + realm_roles: list, + client_names: list, + client_roles_map: dict, + verbose: bool, + max_retries: int +) -> PolicyState: + """ + Validate the generated policy structure and verify it matches the description. + + This is the fourth and final node in the workflow. It performs structural + validation and semantic verification. + + Args: + state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure' and 'description' + llm: LLM instance for semantic verification + realm_roles: List of available realm roles + client_names: List of client names + client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts + + Returns: + Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) + + # Perform structural validation + structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( + policy, + realm_roles, + client_names, + client_roles_map + ) + + # If there are structural errors and we can retry, trigger retry + if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: + return { + **state, + "errors": structural_errors, + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1 + } + + # Return final result; semantic validation is handled per-role in SingleRoleMapper + return { + **state, + "errors": structural_errors, + "validation_passed": len(structural_errors) == 0, + "retry_count": retry_count + } + + +def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: + """ + Determine if validation should retry by going back to parse_and_extract. + + This is a conditional edge function for the LangGraph state machine. + + Args: + state: Current PolicyState containing validation results + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed + + Returns: + "parse_and_extract" if validation failed and retries remain, + otherwise END to terminate the workflow + """ + validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + errors = state.get("errors", []) + + # If validation failed and we haven't exceeded max retries, retry from start + if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: + print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count}/{max_retries}). Retrying from parse_and_extract...") + if errors: + print(f"\nValidation Errors (from this attempt):") + for i, error in enumerate(errors, 1): + print(f" {i}. {error}") + print() + return "parse_and_extract" + + # Either validation passed or max retries exceeded + return END + + +def create_policy_builder_graph( + config: PolicyBuilderConfig, + realm_roles: list, + client_roles_map: dict, + client_names: list +): + """ + Create and compile the policy builder graph. + + Following LangGraph patterns, this function separates graph construction + from the agent class, making it easier to test and visualize. + + Args: + config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance + realm_roles: List of available realm roles + client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles + client_names: List of client names + + Returns: + Compiled LangGraph workflow + """ + + # Define node functions as closures with access to config + def parse_and_extract_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + """Parse natural language and extract role mappings.""" + return _parse_and_extract_scopes( + state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_roles_map, config.verbose + ) + + def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + """Build structured policy from mappings.""" + return _build_policy(state) + + def generate_yaml_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + """Generate YAML output with comments.""" + return _generate_yaml(state) + + def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + """Validate structure and semantics.""" + return _validate_policy( + state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_names, + client_roles_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries + ) + + def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: + """Determine if validation should retry.""" + return _should_retry_validation(state, config.max_retries) + + # Build the graph + workflow = StateGraph(PolicyState) + + # Add nodes + workflow.add_node("parse_and_extract", parse_and_extract_node) + workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) + workflow.add_node("generate_yaml", generate_yaml_node) + workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) + + # Define edges + workflow.set_entry_point("parse_and_extract") + workflow.add_edge("parse_and_extract", "build_policy") + workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "generate_yaml") + workflow.add_edge("generate_yaml", "validate_policy") + + # Add conditional edge for retry logic + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "validate_policy", + should_retry_node, + { + "parse_and_extract": "parse_and_extract", + END: END + } + ) + + return workflow.compile() + + +class PolicyBuilder: + """ + AI-powered access control policy builder using LangGraph. + + Refactored to follow official LangGraph patterns: + - Configuration separated from logic + - Graph construction delegated to factory function + - Pure node functions for better testability + - Support for graph visualization + + This class orchestrates a multi-stage workflow to convert natural language + policy descriptions into structured YAML access control policies. + + Workflow Stages: + 1. parse_and_extract: Parse natural language and extract role mappings + 2. build_policy: Build structured policy from mappings + 3. generate_yaml: Generate YAML output with comments + 4. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) + + Attributes: + config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance + realm_roles: List of available realm role names + client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to their available roles + client_names: List of client names + graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine + """ + + def __init__( + self, + realm: str = "", + config_path: Optional[Path] = None, + llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + ): + """ + Initialize the policy builder with configuration and LLM. + + Args: + config_path: Path to config YAML. If None, AC_CONFIG_PATH env var is used. + llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. If not provided, creates a new + LLM instance using create_llm() + verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + + Raises: + FileNotFoundError: If config_path doesn't exist + yaml.YAMLError: If config file is invalid YAML + """ + # Create LLM if not provided + # LLM config is in the config directory relative to this file (llm.env) + if llm is None: + llm_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "config" / "llm.env" + llm_instance = create_llm(env_path=llm_env_path, verbose=verbose) + else: + llm_instance = llm + + if config_path is not None: + os.environ["AC_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) + + # Create configuration object + self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( + llm=llm_instance, + verbose=verbose, + max_retries=max_retries + ) + + realm_roles_models = api_from_config.get_realm_roles(realm=realm) + self.realm_roles = [ + {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} + for r in realm_roles_models + ] + self.client_roles_map = api_from_config.get_client_roles_map(realm=realm) + self.client_names = api_from_config.get_client_names(realm=realm) + + # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine + self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( + self.config, + self.realm_roles, + self.client_roles_map, + self.client_names + ) + + # ======================================================================== + # GRAPH VISUALIZATION AND INSPECTION + # ======================================================================== + + def get_graph(self): + """ + Get the compiled graph for visualization or inspection. + + Following LangGraph patterns, this allows external tools to + visualize or analyze the graph structure. + + Returns: + Compiled LangGraph workflow + """ + return self.graph + + # ======================================================================== + # PUBLIC API METHODS + # ======================================================================== + + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: + """ + Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. + + This is the main public API method. It executes the complete workflow. + + Args: + description: Natural language description of the access control policy + + Returns: + Dictionary containing: + - yaml_output (str): Complete YAML policy file content + - policy_structure (dict): Structured policy data + - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-client-role mappings from LLM + - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) + - success (bool): True if generation succeeded without errors + - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred + + Example: + >>> builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=Path("config.yaml")) + >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access") + >>> if result["success"]: + ... print(result["yaml_output"]) + """ + # Initialize the workflow state + initial_state: PolicyState = { + "description": description, + "explanation": "", + "parsed_scopes": [], + "policy_structure": {}, + "yaml_output": "", + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True + } + + # Execute the LangGraph workflow + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) + + # Extract and return results + return { + "yaml_output": final_state["yaml_output"], + "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], + "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], + "errors": final_state["errors"], + "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, + "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0) + } + + def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml"): + """ + Save the generated policy YAML to a file. + + Args: + yaml_output: YAML content string to save + filepath: Output file path (default: "access_control_policy.yaml") + """ + with open(filepath, 'w') as f: + f.write(yaml_output) + print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") + + +# ============================================================================ +# BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY +# ============================================================================ +# For backward compatibility, keep the main() function here but delegate to CLI +if __name__ == "__main__": + # This file should not be run directly anymore + # Use main.py in the parent directory instead + print("Please use main.py to run the policy builder:") + print(" python main.py ") + sys.exit(1) + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0bc3f42a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +State Definitions for Policy Builder + +This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph +workflow for policy generation. +""" + +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any +from operator import add + + +class PolicyState(TypedDict): + """ + State dictionary for the policy building LangGraph workflow. + + This TypedDict defines the state that flows through the state machine. + Each node in the graph can read from and write to these fields. + + Attributes: + description: Original natural language policy description + explanation: LLM's explanation of how it mapped the policy + parsed_scopes: List of role-to-client-role mappings built by aggregating SingleRoleMapper results + policy_structure: Structured policy dictionary ready for YAML conversion + yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string + messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) + errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) + retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made + validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded + """ + description: str + explanation: str + parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] + policy_structure: Dict[str, Any] + yaml_output: str + messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation + errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt + retry_count: int + validation_passed: bool # Boolean flag for retry decision, not accumulated + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/prompts/__init__.py b/aiac/src/agent/prompts/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/agent/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3f967a23e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Single Role Prompt Builder for Access Mapping + +This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine +which real roles should have access to a specific client role. +""" + +from typing import List, Dict, Optional + + +def build_single_role_system_prompt( + realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], + client_role: Dict[str, str], + policy_description: str = "", + client_name: str = "", +) -> str: + """ + Build a system prompt for mapping a single client role to real roles. + + Args: + realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles + client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the client role to analyze + policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context + client_name: Name of the client service that owns the role + + Returns: + Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption + """ + # Build available realm roles list with descriptions + available_roles_lines = [] + for role in realm_roles: + role_name = role['name'] + role_desc = role.get('description', '') + if role_desc: + available_roles_lines.append(f" - {role_name}: {role_desc}") + else: + available_roles_lines.append(f" - {role_name}") + + available_roles = ( + "\n".join(available_roles_lines) + if available_roles_lines + else " (none defined)" + ) + + # Format the client role information + client_role_name = client_role['name'] + client_role_desc = client_role.get('description', '') + client_role_info = client_role_name + if client_role_desc: + client_role_info += f": {client_role_desc}" + + # Add policy context if provided + policy_context = "" + if policy_description: + policy_context = f""" +POLICY CONTEXT: +The following policy description provides context for this access control decision: + +{policy_description} + +Use this policy context to understand the access requirements and make informed decisions +about which real roles should have access to the client role. + +""" + + return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping client role capabilities to appropriate user roles. +{policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: +You are given: +1. A list of all available real roles (realm roles) with their descriptions +2. A single client role with its description + +Your task is to determine which real roles should have access to this client role. + +AVAILABLE REAL ROLES (Realm Roles): +{available_roles} + +CLIENT ROLE TO ANALYZE: +{client_role_info} + +ANALYSIS GUIDELINES: +1. IDENTIFY AND MAP ALL USER CATEGORIES (CRITICAL): + - The policy may describe multiple user categories (e.g., "Group A", "Group B") + - Each user category MUST map to at least one realm role + - Use role descriptions to find the best match for each category + - Broad terms (e.g., "all other staff") may map to multiple realm roles + +2. ENABLING / GATEWAY SERVICES ⚠️ CRITICAL — READ CAREFULLY: + An enabling service is one whose description says it provides access TO another service + or technology (e.g., "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Access to the payment + gateway", "Access to the data pipeline"). + + ⚠️ DOMAIN REQUIREMENT — AN ENABLING SERVICE MUST BE IN THE SAME DOMAIN AS THE POLICY: + - "Access to the data warehouse connector" IS an enabling service for a data warehouse policy ✓ (same domain) + - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" is NOT an enabling service for a data warehouse policy ✗ (different domain) + - "Access to the payment gateway" is NOT an enabling service for a document storage policy ✗ + - Even if a role description matches the "access to [service]" pattern, it is only enabling + if the service is directly required to reach the resource the policy is about. + + ⚠️ RULE: ALL user categories that need the downstream resource at ANY access level + MUST be granted this enabling role. + + ⚠️ ACCESS LEVEL DOES NOT MATTER FOR ENABLING SERVICES: + - "read-only access to data files" still requires the data warehouse connector + - "limited access to data" still requires the data pipeline service + - The enabling service is a prerequisite — without it, the user cannot reach the + downstream resource at all, regardless of how limited their access is. + + ⚠️ DO NOT confuse enabling services with final resource roles: + - ENABLING: "Access to the data warehouse connector" → needed by everyone with data access + - FINAL: "Access to public data files" → needed only by those with public access + - FINAL: "Access to confidential data records" → needed only by those with full access + + ⚠️ DO NOT exclude user categories based on their realm role name: + - A "sales" realm role that needs data access still needs the data warehouse connector + - A "support" realm role that needs read-only access still needs the enabling service + - The realm role name is irrelevant — only whether the policy grants them ANY access matters + + EXAMPLE: Policy says "Group A gets full data warehouse access; Group B (including + non-technical roles) gets read-only data warehouse access". + - Role "Access to the data warehouse connector": BOTH Group A AND Group B need it → ["role-a", "role-b"] + - Role "Full data access": only Group A → ["role-a"] + - Role "Read-only data access": only Group B → ["role-b"] + +3. ACCESS LEVEL DIFFERENTIATION (only for FINAL resource roles): + - Pay close attention to access-level qualifiers: "private" vs "public", + "full access" vs "limited", "read-only" vs "read-write" + - For a "both X and Y" capability: grant BOTH roles to the relevant categories + - For "only X" capability: grant ONLY the X role + - Access level differentiation applies only when there are multiple roles for the SAME + final resource (e.g., data-full-access vs data-read-only), NOT for enabling services. + +4. PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE AND POLICY SILENCE: + - Grant access ONLY when explicitly required by the policy or role description + - When in doubt, do NOT grant access + - POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS: If the policy description does not mention this client's + service or domain at all, return []. Do NOT infer access from the user role name + (e.g., "developer") or from what that user type might typically do in their job. + Access is determined solely by what the POLICY TEXT explicitly states. + - Exception: enabling/gateway services are required by all users of the downstream resource. + +5. EXACT NAMES ONLY: + - Use ONLY the exact role names from the "Available Real Roles" list + - Do not modify, abbreviate, or create new role names + +TASK STEPS: +1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this client role (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? + What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. + Do NOT continue to the next steps. + IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the client role's domain. Do NOT reason from + the user role name (e.g., "developers use demo UIs too") — that is forbidden here. + - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" — domain: dashboards. Policy about data warehouse — DIFFERENT → [] + - "Access to the data warehouse connector" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue + - "Access to confidential data records" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue + - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about GitHub repos — DIFFERENT → [] + (Even though "developers" may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) +2. CLASSIFY this client role: is it a FINAL resource role or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? + - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]" + AND the service is in the same domain as the policy + - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]" +3. IDENTIFY USER CATEGORIES: List all user categories mentioned in the policy. +4. APPLY RULE: + - ENABLING/GATEWAY: grant to ALL user categories that need the downstream resource + - FINAL RESOURCE: grant only to categories with explicit access to this specific capability +5. MAP TO REALM ROLES: For each included user category, find matching realm role(s). +6. VERIFY: Every included user category maps to at least one realm role. +7. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the domain check, classification, policy evidence, and mapping. +8. OUTPUT JSON: List of realm role names that should have access. + +Return in this format: +```explanation +[Your brief explanation: why relevant or not, which user categories +need access, how they map to realm roles] +``` + +```json +{{ + "client_role": "{client_role_name}", + "real_roles_with_access": [ + "exact-realm-role-name-1", + "exact-realm-role-name-2" + ] +}} +``` + +EXAMPLE OUTPUTS: + +Example A — domain mismatch, not relevant to policy subject: +```explanation +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is +"data warehouse access". These are DIFFERENT domains — dashboard UI is unrelated to data +warehouse access. Returning [] immediately without further analysis. +Note: Even if "developers" or "analysts" typically use dashboard UIs, the policy is silent +about UI access. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. +``` +```json +{{"client_role": "monitoring-dashboard", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +``` + +Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI role, GitHub policy: +```explanation +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "demo UI interface". Policy domain is +"GitHub repository access". These are DIFFERENT domains. The policy mentions only GitHub +repositories; it says nothing about any UI or web interface. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. +Returning [] immediately. (The fact that "developers" may use demo UIs is irrelevant — +access is determined by the policy text, not by job function assumptions.) +``` +```json +{{"client_role": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +``` + +Example B — enabling/gateway service (ALL users who need the downstream resource): +```explanation +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "data warehouse connector". Policy domain is +"data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. +Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Access to the data warehouse connector" is a prerequisite +service, not a final resource. Policy identifies two user categories: Group A (full access) +and Group B (read-only). Both need ANY level of data warehouse access, so both need this +enabling service. Access level does NOT matter for enabling services. +Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. +``` +```json +{{"client_role": "warehouse-connector", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} +``` + +Example C — restricted role, limited access: +```explanation +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "confidential data records". Policy domain is +"data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. +Step 2 CLASSIFY: FINAL RESOURCE — provides access to restricted data records. +Policy states Group A can access both restricted and public data; Group B can access +public data only. Only Group A has explicit access to restricted data. +Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A. +``` +```json +{{"client_role": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} +``` +""" + + +def build_semantic_verification_prompt( + policy_description: str, + client_name: str, + client_role: Dict[str, str], + realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], + real_roles_with_access: List[str], +) -> str: + """ + Build a prompt to semantically verify a single role mapping. + + Args: + policy_description: Natural language policy description + client_name: Name of the client that owns the role + client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the client role + realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles + real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned + + Returns: + Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption + """ + client_role_name = client_role['name'] + client_role_desc = client_role.get('description', '') + client_role_info = client_role_name + (f" ({client_role_desc})" if client_role_desc else "") + + realm_roles_context = "\n".join( + f" - {r['name']}" + (f": {r.get('description', '')}" if r.get('description') else "") + for r in realm_roles + ) + + assigned_roles = ", ".join(real_roles_with_access) if real_roles_with_access else "(none)" + + return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following role mapping is correct. + +POLICY DESCRIPTION: +{policy_description} + +CLIENT ROLE BEING ANALYZED: + Client: {client_name} + Role: {client_role_info} + +CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this client role): + {assigned_roles} + +AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: +{realm_roles_context} + +VALIDATION TASK: +Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to client role '{client_role_name}' \ +from client '{client_name}' to realm roles [{assigned_roles}] is correct. + +Consider: +- Are the correct user groups (realm roles) included? +- Are any user groups incorrectly included or excluded? +- Does the mapping match the access requirements stated in the policy description? + +Respond in this EXACT format: +MAPPING_CORRECT: YES +EXPLANATION: Brief explanation of why the mapping is correct. + +OR if incorrect: +MAPPING_CORRECT: NO +EXPLANATION: Specific description of what is wrong with the mapping.""" + + +def build_single_role_retry_prompt( + realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], + client_role: Dict[str, str] +) -> str: + """ + Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single role analysis. + + Args: + realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles + client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the client role + + Returns: + Formatted retry prompt string with role reminders and format example + """ + realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] + client_role_name = client_role['name'] + + return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. + +Please provide the mapping again using ONLY these preset names: +- Available real roles: {", ".join(realm_role_names) if realm_role_names else "(none)"} +- Client role to analyze: {client_role_name} + +Remember: Return a list of real role names that should have access to the client role. + +Return in this format: +```explanation +[Your brief explanation] +``` + +```json +{{ + "client_role": "{client_role_name}", + "real_roles_with_access": [ + "exact-realm-role-name-1", + "exact-realm-role-name-2" + ] +}} +```""" diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ba8d0806 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#pre commit +pre-commit + +# Core agent +langgraph>=0.2 +langchain-core>=0.2 +langchain-openai>=1.2 +pydantic>=2 + +# Keycloak integration +python-keycloak==5.3.1 + +# Configuration / IO +PyYAML>=6 +python-dotenv>=1 + +# Tests +pytest>=8 diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..652db0b54 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Single Role Agent Package + +This package provides functionality for mapping individual client roles +to real roles (realm roles) that should have access to them. +""" + +from .graph import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleMapperConfig +from .state import SingleRoleState + +__all__ = [ + 'SingleRoleMapper', + 'SingleRoleMapperConfig', + 'SingleRoleState', +] + +# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ee4cd375d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Single Role Mapper - Main Module + +This module provides the SingleRoleMapper class that uses LangGraph workflows +to determine which real roles (realm roles) should have access to a specific +client role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. + +Key Features: + - Semantic matching of client role to real roles + - Policy description context for better decision making + - Automatic validation and retry mechanism + - LLM-powered analysis of role descriptions +""" + +import re +from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional +from pathlib import Path +import json +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END +from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel + +from config import create_llm +from .state import SingleRoleState +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from prompts.single_role_prompt_builder import ( + build_single_role_system_prompt, + build_single_role_retry_prompt, + build_semantic_verification_prompt, +) + + +@dataclass +class SingleRoleMapperConfig: + """ + Configuration for SingleRoleMapper agent. + + Attributes: + llm: LangChain LLM instance + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + llm: BaseChatModel + verbose: bool = True + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + + +# ============================================================================ +# UTILITY FUNCTIONS +# ============================================================================ + +def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content: str) -> tuple[str, Optional[Dict[str, Any]]]: + """ + Extract explanation and JSON from LLM response for single role mapping. + + Tries, in order: + 1. Fenced ```explanation / ```json blocks (preferred format) + 2. Any ```json or ``` block containing a dict + 3. A bare { ... } object anywhere in the response + """ + explanation = "" + json_data = None + + # Extract explanation block + if "```explanation" in content: + start = content.find("```explanation") + len("```explanation") + end = content.find("```", start) + if end != -1: + explanation = content[start:end].strip() + + # Try fenced ```json block first + if "```json" in content: + start = content.find("```json") + len("```json") + end = content.find("```", start) + if end != -1: + try: + json_data = json.loads(content[start:end].strip()) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + pass + + # Try any generic fenced code block containing a dict + if json_data is None and "```" in content: + import re + for block in re.findall(r"```[^\n]*\n(.*?)```", content, re.DOTALL): + try: + candidate = json.loads(block.strip()) + if isinstance(candidate, dict): + json_data = candidate + break + except json.JSONDecodeError: + pass + + # Fall back: find the first complete { ... } object in the text + if json_data is None: + depth = 0 + start_idx = None + for i, ch in enumerate(content): + if ch == "{": + if depth == 0: + start_idx = i + depth += 1 + elif ch == "}": + depth -= 1 + if depth == 0 and start_idx is not None: + try: + candidate = json.loads(content[start_idx:i + 1]) + if isinstance(candidate, dict): + json_data = candidate + if not explanation: + explanation = content[:start_idx].strip() + break + except json.JSONDecodeError: + start_idx = None + + return explanation, json_data + + +def print_explanation_single_role(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True): + """Print the LLM's explanation if verbose mode is enabled.""" + if verbose and explanation: + prefix = "🔄 Retry Explanation:" if is_retry else "💡 LLM Explanation:" + print(f"\n{prefix}") + print(explanation) + print() + + +# ============================================================================ +# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS +# ============================================================================ + +def _analyze_role_mapping( + state: SingleRoleState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + verbose: bool +) -> SingleRoleState: + """ + Analyze which real roles should have access to the client role. + + This is the first node in the workflow. It sends the client role, + available real roles, policy context, and call chain structure to the LLM + for semantic analysis. + + Args: + state: Current SingleRoleState + llm: LLM instance for processing + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + + Returns: + Updated SingleRoleState with real_roles_with_access and explanation + """ + # Build prompts + system_prompt = build_single_role_system_prompt( + state['realm_roles'], + state['client_role'], + state.get('policy_description', ''), + state.get('client_name', ''), + ) + + user_prompt = ( + f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the client role " + f"'{state['client_role']['name']}' from client '{state['client_name']}'." + ) + + # Add policy context to user prompt if available + if state.get('policy_description'): + user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" + + # First attempt + messages = [ + SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), + HumanMessage(content=user_prompt) + ] + + response = llm.invoke(messages) + content = response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) + explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content) + + # Print explanation if available + print_explanation_single_role(explanation, verbose=verbose) + + # Retry once if parsing failed + if not parsed_data: + retry_prompt = build_single_role_retry_prompt( + state['realm_roles'], + state['client_role'] + ) + + retry_messages = [ + *messages, + response, + HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt) + ] + + retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) + retry_content = ( + retry_response.content + if isinstance(retry_response.content, str) + else str(retry_response.content) + ) + explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(retry_content) + + # Print retry explanation + print_explanation_single_role(explanation, is_retry=True, verbose=verbose) + + # If still failed after retry, raise exception + if not parsed_data: + raise ValueError( + f"Failed to parse valid JSON from LLM response after retry.\n" + f"Last response: {retry_content[:500]}..." + ) + + # Extract real roles with access + # Handle both dict format (new) and list format (old/mock) + if isinstance(parsed_data, dict): + real_roles_with_access = parsed_data.get('real_roles_with_access', []) + elif isinstance(parsed_data, list): + # Old format or mock - assume it's directly the list of roles + real_roles_with_access = parsed_data + else: + real_roles_with_access = [] + + # Return updated state + return { + **state, + "explanation": explanation, + "real_roles_with_access": real_roles_with_access, + "messages": [*state.get("messages", []), response], + "errors": [], # Clear errors on new parse attempt + "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), + "validation_passed": True # Assume passed until validation runs + } + + +def _validate_role_mapping( + state: SingleRoleState, + verbose: bool, + max_retries: int +) -> SingleRoleState: + """ + Validate the role mapping results. + + This is the second node in the workflow. It validates that: + - All returned role names exist in the available realm roles + - The mapping makes semantic sense + + Args: + state: SingleRoleState with real_roles_with_access + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts + + Returns: + Updated SingleRoleState with errors and validation_passed fields + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + real_roles_with_access = state.get("real_roles_with_access", []) + available_role_names = [role['name'] for role in state['realm_roles']] + + errors = [] + + # Normalize real_roles_with_access to handle both string and dict formats + normalized_roles = [] + for item in real_roles_with_access: + if isinstance(item, str): + normalized_roles.append(item) + elif isinstance(item, dict) and 'role' in item: + # Old format: list of dicts with 'role' key + normalized_roles.append(item['role']) + else: + errors.append(f"Invalid role format: {item}") + + # Validate that all returned roles exist + for role_name in normalized_roles: + if role_name not in available_role_names: + errors.append( + f"Invalid role name '{role_name}'. Must be one of: {', '.join(available_role_names)}" + ) + + # Check for duplicates + if len(normalized_roles) != len(set(normalized_roles)): + errors.append("Duplicate role names found in the result") + + # Update state with normalized roles + if normalized_roles != real_roles_with_access: + real_roles_with_access = normalized_roles + + # Determine if validation passed + validation_passed = len(errors) == 0 + + # If there are errors and we can retry, trigger retry + if errors and retry_count < max_retries: + if verbose: + print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count + 1}/{max_retries})") + for error in errors: + print(f" - {error}") + return { + **state, + "real_roles_with_access": normalized_roles, + "errors": errors, + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1 + } + + # Return final result + return { + **state, + "real_roles_with_access": normalized_roles, + "errors": errors, + "validation_passed": validation_passed, + "retry_count": retry_count + } + + +def _verify_semantic_mapping( + state: SingleRoleState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + verbose: bool, + max_retries: int, +) -> SingleRoleState: + """ + Semantically verify the role mapping using LLM. + + Asks the LLM whether the assigned realm roles correctly reflect the access + requirements for this client role given the policy description. On failure + the retry counter is incremented so the graph can loop back to + analyze_role_mapping. + + Args: + state: SingleRoleState with real_roles_with_access populated + llm: LLM instance for verification + verbose: Whether to print verification details + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed + + Returns: + Updated SingleRoleState with validation_passed and errors + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + real_roles_with_access = state.get("real_roles_with_access", []) + + verification_prompt = build_semantic_verification_prompt( + policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), + client_name=state.get("client_name", ""), + client_role=state["client_role"], + realm_roles=state["realm_roles"], + real_roles_with_access=real_roles_with_access, + ) + + try: + response = llm.invoke([HumanMessage(content=verification_prompt)]) + content = response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) + + mapping_match = re.search(r'MAPPING_CORRECT:\s*(YES|NO)', content, re.IGNORECASE) + explanation_match = re.search(r'EXPLANATION:\s*(.+?)$', content, re.DOTALL | re.IGNORECASE) + + mapping_correct = mapping_match.group(1).upper() == 'YES' if mapping_match else False + explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() if explanation_match else content + + if verbose: + status = 'YES' if mapping_correct else 'NO' + print( + f"\nSemantic verification [{state['client_name']}/{state['client_role']['name']}]:" + f" MAPPING_CORRECT={status}" + ) + if not mapping_correct: + print(f" {explanation}") + + if not mapping_correct: + error_msg = ( + f"Semantic mismatch for {state['client_name']}/{state['client_role']['name']}:" + f" {explanation}" + ) + if retry_count < max_retries: + return { + **state, + "errors": [error_msg], + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1, + } + return { + **state, + "errors": [error_msg], + "validation_passed": False, + } + + return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} + + except Exception as e: + # Allow the pipeline to proceed on transient errors (rate limits, etc.) + return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} + + +def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SingleRoleState, max_retries: int) -> str: + """ + Route after structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end. + + Returns: + "analyze_role_mapping" if structural errors remain and retries are available, + "verify_semantic_mapping" if structural validation passed, + END if structural errors remain but retries are exhausted + """ + validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + + if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: + return "analyze_role_mapping" + + if validation_passed: + return "verify_semantic_mapping" + + return END + + +def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SingleRoleState, max_retries: int) -> str: + """ + Determine if semantic verification failure should retry analyze_role_mapping. + + Returns: + "analyze_role_mapping" if semantic check failed and retries remain, + otherwise END to terminate the workflow + """ + validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + + if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: + return "analyze_role_mapping" + + return END + + +# ============================================================================ +# GRAPH CONSTRUCTION +# ============================================================================ + +def create_single_role_mapper_graph(config: SingleRoleMapperConfig): + """ + Create and compile the single role mapper graph. + + Args: + config: SingleRoleMapperConfig instance + + Returns: + Compiled LangGraph workflow + """ + + # Define node functions as closures with access to config + def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> SingleRoleState: + """Analyze which real roles should have access.""" + return _analyze_role_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose) + + def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> SingleRoleState: + """Validate structural correctness of the role mapping.""" + return _validate_role_mapping(state, config.verbose, config.max_retries) + + def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> SingleRoleState: + """Semantically verify the role mapping against the policy description.""" + return _verify_semantic_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose, config.max_retries) + + def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: + """Route after structural validation.""" + return _should_route_after_structural_validation(state, config.max_retries) + + def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: + """Determine if semantic failure should retry.""" + return _should_retry_after_semantic(state, config.max_retries) + + # Build the graph + workflow = StateGraph(SingleRoleState) + + # Add nodes + workflow.add_node("analyze_role_mapping", analyze_role_mapping_node) + workflow.add_node("validate_role_mapping", validate_role_mapping_node) + workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_mapping", verify_semantic_mapping_node) + + # Define edges + workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_role_mapping") + workflow.add_edge("analyze_role_mapping", "validate_role_mapping") + + # After structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "validate_role_mapping", + should_route_after_structure_node, + { + "analyze_role_mapping": "analyze_role_mapping", + "verify_semantic_mapping": "verify_semantic_mapping", + END: END, + } + ) + + # After semantic verification: retry or end + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "verify_semantic_mapping", + should_retry_after_semantic_node, + { + "analyze_role_mapping": "analyze_role_mapping", + END: END, + } + ) + + return workflow.compile() + + +# ============================================================================ +# MAIN CLASS +# ============================================================================ + +class SingleRoleMapper: + """ + AI-powered mapper for determining which real roles should have access to a client role. + + This class uses LangGraph to orchestrate a workflow that: + 1. Analyzes a client role, available real roles, and policy context + 2. Uses LLM to semantically match roles based on descriptions + 3. Validates the results + 4. Retries if validation fails + + Attributes: + config: SingleRoleMapperConfig instance + graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine + """ + + def __init__( + self, + llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + ): + """ + Initialize the single role mapper. + + Args: + llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. If not provided, creates a new + LLM instance using create_llm() + verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + # Create LLM if not provided + if llm is None: + llm_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "config" / "llm.env" + llm_instance = create_llm(env_path=llm_env_path, verbose=verbose) + else: + llm_instance = llm + + # Create configuration object + self.config = SingleRoleMapperConfig( + llm=llm_instance, + verbose=verbose, + max_retries=max_retries + ) + + # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine + self.graph = create_single_role_mapper_graph(self.config) + + def get_graph(self): + """ + Get the compiled graph for visualization or inspection. + + Returns: + Compiled LangGraph workflow + """ + return self.graph + + def map_role( + self, + policy_description: str, + client_name: str, + client_role: Dict[str, str], + realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], + ) -> Dict[str, Any]: + """ + Determine which real roles should have access to a client role. + + Args: + policy_description: Natural language policy description for context + client_name: Name of the client that owns the role + client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the client role + realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles + + Returns: + Dictionary containing: + - policy_description (str): The policy context used + - client_name (str): Name of the client + - client_role (str): Name of the client role analyzed + - real_roles_with_access (list): List of realm role names that should have access + - explanation (str): LLM's explanation of the mapping + - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) + - success (bool): True if mapping succeeded without errors + - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred + """ + # Initialize the workflow state + initial_state: SingleRoleState = { + "policy_description": policy_description, + "client_name": client_name, + "client_role": client_role, + "realm_roles": realm_roles, + "explanation": "", + "real_roles_with_access": [], + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True + } + + # Execute the LangGraph workflow + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) + + # Extract and return results + return { + "policy_description": policy_description, + "client_name": client_name, + "client_role": client_role['name'], + "real_roles_with_access": final_state["real_roles_with_access"], + "explanation": final_state["explanation"], + "errors": final_state["errors"], + "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, + "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0) + } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ff7021360 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +State Definitions for Single Role Mapper + +This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph +workflow for mapping a single client role to real roles that should have access. +""" + +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict +from operator import add + + +class SingleRoleState(TypedDict): + """ + State dictionary for the single role mapping LangGraph workflow. + + Attributes: + policy_description: Natural language policy description (context for the mapping) + client_name: Name of the client that owns the role + client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the client role to analyze + realm_roles: List of available realm roles with descriptions + explanation: LLM's explanation of which real roles should have access + real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names that should have access + messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) + errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) + retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made + validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded + """ + policy_description: str + client_name: str + client_role: Dict[str, str] + realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]] + explanation: str + real_roles_with_access: List[str] + messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation + errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt + retry_count: int + validation_passed: bool # Boolean flag for retry decision, not accumulated + +# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/utils/__init__.py b/aiac/src/agent/utils/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3ccfff21c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Parsing Utilities for Policy Builder + +This module contains functions for parsing LLM responses, extracting JSON +and explanations from formatted output. +""" + +import re +import json +from typing import Tuple, List + + +def extract_explanation_and_json(content: str) -> Tuple[str, List]: + """ + Extract explanation and JSON from formatted LLM output. + + This function parses the LLM's response to extract two components: + 1. The explanation text (from ```explanation``` block or pre-JSON text) + 2. The JSON data (from ```json``` block or plain JSON) + + It handles multiple formats: + - Markdown code blocks with ```explanation``` and ```json``` tags + - Plain text explanation followed by ```json``` block + - Plain text with "explanation" header followed by JSON array + - Plain JSON without code blocks (fallback) + + Args: + content: Raw LLM response content string + + Returns: + Tuple of (explanation_text, parsed_json_list) + Returns empty string and empty list if parsing fails + + Example: + >>> content = '''```explanation + ... Mapping admins to all roles + ... ``` + ... ```json + ... [{"role": "admin", "client_roles": [...]}] + ... ```''' + >>> explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) + """ + explanation = "" + + # Try to extract explanation from dedicated code block + explanation_match = re.search(r'```explanation\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*```', content) + if explanation_match: + explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() + else: + # Fallback 1: Try to extract explanation from text before JSON block + # Look for text before the first JSON code block + json_start = re.search(r'```json', content) + if json_start: + pre_json_text = content[:json_start.start()].strip() + # Remove markdown formatting (bold, italic, etc.) + pre_json_text = re.sub(r'\*\*([^*]+)\*\*', r'\1', pre_json_text) + # Only use if substantial (more than 10 characters) + if pre_json_text and len(pre_json_text) > 10: + explanation = pre_json_text + else: + # Fallback 2: Try to extract explanation from plain text with "explanation" header + # Pattern: "explanation\n- text\n- more text\n[{...}]" + explanation_header_match = re.search(r'^explanation\s*\n([\s\S]*?)(?=\[\s*\{)', content, re.IGNORECASE) + if explanation_header_match: + explanation = explanation_header_match.group(1).strip() + + # Try to extract JSON from markdown code blocks + code_block_patterns = [ + r'```json\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*```', # ```json ... ``` + r'```\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*```', # ``` ... ``` (generic) + ] + + for pattern in code_block_patterns: + match = re.search(pattern, content) + if match: + try: + return explanation, json.loads(match.group(1).strip()) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + # Try next pattern if this one fails + continue + + # Fallback: Try to find JSON array in plain text (after explanation header if present) + # Look for JSON array pattern: [ ... ] + json_array_match = re.search(r'\[\s*\{[\s\S]*\}\s*\]', content) + if json_array_match: + try: + return explanation, json.loads(json_array_match.group(0)) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + pass + + # Final fallback: Try plain JSON without code blocks + try: + return explanation, json.loads(content.strip()) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + # Return empty list if all parsing attempts fail + return explanation, [] + + +def print_explanation(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True): + """ + Print the LLM explanation in a formatted box. + + This function provides visual feedback to the user about how the LLM + interpreted and mapped the policy description. Only prints if verbose + mode is enabled. + + Args: + explanation: The explanation text to print + is_retry: Whether this is from a retry attempt (adds "(Retry)" label) + verbose: Whether to print the explanation + """ + if explanation and verbose: + print("\n" + "=" * 80) + print(f"LLM Explanation{' (Retry)' if is_retry else ''}:") + print("=" * 80) + print(explanation) + print("=" * 80 + "\n") + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a3a980641 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Validation Logic for Policy Builder + +This module contains functions for validating generated policies, including +structural validation and semantic verification using LLM. +""" + +from typing import Dict, List, Any + + +def validate_policy_structure( + policy: Dict[str, Any], + realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], + client_names: List[str], + client_roles_map: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, str]]] +) -> List[str]: + """ + Perform structural validation on the policy. + + Checks that all realm roles, clients, and client roles exist in the + configuration and that the policy structure is valid. + + Args: + policy: The policy dictionary to validate + realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles + client_names: List of valid client names + client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to list of role dicts with 'name' and 'description' + + Returns: + List of error messages (empty if validation passed) + """ + structural_errors = [] + + if not policy: + structural_errors.append("Policy is empty") + return structural_errors + + # Extract realm role names for validation + realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] + + # Validate that only preset names are used + for realm_role, client_role_mappings in policy.items(): + # Validate realm role name + if not realm_role: + structural_errors.append("Found empty realm role name") + elif realm_role not in realm_role_names: + structural_errors.append( + f"Realm role '{realm_role}' is not in the preset realm roles. " + f"Available roles: {', '.join(realm_role_names)}" + ) + + # Check if realm role has any mappings + if not client_role_mappings: + structural_errors.append( + f"Realm role '{realm_role}' has no client role mappings assigned" + ) + + # Validate each client role mapping + for mapping in client_role_mappings: + if not isinstance(mapping, dict): + structural_errors.append( + f"Invalid mapping format in realm role '{realm_role}': " + f"must be a dict with 'client' and 'role' keys" + ) + continue + + client = mapping.get('client', '') + role = mapping.get('role', '') + + # Validate client name + if not client: + structural_errors.append( + f"Found empty client name in realm role '{realm_role}'" + ) + elif client not in client_names: + structural_errors.append( + f"Client '{client}' in realm role '{realm_role}' is not in " + f"the preset client names. Available clients: {', '.join(client_names)}" + ) + + # Validate role name for the client + if not role: + structural_errors.append( + f"Found empty role name for client '{client}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" + ) + elif client in client_roles_map: + # Extract role names from the client roles map + client_role_names = [r['name'] for r in client_roles_map[client]] + if role not in client_role_names: + available_roles = ( + ', '.join(client_role_names) + if client_role_names + else '(none)' + ) + structural_errors.append( + f"Role '{role}' for client '{client}' in realm role '{realm_role}' " + f"is not valid. Available roles for {client}: {available_roles}" + ) + + return structural_errors + + + diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..54bbe5000 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import yaml +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from .models import User, RealmRole, Client, ClientScope, ClientRole, RoleMappings + +load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") + +_CONFIG_ENV_VAR = "AC_CONFIG_PATH" + + +def _load() -> dict: + env_val = os.getenv(_CONFIG_ENV_VAR) + if not env_val: + raise RuntimeError(f"{_CONFIG_ENV_VAR} is not set") + with open(Path(env_val)) as f: + return yaml.safe_load(f) + + +def _parse_client_roles(roles_raw: list) -> list[ClientRole]: + result = [] + for r in roles_raw: + if isinstance(r, dict): + name = r["name"] + description = r.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(r) + description = None + result.append(ClientRole(id=name, name=name, description=description, composite=False, clientRole=True)) + return result + + +def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: + raise NotImplementedError("get_users is not supported from config") + + +def get_realm_roles(realm: str) -> list[RealmRole]: + roles_raw = _load().get("realm_roles", []) + result = [] + for r in roles_raw: + if isinstance(r, dict): + name = r["name"] + description = r.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(r) + description = None + result.append(RealmRole(id=name, name=name, description=description, composite=False, clientRole=False)) + return result + + +def get_clients(realm: str) -> list[Client]: + clients_raw = _load().get("clients", []) + result = [] + for c in clients_raw: + if isinstance(c, dict): + client_id = c.get("client_id", "") + name = c.get("name") or None + else: + client_id = str(c) + name = None + result.append(Client(id=client_id, clientId=client_id, name=name, enabled=True, protocol=None, publicClient=False)) + return result + + +def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: + raise NotImplementedError("get_client_scopes is not supported from config") + + +def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, realm: str) -> RoleMappings: + raise NotImplementedError("get_user_role_mappings is not supported from config") + + +def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: + clients_raw = _load().get("clients", []) + for c in clients_raw: + if isinstance(c, dict) and c.get("client_id") == client_id: + return _parse_client_roles(c.get("roles", [])) + return [] + + +def assign_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: + raise NotImplementedError("assign_client_roles is not supported from config") + + +def revoke_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: + raise NotImplementedError("revoke_client_roles is not supported from config") + + +# Convenience helpers (not in api.py) — return dicts for LLM-facing code + +def get_client_roles_map(realm: str) -> dict[str, list[dict]]: + clients_raw = _load().get("clients", []) + result = {} + for c in clients_raw: + if not isinstance(c, dict) or "client_id" not in c: + continue + client_id = c["client_id"] + roles = [] + for r in c.get("roles", []): + if isinstance(r, dict): + roles.append({"name": r["name"], "description": r.get("description", "")}) + else: + roles.append({"name": str(r), "description": ""}) + result[client_id] = roles + return result + + +def get_client_names(realm: str) -> list[str]: + return list(get_client_roles_map(realm).keys()) diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fcfff6b0c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# Client configurations with roles +# Each client can have multiple roles, each role gets its own audience scope +# Optional 'secret' parameter: if not provided, Keycloak will auto-generate the client secret +clients: + - client_id: "kagenti" + secret: "demo-ui-secret" + direct_access_grants: true + roles: + - name: "demo-ui" + description: "Access to the demo UI interface" + - client_id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" + secret: "github-agent-secret" + direct_access_grants: true + roles: + - name: "github-agent" + description: "Provides access to GitHub services" + - client_id: "github-tool" + secret: "github-tool-secret" + roles: + - name: "github-tool-aud" + description: "Provides access to public GitHub repositories" + - name: "github-full-access" + description: "Provides access to private GitHub repositories" + +# Realm roles (can be composites of client roles) +realm_roles: + - name: "developer" + description: "R&D team members" + - name: "tech-support" + description: "Technical support staff providing customer assistance" + - name: "sales" + description: "Sales team members managing customer relationships" + +# User configurations +users: + - username: "alice" + roles: + - "developer" + + - username: "bob" + roles: + - "tech-support" + + - username: "charlie" + roles: + - "sales" + diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4ac008868 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# Expected policy for permissive_policy.txt +# Policy Description: +# * Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories +# * Other personnel can access public github repositories only + +policy: + developer: + - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + role: github-agent + - client: github-tool + role: github-tool-aud + - client: github-tool + role: github-full-access + tech-support: + - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + role: github-agent + - client: github-tool + role: github-tool-aud + sales: + - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + role: github-agent + - client: github-tool + role: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1221d09c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# Expected policy for regular_policy.txt +# Policy Description: +# * Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories +# * Other technical personnel can access public github repositories only + +policy: + developer: + - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + role: github-agent + - client: github-tool + role: github-tool-aud + - client: github-tool + role: github-full-access + tech-support: + - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + role: github-agent + - client: github-tool + role: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt b/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3f3625222 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +* Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories +* Other personnel can access public github repositories only \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt b/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b13fc7e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +* Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories +* Other technical personnel can access public github repositories only \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ef9d6a49c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +"""Tests for aiac_agent.config.llm_config.load_llm_config (env-only, no network).""" + +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from aiac_agent.config.llm_config import ( + DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES, + DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS, + DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE, + DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, + load_llm_config_from_env as load_llm_config, +) + + +_LLM_VARS = ( + "LLM_MODEL", + "LLM_ENDPOINT", + "LLM_API_KEY", + "LLM_TEMPERATURE", + "LLM_MAX_TOKENS", + "LLM_TIMEOUT", + "LLM_MAX_RETRIES", +) + + +@pytest.fixture +def clean_llm_env(monkeypatch): + """Strip every LLM_* var so each test starts from a clean slate.""" + for key in _LLM_VARS: + monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False) + return monkeypatch + + +MISSING = Path("/nonexistent/llm.env") # Skip the dotenv branch. + + +def test_loads_required_and_optional_vars(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "https://example/v1") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_API_KEY", "sk-test") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.model == "openai/gpt-4o" + assert cfg.endpoint == "https://example/v1" + assert cfg.api_key == "sk-test" + + +def test_endpoint_and_key_are_optional(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.endpoint is None + assert cfg.api_key is None + + +def test_empty_endpoint_and_key_treated_as_unset(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_API_KEY", "") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.endpoint is None + assert cfg.api_key is None + + +def test_model_is_stripped(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", " anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 ") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "https://example.com") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_API_KEY", "test-key") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.model == "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6" + + +def test_rejects_missing_model(clean_llm_env): + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="LLM_MODEL"): + load_llm_config(MISSING) + + +def test_rejects_blank_model(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", " ") + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="LLM_MODEL"): + load_llm_config(MISSING) + + +def test_default_generation_params(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.temperature == DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE + assert cfg.max_tokens == DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS + assert cfg.timeout == DEFAULT_TIMEOUT + assert cfg.retries == DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES + + +def test_overrides_generation_params_from_env(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TEMPERATURE", "0.7") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_TOKENS", "1024") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TIMEOUT", "60") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_RETRIES", "5") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.temperature == 0.7 + assert cfg.max_tokens == 1024 + assert cfg.timeout == 60 + assert cfg.retries == 5 + + +def test_blank_generation_params_fall_back_to_defaults(clean_llm_env): + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TEMPERATURE", "") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_TOKENS", "") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TIMEOUT", "") + clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_RETRIES", "") + + cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) + assert cfg.temperature == DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE + assert cfg.max_tokens == DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS + assert cfg.timeout == DEFAULT_TIMEOUT + assert cfg.retries == DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES + + +def test_loads_from_dotenv_file(clean_llm_env, tmp_path): + env_file = tmp_path / "llm.env" + env_file.write_text( + "LLM_MODEL=ollama/llama3\n" + "LLM_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:11434\n" + "LLM_TEMPERATURE=0.3\n" + ) + + cfg = load_llm_config(env_file) + assert cfg.model == "ollama/llama3" + assert cfg.endpoint == "http://localhost:11434" + assert cfg.temperature == 0.3 diff --git a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..677d6cdb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +""" +Integration tests for policy generation. + +These tests generate policies from natural language descriptions and compare +them with expected YAML outputs. They require an LLM to be configured. + +To run all tests (including integration tests): + pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py + +To skip integration tests (they require LLM access): + pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py -m "not integration" + +To run ONLY integration tests: + pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py -m integration + +To run the manually skipped test (test_generate_policy_from_fixtures): + 1. Ensure LLM is configured in aiac_agent/config/llm.env + 2. Remove or comment out the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on line 111 + 3. Run: pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py::test_generate_policy_from_fixtures -v +""" + +import pytest +import yaml +from pathlib import Path +from unittest.mock import Mock, patch + +from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder +from config import create_llm + + +# Mark all tests in this module as integration tests +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + + +@pytest.fixture +def fixtures_dir(): + """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" + return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" + + +@pytest.fixture +def config_file(): + """Return path to the main config.yaml file.""" + return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" + + +@pytest.fixture +def policy_files(fixtures_dir): + """Return list of policy text files to test.""" + policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" + return sorted(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) + + +@pytest.fixture(params=[ + "claude-haiku", + "gpt-nano", + "gemini", + "gpt-oss" +]) +def llm_model_name(request): + """Return model name for parametrized testing.""" + return request.param + + +@pytest.fixture +def llm_instance(llm_model_name): + """Create LLM instance from YAML config.""" + return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) + + +def normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_content: str) -> dict: + """ + Parse YAML and extract just the policy structure for comparison. + + This ignores comments and formatting differences, focusing only on + the actual policy data structure. + + Args: + yaml_content: YAML string content + + Returns: + Dictionary containing the policy structure + """ + data = yaml.safe_load(yaml_content) + return data.get("policy", {}) + + +def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: + """ + Compare two policy structures and return differences. + + Requires exact equality: every realm role and client-role mapping in + *expected* must appear in *generated*, and *generated* must not contain + any extra roles or mappings beyond what *expected* specifies. + + Args: + generated: Generated policy structure + expected: Expected policy structure + + Returns: + Tuple of (policies_match: bool, differences: list[str]) + """ + differences = [] + + generated_roles = set(generated.keys()) + expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) + + missing_roles = expected_roles - generated_roles + if missing_roles: + differences.append(f"Missing realm roles: {missing_roles}") + + extra_roles = generated_roles - expected_roles + if extra_roles: + differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm roles: {extra_roles}") + + for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: + generated_mappings = generated[role] + expected_mappings = expected[role] + + gen_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in generated_mappings} + exp_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in expected_mappings} + + missing_mappings = exp_set - gen_set + if missing_mappings: + differences.append( + f"Role '{role}' missing mappings: {missing_mappings}" + ) + + extra_mappings = gen_set - exp_set + if extra_mappings: + differences.append( + f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra mappings: {extra_mappings}" + ) + + return len(differences) == 0, differences + + +# @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with configured LLM") +def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): + """ + Test policy generation for all fixture files with multiple LLM models. + + This test: + 1. Reads each policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt + 2. Generates a policy using PolicyBuilder with the specified LLM + 3. Compares with expected YAML in fixtures/expected/*.yaml + + The test is parametrized to run with 4 different LLM models: + - claude-haiku + - gpt-nano + - gemini + - gpt-oss + """ + if not policy_files: + pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") + + # Create PolicyBuilder instance with the parametrized LLM + builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) + + # Use model name for error reporting + model_name = llm_model_name + + failures = [] + + for policy_file in policy_files: + # Read policy description + policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() + + # Determine expected output file + expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + + if not expected_file.exists(): + failures.append( + f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: No expected output file found at {expected_file}" + ) + continue + + # Read expected output + expected_yaml = expected_file.read_text() + expected_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(expected_yaml) + + # Generate policy + try: + result = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) + + if not result["success"]: + failures.append( + f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: Generation failed with errors: {result['errors']}" + ) + continue + + # Parse generated YAML + generated_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(result["yaml_output"]) + + # Compare policies + match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) + + if not match: + failures.append( + f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: Generated policy doesn't match expected:\n" + + "\n".join(f" - {diff}" for diff in differences) + ) + + except Exception as e: + failures.append(f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: Exception during generation: {e}") + + # Report all failures at once + if failures: + pytest.fail( + f"Policy generation tests failed for model {model_name}:\n\n" + "\n\n".join(failures) + ) + + +def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): + """ + Test that PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure. + + This test bypasses LLM calls and directly tests the YAML generation logic. + """ + from full_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml + from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState + + # Create a valid policy state with all required PolicyState fields + state: PolicyState = { + "description": "Test policy description", + "explanation": "Test explanation", + "policy_structure": { + "policy": { + "developer": [ + {"client": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"}, + {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} + ] + } + }, + "parsed_scopes": [], + "yaml_output": "", + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True + } + + # Generate YAML + result_state = _generate_yaml(state) + + # Verify YAML was generated + assert "yaml_output" in result_state + yaml_output = result_state["yaml_output"] + + # Verify YAML contains expected content + assert "policy:" in yaml_output + assert "developer:" in yaml_output + assert "kagenti" in yaml_output + assert "demo-ui" in yaml_output + assert "# Access Control Policy" in yaml_output + assert "# Original Policy Description:" in yaml_output + assert "Test policy description" in yaml_output + + +def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file): + """ + Test that invalid policies are caught by validation. + + This test uses a mock LLM that returns an invalid policy structure + to verify that validation catches errors. + """ + # Create a mock LLM that returns an invalid policy (unknown role) + mock_llm = Mock() + mock_response = Mock() + mock_response.content = """ + ```json + [ + { + "role": "unknown-role", + "client_roles": [ + {"client": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"} + ] + } + ] + ``` + """ + mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + + # Create PolicyBuilder with mock LLM + builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) + + # Generate policy + result = builder.generate_policy("Invalid policy description") + + # Verify validation caught the error + assert not result["success"], "Expected validation to fail for unknown role" + assert len(result["errors"]) > 0 + assert any("unknown-role" in str(err).lower() for err in result["errors"]) + + +def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file): + """Test that PolicyBuilder initializes correctly with config file.""" + # Create a mock LLM to avoid requiring actual LLM configuration + mock_llm = Mock() + + builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) + + # Verify configuration was loaded + # realm_roles are now dicts with 'name' and 'description' + realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in builder.realm_roles] + assert realm_role_names == ["developer", "tech-support", "sales"] + + # Verify clients were loaded + assert "kagenti" in builder.client_roles_map + assert "github-tool" in builder.client_roles_map + assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.client_roles_map + + # Verify client roles are dicts with 'name' and 'description' + kagenti_roles = builder.client_roles_map["kagenti"] + assert len(kagenti_roles) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(role, dict) and 'name' in role for role in kagenti_roles) + + +def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): + """Verify that fixture files are present and properly structured.""" + policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" + expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" + + assert policies_dir.exists(), "Policies directory not found" + assert expected_dir.exists(), "Expected directory not found" + + policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) + assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No policy fixture files found" + + # Check that each policy file has a corresponding expected file + for policy_file in policy_files: + expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + assert expected_file.exists(), ( + f"Missing expected output for {policy_file.name}: {expected_file}" + ) + + # Verify expected file is valid YAML + try: + yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) + except yaml.YAMLError as e: + pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {e}") + From c95f35901e4efe97260b5066afd93d56e48fa39d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 10:50:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 006/273] docs(aiac): refine AIAC Agent endpoints, onboarding graph, and library API MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Add `build` endpoint (diff-only full rebuild) alongside `rebuild` (nuke + re-apply) - Remove `client/{id}/role/{id}` and `client-scope/{id}` endpoints - Split single graph into Policy Update Graph and Client Onboarding Graph - Add client onboarding preprocessing subgraph: classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_client - Introduce ClientType, Skill, ClientInfo, ClientProvision, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition types; split AgentState into BaseAgentState, PolicyUpdateState, OnboardingState - Add clear_assignments node for rebuild (calls revoke_all_role_assignments) - Split nodes.py → nodes_shared/nodes_policy/nodes_onboarding; graph.py → onboarding_graph/policy_update_graph - Add provisioned field to success response - Add three new library API functions: create_client_role, create_client_scope, revoke_all_role_assignments - Add three new Keycloak Configuration Service endpoints with main.py behavior Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md | 22 ++- .../requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md | 184 +++++++++++++----- .../PRD/components/keycloak-service.md | 8 +- .../requirements/PRD/components/library.md | 22 ++- 4 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md index 74db57ff0..161bdebaf 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md @@ -67,13 +67,27 @@ Policy / domain knowledge ingestion (operator-driven): Role enforcement (event-driven): + Policy update triggers (build, rebuild, user, realm-role): + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] - │ + │ (rebuild only: revoke all role assignments first) ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply diff] + + Client onboarding trigger (client/{id}): + + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► kagenti-operator [retrieve ClientInfo (type, description, skills)] + ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ClientProvision] + ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision roles + scopes] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] + ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] + └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply diff] ``` ### Component dependencies @@ -85,7 +99,7 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): | `aiac.keycloak.library.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts, LangGraph agents | Keycloak Configuration Service (HTTP) | Pydantic model instances | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API | — | -| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers, orchestrators | `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API | Applied/revoked role diff | +| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers, orchestrators | `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API, kagenti-operator | Applied/revoked role diff; provisioned client roles/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions @@ -100,7 +114,7 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): ## 3. Component: Keycloak Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies the Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes 8 endpoints (6 reads + assign + revoke). Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies the Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes 11 endpoints (6 reads + assign + revoke + create client role + create client scope + revoke all role assignments). Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. **Full spec:** [components/keycloak-service.md](components/keycloak-service.md) @@ -119,7 +133,7 @@ Python package at `aiac/src/`. Two submodules: ## 5. Component: AIAC Agent -LangGraph `StateGraph` (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Six `/apply/*` endpoints trigger a conditional workflow: three-way parallel fan-out (policy fetch from `aiac-policies` + domain knowledge fetch from `aiac-domain-knowledge` + Keycloak state fetch) → LLM propose diff → LLM validate diff → apply or abort. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +LangGraph `StateGraph` (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Five `/apply/*` endpoints dispatch to one of two compiled graphs. The **Policy Update Graph** handles `build`, `rebuild`, `user/{id}`, and `realm-role/{id}` triggers: three-way parallel fan-out (policy fetch + domain knowledge fetch + Keycloak state fetch) → LLM propose diff → LLM validate diff → apply or abort. The **Client Onboarding Graph** handles `client/{id}` triggers: classify client type via Keycloak + kagenti-operator → LLM analyze (agent or tool) → provision roles/scopes in Keycloak → same fan-out → diff → validate → apply or abort. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md index dc3c3e29e..793439100 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -1,29 +1,61 @@ # Component PRD: AIAC Agent ## Description -A LangGraph-based AI agent that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live Keycloak state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or a full rebuild request. On each invocation the Agent: +A LangGraph-based AI agent that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live Keycloak state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or full build/rebuild requests. The agent runs two compiled `StateGraph` instances: -1. In parallel: retrieves policy chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-policies`), retrieves domain context chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-domain-knowledge`), and reads the relevant Keycloak state via `aiac.library.api`. -2. Interprets the policy and domain context against the current state using an LLM, producing a typed `ProposedDiff`. -3. Validates the diff (existence check, safety guard rails, LLM re-confirmation, scope check). -4. On validation pass: applies changes immediately via `assign_client_roles` and `revoke_client_roles`. On failure: returns a structured error with no changes applied. +- **Policy Update Graph** — handles `build`, `rebuild`, `user/{id}`, and `realm-role/{id}` triggers. Computes role assignment diffs and applies them. +- **Client Onboarding Graph** — handles `client/{id}` triggers. Classifies the new client, provisions its roles and scopes in Keycloak via an LLM-derived `ClientProvision`, then computes and applies mapping diffs. + +On each invocation both graphs: + +1. In parallel: retrieve policy chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-policies`), retrieve domain context chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-domain-knowledge`), and read the relevant Keycloak state via `aiac.library.api`. +2. Interpret the policy and domain context against the current state using an LLM, producing a typed `ProposedDiff`. +3. Validate the diff (existence check, safety guard rails, LLM re-confirmation, scope check). +4. On validation pass: apply changes immediately via `assign_client_roles` and `revoke_client_roles`. On failure: return a structured error with no changes applied. + +The Client Onboarding Graph additionally runs a preprocessing subgraph before step 1: it classifies the client type (Agent or Tool), derives its Keycloak roles and scopes via an LLM call, and provisions them via `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` before the policy diff phase begins. ## Graph design -Structured conditional workflow (`StateGraph`) — not ReAct. LLM is confined to `propose_diff` and `validate_diff` nodes only. A single compiled graph instance is shared by all six endpoints; trigger type and entity ID are passed as initial state. +Two compiled `StateGraph` instances sharing a common set of node functions. Both graphs share `BaseAgentState` as the base state schema. Trigger type and entity ID are passed as initial state. + +### Policy Update Graph + +``` +START → (if rebuild: clear_assignments →) [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → [apply_diff | abort] → format_response → END +``` + +Handles triggers: `build`, `rebuild`, `user/{id}`, `realm-role/{id}`. + +- For `rebuild`: `clear_assignments` runs first (calls `revoke_all_role_assignments(realm)`), then the parallel fetch fan-out proceeds against the now-empty state. The `propose_diff` node receives an empty `keycloak_snapshot` and produces an assign-only diff. +- For `build` and all other triggers: no `clear_assignments`; proceeds directly to the parallel fetch fan-out and computes a minimal diff against live state. + +### Client Onboarding Graph ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → [apply_diff | abort] → format_response → END +START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_client → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → [apply_diff | abort] → format_response → END ``` -### State schema (`AgentState`) +Handles trigger: `client/{id}`. + +- `classify_client`: queries Keycloak and the kagenti-operator to determine client type and retrieve `ClientInfo`. See **kagenti-operator dependency note** below. +- `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node that produces a `ClientProvision` from `ClientInfo`. `analyze_agent` uses agent description + skill list; `analyze_tool` uses description only. Routing is a conditional edge on `ClientInfo.client_type`. +- `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. Runs before `fetch_keycloak_state` so provisioned roles/scopes are visible in the snapshot. + +> **kagenti-operator dependency:** `classify_client` queries the kagenti-operator API to retrieve the Agent Card (for `ClientType.agent`) or tool description (for `ClientType.tool`). The kagenti-operator API contract for this query is defined in a separate investigation. + +### State schema + +#### `BaseAgentState` + +Shared by both graphs. | Field | Type | Description | |-------|------|-------------| | `trigger` | `TriggerContext` | Endpoint type + entity ID | | `realm` | `str` | Keycloak realm (from `KEYCLOAK_REALM`) | | `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection | -| `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Org/business context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; `[]` when the collection is empty — non-fatal | +| `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Org/business context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge`; `[]` when empty — non-fatal | | `keycloak_snapshot` | `KeycloakSnapshot` | Scoped Keycloak data for this trigger | | `proposed_diff` | `ProposedDiff \| None` | LLM output | | `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from `validate_diff` | @@ -31,6 +63,19 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → | `revoked` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed revocations | | `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation (from LLM `reasoning` field) | +#### `PolicyUpdateState` + +Extends `BaseAgentState`. No additional fields. + +#### `OnboardingState` + +Extends `BaseAgentState`. Additional fields: + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `client_info` | `ClientInfo \| None` | Client type, description, and skills — populated by `classify_client` | +| `client_provision` | `ClientProvision \| None` | Roles and scopes to create — populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | + ### State types (`state.py`) `KeycloakSnapshot` is a Pydantic `BaseModel` that reuses model classes from `aiac.library.models`. All fields are optional with empty defaults — each trigger type populates only the relevant subset: @@ -45,6 +90,37 @@ class KeycloakSnapshot(BaseModel): user_role_mappings: dict[str, RoleMappings] = {} # user_id → mappings ``` +Client onboarding types: + +```python +class ClientType(str, Enum): + agent = "agent" + tool = "tool" + +class Skill(BaseModel): + id: str + name: str + description: str + +class ClientInfo(BaseModel): + client_type: ClientType + description: str + skills: list[Skill] = [] + +class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + +class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + +class ClientProvision(BaseModel): + roles: list[RoleDefinition] + scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] + reasoning: str +``` + ### LLM output schema (`ProposedDiff`) ```python @@ -70,35 +146,45 @@ LLM is called via `llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff)` using `langchain-op - System message: auditor role ("verify this diff correctly implements the policy"). - User message: proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks (auditor receives the same context as the planner to enable full re-confirmation). +**Analyze Agent prompt** (`analyze_agent` node): +- System message: provisioner role ("derive the minimal set of Keycloak roles and scopes for this agent from its description and skills"). +- User message: `ClientInfo` rendered as structured text — description paragraph followed by a skill list (id, name, description per skill). + +**Analyze Tool prompt** (`analyze_tool` node): +- System message: provisioner role ("derive the minimal set of Keycloak roles and scopes for this tool from its description"). +- User message: `ClientInfo.description`. + +All four prompt templates are defined as named constants in `prompts.py`: `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`, `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM`, `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM`. + ### `fetch_policy` and `fetch_domain_knowledge` — RAG query strings per trigger type Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings. The query is derived from the **trigger TYPE only** (not the entity ID). | Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | |---------|--------------------------| +| `build` | `"all access control rules"` | | `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | | `user/{id}` | `"user role assignment rules"` | | `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | | `client/{id}` | `"client access control rules"` | -| `client/{id}/role/{id}` | `"client role assignment rules"` | -| `client-scope/{id}` | `"client scope access control rules"` | -- `fetch_policy` queries `aiac-policies` and stores results in `AgentState.policy_chunks`. -- `fetch_domain_knowledge` queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` and stores results in `AgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when the collection is empty — non-fatal, the agent continues with empty domain context. +- `fetch_policy` queries `aiac-policies` and stores results in `BaseAgentState.policy_chunks`. +- `fetch_domain_knowledge` queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` and stores results in `BaseAgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when the collection is empty — non-fatal, the agent continues with empty domain context. - Both nodes share `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` (tenacity retry policy) and return HTTP 503 when ChromaDB is unavailable. Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`), shared across both nodes. ### `fetch_keycloak_state` — Keycloak data scope per trigger type +For the `client/{id}` trigger, `fetch_keycloak_state` runs after `provision_client` in the Client Onboarding Graph so that freshly created roles and scopes are visible in the snapshot. + | Trigger | Fetches via `aiac.library.api` | |---------|----------------------------------------| +| `build` | All users; all clients + their roles; all realm roles; all role mappings for all users | | `rebuild` | All users; all clients + their roles; all realm roles; all role mappings for all users | | `user/{id}` | That user's current role mappings; all clients + their roles | | `realm-role/{id}` | All users; all realm roles | | `client/{id}` | All users; that client's roles; all role mappings for all users | -| `client/{id}/role/{id}` | All users; that client's roles; all role mappings for all users | -| `client-scope/{id}` | All client scopes; all clients; all users | ### `validate_diff` — validation checks (binary abort on any failure) @@ -109,25 +195,30 @@ Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`), shared across bot ## Endpoints -| Method | Path | Description | -|--------|------|-------------| -| POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Full rebuild — recompute all mappings from current Keycloak state and policy RAG, apply immediately | -| POST | `/apply/user/{user_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a user addition or removal | -| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a realm role addition or removal | -| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a client addition or removal | -| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}/role/{role_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a client role addition or removal | -| POST | `/apply/client-scope/{scope_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a client scope addition or removal | +| Method | Path | Description | Graph | +|--------|------|-------------|-------| +| POST | `/apply/build` | Full diff-only rebuild — compute diff against live Keycloak state, apply only required changes | Policy update | +| POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Full nuke + rebuild — clear all role assignments, then recompute and apply from scratch | Policy update | +| POST | `/apply/user/{user_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a user addition or removal | Policy update | +| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a realm role addition or removal | Policy update | +| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Classify and provision a new client, then recompute and apply access mappings | Onboarding | + +Success response (policy update graph): + +```json +{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } +``` -Success response: +Success response (onboarding graph): ```json -{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "..." } +{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } ``` -Abort response (validation failure): +Abort response (validation failure, both graphs): ```json -{ "applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...] } +{ "applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } ``` ## Configuration @@ -158,24 +249,28 @@ ChromaDB collections queried: `aiac-policies` (policy fetch) and `aiac-domain-kn ``` aiac/src/aiac/agent/ -├── __init__.py ← empty +├── __init__.py ← empty ├── service/ -│ ├── __init__.py ← empty -│ ├── main.py ← FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint -│ ├── routes.py ← all six /apply/* route handlers -│ ├── Dockerfile ← Docker image (build context: aiac/src/) -│ └── requirements.txt ← Python dependencies +│ ├── __init__.py ← empty +│ ├── main.py ← FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint +│ ├── routes.py ← five /apply/* route handlers +│ ├── Dockerfile ← Docker image (build context: aiac/src/) +│ └── requirements.txt ← Python dependencies └── agent/ - ├── __init__.py ← empty - ├── state.py ← AgentState, TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, - │ ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict - ├── prompts.py ← planner system prompt template, - │ auditor system prompt template - ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge, fetch_keycloak_state, - │ propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response - └── graph.py ← StateGraph definition, edge wiring, compiled graph instance (singleton); - per-trigger helpers: run_rebuild, run_user, run_realm_role, - run_client, run_client_role, run_client_scope + ├── __init__.py ← empty + ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, PolicyUpdateState, OnboardingState, + │ TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, + │ ValidationVerdict, ClientType, Skill, ClientInfo, + │ RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ClientProvision + ├── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM, + │ ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM + ├── nodes_shared.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge, fetch_keycloak_state, + │ propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response + ├── nodes_policy.py ← clear_assignments + ├── nodes_onboarding.py ← classify_client, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_client + ├── onboarding_graph.py ← Client Onboarding StateGraph singleton + run_client helper + └── policy_update_graph.py ← Policy Update StateGraph singleton + run_build, run_rebuild, + run_user, run_realm_role helpers ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): @@ -188,12 +283,13 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile \ ## Error handling -All upstream calls (`fetch_policy`, `fetch_keycloak_state`, `propose_diff`, `validate_diff`) are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. +All upstream calls (`fetch_policy`, `fetch_keycloak_state`, `propose_diff`, `validate_diff`, `classify_client`, `provision_client`) are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. | Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | |----------|------------------------------| | ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | | Keycloak Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| kagenti-operator | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md index ba3cb963a..2ca355c6c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -18,10 +18,13 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns ra | GET | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles` | Roles defined for a specific client | | POST | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | Assign client roles to a user | | DELETE | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | Revoke client roles from a user | +| POST | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles` | Create a new role for a specific client | +| POST | `/clients/{client_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` then `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create a realm-level scope and assign it to a client as a default scope (atomic) | +| DELETE | `/role-mappings` | loop: `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` → per user `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{id}/role-mappings` → `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` per client | Revoke all client role assignments for all users in the realm | Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. -The GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `clientMappings` fields. The POST and DELETE endpoints accept a JSON array of role representation objects in the request body and return `204 No Content` on success. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. +The GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `clientMappings` fields. The POST and DELETE endpoints for role-mapping operations accept a JSON array of role representation objects in the request body and return `204 No Content` on success. `POST /clients/{client_id}/roles` and `POST /clients/{client_id}/scopes` accept a JSON object with `name` and `description` fields and return `201 Created` with the created resource as JSON. `DELETE /role-mappings` returns `204 No Content` on success. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. ## Configuration @@ -66,4 +69,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/ - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. - POST `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}`: assign the provided roles and return `Response(status_code=204)`. - DELETE `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}`: revoke the provided roles and return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- POST `/clients/{client_id}/roles`: call `admin.create_client_role(client_id, {"name": ..., "description": ...})`; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created role representation. +- POST `/clients/{client_id}/scopes`: call `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the realm-level scope, then call `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(client_id, scope_id)` to assign it to the client; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created scope representation. +- DELETE `/role-mappings`: fetch all users; for each user fetch role mappings; for each client key in `clientMappings` call `admin.delete_client_roles_of_user(user_id, client_id, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)` when all revocations complete. - On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md index 5a1697a56..df6e8cb2f 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ python-dotenv ### Functions -All eight functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter, forwarded to the Service as `?realm=`. +All eleven functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter, forwarded to the Service as `?realm=`. ```python def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: ... @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: ... def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: ... def assign_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: ... def revoke_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: ... +def create_client_role(client_id: str, role_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> ClientRole: ... +def create_client_scope(client_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> ClientScope: ... +def revoke_all_role_assignments(realm: str) -> None: ... ``` Each read function: @@ -155,6 +158,23 @@ Each read function: 2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 3. Return `None` on success. +`create_client_role`: +1. Issues `POST {AC_SERVICE_URL}/clients/{client_id}/roles` with body `{"name": role_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Returns the created `ClientRole` instance parsed from the response. + +`create_client_scope`: +1. Issues `POST {AC_SERVICE_URL}/clients/{client_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the client as a default scope in a single atomic operation. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +4. Returns the created `ClientScope` instance parsed from the response. + +`revoke_all_role_assignments`: +1. Issues `DELETE {AC_SERVICE_URL}/role-mappings`, appending `?realm=`. +2. The service iterates all users in the realm, fetches each user's role mappings, and revokes all client role assignments. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +4. Returns `None` on success. + ### Configuration Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. From 2bd52fa9d025d30f11ec891b9d2af54b57a1e35e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 11:07:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 007/273] docs(aiac): flatten requirements structure and remove Specification folder MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Promote PRD.md and components/ from requirements/PRD/ up to requirements/ and delete the requirements/Specification/ directory. Relative hyperlinks in PRD.md and component files are unchanged — both PRD.md and components/ moved together, preserving their relative paths. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/PRD.md | 0 .../Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml | 186 ------------------ .../components/keycloak-service.yaml | 52 ----- .../Specification/components/library.yaml | 86 -------- .../components/rag-ingest-service.yaml | 83 -------- .../components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml | 30 --- .../Specification/specification.yaml | 64 ------ .../{PRD => }/components/aiac-agent.md | 0 .../{PRD => }/components/keycloak-service.md | 0 .../{PRD => }/components/library.md | 0 .../components/rag-ingest-service.md | 0 .../components/rag-knowledge-base.md | 0 12 files changed, 501 deletions(-) rename aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/PRD.md (100%) delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml rename aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/components/aiac-agent.md (100%) rename aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/components/keycloak-service.md (100%) rename aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/components/library.md (100%) rename aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/components/rag-ingest-service.md (100%) rename aiac/inception/requirements/{PRD => }/components/rag-knowledge-base.md (100%) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/PRD.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 0dee020bb..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/aiac-agent.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,186 +0,0 @@ -- Title: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) Agent -- Description: > - LangGraph-based agent that configures Keycloak access rules from a policy written in - human language. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or a full rebuild - request. Retrieves the standing policy from the RAG knowledge base, reads current - Keycloak state via aiac.library.api, interprets the policy against the changed - state, computes the required RBAC diff, validates it, and applies role assignments and - revocations immediately. -- Graph: - - Type: Structured conditional workflow (LangGraph StateGraph) — not ReAct. - LLM is confined to propose_diff and validate_diff nodes only. - - Single compiled graph: one graph.compile() instance (module-level singleton exported from graph.py) - shared by all six FastAPI endpoints. Trigger type and entity ID are passed as initial state; - nodes branch internally on trigger type. - - State schema (AgentState TypedDict): - - trigger: TriggerContext — endpoint type (rebuild | user | realm-role | client | client-role | client-scope) + entity ID - - realm: str — Keycloak realm, from KEYCLOAK_REALM env var - - policy_chunks: list[str] — policy text chunks retrieved from aiac-policies ChromaDB collection - - domain_knowledge_chunks: list[str] — org/business context chunks retrieved from - aiac-domain-knowledge ChromaDB collection. Empty list when the collection has no - content — non-fatal, agent continues with empty domain context. - - keycloak_snapshot: KeycloakSnapshot — scoped Keycloak data fetched for this trigger - - proposed_diff: ProposedDiff | None — LLM output from propose_diff node - - validation_errors: list[str] — errors from validate_diff node - - applied: list[RoleAssignment] — role assignments executed - - revoked: list[RoleAssignment] — role revocations executed - - summary: str — human-readable explanation (from LLM reasoning field) - - Nodes: - - fetch_policy: queries ChromaDB aiac-policies collection using a trigger-scoped - similarity search query derived from trigger type (not entity ID). - Query strings by trigger type: - rebuild → "all access control rules" - user → "user role assignment rules" - realm-role → "realm role assignment rules" - client → "client access control rules" - client-role → "client role assignment rules" - client-scope → "client scope access control rules" - Number of results capped by CHROMA_N_RESULTS (default 10). - Stores results in AgentState.policy_chunks. - - fetch_domain_knowledge: queries ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge collection using the - same trigger-type-keyed query strings as fetch_policy (trigger TYPE only, not entity ID). - Number of results capped by CHROMA_N_RESULTS (same env var as fetch_policy). - Returns [] when the collection is empty — non-fatal. - Stores results in AgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks. - Shares UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES tenacity policy and 503-on-ChromaDB-down contract - with fetch_policy. - - fetch_keycloak_state: reads Keycloak state via aiac.library.api; - scope is determined by trigger type: - rebuild → all users, all clients + their roles, all realm roles, - all role mappings for all users - user/{id} → that user's current role mappings, - all clients + their roles - realm-role/{id} → all users, all realm roles - client/{id} → all users, that client's roles, - all role mappings for all users - client/{id}/role → all users, that client's roles, - all role mappings for all users - client-scope/{id}→ all client scopes, all clients, all users - - propose_diff: LLM node — builds scoped text summary (policy chunks + - Keycloak snapshot + trigger context) and calls LLM via with_structured_output(ProposedDiff) - - validate_diff: validates proposed diff with four checks (see Validation below) - - apply_diff: calls assign_client_roles / revoke_client_roles from aiac.library.api - - format_response: builds final response dict - - Edges: - - START → fetch_policy (parallel branch) - - START → fetch_domain_knowledge (parallel branch) - - START → fetch_keycloak_state (parallel branch) - - fetch_policy → propose_diff - - fetch_domain_knowledge → propose_diff - - fetch_keycloak_state → propose_diff - - propose_diff → validate_diff - - validate_diff → apply_diff (validation passed) - - validate_diff → format_response (validation failed — binary abort, no changes applied) - - apply_diff → format_response - - format_response → END -- Validation node: - - Existence check: every user_id, client_id, role_id in proposed diff exists in keycloak_snapshot - - Safety guard rails: abort if total changes (assign + revoke) exceed MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN - - LLM re-confirmation: second LLM call (same ChatOpenAI instance, auditor system prompt) - with proposed diff + policy chunks; output via with_structured_output(ValidationVerdict) - where ValidationVerdict has approved (bool) and reason (str) - - Scope validation: diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger (no over-reach on partial updates) - - Failure outcome: binary abort — zero changes applied; returns structured error response -- LLM: - - SDK: langchain-openai (ChatOpenAI) - - Endpoint configured via LLM_BASE_URL — any OpenAI-compatible endpoint (vLLM, Ollama, Azure, etc.) - - Target model must support tool calling (required for with_structured_output) - - Output: structured via with_structured_output(ProposedDiff) - - ProposedDiff schema: - - assign: list[RoleAssignment] - - revoke: list[RoleAssignment] - - reasoning: str (propagated as summary in the HTTP response) - - RoleAssignment schema: - - user_id: str - - client_id: str - - role_id: str - - role_name: str - - Prompt structure (prompts.py): - - System message (stable, cacheable): role definition + AIAC_AC_MODEL framing + - output instructions ("enforce {AC_MODEL} policy, compute minimal role diff") - - User message (per-request): trigger description - + policy chunks (from aiac-policies via fetch_policy) - + domain knowledge chunks (from aiac-domain-knowledge via fetch_domain_knowledge; - omitted or rendered as empty section when domain_knowledge_chunks is []) - + scoped Keycloak snapshot summary (structured text, not raw JSON) - - Auditor prompt (validate_diff re-confirmation): - - System message: auditor role ("verify this diff correctly implements the policy") - - User message: proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks - (auditor receives the same context as the planner to enable full re-confirmation) -- Configuration: - - AC_SERVICE_URL: Base URL of the Keycloak Configuration Service. - Default: http://aiac-keycloak-service:7070 - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - CHROMA_URL: Base URL of the ChromaDB instance in the RAG Pod. - Default: http://aiac-rag-service:7080 - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - KEYCLOAK_REALM: Keycloak realm targeted by all agent operations. - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (aiac-keycloak-config ConfigMap). - - LLM_BASE_URL: Base URL of the externally deployed LLM API endpoint. - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - LLM_MODEL: Model name to use for policy interpretation and diff validation. - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - LLM_API_KEY: LLM API access token. - Source: Kubernetes Secret mounted as environment variable. - - AIAC_AC_MODEL: Access control model type used to frame the LLM system prompt. - Affects system prompt framing only — not data fetching or output schema. - Default: RBAC - Accepted values: RBAC, ABAC, REBAC (uppercase) - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - CHROMA_N_RESULTS: Maximum number of policy chunks retrieved per ChromaDB query. - Default: 10 - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN: Maximum total role changes (assign + revoke) allowed per invocation. - Default: 50 - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). - - UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES: Number of retry attempts (with exponential backoff) before - failing on upstream errors (ChromaDB, Keycloak Configuration Service, LLM API). - Default: 3 - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest (ConfigMap). -- Invocation: HTTP endpoint -- Endpoints: - - POST /apply/rebuild: full rebuild — recompute all mappings from current Keycloak - state and Policy RAG, apply immediately - - POST /apply/user/{user_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a user addition or removal - - POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a realm role addition or removal - - POST /apply/client/{client_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a client addition or removal - - POST /apply/client/{client_id}/role/{role_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a client role addition or removal - - POST /apply/client-scope/{scope_id}: recompute and apply mappings affected by a client scope addition or removal - - Success response: {"applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "..."} - where applied/revoked are arrays of RoleAssignment objects and summary is the LLM reasoning - - Abort response: {"applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...]} -- State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required -- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn -- Port: 7071 -- Error handling: - - All upstream calls are retried up to UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES times with exponential backoff - using the tenacity library before the error is propagated. - - ChromaDB unavailable → HTTP 503 Service Unavailable - - Keycloak Configuration Service error → HTTP 502 Bad Gateway - - LLM API failure → HTTP 504 Gateway Timeout -- Dependencies: langgraph, langchain-openai, chromadb, tenacity, fastapi, uvicorn[standard], requests, python-dotenv -- File structure: - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/main.py: FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/routes.py: all six /apply/* route handlers - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile: Docker image definition - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/requirements.txt: Python dependencies - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/state.py: AgentState, TriggerContext, - KeycloakSnapshot (Pydantic BaseModel reusing User, RealmRole, Client, ClientRole, - ClientScope, RoleMappings from aiac.library.models), - ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/prompts.py: planner system prompt template, - auditor system prompt template - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/nodes.py: fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge, - fetch_keycloak_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response node functions - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/graph.py: StateGraph definition, edge wiring, - compiled graph instance (module-level singleton), - per-trigger helper functions exported as public API: - run_rebuild(realm), run_user(user_id, realm), - run_realm_role(role_id, realm), run_client(client_id, realm), - run_client_role(client_id, role_id, realm), run_client_scope(scope_id, realm) -- Location: aiac/src/aiac/agent/ -- Docker build context: aiac/src/ -- Deployment: Kubernetes Pod diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 4b0f6edf9..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/keycloak-service.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -- Title: Keycloak Configuration Service -- Description: Web service providing read and write access to Keycloak configuration data via the Keycloak Admin REST API. -- Common query parameter: - - realm (str, optional): when supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm - instead of the service default (KEYCLOAK_REALM). Omit to use the service default. - When provided, a new KeycloakAdmin bound to that realm is instantiated per request. -- Methods: - - Get users: - - Description: Retrieves current users from Keycloak server. - - Endpoint: /users - - Get realm roles: - - Description: Retrieves current realm roles from Keycloak server. - - Endpoint: /realm-roles - - Get user role mappings: - - Description: Retrieves realm and client role mappings for a specific user from Keycloak server. - - Endpoint: /users/{user_id}/role-mappings - - Path parameter: user_id (Keycloak user UUID) - - Keycloak Admin API: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings - - Returns: raw JSON object with realmMappings and clientMappings fields - - Get clients: - - Description: Retrieves current clients from Keycloak server. - - Endpoint: /clients - - Get client scopes: - - Description: Retrieves current client scopes from Keycloak server. - - Endpoint: /client-scopes - - Get client roles: - - Description: Retrieves roles defined for a specific client. - - Endpoint: /clients/{client_id}/roles - - Path parameter: client_id (Keycloak client UUID) - - Keycloak Admin API: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles - - Returns: raw JSON array of role objects - - Assign client roles to user: - - Description: Assigns one or more client roles to a user. - - Endpoint: /users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} - - Path parameters: user_id (Keycloak user UUID), client_id (Keycloak client UUID) - - Keycloak Admin API: POST /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} - - Body: JSON array of role representation objects - - Returns: 204 No Content on success - - Revoke client roles from user: - - Description: Revokes one or more client roles from a user. - - Endpoint: /users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} - - Path parameters: user_id (Keycloak user UUID), client_id (Keycloak client UUID) - - Keycloak Admin API: DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id} - - Body: JSON array of role representation objects - - Returns: 204 No Content on success -- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn -- Bind: 0.0.0.0 (exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Service for inter-Pod access; also reachable via kubectl port-forward) -- Implementation: Python -- Port: 7070 -- Location: aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/ -- Image: Built independently via its own Dockerfile in aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/. -- Deployment: Docker container in the Keycloak Service Pod, exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Service. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index fd62805bd..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/library.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -- Models: - - Title: Keycloak configuration accessor Models - - Description: > - Data structures and schema library containing Pydantic BaseModel subclasses - representing Keycloak entities. Importable standalone — no HTTP client dependency. - Used by the API library, AI agents, and LangGraph agents to parse and validate - raw Keycloak JSON. - - Module: aiac.keycloak.library.models - - Schemas: - - User: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak user. - - RealmRole: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak realm role. - - RoleMappings: > - Pydantic BaseModel representing the Keycloak Admin REST API response from - GET /users/{id}/role-mappings. Fields: realmMappings (list[RealmRole], default []), - clientMappings (dict[str, Any], default {}). Defined after RealmRole. - - Client: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak client. - - ClientScope: Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak client scope. - - ClientRole: > - Pydantic BaseModel representing a Keycloak client role. - Fields: id (str), name (str), description (str | None), composite (bool), clientRole (bool). - Used as the payload element for assign/revoke client role operations. - - Model config: extra='ignore' on all models to stay stable across Keycloak version changes. - - Dependencies: pydantic - - Implementation: Python - - Location: aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/ - - Deployment: Python module distributed as part of the repository. - -- API: - - Title: Keycloak configuration accessor API - - Description: > - Python API library wrapping the Keycloak Configuration Service. - Exposes its REST endpoints as typed Python functions returning Pydantic model - instances from aiac.library.models. Intended for Python scripts and LangGraph agents. - - Module: aiac.keycloak.library.api - - Common parameter: - - realm (str, mandatory): passed to the Service as ?realm= so the request - targets the named Keycloak realm. All eight functions require this parameter. - - Functions: - - Get users: - - Description: Retrieves current users from Keycloak server. - - Function: get_users - - Parameters: realm (str) - - Returns: list[User] - - Get realm roles: - - Description: Retrieves current realm roles from Keycloak server. - - Function: get_realm_roles - - Parameters: realm (str) - - Returns: list[RealmRole] - - Get user role mappings: - - Description: Retrieves realm and client role mappings for a specific user from Keycloak server. - - Function: get_user_role_mappings - - Parameters: user_id (str) — Keycloak user UUID; realm (str) - - Returns: RoleMappings - - Get clients: - - Description: Retrieves current clients from Keycloak server. - - Function: get_clients - - Parameters: realm (str) - - Returns: list[Client] - - Get client scopes: - - Description: Retrieves current client scopes from Keycloak server. - - Function: get_client_scopes - - Parameters: realm (str) - - Returns: list[ClientScope] - - Get client roles: - - Description: Retrieves roles defined for a specific client. - - Function: get_client_roles - - Parameters: client_id (str) — Keycloak client UUID; realm (str) - - Returns: list[ClientRole] - - Assign client roles to user: - - Description: Assigns one or more client roles to a user. - - Function: assign_client_roles - - Parameters: user_id (str), client_id (str), roles (list[ClientRole]), realm (str) - - Returns: None - - Revoke client roles from user: - - Description: Revokes one or more client roles from a user. - - Function: revoke_client_roles - - Parameters: user_id (str), client_id (str), roles (list[ClientRole]), realm (str) - - Returns: None - - Configuration: - - AC_SERVICE_URL: Base URL of the Keycloak Configuration Service. - Default: http://127.0.0.1:7070 - Source: .env file consumed via python-dotenv, with fallback to default. - - Dependencies: requests, pydantic, python-dotenv, aiac.library.models - - Implementation: Python - - Location: aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/ - - Deployment: Python module distributed as part of the repository. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 06f07dfe1..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-ingest-service.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,83 +0,0 @@ -- Title: AIAC RAG Ingest Service -- Description: > - FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Exposes ingest endpoints - that accept knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunk and embed them, and - write the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance running in the same Pod. Supports - both access control policies (aiac-policies collection) and org/business domain context - (aiac-domain-knowledge collection) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. - Accessible from outside Kubernetes via kubectl port-forward for developer-driven ingestion. -- Endpoints: - Replace (wipe + reload named collection): - - POST /ingest/{collection}/text: - Replace the entire named collection from a JSON body. - Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "text": ""}, ...]} - Empty docs list is allowed — wipes the collection. - - POST /ingest/{collection}/file: - Replace the entire named collection from one or more uploaded files. - Multipart upload; each file becomes one document. - doc_id = filename without extension. Multiple files → multiple docs. - Filename collisions within one call → 400. - - POST /ingest/{collection}/url: - Replace the entire named collection from a JSON body of URLs. - Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "url": ""}, ...]} - Service fetches each URL; response body becomes the document text. - Caller assigns doc_id independent of the URL. - - Update (document-level upsert — additive, never deletes): - - POST /ingest/{collection}/update/text: - Upsert documents into the named collection from a JSON body. - Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "text": ""}, ...]} - New doc_id → add; matching doc_id → replace that doc's chunks. - doc_ids in the collection but absent from the body are KEPT (additive semantics). - Empty docs list → no-op. - - POST /ingest/{collection}/update/file: - Upsert documents into the named collection from one or more uploaded files. - Same multipart conventions as POST /ingest/{collection}/file. - Existing docs with matching doc_id are replaced; others are left untouched. - - POST /ingest/{collection}/update/url: - Upsert documents into the named collection from a JSON body of URLs. - Body: {"docs": [{"id": "", "url": ""}, ...]} - Additive: only named doc_ids are affected. - - Delete (explicit removal — the only path that removes content from the collection): - - DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}: - Remove all chunks belonging to doc_id from the named collection. - doc_id not found → 404. - - Collection validation (all endpoints): - - {collection} must be a member of AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS (default: policy,domain-knowledge). - - Unknown collection slug → 404. - - Collection slug to ChromaDB collection name mapping: - policy → aiac-policies - domain-knowledge → aiac-domain-knowledge - -- Ingest semantics: - - Replace: drops the ChromaDB collection and recreates it, then ingests all provided docs. - Atomic at the collection level — partial failures roll back to empty collection. - - Update: document-level upsert keyed on doc_id stored in chunk metadata. For each - incoming doc_id: delete existing chunks with that doc_id, then insert new chunks. - All other doc_ids in the collection are untouched. - - Delete: removes all chunks whose metadata.doc_id equals the given doc_id. - - Chunking and embedding applied uniformly across all operations and both collections. - doc_id is stored in ChromaDB chunk metadata on every write to enable update and delete. - -- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn -- Configuration: - - CHROMA_URL: Base URL of the ChromaDB instance co-located in the same Pod. - Default: http://localhost:7080 - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. - - AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS: Comma-separated list of legal collection slugs. - Default: policy,domain-knowledge - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. - Adding a third slug here (and a corresponding ChromaDB collection name in the - slug→name map) is a config-only change requiring no code modification. - - EMBEDDING_BASE_URL: Base URL of the embedding model API endpoint. - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. - - EMBEDDING_MODEL: Embedding model name (shared across all collections). - Source: Environment variable injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest. - - EMBEDDING_API_KEY: Embedding API access token (shared across all collections). - Source: Kubernetes Secret mounted as environment variable. -- Port: 7072 -- Dependencies: TBD (chromadb client, embedding model client, fastapi, uvicorn, httpx for URL fetching) -- Location: TBD -- Deployment: Docker container co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 9a14db0a9..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -- Title: AIAC RAG Knowledge Base -- Description: > - Vector store knowledge base that holds two collections in a single ChromaDB instance: - (1) AIAC access control policies and (2) org/business domain context. The Agent retrieves - relevant chunks from both collections at runtime via similarity search. Deployed as a - Kubernetes Deployment in a dedicated Pod, co-located with the RAG Ingest Service. -- Technology: ChromaDB -- Collections: - - aiac-policies: access control policy rules in natural language. - Written by the RAG Ingest Service via the "policy" collection slug. - Read by the AIAC Agent's fetch_policy node. - - aiac-domain-knowledge: org/business context — team rosters, application ownership, - department mappings, who-does-what. Written by the RAG Ingest Service via the - "domain-knowledge" collection slug. Read by the AIAC Agent's fetch_domain_knowledge node. - The legal collection set is an open extension point governed by AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS - on the RAG Ingest Service. ChromaDB itself imposes no constraint on the collection set. - Collection slug (wire) → ChromaDB collection name mapping: - policy → aiac-policies - domain-knowledge → aiac-domain-knowledge -- Access patterns: - - RAG Ingest Service: writes — replaces, upserts, or deletes documents in either - collection via collection-parameterized endpoints. Each chunk stored with - doc_id in its metadata to support document-level upsert and deletion. - - AIAC Agent fetch_policy: reads aiac-policies (similarity search, top-N chunks) - - AIAC Agent fetch_domain_knowledge: reads aiac-domain-knowledge (similarity search, - top-N chunks, same query keying as fetch_policy: trigger TYPE only) -- Port: 7080 -- Dependencies: TBD -- Location: TBD -- Deployment: Kubernetes Deployment, dedicated RAG Pod, co-located with RAG Ingest Service diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml b/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 8b2164236..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/Specification/specification.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -- Title: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) for Keycloak -- Deployment: - - Topology: - - Keycloak Configuration Service Pod: aiac-service container (FastAPI :7070). Exposed as Kubernetes - ClusterIP Service to allow inter-Pod access from the Agent Pod. - - RAG Pod: chromadb container (:7080) + aiac-rag-ingest container (FastAPI :7072). Exposed as - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service for Agent (RAG query) and for ingest access via - kubectl port-forward. ChromaDB hosts two collections: aiac-policies (policy rules) - and aiac-domain-knowledge (org/business context). The legal collection set is governed - by AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS on the Ingest Service container. - - Agent Pod: aiac-agent container (FastAPI :7071). Calls Keycloak Configuration Service Pod and RAG Pod - over the cluster network. - - Manifests: - - aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-deployment.yaml: Keycloak Configuration Service Pod + ClusterIP Service - - aiac/k8s/rag-deployment.yaml: RAG Pod (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service) + ClusterIP Service - - aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml: Agent Pod + ClusterIP Service - - ConfigMap: aiac-keycloak-config carrying KEYCLOAK_URL and KEYCLOAK_REALM. - Reuses keycloak-admin-secret for admin credentials. - RAG-specific configuration (AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS, EMBEDDING_*) lives in the RAG Pod's - own ConfigMap/env block, not in aiac-keycloak-config. - - Note: Keycloak Configuration Service Pod previously bound to 127.0.0.1 only. Now binds to 0.0.0.0 - and is exposed as a ClusterIP Service to allow the Agent Pod to reach it. -- Testing: - - Unit tests: Mock the web service in library tests; mock Keycloak in configuration service tests. Located in tests/. - - Integration tests: Hit a live Keycloak instance. Located in tests/. Require KEYCLOAK_URL, - KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD to be set. -- Components: - - Keycloak Configuration Service: - - Description: FastAPI service (:7070) proxying the Keycloak Admin REST API (8 endpoints). - - spec: components/keycloak-service.yaml - - Library: - - Description: Python package — dependency-free Pydantic models (models.py) + HTTP client returning typed instances (api.py). - - spec: components/library.yaml - - Agent: - - Description: LangGraph StateGraph (:7071) — six /apply/* endpoints, parallel RAG + Keycloak fetch, LLM propose/validate, immediate apply. - - spec: components/aiac-agent.yaml - - RAG Knowledge Base: - - Description: ChromaDB vector store (:7080) holding the aiac-policies collection in the RAG Pod. - - spec: components/rag-knowledge-base.yaml - - RAG Ingest Service: - - Description: FastAPI service (:7072) accepting policy documents and writing vectors into co-located ChromaDB. - - spec: components/rag-ingest-service.yaml -- Package structure: - - aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py: absent (namespace package) - - aiac/src/aiac/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py: empty (callers must use explicit submodule paths) - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py: Pydantic model definitions - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py: HTTP client functions - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py: FastAPI app + uvicorn entrypoint - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile: Docker image (build context aiac/src/) - - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt: Python dependencies - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/main.py: FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/routes.py: all six /apply/* route handlers - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile: Docker image (build context aiac/src/) - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/requirements.txt: Python dependencies - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/__init__.py: empty - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/state.py: AgentState, TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/prompts.py: planner and auditor system prompt templates - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/nodes.py: all node functions - - aiac/src/aiac/agent/agent/graph.py: StateGraph definition, edge wiring, compiled graph instance diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/aiac-agent.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/keycloak-service.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/library.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-ingest-service.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD/components/rag-knowledge-base.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md From cfb741f41542e489eb12c116bf460c13c6a5c8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 11:39:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 008/273] docs(aiac): update AIAC Agent PRD with classify_client K8s API contract Replace the vague kagenti-operator HTTP dependency with the resolved classify_client contract: K8s API lookup of AgentRuntime/AgentCard CRs, client_id parsing (SPIFFE + short formats), tool classification by CR absence, tool description from Client.description. Update error table and add kubernetes to the dependencies list. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 22 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 793439100..0dfc878db 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -38,12 +38,23 @@ START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_clien Handles trigger: `client/{id}`. -- `classify_client`: queries Keycloak and the kagenti-operator to determine client type and retrieve `ClientInfo`. See **kagenti-operator dependency note** below. +- `classify_client`: determines client type and populates `ClientInfo` using the Kubernetes API (in-cluster `ServiceAccount`) and the Keycloak library. + 1. **Parse `trigger.client_id`** to extract namespace + workload name: + - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract namespace. + - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. + - Unrecognised format → treat as `ClientType.tool`. + 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. + - **Found** → `client_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR (same namespace and name); populate `ClientInfo(client_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. + - **Not found** → `client_type = tool`: call `get_clients(realm)` from `aiac.keycloak.library.api`; locate the `Client` by `client_id`; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=tool, description=client.description or client.name, skills=[])`. + 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Keycloak Client record is not found for a tool. + + > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. RBAC manifests are specified in the K8s deployment issue. + + > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API — it is a controller-runtime manager only. Agent cards are stored as `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) alongside their workloads. Tools are not operator-managed; absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ClientType.tool`. + - `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node that produces a `ClientProvision` from `ClientInfo`. `analyze_agent` uses agent description + skill list; `analyze_tool` uses description only. Routing is a conditional edge on `ClientInfo.client_type`. - `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. Runs before `fetch_keycloak_state` so provisioned roles/scopes are visible in the snapshot. -> **kagenti-operator dependency:** `classify_client` queries the kagenti-operator API to retrieve the Agent Card (for `ClientType.agent`) or tool description (for `ClientType.tool`). The kagenti-operator API contract for this query is defined in a separate investigation. - ### State schema #### `BaseAgentState` @@ -90,6 +101,8 @@ class KeycloakSnapshot(BaseModel): user_role_mappings: dict[str, RoleMappings] = {} # user_id → mappings ``` +> **Model dependency:** `classify_client` reads `Client.description` from the Keycloak library model for the tool path. The `Client` model in `aiac.keycloak.library.models` must include `description: str | None = None` (added in issue 1.5). + Client onboarding types: ```python @@ -289,7 +302,7 @@ All upstream calls (`fetch_policy`, `fetch_keycloak_state`, `propose_diff`, `val |----------|------------------------------| | ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | | Keycloak Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | -| kagenti-operator | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| Kubernetes API (AgentRuntime / AgentCard lookup) | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) @@ -303,4 +316,5 @@ fastapi uvicorn[standard] requests python-dotenv +kubernetes ``` From 59af223dd139f9924e555224557aeb2fe52e3744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 13:00:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 009/273] Initial file 'agent' file structure Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/tmp.txt | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt | 0 3 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/tmp.txt create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/tmp.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb From 965145989745ad46add4743769c83324e45a3253 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 10:51:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 010/273] move agent to a new locations Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- aiac/pyproject.toml | 2 +- aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/aiac_cli.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/config/__init__.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/config/constants.py | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/config/llm_config.py | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/full_policy_agent/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/full_policy_agent/state.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/prompts/__init__.py | 0 .../onboarding/policy}/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/requirements.txt | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/single_role_agent/graph.py | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy}/single_role_agent/state.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/utils/__init__.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/utils/parsers.py | 0 .../{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/utils/validators.py | 0 aiac/test/test_llm_config.py | 2 +- 20 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/aiac_cli.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/config/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/config/constants.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/config/llm_config.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/full_policy_agent/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/full_policy_agent/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/full_policy_agent/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/prompts/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/requirements.txt (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/single_role_agent/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/single_role_agent/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/single_role_agent/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/utils/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/utils/parsers.py (100%) rename aiac/src/{agent => aiac/agent/onboarding/policy}/utils/validators.py (100%) diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml index 5ad77b211..5950ae193 100644 --- a/aiac/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [tool.pytest.ini_options] testpaths = ["test"] -pythonpath = ["src", "src/agent"] +pythonpath = ["src", "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy"] markers = [ "integration: tests that call real LLM endpoints", ] diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/aiac_cli.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/config/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/constants.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/config/constants.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/constants.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/config/llm_config.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/full_policy_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/prompts/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/prompts/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/requirements.txt similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/requirements.txt rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/requirements.txt diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/single_role_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/utils/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/utils/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/utils/parsers.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py diff --git a/aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/agent/utils/validators.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py diff --git a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py index ef9d6a49c..5899e4117 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import pytest -from aiac_agent.config.llm_config import ( +from config.llm_config import ( DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES, DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS, DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE, From 8bf3f85e225b2f8d08421178a730753753ff836e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 12:18:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 011/273] client policy agent Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py | 15 + .../policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py | 409 +++++++++++++ .../policy/client_policy_agent/state.py | 38 ++ aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py | 555 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 1017 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f9bdb6bdd --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +""" +Client Policy Agent + +Generates a partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak client. +""" + +from .graph import ClientPolicyBuilder, ClientPolicyBuilderConfig, create_client_policy_builder_graph +from .state import ClientPolicyState + +__all__ = [ + "ClientPolicyBuilder", + "ClientPolicyBuilderConfig", + "create_client_policy_builder_graph", + "ClientPolicyState", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5f9a77672 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Client Policy Agent + +Generates a partial access control policy that contains only the rules +relevant for a single specified Keycloak client. Inputs are a natural +language policy description and a client ID; output is a YAML policy +with realm-role → client-role mappings scoped to that client. + +Workflow: + 1. filter_and_extract — run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the + given client and aggregate the results. + 2. build_policy — assemble the {policy: {realm_role: [...]}} dict. + 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with header comments. + 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry. +""" + +from typing import Dict, Any, Optional +from pathlib import Path +import os +import sys +import yaml +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel + +from config import create_llm +from client_policy_agent.state import ClientPolicyState +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from aiac.keycloak.library import api_from_config +from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper +from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure + + +@dataclass +class ClientPolicyBuilderConfig: + """ + Configuration for the ClientPolicyBuilder agent. + + Attributes: + llm: LangChain LLM instance + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + llm: BaseChatModel + verbose: bool = True + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + + +# ============================================================================ +# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS +# ============================================================================ + +def _filter_and_extract_scopes( + state: ClientPolicyState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + realm_roles: list, + client_roles: list, + verbose: bool, +) -> ClientPolicyState: + """ + Run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the target client and invert the + results into the {role → client_roles} structure used by _build_policy. + + Args: + state: Current ClientPolicyState (needs 'description' and 'client_id') + llm: LLM instance + realm_roles: All available realm roles [{name, description}] + client_roles: Roles belonging to the target client [{name, description}] + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + + Returns: + Updated ClientPolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation + """ + client_id = state["client_id"] + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) + + explanations: list[str] = [] + realm_role_to_client_roles: dict = {} + + for client_role in client_roles: + result = mapper.map_role( + policy_description=state["description"], + client_name=client_id, + client_role=client_role, + realm_roles=realm_roles, + ) + + if result.get("explanation"): + explanations.append(f"{client_id}/{client_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}") + + for realm_role_name in result.get("real_roles_with_access", []): + realm_role_to_client_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( + {"client": client_id, "role": client_role["name"]} + ) + + parsed_scopes = [ + {"role": realm_role, "client_roles": cr_list} + for realm_role, cr_list in realm_role_to_client_roles.items() + ] + + return { + **state, + "explanation": "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", + "parsed_scopes": parsed_scopes, + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), + "validation_passed": True, + } + + +def _build_policy(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + """ + Assemble the structured policy dict from parsed_scopes. + + Returns: + Updated ClientPolicyState with policy_structure + """ + policy: dict = {} + for entry in state["parsed_scopes"]: + policy[entry["role"]] = entry["client_roles"] + + return {**state, "policy_structure": {"policy": policy}} + + +def _generate_yaml(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + """ + Render the policy structure as a YAML string with explanatory comments. + + Returns: + Updated ClientPolicyState with yaml_output + """ + client_id = state.get("client_id", "") + header = ( + "# Partial Access Control Policy\n" + f"# Scoped to client: {client_id}\n" + "# Maps realm roles to the client roles they may access.\n\n" + ) + + if state.get("description"): + header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in state["description"].strip().splitlines(): + header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + header += "#\n" + + if state.get("explanation"): + header += "# LLM Mapping Explanation:\n" + for line in state["explanation"].strip().splitlines(): + header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + header += "\n" + + yaml_content = yaml.dump( + state["policy_structure"], + default_flow_style=False, + sort_keys=False, + allow_unicode=True, + ) + footer = "\n# Generated by ClientPolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" + + return {**state, "yaml_output": header + yaml_content + footer} + + +def _validate_policy( + state: ClientPolicyState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + realm_roles: list, + client_id: str, + client_roles: list, + verbose: bool, + max_retries: int, +) -> ClientPolicyState: + """ + Structural validation of the generated policy. + + Returns: + Updated ClientPolicyState with errors and validation_passed + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) + client_names = [client_id] + client_roles_map = {client_id: client_roles} + + structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( + policy, realm_roles, client_names, client_roles_map + ) + # An empty policy is valid for a client-scoped agent: the policy description + # may simply not grant any permissions to this client's services. + structural_errors = [e for e in structural_errors if e != "Policy is empty"] + + if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: + return { + **state, + "errors": structural_errors, + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1, + } + + return { + **state, + "errors": structural_errors, + "validation_passed": len(structural_errors) == 0, + "retry_count": retry_count, + } + + +def _should_retry(state: ClientPolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: + """Conditional edge: retry parse or finish.""" + if not state.get("validation_passed", False) and state.get("retry_count", 0) < max_retries: + errors = state.get("errors", []) + print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {state['retry_count']}/{max_retries}). Retrying...") + for i, err in enumerate(errors, 1): + print(f" {i}. {err}") + return "filter_and_extract" + return END + + +# ============================================================================ +# GRAPH CONSTRUCTION +# ============================================================================ + +def create_client_policy_builder_graph( + config: ClientPolicyBuilderConfig, + realm_roles: list, + client_id: str, + client_roles: list, +): + """ + Build and compile the client-scoped policy builder graph. + + Args: + config: ClientPolicyBuilderConfig + realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] + client_id: Target Keycloak client ID + client_roles: Roles of the target client [{name, description}] + + Returns: + Compiled LangGraph workflow + """ + + def filter_and_extract_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + return _filter_and_extract_scopes( + state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_roles, config.verbose + ) + + def build_policy_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + return _build_policy(state) + + def generate_yaml_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + return _generate_yaml(state) + + def validate_policy_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + return _validate_policy( + state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_id, client_roles, + config.verbose, config.max_retries + ) + + def should_retry_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> str: + return _should_retry(state, config.max_retries) + + workflow = StateGraph(ClientPolicyState) + workflow.add_node("filter_and_extract", filter_and_extract_node) + workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) + workflow.add_node("generate_yaml", generate_yaml_node) + workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) + + workflow.set_entry_point("filter_and_extract") + workflow.add_edge("filter_and_extract", "build_policy") + workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "generate_yaml") + workflow.add_edge("generate_yaml", "validate_policy") + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "validate_policy", + should_retry_node, + {"filter_and_extract": "filter_and_extract", END: END}, + ) + + return workflow.compile() + + +# ============================================================================ +# PUBLIC CLASS +# ============================================================================ + +class ClientPolicyBuilder: + """ + AI-powered policy builder scoped to a single Keycloak client. + + Given a natural language policy description and a client ID, produces + a YAML access control policy that contains only the realm-role → + client-role mappings relevant to that client. + + Workflow: + 1. filter_and_extract — map each role of the client to realm roles + 2. build_policy — assemble the structured policy dict + 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with comments + 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry + """ + + def __init__( + self, + client_id: str, + realm: str = "", + config_path: Optional[Path] = None, + llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, + ): + """ + Args: + client_id: Keycloak client ID to scope the policy to + realm: Keycloak realm name (empty string uses the default realm) + config_path: Path to the AC config YAML; falls back to AC_CONFIG_PATH env var + llm: LangChain LLM instance; created automatically if not provided + verbose: Print LLM explanations and validation details + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + if llm is None: + llm_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "config" / "llm.env" + llm_instance = create_llm(env_path=llm_env_path, verbose=verbose) + else: + llm_instance = llm + + if config_path is not None: + os.environ["AC_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) + + self.client_id = client_id + self.config = ClientPolicyBuilderConfig( + llm=llm_instance, + verbose=verbose, + max_retries=max_retries, + ) + + realm_roles_models = api_from_config.get_realm_roles(realm=realm) + self.realm_roles = [ + {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} + for r in realm_roles_models + ] + + client_roles_map = api_from_config.get_client_roles_map(realm=realm) + self.client_roles = client_roles_map.get(client_id, []) + + self.graph = create_client_policy_builder_graph( + self.config, + self.realm_roles, + self.client_id, + self.client_roles, + ) + + def get_graph(self): + """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" + return self.graph + + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: + """ + Generate a client-scoped access control policy from a natural language description. + + Args: + description: Natural language policy description + + Returns: + dict with keys: + yaml_output (str) — YAML policy file content + policy_structure (dict) — structured policy data + parsed_scopes (list) — raw realm-role → client-role mappings + errors (list) — validation errors (empty on success) + success (bool) — True when no validation errors + retry_count (int) — number of validation retries + """ + initial_state: ClientPolicyState = { + "description": description, + "client_id": self.client_id, + "explanation": "", + "parsed_scopes": [], + "policy_structure": {}, + "yaml_output": "", + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) + + return { + "yaml_output": final_state["yaml_output"], + "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], + "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], + "errors": final_state["errors"], + "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, + "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), + } + + def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "client_policy.yaml"): + """ + Save the generated policy YAML to a file. + + Args: + yaml_output: YAML content string + filepath: Destination file path + """ + with open(filepath, "w") as f: + f.write(yaml_output) + print(f"Client policy saved to {filepath}") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print("Use ClientPolicyBuilder programmatically or via the CLI.") + sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c47ffdcf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +State Definitions for Client Policy Agent + +TypedDict state structure for the LangGraph workflow that generates a +partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak client. +""" + +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any +from operator import add + + +class ClientPolicyState(TypedDict): + """ + State for the client-scoped policy building workflow. + + Attributes: + description: Natural language policy description + client_id: Keycloak client ID to scope the policy to + explanation: LLM explanation of the role mappings + parsed_scopes: List of {role, client_roles} mappings (realm-role → client-roles) + policy_structure: Structured policy dict ready for YAML conversion + yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string + messages: Accumulated LLM messages + errors: Validation errors — replaced on each validation attempt + retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts + validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded + """ + description: str + client_id: str + explanation: str + parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] + policy_structure: Dict[str, Any] + yaml_output: str + messages: Annotated[List, add] + errors: List[str] + retry_count: int + validation_passed: bool diff --git a/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c4c7f001a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,555 @@ +""" +Tests for the client_policy_agent. + +The agent takes a natural language policy description plus a client ID and +produces a partial policy containing only the rules relevant to that client. + +To run all tests: + pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py + +To skip integration tests (require LLM access): + pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py -m "not integration" + +To run ONLY integration tests: + pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py -m integration + +To run the LLM-backed fixture test: + 1. Ensure LLM is configured in config/llm.env + 2. Remove the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures + 3. Run: pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py::test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures -v +""" + +import pytest +import yaml +from pathlib import Path +from unittest.mock import Mock + +from client_policy_agent import ClientPolicyBuilder +from client_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy, _filter_and_extract_scopes +from client_policy_agent.state import ClientPolicyState +from config import create_llm + + +# Mark all tests in this module as integration tests +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + + +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURES +# ============================================================================ + +@pytest.fixture +def fixtures_dir(): + """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" + return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" + + +@pytest.fixture +def config_file(): + """Return path to the main config.yaml file.""" + return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" + + +@pytest.fixture +def policy_files(fixtures_dir): + """Return list of policy text files to test.""" + return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) + + +@pytest.fixture(params=[ + "claude-haiku", + "gpt-nano", + "gemini", + "gpt-oss", +]) +def llm_model_name(request): + """Return model name for parametrised testing.""" + return request.param + + +@pytest.fixture +def llm_instance(llm_model_name): + """Create LLM instance from YAML config.""" + return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) + + +@pytest.fixture +def mock_llm(): + """Return a bare Mock that can stand in for a LangChain LLM.""" + return Mock() + + +# ============================================================================ +# HELPERS +# ============================================================================ + +def normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_content: str) -> dict: + """Parse YAML and extract the 'policy' sub-dict for comparison.""" + data = yaml.safe_load(yaml_content) + return data.get("policy", {}) + + +def filter_policy_to_client(policy: dict, client_id: str) -> dict: + """ + Keep only the realm-role entries that contain at least one mapping for + *client_id*. Within each kept entry, retain only the mappings for that + client. Used to derive the expected partial policy from a full fixture. + """ + result = {} + for realm_role, mappings in policy.items(): + client_mappings = [m for m in mappings if m.get("client") == client_id] + if client_mappings: + result[realm_role] = client_mappings + return result + + +def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: + """ + Require exact equality between *generated* and *expected* policy dicts. + + Returns: + (match: bool, differences: list[str]) + """ + differences = [] + + generated_roles = set(generated.keys()) + expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) + + for role in expected_roles - generated_roles: + differences.append(f"Missing realm role: '{role}'") + + for role in generated_roles - expected_roles: + differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") + + for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: + gen_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} + exp_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} + + for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: + differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") + + for mapping in gen_set - exp_set: + differences.append(f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra mapping: {mapping}") + + return len(differences) == 0, differences + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) +# ============================================================================ + +def test_generate_yaml_unit(): + """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure.""" + state: ClientPolicyState = { + "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", + "client_id": "github-tool", + "explanation": "Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", + "policy_structure": { + "policy": { + "developer": [ + {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, + ] + } + }, + "parsed_scopes": [], + "yaml_output": "", + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + result = _generate_yaml(state) + + output = result["yaml_output"] + assert "policy:" in output + assert "developer:" in output + assert "github-tool" in output + assert "github-full-access" in output + # Header must mention the scoped client + assert "github-tool" in output + assert "# Partial Access Control Policy" in output + assert "# Original Policy Description:" in output + assert "Developers get full GitHub access." in output + + +def test_build_policy_unit(): + """_build_policy assembles policy_structure correctly from parsed_scopes.""" + state: ClientPolicyState = { + "description": "test", + "client_id": "github-tool", + "explanation": "", + "parsed_scopes": [ + { + "role": "developer", + "client_roles": [ + {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, + {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + ], + }, + { + "role": "tech-support", + "client_roles": [ + {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + ], + }, + ], + "policy_structure": {}, + "yaml_output": "", + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + result = _build_policy(state) + + policy = result["policy_structure"]["policy"] + assert "developer" in policy + assert "tech-support" in policy + assert {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} in policy["developer"] + assert {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"} in policy["tech-support"] + # No other clients should appear + all_clients = {m["client"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} + assert all_clients == {"github-tool"} + + +def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): + """_build_policy produces an empty policy when no scopes matched.""" + state: ClientPolicyState = { + "description": "test", + "client_id": "kagenti", + "explanation": "", + "parsed_scopes": [], + "policy_structure": {}, + "yaml_output": "", + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + result = _build_policy(state) + assert result["policy_structure"] == {"policy": {}} + + +def test_client_policy_builder_initialization(config_file): + """ClientPolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified client.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + + assert builder.client_id == "github-tool" + # Realm roles come from config regardless of scoping + realm_role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.realm_roles] + assert "developer" in realm_role_names + assert "tech-support" in realm_role_names + + # Only github-tool roles should be loaded + role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.client_roles] + assert "github-tool-aud" in role_names + assert "github-full-access" in role_names + # Roles from other clients must not appear + assert "demo-ui" not in role_names + assert "github-agent" not in role_names + + +def test_client_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_client(config_file): + """ClientPolicyBuilder with an unknown client_id yields an empty role list.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="does-not-exist", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + + assert builder.client_roles == [] + + +def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file): + """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + graph = builder.get_graph() + assert graph is not None + + +# ============================================================================ +# MOCK-LLM TESTS (structural / format validation, no real LLM) +# ============================================================================ + +def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, client_id: str, role_name: str) -> str: + """Return a well-formed LLM JSON response for a single role mapping.""" + return f""" +```explanation +Policy grants {realm_role} access to {role_name} on {client_id}. +``` +```json +{{ + "client_role": "{role_name}", + "real_roles_with_access": ["{realm_role}"] +}} +``` +""" + + +def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file): + """generate_policy result contains all documented keys.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + mock_response = Mock() + mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( + "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" + ) + mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + result = builder.generate_policy("Developers access public repos.") + + assert "yaml_output" in result + assert "policy_structure" in result + assert "parsed_scopes" in result + assert "errors" in result + assert "success" in result + assert "retry_count" in result + + +def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file): + """yaml_output in the result must be parseable YAML.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + mock_response = Mock() + mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( + "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" + ) + mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") + + parsed = yaml.safe_load(result["yaml_output"]) + assert isinstance(parsed, dict) + assert "policy" in parsed + + +def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_client_only(config_file): + """All mappings in the generated policy belong to the specified client.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + mock_response = Mock() + mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( + "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" + ) + mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") + + policy = result["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) + for mappings in policy.values(): + for mapping in mappings: + assert mapping["client"] == "github-tool", ( + f"Mapping for a different client leaked in: {mapping}" + ) + + +def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file): + """A mapping with an unknown realm role is caught by validation.""" + mock_llm = Mock() + mock_response = Mock() + mock_response.content = """ +```json +{ + "client_role": "github-tool-aud", + "real_roles_with_access": ["nonexistent-realm-role"] +} +``` +""" + mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + result = builder.generate_policy("Some policy description.") + + assert not result["success"], "Validation should fail for an unknown realm role" + assert any( + "nonexistent-realm-role" in str(err) for err in result["errors"] + ) + + +def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_client_role(config_file): + """ + The client/role in every output mapping always comes from the predefined + client_roles list, not from the LLM JSON. Even if the LLM's client_role + field names a role from a different client (demo-ui belongs to kagenti), + the output must only contain github-tool roles and succeed. + """ + mock_llm = Mock() + mock_response = Mock() + # LLM mentions demo-ui (a kagenti role) in its JSON client_role field. + # That field is ignored; only real_roles_with_access matters. + mock_response.content = """ +```explanation +Mapping developer to demo-ui (wrong client - but client_role field is ignored). +``` +```json +{ + "client_role": "demo-ui", + "real_roles_with_access": ["developer"] +} +``` +""" + mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id="github-tool", + config_path=config_file, + llm=mock_llm, + verbose=False, + ) + result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + + # The mapping is structurally valid: developer → github-tool roles + assert result["success"], f"Unexpected errors: {result['errors']}" + policy = result["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) + all_clients = {m["client"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} + assert all_clients == {"github-tool"}, ( + f"Foreign client leaked into output: {all_clients}" + ) + + +# ============================================================================ +# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) +# ============================================================================ + +# @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with a configured LLM") +def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): + """ + Integration test: generate a partial policy for each fixture using a real LLM. + + For every policy fixture the test: + 1. Reads the policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt + 2. Loads the expected FULL policy from fixtures/expected/*.yaml + 3. Derives the expected PARTIAL policy by keeping only mappings for + each target client defined in the fixture config + 4. Generates a partial policy with ClientPolicyBuilder + 5. Compares the result with the derived expected partial policy + + The test is parametrised over the four LLM models defined in llm_model_name. + """ + if not policy_files: + pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") + + # Collect all client IDs from config + config_data = yaml.safe_load((config_file).read_text()) + all_client_ids = [c["client_id"] for c in config_data.get("clients", [])] + + failures = [] + + for policy_file in policy_files: + policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() + expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + + if not expected_file.exists(): + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" + ) + continue + + full_expected = normalize_policy_yaml(expected_file.read_text()) + + for client_id in all_client_ids: + expected_partial = filter_policy_to_client(full_expected, client_id) + + try: + builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( + client_id=client_id, + config_path=config_file, + llm=llm_instance, + verbose=False, + ) + result = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) + + if not result["success"]: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {client_id}: " + f"generation failed: {result['errors']}" + ) + continue + + generated_partial = normalize_policy_yaml(result["yaml_output"]) + match, diffs = compare_policies(generated_partial, expected_partial) + + if not match: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {client_id}: " + "policy mismatch:\n" + + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in diffs) + ) + + except Exception as exc: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {client_id}: " + f"exception: {exc}" + ) + + if failures: + pytest.fail( + f"Client policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + + "\n\n".join(failures) + ) + + +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURE SANITY CHECK +# ============================================================================ + +def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): + """Verify that fixture files are present and valid.""" + policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" + expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" + + assert policies_dir.exists(), "fixtures/policies/ not found" + assert expected_dir.exists(), "fixtures/expected/ not found" + + policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) + assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No .txt policy files found in fixtures/policies/" + + for policy_file in policy_files: + expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + assert expected_file.exists(), ( + f"No expected output for {policy_file.name}: {expected_file}" + ) + try: + yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {exc}") From 1c41950e142e1b329dedbb55801aa39966f6b8c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 12:19:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 012/273] client policy agent Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/tmp.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 From dbf0be45e0a9f00af3d30974ae9c928be73e2125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 17:28:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 013/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs(aiac):=20redesign=20AIAC=20Agent?= =?UTF-8?q?=20architecture=20=E2=80=94=20Controller=20+=203=20Orchestrator?= =?UTF-8?q?s=20+=206=20sub-agents?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Replace the two-graph (Policy Update / Client Onboarding) design with a Controller-plus-Orchestrator structure: a thin FastAPI Controller dispatches to three Orchestrators (Client Onboarding, Policy Update, Users & Realm Roles), each owning one or more compiled LangGraph StateGraph sub-agents. Key decisions captured: - Policy Update split into Build and Rebuild sub-agents; Rebuild exclusively calls clear_assignments before the fetch fan-out - Users & Realm Roles split into User and Realm Role sub-agents with scoped fetch_keycloak_state and scope-bounded validate_mappings - Client Onboarding sequences Client Provision → Client Policy sub-agents; classify_client uses in-cluster Kubernetes API (AgentRuntime/AgentCard CRs) - Only fetch_policy and fetch_domain_knowledge are shared nodes; all other nodes (propose/validate/apply) are per-graph with agent-specific semantics - Each sub-agent owns its own prompts.py (PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM) - Full file structure, state schema, endpoint table, and config documented PRD.md updated to match: call flow split into three trigger paths, component dependency table updated, section 5 rewritten, Dockerfile path corrected. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 39 +- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 461 +++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 325 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 161bdebaf..5cadbfe8a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -67,27 +67,36 @@ Policy / domain knowledge ingestion (operator-driven): Role enforcement (event-driven): - Policy update triggers (build, rebuild, user, realm-role): + Policy update triggers (build, rebuild) → Policy Update Orchestrator: - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬── (rebuild only) library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service [revoke all role assignments] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] - │ (rebuild only: revoke all role assignments first) ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply diff] - Client onboarding trigger (client/{id}): + Users & realm roles triggers (user/{id}, realm-role/{id}) → Users & Realm Roles Orchestrator: + + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] + ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose mappings scoped to affected entity] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] + └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply mappings] + + Client onboarding trigger (client/{id}) → Client Onboarding Orchestrator: - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► kagenti-operator [retrieve ClientInfo (type, description, skills)] + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ClientInfo] ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ClientProvision] ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision roles + scopes] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] - └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply diff] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose mappings for new client] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] + └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply mappings] ``` ### Component dependencies @@ -99,7 +108,7 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): | `aiac.keycloak.library.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts, LangGraph agents | Keycloak Configuration Service (HTTP) | Pydantic model instances | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API | — | -| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers, orchestrators | `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API, kagenti-operator | Applied/revoked role diff; provisioned client roles/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers | Controller → Orchestrators → `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API (in-cluster) | Applied/revoked role diff; provisioned client roles/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions @@ -133,7 +142,15 @@ Python package at `aiac/src/`. Two submodules: ## 5. Component: AIAC Agent -LangGraph `StateGraph` (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Five `/apply/*` endpoints dispatch to one of two compiled graphs. The **Policy Update Graph** handles `build`, `rebuild`, `user/{id}`, and `realm-role/{id}` triggers: three-way parallel fan-out (policy fetch + domain knowledge fetch + Keycloak state fetch) → LLM propose diff → LLM validate diff → apply or abort. The **Client Onboarding Graph** handles `client/{id}` triggers: classify client type via Keycloak + kagenti-operator → LLM analyze (agent or tool) → provision roles/scopes in Keycloak → same fan-out → diff → validate → apply or abort. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches five `/apply/*` endpoints to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: + +| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | +|---|---|---| +| Client Onboarding | `client/{id}` | Client Provision → Client Policy (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | +| Users & Realm Roles | `user/{id}`, `realm-role/{id}` | User sub-agent or Realm Role sub-agent (alternative) | + +All six sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live Keycloak state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all role assignments before computing the diff. The **Users & Realm Roles** sub-agents apply scoped mappings for a single affected user or realm role. The **Client Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions client roles/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new client's roles/scopes. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) @@ -178,7 +195,7 @@ Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile -t ac-configuration-service:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ # Build RAG Ingest Service docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 0dfc878db..e0b9d21ed 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -1,95 +1,213 @@ # Component PRD: AIAC Agent ## Description -A LangGraph-based AI agent that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live Keycloak state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or full build/rebuild requests. The agent runs two compiled `StateGraph` instances: -- **Policy Update Graph** — handles `build`, `rebuild`, `user/{id}`, and `realm-role/{id}` triggers. Computes role assignment diffs and applies them. -- **Client Onboarding Graph** — handles `client/{id}` triggers. Classifies the new client, provisions its roles and scopes in Keycloak via an LLM-derived `ClientProvision`, then computes and applies mapping diffs. +A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live Keycloak state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or full build/rebuild requests. -On each invocation both graphs: +The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: -1. In parallel: retrieve policy chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-policies`), retrieve domain context chunks from ChromaDB (`aiac-domain-knowledge`), and read the relevant Keycloak state via `aiac.library.api`. -2. Interpret the policy and domain context against the current state using an LLM, producing a typed `ProposedDiff`. -3. Validate the diff (existence check, safety guard rails, LLM re-confirmation, scope check). -4. On validation pass: apply changes immediately via `assign_client_roles` and `revoke_client_roles`. On failure: return a structured error with no changes applied. +| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | +|---|---|---| +| Client Onboarding | `client/{id}` | Client Provision → Client Policy (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | +| Users & Realm Roles | `user/{id}`, `realm-role/{id}` | User sub-agent or Realm Role sub-agent (alternative) | -The Client Onboarding Graph additionally runs a preprocessing subgraph before step 1: it classifies the client type (Agent or Tool), derives its Keycloak roles and scopes via an LLM call, and provisions them via `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` before the policy diff phase begins. +All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. -## Graph design +--- -Two compiled `StateGraph` instances sharing a common set of node functions. Both graphs share `BaseAgentState` as the base state schema. Trigger type and entity ID are passed as initial state. +## Controller -### Policy Update Graph +The Controller is a thin FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its sole responsibilities are: -``` -START → (if rebuild: clear_assignments →) [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → [apply_diff | abort] → format_response → END -``` +- Parse the trigger type and entity ID from the request path. +- Dispatch to the appropriate orchestrator. +- Return the orchestrator's response to the caller. + +No business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. -Handles triggers: `build`, `rebuild`, `user/{id}`, `realm-role/{id}`. +--- -- For `rebuild`: `clear_assignments` runs first (calls `revoke_all_role_assignments(realm)`), then the parallel fetch fan-out proceeds against the now-empty state. The `propose_diff` node receives an empty `keycloak_snapshot` and produces an assign-only diff. -- For `build` and all other triggers: no `clear_assignments`; proceeds directly to the parallel fetch fan-out and computes a minimal diff against live state. +## Client Onboarding Orchestrator -### Client Onboarding Graph +Handles `POST /apply/client/{client_id}`. + +The orchestrator sequences two sub-agents and assembles the final response: ``` -START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_client → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → [apply_diff | abort] → format_response → END +ClientProvisionGraph.invoke() → ClientPolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response ``` -Handles trigger: `client/{id}`. +### Client Provision Sub-agent -- `classify_client`: determines client type and populates `ClientInfo` using the Kubernetes API (in-cluster `ServiceAccount`) and the Keycloak library. - 1. **Parse `trigger.client_id`** to extract namespace + workload name: +``` +START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_client → format_response → END +``` + +- `classify_client`: determines client type and populates `ClientInfo`. + 1. **Parse `trigger.client_id`**: - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract namespace. - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. - Unrecognised format → treat as `ClientType.tool`. 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - - **Found** → `client_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR (same namespace and name); populate `ClientInfo(client_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. + - **Found** → `client_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - **Not found** → `client_type = tool`: call `get_clients(realm)` from `aiac.keycloak.library.api`; locate the `Client` by `client_id`; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=tool, description=client.description or client.name, skills=[])`. 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Keycloak Client record is not found for a tool. - > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. RBAC manifests are specified in the K8s deployment issue. + > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. - > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API — it is a controller-runtime manager only. Agent cards are stored as `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) alongside their workloads. Tools are not operator-managed; absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ClientType.tool`. + > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ClientType.tool`. -- `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node that produces a `ClientProvision` from `ClientInfo`. `analyze_agent` uses agent description + skill list; `analyze_tool` uses description only. Routing is a conditional edge on `ClientInfo.client_type`. -- `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. Runs before `fetch_keycloak_state` so provisioned roles/scopes are visible in the snapshot. +- `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node producing a `ClientProvision` from `ClientInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ClientInfo.client_type`. +- `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. +- `format_response`: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. -### State schema +**State:** `OnboardingProvisionState` extends `BaseAgentState` with: -#### `BaseAgentState` +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `client_info` | `ClientInfo \| None` | Populated by `classify_client` | +| `client_provision` | `ClientProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | + +### Client Policy Sub-agent + +Runs after Client Provision completes. Freshly provisioned roles/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +``` + +- Examines all realm roles and determines which realm role → client role/scope mappings to create for the newly added client, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. +- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches all users, all realm roles, the new client's roles and scopes, and all user role mappings. +- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new client only. +- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new client). +- `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles` for each entry in the validated diff. +- `format_response`: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. + +**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +**Prompts** (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-client mapping context. + +--- + +## Policy Update Orchestrator + +Handles `POST /apply/build` and `POST /apply/rebuild`. Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type. + +The Policy Update agent compares the **current Keycloak state** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing assignments and removing stale ones. + +### Build Sub-agent + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +``` + +- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches all users, all clients + their roles, all realm roles, all role mappings for all users. +- `propose_diff`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live Keycloak state. +- `validate_diff`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. +- `apply_diff`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. +- `format_response`: assembles the build result. + +**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +**Prompts** (`policy_update/build/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +### Rebuild Sub-agent + +``` +START → clear_assignments → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +``` + +- `clear_assignments`: calls `revoke_all_role_assignments(realm)` before the fetch fan-out. `propose_diff` receives an empty `keycloak_snapshot` and produces an assign-only diff. +- All other nodes: identical in contract to Build sub-agent. + +**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +**Prompts** (`policy_update/rebuild/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +--- -Shared by both graphs. +## Users & Realm Roles Orchestrator + +Handles `POST /apply/user/{user_id}` and `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}`. Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type. + +### User Sub-agent + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +``` + +- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches that user's current role mappings and all clients + their roles. +- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected user. +- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected user). +- `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. +- `format_response`: assembles the result. + +**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +**Prompts** (`users_realm_roles/user/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +### Realm Role Sub-agent + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +``` + +- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches all users and all realm roles. +- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. +- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). +- `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. +- `format_response`: assembles the result. + +**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +**Prompts** (`users_realm_roles/realm_role/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +--- + +## Shared Module + +Lives at `aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/`. + +### `shared/nodes.py` + +Two node functions shared by all policy-applying sub-agents: + +- `fetch_policy`: queries `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `BaseAgentState.policy_chunks`. Returns `503` when ChromaDB is unavailable after `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` retries. +- `fetch_domain_knowledge`: queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `BaseAgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when collection is empty — non-fatal. + +Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings: + +| Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | +|---|---| +| `build` | `"all access control rules"` | +| `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | +| `user/{id}` | `"user role assignment rules"` | +| `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | +| `client/{id}` | `"client access control rules"` | + +Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`). + +### `shared/state.py` + +All type definitions shared across agents: + +#### `BaseAgentState` | Field | Type | Description | -|-------|------|-------------| +|---|---|---| | `trigger` | `TriggerContext` | Endpoint type + entity ID | | `realm` | `str` | Keycloak realm (from `KEYCLOAK_REALM`) | -| `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection | -| `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Org/business context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge`; `[]` when empty — non-fatal | +| `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` | +| `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Domain context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` | | `keycloak_snapshot` | `KeycloakSnapshot` | Scoped Keycloak data for this trigger | | `proposed_diff` | `ProposedDiff \| None` | LLM output | -| `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from `validate_diff` | +| `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from validate node | | `applied` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed assignments | | `revoked` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed revocations | -| `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation (from LLM `reasoning` field) | - -#### `PolicyUpdateState` - -Extends `BaseAgentState`. No additional fields. +| `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation | -#### `OnboardingState` - -Extends `BaseAgentState`. Additional fields: - -| Field | Type | Description | -|-------|------|-------------| -| `client_info` | `ClientInfo \| None` | Client type, description, and skills — populated by `classify_client` | -| `client_provision` | `ClientProvision \| None` | Roles and scopes to create — populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | - -### State types (`state.py`) - -`KeycloakSnapshot` is a Pydantic `BaseModel` that reuses model classes from `aiac.library.models`. All fields are optional with empty defaults — each trigger type populates only the relevant subset: +#### `KeycloakSnapshot` ```python class KeycloakSnapshot(BaseModel): @@ -101,9 +219,30 @@ class KeycloakSnapshot(BaseModel): user_role_mappings: dict[str, RoleMappings] = {} # user_id → mappings ``` -> **Model dependency:** `classify_client` reads `Client.description` from the Keycloak library model for the tool path. The `Client` model in `aiac.keycloak.library.models` must include `description: str | None = None` (added in issue 1.5). +#### `ProposedDiff` and `RoleAssignment` + +```python +class RoleAssignment(BaseModel): + user_id: str + client_id: str + role_id: str + role_name: str + +class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): + assign: list[RoleAssignment] + revoke: list[RoleAssignment] + reasoning: str +``` + +#### `ValidationVerdict` -Client onboarding types: +```python +class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): + approved: bool + reason: str +``` + +#### Client Onboarding types (in `onboarding/provision/state.py`) ```python class ClientType(str, Enum): @@ -132,112 +271,69 @@ class ClientProvision(BaseModel): roles: list[RoleDefinition] scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] reasoning: str -``` - -### LLM output schema (`ProposedDiff`) - -```python -class RoleAssignment(BaseModel): - user_id: str - client_id: str - role_id: str - role_name: str -class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): - assign: list[RoleAssignment] - revoke: list[RoleAssignment] - reasoning: str +class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): + client_info: ClientInfo | None = None + client_provision: ClientProvision | None = None ``` -LLM is called via `llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff)` using `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`). Target endpoint must support tool calling. - -**Planner prompt** (`propose_diff` node): -- System message (stable, cacheable): role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing + output instructions ("enforce {AC_MODEL} policy, compute minimal role diff, be conservative"). -- User message (per-request): trigger description + policy chunks (from `aiac-policies`) + domain knowledge section (from `aiac-domain-knowledge`; omitted or rendered as empty section when `domain_knowledge_chunks` is `[]`) + scoped Keycloak snapshot summary (structured text, not raw JSON). +--- -**Auditor prompt** (`validate_diff` re-confirmation): -- System message: auditor role ("verify this diff correctly implements the policy"). -- User message: proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks (auditor receives the same context as the planner to enable full re-confirmation). +## LLM Integration -**Analyze Agent prompt** (`analyze_agent` node): -- System message: provisioner role ("derive the minimal set of Keycloak roles and scopes for this agent from its description and skills"). -- User message: `ClientInfo` rendered as structured text — description paragraph followed by a skill list (id, name, description per skill). +All `propose_*` and `validate_*` nodes use `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`) via `llm.with_structured_output()`. Target endpoint must support tool calling. -**Analyze Tool prompt** (`analyze_tool` node): -- System message: provisioner role ("derive the minimal set of Keycloak roles and scopes for this tool from its description"). -- User message: `ClientInfo.description`. +Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants in its `prompts.py`: -All four prompt templates are defined as named constants in `prompts.py`: `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`, `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM`, `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM`. +- **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped Keycloak snapshot summary. +- **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. -### `fetch_policy` and `fetch_domain_knowledge` — RAG query strings per trigger type +Client Provision sub-agent additionally defines `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` and `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` in `onboarding/provision/prompts.py`. -Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings. The query is derived from the **trigger TYPE only** (not the entity ID). +--- -| Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | -|---------|--------------------------| -| `build` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `user/{id}` | `"user role assignment rules"` | -| `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | -| `client/{id}` | `"client access control rules"` | - -- `fetch_policy` queries `aiac-policies` and stores results in `BaseAgentState.policy_chunks`. -- `fetch_domain_knowledge` queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` and stores results in `BaseAgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when the collection is empty — non-fatal, the agent continues with empty domain context. -- Both nodes share `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` (tenacity retry policy) and return HTTP 503 when ChromaDB is unavailable. - -Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`), shared across both nodes. - -### `fetch_keycloak_state` — Keycloak data scope per trigger type +## Validate Node — Common Checks (All Agents) -For the `client/{id}` trigger, `fetch_keycloak_state` runs after `provision_client` in the Client Onboarding Graph so that freshly created roles and scopes are visible in the snapshot. - -| Trigger | Fetches via `aiac.library.api` | -|---------|----------------------------------------| -| `build` | All users; all clients + their roles; all realm roles; all role mappings for all users | -| `rebuild` | All users; all clients + their roles; all realm roles; all role mappings for all users | -| `user/{id}` | That user's current role mappings; all clients + their roles | -| `realm-role/{id}` | All users; all realm roles | -| `client/{id}` | All users; that client's roles; all role mappings for all users | - -### `validate_diff` — validation checks (binary abort on any failure) +All `validate_*` / `validate_mappings` nodes perform the same four checks. Binary abort on any failure: 1. **Existence check** — every `user_id`, `client_id`, `role_id` in the diff exists in `keycloak_snapshot`. 2. **Safety guard rails** — total changes (`assign` + `revoke`) ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. -3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call (same `ChatOpenAI` instance, auditor system prompt) with diff + policy chunks; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved: bool, reason: str)` via `with_structured_output`. -4. **Scope validation** — diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. +3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. +4. **Scope check** — diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. -## Endpoints +--- -| Method | Path | Description | Graph | -|--------|------|-------------|-------| -| POST | `/apply/build` | Full diff-only rebuild — compute diff against live Keycloak state, apply only required changes | Policy update | -| POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Full nuke + rebuild — clear all role assignments, then recompute and apply from scratch | Policy update | -| POST | `/apply/user/{user_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a user addition or removal | Policy update | -| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Recompute and apply mappings affected by a realm role addition or removal | Policy update | -| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Classify and provision a new client, then recompute and apply access mappings | Onboarding | +## Endpoints -Success response (policy update graph): +| Method | Path | Orchestrator | Sub-agent | +|---|---|---|---| +| POST | `/apply/build` | Policy Update | Build | +| POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | +| POST | `/apply/user/{user_id}` | Users & Realm Roles | User | +| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Users & Realm Roles | Realm Role | +| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Client Onboarding | Provision → Policy | +**Success response (Client Onboarding):** ```json -{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } +{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } ``` -Success response (onboarding graph): - +**Success response (all other agents):** ```json -{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } +{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } ``` -Abort response (validation failure, both graphs): - +**Abort response (validation failure, all agents):** ```json { "applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } ``` +--- + ## Configuration | Variable | Default | Source | -|----------|---------|--------| +|---|---|---| | `AC_SERVICE_URL` | `http://aiac-keycloak-service:7070` | ConfigMap | | `CHROMA_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7080` | ConfigMap | | `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-keycloak-config`) | @@ -249,7 +345,22 @@ Abort response (validation failure, both graphs): | `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN` | `50` | ConfigMap | | `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | `3` | ConfigMap | -ChromaDB collections queried: `aiac-policies` (policy fetch) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (domain knowledge fetch). +ChromaDB collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`. + +--- + +## Error Handling + +All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. + +| Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | +|---|---| +| ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | +| Keycloak Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | + +--- ## Runtime @@ -258,52 +369,74 @@ ChromaDB collections queried: `aiac-policies` (policy fetch) and `aiac-domain-kn - State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required - Base image: `python:3.14-slim` -## File structure +--- + +## File Structure ``` aiac/src/aiac/agent/ -├── __init__.py ← empty -├── service/ -│ ├── __init__.py ← empty -│ ├── main.py ← FastAPI app factory + uvicorn entrypoint -│ ├── routes.py ← five /apply/* route handlers -│ ├── Dockerfile ← Docker image (build context: aiac/src/) -│ └── requirements.txt ← Python dependencies -└── agent/ - ├── __init__.py ← empty - ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, PolicyUpdateState, OnboardingState, - │ TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, - │ ValidationVerdict, ClientType, Skill, ClientInfo, - │ RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ClientProvision - ├── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM, - │ ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM - ├── nodes_shared.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge, fetch_keycloak_state, - │ propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response - ├── nodes_policy.py ← clear_assignments - ├── nodes_onboarding.py ← classify_client, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_client - ├── onboarding_graph.py ← Client Onboarding StateGraph singleton + run_client helper - └── policy_update_graph.py ← Policy Update StateGraph singleton + run_build, run_rebuild, - run_user, run_realm_role helpers +├── controller/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ └── routes.py ← FastAPI app + five /apply/* route handlers +│ +├── onboarding/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy, assembles combined response +│ ├── provision/ +│ │ ├── __init__.py +│ │ ├── graph.py ← Client Provision StateGraph +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_client, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_client, format_response +│ │ ├── prompts.py ← ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM +│ │ └── state.py ← ClientType, Skill, ClientInfo, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ClientProvision, OnboardingProvisionState +│ └── policy/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── graph.py ← Client Policy StateGraph +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ +├── policy_update/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to build or rebuild sub-agent +│ ├── build/ +│ │ ├── __init__.py +│ │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ └── rebuild/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph +│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_assignments, fetch_keycloak_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ +├── users_realm_roles/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to user or realm_role sub-agent +│ ├── user/ +│ │ ├── __init__.py +│ │ ├── graph.py ← User StateGraph +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ └── realm_role/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── graph.py ← Realm Role StateGraph +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ +└── shared/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge + └── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): ```bash -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/service/Dockerfile \ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile \ -t aiac-agent:latest \ aiac/src/ ``` -## Error handling - -All upstream calls (`fetch_policy`, `fetch_keycloak_state`, `propose_diff`, `validate_diff`, `classify_client`, `provision_client`) are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. - -| Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | -|----------|------------------------------| -| ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | -| Keycloak Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | -| Kubernetes API (AgentRuntime / AgentCard lookup) | `502 Bad Gateway` | -| LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | +--- ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) From d85d3c1ea1016bdf122a6fd137d3fff7ebad4a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 21:07:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 014/273] docs(aiac): add Mermaid diagrams to AIAC Agent PRD Embed all 8 flowchart diagrams from aiac-agent-diagram.md directly into aiac-agent.md: top-level architecture, Client Provision, Client Policy, Build, Rebuild, Users & Realm Roles, Shared Module, and Validate Node. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/aiac-agent-diagram.md | 249 ++++++++++++++++++ .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 209 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 458 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7a8ea95c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +# AIAC Agent — Visual Diagrams + +## 1. Top-Level Architecture + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + subgraph CO["Client Onboarding"] + ORC1["Orchestrator"] + SA1["Client Provision"] + SA2["Client Policy"] + ORC1 --> SA1 + ORC1 --> SA2 + end + + subgraph PU["Policy Update"] + ORC2["Orchestrator"] + SA3["Build"] + SA4["Rebuild"] + ORC2 --> SA3 + ORC2 --> SA4 + end + + subgraph URR["Users and Realm Roles"] + ORC3["Orchestrator"] + SA5["Users"] + SA6["Realm Roles"] + ORC3 --> SA5 + ORC3 --> SA6 + end + + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + CTRL -->|"user/:id or realm-role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 + CTRL -->|"client/:id"| ORC1 +``` + +--- + +## 2. Client Onboarding Sub-agents + +### 2a. Client Provision + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_client\n\n1. Parse client_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ClientInfo"] + + CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] + + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_client\n\ncreate_client_role\ncreate_client_scope\nper ClientProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION + + PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + %% State annotations + style CLASSIFY fill:#dbeafe + style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#fef9c3 + style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#fef9c3 + style PROVISION fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +**State:** `OnboardingProvisionState` — adds `client_info: ClientInfo | None` and `client_provision: ClientProvision | None` to `BaseAgentState`. + +### 2b. Client Policy + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nusers, realm roles,\nclient roles/scopes,\nuser role mappings"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new client only"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new client only"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions). + +--- + +## 3. Policy Update Sub-agents + +### 3a. Build + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nall users, clients,\nrealm roles, all\nrole mappings"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live state"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +### 3b. Rebuild + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_assignments\nrevoke_all_role_assignments\nrealm-wide wipe"] + + CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nempty snapshot\nafter wipe"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nassign-only state is empty"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles only"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style CLEAR fill:#fee2e2 + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +**Rebuild differs from Build only by the `clear_assignments` node before the fan-out.** + +--- + +## 4. Users & Realm Roles Sub-agents + +Both sub-agents share the same graph shape; only `fetch_keycloak_state` scope differs. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\n\nUser: that users\ncurrent mappings\nand all clients/roles\n\nRealm Role: all users\nand all realm roles"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected\nuser OR realm role"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected entity only"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +--- + +## 5. Shared Module + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + subgraph SHARED["shared - used by all policy-applying sub-agents"] + FP["fetch_policy\nQuery: aiac-policies collection\nReturns: policy_chunks\nFails: 503 after UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES"] + FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nQuery: aiac-domain-knowledge collection\nReturns: domain_knowledge_chunks\nFails: non-fatal"] + end + + subgraph STATE["BaseAgentState"] + S1["trigger: TriggerContext"] + S2["realm: str"] + S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] + S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] + S5["keycloak_snapshot: KeycloakSnapshot"] + S6["proposed_diff: ProposedDiff or None"] + S7["validation_errors: list of str"] + S8["applied / revoked: list of RoleAssignment"] + S9["summary: str"] + end + + subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] + Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] + Q2["user/:id -> user role assignment rules"] + Q3["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] + Q4["client/:id -> client access control rules"] + end + + FP & FDK --> STATE + QUERY_KEYS --> FP + QUERY_KEYS --> FDK +``` + +--- + +## 6. Validate Node — Common Checks + +All `validate_*` nodes execute the same four checks (binary abort on any failure): + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + IN["proposed_diff\n+ keycloak_snapshot"] --> C1 + + C1{"1. Existence check\nEvery user_id, client_id,\nrole_id in diff exists\nin keycloak_snapshot"} + C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\napplied and revoked empty"] + C1 -->|"pass"| C2 + + C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal changes\nassign + revoke\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} + C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT + C2 -->|"pass"| C3 + + C3{"3. LLM re-confirmation\nAuditor system prompt\n-> ValidationVerdict\napproved bool + reason str"} + C3 -->|"approved=false"| ABORT + C3 -->|"approved=true"| C4 + + C4{"4. Scope check\nDiff bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} + C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT + C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] + + style ABORT fill:#fee2e2 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style C3 fill:#fef9c3 +``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index e0b9d21ed..6872addf6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -14,6 +14,41 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. +```mermaid +flowchart TD + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + subgraph CO["Client Onboarding"] + ORC1["Orchestrator"] + SA1["Client Provision"] + SA2["Client Policy"] + ORC1 --> SA1 + ORC1 --> SA2 + end + + subgraph PU["Policy Update"] + ORC2["Orchestrator"] + SA3["Build"] + SA4["Rebuild"] + ORC2 --> SA3 + ORC2 --> SA4 + end + + subgraph URR["Users and Realm Roles"] + ORC3["Orchestrator"] + SA5["Users"] + SA6["Realm Roles"] + ORC3 --> SA5 + ORC3 --> SA6 + end + + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + CTRL -->|"user/:id or realm-role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 + CTRL -->|"client/:id"| ORC1 +``` + --- ## Controller @@ -62,6 +97,25 @@ START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_clien - `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. - `format_response`: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_client\n\n1. Parse client_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ClientInfo"] + + CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] + + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_client\n\ncreate_client_role\ncreate_client_scope\nper ClientProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION + + PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style CLASSIFY fill:#dbeafe + style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#fef9c3 + style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#fef9c3 + style PROVISION fill:#dcfce7 +``` + **State:** `OnboardingProvisionState` extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | @@ -84,6 +138,30 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → - `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles` for each entry in the validated diff. - `format_response`: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nusers, realm roles,\nclient roles/scopes,\nuser role mappings"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new client only"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new client only"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + **State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). **Prompts** (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-client mapping context. @@ -108,6 +186,30 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → - `apply_diff`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. - `format_response`: assembles the build result. +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nall users, clients,\nrealm roles, all\nrole mappings"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live state"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + **State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). **Prompts** (`policy_update/build/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. @@ -121,6 +223,31 @@ START → clear_assignments → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fet - `clear_assignments`: calls `revoke_all_role_assignments(realm)` before the fetch fan-out. `propose_diff` receives an empty `keycloak_snapshot` and produces an assign-only diff. - All other nodes: identical in contract to Build sub-agent. +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_assignments\nrevoke_all_role_assignments\nrealm-wide wipe"] + + CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nempty snapshot\nafter wipe"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nassign-only state is empty"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles only"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style CLEAR fill:#fee2e2 + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + **State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). **Prompts** (`policy_update/rebuild/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. @@ -131,6 +258,32 @@ START → clear_assignments → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fet Handles `POST /apply/user/{user_id}` and `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}`. Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type. +Both sub-agents share the same graph shape; only `fetch_keycloak_state` scope differs. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\n\nUser: that users\ncurrent mappings\nand all clients/roles\n\nRealm Role: all users\nand all realm roles"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected\nuser OR realm role"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected entity only"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + ### User Sub-agent ``` @@ -169,6 +322,37 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → Lives at `aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/`. +```mermaid +flowchart TD + subgraph SHARED["shared - used by all policy-applying sub-agents"] + FP["fetch_policy\nQuery: aiac-policies collection\nReturns: policy_chunks\nFails: 503 after UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES"] + FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nQuery: aiac-domain-knowledge collection\nReturns: domain_knowledge_chunks\nFails: non-fatal"] + end + + subgraph STATE["BaseAgentState"] + S1["trigger: TriggerContext"] + S2["realm: str"] + S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] + S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] + S5["keycloak_snapshot: KeycloakSnapshot"] + S6["proposed_diff: ProposedDiff or None"] + S7["validation_errors: list of str"] + S8["applied / revoked: list of RoleAssignment"] + S9["summary: str"] + end + + subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] + Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] + Q2["user/:id -> user role assignment rules"] + Q3["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] + Q4["client/:id -> client access control rules"] + end + + FP & FDK --> STATE + QUERY_KEYS --> FP + QUERY_KEYS --> FDK +``` + ### `shared/nodes.py` Two node functions shared by all policy-applying sub-agents: @@ -296,6 +480,31 @@ Client Provision sub-agent additionally defines `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` and `ANAL All `validate_*` / `validate_mappings` nodes perform the same four checks. Binary abort on any failure: +```mermaid +flowchart TD + IN["proposed_diff\n+ keycloak_snapshot"] --> C1 + + C1{"1. Existence check\nEvery user_id, client_id,\nrole_id in diff exists\nin keycloak_snapshot"} + C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\napplied and revoked empty"] + C1 -->|"pass"| C2 + + C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal changes\nassign + revoke\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} + C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT + C2 -->|"pass"| C3 + + C3{"3. LLM re-confirmation\nAuditor system prompt\n-> ValidationVerdict\napproved bool + reason str"} + C3 -->|"approved=false"| ABORT + C3 -->|"approved=true"| C4 + + C4{"4. Scope check\nDiff bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} + C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT + C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] + + style ABORT fill:#fee2e2 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style C3 fill:#fef9c3 +``` + 1. **Existence check** — every `user_id`, `client_id`, `role_id` in the diff exists in `keycloak_snapshot`. 2. **Safety guard rails** — total changes (`assign` + `revoke`) ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. 3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. From aa22feb498344bcaaedc33e40c35e2c438072f66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 23:22:50 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 015/273] docs(aiac): redesign AIAC around generic PDP abstraction with phase-based policy backends MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Introduces a PDP (Policy Decision Point) abstraction that decouples the AIAC system from Keycloak-specific API shapes. The monolithic Keycloak Configuration Service is split into two separate pods: a stable read service (PDP Configuration Service) and a swappable write service (PDP Policy Service). Phase 1 write target is Keycloak composite role mappings; Phase 2 write target is LLM-generated Rego rules pushed to OPA. Phase transition is a pod swap behind a stable ClusterIP name. Key changes: - Add pdp-configuration-service.md and pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md - Supersede keycloak-service.md (redirects to new files) - Rename aiac.keycloak.* to aiac.pdp.* throughout; split library API into read_api and write_api modules - Generic model renames: User→Subject, RealmRole→Role, Client→Service, ClientRole→Permission, ClientScope→Scope, RoleMappings→Assignments - Switch write model from per-user role assignments to RBAC composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) - Drop user/{id} trigger; reduce to four triggers: build, rebuild, realm-role/{id}, client/{id} - RAG Ingest Service fires POST /apply/build after every ingest; rebuild remains operator-only - Add AIAC_AGENT_URL env var to RAG Pod; split AC_SERVICE_URL into AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL + AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL - Rename aiac-keycloak-config ConfigMap to aiac-pdp-config - Downgrade Python target from 3.14 to 3.12 Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 200 ++++++++++----- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 229 ++++++++---------- .../components/keycloak-service.md | 8 +- .../requirements/components/library.md | 178 +++++++++----- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 68 ++++++ .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 74 ++++++ .../components/rag-ingest-service.md | 9 +- 7 files changed, 509 insertions(+), 257 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 5cadbfe8a..25828695a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -1,26 +1,49 @@ -# PRD: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) for Keycloak +# PRD: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) ## 1. Purpose -Automate Keycloak RBAC management using a natural-language access control policy enforced by an AI agent. The system has three concerns: +Automate RBAC management using a natural-language access control policy enforced by an AI agent. The system is designed around a generic **Policy Decision Point (PDP)** abstraction, with Keycloak as the Phase 1 backend. The system has three concerns: -1. **Configuration accessor** — a REST service and Python library that expose Keycloak user, role, client, and role-mapping data for both read and write operations. -2. **Policy knowledge base** — a ChromaDB RAG store holding the access control policy in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located ingest service. -3. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Keycloak state-change events. It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live Keycloak state, and applies the required role assignments and revocations immediately. +1. **PDP Configuration Service** — a REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. +2. **PDP Policy Service** — a REST service that applies policy changes to the PDP backend. Phase 1 implementation writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a deployment swap only. +3. **Policy knowledge base** — a ChromaDB RAG store holding the access control policy in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located ingest service. +4. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Keycloak state-change events (via Keycloak SPI listener) and by the RAG Ingest Service. It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required composite mappings immediately. +5. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `read_api` and `write_api` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. + +### Implementation phases + +| Phase | PDP Policy write target | Write operation | +|---|---|---| +| Phase 1 | Keycloak | Composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) | +| Phase 2 | OPA | LLM-generated Rego rules | + +Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite mappings from Keycloak, then the PDP Policy pod is replaced with the OPA implementation. + +--- ## 2. Architecture Overview -Six components across three Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.14. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. +Six components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. ### Deployment topology ``` ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Keycloak Configuration Service Pod │ +│ PDP Configuration Pod │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ Keycloak Configuration│ :7070 ClusterIP │ -│ │ Service (FastAPI) │ aiac-keycloak-service │ +│ │ PDP Configuration │ :7070 ClusterIP │ +│ │ Service (FastAPI) │ aiac-pdp-config-service │ +│ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ + │ +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ PDP Policy Pod (Phase 1: Keycloak | Phase 2: OPA) │ +│ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ PDP Policy Service │ :7073 ClusterIP │ +│ │ (FastAPI) │ aiac-pdp-policy-service │ │ └────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ │ └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ @@ -50,9 +73,11 @@ Six components across three Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imp ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ -│ aiac.keycloak.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.keycloak.library.api — HTTP client → │ -│ Keycloak Configuration Service │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.read_api — HTTP client → │ +│ PDP Configuration Service │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.write_api — HTTP client → │ +│ PDP Policy Service │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` @@ -63,100 +88,119 @@ Policy / domain knowledge ingestion (operator-driven): Developer ──(kubectl port-forward)──► RAG Ingest Service ──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [policy rules] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [org/business context] - └──► Embedding API (external) + ├──► Embedding API (external) + └──► AIAC Agent /apply/build [trigger policy recompute] Role enforcement (event-driven): Policy update triggers (build, rebuild) → Policy Update Orchestrator: - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬── (rebuild only) library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service [revoke all role assignments] + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬── (rebuild only) write_api ──► PDP Policy Service [clear all composite mappings] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state + composites] ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] - └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply diff] + └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite diff] - Users & realm roles triggers (user/{id}, realm-role/{id}) → Users & Realm Roles Orchestrator: + Realm role trigger (realm-role/{id}) → Realm Roles Orchestrator: Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose mappings scoped to affected entity] + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings scoped to affected role] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply mappings] + └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] Client onboarding trigger (client/{id}) → Client Onboarding Orchestrator: Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ClientInfo] ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ClientProvision] - ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision roles + scopes] + ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose mappings for new client] + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings for new service] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - └──► library.api ──► Keycloak Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply mappings] + └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] ``` ### Component dependencies | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| Keycloak Configuration Service | `aiac.keycloak.library.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON | -| `aiac.keycloak.library.models` | `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, AIAC Agent, other agents | — | Pydantic model definitions | -| `aiac.keycloak.library.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts, LangGraph agents | Keycloak Configuration Service (HTTP) | Pydantic model instances | +| PDP Configuration Service | `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) | `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.read_api`, `aiac.pdp.library.write_api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions | +| `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances | +| `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | -| RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API | — | -| AIAC Agent | Keycloak event handlers | Controller → Orchestrators → `aiac.keycloak.library.api`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API (in-cluster) | Applied/revoked role diff; provisioned client roles/scopes (onboarding) | +| RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, AIAC Agent | — | +| AIAC Agent | Keycloak SPI listener (entity events), RAG Ingest Service (build), operator (rebuild) | Policy Update / Realm Roles / Client Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **Keycloak Configuration Service binds to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as a Kubernetes ClusterIP Service (`aiac-keycloak-service`) so that the Agent Pod can reach it over the cluster network. Also accessible via `kubectl port-forward`. -- **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as a Kubernetes ClusterIP Service (`aiac-rag-service`) on ports 7080 (ChromaDB) and 7072 (RAG Ingest Service). Developer ingestion is done via `kubectl port-forward`. +- **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. +- **PDP Policy Service ClusterIP name is stable across phases.** `aiac-pdp-policy-service` on `:7073` is used in both Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA). Phase transition = deployment swap only. +- **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages realm role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a realm role. +- **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 7080 (ChromaDB) and 7072 (RAG Ingest Service). - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. -- **`aiac.keycloak.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. -- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.keycloak.__init__`, `aiac.keycloak.library.__init__`, and `aiac.keycloak.service.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.keycloak.library.models import User`, `from aiac.keycloak.library.api import get_users`. -- **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** The legal collection set is governed by `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` on the RAG Ingest Service (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. +- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.library.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.configuration.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.policy.__init__`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.read_api import get_subjects`. +- **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. +- **`rebuild` is operator-only.** Never triggered automatically. Clears all composite mappings then recomputes from scratch. RAG Ingest Service triggers `build` (incremental) only. +- **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are realm-role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. --- -## 3. Component: Keycloak Configuration Service +## 3. Component: PDP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies the Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes 11 endpoints (6 reads + assign + revoke + create client role + create client scope + revoke all role assignments). Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints using generic PDP entity names. Exposes 7 read endpoints. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. -**Full spec:** [components/keycloak-service.md](components/keycloak-service.md) +**Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) --- -## 4. Component: Library +## 4. Component: PDP Policy Service -Python package at `aiac/src/`. Two submodules: +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two implementations share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service`): -- **`aiac.keycloak.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all Keycloak entities (`User`, `RealmRole`, `Client`, `ClientRole`, `ClientScope`, `RoleMappings`). -- **`aiac.keycloak.library.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the Keycloak Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. +- **Phase 1 — Keycloak:** manages composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. +- **Phase 2 — OPA:** writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Interface TBD (separate PRD). + +**Phase 1 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) + +--- + +## 5. Component: Library + +Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: + +- **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all PDP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Permission`, `Scope`, `Assignments`). +- **`aiac.pdp.library.read_api`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.write_api`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service; abstracts Phase 1 (Keycloak composite mappings) and Phase 2 (OPA Rego) behind a stable function interface. **Full spec:** [components/library.md](components/library.md) --- -## 5. Component: AIAC Agent +## 6. Component: AIAC Agent -FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches five `/apply/*` endpoints to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: +FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches four `/apply/*` endpoints to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| | Client Onboarding | `client/{id}` | Client Provision → Client Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Users & Realm Roles | `user/{id}`, `realm-role/{id}` | User sub-agent or Realm Role sub-agent (alternative) | +| Realm Roles | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | -All six sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live Keycloak state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all role assignments before computing the diff. The **Users & Realm Roles** sub-agents apply scoped mappings for a single affected user or realm role. The **Client Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions client roles/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new client's roles/scopes. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All four sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Realm Roles** sub-agent applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Client Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) --- -## 6. Component: RAG Knowledge Base +## 7. Component: RAG Knowledge Base ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. @@ -164,35 +208,54 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p --- -## 7. Component: RAG Ingest Service +## 8. Component: RAG Ingest Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service calls `POST /apply/build` on the AIAC Agent (`AIAC_AGENT_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. **Full spec:** [components/rag-ingest-service.md](components/rag-ingest-service.md) --- -## 8. Deployment +## 9. Component: Keycloak SPI Listener + +A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into HTTP calls to the AIAC Agent's `/apply/*` endpoints. + +| Keycloak Event | AIAC Agent endpoint | +|---|---| +| `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; composite roles handle user permission inheritance automatically) | +| `CLIENT_CREATED` | `POST /apply/client/{id}` | +| Realm role created/updated | `POST /apply/realm-role/{id}` | + +**Full spec:** TBD (separate PRD). + +--- + +## 10. Deployment ### Kubernetes manifests -Three separate manifest files: +Five separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-keycloak-config` ConfigMap + Keycloak Configuration Service Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-config-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Configuration Service Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-policy-keycloak-deployment.yaml` | PDP Policy Service Pod Deployment (Keycloak implementation) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-deployment.yaml` | RAG Pod Deployment (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` | PDP Policy Service Pod Deployment (OPA implementation) — Phase 2, TBD | -The Keycloak Configuration Service Pod mounts `aiac-keycloak-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. +The PDP Configuration and PDP Policy (Keycloak) Pods mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. ### Docker images Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash -# Build Keycloak Configuration Service -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile -t ac-configuration-service:latest aiac/src/ +# Build PDP Configuration Service +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ @@ -201,23 +264,26 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest a docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ ``` -### `aiac-keycloak-config` ConfigMap template +### `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap template ```yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: - name: aiac-keycloak-config + name: aiac-pdp-config data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" + AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7070" + AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7073" + AIAC_AGENT_URL: "http://aiac-agent-service:7071" ``` Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before applying. --- -## 9. Testing +## 11. Testing Tests live in `aiac/test/`. @@ -225,9 +291,11 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | Target | What to mock | What to assert | |--------|-------------|----------------| -| Keycloak Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 204 on write success, 502 on Keycloak error | -| `aiac.keycloak.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | -| `aiac.keycloak.library.api` functions | Keycloak Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| PDP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | +| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods | 204 on write success, 201 on create, 502 on Keycloak error | +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | +| `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` functions | PDP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | AIAC Agent | TBD | TBD | ### Integration tests @@ -241,7 +309,7 @@ Require a live Keycloak instance. Controlled by env vars: | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Admin username | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Admin password | -Integration tests call the live Keycloak Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. +Integration tests call the live PDP Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. Use a pytest marker (e.g. `@pytest.mark.integration`) so unit tests and integration tests can be run independently: @@ -252,12 +320,12 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only --- -## 10. Conventions and constraints +## 12. Conventions and constraints -- Python version: 3.14 -- Base Docker image: `python:3.14-slim` +- Python version: 3.12 +- Base Docker image: `python:3.12-slim` - Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) - Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` -- No auth on Keycloak Configuration Service or RAG Ingest Service — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism -- Keycloak Configuration Service, Agent, and RAG Ingest Service are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- No auth on PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, or RAG Ingest Service — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism +- PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, Agent, and RAG Ingest Service are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes - `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 6872addf6..f2ad51ec3 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## Description -A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live Keycloak state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state change events or full build/rebuild requests. +A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state-change events (via Keycloak SPI listener) or full build/rebuild requests (via RAG Ingest Service or admin call). The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t |---|---|---| | Client Onboarding | `client/{id}` | Client Provision → Client Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Users & Realm Roles | `user/{id}`, `realm-role/{id}` | User sub-agent or Realm Role sub-agent (alternative) | +| Realm Roles | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -35,16 +35,14 @@ flowchart TD ORC2 --> SA4 end - subgraph URR["Users and Realm Roles"] + subgraph RR["Realm Roles"] ORC3["Orchestrator"] - SA5["Users"] - SA6["Realm Roles"] + SA5["Realm Role"] ORC3 --> SA5 - ORC3 --> SA6 end TRIGGERS --> CTRL - CTRL -->|"user/:id or realm-role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"realm-role/:id"| ORC3 CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 CTRL -->|"client/:id"| ORC1 ``` @@ -86,15 +84,15 @@ START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_clien - Unrecognised format → treat as `ClientType.tool`. 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - **Found** → `client_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - - **Not found** → `client_type = tool`: call `get_clients(realm)` from `aiac.keycloak.library.api`; locate the `Client` by `client_id`; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=tool, description=client.description or client.name, skills=[])`. - 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Keycloak Client record is not found for a tool. + - **Not found** → `client_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.read_api`; locate the `Service` by `client_id`; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. + 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Service record is not found for a tool. > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ClientType.tool`. - `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node producing a `ClientProvision` from `ClientInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ClientInfo.client_type`. -- `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_client_role` and `create_client_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. +- `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. - `format_response`: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. ```mermaid @@ -104,7 +102,7 @@ flowchart TD CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_client\n\ncreate_client_role\ncreate_client_scope\nper ClientProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_client\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ClientProvision entry"] ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] @@ -125,17 +123,17 @@ flowchart TD ### Client Policy Sub-agent -Runs after Client Provision completes. Freshly provisioned roles/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. +Runs after Client Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END ``` -- Examines all realm roles and determines which realm role → client role/scope mappings to create for the newly added client, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. -- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches all users, all realm roles, the new client's roles and scopes, and all user role mappings. -- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new client only. -- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new client). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles` for each entry in the validated diff. +- Examines all realm roles and determines which realm role → service permission/scope composite mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. +- `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. +- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. +- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). +- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` for each entry in the validated diff. - `format_response`: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. ```mermaid @@ -144,13 +142,13 @@ flowchart TD START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nusers, realm roles,\nclient roles/scopes,\nuser role mappings"] + START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nroles + composites,\nnew service permissions/scopes"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new client only"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new service only"] - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new client only"] + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new service only"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) @@ -164,7 +162,7 @@ flowchart TD **State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). -**Prompts** (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-client mapping context. +**Prompts** (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-service composite mapping context. --- @@ -172,18 +170,18 @@ flowchart TD Handles `POST /apply/build` and `POST /apply/rebuild`. Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type. -The Policy Update agent compares the **current Keycloak state** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing assignments and removing stale ones. +The Policy Update agent compares the **current composite role mappings** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing composite mappings and removing stale ones. ### Build Sub-agent ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END ``` -- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches all users, all clients + their roles, all realm roles, all role mappings for all users. -- `propose_diff`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live Keycloak state. +- `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. +- `propose_diff`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. - `validate_diff`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. -- `apply_diff`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. +- `apply_diff`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites`. - `format_response`: assembles the build result. ```mermaid @@ -192,13 +190,13 @@ flowchart TD START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nall users, clients,\nrealm roles, all\nrole mappings"] + START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nall roles + composites,\nall services + permissions"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live state"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live composites"] PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) @@ -217,25 +215,25 @@ flowchart TD ### Rebuild Sub-agent ``` -START → clear_assignments → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END ``` -- `clear_assignments`: calls `revoke_all_role_assignments(realm)` before the fetch fan-out. `propose_diff` receives an empty `keycloak_snapshot` and produces an assign-only diff. +- `clear_composites`: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. `propose_diff` receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` and produces an add-only diff. - All other nodes: identical in contract to Build sub-agent. ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_assignments\nrevoke_all_role_assignments\nrealm-wide wipe"] + START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_composites\nclear_all_composites\nrealm-wide wipe"] CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nempty snapshot\nafter wipe"] + CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nempty role_composites\nafter wipe"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nassign-only state is empty"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nadd-only: composites are empty"] PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles only"] + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites only"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) @@ -254,11 +252,21 @@ flowchart TD --- -## Users & Realm Roles Orchestrator +## Realm Roles Orchestrator -Handles `POST /apply/user/{user_id}` and `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}`. Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type. +Handles `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}`. Dispatches to the Realm Role sub-agent. -Both sub-agents share the same graph shape; only `fetch_keycloak_state` scope differs. +### Realm Role Sub-agent + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +``` + +- `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all services and their permissions, all realm roles, and the current composites for the affected realm role. +- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. +- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). +- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites`. +- `format_response`: assembles the result. ```mermaid flowchart TD @@ -266,13 +274,13 @@ flowchart TD START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\n\nUser: that users\ncurrent mappings\nand all clients/roles\n\nRealm Role: all users\nand all realm roles"] + START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\naffected role composites,\nall services + permissions"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected\nuser OR realm role"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected realm role"] - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected entity only"] + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) @@ -284,37 +292,9 @@ flowchart TD style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 ``` -### User Sub-agent - -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END -``` - -- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches that user's current role mappings and all clients + their roles. -- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected user. -- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected user). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. -- `format_response`: assembles the result. - -**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -**Prompts** (`users_realm_roles/user/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. - -### Realm Role Sub-agent - -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_keycloak_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END -``` - -- `fetch_keycloak_state`: fetches all users and all realm roles. -- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. -- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `assign_client_roles` / `revoke_client_roles`. -- `format_response`: assembles the result. - **State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). -**Prompts** (`users_realm_roles/realm_role/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. +**Prompts** (`realm_roles/realm_role/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. --- @@ -334,18 +314,17 @@ flowchart TD S2["realm: str"] S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] - S5["keycloak_snapshot: KeycloakSnapshot"] + S5["pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot"] S6["proposed_diff: ProposedDiff or None"] S7["validation_errors: list of str"] - S8["applied / revoked: list of RoleAssignment"] + S8["added / removed: list of CompositeMapping"] S9["summary: str"] end subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] - Q2["user/:id -> user role assignment rules"] - Q3["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] - Q4["client/:id -> client access control rules"] + Q2["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] + Q3["client/:id -> client access control rules"] end FP & FDK --> STATE @@ -366,7 +345,6 @@ Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings: |---|---| | `build` | `"all access control rules"` | | `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `user/{id}` | `"user role assignment rules"` | | `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | | `client/{id}` | `"client access control rules"` | @@ -381,40 +359,41 @@ All type definitions shared across agents: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| | `trigger` | `TriggerContext` | Endpoint type + entity ID | -| `realm` | `str` | Keycloak realm (from `KEYCLOAK_REALM`) | +| `realm` | `str` | Realm name (from `KEYCLOAK_REALM`) | | `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` | | `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Domain context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` | -| `keycloak_snapshot` | `KeycloakSnapshot` | Scoped Keycloak data for this trigger | +| `pdp_snapshot` | `PDPSnapshot` | Scoped PDP data for this trigger | | `proposed_diff` | `ProposedDiff \| None` | LLM output | | `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from validate node | -| `applied` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed assignments | -| `revoked` | `list[RoleAssignment]` | Executed revocations | +| `added` | `list[CompositeMapping]` | Executed composite additions | +| `removed` | `list[CompositeMapping]` | Executed composite removals | | `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation | -#### `KeycloakSnapshot` +#### `PDPSnapshot` ```python -class KeycloakSnapshot(BaseModel): - users: list[User] = [] - realm_roles: list[RealmRole] = [] - clients: list[Client] = [] - client_roles: dict[str, list[ClientRole]] = {} # client_id → roles - client_scopes: list[ClientScope] = [] - user_role_mappings: dict[str, RoleMappings] = {} # user_id → mappings +class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): + subjects: list[Subject] = [] + roles: list[Role] = [] + services: list[Service] = [] + service_permissions: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # service_id → permissions + service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] + subject_assignments: dict[str, Assignments] = {} # subject_id → assignments + role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # role_name → current composite permissions ``` -#### `ProposedDiff` and `RoleAssignment` +#### `ProposedDiff` and `CompositeMapping` ```python -class RoleAssignment(BaseModel): - user_id: str - client_id: str - role_id: str +class CompositeMapping(BaseModel): role_name: str + service_id: str + permission_id: str + permission_name: str class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): - assign: list[RoleAssignment] - revoke: list[RoleAssignment] + add: list[CompositeMapping] + remove: list[CompositeMapping] reasoning: str ``` @@ -469,7 +448,7 @@ All `propose_*` and `validate_*` nodes use `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`) via Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants in its `prompts.py`: -- **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped Keycloak snapshot summary. +- **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped PDP snapshot summary. - **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. Client Provision sub-agent additionally defines `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` and `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` in `onboarding/provision/prompts.py`. @@ -482,13 +461,13 @@ All `validate_*` / `validate_mappings` nodes perform the same four checks. Binar ```mermaid flowchart TD - IN["proposed_diff\n+ keycloak_snapshot"] --> C1 + IN["proposed_diff\n+ pdp_snapshot"] --> C1 - C1{"1. Existence check\nEvery user_id, client_id,\nrole_id in diff exists\nin keycloak_snapshot"} - C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\napplied and revoked empty"] + C1{"1. Existence check\nEvery role_name, service_id,\npermission_id in diff exists\nin pdp_snapshot"} + C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nadded and removed empty"] C1 -->|"pass"| C2 - C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal changes\nassign + revoke\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} + C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal changes\nadd + remove\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT C2 -->|"pass"| C3 @@ -505,8 +484,8 @@ flowchart TD style C3 fill:#fef9c3 ``` -1. **Existence check** — every `user_id`, `client_id`, `role_id` in the diff exists in `keycloak_snapshot`. -2. **Safety guard rails** — total changes (`assign` + `revoke`) ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. +1. **Existence check** — every `role_name`, `service_id`, `permission_id` in the diff exists in `pdp_snapshot`. +2. **Safety guard rails** — total changes (`add` + `remove`) ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. 3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. 4. **Scope check** — diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. @@ -518,23 +497,22 @@ flowchart TD |---|---|---|---| | POST | `/apply/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | -| POST | `/apply/user/{user_id}` | Users & Realm Roles | User | -| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Users & Realm Roles | Realm Role | +| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Realm Roles | Realm Role | | POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Client Onboarding | Provision → Policy | **Success response (Client Onboarding):** ```json -{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } +{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } ``` **Success response (all other agents):** ```json -{ "applied": [...], "revoked": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } +{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } ``` **Abort response (validation failure, all agents):** ```json -{ "applied": [], "revoked": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } +{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } ``` --- @@ -543,9 +521,10 @@ flowchart TD | Variable | Default | Source | |---|---|---| -| `AC_SERVICE_URL` | `http://aiac-keycloak-service:7070` | ConfigMap | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7070` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7073` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `CHROMA_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7080` | ConfigMap | -| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-keycloak-config`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | | `LLM_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | | `LLM_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | @@ -565,7 +544,8 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti | Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | |---|---| | ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | -| Keycloak Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| PDP Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| PDP Policy Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | | Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | @@ -576,7 +556,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti - Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` - State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required -- Base image: `python:3.14-slim` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` --- @@ -586,7 +566,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── controller/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ └── routes.py ← FastAPI app + five /apply/* route handlers +│ └── routes.py ← FastAPI app + four /apply/* route handlers │ ├── onboarding/ │ ├── __init__.py @@ -600,7 +580,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ └── policy/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Client Policy StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ ├── policy_update/ @@ -609,32 +589,27 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── build/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response │ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ └── rebuild/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_assignments, fetch_keycloak_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ -├── users_realm_roles/ +├── realm_roles/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to user or realm_role sub-agent -│ ├── user/ -│ │ ├── __init__.py -│ │ ├── graph.py ← User StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response -│ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to realm_role sub-agent │ └── realm_role/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Realm Role StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_keycloak_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ └── shared/ ├── __init__.py ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge - └── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, KeycloakSnapshot, ProposedDiff, RoleAssignment, ValidationVerdict + └── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, ProposedDiff, CompositeMapping, ValidationVerdict ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md index 2ca355c6c..2d759f8e3 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -1,4 +1,10 @@ -# Component PRD: Keycloak Configuration Service +# ~~Component PRD: Keycloak Configuration Service~~ + +> **Superseded.** This component has been replaced by two separate services: +> - **PDP Configuration Service** (read endpoints) — see [pdp-configuration-service.md](pdp-configuration-service.md) +> - **PDP Policy Service — Keycloak Implementation** (write endpoints) — see [pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) +> +> The content below is retained for reference only. ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index df6e8cb2f..5cef13b8d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -9,30 +9,38 @@ aiac/src/ └── aiac/ ├── __init__.py # empty - └── keycloak/ + └── pdp/ ├── __init__.py # empty ├── library/ │ ├── __init__.py # empty │ ├── models.py # Pydantic model definitions only - │ └── api.py # HTTP client functions - └── service/ + │ ├── read_api.py # HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service + │ └── write_api.py # HTTP client → PDP Policy Service + ├── configuration/ + │ ├── __init__.py # empty + │ ├── main.py # FastAPI app (read service) + │ ├── Dockerfile + │ └── requirements.txt + └── policy/ ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── main.py # FastAPI app - ├── Dockerfile - └── requirements.txt + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── main.py # FastAPI app (Keycloak write service) + ├── Dockerfile + └── requirements.txt aiac/test/ -└── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.keycloak.library.models +└── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.models aiac/pyproject.toml # pytest config: testpaths=["test"], pythonpath=["src"] ``` -`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.keycloak`, `aiac.keycloak.library`, and `aiac.keycloak.service` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. +`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.pdp`, `aiac.pdp.library`, `aiac.pdp.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.policy`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. --- -## Submodule: `aiac.keycloak.library.models` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.models` ### Description -Data structures and schema library. Contains only Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing Keycloak entities. No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. +Data structures and schema library. Contains only Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic PDP entities. No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -41,9 +49,11 @@ pydantic ### Pydantic models -All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown Keycloak fields, ensuring stability across Keycloak version upgrades. +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown fields, ensuring stability across backend version upgrades. + +#### `Subject` -#### `User` +Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | |-------|------|----------------| @@ -54,7 +64,9 @@ All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard u | `lastName` | `str \| None` | `lastName` | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | -#### `RealmRole` +#### `Role` + +Represents a realm-level role (Keycloak: `realm role`). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | |-------|------|----------------| @@ -64,18 +76,20 @@ All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard u | `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | | `clientRole` | `bool` | `clientRole` | -#### `RoleMappings` +#### `Assignments` -Represents the Keycloak Admin REST API response from `GET /users/{id}/role-mappings`. +Represents the current role and permission assignments for a subject (Keycloak: `GET /users/{id}/role-mappings` response). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | |-------|------|----------------|---------| -| `realmMappings` | `list[RealmRole]` | `realmMappings` | `[]` | -| `clientMappings` | `dict[str, Any]` | `clientMappings` | `{}` | +| `realmMappings` | `list[Role]` | `realmMappings` | `[]` | +| `serviceMappings` | `dict[str, Any]` | `clientMappings` | `{}` | -`realmMappings` is a typed list of `RealmRole` instances. `clientMappings` is kept as a raw dict (structure varies by Keycloak version). `RoleMappings` is defined after `RealmRole` in the module. +`realmMappings` is a typed list of `Role` instances. `serviceMappings` is kept as a raw dict (structure varies by Keycloak version). `Assignments` is defined after `Role` in the module. -#### `Client` +#### `Service` + +Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | |-------|------|----------------| @@ -86,7 +100,9 @@ Represents the Keycloak Admin REST API response from `GET /users/{id}/role-mappi | `protocol` | `str \| None` | `protocol` | | `publicClient` | `bool` | `publicClient` | -#### `ClientScope` +#### `Scope` + +Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | |-------|------|----------------| @@ -95,9 +111,9 @@ Represents the Keycloak Admin REST API response from `GET /users/{id}/role-mappi | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | | `protocol` | `str \| None` | `protocol` | -#### `ClientRole` +#### `Permission` -Represents a Keycloak client role. Used as both the return type of `get_client_roles` and the payload element for assign/revoke operations. +Represents a service permission (Keycloak: `client role`). Used as both the return type of `get_service_permissions` / `get_role_composites` and the payload element for composite add/remove operations. | Field | Type | Keycloak field | |-------|------|----------------| @@ -110,18 +126,18 @@ Represents a Keycloak client role. Used as both the return type of `get_client_r ### Usage ```python -from aiac.keycloak.library.models import User +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list -users = [User.model_validate(u) for u in raw] +subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] ``` --- -## Submodule: `aiac.keycloak.library.api` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` ### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the Keycloak Configuration Service REST API and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.keycloak.library.models`. +HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.models`. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -132,63 +148,101 @@ python-dotenv ### Functions -All eleven functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter, forwarded to the Service as `?realm=`. +All seven functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter, forwarded to the Service as `?realm=`. ```python -def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: ... -def get_realm_roles(realm: str) -> list[RealmRole]: ... -def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, realm: str) -> RoleMappings: ... -def get_clients(realm: str) -> list[Client]: ... -def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: ... -def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: ... -def assign_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: ... -def revoke_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: ... -def create_client_role(client_id: str, role_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> ClientRole: ... -def create_client_scope(client_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> ClientScope: ... -def revoke_all_role_assignments(realm: str) -> None: ... +def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: ... +def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: ... +def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: ... +def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: ... +def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: ... +def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: ... +def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: ... ``` -Each read function: -1. Issues `GET {AC_SERVICE_URL}/` (with path parameters substituted as needed), always appending `?realm=`. +Each function: +1. Issues `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/` (with path parameters substituted as needed), always appending `?realm=`. 2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 3. Parses the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). -`assign_client_roles` and `revoke_client_roles`: -1. Issue `POST` / `DELETE {AC_SERVICE_URL}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` with the serialised role list as JSON body, always appending `?realm=`. +### Configuration + +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `read_api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.read_api import get_subjects, get_roles + +subjects = get_subjects(realm="kagenti") +for s in subjects: + print(s.username, s.email) +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` + +### Description +HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Policy Service REST API. Abstracts the Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA) policy write backends behind a stable function interface — callers never interact with the backend directly. The active backend is determined by `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, which points to whichever policy service pod is deployed. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +All functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter. + +```python +def add_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: ... +def remove_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: ... +def clear_all_composites(realm: str) -> None: ... +def create_service_permission(service_id: str, permission_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> Permission: ... +def create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> Scope: ... +``` + +`add_role_composites` and `remove_role_composites`: +1. Issue `POST` / `DELETE {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/roles/{role_name}/composites` with the serialised permission list as JSON body, appending `?realm=`. 2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 3. Return `None` on success. -`create_client_role`: -1. Issues `POST {AC_SERVICE_URL}/clients/{client_id}/roles` with body `{"name": role_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. -2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -3. Returns the created `ClientRole` instance parsed from the response. - -`create_client_scope`: -1. Issues `POST {AC_SERVICE_URL}/clients/{client_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. -2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the client as a default scope in a single atomic operation. +`clear_all_composites`: +1. Issues `DELETE {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/composites`, appending `?realm=`. +2. The service iterates all realm roles and removes all composite mappings. 3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -4. Returns the created `ClientScope` instance parsed from the response. +4. Returns `None` on success. + +`create_service_permission`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/services/{service_id}/permissions` with body `{"name": permission_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Returns the created `Permission` instance parsed from the response. -`revoke_all_role_assignments`: -1. Issues `DELETE {AC_SERVICE_URL}/role-mappings`, appending `?realm=`. -2. The service iterates all users in the realm, fetches each user's role mappings, and revokes all client role assignments. +`create_service_scope`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/services/{service_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the service as a default scope in a single atomic operation. 3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -4. Returns `None` on success. +4. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. ### Configuration -Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. - | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| -| `AC_SERVICE_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7073` | ### Usage ```python -from aiac.keycloak.library.api import get_users, get_realm_roles +from aiac.pdp.library.write_api import add_role_composites +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Permission -users = get_users(realm="kagenti") -for u in users: - print(u.username, u.email) +permissions = [Permission(id="abc", name="editor", description=None, composite=False, clientRole=True)] +add_role_composites(role_name="developer", permissions=permissions, realm="kagenti") ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4268e9901 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Configuration Service + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Returns PDP entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2; the read interface is stable across phases. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | +|--------|------|------------------------|-------------| +| GET | `/subjects` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All subjects (users) in realm | +| GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | +| GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{subject_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and service permission assignments for a subject | +| GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | +| GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Permissions (roles) defined for a specific service | +| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a realm role | + +Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. + +All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. + +## Configuration + +Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Yes | Realm name, e.g. `kagenti` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7070` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +``` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/ +├── Dockerfile +├── requirements.txt +└── main.py +``` + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. +- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. When `realm` is `None` it returns the startup singleton; when `realm` is set it returns a new `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm. +- Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. +- Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. +- `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`; return the result as `JSONResponse`. +- On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a6cc3f81 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Service — Keycloak Implementation + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Realm roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a realm role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. + +This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a Kubernetes Pod behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP — the same service name used by the Phase 2 OPA implementation. Swapping phases is a deployment replacement only; the service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | +|--------|------|------------------------|-------------| +| POST | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Add service permissions (client roles) to a realm role composite | +| DELETE | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Remove service permissions (client roles) from a realm role composite | +| DELETE | `/composites` | loop: `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` → per role `GET .../composites` → `DELETE .../composites` | Revoke all composite mappings from all realm roles (rebuild) | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Create a new permission (client role) for a specific service | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` then `PUT .../clients/{service_id}/default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create a realm-level scope and assign it to a service as a default scope (atomic) | + +Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter, same as the PDP Configuration Service. + +`POST /roles/{role_name}/composites` and `DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites` accept a JSON array of role representation objects `[{"id": "...", "name": "..."}]` and return `204 No Content` on success. + +`DELETE /composites` returns `204 No Content` on success. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/permissions` and `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes` accept a JSON object `{"name": "...", "description": "..."}` and return `201 Created` with the created resource as JSON. + +All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Yes | Realm name, e.g. `kagenti` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7073` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +``` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/ +├── Dockerfile +├── requirements.txt +└── main.py +``` + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. +- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. +- `POST /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.add_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /composites`: fetch all realm roles via `admin.get_realm_roles()`; for each role call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name)`; if composites are non-empty call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, composites)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `POST /services/{service_id}/permissions`: call `admin.create_client_role(service_id, {"name": ..., "description": ...})`; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created permission representation. +- `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the realm-level scope, then call `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign it to the service; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created scope representation. +- On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md index bee256334..0361d92fe 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ ## Description A FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Accepts knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunks and embeds them, and writes the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance in the same Pod. Supports both access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. Developer-driven ingestion is performed via `kubectl port-forward`. +After every successful ingest operation the service notifies the AIAC Agent by calling `POST /apply/build` on `AIAC_AGENT_URL`. This triggers the agent to recompute and apply the updated policy against the live PDP state. All three ingest semantics (replace, update, delete) fire `build`; `rebuild` is an explicit operator-only call and is never triggered by the ingest service. + ## Endpoints The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Unknown slug → 404. @@ -35,6 +37,10 @@ The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (defa **Delete** is the only path that removes content from a collection. `/update/*` endpoints never delete as a side effect. +## Post-ingest agent notification + +After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the service fires a best-effort `POST {AIAC_AGENT_URL}/apply/build`. The notification is non-blocking: ingest success is reported to the caller before the agent call completes. Agent call failures are logged but do not cause the ingest endpoint to return an error. This preserves ingest availability even when the AIAC Agent pod is temporarily unavailable. + ## Collection slug → ChromaDB name mapping | Slug | ChromaDB Collection Name | @@ -55,6 +61,7 @@ The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (defa |----------|---------|--------| | `CHROMA_URL` | `http://localhost:7080` | ConfigMap | | `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` | `policy,domain-knowledge` | ConfigMap | +| `AIAC_AGENT_URL` | `http://aiac-agent-service:7071` | ConfigMap | | `EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | | `EMBEDDING_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | | `EMBEDDING_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | @@ -65,7 +72,7 @@ Adding a third collection is a configuration-only change: add a new slug to `AIA - Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` -- Base image: `python:3.14-slim` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) From 5e089be079a4d534cb52547ac614d6807be3cba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 23:51:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 016/273] docs(aiac): rename client to service in AIAC Agent PRD MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Replace all workload-facing "client" terminology with "service" to align with the generic PDP model: ClientType→ServiceType, ClientInfo→ServiceInfo, ClientProvision→ServiceProvision, classify_client→classify_service, provision_client→provision_service, /apply/client/{id}→/apply/service/{id}, and matching diagram labels, query strings, and state field names. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 98 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index f2ad51ec3..92dedd4a4 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -2,13 +2,17 @@ ## Description -A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via HTTP by Keycloak state-change events (via Keycloak SPI listener) or full build/rebuild requests (via RAG Ingest Service or admin call). +A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via HTTP by: + +- **Keycloak SPI listener** (state-change events) → `service/{id}` and `realm-role/{id}` triggers +- **RAG Ingest Service** (post-ingest completion) → `build` trigger only +- **Operator/admin call** → `rebuild` trigger only The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| -| Client Onboarding | `client/{id}` | Client Provision → Client Policy (sequential) | +| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Realm Roles | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | @@ -19,10 +23,10 @@ flowchart TD TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*"] CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] - subgraph CO["Client Onboarding"] + subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] - SA1["Client Provision"] - SA2["Client Policy"] + SA1["Service Provision"] + SA2["Service Policy"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 end @@ -44,7 +48,7 @@ flowchart TD TRIGGERS --> CTRL CTRL -->|"realm-role/:id"| ORC3 CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 - CTRL -->|"client/:id"| ORC1 + CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 ``` --- @@ -61,48 +65,48 @@ No business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. --- -## Client Onboarding Orchestrator +## Service Onboarding Orchestrator -Handles `POST /apply/client/{client_id}`. +Handles `POST /apply/service/{service_id}`. The orchestrator sequences two sub-agents and assembles the final response: ``` -ClientProvisionGraph.invoke() → ClientPolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response +ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response ``` -### Client Provision Sub-agent +### Service Provision Sub-agent ``` -START → classify_client → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_client → format_response → END +START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → format_response → END ``` -- `classify_client`: determines client type and populates `ClientInfo`. - 1. **Parse `trigger.client_id`**: +- `classify_service`: determines service type and populates `ServiceInfo`. + 1. **Parse `trigger.service_id`**: - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract namespace. - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. - - Unrecognised format → treat as `ClientType.tool`. + - Unrecognised format → treat as `ServiceType.tool`. 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - - **Found** → `client_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - - **Not found** → `client_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.read_api`; locate the `Service` by `client_id`; populate `ClientInfo(client_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. + - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. + - **Not found** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.read_api`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Service record is not found for a tool. > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. - > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ClientType.tool`. + > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ServiceType.tool`. -- `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node producing a `ClientProvision` from `ClientInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ClientInfo.client_type`. -- `provision_client`: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` for each entry in `ClientProvision`. +- `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. +- `provision_service`: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. - `format_response`: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_client\n\n1. Parse client_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ClientInfo"] + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ServiceInfo"] - CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] - CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_client\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ClientProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] @@ -118,12 +122,12 @@ flowchart TD | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| -| `client_info` | `ClientInfo \| None` | Populated by `classify_client` | -| `client_provision` | `ClientProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | +| `service_info` | `ServiceInfo \| None` | Populated by `classify_service` | +| `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | -### Client Policy Sub-agent +### Service Policy Sub-agent -Runs after Client Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. +Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. ``` START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END @@ -133,7 +137,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop - `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. - `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. - `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` for each entry in the validated diff. +- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` for each entry in the validated diff. - `format_response`: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. ```mermaid @@ -181,7 +185,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop - `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. - `propose_diff`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. - `validate_diff`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. -- `apply_diff`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites`. +- `apply_diff`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api`. - `format_response`: assembles the build result. ```mermaid @@ -218,7 +222,7 @@ flowchart TD START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END ``` -- `clear_composites`: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. `propose_diff` receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` and produces an add-only diff. +- `clear_composites`: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. `propose_diff` receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` and produces an add-only diff. - All other nodes: identical in contract to Build sub-agent. ```mermaid @@ -265,7 +269,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop - `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all services and their permissions, all realm roles, and the current composites for the affected realm role. - `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. - `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites`. +- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api`. - `format_response`: assembles the result. ```mermaid @@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] Q2["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] - Q3["client/:id -> client access control rules"] + Q3["service/:id -> service access control rules"] end FP & FDK --> STATE @@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings: | `build` | `"all access control rules"` | | `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | | `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | -| `client/{id}` | `"client access control rules"` | +| `service/{id}` | `"service access control rules"` | Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`). @@ -405,10 +409,10 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -#### Client Onboarding types (in `onboarding/provision/state.py`) +#### Service Onboarding types (in `onboarding/provision/state.py`) ```python -class ClientType(str, Enum): +class ServiceType(str, Enum): agent = "agent" tool = "tool" @@ -417,8 +421,8 @@ class Skill(BaseModel): name: str description: str -class ClientInfo(BaseModel): - client_type: ClientType +class ServiceInfo(BaseModel): + service_type: ServiceType description: str skills: list[Skill] = [] @@ -430,14 +434,14 @@ class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): name: str description: str -class ClientProvision(BaseModel): +class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): roles: list[RoleDefinition] scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] reasoning: str class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): - client_info: ClientInfo | None = None - client_provision: ClientProvision | None = None + service_info: ServiceInfo | None = None + service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None ``` --- @@ -451,7 +455,7 @@ Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants i - **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped PDP snapshot summary. - **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. -Client Provision sub-agent additionally defines `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` and `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` in `onboarding/provision/prompts.py`. +Service Provision sub-agent additionally defines `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` and `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` in `onboarding/provision/prompts.py`. --- @@ -498,9 +502,9 @@ flowchart TD | POST | `/apply/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | | POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Realm Roles | Realm Role | -| POST | `/apply/client/{client_id}` | Client Onboarding | Provision → Policy | +| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | -**Success response (Client Onboarding):** +**Success response (Service Onboarding):** ```json { "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } ``` @@ -573,13 +577,13 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy, assembles combined response │ ├── provision/ │ │ ├── __init__.py -│ │ ├── graph.py ← Client Provision StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_client, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_client, format_response +│ │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response │ │ ├── prompts.py ← ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM -│ │ └── state.py ← ClientType, Skill, ClientInfo, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ClientProvision, OnboardingProvisionState +│ │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, Skill, ServiceInfo, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState │ └── policy/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Client Policy StateGraph +│ ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ From 3e6a1266269598382a0d80a26572b49e954506ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 00:33:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 017/273] docs(aiac): add Keycloak client roles vs scopes reference Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md | 55 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4d5ba329a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# Keycloak: Client Roles vs Client Scopes + +## Definitions + +**Client Role** — a named permission defined within a specific client (e.g., `my-app:admin`). Represents what a user is authorized to do inside that application. Assigned to users or groups. + +**Client Scope** — a reusable container that bundles claims, role mappers, and protocol mappers. Controls what gets included in a token when a client requests it. Defined at the realm level and shared across clients. + +| | Client Role | Client Scope | +|---|---|---| +| **What it is** | A named permission/authority | A reusable claim bundle | +| **Defined on** | A specific client | Realm level, shared across clients | +| **Controls** | What a user is authorized to do | What appears in the access token | +| **Assigned to** | Users / groups | Clients (as default or optional scope) | + +## Role-to-Scope Mapping + +The relationship is not one-to-one. It is flexible in both directions. + +- **One scope → many roles**: a `reporting` scope can inject `analytics-service:read`, `data-warehouse:export`, and `audit-log:view` in a single grant. +- **One role → many scopes**: `user-service:read` can appear in both a `basic-access` (default) and a `user-management` (optional) scope. +- **Scope with no roles**: carries only protocol mappers (e.g., `email`, `given_name`). The built-in OIDC `profile` and `email` scopes work this way. +- **Role with no scope**: a role assigned directly to a user appears in the token without any scope involvement, as long as the default `roles` mapper is active. +- **Many clients, one scope**: a `service-account` scope defined once at the realm level can be assigned as a default to many backend clients, avoiding per-client configuration. + +## Are Scopes Required for RBAC or ABAC? + +No. + +### RBAC without scopes + +Assign client roles directly to users or groups. The roles land in the token via the default `roles` mapper. The application reads `resource_access["my-app"].roles` and gates access. + +```json +{ "resource_access": { "my-app": { "roles": ["admin"] } } } +``` + +### ABAC without scopes + +Add a custom user attribute mapper directly on the client. It injects attributes into the token, which the app or a policy engine (e.g., OPA) evaluates for access decisions. + +```json +{ "department": "finance", "clearance": "secret" } +``` + +## When Scopes Are Worth Using + +- **Multi-client reuse** — same role bundle or attribute set needed across many clients +- **OAuth2 consent flows** — user explicitly grants a third-party app access to specific capabilities +- **Least-privilege token narrowing** — client requests a reduced scope to get a token with fewer permissions than the user holds +- **Federation / external IdP** — normalizing incoming claims from an external provider across all clients + +## Summary + +For internal applications, direct role and attribute mappers on the client are simpler and sufficient. Scopes become worthwhile when many clients share the same access model, or when doing OAuth2 delegation flows where the user consents to what a client may access on their behalf. From 0a41154418a97a34b5578487871b418b0ec1c454 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 00:34:21 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 018/273] docs(aiac): move keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md to inception folder Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/{requirements => }/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) rename aiac/inception/{requirements => }/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md (100%) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md b/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md rename to aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md From 74a5b9b5a053645340bec7bcb00a8032a8931678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 00:48:27 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 019/273] docs(aiac): expand Keycloak roles/scopes with AuthBridge PDP/PEP analysis Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md b/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md index 4d5ba329a..a0304b881 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md +++ b/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md @@ -53,3 +53,105 @@ Add a custom user attribute mapper directly on the client. It injects attributes ## Summary For internal applications, direct role and attribute mappers on the client are simpler and sufficient. Scopes become worthwhile when many clients share the same access model, or when doing OAuth2 delegation flows where the user consents to what a client may access on their behalf. + +--- + +## How a Client Requests a Scope (Technical Detail) + +The `scope` parameter is a space-separated string sent in the POST body to Keycloak's token endpoint. It is a *ceiling request* — Keycloak returns only the claims/roles mapped by those scopes, even if the subject holds broader permissions. + +``` +POST /realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token +grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange +subject_token= +audience=github-tool +scope=openid github-tool-aud github-full-access +``` + +Keycloak evaluates three constraints before issuing the narrowed token: + +| Constraint | What Keycloak checks | +|---|---| +| Client allowed? | Is `token-exchange` enabled on the acting client? | +| Scope registered? | Is the requested scope configured on the target client? | +| Subject holds it? | Does the subject token's holder actually have access to that scope? | + +## How It Works in Kagenti / AuthBridge + +The requesting entity is never the application developer manually — it is **AuthBridge's token-exchange plugin** acting transparently on behalf of the workload. + +### 1. Static route configuration (`authproxy-routes` ConfigMap) + +An operator declares per outbound target what scopes to request: + +```yaml +routes: + - host: "github-tool-mcp" + target_audience: "github-tool" + token_scopes: "openid github-tool-aud github-full-access" +``` + +### 2. Intercept outbound request + +When the workload makes an HTTP call to `github-tool-mcp`, AuthBridge's forward proxy intercepts it, matches the host against the route table, and resolves the target audience and scopes. + +### 3. RFC 8693 token exchange call + +AuthBridge calls Keycloak's token endpoint with the subject token, audience, and scope. Keycloak mints a new, narrowed access token. AuthBridge injects it into the outbound request — the workload itself is unaware. + +### 4. End result + +Even if the calling agent holds `read`, `write`, and `admin` roles, the token delivered to `github-tool` contains only the claims mapped by the requested scopes. The token is valid for exactly one target audience, for the duration of that call. + +--- + +## Keycloak as PDP, AuthBridge as Pure PEP + +In the current Kagenti design, AuthBridge is a hybrid PDP/PEP: it influences policy by declaring `token_scopes` in the route config. Keycloak validates and issues accordingly, but the *intent* lives in AuthBridge. + +It is possible to achieve a clean PDP/PEP split where Keycloak is the sole policy decision point. + +### What changes + +AuthBridge sends the exchange request **without a `scope` parameter** — only the `audience`: + +``` +POST /realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token +grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange +subject_token= +audience=github-tool +``` + +Keycloak then applies its own configured policies to determine what goes into the issued token. + +### How Keycloak carries the policy + +| Mechanism | How it works | +|---|---| +| **Default scopes on the target client** | Scopes listed as default are always included in any token issued for that audience, regardless of what the requester asks. | +| **Token exchange policies (Keycloak 26+)** | Fine-grained policies define, per `(calling_client → target_client)` pair, exactly what scopes are granted. Policy lives entirely in Keycloak. | +| **Optional scopes** | A scope marked optional on the target client is only included if explicitly requested. Not requesting it = not included. The optional/default split is itself a policy instrument. | + +### Structural comparison + +| | Current (hybrid) | Pure PDP/PEP | +|---|---|---| +| Where scope policy lives | `authproxy-routes` in AuthBridge | Keycloak client config / exchange policies | +| AuthBridge sends | `audience` + `scope` | `audience` only | +| Keycloak role | Validates and enforces ceiling | Decides and issues | +| AuthBridge role | Influences and enforces | Enforces only | + +### Tradeoffs + +**Pro:** Keycloak becomes the single source of truth for what a service is allowed to receive. Policy is auditable in one place. + +**Con:** When no `scope` is sent, Keycloak defaults to issuing all default scopes for the target client. If those defaults are broad, the least-privilege guarantee depends on careful default scope configuration on each target client — the discipline shifts from AuthBridge route config to Keycloak realm config. + +**Con:** Requires Keycloak 26+ token exchange policies for per-caller-pair scope control. Below that, only per-target defaults are available. + +### Implementation requirements + +1. Remove `token_scopes` from `authproxy-routes` +2. Audit and tighten default scopes on every target client in Keycloak +3. Use Keycloak 26+ token exchange policies if per-caller-pair scope control is needed +4. The `keycloak_sync.py` tool would own this configuration — encoding scope policy as default/optional scope assignments on each client From fc6706f8887c556ddd149c7dc920f6242112e54e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 07:24:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 020/273] formatting any IDE issues Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- aiac/pyrightconfig.json | 8 + aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py | 34 ++-- aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py | 241 ++++++++++++-------------- pyrightconfig.json | 8 + 4 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 151 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/pyrightconfig.json create mode 100644 pyrightconfig.json diff --git a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc8392427 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +{ + "extraPaths": [ + "src", + "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy" + ], + "pythonVersion": "3.12", + "typeCheckingMode": "basic" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py index c4c7f001a..fc4cebb7d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: # ============================================================================ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): - """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure.""" + """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure (bypasses LLM).""" state: ClientPolicyState = { "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", "client_id": "github-tool", @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): def test_build_policy_unit(): - """_build_policy assembles policy_structure correctly from parsed_scopes.""" + """_build_policy assembles policy_structure correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" state: ClientPolicyState = { "description": "test", "client_id": "github-tool", @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): - """_build_policy produces an empty policy when no scopes matched.""" + """_build_policy produces an empty policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" state: ClientPolicyState = { "description": "test", "client_id": "kagenti", @@ -233,10 +233,8 @@ def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): result = _build_policy(state) assert result["policy_structure"] == {"policy": {}} - -def test_client_policy_builder_initialization(config_file): +def test_client_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): """ClientPolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified client.""" - mock_llm = Mock() builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( client_id="github-tool", @@ -259,10 +257,8 @@ def test_client_policy_builder_initialization(config_file): assert "demo-ui" not in role_names assert "github-agent" not in role_names - -def test_client_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_client(config_file): +def test_client_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_client(config_file, mock_llm): """ClientPolicyBuilder with an unknown client_id yields an empty role list.""" - mock_llm = Mock() builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( client_id="does-not-exist", @@ -274,9 +270,8 @@ def test_client_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_client(config_file): assert builder.client_roles == [] -def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file): +def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" - mock_llm = Mock() builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( client_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, @@ -287,6 +282,8 @@ def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file): assert graph is not None + + # ============================================================================ # MOCK-LLM TESTS (structural / format validation, no real LLM) # ============================================================================ @@ -306,9 +303,8 @@ def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, client_id: str, role_name: str) -> """ -def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file): +def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file, mock_llm): """generate_policy result contains all documented keys.""" - mock_llm = Mock() mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" @@ -331,9 +327,8 @@ def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file): assert "retry_count" in result -def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file): +def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): """yaml_output in the result must be parseable YAML.""" - mock_llm = Mock() mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" @@ -353,9 +348,8 @@ def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file): assert "policy" in parsed -def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_client_only(config_file): +def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_client_only(config_file, mock_llm): """All mappings in the generated policy belong to the specified client.""" - mock_llm = Mock() mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" @@ -378,9 +372,8 @@ def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_client_only(config_file): ) -def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file): +def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): """A mapping with an unknown realm role is caught by validation.""" - mock_llm = Mock() mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = """ ```json @@ -406,14 +399,13 @@ def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file): ) -def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_client_role(config_file): +def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_client_role(config_file, mock_llm): """ The client/role in every output mapping always comes from the predefined client_roles list, not from the LLM JSON. Even if the LLM's client_role field names a role from a different client (demo-ui belongs to kagenti), the output must only contain github-tool roles and succeed. """ - mock_llm = Mock() mock_response = Mock() # LLM mentions demo-ui (a kagenti role) in its JSON client_role field. # That field is ignored; only real_roles_with_access matters. diff --git a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py index 677d6cdb7..04e609591 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py @@ -4,25 +4,25 @@ These tests generate policies from natural language descriptions and compare them with expected YAML outputs. They require an LLM to be configured. -To run all tests (including integration tests): - pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py +To run all tests: + pytest test/test_policy_generation.py -To skip integration tests (they require LLM access): - pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py -m "not integration" +To skip integration tests (require LLM access): + pytest test/test_policy_generation.py -m "not integration" To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py -m integration + pytest test/test_policy_generation.py -m integration -To run the manually skipped test (test_generate_policy_from_fixtures): - 1. Ensure LLM is configured in aiac_agent/config/llm.env - 2. Remove or comment out the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on line 111 - 3. Run: pytest tests/test_policy_generation.py::test_generate_policy_from_fixtures -v +To run the LLM-backed fixture test: + 1. Ensure LLM is configured in config/llm.env + 2. Remove the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on test_generate_policy_from_fixtures + 3. Run: pytest test/test_policy_generation.py::test_generate_policy_from_fixtures -v """ import pytest import yaml from pathlib import Path -from unittest.mock import Mock, patch +from unittest.mock import Mock from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm @@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURES +# ============================================================================ + @pytest.fixture def fixtures_dir(): """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" @@ -47,18 +51,17 @@ def config_file(): @pytest.fixture def policy_files(fixtures_dir): """Return list of policy text files to test.""" - policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" - return sorted(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) + return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) @pytest.fixture(params=[ "claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", - "gpt-oss" + "gpt-oss", ]) def llm_model_name(request): - """Return model name for parametrized testing.""" + """Return model name for parametrised testing.""" return request.param @@ -68,159 +71,142 @@ def llm_instance(llm_model_name): return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) +@pytest.fixture +def mock_llm(): + """Return a bare Mock that can stand in for a LangChain LLM.""" + return Mock() + + +# ============================================================================ +# HELPERS +# ============================================================================ + def normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_content: str) -> dict: - """ - Parse YAML and extract just the policy structure for comparison. - - This ignores comments and formatting differences, focusing only on - the actual policy data structure. - - Args: - yaml_content: YAML string content - - Returns: - Dictionary containing the policy structure - """ + """Parse YAML and extract the 'policy' sub-dict for comparison.""" data = yaml.safe_load(yaml_content) return data.get("policy", {}) def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: """ - Compare two policy structures and return differences. - - Requires exact equality: every realm role and client-role mapping in - *expected* must appear in *generated*, and *generated* must not contain - any extra roles or mappings beyond what *expected* specifies. - - Args: - generated: Generated policy structure - expected: Expected policy structure + Require exact equality between *generated* and *expected* policy dicts. Returns: - Tuple of (policies_match: bool, differences: list[str]) + (match: bool, differences: list[str]) """ differences = [] generated_roles = set(generated.keys()) expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) - missing_roles = expected_roles - generated_roles - if missing_roles: - differences.append(f"Missing realm roles: {missing_roles}") + for role in expected_roles - generated_roles: + differences.append(f"Missing realm role: '{role}'") - extra_roles = generated_roles - expected_roles - if extra_roles: - differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm roles: {extra_roles}") + for role in generated_roles - expected_roles: + differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - generated_mappings = generated[role] - expected_mappings = expected[role] + gen_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} + exp_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} - gen_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in generated_mappings} - exp_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in expected_mappings} + for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: + differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") - missing_mappings = exp_set - gen_set - if missing_mappings: - differences.append( - f"Role '{role}' missing mappings: {missing_mappings}" - ) - - extra_mappings = gen_set - exp_set - if extra_mappings: - differences.append( - f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra mappings: {extra_mappings}" - ) + for mapping in gen_set - exp_set: + differences.append(f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra mapping: {mapping}") return len(differences) == 0, differences -# @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with configured LLM") +# ============================================================================ +# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) +# ============================================================================ + +# @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with a configured LLM") def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): """ - Test policy generation for all fixture files with multiple LLM models. - - This test: - 1. Reads each policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt + Integration test: generate policies from fixtures using a real LLM. + + For every policy fixture the test: + 1. Reads the policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt 2. Generates a policy using PolicyBuilder with the specified LLM 3. Compares with expected YAML in fixtures/expected/*.yaml - - The test is parametrized to run with 4 different LLM models: - - claude-haiku - - gpt-nano - - gemini - - gpt-oss + + The test is parametrised over the four LLM models defined in llm_model_name. """ if not policy_files: pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - + # Create PolicyBuilder instance with the parametrized LLM builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) - - # Use model name for error reporting - model_name = llm_model_name - + failures = [] - + for policy_file in policy_files: # Read policy description policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() - + # Determine expected output file expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - + if not expected_file.exists(): failures.append( - f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: No expected output file found at {expected_file}" + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" ) continue - + # Read expected output expected_yaml = expected_file.read_text() expected_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(expected_yaml) - + # Generate policy try: result = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - + if not result["success"]: failures.append( - f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: Generation failed with errors: {result['errors']}" + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " + f"generation failed: {result['errors']}" ) continue - + # Parse generated YAML generated_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(result["yaml_output"]) - + # Compare policies match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) - + if not match: failures.append( - f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: Generated policy doesn't match expected:\n" + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " + "policy mismatch:\n" + "\n".join(f" - {diff}" for diff in differences) ) - - except Exception as e: - failures.append(f"[{model_name}] {policy_file.name}: Exception during generation: {e}") - + + except Exception as exc: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " + f"exception: {exc}" + ) + # Report all failures at once if failures: pytest.fail( - f"Policy generation tests failed for model {model_name}:\n\n" + "\n\n".join(failures) + f"Policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + + "\n\n".join(failures) ) +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) +# ============================================================================ + def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): - """ - Test that PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure. - - This test bypasses LLM calls and directly tests the YAML generation logic. - """ + """PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure (bypasses LLM).""" from full_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState - - # Create a valid policy state with all required PolicyState fields + + # Create a valid policy state with all required fields state: PolicyState = { "description": "Test policy description", "explanation": "Test explanation", @@ -239,14 +225,14 @@ def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): "retry_count": 0, "validation_passed": True } - + # Generate YAML result_state = _generate_yaml(state) - + # Verify YAML was generated assert "yaml_output" in result_state yaml_output = result_state["yaml_output"] - + # Verify YAML contains expected content assert "policy:" in yaml_output assert "developer:" in yaml_output @@ -257,15 +243,9 @@ def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): assert "Test policy description" in yaml_output -def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file): - """ - Test that invalid policies are caught by validation. - - This test uses a mock LLM that returns an invalid policy structure - to verify that validation catches errors. - """ - # Create a mock LLM that returns an invalid policy (unknown role) - mock_llm = Mock() +def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): + """Invalid policies are caught by validation (uses mock LLM).""" + # Mock LLM returns an invalid policy (unknown role) mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = """ ```json @@ -280,63 +260,64 @@ def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file): ``` """ mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - + # Create PolicyBuilder with mock LLM builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - + # Generate policy result = builder.generate_policy("Invalid policy description") - + # Verify validation caught the error assert not result["success"], "Expected validation to fail for unknown role" assert len(result["errors"]) > 0 assert any("unknown-role" in str(err).lower() for err in result["errors"]) -def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file): - """Test that PolicyBuilder initializes correctly with config file.""" - # Create a mock LLM to avoid requiring actual LLM configuration - mock_llm = Mock() - +def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): + """PolicyBuilder initializes correctly with config file.""" builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - + # Verify configuration was loaded # realm_roles are now dicts with 'name' and 'description' realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in builder.realm_roles] assert realm_role_names == ["developer", "tech-support", "sales"] - + # Verify clients were loaded assert "kagenti" in builder.client_roles_map assert "github-tool" in builder.client_roles_map assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.client_roles_map - + # Verify client roles are dicts with 'name' and 'description' kagenti_roles = builder.client_roles_map["kagenti"] assert len(kagenti_roles) > 0 assert all(isinstance(role, dict) and 'name' in role for role in kagenti_roles) +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURE SANITY CHECK +# ============================================================================ + def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): - """Verify that fixture files are present and properly structured.""" + """Verify that fixture files are present and valid.""" policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" - - assert policies_dir.exists(), "Policies directory not found" - assert expected_dir.exists(), "Expected directory not found" + assert policies_dir.exists(), "fixtures/policies/ not found" + assert expected_dir.exists(), "fixtures/expected/ not found" + policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) - assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No policy fixture files found" - + assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No .txt policy files found in fixtures/policies/" + # Check that each policy file has a corresponding expected file for policy_file in policy_files: expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" assert expected_file.exists(), ( - f"Missing expected output for {policy_file.name}: {expected_file}" + f"No expected output for {policy_file.name}: {expected_file}" ) - + # Verify expected file is valid YAML try: yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) - except yaml.YAMLError as e: - pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {e}") + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {exc}") diff --git a/pyrightconfig.json b/pyrightconfig.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a25c0be4 --- /dev/null +++ b/pyrightconfig.json @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +{ + "extraPaths": [ + "aiac/src", + "aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy" + ], + "pythonVersion": "3.12", + "typeCheckingMode": "basic" +} \ No newline at end of file From 0d15a05956562b7469fd11c8263bdd953fa3922f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 10:30:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 021/273] docs(aiac): enrich PRD Purpose chapter and roles/scopes with PDP/PEP architecture MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit PRD § 1: fix component count ("three" → "five"), align component names with the rest of the document (RAG Knowledge Base, correct trigger list), remove Phase 1-specific language from the agent description, and add problem framing, PDP/PEP three-layer table, and an extended Implementation phases table that captures PEP behaviour per phase. keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md: reframe the hybrid model as the pre-AIAC baseline, replace the keycloak_sync.py reference with AIAC, and add a new "The Kagenti/AIAC Solution" section covering the three-layer architecture, Phase 1 composite role mappings, Phase 2 OPA Rego transition sequence, and a hybrid vs Phase 1 vs Phase 2 comparison table. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 34 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md b/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md index a0304b881..28ab8db06 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md +++ b/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ Even if the calling agent holds `read`, `write`, and `admin` roles, the token de ## Keycloak as PDP, AuthBridge as Pure PEP -In the current Kagenti design, AuthBridge is a hybrid PDP/PEP: it influences policy by declaring `token_scopes` in the route config. Keycloak validates and issues accordingly, but the *intent* lives in AuthBridge. +Without automated policy management, the natural Kagenti design is a hybrid PDP/PEP: AuthBridge influences policy by declaring `token_scopes` in the route config. Keycloak validates and issues accordingly, but the *intent* lives in AuthBridge. This is the baseline to reason from. -It is possible to achieve a clean PDP/PEP split where Keycloak is the sole policy decision point. +AIAC (AI-based Access Control) is the system that replaces this hybrid with a clean PDP/PEP split. The mechanism is described in detail in [The Kagenti/AIAC Solution](#the-kagentiaiac-solution) below; this section establishes the structural change that AIAC implements. ### What changes @@ -154,4 +154,71 @@ Keycloak then applies its own configured policies to determine what goes into th 1. Remove `token_scopes` from `authproxy-routes` 2. Audit and tighten default scopes on every target client in Keycloak 3. Use Keycloak 26+ token exchange policies if per-caller-pair scope control is needed -4. The `keycloak_sync.py` tool would own this configuration — encoding scope policy as default/optional scope assignments on each client +4. AIAC owns this configuration — encoding access policy as composite role mappings (Phase 1) or Rego rules (Phase 2) rather than per-route scope declarations in AuthBridge + +--- + +## The Kagenti/AIAC Solution + +AIAC implements and maintains the clean PDP/PEP split described above. It introduces a **policy management layer** between the natural-language policy source and the PDP, removing the need for any policy knowledge inside AuthBridge. + +### Three-Layer Architecture + +| Layer | Component | Responsibility | +|---|---|---| +| **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Reads natural-language policy from RAG store; translates it to PDP configuration on every trigger | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Evaluates what a caller may access; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens with `audience` only; forwards narrowed credentials; carries no policy knowledge | + +AuthBridge is a pure PEP in both phases. The PDP backend is the only moving part between phases. + +### Phase 1: Keycloak Composite Role Mappings as PDP Policy + +AIAC manages **realm role → service permission composite mappings** in Keycloak. Each realm role (e.g., `data-analyst`) is a composite that bundles the exact client-level permissions it should grant on each downstream service. When the caller's realm role changes or a new service is onboarded, AIAC recomputes and applies a minimal mapping delta. + +AuthBridge performs the token exchange with `audience` only: + +``` +POST /realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token +grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange +subject_token= +audience=target-service +``` + +Keycloak applies the composite mappings managed by AIAC and issues a token containing exactly the permissions the caller's realm role entitles on `target-service`. The `token_scopes` field is absent from `authproxy-routes`; routes carry only routing intent (`host` → `target_audience`). + +The discipline of keeping composite mappings tight is delegated entirely to AIAC. It reacts to four trigger types: + +| Trigger | Scope | What AIAC does | +|---|---|---| +| `client/{id}` (new service onboarded) | Single new service | Provisions permissions/scopes on the client; maps all realm roles that should access it | +| `realm-role/{id}` (role created/updated) | Single affected role | Recomputes composite mappings for that role only | +| `build` (policy document updated, incremental) | Minimal delta | Retrieves updated policy from RAG store; applies diff to composite mappings | +| `rebuild` (operator-initiated, full reset) | All mappings | Clears all composites; recomputes from scratch | + +This covers the "Con" identified above — broad default scopes are controlled not by per-operator discipline but by automated, policy-driven AIAC recomputation. + +### Phase 2: OPA as PDP — LLM-Generated Rego + +Phase 2 replaces composite role mappings with LLM-generated Rego rules evaluated by OPA. AIAC generates Rego from the same natural-language policy RAG store and writes it to OPA via the PDP Policy Service — the same stable interface, different backend. + +**Transition sequence:** + +1. AIAC clears all composite mappings from Keycloak (Keycloak reverts to a pure token issuer with no embedded access policy). +2. The PDP Policy Service pod is swapped to the OPA implementation — same `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP, same API contract. This is a deployment swap only. +3. AIAC begins writing LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA instead of composite mappings to Keycloak. + +AuthBridge is unaffected. It continues sending audience-only token exchange requests. The PDP has changed; the PEP has not. + +Phase 2 achieves a stronger separation: Rego rules express policy in a purpose-built, human-auditable language rather than as implicit Keycloak composite graph traversals. + +### Comparison + +| Concern | Hybrid (pre-AIAC) | AIAC Phase 1 (Keycloak) | AIAC Phase 2 (OPA) | +|---|---|---|---| +| Where access policy lives | `authproxy-routes` in AuthBridge | RAG store → Keycloak composite mappings | RAG store → OPA Rego rules | +| AuthBridge sends | `audience` + `scope` | `audience` only | `audience` only | +| PDP | Keycloak (validates ceiling) | Keycloak (decides from composites) | OPA (decides from Rego) | +| Policy auditability | Fragmented across route configs | Single source: RAG store + Keycloak composites | Single source: RAG store + Rego | +| New service onboarding | Manual: add scopes to every caller's route | Automated: AIAC provisions on `CLIENT_CREATED` | Automated: AIAC provisions on `CLIENT_CREATED` | +| Phase transition cost | — | Baseline | PDP pod swap; AuthBridge and AIAC unchanged | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 25828695a..08b4e1def 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -2,22 +2,38 @@ ## 1. Purpose -Automate RBAC management using a natural-language access control policy enforced by an AI agent. The system is designed around a generic **Policy Decision Point (PDP)** abstraction, with Keycloak as the Phase 1 backend. The system has three concerns: +Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Each call must carry a token narrowed to exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. The challenge is where access policy lives: without a dedicated policy management layer, the natural design is a hybrid where AuthBridge (the per-pod enforcement sidecar) declares `token_scopes` in its route configuration — spreading policy intent across per-deployment ConfigMaps rather than maintaining it in a single authoritative place. + +AIAC solves this by automating RBAC/ABAC management using a natural-language policy enforced by an AI agent, built around a generic **Policy Decision Point (PDP)** abstraction with Keycloak as the Phase 1 backend. The system comprises five components: 1. **PDP Configuration Service** — a REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. -2. **PDP Policy Service** — a REST service that applies policy changes to the PDP backend. Phase 1 implementation writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a deployment swap only. -3. **Policy knowledge base** — a ChromaDB RAG store holding the access control policy in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located ingest service. -4. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Keycloak state-change events (via Keycloak SPI listener) and by the RAG Ingest Service. It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required composite mappings immediately. +2. **PDP Policy Service** — a REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 implementation writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a deployment swap only. +3. **RAG Knowledge Base** — a ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. +4. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Keycloak state-change events (via Keycloak SPI listener), by the RAG Ingest Service (incremental build), and by the operator (full rebuild). It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. 5. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `read_api` and `write_api` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. -### Implementation phases +### Design principle: PDP/PEP separation -| Phase | PDP Policy write target | Write operation | +AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model across both phases: + +| Layer | Component | Role | |---|---|---| -| Phase 1 | Keycloak | Composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) | -| Phase 2 | OPA | LLM-generated Rego rules | +| **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Decides what a caller may access; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | + +The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. The PDP evaluates the caller's realm role and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. + +This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration carries routing intent only (`host` → `target_audience`). Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, kept current by AIAC. + +### Implementation phases + +| Phase | PDP Policy write target | Write operation | PEP behaviour | +|---|---|---|---| +| Phase 1 | Keycloak | Composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) | `audience` only — Keycloak resolves entitlements from composites | +| Phase 2 | OPA | LLM-generated Rego rules | `audience` only — OPA evaluates Rego; PEP is unchanged | -Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite mappings from Keycloak, then the PDP Policy pod is replaced with the OPA implementation. +Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite mappings from Keycloak, then the PDP Policy pod is replaced with the OPA implementation. AuthBridge requires no changes — the PEP is identical in both phases. --- From 2833fbd323e0a20a1e22560f78e3b2d6fc92f2bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 10:58:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 022/273] docs(aiac): align PRD with service/{id} terminology from component spec Update sections 2, 6, and 9 to match aiac-agent.md: rename Client Onboarding Orchestrator to Service Onboarding Orchestrator, client/{id} to service/{id}, ClientInfo/ClientProvision to ServiceInfo/ServiceProvision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 08b4e1def..a08902c7d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] - Client onboarding trigger (client/{id}) → Client Onboarding Orchestrator: + Service onboarding trigger (service/{id}) → Service Onboarding Orchestrator: - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ClientInfo] - ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ClientProvision] + Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ServiceInfo] + ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ServiceProvision] ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Structured as a thin **Controller* | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| -| Client Onboarding | `client/{id}` | Client Provision → Client Policy (sequential) | +| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Realm Roles | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal | Keycloak Event | AIAC Agent endpoint | |---|---| | `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; composite roles handle user permission inheritance automatically) | -| `CLIENT_CREATED` | `POST /apply/client/{id}` | +| `CLIENT_CREATED` | `POST /apply/service/{id}` | | Realm role created/updated | `POST /apply/realm-role/{id}` | **Full spec:** TBD (separate PRD). From 078fe2a84f9d32bbd91572b952a1c04d35627991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 18:18:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 023/273] docs(aiac): introduce Event Broker component to decouple triggers from Agent Add NATS JetStream Event Broker as a new AIAC component that decouples Keycloak SPI and RAG Ingest Service from the AIAC Agent. The Agent now subscribes as a durable competing consumer (aiac-agent-consumer queue group) on the aiac-events stream, replacing direct HTTP calls for all automated triggers. The rebuild command remains HTTP-only. Key decisions: WorkQueuePolicy with DLQ after 5 retries, no-auth consistent with other AIAC ClusterIP services, asyncio background task consumer with await-before-ack contract, AIAC init container gates Agent startup on all four dependencies. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 187 ++++++++++++------ .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 53 ++++- .../requirements/components/event-broker.md | 122 ++++++++++++ .../components/rag-ingest-service.md | 11 +- 4 files changed, 299 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index a08902c7d..5730eb3c6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -4,13 +4,14 @@ Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Each call must carry a token narrowed to exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. The challenge is where access policy lives: without a dedicated policy management layer, the natural design is a hybrid where AuthBridge (the per-pod enforcement sidecar) declares `token_scopes` in its route configuration — spreading policy intent across per-deployment ConfigMaps rather than maintaining it in a single authoritative place. -AIAC solves this by automating RBAC/ABAC management using a natural-language policy enforced by an AI agent, built around a generic **Policy Decision Point (PDP)** abstraction with Keycloak as the Phase 1 backend. The system comprises five components: +AIAC solves this by automating RBAC/ABAC management using a natural-language policy enforced by an AI agent, built around a generic **Policy Decision Point (PDP)** abstraction with Keycloak as the Phase 1 backend. The system comprises six components: 1. **PDP Configuration Service** — a REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. 2. **PDP Policy Service** — a REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 implementation writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a deployment swap only. 3. **RAG Knowledge Base** — a ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. -4. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Keycloak state-change events (via Keycloak SPI listener), by the RAG Ingest Service (incremental build), and by the operator (full rebuild). It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. -5. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `read_api` and `write_api` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. +4. **Event Broker** — a NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. +5. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. +6. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `read_api` and `write_api` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. ### Design principle: PDP/PEP separation @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite ma ## 2. Architecture Overview -Six components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. +Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. ### Deployment topology @@ -65,12 +66,34 @@ Six components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ │ +│ Event Broker Pod │ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) │ :7071 ClusterIP │ -│ │ LangGraph-based │ │ +│ │ NATS JetStream │ :4222 ClusterIP │ +│ │ │ aiac-event-broker-service │ +│ │ stream: aiac-events │ │ +│ │ subjects: aiac.apply.>│ │ +│ │ dlq: aiac.apply.dlq │ │ │ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +│ (publish) │ │ (publish) │ +└──────────────┼────────────────┼──────────────────────────┘ + │ (subscribe) │ +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ │ +│ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ aiac-init (init container) │ │ +│ │ python:3.12-slim + nats-py + httpx │ │ +│ │ gates: NATS + PDP Config + PDP Policy + RAG │ │ +│ │ creates: aiac-events JetStream stream │ │ +│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) :7071 ClusterIP │ │ +│ │ LangGraph-based │ │ +│ │ + NATS consumer (asyncio background task) │ │ +│ │ consumer: aiac-agent-consumer queue group │ │ +│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ │ └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ @@ -105,40 +128,52 @@ Policy / domain knowledge ingestion (operator-driven): Developer ──(kubectl port-forward)──► RAG Ingest Service ──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [policy rules] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [org/business context] ├──► Embedding API (external) - └──► AIAC Agent /apply/build [trigger policy recompute] + └──► Event Broker aiac.apply.build [trigger policy recompute] Role enforcement (event-driven): - Policy update triggers (build, rebuild) → Policy Update Orchestrator: - - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬── (rebuild only) write_api ──► PDP Policy Service [clear all composite mappings] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state + composites] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] - └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite diff] - - Realm role trigger (realm-role/{id}) → Realm Roles Orchestrator: - - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings scoped to affected role] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] - - Service onboarding trigger (service/{id}) → Service Onboarding Orchestrator: - - Trigger ──► AIAC Agent ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ServiceInfo] - ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ServiceProvision] - ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings for new service] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] + Policy build trigger (aiac.apply.build) → Policy Update Orchestrator: + + Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state + composites] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] + ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite diff] + └──► NATS ack [message removed from stream] + + Rebuild trigger (operator-only, HTTP direct): + + Operator ──(kubectl port-forward)──► AIAC Agent /apply/rebuild ──┬── write_api ──► PDP Policy Service [clear all composite mappings] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API + ├──► LLM API (external) + ├──► LLM API (external) + └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API + + Realm role trigger (aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}) → Realm Roles Orchestrator: + + Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings scoped to affected role] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] + ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] + └──► NATS ack + + Service onboarding trigger (aiac.apply.service.{id}) → Service Onboarding Orchestrator: + + Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ServiceInfo] + ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ServiceProvision] + ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] + ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] + ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] + ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings for new service] + ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] + ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] + └──► NATS ack ``` ### Component dependencies @@ -151,8 +186,9 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): | `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances | | `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | -| RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, AIAC Agent | — | -| AIAC Agent | Keycloak SPI listener (entity events), RAG Ingest Service (build), operator (rebuild) | Policy Update / Realm Roles / Client Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | +| Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Realm Roles / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions @@ -161,10 +197,15 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): - **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages realm role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a realm role. - **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 7080 (ChromaDB) and 7072 (RAG Ingest Service). - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. +- **Event Broker decouples all automated triggers from the Agent.** The Keycloak SPI listener and RAG Ingest Service publish to NATS subjects; the Agent subscribes as a durable competing consumer. This removes all direct dependencies between trigger sources and the Agent. +- **`rebuild` bypasses the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via HTTP (`kubectl port-forward`). It is never published to NATS and has no NATS listener. +- **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. +- **Agent `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. +- **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. +- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. - **`aiac.pdp.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. - **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.library.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.configuration.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.policy.__init__`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.read_api import get_subjects`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. -- **`rebuild` is operator-only.** Never triggered automatically. Clears all composite mappings then recomputes from scratch. RAG Ingest Service triggers `build` (incremental) only. - **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are realm-role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. --- @@ -200,23 +241,31 @@ Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: --- -## 6. Component: AIAC Agent +## 6. Component: Event Broker + +NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides at-least-once delivery, replay on pod restart via `WorkQueuePolicy`, and a dead-letter subject (`aiac.apply.dlq`) after 5 failed deliveries. No authentication — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism. Stream: `aiac-events`, subjects `aiac.apply.>`, consumer group `aiac-agent-consumer`. + +**Full spec:** [components/event-broker.md](components/event-broker.md) + +--- + +## 7. Component: AIAC Agent -FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches four `/apply/*` endpoints to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: +FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Realm Roles | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | +| Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `aiac.apply.build`, `/apply/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | +| Realm Roles | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | -All four sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Realm Roles** sub-agent applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Client Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Realm Roles** sub-agent applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) --- -## 7. Component: RAG Knowledge Base +## 8. Component: RAG Knowledge Base ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. @@ -224,40 +273,41 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p --- -## 8. Component: RAG Ingest Service +## 9. Component: RAG Ingest Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service calls `POST /apply/build` on the AIAC Agent (`AIAC_AGENT_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. **Full spec:** [components/rag-ingest-service.md](components/rag-ingest-service.md) --- -## 9. Component: Keycloak SPI Listener +## 10. Component: Keycloak SPI Listener -A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into HTTP calls to the AIAC Agent's `/apply/*` endpoints. +A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into NATS publish calls to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent subject schema is authoritative; the SPI PRD references it. -| Keycloak Event | AIAC Agent endpoint | +| Keycloak Event | Event Broker subject | |---|---| | `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; composite roles handle user permission inheritance automatically) | -| `CLIENT_CREATED` | `POST /apply/service/{id}` | -| Realm role created/updated | `POST /apply/realm-role/{id}` | +| `CLIENT_CREATED` | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | +| Realm role created/updated | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | **Full spec:** TBD (separate PRD). --- -## 10. Deployment +## 11. Deployment ### Kubernetes manifests -Five separate manifest files: +Six separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| | `aiac/k8s/pdp-config-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Configuration Service Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/pdp-policy-keycloak-deployment.yaml` | PDP Policy Service Pod Deployment (Keycloak implementation) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-deployment.yaml` | RAG Pod Deployment (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` | PDP Policy Service Pod Deployment (OPA implementation) — Phase 2, TBD | The PDP Configuration and PDP Policy (Keycloak) Pods mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. @@ -273,13 +323,15 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:la # Build PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ -# Build Agent +# Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ # Build RAG Ingest Service docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ ``` +The Event Broker uses the official `nats` Docker image with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag). No custom build required. + ### `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap template ```yaml @@ -292,14 +344,15 @@ data: KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7070" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7073" - AIAC_AGENT_URL: "http://aiac-agent-service:7071" + NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" + AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7072" ``` Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before applying. --- -## 11. Testing +## 12. Testing Tests live in `aiac/test/`. @@ -312,6 +365,9 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | | `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` functions | PDP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | +| Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | +| Init container health-check | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence; NATS TCP refused then connected | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies healthy; `add_stream` called with correct config | | AIAC Agent | TBD | TBD | ### Integration tests @@ -325,7 +381,7 @@ Require a live Keycloak instance. Controlled by env vars: | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Admin username | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Admin password | -Integration tests call the live PDP Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. +Integration tests call the live PDP Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. Event Broker integration tests require a live NATS JetStream instance. Use a pytest marker (e.g. `@pytest.mark.integration`) so unit tests and integration tests can be run independently: @@ -336,12 +392,13 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only --- -## 12. Conventions and constraints +## 13. Conventions and constraints - Python version: 3.12 - Base Docker image: `python:3.12-slim` - Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) - Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` -- No auth on PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, or RAG Ingest Service — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism -- PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, Agent, and RAG Ingest Service are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- No auth on PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism +- PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes - `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package +- NATS consumer must **await** handler completion before issuing ack — fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is prohibited; premature ack breaks at-least-once delivery guarantees diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 92dedd4a4..1bc0034b9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -2,11 +2,16 @@ ## Description -A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via HTTP by: +A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) for all automated triggers, and directly via HTTP for the operator-only `rebuild` command: -- **Keycloak SPI listener** (state-change events) → `service/{id}` and `realm-role/{id}` triggers -- **RAG Ingest Service** (post-ingest completion) → `build` trigger only -- **Operator/admin call** → `rebuild` trigger only +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.service.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI realm role created/updated) +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.build` subject (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) +- **Operator/admin call** → `POST /apply/rebuild` directly via `kubectl port-forward` (HTTP only — not routed through Event Broker) + +The Agent subscribes to the Event Broker as a durable competing consumer (`aiac-agent-consumer` queue group). It acknowledges each message only after successful processing — ensuring at-least-once delivery and automatic replay on pod restart. + +The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NATS consumer is a thin adapter layer** that receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions — there is no duplicated business logic. The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: @@ -20,9 +25,15 @@ All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process ```mermaid flowchart TD - TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*"] + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.>"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*\n(debugging + rebuild)"] CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] @@ -53,6 +64,36 @@ flowchart TD --- +## NATS Consumer + +A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler. It subscribes to the `aiac.apply.>` wildcard on the `aiac-events` NATS JetStream stream using the `aiac-agent-consumer` durable queue group. + +### Dispatch table + +| Subject pattern | Internal handler | +|---|---| +| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Roles Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.build` | Policy Update Orchestrator (Build) | + +### Ack contract + +The consumer **awaits** the internal handler before issuing the NATS acknowledgement. On handler success → ack. On handler exception → do not ack; NATS redelivers after `AckWait`. After 5 unacknowledged redeliveries, NATS routes the message to `aiac.apply.dlq`. + +Fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is explicitly prohibited — acking before handler completion would break at-least-once guarantees. + +### Failure isolation + +The consumer and the FastAPI HTTP server share the same process. If the Agent pod crashes mid-processing, the in-flight message was never acked and NATS redelivers it to the next pod instance. This prevents the consumer from exhausting retry counts against an unavailable handler (which would occur if they were separate containers). + +### Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | + +--- + ## Controller The Controller is a thin FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its sole responsibilities are: @@ -525,6 +566,7 @@ flowchart TD | Variable | Default | Source | |---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7070` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7073` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `CHROMA_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7080` | ConfigMap | @@ -638,4 +680,5 @@ uvicorn[standard] requests python-dotenv kubernetes +nats-py ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cf238f5a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +# Component PRD: Event Broker + +## Description + +A NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers from the AIAC Agent. Producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) publish lightweight trigger events to named NATS subjects. The AIAC Agent subscribes as a durable competing consumer, guaranteeing at-least-once delivery and automatic replay of unprocessed events after pod restarts. + +The Event Broker is a single-node NATS JetStream instance. It owns no business logic — it is a pure transport layer. All policy decisions, orchestration, and state remain in the AIAC Agent. + +--- + +## Stream Configuration + +| Property | Value | +|---|---| +| Stream name | `aiac-events` | +| Subjects | `aiac.apply.>` | +| Retention policy | `WorkQueuePolicy` — message deleted from stream after acknowledgement | +| Consumer name | `aiac-agent-consumer` | +| Consumer type | Durable push consumer with queue group (competing consumers) | +| Authentication | None — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism | +| Dead-letter subject | `aiac.apply.dlq` | +| Max delivery attempts | 5 — message routed to DLQ after 5 unacknowledged redeliveries | + +--- + +## Subjects + +| Subject | Publisher | Consumer | Trigger | +|---|---|---|---| +| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak `CLIENT_CREATED` event | +| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak realm role created/updated | +| `aiac.apply.build` | RAG Ingest Service | AIAC Agent | Post-ingest completion (any collection) | +| `aiac.apply.dlq` | NATS JetStream (automatic) | Operator (manual inspection) | Max delivery attempts exceeded | + +**`rebuild` is not routed through the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via `POST /apply/rebuild` on the AIAC Agent using `kubectl port-forward`. + +--- + +## Message Payload + +All messages carry a minimal JSON payload containing only the entity ID: + +```json +{ "id": "" } +``` + +For `aiac.apply.build`, the payload is empty (`{}`). The AIAC Agent pulls all required state from the PDP Configuration Service at processing time — the event payload is a trigger, not a data carrier. + +--- + +## Delivery Guarantees + +- **At-least-once delivery** — NATS redelivers any message not acknowledged within the `AckWait` window. +- **Exactly-one processing** — the Agent subscribes via a queue group (`aiac-agent-consumer`). Only one Agent pod receives each message; other pods in the group are not notified. +- **Replay on restart** — `WorkQueuePolicy` retains all unacknowledged messages. A restarted Agent pod automatically receives pending messages on reconnection. +- **DLQ on repeated failure** — after 5 unacknowledged redeliveries, NATS routes the message to `aiac.apply.dlq` for operator inspection. No message is silently dropped. + +--- + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | + +No authentication credentials are required. The NATS server runs with no-auth configuration. + +--- + +## Runtime + +- Image: `nats:latest` with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag) +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:4222` (NATS client port) +- Kubernetes ClusterIP service: `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` +- Base image: official `nats` Docker image + +--- + +## Kubernetes Manifest + +`aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` — NATS JetStream Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service. + +--- + +## AIAC Init Container + +A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agent container starts. It orchestrates the AIAC startup sequence: + +1. **Wait for NATS** — poll `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` until TCP connection succeeds. +2. **Wait for PDP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. +3. **Wait for PDP Policy Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL/health` until HTTP 200. +4. **Wait for RAG Ingest Service** — poll `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL/health` until HTTP 200 (confirms ChromaDB in the same RAG pod is also up). +5. **Create NATS JetStream stream** — call `js.add_stream()` idempotently with the `aiac-events` stream configuration. Safe to call on every restart. + +The init container uses `python:3.12-slim` with `nats-py` and `httpx`. It is version-controlled alongside the Agent. All dependency URLs are read from the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap. + +### Init Container Configuration + +| Variable | Source | +|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | + +### Init Container Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +nats-py +httpx +``` + +--- + +## Testing + +| Target | What to mock | What to assert | +|---|---|---| +| Init container health-check loop | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies respond healthy | +| Init container stream creation | NATS JetStream `add_stream` call | Called with correct stream name, subjects, and retention policy; idempotent on second call | +| Agent NATS consumer dispatch | NATS message delivery | Correct `/apply/*` handler invoked for each subject pattern; message acked on success; message not acked on handler exception | +| DLQ routing | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message appears on `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md index 0361d92fe..bd8b2de51 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Accepts knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunks and embeds them, and writes the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance in the same Pod. Supports both access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. Developer-driven ingestion is performed via `kubectl port-forward`. -After every successful ingest operation the service notifies the AIAC Agent by calling `POST /apply/build` on `AIAC_AGENT_URL`. This triggers the agent to recompute and apply the updated policy against the live PDP state. All three ingest semantics (replace, update, delete) fire `build`; `rebuild` is an explicit operator-only call and is never triggered by the ingest service. +After every successful ingest operation the service publishes a trigger event to the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) on the `aiac.apply.build` subject. This causes the AIAC Agent to recompute and apply the updated policy against the live PDP state. All three ingest semantics (replace, update, delete) publish `build`; `rebuild` is an explicit operator-only command issued directly to the Agent and is never triggered by the ingest service. ## Endpoints @@ -37,9 +37,11 @@ The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (defa **Delete** is the only path that removes content from a collection. `/update/*` endpoints never delete as a side effect. -## Post-ingest agent notification +## Post-ingest Event Broker notification -After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the service fires a best-effort `POST {AIAC_AGENT_URL}/apply/build`. The notification is non-blocking: ingest success is reported to the caller before the agent call completes. Agent call failures are logged but do not cause the ingest endpoint to return an error. This preserves ingest availability even when the AIAC Agent pod is temporarily unavailable. +After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the service publishes `{"id": ""}` to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). The publish is non-blocking: ingest success is reported to the caller before the NATS publish completes. Publish failures are logged but do not cause the ingest endpoint to return an error. This preserves ingest availability even when the Event Broker is temporarily unavailable. + +The AIAC Agent's durable consumer receives the event and acknowledges it after successful processing. Delivery guarantees (at-least-once, replay on Agent restart) are managed by the Event Broker — the RAG Ingest Service is fire-and-forget from its perspective. ## Collection slug → ChromaDB name mapping @@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the servic |----------|---------|--------| | `CHROMA_URL` | `http://localhost:7080` | ConfigMap | | `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` | `policy,domain-knowledge` | ConfigMap | -| `AIAC_AGENT_URL` | `http://aiac-agent-service:7071` | ConfigMap | +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | | `EMBEDDING_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | | `EMBEDDING_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | @@ -81,6 +83,7 @@ fastapi uvicorn[standard] chromadb httpx +nats-py ``` (Embedding model client TBD — depends on chosen embedding provider) From 0571cec12969c779e1b47f5250984ddf2fca2b4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 18:41:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 024/273] feat(aiac): add PDP library, config/policy services, and health endpoints Implements the PDP library layer (Pydantic models, read/write HTTP clients) and both FastAPI services (Configuration on :7070, Policy on :7073) with full unit test coverage. Adds GET /health readiness probes to both services so the aiac-init container (3.16) can gate Agent startup on PDP availability. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py | 109 ++++++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py | 62 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py | 64 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py | 65 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py | 118 ++++++++ aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py | 252 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py | 198 ++++++++++++++ aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py | 224 ++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py | 141 ++++++++++ aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py | 139 ++++++++++ 15 files changed, 1372 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..071b15a3a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +import os +from contextlib import asynccontextmanager +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + +from dotenv import load_dotenv +from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query +from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError +from starlette.responses import JSONResponse + +_admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None + + +def get_admin(realm: str | None = Query(None)) -> KeycloakAdmin: + if realm is None: + return _admin + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=realm, + username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +@asynccontextmanager +async def _lifespan(application: FastAPI): + global _admin + load_dotenv(Path(__file__).parent / ".env") + _admin = KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_REALM"], + username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + yield + + +app = FastAPI(lifespan=_lifespan) + + +@app.get("/subjects") +def list_subjects(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_users() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/roles") +def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_realm_roles() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/services") +def list_services(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_clients() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/scopes") +def list_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client_scopes() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments") +def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + raw = admin.get_all_roles_of_user(subject_id) + # Remap clientMappings → serviceMappings for PDP naming + return { + "realmMappings": raw.get("realmMappings", []), + "serviceMappings": raw.get("clientMappings", {}), + } + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/services/{service_id}/permissions") +def list_service_permissions(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client_roles(service_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/roles/{role_name}/composites") +def list_role_composites(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/health") +def health(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + admin.get_server_info() + return {"status": "ok"} + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=503, content={"status": "unavailable", "error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bee3e3452 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +from typing import Any + +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict + + +class Subject(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + username: str + email: str | None = None + firstName: str | None = None + lastName: str | None = None + enabled: bool + + +class Role(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + composite: bool + clientRole: bool + + +class Assignments(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + realmMappings: list[Role] = [] + serviceMappings: dict[str, Any] = {} + + +class Service(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + clientId: str + name: str | None = None + description: str | None = None + enabled: bool + protocol: str | None = None + publicClient: bool + + +class Scope(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + protocol: str | None = None + + +class Permission(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + composite: bool + clientRole: bool diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ac3fe86e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import requests +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from .models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission + +load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") + + +def _base_url() -> str: + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7070") + + +def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: + return {"realm": realm} + + +def _check(resp) -> None: + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + + +def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/subjects", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + + +def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/roles", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Role.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] + + +def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/services", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + + +def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/scopes", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Scope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + + +def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return Assignments.model_validate(resp.json()) + + +def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/services/{service_id}/permissions", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Permission.model_validate(p) for p in resp.json()] + + +def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/roles/{role_name}/composites", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + return [Permission.model_validate(p) for p in resp.json()] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ac4487762 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import requests +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from .models import Permission, Scope + +load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") + + +def _base_url() -> str: + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7073") + + +def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: + return {"realm": realm} + + +def _check(resp) -> None: + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + + +def add_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: + url = f"{_base_url()}/roles/{role_name}/composites" + resp = requests.post(url, json=[p.model_dump() for p in permissions], params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + + +def remove_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: + url = f"{_base_url()}/roles/{role_name}/composites" + resp = requests.delete(url, json=[p.model_dump() for p in permissions], params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + + +def clear_all_composites(realm: str) -> None: + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/composites", params=_params(realm)) + _check(resp) + + +def create_service_permission( + service_id: str, permission_name: str, description: str, realm: str +) -> Permission: + url = f"{_base_url()}/services/{service_id}/permissions" + resp = requests.post( + url, + json={"name": permission_name, "description": description}, + params=_params(realm), + ) + _check(resp) + return Permission.model_validate(resp.json()) + + +def create_service_scope( + service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, realm: str +) -> Scope: + url = f"{_base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes" + resp = requests.post( + url, + json={"name": scope_name, "description": description}, + params=_params(realm), + ) + _check(resp) + return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..adc94c2ed --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +import os +from contextlib import asynccontextmanager +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + +from dotenv import load_dotenv +from fastapi import Body, Depends, FastAPI, Query +from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError +from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response + +_admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None + + +def get_admin(realm: str | None = Query(None)) -> KeycloakAdmin: + if realm is None: + return _admin + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=realm, + username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +@asynccontextmanager +async def _lifespan(application: FastAPI): + global _admin + load_dotenv(Path(__file__).parent / ".env") + _admin = KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_REALM"], + username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + yield + + +app = FastAPI(lifespan=_lifespan) + + +@app.post("/roles/{role_name}/composites", status_code=204) +def add_role_composites( + role_name: str, + roles: list[Any] = Body(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + admin.add_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles) + return Response(status_code=204) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.delete("/roles/{role_name}/composites", status_code=204) +def remove_role_composites( + role_name: str, + roles: list[Any] = Body(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles) + return Response(status_code=204) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.delete("/composites", status_code=204) +def clear_all_composites(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + for role in admin.get_realm_roles(): + composites = admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role["name"]) + if composites: + admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role["name"], composites) + return Response(status_code=204) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/permissions", status_code=201) +def create_service_permission( + service_id: str, + body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + created = admin.create_client_role(service_id, body) + return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content=created) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/scopes", status_code=201) +def create_service_scope( + service_id: str, + body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + scope_payload = { + "name": body["name"], + "description": body.get("description", ""), + "protocol": "openid-connect", + } + created = admin.create_client_scope(scope_payload) + admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, created["id"]) + return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content=created) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/health") +def health(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + admin.get_server_info() + return {"status": "ok"} + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=503, content={"status": "unavailable", "error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5232da4de --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py FastAPI application.""" + +import os +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + +from aiac.pdp.configuration.main import app, get_admin + +REALM = "kagenti" + + +def _make_client(admin_mock: MagicMock) -> TestClient: + app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm=None: admin_mock + return TestClient(app) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /subjects +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetSubjects: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_users.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetRoles: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /services +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetServices: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_clients.return_value = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app"}] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetScopes: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /subjects/{subject_id}/assignments +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetSubjectAssignments: + def test_returns_object_with_realm_and_service_mappings(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.return_value = { + "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}], + "clientMappings": {"account": {"id": "a1", "mappings": []}}, + } + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects/user-uuid/assignments?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert "realmMappings" in body + assert "serviceMappings" in body + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /services/{service_id}/permissions +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetServicePermissions: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/permissions?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /roles/{role_name}/composites +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetRoleComposites: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.return_value = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer"}] + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.assert_called_once_with(role_name="admin") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Realm query parameter: optional, singleton at startup +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRealmQueryParam: + def test_no_realm_returns_200(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_users.return_value = [] + app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm=None: admin + resp = TestClient(app).get("/subjects") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + + def test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + admin_mock = MagicMock() + admin_mock.get_users.return_value = [] + env = { + "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", + "KEYCLOAK_REALM": "master", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", + } + with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.configuration.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + with TestClient(app) as client: + resp = client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + # First call is the startup singleton; second is per-realm + calls = mock_cls.call_args_list + per_realm = [c for c in calls if c.kwargs.get("realm_name") == REALM] + assert len(per_realm) == 1 + + def test_startup_creates_singleton_with_keycloak_realm(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + admin_mock = MagicMock() + admin_mock.get_users.return_value = [] + env = { + "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", + "KEYCLOAK_REALM": "master", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", + } + with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.configuration.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + with TestClient(app) as client: + pass # lifespan runs + startup_calls = [c for c in mock_cls.call_args_list if c.kwargs.get("realm_name") == "master"] + assert len(startup_calls) == 1 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /health (readiness probe — pings Keycloak) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestHealth: + def test_returns_200_when_keycloak_reachable(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == {"status": "ok"} + admin.get_server_info.assert_called_once() + + def test_returns_503_when_keycloak_unreachable(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_server_info.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="connection refused", response_code=503 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 503 + body = resp.json() + assert body["status"] == "unavailable" + assert "error" in body + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# KeycloakError → 502 on all endpoints +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _keycloak_error(): + return KeycloakError(error_message="connection refused", response_code=503) + + +class TestKeycloakErrorProduces502: + def test_get_subjects(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_users.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def test_get_roles(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def test_get_services(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_clients.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def test_get_scopes(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_scopes.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/scopes?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def test_get_subject_assignments(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects/u1/assignments?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def test_get_service_permissions(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/permissions?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def test_get_role_composites(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d3f729c00 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission + + +class TestSubject: + def test_full_payload(self): + s = Subject.model_validate( + { + "id": "u1", + "username": "alice", + "email": "alice@example.com", + "firstName": "Alice", + "lastName": "Smith", + "enabled": True, + } + ) + assert s.id == "u1" + assert s.username == "alice" + assert s.email == "alice@example.com" + assert s.firstName == "Alice" + assert s.lastName == "Smith" + assert s.enabled is True + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + s = Subject.model_validate({"id": "u2", "username": "bob", "enabled": False}) + assert s.email is None + assert s.firstName is None + assert s.lastName is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + s = Subject.model_validate( + {"id": "u3", "username": "carol", "enabled": True, "unknownField": "garbage"} + ) + assert not hasattr(s, "unknownField") + + +class TestRole: + def test_full_payload(self): + r = Role.model_validate( + { + "id": "r1", + "name": "admin", + "description": "Administrator role", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": False, + } + ) + assert r.id == "r1" + assert r.name == "admin" + assert r.description == "Administrator role" + assert r.composite is False + assert r.clientRole is False + + def test_optional_description_absent(self): + r = Role.model_validate( + {"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} + ) + assert r.description is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + r = Role.model_validate( + { + "id": "r3", + "name": "editor", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": False, + "containerId": "master", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(r, "containerId") + + +class TestAssignments: + def test_full_payload(self): + a = Assignments.model_validate( + { + "realmMappings": [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False} + ], + "serviceMappings": { + "account": {"id": "a1", "client": "account", "mappings": []} + }, + } + ) + assert len(a.realmMappings) == 1 + assert a.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" + assert "account" in a.serviceMappings + + def test_defaults_to_empty(self): + a = Assignments.model_validate({}) + assert a.realmMappings == [] + assert a.serviceMappings == {} + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + a = Assignments.model_validate({"realmMappings": [], "unknownField": "dropped"}) + assert not hasattr(a, "unknownField") + + +class TestService: + def test_full_payload(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c1", + "clientId": "my-app", + "name": "My Application", + "description": "Does things", + "enabled": True, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "publicClient": False, + } + ) + assert s.id == "c1" + assert s.clientId == "my-app" + assert s.name == "My Application" + assert s.description == "Does things" + assert s.enabled is True + assert s.protocol == "openid-connect" + assert s.publicClient is False + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + {"id": "c2", "clientId": "bare-client", "enabled": False, "publicClient": True} + ) + assert s.name is None + assert s.description is None + assert s.protocol is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c3", + "clientId": "extra-client", + "enabled": True, + "publicClient": False, + "surplusField": "ignored", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(s, "surplusField") + + +class TestScope: + def test_full_payload(self): + s = Scope.model_validate( + { + "id": "s1", + "name": "email", + "description": "Email scope", + "protocol": "openid-connect", + } + ) + assert s.id == "s1" + assert s.name == "email" + assert s.description == "Email scope" + assert s.protocol == "openid-connect" + + def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s2", "name": "profile"}) + assert s.description is None + assert s.protocol is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s3", "name": "roles", "unknownAttr": "dropped"}) + assert not hasattr(s, "unknownAttr") + + +class TestPermission: + def test_full_payload(self): + p = Permission.model_validate( + { + "id": "cr1", + "name": "view-clients", + "description": "View clients role", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": True, + } + ) + assert p.id == "cr1" + assert p.name == "view-clients" + assert p.description == "View clients role" + assert p.composite is False + assert p.clientRole is True + + def test_optional_description_absent(self): + p = Permission.model_validate( + {"id": "cr2", "name": "manage-clients", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} + ) + assert p.description is None + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + p = Permission.model_validate( + { + "id": "cr3", + "name": "query-clients", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": True, + "containerId": "master", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(p, "containerId") diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81b7235d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" + +import os +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + +from aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak.main import app, get_admin + +REALM = "kagenti" + + +def _make_client(admin_mock: MagicMock) -> TestClient: + app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm=None: admin_mock + return TestClient(app) + + +def _keycloak_error(): + return KeycloakError(error_message="connection refused", response_code=503) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /roles/{role_name}/composites → 204 +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestAddRoleComposites: + def test_returns_204(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}], + ) + assert resp.status_code == 204 + admin.add_composite_realm_roles_to_role.assert_called_once() + + def test_keycloak_error_returns_502(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.add_composite_realm_roles_to_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}], + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites → 204 +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRemoveRoleComposites: + def test_returns_204(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).request( + "DELETE", + f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}], + ) + assert resp.status_code == 204 + admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role.assert_called_once() + + def test_keycloak_error_returns_502(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).request( + "DELETE", + f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}", + json=[{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}], + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /composites → 204 +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestClearAllComposites: + def test_returns_204(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}, + {"id": "r2", "name": "viewer"}, + ] + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.return_value = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).request("DELETE", f"/composites?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + + def test_iterates_all_roles_and_removes_composites(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.return_value = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer"}] + _make_client(admin).request("DELETE", f"/composites?realm={REALM}") + admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role.assert_called_once() + + def test_skips_role_with_no_composites(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.return_value = [] + _make_client(admin).request("DELETE", f"/composites?realm={REALM}") + admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role.assert_not_called() + + def test_keycloak_error_returns_502(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).request("DELETE", f"/composites?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /services/{service_id}/permissions → 201 + JSON +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateServicePermission: + def test_returns_201_with_created_role(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_role.return_value = {"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data"} + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/permissions?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "view-data", "description": "View data permission"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 201 + assert resp.json()["name"] == "view-data" + + def test_keycloak_error_returns_502(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/permissions?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "view-data", "description": ""}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /services/{service_id}/scopes → 201 + JSON +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateServiceScope: + def test_returns_201_with_created_scope(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.return_value = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data"} + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "read:data", "description": "Read data scope"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 201 + assert resp.json()["name"] == "read:data" + admin.add_default_default_client_scope.assert_called_once() + + def test_keycloak_error_returns_502(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "read:data", "description": ""}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Realm query parameter: optional +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRealmQueryParam: + def test_no_realm_returns_200(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [] + admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.return_value = [] + app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm=None: admin + resp = TestClient(app).request("DELETE", "/composites") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /health (readiness probe — pings Keycloak) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestHealth: + def test_returns_200_when_keycloak_reachable(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == {"status": "ok"} + admin.get_server_info.assert_called_once() + + def test_returns_503_when_keycloak_unreachable(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_server_info.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="connection refused", response_code=503 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 503 + body = resp.json() + assert body["status"] == "unavailable" + assert "error" in body + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..30b3ca521 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.read_api.""" + +import pytest +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission +from aiac.pdp.library import read_api + +REALM = "kagenti" +BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7070" + +_ALL_FUNCTIONS = [ + ("get_subjects", (REALM,), "get"), + ("get_roles", (REALM,), "get"), + ("get_services", (REALM,), "get"), + ("get_scopes", (REALM,), "get"), + ("get_subject_assignments", ("subject-uuid", REALM), "get"), + ("get_service_permissions", ("svc-uuid", REALM), "get"), + ("get_role_composites", ("admin", REALM), "get"), +] + + +def _ok(json_data, status=200): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.ok = True + resp.status_code = status + resp.json.return_value = json_data + return resp + + +def _err(status=500): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.ok = False + resp.status_code = status + resp.text = "internal error" + return resp + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Success paths — typed returns +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetSubjects: + def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + result = read_api.get_subjects(REALM) + assert isinstance(result[0], Subject) + assert result[0].username == "alice" + m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/subjects", params={"realm": REALM}) + + +class TestGetRoles: + def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = read_api.get_roles(REALM) + assert isinstance(result[0], Role) + assert result[0].name == "admin" + + +class TestGetServices: + def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = read_api.get_services(REALM) + assert isinstance(result[0], Service) + assert result[0].clientId == "my-app" + + +class TestGetScopes: + def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = read_api.get_scopes(REALM) + assert isinstance(result[0], Scope) + assert result[0].name == "email" + + +class TestGetSubjectAssignments: + def test_returns_assignments(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = { + "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}], + "serviceMappings": {}, + } + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = read_api.get_subject_assignments("subject-uuid", REALM) + assert isinstance(result, Assignments) + assert result.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" + + +class TestGetServicePermissions: + def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data", "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = read_api.get_service_permissions("svc-uuid", REALM) + assert isinstance(result[0], Permission) + assert result[0].name == "view-data" + + +class TestGetRoleComposites: + def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = read_api.get_role_composites("admin", REALM) + assert isinstance(result[0], Permission) + assert result[0].name == "viewer" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Non-2xx → RuntimeError for all functions +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("fn_name,args,method", _ALL_FUNCTIONS) +def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + getattr(read_api, fn_name)(*args) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Default URL fallback +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", raising=False) + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + read_api.get_subjects(REALM) + assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7070") diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b7248cb99 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.write_api.""" + +import pytest +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Permission, Scope +from aiac.pdp.library import write_api + +REALM = "kagenti" +BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7073" + +_WRITE_FUNCTIONS = [ + ("add_role_composites", ("admin", [], REALM), "post"), + ("remove_role_composites", ("admin", [], REALM), "delete"), + ("clear_all_composites", (REALM,), "delete"), + ("create_service_permission", ("svc-uuid", "view-data", "desc", REALM), "post"), + ("create_service_scope", ("svc-uuid", "read:data", "desc", REALM), "post"), +] + + +def _ok(json_data=None, status=204): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.ok = True + resp.status_code = status + resp.json.return_value = json_data or {} + return resp + + +def _err(status=500): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.ok = False + resp.status_code = status + resp.text = "internal error" + return resp + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# add_role_composites +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestAddRoleComposites: + def test_posts_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + perms = [Permission(id="r1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=False)] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + result = write_api.add_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) + assert result is None + m.assert_called_once() + url, kwargs = m.call_args[0][0], m.call_args[1] + assert "/roles/admin/composites" in url + assert "realm" in kwargs.get("params", {}) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# remove_role_composites +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRemoveRoleComposites: + def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + perms = [Permission(id="r1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=False)] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: + result = write_api.remove_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) + assert result is None + m.assert_called_once() + url = m.call_args[0][0] + assert "/roles/admin/composites" in url + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# clear_all_composites +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestClearAllComposites: + def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: + result = write_api.clear_all_composites(REALM) + assert result is None + url = m.call_args[0][0] + assert url.endswith("/composites") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# create_service_permission +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateServicePermission: + def test_returns_permission_instance(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data", "composite": False, "clientRole": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): + result = write_api.create_service_permission("svc-uuid", "view-data", "desc", REALM) + assert isinstance(result, Permission) + assert result.name == "view-data" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# create_service_scope +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateServiceScope: + def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): + result = write_api.create_service_scope("svc-uuid", "read:data", "desc", REALM) + assert isinstance(result, Scope) + assert result.name == "read:data" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Non-2xx → RuntimeError for all functions +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("fn_name,args,method", _WRITE_FUNCTIONS) +def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + getattr(write_api, fn_name)(*args) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Default URL fallback +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: + write_api.clear_all_composites(REALM) + assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7073") From 6788a2a9b0d72c3cd33edeec54d3002d4b639145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 19:39:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 025/273] docs Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py | 33 +++++++++++-- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 36 +++++++++++++-- .../policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py | 6 +-- .../policy/client_policy_agent/state.py | 4 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 4 +- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 46 ++++++++++--------- .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 32 +++++++++++-- .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py | 8 ++-- 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py index 39ce602e9..2ce72b300 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py @@ -1,13 +1,38 @@ """ -Access Control Policy Builder Package +AIAC Policy Agent - Access Control Policy Builder Package -AI-powered access control policy builder using LangGraph. -Converts natural language descriptions into structured YAML policies. +AI-powered access control policy builder using LangGraph workflows and LLMs. +Converts natural language policy descriptions into structured YAML policies for Keycloak. + +Main Components: + - PolicyBuilder: Full policy generation for all clients in a realm + - ClientPolicyBuilder: Client-scoped policy generation + - SingleRoleMapper: Individual role mapping with semantic analysis + +Quick Start: + >>> from pathlib import Path + >>> from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder + >>> + >>> builder = PolicyBuilder(realm="my-realm", config_path=Path("config.yaml")) + >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access to all services") + >>> + >>> if result["success"]: + ... builder.save_policy(result["yaml_output"], "policy.yaml") + +For detailed documentation, see README.md in this directory. """ from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder +from client_policy_agent.graph import ClientPolicyBuilder +from single_role_agent.graph import SingleRoleMapper __version__ = "1.0.0" +__author__ = "AIAC Development Team" +__license__ = "MIT" -__all__ = ["PolicyBuilder"] +__all__ = [ + "PolicyBuilder", + "ClientPolicyBuilder", + "SingleRoleMapper", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 0735d5ae7..94d3ca415 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -1,11 +1,32 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""AIAC CLI — orchestrate end-to-end policy update against Keycloak. +""" +AIAC CLI - Access Control Policy Generator + +Command-line interface for generating Keycloak access control policies from +natural language descriptions using AI-powered semantic analysis. Usage: python aiac_cli.py -The first form runs the full Keycloak pipeline. The `generate` subcommand only -runs the agent's text->YAML step (no Keycloak interaction). +Arguments: + policy_text_file Path to file containing natural language policy description + config.yaml Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML + output.yaml Path where generated YAML policy will be saved + +Example: + python aiac_cli.py my_policy.txt keycloak_config.yaml generated_policy.yaml + +The CLI generates a complete access control policy by: + 1. Reading the natural language policy description + 2. Loading Keycloak realm configuration (roles, clients) + 3. Using LLM to map roles based on semantic analysis + 4. Validating the generated policy structure + 5. Saving the result as a YAML file with explanatory comments + +For programmatic usage, import PolicyBuilder directly: + from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder + builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=Path("config.yaml")) + result = builder.generate_policy("policy description") """ import argparse @@ -53,7 +74,14 @@ def print_info(message: str) -> None: def generate_policy_only( policy_file: Path, config_path: Path, output_file: str ) -> None: - """Run only the agent's natural-language → YAML step (no Keycloak).""" + """ + Run only the agent's natural-language to YAML step (no Keycloak interaction). + + Args: + policy_file: Path to file containing natural language policy description + config_path: Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML + output_file: Path where generated YAML policy will be saved + """ if not policy_file.exists(): raise FileNotFoundError(f"Policy file not found: {policy_file}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py index 5f9a77672..7720fc174 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( ) -> ClientPolicyState: """ Run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the target client and invert the - results into the {role → client_roles} structure used by _build_policy. + results into the {role to client_roles} structure used by _build_policy. Args: state: Current ClientPolicyState (needs 'description' and 'client_id') llm: LLM instance - realm_roles: All available realm roles [{name, description}] - client_roles: Roles belonging to the target client [{name, description}] + realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] + client_roles: Roles belonging to the target client [{'name': str, 'description': str}] verbose: Whether to print detailed output Returns: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py index c47ffdcf2..8c55258be 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py @@ -18,11 +18,11 @@ class ClientPolicyState(TypedDict): description: Natural language policy description client_id: Keycloak client ID to scope the policy to explanation: LLM explanation of the role mappings - parsed_scopes: List of {role, client_roles} mappings (realm-role → client-roles) + parsed_scopes: List of {role, client_roles} mappings (realm-role to client-roles) policy_structure: Structured policy dict ready for YAML conversion yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated LLM messages - errors: Validation errors — replaced on each validation attempt + errors: Validation errors - replaced on each validation attempt retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 757b1796d..d7488b152 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -83,13 +83,13 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( results into the parsed_scopes format expected by _build_policy. For every client role across all clients, SingleRoleMapper determines which - realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that + realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, client_roles: [...]}. Args: state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field llm: LLM instance for processing - realm_roles: List of available realm roles + realm_roles: List of available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles verbose: Whether to print detailed output diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index 3f967a23e..5616c82d1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -16,7 +16,11 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( client_name: str = "", ) -> str: """ - Build a system prompt for mapping a single client role to real roles. + Build a system prompt for mapping a single client role to realm roles. + + This function constructs a comprehensive prompt that guides the LLM through + the process of determining which realm roles should have access to a specific + client role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. Args: realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles @@ -67,12 +71,12 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping client role capabilities to appropriate user roles. {policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: You are given: -1. A list of all available real roles (realm roles) with their descriptions +1. A list of all available realm roles with their descriptions 2. A single client role with its description -Your task is to determine which real roles should have access to this client role. +Your task is to determine which realm roles should have access to this client role. -AVAILABLE REAL ROLES (Realm Roles): +AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: {available_roles} CLIENT ROLE TO ANALYZE: @@ -85,42 +89,42 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - Use role descriptions to find the best match for each category - Broad terms (e.g., "all other staff") may map to multiple realm roles -2. ENABLING / GATEWAY SERVICES ⚠️ CRITICAL — READ CAREFULLY: +2. ENABLING / GATEWAY SERVICES - CRITICAL - READ CAREFULLY: An enabling service is one whose description says it provides access TO another service or technology (e.g., "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Access to the payment gateway", "Access to the data pipeline"). - ⚠️ DOMAIN REQUIREMENT — AN ENABLING SERVICE MUST BE IN THE SAME DOMAIN AS THE POLICY: - - "Access to the data warehouse connector" IS an enabling service for a data warehouse policy ✓ (same domain) - - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" is NOT an enabling service for a data warehouse policy ✗ (different domain) - - "Access to the payment gateway" is NOT an enabling service for a document storage policy ✗ + DOMAIN REQUIREMENT - AN ENABLING SERVICE MUST BE IN THE SAME DOMAIN AS THE POLICY: + - "Access to the data warehouse connector" IS an enabling service for a data warehouse policy (same domain) + - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" is NOT an enabling service for a data warehouse policy (different domain) + - "Access to the payment gateway" is NOT an enabling service for a document storage policy (different domains) - Even if a role description matches the "access to [service]" pattern, it is only enabling if the service is directly required to reach the resource the policy is about. - ⚠️ RULE: ALL user categories that need the downstream resource at ANY access level + RULE: ALL user categories that need the downstream resource at ANY access level MUST be granted this enabling role. - ⚠️ ACCESS LEVEL DOES NOT MATTER FOR ENABLING SERVICES: + ACCESS LEVEL DOES NOT MATTER FOR ENABLING SERVICES: - "read-only access to data files" still requires the data warehouse connector - "limited access to data" still requires the data pipeline service - - The enabling service is a prerequisite — without it, the user cannot reach the + - The enabling service is a prerequisite - without it, the user cannot reach the downstream resource at all, regardless of how limited their access is. - ⚠️ DO NOT confuse enabling services with final resource roles: - - ENABLING: "Access to the data warehouse connector" → needed by everyone with data access - - FINAL: "Access to public data files" → needed only by those with public access - - FINAL: "Access to confidential data records" → needed only by those with full access + DO NOT confuse enabling services with final resource roles: + - ENABLING: "Access to the data warehouse connector" - needed by everyone with data access + - FINAL: "Access to public data files" - needed only by those with public access + - FINAL: "Access to confidential data records" - needed only by those with full access - ⚠️ DO NOT exclude user categories based on their realm role name: + DO NOT exclude user categories based on their realm role name: - A "sales" realm role that needs data access still needs the data warehouse connector - A "support" realm role that needs read-only access still needs the enabling service - - The realm role name is irrelevant — only whether the policy grants them ANY access matters + - The realm role name is irrelevant - only whether the policy grants them ANY access matters EXAMPLE: Policy says "Group A gets full data warehouse access; Group B (including non-technical roles) gets read-only data warehouse access". - - Role "Access to the data warehouse connector": BOTH Group A AND Group B need it → ["role-a", "role-b"] - - Role "Full data access": only Group A → ["role-a"] - - Role "Read-only data access": only Group B → ["role-b"] + - Role "Access to the data warehouse connector": BOTH Group A AND Group B need it - ["role-a", "role-b"] + - Role "Full data access": only Group A - ["role-a"] + - Role "Read-only data access": only Group B - ["role-b"] 3. ACCESS LEVEL DIFFERENTIATION (only for FINAL resource roles): - Pay close attention to access-level qualifiers: "private" vs "public", diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py index ee4cd375d..e14cdd446 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -56,10 +56,17 @@ def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content: str) -> tuple[str, Optiona """ Extract explanation and JSON from LLM response for single role mapping. - Tries, in order: - 1. Fenced ```explanation / ```json blocks (preferred format) - 2. Any ```json or ``` block containing a dict - 3. A bare { ... } object anywhere in the response + Tries multiple parsing strategies in order: + 1. Fenced code blocks with ```explanation and ```json tags (preferred format) + 2. Any ```json or generic ``` block containing a dict + 3. A bare { ... } JSON object anywhere in the response + + Args: + content: Raw LLM response content string + + Returns: + Tuple of (explanation_text, parsed_json_dict) + Returns empty string and None if parsing fails """ explanation = "" json_data = None @@ -119,7 +126,14 @@ def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content: str) -> tuple[str, Optiona def print_explanation_single_role(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True): - """Print the LLM's explanation if verbose mode is enabled.""" + """ + Print the LLM's explanation if verbose mode is enabled. + + Args: + explanation: The explanation text to print + is_retry: Whether this is from a retry attempt (adds retry indicator) + verbose: Whether to print the explanation + """ if verbose and explanation: prefix = "🔄 Retry Explanation:" if is_retry else "💡 LLM Explanation:" print(f"\n{prefix}") @@ -395,6 +409,10 @@ def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SingleRoleState, max_retrie """ Route after structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end. + Args: + state: Current SingleRoleState with validation results + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed + Returns: "analyze_role_mapping" if structural errors remain and retries are available, "verify_semantic_mapping" if structural validation passed, @@ -416,6 +434,10 @@ def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SingleRoleState, max_retries: int) -> st """ Determine if semantic verification failure should retry analyze_role_mapping. + Args: + state: Current SingleRoleState with semantic verification results + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed + Returns: "analyze_role_mapping" if semantic check failed and retries remain, otherwise END to terminate the workflow diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py index 3ccfff21c..05f125499 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ def extract_explanation_and_json(content: str) -> Tuple[str, List]: Extract explanation and JSON from formatted LLM output. This function parses the LLM's response to extract two components: - 1. The explanation text (from ```explanation``` block or pre-JSON text) - 2. The JSON data (from ```json``` block or plain JSON) + 1. The explanation text (from code block with ```explanation tag or pre-JSON text) + 2. The JSON data (from code block with ```json tag or plain JSON) It handles multiple formats: - - Markdown code blocks with ```explanation``` and ```json``` tags - - Plain text explanation followed by ```json``` block + - Markdown code blocks with ```explanation and ```json tags + - Plain text explanation followed by ```json block - Plain text with "explanation" header followed by JSON array - Plain JSON without code blocks (fallback) From 2e850a86f0efc67009e69a7867efc1b96a15c7b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 11:02:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 026/273] client -> service Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- aiac/pyrightconfig.json | 21 +- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py | 8 +- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 8 +- .../policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py | 15 -- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 103 +++++---- .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 2 +- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 104 ++++----- .../policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py | 15 ++ .../graph.py | 189 ++++++++-------- .../state.py | 14 +- .../policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 2 +- .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 56 ++--- .../policy/single_role_agent/state.py | 10 +- .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py | 2 +- .../onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 56 ++--- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py | 17 ++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py | 23 ++ .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 205 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml | 16 +- .../fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml | 14 +- .../fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml | 10 +- aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py | 24 +- ..._agent.py => test_service_policy_agent.py} | 186 ++++++++-------- 23 files changed, 695 insertions(+), 405 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/{client_policy_agent => service_policy_agent}/graph.py (63%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/{client_policy_agent => service_policy_agent}/state.py (71%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py rename aiac/test/{test_client_policy_agent.py => test_service_policy_agent.py} (71%) diff --git a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json index dc8392427..be3a2acbe 100644 --- a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json +++ b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json @@ -1,8 +1,27 @@ { + "include": [ + "src" + ], "extraPaths": [ "src", "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy" ], "pythonVersion": "3.12", - "typeCheckingMode": "basic" + "typeCheckingMode": "basic", + "executionEnvironments": [ + { + "root": "src", + "pythonVersion": "3.12", + "extraPaths": [ + "src" + ] + }, + { + "root": "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy", + "pythonVersion": "3.12", + "extraPaths": [ + "src" + ] + } + ] } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py index 2ce72b300..ff28347a0 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ Converts natural language policy descriptions into structured YAML policies for Keycloak. Main Components: - - PolicyBuilder: Full policy generation for all clients in a realm - - ClientPolicyBuilder: Client-scoped policy generation + - PolicyBuilder: Full policy generation for all services in a realm + - ServicePolicyBuilder: Service-scoped policy generation - SingleRoleMapper: Individual role mapping with semantic analysis Quick Start: @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ """ from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder -from client_policy_agent.graph import ClientPolicyBuilder +from service_policy_agent.graph import ServicePolicyBuilder from single_role_agent.graph import SingleRoleMapper __version__ = "1.0.0" @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ __all__ = [ "PolicyBuilder", - "ClientPolicyBuilder", + "ServicePolicyBuilder", "SingleRoleMapper", ] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 94d3ca415..94b3f0946 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -122,14 +122,14 @@ def generate_policy_only( print(f" - {error}") print("\n" + "=" * 80) - print("Parsed Role-to-Client-Role Mappings:") + print("Parsed Role-to-Service-Role Mappings:") print("=" * 80) for role_mapping in result["parsed_scopes"]: realm_role = role_mapping["role"] - client_roles = role_mapping.get("client_roles", []) + service_roles = role_mapping.get("service_roles", []) print(f" {realm_role}:") - for cr in client_roles: - print(f" - {cr['client']}: {cr['role']}") + for sr in service_roles: + print(f" - {sr['service']}: {sr['role']}") def main() -> None: gen_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index f9bdb6bdd..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -""" -Client Policy Agent - -Generates a partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak client. -""" - -from .graph import ClientPolicyBuilder, ClientPolicyBuilderConfig, create_client_policy_builder_graph -from .state import ClientPolicyState - -__all__ = [ - "ClientPolicyBuilder", - "ClientPolicyBuilderConfig", - "create_client_policy_builder_graph", - "ClientPolicyState", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index d7488b152..45cc2c049 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -43,7 +43,11 @@ from config import create_llm from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.keycloak.library import api_from_config +from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import ( + get_roles, + get_services, + get_service_permissions, +) from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -75,22 +79,22 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( state: PolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - client_roles_map: dict, + service_roles_map: dict, verbose: bool ) -> PolicyState: """ - Map each client role to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate + Map each service role to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate results into the parsed_scopes format expected by _build_policy. - For every client role across all clients, SingleRoleMapper determines which + For every service role across all services, SingleRoleMapper determines which realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that - parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, client_roles: [...]}. + parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, service_roles: [...]}. Args: state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field llm: LLM instance for processing realm_roles: List of available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles + service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to roles verbose: Whether to print detailed output Returns: @@ -99,31 +103,31 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( mapper = SingleRoleMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations = [] - # realm_role_name -> list of {"client": X, "role": Y} dicts - realm_role_to_client_roles: dict = {} + # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": X, "role": Y} dicts + realm_role_to_service_roles: dict = {} - for client_name, client_roles in client_roles_map.items(): - for client_role in client_roles: + for service_name, service_roles in service_roles_map.items(): + for service_role in service_roles: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state['description'], - client_name=client_name, - client_role=client_role, + service_name=service_name, + service_role=service_role, realm_roles=realm_roles, ) if result.get('explanation'): explanations.append( - f"{client_name}/{client_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}" + f"{service_name}/{service_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}" ) for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): - realm_role_to_client_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - {'client': client_name, 'role': client_role['name']} + realm_role_to_service_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( + {'service': service_name, 'role': service_role['name']} ) parsed_scopes = [ - {'role': realm_role, 'client_roles': client_roles} - for realm_role, client_roles in realm_role_to_client_roles.items() + {'role': realm_role, 'service_roles': service_roles} + for realm_role, service_roles in realm_role_to_service_roles.items() ] return { @@ -154,8 +158,8 @@ def _build_policy(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: # Transform parsed scopes into policy structure for role_info in state["parsed_scopes"]: role_name = role_info.get("role", "") - client_roles = role_info.get("client_roles", []) - policy[role_name] = client_roles + service_roles = role_info.get("service_roles", []) + policy[role_name] = service_roles # Wrap in policy structure policy_structure = {"policy": policy} @@ -180,9 +184,9 @@ def _generate_yaml(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """ # Create header comments header = """# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific client roles -# Format: user_role_name -> list of client role mappings -# Each entry specifies: client (client name) and role (role name from that client) +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific service roles +# Format: user_role_name -> list of service role mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and role (role name from that service) """ @@ -226,8 +230,8 @@ def _validate_policy( state: PolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - client_names: list, - client_roles_map: dict, + service_names: list, + service_roles_map: dict, verbose: bool, max_retries: int ) -> PolicyState: @@ -241,8 +245,8 @@ def _validate_policy( state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure' and 'description' llm: LLM instance for semantic verification realm_roles: List of available realm roles - client_names: List of client names - client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles + service_names: List of service names + service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to roles verbose: Whether to print detailed output max_retries: Maximum retry attempts @@ -256,8 +260,8 @@ def _validate_policy( structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( policy, realm_roles, - client_names, - client_roles_map + service_names, + service_roles_map ) # If there are structural errors and we can retry, trigger retry @@ -313,8 +317,8 @@ def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: def create_policy_builder_graph( config: PolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, - client_roles_map: dict, - client_names: list + service_roles_map: dict, + service_names: list ): """ Create and compile the policy builder graph. @@ -325,8 +329,8 @@ def create_policy_builder_graph( Args: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm roles - client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to roles - client_names: List of client names + service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to roles + service_names: List of service names Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow @@ -336,7 +340,7 @@ def create_policy_builder_graph( def parse_and_extract_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """Parse natural language and extract role mappings.""" return _parse_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_roles_map, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_roles_map, config.verbose ) def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: @@ -350,8 +354,8 @@ def generate_yaml_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """Validate structure and semantics.""" return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_names, - client_roles_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_names, + service_roles_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: @@ -408,8 +412,8 @@ class PolicyBuilder: Attributes: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm role names - client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to their available roles - client_names: List of client names + service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to their available roles + service_names: List of service names graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine """ @@ -444,7 +448,7 @@ def __init__( llm_instance = llm if config_path is not None: - os.environ["AC_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) # Create configuration object self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( @@ -453,20 +457,28 @@ def __init__( max_retries=max_retries ) - realm_roles_models = api_from_config.get_realm_roles(realm=realm) + roles_models = get_roles(realm=realm) self.realm_roles = [ {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} - for r in realm_roles_models + for r in roles_models ] - self.client_roles_map = api_from_config.get_client_roles_map(realm=realm) - self.client_names = api_from_config.get_client_names(realm=realm) + services = get_services(realm=realm) + self.service_roles_map = {} + self.service_names = [] + for service in services: + permissions = get_service_permissions(service.id, realm=realm) + self.service_roles_map[service.clientId] = [ + {"name": permission.name, "description": permission.description or ""} + for permission in permissions + ] + self.service_names.append(service.clientId) # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( self.config, self.realm_roles, - self.client_roles_map, - self.client_names + self.service_roles_map, + self.service_names ) # ======================================================================== @@ -502,7 +514,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: Dictionary containing: - yaml_output (str): Complete YAML policy file content - policy_structure (dict): Structured policy data - - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-client-role mappings from LLM + - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-service-role mappings from LLM - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) - success (bool): True if generation succeeded without errors - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred @@ -564,3 +576,4 @@ def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.y sys.exit(1) # Made with Bob + diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py index 0bc3f42a6..6f85d9268 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class PolicyState(TypedDict): Attributes: description: Original natural language policy description explanation: LLM's explanation of how it mapped the policy - parsed_scopes: List of role-to-client-role mappings built by aggregating SingleRoleMapper results + parsed_scopes: List of role-to-service-role mappings built by aggregating SingleRoleMapper results policy_structure: Structured policy dictionary ready for YAML conversion yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index 5616c82d1..b3758e1bc 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Single Role Prompt Builder for Access Mapping This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine -which real roles should have access to a specific client role. +which real roles should have access to a specific service role. """ from typing import List, Dict, Optional @@ -11,22 +11,22 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - client_role: Dict[str, str], + service_role: Dict[str, str], policy_description: str = "", - client_name: str = "", + service_name: str = "", ) -> str: """ - Build a system prompt for mapping a single client role to realm roles. + Build a system prompt for mapping a single service role to realm roles. This function constructs a comprehensive prompt that guides the LLM through the process of determining which realm roles should have access to a specific - client role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. + service role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. Args: realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the client role to analyze + service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the service role to analyze policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context - client_name: Name of the client service that owns the role + service_name: Name of the service that owns the role Returns: Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption @@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( else " (none defined)" ) - # Format the client role information - client_role_name = client_role['name'] - client_role_desc = client_role.get('description', '') - client_role_info = client_role_name - if client_role_desc: - client_role_info += f": {client_role_desc}" + # Format the service role information + service_role_name = service_role['name'] + service_role_desc = service_role.get('description', '') + service_role_info = service_role_name + if service_role_desc: + service_role_info += f": {service_role_desc}" # Add policy context if provided policy_context = "" @@ -64,23 +64,23 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( {policy_description} Use this policy context to understand the access requirements and make informed decisions -about which real roles should have access to the client role. +about which real roles should have access to the service role. """ - return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping client role capabilities to appropriate user roles. + return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping service role capabilities to appropriate user roles. {policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: You are given: 1. A list of all available realm roles with their descriptions -2. A single client role with its description +2. A single service role with its description -Your task is to determine which realm roles should have access to this client role. +Your task is to determine which realm roles should have access to this service role. AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: {available_roles} -CLIENT ROLE TO ANALYZE: -{client_role_info} +SERVICE ROLE TO ANALYZE: +{service_role_info} ANALYSIS GUIDELINES: 1. IDENTIFY AND MAP ALL USER CATEGORIES (CRITICAL): @@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( 4. PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE AND POLICY SILENCE: - Grant access ONLY when explicitly required by the policy or role description - When in doubt, do NOT grant access - - POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS: If the policy description does not mention this client's - service or domain at all, return []. Do NOT infer access from the user role name + - POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS: If the policy description does not mention this service's + domain at all, return []. Do NOT infer access from the user role name (e.g., "developer") or from what that user type might typically do in their job. Access is determined solely by what the POLICY TEXT explicitly states. - Exception: enabling/gateway services are required by all users of the downstream resource. @@ -148,17 +148,17 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - Do not modify, abbreviate, or create new role names TASK STEPS: -1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this client role (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? +1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this service role (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. Do NOT continue to the next steps. - IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the client role's domain. Do NOT reason from + IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the service role's domain. Do NOT reason from the user role name (e.g., "developers use demo UIs too") — that is forbidden here. - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" — domain: dashboards. Policy about data warehouse — DIFFERENT → [] - "Access to the data warehouse connector" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - "Access to confidential data records" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about GitHub repos — DIFFERENT → [] (Even though "developers" may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) -2. CLASSIFY this client role: is it a FINAL resource role or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? +2. CLASSIFY this service role: is it a FINAL resource role or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]" AND the service is in the same domain as the policy - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]" @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( ```json {{ - "client_role": "{client_role_name}", + "service_role": "{service_role_name}", "real_roles_with_access": [ "exact-realm-role-name-1", "exact-realm-role-name-2" @@ -191,31 +191,31 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Example A — domain mismatch, not relevant to policy subject: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". These are DIFFERENT domains — dashboard UI is unrelated to data warehouse access. Returning [] immediately without further analysis. Note: Even if "developers" or "analysts" typically use dashboard UIs, the policy is silent about UI access. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. ``` ```json -{{"client_role": "monitoring-dashboard", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"service_role": "monitoring-dashboard", "real_roles_with_access": []}} ``` Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI role, GitHub policy: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "demo UI interface". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "demo UI interface". Policy domain is "GitHub repository access". These are DIFFERENT domains. The policy mentions only GitHub repositories; it says nothing about any UI or web interface. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. Returning [] immediately. (The fact that "developers" may use demo UIs is irrelevant — access is determined by the policy text, not by job function assumptions.) ``` ```json -{{"client_role": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"service_role": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": []}} ``` Example B — enabling/gateway service (ALL users who need the downstream resource): ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "data warehouse connector". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "data warehouse connector". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Access to the data warehouse connector" is a prerequisite service, not a final resource. Policy identifies two user categories: Group A (full access) @@ -224,12 +224,12 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. ``` ```json -{{"client_role": "warehouse-connector", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} +{{"service_role": "warehouse-connector", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} ``` Example C — restricted role, limited access: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: client role domain is "confidential data records". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "confidential data records". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. Step 2 CLASSIFY: FINAL RESOURCE — provides access to restricted data records. Policy states Group A can access both restricted and public data; Group B can access @@ -237,15 +237,15 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A. ``` ```json -{{"client_role": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} +{{"service_role": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} ``` """ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, - client_name: str, - client_role: Dict[str, str], + service_name: str, + service_role: Dict[str, str], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], real_roles_with_access: List[str], ) -> str: @@ -254,17 +254,17 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description - client_name: Name of the client that owns the role - client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the client role + service_name: Name of the service that owns the role + service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the service role realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned Returns: Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption """ - client_role_name = client_role['name'] - client_role_desc = client_role.get('description', '') - client_role_info = client_role_name + (f" ({client_role_desc})" if client_role_desc else "") + service_role_name = service_role['name'] + service_role_desc = service_role.get('description', '') + service_role_info = service_role_name + (f" ({service_role_desc})" if service_role_desc else "") realm_roles_context = "\n".join( f" - {r['name']}" + (f": {r.get('description', '')}" if r.get('description') else "") @@ -278,19 +278,19 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( POLICY DESCRIPTION: {policy_description} -CLIENT ROLE BEING ANALYZED: - Client: {client_name} - Role: {client_role_info} +SERVICE ROLE BEING ANALYZED: + Service: {service_name} + Role: {service_role_info} -CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this client role): +CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this service role): {assigned_roles} AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: {realm_roles_context} VALIDATION TASK: -Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to client role '{client_role_name}' \ -from client '{client_name}' to realm roles [{assigned_roles}] is correct. +Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to service role '{service_role_name}' \ +from service '{service_name}' to realm roles [{assigned_roles}] is correct. Consider: - Are the correct user groups (realm roles) included? @@ -308,28 +308,28 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( def build_single_role_retry_prompt( realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - client_role: Dict[str, str] + service_role: Dict[str, str] ) -> str: """ Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single role analysis. Args: realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the client role + service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the service role Returns: Formatted retry prompt string with role reminders and format example """ realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] - client_role_name = client_role['name'] + service_role_name = service_role['name'] return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. Please provide the mapping again using ONLY these preset names: - Available real roles: {", ".join(realm_role_names) if realm_role_names else "(none)"} -- Client role to analyze: {client_role_name} +- Service role to analyze: {service_role_name} -Remember: Return a list of real role names that should have access to the client role. +Remember: Return a list of real role names that should have access to the service role. Return in this format: ```explanation @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ def build_single_role_retry_prompt( ```json {{ - "client_role": "{client_role_name}", + "service_role": "{service_role_name}", "real_roles_with_access": [ "exact-realm-role-name-1", "exact-realm-role-name-2" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e4f4ec1b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +""" +Service Policy Agent + +Generates a partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak service. +""" + +from .graph import ServicePolicyBuilder, ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, create_service_policy_builder_graph +from .state import ServicePolicyState + +__all__ = [ + "ServicePolicyBuilder", + "ServicePolicyBuilderConfig", + "create_service_policy_builder_graph", + "ServicePolicyState", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py similarity index 63% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 7720fc174..45bfa8ab3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ -Client Policy Agent +Service Policy Agent Generates a partial access control policy that contains only the rules -relevant for a single specified Keycloak client. Inputs are a natural -language policy description and a client ID; output is a YAML policy -with realm-role → client-role mappings scoped to that client. +relevant for a single specified Keycloak service. Inputs are a natural +language policy description and a service ID; output is a YAML policy +with realm-role → service-role mappings scoped to that service. Workflow: 1. filter_and_extract — run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the - given client and aggregate the results. + given service and aggregate the results. 2. build_policy — assemble the {policy: {realm_role: [...]}} dict. 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with header comments. 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry. @@ -26,17 +26,21 @@ from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel from config import create_llm -from client_policy_agent.state import ClientPolicyState +from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.keycloak.library import api_from_config +from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import ( + get_roles, + get_services, + get_service_permissions, +) from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @dataclass -class ClientPolicyBuilderConfig: +class ServicePolicyBuilderConfig: """ - Configuration for the ClientPolicyBuilder agent. + Configuration for the ServicePolicyBuilder agent. Attributes: llm: LangChain LLM instance @@ -53,51 +57,51 @@ class ClientPolicyBuilderConfig: # ============================================================================ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state: ClientPolicyState, + state: ServicePolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - client_roles: list, + service_roles: list, verbose: bool, -) -> ClientPolicyState: +) -> ServicePolicyState: """ - Run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the target client and invert the - results into the {role to client_roles} structure used by _build_policy. + Run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the target service and invert the + results into the {role to service_roles} structure used by _build_policy. Args: - state: Current ClientPolicyState (needs 'description' and 'client_id') + state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_id') llm: LLM instance realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - client_roles: Roles belonging to the target client [{'name': str, 'description': str}] + service_roles: Roles belonging to the target service [{'name': str, 'description': str}] verbose: Whether to print detailed output Returns: - Updated ClientPolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation + Updated ServicePolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation """ - client_id = state["client_id"] + service_id = state["service_id"] mapper = SingleRoleMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations: list[str] = [] - realm_role_to_client_roles: dict = {} + realm_role_to_service_roles: dict = {} - for client_role in client_roles: + for service_role in service_roles: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state["description"], - client_name=client_id, - client_role=client_role, + service_name=service_id, + service_role=service_role, realm_roles=realm_roles, ) if result.get("explanation"): - explanations.append(f"{client_id}/{client_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}") + explanations.append(f"{service_id}/{service_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}") for realm_role_name in result.get("real_roles_with_access", []): - realm_role_to_client_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - {"client": client_id, "role": client_role["name"]} + realm_role_to_service_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( + {"service": service_id, "role": service_role["name"]} ) parsed_scopes = [ - {"role": realm_role, "client_roles": cr_list} - for realm_role, cr_list in realm_role_to_client_roles.items() + {"role": realm_role, "service_roles": cr_list} + for realm_role, cr_list in realm_role_to_service_roles.items() ] return { @@ -111,32 +115,32 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( } -def _build_policy(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: +def _build_policy(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: """ Assemble the structured policy dict from parsed_scopes. Returns: - Updated ClientPolicyState with policy_structure + Updated ServicePolicyState with policy_structure """ policy: dict = {} for entry in state["parsed_scopes"]: - policy[entry["role"]] = entry["client_roles"] + policy[entry["role"]] = entry["service_roles"] return {**state, "policy_structure": {"policy": policy}} -def _generate_yaml(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: +def _generate_yaml(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: """ Render the policy structure as a YAML string with explanatory comments. Returns: - Updated ClientPolicyState with yaml_output + Updated ServicePolicyState with yaml_output """ - client_id = state.get("client_id", "") + service_id = state.get("service_id", "") header = ( "# Partial Access Control Policy\n" - f"# Scoped to client: {client_id}\n" - "# Maps realm roles to the client roles they may access.\n\n" + f"# Scoped to service: {service_id}\n" + "# Maps realm roles to the service roles they may access.\n\n" ) if state.get("description"): @@ -157,36 +161,36 @@ def _generate_yaml(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: sort_keys=False, allow_unicode=True, ) - footer = "\n# Generated by ClientPolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" + footer = "\n# Generated by ServicePolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" return {**state, "yaml_output": header + yaml_content + footer} def _validate_policy( - state: ClientPolicyState, + state: ServicePolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - client_id: str, - client_roles: list, + service_id: str, + service_roles: list, verbose: bool, max_retries: int, -) -> ClientPolicyState: +) -> ServicePolicyState: """ Structural validation of the generated policy. Returns: - Updated ClientPolicyState with errors and validation_passed + Updated ServicePolicyState with errors and validation_passed """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - client_names = [client_id] - client_roles_map = {client_id: client_roles} + service_names = [service_id] + service_roles_map = {service_id: service_roles} structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy, realm_roles, client_names, client_roles_map + policy, realm_roles, service_names, service_roles_map ) - # An empty policy is valid for a client-scoped agent: the policy description - # may simply not grant any permissions to this client's services. + # An empty policy is valid for a service-scoped agent: the policy description + # may simply not grant any permissions to this service's roles. structural_errors = [e for e in structural_errors if e != "Policy is empty"] if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: @@ -205,7 +209,7 @@ def _validate_policy( } -def _should_retry(state: ClientPolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: +def _should_retry(state: ServicePolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: """Conditional edge: retry parse or finish.""" if not state.get("validation_passed", False) and state.get("retry_count", 0) < max_retries: errors = state.get("errors", []) @@ -220,46 +224,46 @@ def _should_retry(state: ClientPolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: # GRAPH CONSTRUCTION # ============================================================================ -def create_client_policy_builder_graph( - config: ClientPolicyBuilderConfig, +def create_service_policy_builder_graph( + config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, - client_id: str, - client_roles: list, + service_id: str, + service_roles: list, ): """ - Build and compile the client-scoped policy builder graph. + Build and compile the service-scoped policy builder graph. Args: - config: ClientPolicyBuilderConfig + config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] - client_id: Target Keycloak client ID - client_roles: Roles of the target client [{name, description}] + service_id: Target Keycloak service ID + service_roles: Roles of the target service [{name, description}] Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow """ - def filter_and_extract_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + def filter_and_extract_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_roles, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_roles, config.verbose ) - def build_policy_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + def build_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _build_policy(state) - def generate_yaml_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + def generate_yaml_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _generate_yaml(state) - def validate_policy_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> ClientPolicyState: + def validate_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, client_id, client_roles, + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_id, service_roles, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) - def should_retry_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> str: + def should_retry_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> str: return _should_retry(state, config.max_retries) - workflow = StateGraph(ClientPolicyState) + workflow = StateGraph(ServicePolicyState) workflow.add_node("filter_and_extract", filter_and_extract_node) workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) workflow.add_node("generate_yaml", generate_yaml_node) @@ -282,16 +286,16 @@ def should_retry_node(state: ClientPolicyState) -> str: # PUBLIC CLASS # ============================================================================ -class ClientPolicyBuilder: +class ServicePolicyBuilder: """ - AI-powered policy builder scoped to a single Keycloak client. + AI-powered policy builder scoped to a single Keycloak service. - Given a natural language policy description and a client ID, produces + Given a natural language policy description and a service ID, produces a YAML access control policy that contains only the realm-role → - client-role mappings relevant to that client. + service-role mappings relevant to that service. Workflow: - 1. filter_and_extract — map each role of the client to realm roles + 1. filter_and_extract — map each role of the service to realm roles 2. build_policy — assemble the structured policy dict 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with comments 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry @@ -299,7 +303,7 @@ class ClientPolicyBuilder: def __init__( self, - client_id: str, + service_id: str, realm: str = "", config_path: Optional[Path] = None, llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, @@ -308,7 +312,7 @@ def __init__( ): """ Args: - client_id: Keycloak client ID to scope the policy to + service_id: Keycloak service ID to scope the policy to realm: Keycloak realm name (empty string uses the default realm) config_path: Path to the AC config YAML; falls back to AC_CONFIG_PATH env var llm: LangChain LLM instance; created automatically if not provided @@ -322,29 +326,38 @@ def __init__( llm_instance = llm if config_path is not None: - os.environ["AC_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) - self.client_id = client_id - self.config = ClientPolicyBuilderConfig( + self.service_id = service_id + self.config = ServicePolicyBuilderConfig( llm=llm_instance, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries, ) - realm_roles_models = api_from_config.get_realm_roles(realm=realm) + roles_models = get_roles(realm=realm) self.realm_roles = [ {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} - for r in realm_roles_models + for r in roles_models ] - client_roles_map = api_from_config.get_client_roles_map(realm=realm) - self.client_roles = client_roles_map.get(client_id, []) - - self.graph = create_client_policy_builder_graph( + services = get_services(realm=realm) + self.service_roles = [] + for service in services: + if service.clientId != service_id: + continue + permissions = get_service_permissions(service.id, realm=realm) + self.service_roles = [ + {"name": permission.name, "description": permission.description or ""} + for permission in permissions + ] + break + + self.graph = create_service_policy_builder_graph( self.config, self.realm_roles, - self.client_id, - self.client_roles, + self.service_id, + self.service_roles, ) def get_graph(self): @@ -353,7 +366,7 @@ def get_graph(self): def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: """ - Generate a client-scoped access control policy from a natural language description. + Generate a service-scoped access control policy from a natural language description. Args: description: Natural language policy description @@ -362,14 +375,14 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: dict with keys: yaml_output (str) — YAML policy file content policy_structure (dict) — structured policy data - parsed_scopes (list) — raw realm-role → client-role mappings + parsed_scopes (list) — raw realm-role → service-role mappings errors (list) — validation errors (empty on success) success (bool) — True when no validation errors retry_count (int) — number of validation retries """ - initial_state: ClientPolicyState = { + initial_state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": description, - "client_id": self.client_id, + "service_id": self.service_id, "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], "policy_structure": {}, @@ -391,7 +404,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), } - def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "client_policy.yaml"): + def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "service_policy.yaml"): """ Save the generated policy YAML to a file. @@ -401,9 +414,9 @@ def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "client_policy.yaml"): """ with open(filepath, "w") as f: f.write(yaml_output) - print(f"Client policy saved to {filepath}") + print(f"Service policy saved to {filepath}") if __name__ == "__main__": - print("Use ClientPolicyBuilder programmatically or via the CLI.") + print("Use ServicePolicyBuilder programmatically or via the CLI.") sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py similarity index 71% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py index 8c55258be..f7eeb6deb 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/client_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ -State Definitions for Client Policy Agent +State Definitions for Service Policy Agent TypedDict state structure for the LangGraph workflow that generates a -partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak client. +partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak service. """ from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any from operator import add -class ClientPolicyState(TypedDict): +class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): """ - State for the client-scoped policy building workflow. + State for the service-scoped policy building workflow. Attributes: description: Natural language policy description - client_id: Keycloak client ID to scope the policy to + service_id: Keycloak service ID to scope the policy to explanation: LLM explanation of the role mappings - parsed_scopes: List of {role, client_roles} mappings (realm-role to client-roles) + parsed_scopes: List of {role, service_roles} mappings (realm-role to service-roles) policy_structure: Structured policy dict ready for YAML conversion yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated LLM messages @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ class ClientPolicyState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded """ description: str - client_id: str + service_id: str explanation: str parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] policy_structure: Dict[str, Any] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py index 652db0b54..006b03664 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ """ Single Role Agent Package -This package provides functionality for mapping individual client roles +This package provides functionality for mapping individual service roles to real roles (realm roles) that should have access to them. """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py index e14cdd446..fb781812b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ This module provides the SingleRoleMapper class that uses LangGraph workflows to determine which real roles (realm roles) should have access to a specific -client role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. +service role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. Key Features: - - Semantic matching of client role to real roles + - Semantic matching of service role to real roles - Policy description context for better decision making - Automatic validation and retry mechanism - LLM-powered analysis of role descriptions @@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( verbose: bool ) -> SingleRoleState: """ - Analyze which real roles should have access to the client role. + Analyze which real roles should have access to the service role. - This is the first node in the workflow. It sends the client role, + This is the first node in the workflow. It sends the service role, available real roles, policy context, and call chain structure to the LLM for semantic analysis. @@ -168,14 +168,14 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( # Build prompts system_prompt = build_single_role_system_prompt( state['realm_roles'], - state['client_role'], + state['service_role'], state.get('policy_description', ''), - state.get('client_name', ''), + state.get('service_name', ''), ) user_prompt = ( - f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the client role " - f"'{state['client_role']['name']}' from client '{state['client_name']}'." + f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the service role " + f"'{state['service_role']['name']}' from service '{state['service_name']}'." ) # Add policy context to user prompt if available @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( if not parsed_data: retry_prompt = build_single_role_retry_prompt( state['realm_roles'], - state['client_role'] + state['service_role'] ) retry_messages = [ @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( Semantically verify the role mapping using LLM. Asks the LLM whether the assigned realm roles correctly reflect the access - requirements for this client role given the policy description. On failure + requirements for this service role given the policy description. On failure the retry counter is incremented so the graph can loop back to analyze_role_mapping. @@ -355,8 +355,8 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( verification_prompt = build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), - client_name=state.get("client_name", ""), - client_role=state["client_role"], + service_name=state.get("service_name", ""), + service_role=state["service_role"], realm_roles=state["realm_roles"], real_roles_with_access=real_roles_with_access, ) @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( if verbose: status = 'YES' if mapping_correct else 'NO' print( - f"\nSemantic verification [{state['client_name']}/{state['client_role']['name']}]:" + f"\nSemantic verification [{state['service_name']}/{state['service_role']['name']}]:" f" MAPPING_CORRECT={status}" ) if not mapping_correct: @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( if not mapping_correct: error_msg = ( - f"Semantic mismatch for {state['client_name']}/{state['client_role']['name']}:" + f"Semantic mismatch for {state['service_name']}/{state['service_role']['name']}:" f" {explanation}" ) if retry_count < max_retries: @@ -529,10 +529,10 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: class SingleRoleMapper: """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which real roles should have access to a client role. - + AI-powered mapper for determining which real roles should have access to a service role. + This class uses LangGraph to orchestrate a workflow that: - 1. Analyzes a client role, available real roles, and policy context + 1. Analyzes a service role, available real roles, and policy context 2. Uses LLM to semantically match roles based on descriptions 3. Validates the results 4. Retries if validation fails @@ -586,24 +586,24 @@ def get_graph(self): def map_role( self, policy_description: str, - client_name: str, - client_role: Dict[str, str], + service_name: str, + service_role: Dict[str, str], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], ) -> Dict[str, Any]: """ - Determine which real roles should have access to a client role. + Determine which real roles should have access to a service role. Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description for context - client_name: Name of the client that owns the role - client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the client role + service_name: Name of the service that owns the role + service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the service role realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles Returns: Dictionary containing: - policy_description (str): The policy context used - - client_name (str): Name of the client - - client_role (str): Name of the client role analyzed + - service_name (str): Name of the service + - service_role (str): Name of the service role analyzed - real_roles_with_access (list): List of realm role names that should have access - explanation (str): LLM's explanation of the mapping - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) @@ -613,8 +613,8 @@ def map_role( # Initialize the workflow state initial_state: SingleRoleState = { "policy_description": policy_description, - "client_name": client_name, - "client_role": client_role, + "service_name": service_name, + "service_role": service_role, "realm_roles": realm_roles, "explanation": "", "real_roles_with_access": [], @@ -630,8 +630,8 @@ def map_role( # Extract and return results return { "policy_description": policy_description, - "client_name": client_name, - "client_role": client_role['name'], + "service_name": service_name, + "service_role": service_role['name'], "real_roles_with_access": final_state["real_roles_with_access"], "explanation": final_state["explanation"], "errors": final_state["errors"], diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py index ff7021360..1c98cd89c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ State Definitions for Single Role Mapper This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph -workflow for mapping a single client role to real roles that should have access. +workflow for mapping a single service role to real roles that should have access. """ from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ class SingleRoleState(TypedDict): Attributes: policy_description: Natural language policy description (context for the mapping) - client_name: Name of the client that owns the role - client_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the client role to analyze + service_name: Name of the service that owns the role + service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the service role to analyze realm_roles: List of available realm roles with descriptions explanation: LLM's explanation of which real roles should have access real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names that should have access @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ class SingleRoleState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded """ policy_description: str - client_name: str - client_role: Dict[str, str] + service_name: str + service_role: Dict[str, str] realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]] explanation: str real_roles_with_access: List[str] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py index 05f125499..a7518371f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ def extract_explanation_and_json(content: str) -> Tuple[str, List]: ... Mapping admins to all roles ... ``` ... ```json - ... [{"role": "admin", "client_roles": [...]}] + ... [{"role": "admin", "service_roles": [...]}] ... ```''' >>> explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index a3a980641..00dbd2523 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -12,20 +12,20 @@ def validate_policy_structure( policy: Dict[str, Any], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - client_names: List[str], - client_roles_map: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, str]]] + service_names: List[str], + service_roles_map: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, str]]] ) -> List[str]: """ Perform structural validation on the policy. - Checks that all realm roles, clients, and client roles exist in the + Checks that all realm roles, services, and service roles exist in the configuration and that the policy structure is valid. Args: policy: The policy dictionary to validate realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - client_names: List of valid client names - client_roles_map: Dict mapping client names to list of role dicts with 'name' and 'description' + service_names: List of valid service names + service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to list of role dicts with 'name' and 'description' Returns: List of error messages (empty if validation passed) @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ def validate_policy_structure( realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] # Validate that only preset names are used - for realm_role, client_role_mappings in policy.items(): + for realm_role, service_role_mappings in policy.items(): # Validate realm role name if not realm_role: structural_errors.append("Found empty realm role name") @@ -51,51 +51,51 @@ def validate_policy_structure( ) # Check if realm role has any mappings - if not client_role_mappings: + if not service_role_mappings: structural_errors.append( - f"Realm role '{realm_role}' has no client role mappings assigned" + f"Realm role '{realm_role}' has no service role mappings assigned" ) - # Validate each client role mapping - for mapping in client_role_mappings: + # Validate each service role mapping + for mapping in service_role_mappings: if not isinstance(mapping, dict): structural_errors.append( f"Invalid mapping format in realm role '{realm_role}': " - f"must be a dict with 'client' and 'role' keys" + f"must be a dict with 'service' and 'role' keys" ) continue - client = mapping.get('client', '') + service = mapping.get('service', '') role = mapping.get('role', '') - # Validate client name - if not client: + # Validate service name + if not service: structural_errors.append( - f"Found empty client name in realm role '{realm_role}'" + f"Found empty service name in realm role '{realm_role}'" ) - elif client not in client_names: + elif service not in service_names: structural_errors.append( - f"Client '{client}' in realm role '{realm_role}' is not in " - f"the preset client names. Available clients: {', '.join(client_names)}" + f"Service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}' is not in " + f"the preset service names. Available services: {', '.join(service_names)}" ) - # Validate role name for the client + # Validate role name for the service if not role: structural_errors.append( - f"Found empty role name for client '{client}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" + f"Found empty role name for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" ) - elif client in client_roles_map: - # Extract role names from the client roles map - client_role_names = [r['name'] for r in client_roles_map[client]] - if role not in client_role_names: + elif service in service_roles_map: + # Extract role names from the service roles map + service_role_names = [r['name'] for r in service_roles_map[service]] + if role not in service_role_names: available_roles = ( - ', '.join(client_role_names) - if client_role_names + ', '.join(service_role_names) + if service_role_names else '(none)' ) structural_errors.append( - f"Role '{role}' for client '{client}' in realm role '{realm_role}' " - f"is not valid. Available roles for {client}: {available_roles}" + f"Role '{role}' for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}' " + f"is not valid. Available roles for {service}: {available_roles}" ) return structural_errors diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py index e69de29bb..480481329 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +""" +PDP (Policy Decision Point) Package + +Contains configuration, library, and policy modules for access control. +""" + +from . import library +from . import configuration +from . import policy + +__all__ = [ + "library", + "configuration", + "policy", +] + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py index e69de29bb..6fc372914 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +""" +PDP Library API + +Provides read and write APIs for accessing PDP configuration and policy data. +Users can choose between: +- read_api: Makes HTTP requests to a service +- read_api_from_config: Reads from a YAML config file +""" + +# Expose submodules for direct import +from . import read_api +from . import read_api_from_config +from . import write_api +from . import models + +__all__ = [ + "read_api", + "read_api_from_config", + "write_api", + "models", +] + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..85fe9b09e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import yaml +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from .models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission + +load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") + +_CONFIG_ENV_VAR = "AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH" + + +def _load() -> dict: + env_val = os.getenv(_CONFIG_ENV_VAR) + if not env_val: + raise RuntimeError(f"{_CONFIG_ENV_VAR} is not set") + with open(Path(env_val)) as f: + return yaml.safe_load(f) + + +def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: + subjects_raw = _load().get("subjects", []) + result = [] + for subject in subjects_raw: + if not isinstance(subject, dict): + continue + subject_id = subject.get("id") or subject.get("username") + username = subject.get("username") or subject_id + if not subject_id or not username: + continue + result.append( + Subject( + id=subject_id, + username=username, + email=subject.get("email"), + firstName=subject.get("firstName"), + lastName=subject.get("lastName"), + enabled=subject.get("enabled", True), + ) + ) + return result + + +def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: + roles_raw = _load().get("realm_roles", []) + result = [] + for role in roles_raw: + if isinstance(role, dict): + name = role["name"] + description = role.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(role) + description = None + result.append( + Role( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + composite=False, + clientRole=False, + ) + ) + return result + + +def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: + services_raw = _load().get("services", []) + result = [] + for service in services_raw: + if isinstance(service, dict): + service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or "" + client_id = service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or service_id + name = service.get("name") or None + description = service.get("description") or None + enabled = service.get("enabled", True) + protocol = service.get("protocol") + public_client = service.get("publicClient", False) + else: + service_id = str(service) + client_id = service_id + name = None + description = None + enabled = True + protocol = None + public_client = False + result.append( + Service( + id=service_id, + clientId=client_id, + name=name, + description=description, + enabled=enabled, + protocol=protocol, + publicClient=public_client, + ) + ) + return result + + +def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: + scopes_raw = _load().get("scopes", []) + result = [] + for scope in scopes_raw: + if isinstance(scope, dict): + name = scope["name"] + description = scope.get("description") or None + protocol = scope.get("protocol") + else: + name = str(scope) + description = None + protocol = None + result.append( + Scope( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + protocol=protocol, + ) + ) + return result + + +def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: + assignments_raw = _load().get("subject_assignments", {}) + subject_assignments = assignments_raw.get(subject_id, {}) + realm_mappings_raw = subject_assignments.get("realmMappings", []) + realm_mappings = [] + for role in realm_mappings_raw: + if isinstance(role, dict): + name = role["name"] + description = role.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(role) + description = None + realm_mappings.append( + Role( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + composite=False, + clientRole=False, + ) + ) + return Assignments( + realmMappings=realm_mappings, + serviceMappings=subject_assignments.get("serviceMappings", {}), + ) + + +def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: + services_raw = _load().get("services", []) + for service in services_raw: + if not isinstance(service, dict): + continue + current_service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") + if current_service_id != service_id: + continue + permissions = [] + for permission in service.get("permissions", service.get("roles", [])): + if isinstance(permission, dict): + name = permission["name"] + description = permission.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(permission) + description = None + permissions.append( + Permission( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + composite=False, + clientRole=True, + ) + ) + return permissions + return [] + + +def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: + roles_raw = _load().get("roles", []) + for role in roles_raw: + if not isinstance(role, dict) or role.get("name") != role_name: + continue + composites = [] + for composite in role.get("composites", []): + if isinstance(composite, dict): + name = composite["name"] + description = composite.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(composite) + description = None + composites.append( + Permission( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + composite=False, + clientRole=True, + ) + ) + return composites + return [] + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml index fcfff6b0c..5379e5167 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml @@ -1,20 +1,20 @@ -# Client configurations with roles -# Each client can have multiple roles, each role gets its own audience scope -# Optional 'secret' parameter: if not provided, Keycloak will auto-generate the client secret -clients: - - client_id: "kagenti" +# Service configurations with roles +# Each service can have multiple roles, each role gets its own audience scope +# Optional 'secret' parameter: if not provided, Keycloak will auto-generate the service secret +services: + - service_id: "kagenti" secret: "demo-ui-secret" direct_access_grants: true roles: - name: "demo-ui" description: "Access to the demo UI interface" - - client_id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" + - service_id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" secret: "github-agent-secret" direct_access_grants: true roles: - name: "github-agent" description: "Provides access to GitHub services" - - client_id: "github-tool" + - service_id: "github-tool" secret: "github-tool-secret" roles: - name: "github-tool-aud" @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ clients: - name: "github-full-access" description: "Provides access to private GitHub repositories" -# Realm roles (can be composites of client roles) +# Realm roles (can be composites of service roles) realm_roles: - name: "developer" description: "R&D team members" diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml index 4ac008868..bf03862ce 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml @@ -5,19 +5,19 @@ policy: developer: - - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent role: github-agent - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-tool-aud - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-full-access tech-support: - - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent role: github-agent - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-tool-aud sales: - - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent role: github-agent - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml index 1221d09c5..755d88b9d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml @@ -5,14 +5,14 @@ policy: developer: - - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent role: github-agent - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-tool-aud - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-full-access tech-support: - - client: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent + - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent role: github-agent - - client: github-tool + - service: github-tool role: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py index 04e609591..2af22b53c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} - exp_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} + gen_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} + exp_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") @@ -213,8 +213,8 @@ def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): "policy_structure": { "policy": { "developer": [ - {"client": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"}, - {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} + {"service": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"}, + {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} ] } }, @@ -252,8 +252,8 @@ def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): [ { "role": "unknown-role", - "client_roles": [ - {"client": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"} + "service_roles": [ + {"service": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"} ] } ] @@ -282,13 +282,13 @@ def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in builder.realm_roles] assert realm_role_names == ["developer", "tech-support", "sales"] - # Verify clients were loaded - assert "kagenti" in builder.client_roles_map - assert "github-tool" in builder.client_roles_map - assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.client_roles_map + # Verify services were loaded + assert "kagenti" in builder.service_roles_map + assert "github-tool" in builder.service_roles_map + assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.service_roles_map - # Verify client roles are dicts with 'name' and 'description' - kagenti_roles = builder.client_roles_map["kagenti"] + # Verify service roles are dicts with 'name' and 'description' + kagenti_roles = builder.service_roles_map["kagenti"] assert len(kagenti_roles) > 0 assert all(isinstance(role, dict) and 'name' in role for role in kagenti_roles) diff --git a/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py similarity index 71% rename from aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py rename to aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py index fc4cebb7d..690f2ecf2 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_client_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ """ -Tests for the client_policy_agent. +Tests for the service_policy_agent. -The agent takes a natural language policy description plus a client ID and -produces a partial policy containing only the rules relevant to that client. +The agent takes a natural language policy description plus a service ID and +produces a partial policy containing only the rules relevant to that service. To run all tests: - pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py + pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py To skip integration tests (require LLM access): - pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py -m "not integration" + pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py -m "not integration" To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py -m integration + pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py -m integration To run the LLM-backed fixture test: 1. Ensure LLM is configured in config/llm.env - 2. Remove the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures - 3. Run: pytest test/test_client_policy_agent.py::test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures -v + 2. Remove the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures + 3. Run: pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py::test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures -v """ import pytest @@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock -from client_policy_agent import ClientPolicyBuilder -from client_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy, _filter_and_extract_scopes -from client_policy_agent.state import ClientPolicyState +from service_policy_agent import ServicePolicyBuilder +from service_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy, _filter_and_extract_scopes +from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState from config import create_llm @@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ def normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_content: str) -> dict: return data.get("policy", {}) -def filter_policy_to_client(policy: dict, client_id: str) -> dict: +def filter_policy_to_service(policy: dict, service_id: str) -> dict: """ Keep only the realm-role entries that contain at least one mapping for - *client_id*. Within each kept entry, retain only the mappings for that - client. Used to derive the expected partial policy from a full fixture. + *service_id*. Within each kept entry, retain only the mappings for that + service. Used to derive the expected partial policy from a full fixture. """ result = {} for realm_role, mappings in policy.items(): - client_mappings = [m for m in mappings if m.get("client") == client_id] - if client_mappings: - result[realm_role] = client_mappings + service_mappings = [m for m in mappings if m.get("service") == service_id] + if service_mappings: + result[realm_role] = service_mappings return result @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} - exp_set = {(m["client"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} + gen_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} + exp_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") @@ -140,15 +140,15 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: def test_generate_yaml_unit(): """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure (bypasses LLM).""" - state: ClientPolicyState = { + state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", - "client_id": "github-tool", + "service_id": "github-tool", "explanation": "Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", "policy_structure": { "policy": { "developer": [ - {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, - {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, + {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, ] } }, @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): assert "developer:" in output assert "github-tool" in output assert "github-full-access" in output - # Header must mention the scoped client + # Header must mention the scoped service assert "github-tool" in output assert "# Partial Access Control Policy" in output assert "# Original Policy Description:" in output @@ -176,22 +176,22 @@ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): def test_build_policy_unit(): """_build_policy assembles policy_structure correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" - state: ClientPolicyState = { + state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", - "client_id": "github-tool", + "service_id": "github-tool", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [ { "role": "developer", - "client_roles": [ - {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, - {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + "service_roles": [ + {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, + {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, ], }, { "role": "tech-support", - "client_roles": [ - {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + "service_roles": [ + {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, ], }, ], @@ -208,18 +208,18 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): policy = result["policy_structure"]["policy"] assert "developer" in policy assert "tech-support" in policy - assert {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} in policy["developer"] - assert {"client": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"} in policy["tech-support"] - # No other clients should appear - all_clients = {m["client"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} - assert all_clients == {"github-tool"} + assert {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} in policy["developer"] + assert {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"} in policy["tech-support"] + # No other services should appear + all_services = {m["service"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} + assert all_services == {"github-tool"} def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): """_build_policy produces an empty policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" - state: ClientPolicyState = { + state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", - "client_id": "kagenti", + "service_id": "kagenti", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], "policy_structure": {}, @@ -233,47 +233,47 @@ def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): result = _build_policy(state) assert result["policy_structure"] == {"policy": {}} -def test_client_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): - """ClientPolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified client.""" +def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): + """ServicePolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified service.""" - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) - assert builder.client_id == "github-tool" + assert builder.service_id == "github-tool" # Realm roles come from config regardless of scoping realm_role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.realm_roles] assert "developer" in realm_role_names assert "tech-support" in realm_role_names # Only github-tool roles should be loaded - role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.client_roles] + role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.service_roles] assert "github-tool-aud" in role_names assert "github-full-access" in role_names - # Roles from other clients must not appear + # Roles from other services must not appear assert "demo-ui" not in role_names assert "github-agent" not in role_names -def test_client_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_client(config_file, mock_llm): - """ClientPolicyBuilder with an unknown client_id yields an empty role list.""" +def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock_llm): + """ServicePolicyBuilder with an unknown service_id yields an empty role list.""" - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="does-not-exist", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="does-not-exist", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) - assert builder.client_roles == [] + assert builder.service_roles == [] def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, @@ -288,15 +288,15 @@ def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): # MOCK-LLM TESTS (structural / format validation, no real LLM) # ============================================================================ -def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, client_id: str, role_name: str) -> str: +def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, service_id: str, role_name: str) -> str: """Return a well-formed LLM JSON response for a single role mapping.""" return f""" ```explanation -Policy grants {realm_role} access to {role_name} on {client_id}. +Policy grants {realm_role} access to {role_name} on {service_id}. ``` ```json {{ - "client_role": "{role_name}", + "service_role": "{role_name}", "real_roles_with_access": ["{realm_role}"] }} ``` @@ -311,8 +311,8 @@ def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file, mock_llm): ) mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, @@ -335,8 +335,8 @@ def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): ) mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, @@ -348,16 +348,16 @@ def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): assert "policy" in parsed -def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_client_only(config_file, mock_llm): - """All mappings in the generated policy belong to the specified client.""" +def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_service_only(config_file, mock_llm): + """All mappings in the generated policy belong to the specified service.""" mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" ) mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, @@ -367,8 +367,8 @@ def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_client_only(config_file, mock_llm): policy = result["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) for mappings in policy.values(): for mapping in mappings: - assert mapping["client"] == "github-tool", ( - f"Mapping for a different client leaked in: {mapping}" + assert mapping["service"] == "github-tool", ( + f"Mapping for a different service leaked in: {mapping}" ) @@ -378,15 +378,15 @@ def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): mock_response.content = """ ```json { - "client_role": "github-tool-aud", + "service_role": "github-tool-aud", "real_roles_with_access": ["nonexistent-realm-role"] } ``` """ mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, @@ -399,31 +399,31 @@ def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): ) -def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_client_role(config_file, mock_llm): +def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_service_role(config_file, mock_llm): """ - The client/role in every output mapping always comes from the predefined - client_roles list, not from the LLM JSON. Even if the LLM's client_role - field names a role from a different client (demo-ui belongs to kagenti), + The service/role in every output mapping always comes from the predefined + service_roles list, not from the LLM JSON. Even if the LLM's service_role + field names a role from a different service (demo-ui belongs to kagenti), the output must only contain github-tool roles and succeed. """ mock_response = Mock() - # LLM mentions demo-ui (a kagenti role) in its JSON client_role field. + # LLM mentions demo-ui (a kagenti role) in its JSON service_role field. # That field is ignored; only real_roles_with_access matters. mock_response.content = """ ```explanation -Mapping developer to demo-ui (wrong client - but client_role field is ignored). +Mapping developer to demo-ui (wrong service - but service_role field is ignored). ``` ```json { - "client_role": "demo-ui", + "service_role": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": ["developer"] } ``` """ mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id="github-tool", + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id="github-tool", config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, @@ -433,9 +433,9 @@ def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_client_role(config_file, m # The mapping is structurally valid: developer → github-tool roles assert result["success"], f"Unexpected errors: {result['errors']}" policy = result["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - all_clients = {m["client"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} - assert all_clients == {"github-tool"}, ( - f"Foreign client leaked into output: {all_clients}" + all_services = {m["service"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} + assert all_services == {"github-tool"}, ( + f"Foreign service leaked into output: {all_services}" ) @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_client_role(config_file, m # ============================================================================ # @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with a configured LLM") -def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): +def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): """ Integration test: generate a partial policy for each fixture using a real LLM. @@ -452,8 +452,8 @@ def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_ 1. Reads the policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt 2. Loads the expected FULL policy from fixtures/expected/*.yaml 3. Derives the expected PARTIAL policy by keeping only mappings for - each target client defined in the fixture config - 4. Generates a partial policy with ClientPolicyBuilder + each target service defined in the fixture config + 4. Generates a partial policy with ServicePolicyBuilder 5. Compares the result with the derived expected partial policy The test is parametrised over the four LLM models defined in llm_model_name. @@ -461,9 +461,9 @@ def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_ if not policy_files: pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - # Collect all client IDs from config + # Collect all service IDs from config config_data = yaml.safe_load((config_file).read_text()) - all_client_ids = [c["client_id"] for c in config_data.get("clients", [])] + all_service_ids = [c["service_id"] for c in config_data.get("services", [])] failures = [] @@ -479,12 +479,12 @@ def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_ full_expected = normalize_policy_yaml(expected_file.read_text()) - for client_id in all_client_ids: - expected_partial = filter_policy_to_client(full_expected, client_id) + for service_id in all_service_ids: + expected_partial = filter_policy_to_service(full_expected, service_id) try: - builder = ClientPolicyBuilder( - client_id=client_id, + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( + service_id=service_id, config_path=config_file, llm=llm_instance, verbose=False, @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_ if not result["success"]: failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {client_id}: " + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " f"generation failed: {result['errors']}" ) continue @@ -503,20 +503,20 @@ def test_generate_client_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_ if not match: failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {client_id}: " + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " "policy mismatch:\n" + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in diffs) ) except Exception as exc: failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {client_id}: " + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " f"exception: {exc}" ) if failures: pytest.fail( - f"Client policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + f"Service policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + "\n\n".join(failures) ) From ef2d819bbff3ba86b4d7ece829246b667752c5d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 12:50:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 027/273] priviledges Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py | 6 +- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 8 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 72 +++++------ .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 2 +- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 100 +++++++-------- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 60 ++++----- .../policy/service_policy_agent/state.py | 4 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py | 18 +++ .../graph.py | 114 +++++++++--------- .../state.py | 14 +-- .../policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 18 --- .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py | 4 +- .../onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 44 +++---- .../fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml | 14 +-- .../fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml | 10 +- aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py | 24 ++-- aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py | 36 +++--- 17 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 274 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/{single_role_agent => single_privilege_agent}/graph.py (85%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/{single_role_agent => single_privilege_agent}/state.py (75%) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py index ff28347a0..9b419f1e7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Main Components: - PolicyBuilder: Full policy generation for all services in a realm - ServicePolicyBuilder: Service-scoped policy generation - - SingleRoleMapper: Individual role mapping with semantic analysis + - SinglePrivilegeMapper: Individual privilege mapping with semantic analysis Quick Start: >>> from pathlib import Path @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder from service_policy_agent.graph import ServicePolicyBuilder -from single_role_agent.graph import SingleRoleMapper +from single_privilege_agent.graph import SinglePrivilegeMapper __version__ = "1.0.0" __author__ = "AIAC Development Team" @@ -33,6 +33,6 @@ __all__ = [ "PolicyBuilder", "ServicePolicyBuilder", - "SingleRoleMapper", + "SinglePrivilegeMapper", ] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 94b3f0946..8acbc5ae8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -122,14 +122,14 @@ def generate_policy_only( print(f" - {error}") print("\n" + "=" * 80) - print("Parsed Role-to-Service-Role Mappings:") + print("Parsed Role-to-Privilege Mappings:") print("=" * 80) for role_mapping in result["parsed_scopes"]: realm_role = role_mapping["role"] - service_roles = role_mapping.get("service_roles", []) + privileges = role_mapping.get("privileges", []) print(f" {realm_role}:") - for sr in service_roles: - print(f" - {sr['service']}: {sr['role']}") + for priv in privileges: + print(f" - {priv['service']}: {priv['privilege']}") def main() -> None: gen_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 45cc2c049..7992432aa 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ get_services, get_service_permissions, ) -from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper +from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -79,55 +79,55 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( state: PolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - service_roles_map: dict, + privileges_map: dict, verbose: bool ) -> PolicyState: """ - Map each service role to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate + Map each privilege to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate results into the parsed_scopes format expected by _build_policy. - For every service role across all services, SingleRoleMapper determines which + For every privilege across all services, SingleRoleMapper determines which realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that - parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, service_roles: [...]}. + parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, privileges: [...]}. Args: state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field llm: LLM instance for processing realm_roles: List of available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges verbose: Whether to print detailed output Returns: Updated PolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation """ - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations = [] - # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": X, "role": Y} dicts - realm_role_to_service_roles: dict = {} + # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": X, "privilege": Y} dicts + realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} - for service_name, service_roles in service_roles_map.items(): - for service_role in service_roles: + for service_name, privileges in privileges_map.items(): + for privilege in privileges: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state['description'], service_name=service_name, - service_role=service_role, + privilege=privilege, realm_roles=realm_roles, ) if result.get('explanation'): explanations.append( - f"{service_name}/{service_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}" + f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" ) for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): - realm_role_to_service_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - {'service': service_name, 'role': service_role['name']} + realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( + {'service': service_name, 'privilege': privilege['name']} ) parsed_scopes = [ - {'role': realm_role, 'service_roles': service_roles} - for realm_role, service_roles in realm_role_to_service_roles.items() + {'role': realm_role, 'privileges': priv_list} + for realm_role, priv_list in realm_role_to_privileges.items() ] return { @@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ def _build_policy(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: # Transform parsed scopes into policy structure for role_info in state["parsed_scopes"]: role_name = role_info.get("role", "") - service_roles = role_info.get("service_roles", []) - policy[role_name] = service_roles + privileges = role_info.get("privileges", []) + policy[role_name] = privileges # Wrap in policy structure policy_structure = {"policy": policy} @@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ def _generate_yaml(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """ # Create header comments header = """# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific service roles -# Format: user_role_name -> list of service role mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and role (role name from that service) +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges +# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) """ @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ def _validate_policy( llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, service_names: list, - service_roles_map: dict, + privileges_map: dict, verbose: bool, max_retries: int ) -> PolicyState: @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ def _validate_policy( llm: LLM instance for semantic verification realm_roles: List of available realm roles service_names: List of service names - service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges verbose: Whether to print detailed output max_retries: Maximum retry attempts @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ def _validate_policy( policy, realm_roles, service_names, - service_roles_map + privileges_map ) # If there are structural errors and we can retry, trigger retry @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ def _validate_policy( "retry_count": retry_count + 1 } - # Return final result; semantic validation is handled per-role in SingleRoleMapper + # Return final result; semantic validation is handled per-privilege in SingleRoleMapper return { **state, "errors": structural_errors, @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: def create_policy_builder_graph( config: PolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, - service_roles_map: dict, + privileges_map: dict, service_names: list ): """ @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ def create_policy_builder_graph( Args: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm roles - service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges service_names: List of service names Returns: @@ -338,9 +338,9 @@ def create_policy_builder_graph( # Define node functions as closures with access to config def parse_and_extract_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """Parse natural language and extract role mappings.""" + """Parse natural language and extract privilege mappings.""" return _parse_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_roles_map, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, privileges_map, config.verbose ) def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """Validate structure and semantics.""" return _validate_policy( state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_names, - service_roles_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries + privileges_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ class PolicyBuilder: Attributes: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm role names - service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to their available roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to their available privileges service_names: List of service names graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine """ @@ -463,11 +463,11 @@ def __init__( for r in roles_models ] services = get_services(realm=realm) - self.service_roles_map = {} + self.privileges_map = {} self.service_names = [] for service in services: permissions = get_service_permissions(service.id, realm=realm) - self.service_roles_map[service.clientId] = [ + self.privileges_map[service.clientId] = [ {"name": permission.name, "description": permission.description or ""} for permission in permissions ] @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ def __init__( self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( self.config, self.realm_roles, - self.service_roles_map, + self.privileges_map, self.service_names ) @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: Dictionary containing: - yaml_output (str): Complete YAML policy file content - policy_structure (dict): Structured policy data - - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-service-role mappings from LLM + - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-privilege mappings from LLM - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) - success (bool): True if generation succeeded without errors - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py index 6f85d9268..5dc0a583a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class PolicyState(TypedDict): Attributes: description: Original natural language policy description explanation: LLM's explanation of how it mapped the policy - parsed_scopes: List of role-to-service-role mappings built by aggregating SingleRoleMapper results + parsed_scopes: List of role-to-privilege mappings built by aggregating SingleRoleMapper results policy_structure: Structured policy dictionary ready for YAML conversion yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index b3758e1bc..2b0114aaa 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Single Role Prompt Builder for Access Mapping This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine -which real roles should have access to a specific service role. +which real roles should have access to a specific privilege. """ from typing import List, Dict, Optional @@ -11,22 +11,22 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - service_role: Dict[str, str], + privilege: Dict[str, str], policy_description: str = "", service_name: str = "", ) -> str: """ - Build a system prompt for mapping a single service role to realm roles. + Build a system prompt for mapping a single privilege to realm roles. This function constructs a comprehensive prompt that guides the LLM through the process of determining which realm roles should have access to a specific - service role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. + privilege based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. Args: realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the service role to analyze + privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege to analyze policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context - service_name: Name of the service that owns the role + service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege Returns: Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption @@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( else " (none defined)" ) - # Format the service role information - service_role_name = service_role['name'] - service_role_desc = service_role.get('description', '') - service_role_info = service_role_name - if service_role_desc: - service_role_info += f": {service_role_desc}" + # Format the privilege information + privilege_name = privilege['name'] + privilege_desc = privilege.get('description', '') + privilege_info = privilege_name + if privilege_desc: + privilege_info += f": {privilege_desc}" # Add policy context if provided policy_context = "" @@ -68,19 +68,19 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( """ - return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping service role capabilities to appropriate user roles. + return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping privilege capabilities to appropriate user roles. {policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: You are given: 1. A list of all available realm roles with their descriptions -2. A single service role with its description +2. A single privilege with its description -Your task is to determine which realm roles should have access to this service role. +Your task is to determine which realm roles should have access to this privilege. AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: {available_roles} -SERVICE ROLE TO ANALYZE: -{service_role_info} +PRIVILEGE TO ANALYZE: +{privilege_info} ANALYSIS GUIDELINES: 1. IDENTIFY AND MAP ALL USER CATEGORIES (CRITICAL): @@ -148,17 +148,17 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - Do not modify, abbreviate, or create new role names TASK STEPS: -1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this service role (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? +1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this privilege (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. Do NOT continue to the next steps. - IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the service role's domain. Do NOT reason from + IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the privilege's domain. Do NOT reason from the user role name (e.g., "developers use demo UIs too") — that is forbidden here. - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" — domain: dashboards. Policy about data warehouse — DIFFERENT → [] - "Access to the data warehouse connector" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - "Access to confidential data records" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about GitHub repos — DIFFERENT → [] (Even though "developers" may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) -2. CLASSIFY this service role: is it a FINAL resource role or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? +2. CLASSIFY this privilege: is it a FINAL resource privilege or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]" AND the service is in the same domain as the policy - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]" @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( ```json {{ - "service_role": "{service_role_name}", + "privilege": "{privilege_name}", "real_roles_with_access": [ "exact-realm-role-name-1", "exact-realm-role-name-2" @@ -191,31 +191,31 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Example A — domain mismatch, not relevant to policy subject: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". These are DIFFERENT domains — dashboard UI is unrelated to data warehouse access. Returning [] immediately without further analysis. Note: Even if "developers" or "analysts" typically use dashboard UIs, the policy is silent about UI access. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. ``` ```json -{{"service_role": "monitoring-dashboard", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "monitoring-dashboard", "real_roles_with_access": []}} ``` -Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI role, GitHub policy: +Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI privilege, GitHub policy: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "demo UI interface". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "demo UI interface". Policy domain is "GitHub repository access". These are DIFFERENT domains. The policy mentions only GitHub repositories; it says nothing about any UI or web interface. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. Returning [] immediately. (The fact that "developers" may use demo UIs is irrelevant — access is determined by the policy text, not by job function assumptions.) ``` ```json -{{"service_role": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": []}} ``` Example B — enabling/gateway service (ALL users who need the downstream resource): ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "data warehouse connector". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "data warehouse connector". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Access to the data warehouse connector" is a prerequisite service, not a final resource. Policy identifies two user categories: Group A (full access) @@ -224,12 +224,12 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. ``` ```json -{{"service_role": "warehouse-connector", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} +{{"privilege": "warehouse-connector", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} ``` -Example C — restricted role, limited access: +Example C — restricted privilege, limited access: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: service role domain is "confidential data records". Policy domain is +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "confidential data records". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. Step 2 CLASSIFY: FINAL RESOURCE — provides access to restricted data records. Policy states Group A can access both restricted and public data; Group B can access @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A. ``` ```json -{{"service_role": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} +{{"privilege": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} ``` """ @@ -245,26 +245,26 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( def build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, service_name: str, - service_role: Dict[str, str], + privilege: Dict[str, str], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], real_roles_with_access: List[str], ) -> str: """ - Build a prompt to semantically verify a single role mapping. + Build a prompt to semantically verify a single privilege mapping. Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description - service_name: Name of the service that owns the role - service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the service role + service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege + privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned Returns: Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption """ - service_role_name = service_role['name'] - service_role_desc = service_role.get('description', '') - service_role_info = service_role_name + (f" ({service_role_desc})" if service_role_desc else "") + privilege_name = privilege['name'] + privilege_desc = privilege.get('description', '') + privilege_info = privilege_name + (f" ({privilege_desc})" if privilege_desc else "") realm_roles_context = "\n".join( f" - {r['name']}" + (f": {r.get('description', '')}" if r.get('description') else "") @@ -273,23 +273,23 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( assigned_roles = ", ".join(real_roles_with_access) if real_roles_with_access else "(none)" - return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following role mapping is correct. + return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following privilege mapping is correct. POLICY DESCRIPTION: {policy_description} -SERVICE ROLE BEING ANALYZED: +PRIVILEGE BEING ANALYZED: Service: {service_name} - Role: {service_role_info} + Privilege: {privilege_info} -CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this service role): +CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this privilege): {assigned_roles} AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: {realm_roles_context} VALIDATION TASK: -Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to service role '{service_role_name}' \ +Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to privilege '{privilege_name}' \ from service '{service_name}' to realm roles [{assigned_roles}] is correct. Consider: @@ -308,28 +308,28 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( def build_single_role_retry_prompt( realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - service_role: Dict[str, str] + privilege: Dict[str, str] ) -> str: """ - Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single role analysis. + Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single privilege analysis. Args: realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the service role + privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege Returns: Formatted retry prompt string with role reminders and format example """ realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] - service_role_name = service_role['name'] + privilege_name = privilege['name'] return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. Please provide the mapping again using ONLY these preset names: - Available real roles: {", ".join(realm_role_names) if realm_role_names else "(none)"} -- Service role to analyze: {service_role_name} +- Privilege to analyze: {privilege_name} -Remember: Return a list of real role names that should have access to the service role. +Remember: Return a list of real role names that should have access to the privilege. Return in this format: ```explanation @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ def build_single_role_retry_prompt( ```json {{ - "service_role": "{service_role_name}", + "privilege": "{privilege_name}", "real_roles_with_access": [ "exact-realm-role-name-1", "exact-realm-role-name-2" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 45bfa8ab3..5b6ddea2c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ get_services, get_service_permissions, ) -from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper +from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -60,48 +60,48 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( state: ServicePolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - service_roles: list, + privileges: list, verbose: bool, ) -> ServicePolicyState: """ - Run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the target service and invert the - results into the {role to service_roles} structure used by _build_policy. + Run SingleRoleMapper for every privilege of the target service and invert the + results into the {role to privileges} structure used by _build_policy. Args: state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_id') llm: LLM instance realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - service_roles: Roles belonging to the target service [{'name': str, 'description': str}] + privileges: Privileges belonging to the target service [{'name': str, 'description': str}] verbose: Whether to print detailed output Returns: Updated ServicePolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation """ service_id = state["service_id"] - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations: list[str] = [] - realm_role_to_service_roles: dict = {} + realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} - for service_role in service_roles: + for privilege in privileges: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state["description"], service_name=service_id, - service_role=service_role, + privilege=privilege, realm_roles=realm_roles, ) if result.get("explanation"): - explanations.append(f"{service_id}/{service_role['name']}: {result['explanation']}") + explanations.append(f"{service_id}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}") for realm_role_name in result.get("real_roles_with_access", []): - realm_role_to_service_roles.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - {"service": service_id, "role": service_role["name"]} + realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( + {"service": service_id, "privilege": privilege["name"]} ) parsed_scopes = [ - {"role": realm_role, "service_roles": cr_list} - for realm_role, cr_list in realm_role_to_service_roles.items() + {"role": realm_role, "privileges": priv_list} + for realm_role, priv_list in realm_role_to_privileges.items() ] return { @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ def _build_policy(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: """ policy: dict = {} for entry in state["parsed_scopes"]: - policy[entry["role"]] = entry["service_roles"] + policy[entry["role"]] = entry["privileges"] return {**state, "policy_structure": {"policy": policy}} @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ def _generate_yaml(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: header = ( "# Partial Access Control Policy\n" f"# Scoped to service: {service_id}\n" - "# Maps realm roles to the service roles they may access.\n\n" + "# Maps realm roles to the privileges they may access.\n\n" ) if state.get("description"): @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ def _validate_policy( llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, service_id: str, - service_roles: list, + privileges: list, verbose: bool, max_retries: int, ) -> ServicePolicyState: @@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ def _validate_policy( retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) service_names = [service_id] - service_roles_map = {service_id: service_roles} + privileges_map = {service_id: privileges} structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy, realm_roles, service_names, service_roles_map + policy, realm_roles, service_names, privileges_map ) # An empty policy is valid for a service-scoped agent: the policy description - # may simply not grant any permissions to this service's roles. + # may simply not grant any permissions to this service's privileges. structural_errors = [e for e in structural_errors if e != "Policy is empty"] if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, service_id: str, - service_roles: list, + privileges: list, ): """ Build and compile the service-scoped policy builder graph. @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] service_id: Target Keycloak service ID - service_roles: Roles of the target service [{name, description}] + privileges: Privileges of the target service [{name, description}] Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( def filter_and_extract_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_roles, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, privileges, config.verbose ) def build_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ def generate_yaml_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: def validate_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_id, service_roles, + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_id, privileges, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) @@ -292,10 +292,10 @@ class ServicePolicyBuilder: Given a natural language policy description and a service ID, produces a YAML access control policy that contains only the realm-role → - service-role mappings relevant to that service. + privilege mappings relevant to that service. Workflow: - 1. filter_and_extract — map each role of the service to realm roles + 1. filter_and_extract — map each privilege of the service to realm roles 2. build_policy — assemble the structured policy dict 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with comments 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry @@ -342,12 +342,12 @@ def __init__( ] services = get_services(realm=realm) - self.service_roles = [] + self.privileges = [] for service in services: if service.clientId != service_id: continue permissions = get_service_permissions(service.id, realm=realm) - self.service_roles = [ + self.privileges = [ {"name": permission.name, "description": permission.description or ""} for permission in permissions ] @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ def __init__( self.config, self.realm_roles, self.service_id, - self.service_roles, + self.privileges, ) def get_graph(self): @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: dict with keys: yaml_output (str) — YAML policy file content policy_structure (dict) — structured policy data - parsed_scopes (list) — raw realm-role → service-role mappings + parsed_scopes (list) — raw realm-role → privilege mappings errors (list) — validation errors (empty on success) success (bool) — True when no validation errors retry_count (int) — number of validation retries diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py index f7eeb6deb..c8d361621 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): Attributes: description: Natural language policy description service_id: Keycloak service ID to scope the policy to - explanation: LLM explanation of the role mappings - parsed_scopes: List of {role, service_roles} mappings (realm-role to service-roles) + explanation: LLM explanation of the privilege mappings + parsed_scopes: List of {role, privileges} mappings (realm-role to privileges) policy_structure: Structured policy dict ready for YAML conversion yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated LLM messages diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e78e71c7a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Single Privilege Mapper Package + +This package provides functionality for mapping individual privileges +to real roles (realm roles) that should have access to them. +""" + +from .graph import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig +from .state import SinglePrivilegeState + +__all__ = [ + 'SinglePrivilegeMapper', + 'SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig', + 'SinglePrivilegeState', +] + +# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py similarity index 85% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index fb781812b..87d25be99 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ -Single Role Mapper - Main Module +Single Privilege Mapper - Main Module -This module provides the SingleRoleMapper class that uses LangGraph workflows +This module provides the SinglePrivilegeMapper class that uses LangGraph workflows to determine which real roles (realm roles) should have access to a specific -service role based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. +privilege based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. Key Features: - - Semantic matching of service role to real roles + - Semantic matching of privilege to real roles - Policy description context for better decision making - Automatic validation and retry mechanism - LLM-powered analysis of role descriptions @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel from config import create_llm -from .state import SingleRoleState +from .state import SinglePrivilegeState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from prompts.single_role_prompt_builder import ( build_single_role_system_prompt, @@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ @dataclass -class SingleRoleMapperConfig: +class SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig: """ - Configuration for SingleRoleMapper agent. + Configuration for SinglePrivilegeMapper agent. Attributes: llm: LangChain LLM instance @@ -146,36 +146,36 @@ def print_explanation_single_role(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verb # ============================================================================ def _analyze_role_mapping( - state: SingleRoleState, + state: SinglePrivilegeState, llm: BaseChatModel, verbose: bool -) -> SingleRoleState: +) -> SinglePrivilegeState: """ - Analyze which real roles should have access to the service role. + Analyze which real roles should have access to the privilege. - This is the first node in the workflow. It sends the service role, + This is the first node in the workflow. It sends the privilege, available real roles, policy context, and call chain structure to the LLM for semantic analysis. Args: - state: Current SingleRoleState + state: Current SinglePrivilegeState llm: LLM instance for processing verbose: Whether to print detailed output Returns: - Updated SingleRoleState with real_roles_with_access and explanation + Updated SinglePrivilegeState with real_roles_with_access and explanation """ # Build prompts system_prompt = build_single_role_system_prompt( state['realm_roles'], - state['service_role'], + state['privilege'], state.get('policy_description', ''), state.get('service_name', ''), ) user_prompt = ( - f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the service role " - f"'{state['service_role']['name']}' from service '{state['service_name']}'." + f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the privilege " + f"'{state['privilege']['name']}' from service '{state['service_name']}'." ) # Add policy context to user prompt if available @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( if not parsed_data: retry_prompt = build_single_role_retry_prompt( state['realm_roles'], - state['service_role'] + state['privilege'] ) retry_messages = [ @@ -249,10 +249,10 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( def _validate_role_mapping( - state: SingleRoleState, + state: SinglePrivilegeState, verbose: bool, max_retries: int -) -> SingleRoleState: +) -> SinglePrivilegeState: """ Validate the role mapping results. @@ -261,12 +261,12 @@ def _validate_role_mapping( - The mapping makes semantic sense Args: - state: SingleRoleState with real_roles_with_access + state: SinglePrivilegeState with real_roles_with_access verbose: Whether to print detailed output max_retries: Maximum retry attempts - + Returns: - Updated SingleRoleState with errors and validation_passed fields + Updated SinglePrivilegeState with errors and validation_passed fields """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) real_roles_with_access = state.get("real_roles_with_access", []) @@ -328,27 +328,27 @@ def _validate_role_mapping( def _verify_semantic_mapping( - state: SingleRoleState, + state: SinglePrivilegeState, llm: BaseChatModel, verbose: bool, max_retries: int, -) -> SingleRoleState: +) -> SinglePrivilegeState: """ Semantically verify the role mapping using LLM. Asks the LLM whether the assigned realm roles correctly reflect the access - requirements for this service role given the policy description. On failure + requirements for this privilege given the policy description. On failure the retry counter is incremented so the graph can loop back to analyze_role_mapping. Args: - state: SingleRoleState with real_roles_with_access populated + state: SinglePrivilegeState with real_roles_with_access populated llm: LLM instance for verification verbose: Whether to print verification details max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed Returns: - Updated SingleRoleState with validation_passed and errors + Updated SinglePrivilegeState with validation_passed and errors """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) real_roles_with_access = state.get("real_roles_with_access", []) @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( verification_prompt = build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), service_name=state.get("service_name", ""), - service_role=state["service_role"], + privilege=state["privilege"], realm_roles=state["realm_roles"], real_roles_with_access=real_roles_with_access, ) @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( if verbose: status = 'YES' if mapping_correct else 'NO' print( - f"\nSemantic verification [{state['service_name']}/{state['service_role']['name']}]:" + f"\nSemantic verification [{state['service_name']}/{state['privilege']['name']}]:" f" MAPPING_CORRECT={status}" ) if not mapping_correct: @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( if not mapping_correct: error_msg = ( - f"Semantic mismatch for {state['service_name']}/{state['service_role']['name']}:" + f"Semantic mismatch for {state['service_name']}/{state['privilege']['name']}:" f" {explanation}" ) if retry_count < max_retries: @@ -405,12 +405,12 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} -def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SingleRoleState, max_retries: int) -> str: +def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) -> str: """ Route after structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end. Args: - state: Current SingleRoleState with validation results + state: Current SinglePrivilegeState with validation results max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed Returns: @@ -430,12 +430,12 @@ def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SingleRoleState, max_retrie return END -def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SingleRoleState, max_retries: int) -> str: +def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) -> str: """ Determine if semantic verification failure should retry analyze_role_mapping. Args: - state: Current SingleRoleState with semantic verification results + state: Current SinglePrivilegeState with semantic verification results max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed Returns: @@ -455,40 +455,40 @@ def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SingleRoleState, max_retries: int) -> st # GRAPH CONSTRUCTION # ============================================================================ -def create_single_role_mapper_graph(config: SingleRoleMapperConfig): +def create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config: SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig): """ - Create and compile the single role mapper graph. + Create and compile the single privilege mapper graph. Args: - config: SingleRoleMapperConfig instance + config: SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig instance Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow """ # Define node functions as closures with access to config - def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> SingleRoleState: + def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> SinglePrivilegeState: """Analyze which real roles should have access.""" return _analyze_role_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose) - def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> SingleRoleState: + def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> SinglePrivilegeState: """Validate structural correctness of the role mapping.""" return _validate_role_mapping(state, config.verbose, config.max_retries) - def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> SingleRoleState: + def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> SinglePrivilegeState: """Semantically verify the role mapping against the policy description.""" return _verify_semantic_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose, config.max_retries) - def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: + def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: """Route after structural validation.""" return _should_route_after_structural_validation(state, config.max_retries) - def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: + def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: """Determine if semantic failure should retry.""" return _should_retry_after_semantic(state, config.max_retries) # Build the graph - workflow = StateGraph(SingleRoleState) + workflow = StateGraph(SinglePrivilegeState) # Add nodes workflow.add_node("analyze_role_mapping", analyze_role_mapping_node) @@ -527,18 +527,18 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: # MAIN CLASS # ============================================================================ -class SingleRoleMapper: +class SinglePrivilegeMapper: """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which real roles should have access to a service role. + AI-powered mapper for determining which real roles should have access to a privilege. This class uses LangGraph to orchestrate a workflow that: - 1. Analyzes a service role, available real roles, and policy context + 1. Analyzes a privilege, available real roles, and policy context 2. Uses LLM to semantically match roles based on descriptions 3. Validates the results 4. Retries if validation fails Attributes: - config: SingleRoleMapperConfig instance + config: SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig instance graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine """ @@ -565,14 +565,14 @@ def __init__( llm_instance = llm # Create configuration object - self.config = SingleRoleMapperConfig( + self.config = SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig( llm=llm_instance, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries ) # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine - self.graph = create_single_role_mapper_graph(self.config) + self.graph = create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(self.config) def get_graph(self): """ @@ -587,23 +587,23 @@ def map_role( self, policy_description: str, service_name: str, - service_role: Dict[str, str], + privilege: Dict[str, str], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], ) -> Dict[str, Any]: """ - Determine which real roles should have access to a service role. + Determine which real roles should have access to a privilege. Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description for context - service_name: Name of the service that owns the role - service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the service role + service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege + privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles Returns: Dictionary containing: - policy_description (str): The policy context used - service_name (str): Name of the service - - service_role (str): Name of the service role analyzed + - privilege (str): Name of the privilege analyzed - real_roles_with_access (list): List of realm role names that should have access - explanation (str): LLM's explanation of the mapping - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) @@ -611,10 +611,10 @@ def map_role( - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred """ # Initialize the workflow state - initial_state: SingleRoleState = { + initial_state: SinglePrivilegeState = { "policy_description": policy_description, "service_name": service_name, - "service_role": service_role, + "privilege": privilege, "realm_roles": realm_roles, "explanation": "", "real_roles_with_access": [], @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ def map_role( return { "policy_description": policy_description, "service_name": service_name, - "service_role": service_role['name'], + "privilege": privilege['name'], "real_roles_with_access": final_state["real_roles_with_access"], "explanation": final_state["explanation"], "errors": final_state["errors"], diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py similarity index 75% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py index 1c98cd89c..6197a0836 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py @@ -1,23 +1,23 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ -State Definitions for Single Role Mapper +State Definitions for Single Privilege Mapper This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph -workflow for mapping a single service role to real roles that should have access. +workflow for mapping a single privilege to real roles that should have access. """ from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict from operator import add -class SingleRoleState(TypedDict): +class SinglePrivilegeState(TypedDict): """ - State dictionary for the single role mapping LangGraph workflow. + State dictionary for the single privilege mapping LangGraph workflow. Attributes: policy_description: Natural language policy description (context for the mapping) - service_name: Name of the service that owns the role - service_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the service role to analyze + service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege + privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege to analyze realm_roles: List of available realm roles with descriptions explanation: LLM's explanation of which real roles should have access real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names that should have access @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ class SingleRoleState(TypedDict): """ policy_description: str service_name: str - service_role: Dict[str, str] + privilege: Dict[str, str] realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]] explanation: str real_roles_with_access: List[str] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 006b03664..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Single Role Agent Package - -This package provides functionality for mapping individual service roles -to real roles (realm roles) that should have access to them. -""" - -from .graph import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleMapperConfig -from .state import SingleRoleState - -__all__ = [ - 'SingleRoleMapper', - 'SingleRoleMapperConfig', - 'SingleRoleState', -] - -# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py index a7518371f..21db0e9ed 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ def extract_explanation_and_json(content: str) -> Tuple[str, List]: Example: >>> content = '''```explanation - ... Mapping admins to all roles + ... Mapping admins to all privileges ... ``` ... ```json - ... [{"role": "admin", "service_roles": [...]}] + ... [{"role": "admin", "privileges": [...]}] ... ```''' >>> explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index 00dbd2523..cd76f1237 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -13,19 +13,19 @@ def validate_policy_structure( policy: Dict[str, Any], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], service_names: List[str], - service_roles_map: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, str]]] + privileges_map: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, str]]] ) -> List[str]: """ Perform structural validation on the policy. - Checks that all realm roles, services, and service roles exist in the + Checks that all realm roles, services, and privileges exist in the configuration and that the policy structure is valid. Args: policy: The policy dictionary to validate realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles service_names: List of valid service names - service_roles_map: Dict mapping service names to list of role dicts with 'name' and 'description' + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to list of privilege dicts with 'name' and 'description' Returns: List of error messages (empty if validation passed) @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ def validate_policy_structure( realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] # Validate that only preset names are used - for realm_role, service_role_mappings in policy.items(): + for realm_role, privilege_mappings in policy.items(): # Validate realm role name if not realm_role: structural_errors.append("Found empty realm role name") @@ -51,22 +51,22 @@ def validate_policy_structure( ) # Check if realm role has any mappings - if not service_role_mappings: + if not privilege_mappings: structural_errors.append( - f"Realm role '{realm_role}' has no service role mappings assigned" + f"Realm role '{realm_role}' has no privilege mappings assigned" ) - # Validate each service role mapping - for mapping in service_role_mappings: + # Validate each privilege mapping + for mapping in privilege_mappings: if not isinstance(mapping, dict): structural_errors.append( f"Invalid mapping format in realm role '{realm_role}': " - f"must be a dict with 'service' and 'role' keys" + f"must be a dict with 'service' and 'privilege' keys" ) continue service = mapping.get('service', '') - role = mapping.get('role', '') + privilege = mapping.get('privilege', '') # Validate service name if not service: @@ -79,23 +79,23 @@ def validate_policy_structure( f"the preset service names. Available services: {', '.join(service_names)}" ) - # Validate role name for the service - if not role: + # Validate privilege name for the service + if not privilege: structural_errors.append( - f"Found empty role name for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" + f"Found empty privilege name for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" ) - elif service in service_roles_map: - # Extract role names from the service roles map - service_role_names = [r['name'] for r in service_roles_map[service]] - if role not in service_role_names: - available_roles = ( - ', '.join(service_role_names) - if service_role_names + elif service in privileges_map: + # Extract privilege names from the privileges map + privilege_names = [p['name'] for p in privileges_map[service]] + if privilege not in privilege_names: + available_privileges = ( + ', '.join(privilege_names) + if privilege_names else '(none)' ) structural_errors.append( - f"Role '{role}' for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}' " - f"is not valid. Available roles for {service}: {available_roles}" + f"Privilege '{privilege}' for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}' " + f"is not valid. Available privileges for {service}: {available_privileges}" ) return structural_errors diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml index bf03862ce..36536665c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml @@ -6,18 +6,18 @@ policy: developer: - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - role: github-agent + privilege: github-agent - service: github-tool - role: github-tool-aud + privilege: github-tool-aud - service: github-tool - role: github-full-access + privilege: github-full-access tech-support: - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - role: github-agent + privilege: github-agent - service: github-tool - role: github-tool-aud + privilege: github-tool-aud sales: - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - role: github-agent + privilege: github-agent - service: github-tool - role: github-tool-aud + privilege: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml index 755d88b9d..c26d5a69d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ policy: developer: - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - role: github-agent + privilege: github-agent - service: github-tool - role: github-tool-aud + privilege: github-tool-aud - service: github-tool - role: github-full-access + privilege: github-full-access tech-support: - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - role: github-agent + privilege: github-agent - service: github-tool - role: github-tool-aud + privilege: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py index 2af22b53c..45321375f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} - exp_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} + gen_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in generated[role]} + exp_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in expected[role]} for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") @@ -252,8 +252,8 @@ def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): [ { "role": "unknown-role", - "service_roles": [ - {"service": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"} + "privileges": [ + {"service": "kagenti", "privilege": "demo-ui"} ] } ] @@ -283,14 +283,14 @@ def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): assert realm_role_names == ["developer", "tech-support", "sales"] # Verify services were loaded - assert "kagenti" in builder.service_roles_map - assert "github-tool" in builder.service_roles_map - assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.service_roles_map - - # Verify service roles are dicts with 'name' and 'description' - kagenti_roles = builder.service_roles_map["kagenti"] - assert len(kagenti_roles) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(role, dict) and 'name' in role for role in kagenti_roles) + assert "kagenti" in builder.privileges_map + assert "github-tool" in builder.privileges_map + assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.privileges_map + + # Verify privileges are dicts with 'name' and 'description' + kagenti_privileges = builder.privileges_map["kagenti"] + assert len(kagenti_privileges) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(priv, dict) and 'name' in priv for priv in kagenti_privileges) # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py index 690f2ecf2..a3189bfae 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in generated[role]} - exp_set = {(m["service"], m["role"]) for m in expected[role]} + gen_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in generated[role]} + exp_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in expected[role]} for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") @@ -183,15 +183,15 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): "parsed_scopes": [ { "role": "developer", - "service_roles": [ - {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, - {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + "privileges": [ + {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-full-access"}, + {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, ], }, { "role": "tech-support", - "service_roles": [ - {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, + "privileges": [ + {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, ], }, ], @@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): policy = result["policy_structure"]["policy"] assert "developer" in policy assert "tech-support" in policy - assert {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} in policy["developer"] - assert {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"} in policy["tech-support"] + assert {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-full-access"} in policy["developer"] + assert {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-tool-aud"} in policy["tech-support"] # No other services should appear all_services = {m["service"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} assert all_services == {"github-tool"} @@ -249,16 +249,16 @@ def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): assert "developer" in realm_role_names assert "tech-support" in realm_role_names - # Only github-tool roles should be loaded - role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.service_roles] - assert "github-tool-aud" in role_names - assert "github-full-access" in role_names - # Roles from other services must not appear - assert "demo-ui" not in role_names - assert "github-agent" not in role_names + # Only github-tool privileges should be loaded + privilege_names = [p["name"] for p in builder.privileges] + assert "github-tool-aud" in privilege_names + assert "github-full-access" in privilege_names + # Privileges from other services must not appear + assert "demo-ui" not in privilege_names + assert "github-agent" not in privilege_names def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock_llm): - """ServicePolicyBuilder with an unknown service_id yields an empty role list.""" + """ServicePolicyBuilder with an unknown service_id yields an empty privilege list.""" builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( service_id="does-not-exist", @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock verbose=False, ) - assert builder.service_roles == [] + assert builder.privileges == [] def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): From 3dec2ff8e6321856b762c870c212a1cbff3c2505 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 00:46:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 028/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs(aiac):=20restructure=20PDP=20names?= =?UTF-8?q?pace=20=E2=80=94=20move=20services=20under=20pdp/service/,=20re?= =?UTF-8?q?name=20library=20modules?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Both PDP services moved under aiac.pdp.service (configuration/keycloak, policy/keycloak) - Library modules renamed: read_api → configuration, write_api → policy - Intermediate __init__.py package added for aiac.pdp.service - All PRD files updated: Docker build paths, module names, call flows, usage examples Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 50 +++++++++---------- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 12 ++--- .../requirements/components/library.md | 40 ++++++++------- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 15 ++++-- .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 15 ++++-- 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 5730eb3c6..28b776643 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ AIAC solves this by automating RBAC/ABAC management using a natural-language pol 3. **RAG Knowledge Base** — a ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. 4. **Event Broker** — a NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. 5. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. -6. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `read_api` and `write_api` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. +6. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `configuration` and `policy` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. ### Design principle: PDP/PEP separation @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imple │ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ │ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.read_api — HTTP client → │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.configuration — HTTP client → │ │ PDP Configuration Service │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.write_api — HTTP client → │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ │ PDP Policy Service │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` @@ -136,43 +136,43 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state + composites] + ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state + composites] ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] - ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite diff] + ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite diff] └──► NATS ack [message removed from stream] Rebuild trigger (operator-only, HTTP direct): - Operator ──(kubectl port-forward)──► AIAC Agent /apply/rebuild ──┬── write_api ──► PDP Policy Service [clear all composite mappings] + Operator ──(kubectl port-forward)──► AIAC Agent /apply/rebuild ──┬── policy ──► PDP Policy Service [clear all composite mappings] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API + ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API ├──► LLM API (external) ├──► LLM API (external) - └──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API + └──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API Realm role trigger (aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}) → Realm Roles Orchestrator: Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] + ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings scoped to affected role] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] + ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] └──► NATS ack Service onboarding trigger (aiac.apply.service.{id}) → Service Onboarding Orchestrator: Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ServiceInfo] ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ServiceProvision] - ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] + ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► read_api ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] + ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings for new service] ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - ├──► write_api ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] + ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] └──► NATS ack ``` @@ -180,11 +180,11 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| PDP Configuration Service | `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) | `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.read_api`, `aiac.pdp.library.write_api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions | -| `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances | -| `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None | +| PDP Configuration Service | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions | +| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): - **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. - **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. - **`aiac.pdp.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. -- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.library.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.configuration.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.policy.__init__`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.read_api import get_subjects`. +- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.library.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy.__init__`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import get_subjects`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. - **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are realm-role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. @@ -234,8 +234,8 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) that applies policy changes to the active PDP b Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: - **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all PDP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Permission`, `Scope`, `Assignments`). -- **`aiac.pdp.library.read_api`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. -- **`aiac.pdp.library.write_api`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service; abstracts Phase 1 (Keycloak composite mappings) and Phase 2 (OPA Rego) behind a stable function interface. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.configuration`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service; abstracts Phase 1 (Keycloak composite mappings) and Phase 2 (OPA Rego) behind a stable function interface. **Full spec:** [components/library.md](components/library.md) @@ -318,10 +318,10 @@ Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash # Build PDP Configuration Service -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ # Build PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ @@ -363,8 +363,8 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | PDP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | | PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods | 204 on write success, 201 on create, 502 on Keycloak error | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | -| `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` functions | PDP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | -| `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` functions | PDP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | | Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | | Init container health-check | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence; NATS TCP refused then connected | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies healthy; `add_stream` called with correct config | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 1bc0034b9..ed6cf1b75 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv - Unrecognised format → treat as `ServiceType.tool`. 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - - **Not found** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.read_api`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. + - **Not found** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Service record is not found for a tool. > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ServiceType.tool`. - `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. -- `provision_service`: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. +- `provision_service`: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. - `format_response`: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. ```mermaid @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop - `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. - `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. - `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` for each entry in the validated diff. +- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in the validated diff. - `format_response`: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. ```mermaid @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop - `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. - `propose_diff`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. - `validate_diff`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. -- `apply_diff`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api`. +- `apply_diff`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. - `format_response`: assembles the build result. ```mermaid @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ flowchart TD START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END ``` -- `clear_composites`: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. `propose_diff` receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` and produces an add-only diff. +- `clear_composites`: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. `propose_diff` receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` and produces an add-only diff. - All other nodes: identical in contract to Build sub-agent. ```mermaid @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop - `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all services and their permissions, all realm roles, and the current composites for the affected realm role. - `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. - `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.write_api`. +- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. - `format_response`: assembles the result. ```mermaid diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 5cef13b8d..0dc8ca527 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -14,26 +14,30 @@ aiac/src/ ├── library/ │ ├── __init__.py # empty │ ├── models.py # Pydantic model definitions only - │ ├── read_api.py # HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service - │ └── write_api.py # HTTP client → PDP Policy Service - ├── configuration/ - │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ ├── main.py # FastAPI app (read service) - │ ├── Dockerfile - │ └── requirements.txt - └── policy/ + │ ├── configuration.py # HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service + │ └── policy.py # HTTP client → PDP Policy Service + └── service/ ├── __init__.py # empty - └── keycloak/ + ├── configuration/ + │ ├── __init__.py # empty + │ └── keycloak/ + │ ├── __init__.py # empty + │ ├── main.py # FastAPI app (Keycloak read service) + │ ├── Dockerfile + │ └── requirements.txt + └── policy/ ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── main.py # FastAPI app (Keycloak write service) - ├── Dockerfile - └── requirements.txt + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── main.py # FastAPI app (Keycloak write service) + ├── Dockerfile + └── requirements.txt aiac/test/ └── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.models aiac/pyproject.toml # pytest config: testpaths=["test"], pythonpath=["src"] ``` -`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.pdp`, `aiac.pdp.library`, `aiac.pdp.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.policy`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. +`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.pdp`, `aiac.pdp.library`, `aiac.pdp.service`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. --- @@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.read_api` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` ### Description HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.models`. @@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ Each function: ### Configuration -Read from a `.env` file co-located with `read_api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `configuration.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| @@ -176,7 +180,7 @@ Read from a `.env` file co-located with `read_api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/librar ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.read_api import get_subjects, get_roles +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import get_subjects, get_roles subjects = get_subjects(realm="kagenti") for s in subjects: @@ -185,7 +189,7 @@ for s in subjects: --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.write_api` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` ### Description HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Policy Service REST API. Abstracts the Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA) policy write backends behind a stable function interface — callers never interact with the backend directly. The active backend is determined by `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, which points to whichever policy service pod is deployed. @@ -240,7 +244,7 @@ def create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, rea ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.write_api import add_role_composites +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import add_role_composites from aiac.pdp.library.models import Permission permissions = [Permission(id="abc", name="editor", description=None, composite=False, clientRole=True)] diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index 4268e9901..bbd12f973 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Component PRD: PDP Configuration Service ## Location -`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/` +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` ## Description A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Returns PDP entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2; the read interface is stable across phases. @@ -52,10 +52,15 @@ python-keycloak ## File structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/ -├── Dockerfile -├── requirements.txt -└── main.py +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ +├── __init__.py +└── configuration/ + ├── __init__.py + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── Dockerfile + ├── requirements.txt + └── main.py ``` ## `main.py` behaviour notes diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 5a6cc3f81..19ed6a363 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Component PRD: PDP Policy Service — Keycloak Implementation ## Location -`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/` +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/` ## Description A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Realm roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a realm role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. @@ -56,10 +56,15 @@ python-keycloak ## File structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/ -├── Dockerfile -├── requirements.txt -└── main.py +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ +├── __init__.py +└── policy/ + ├── __init__.py + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── Dockerfile + ├── requirements.txt + └── main.py ``` ## `main.py` behaviour notes From 5a2d45831d2edea8da623a70cb29c790e0ef4561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 01:18:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 029/273] refact(aiac): apply PDP namespace rename to source and tests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Move services to pdp/service/{configuration,policy}/keycloak/, rename library modules read_api→configuration and write_api→policy, and update all tests and __init__.py exports to match. Add Dockerfiles and requirements.txt for both services. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py | 14 +------ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py | 20 ++-------- .../library/{read_api.py => configuration.py} | 0 .../pdp/library/{write_api.py => policy.py} | 0 .../{configuration => service}/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration}/__init__.py | 0 .../service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile | 12 ++++++ .../configuration}/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak}/main.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt | 4 ++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py | 0 .../pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile | 12 ++++++ .../pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 .../pdp/{ => service}/policy/keycloak/main.py | 0 .../service/policy/keycloak/requirements.txt | 4 ++ aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py | 8 ++-- ...i.py => test_pdp_library_configuration.py} | 40 +++++++++---------- ...rite_api.py => test_pdp_library_policy.py} | 32 +++++++-------- aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py | 4 +- 19 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/{read_api.py => configuration.py} (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/{write_api.py => policy.py} (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/{configuration => service}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/{policy => service/configuration}/__init__.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/{policy => service/configuration}/keycloak/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/{configuration => service/configuration/keycloak}/main.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/{ => service}/policy/keycloak/main.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/requirements.txt rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_read_api.py => test_pdp_library_configuration.py} (74%) rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_write_api.py => test_pdp_library_policy.py} (77%) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py index 480481329..e8e8ee53f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py @@ -1,17 +1,7 @@ -""" -PDP (Policy Decision Point) Package - -Contains configuration, library, and policy modules for access control. -""" - from . import library -from . import configuration -from . import policy +from . import service __all__ = [ "library", - "configuration", - "policy", + "service", ] - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py index 6fc372914..8346b7a0d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py @@ -1,23 +1,11 @@ -""" -PDP Library API - -Provides read and write APIs for accessing PDP configuration and policy data. -Users can choose between: -- read_api: Makes HTTP requests to a service -- read_api_from_config: Reads from a YAML config file -""" - -# Expose submodules for direct import -from . import read_api from . import read_api_from_config -from . import write_api +from . import configuration +from . import policy from . import models __all__ = [ - "read_api", "read_api_from_config", - "write_api", + "configuration", + "policy", "models", ] - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/write_api.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..131786fc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY main.py . + +EXPOSE 7070 + +CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7070"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0464cb432 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +python-dotenv diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7589f4ce --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY main.py . + +EXPOSE 7073 + +CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7073"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0464cb432 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +python-dotenv diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py index 5232da4de..e6b9c1bc5 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/configuration/main.py FastAPI application.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" import os from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError -from aiac.pdp.configuration.main import app, get_admin +from aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import app, get_admin REALM = "kagenti" @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ def test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin(self): "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.configuration.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: with TestClient(app) as client: resp = client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ def test_startup_creates_singleton_with_keycloak_realm(self): "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.configuration.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: with TestClient(app) as client: pass # lifespan runs startup_calls = [c for c in mock_cls.call_args_list if c.kwargs.get("realm_name") == "master"] diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_library_configuration.py similarity index 74% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py rename to aiac/test/test_pdp_library_configuration.py index 30b3ca521..d4ae94d0f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_pdp_read_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_library_configuration.py @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.read_api.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.configuration.""" import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission -from aiac.pdp.library import read_api +from aiac.pdp.library import configuration REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7070" @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ class TestGetSubjects: def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: - result = read_api.get_subjects(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + result = configuration.get_subjects(REALM) assert isinstance(result[0], Subject) assert result[0].username == "alice" m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/subjects", params={"realm": REALM}) @@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ class TestGetRoles: def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = read_api.get_roles(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = configuration.get_roles(REALM) assert isinstance(result[0], Role) assert result[0].name == "admin" @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ class TestGetServices: def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = read_api.get_services(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = configuration.get_services(REALM) assert isinstance(result[0], Service) assert result[0].clientId == "my-app" @@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ class TestGetScopes: def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = read_api.get_scopes(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = configuration.get_scopes(REALM) assert isinstance(result[0], Scope) assert result[0].name == "email" @@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ def test_returns_assignments(self, monkeypatch): "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}], "serviceMappings": {}, } - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = read_api.get_subject_assignments("subject-uuid", REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = configuration.get_subject_assignments("subject-uuid", REALM) assert isinstance(result, Assignments) assert result.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ class TestGetServicePermissions: def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data", "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = read_api.get_service_permissions("svc-uuid", REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = configuration.get_service_permissions("svc-uuid", REALM) assert isinstance(result[0], Permission) assert result[0].name == "view-data" @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ class TestGetRoleComposites: def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = read_api.get_role_composites("admin", REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = configuration.get_role_composites("admin", REALM) assert isinstance(result[0], Permission) assert result[0].name == "viewer" @@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): @pytest.mark.parametrize("fn_name,args,method", _ALL_FUNCTIONS) def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): + with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - getattr(read_api, fn_name)(*args) + getattr(configuration, fn_name)(*args) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -136,6 +136,6 @@ def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", raising=False) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.read_api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: - read_api.get_subjects(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + configuration.get_subjects(REALM) assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7070") diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_library_policy.py similarity index 77% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py rename to aiac/test/test_pdp_library_policy.py index b7248cb99..d60baad6e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_pdp_write_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_library_policy.py @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.write_api.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.policy.""" import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from aiac.pdp.library.models import Permission, Scope -from aiac.pdp.library import write_api +from aiac.pdp.library import policy REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7073" @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ class TestAddRoleComposites: def test_posts_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) perms = [Permission(id="r1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=False)] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: - result = write_api.add_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + result = policy.add_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) assert result is None m.assert_called_once() url, kwargs = m.call_args[0][0], m.call_args[1] @@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ class TestRemoveRoleComposites: def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) perms = [Permission(id="r1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=False)] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: - result = write_api.remove_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: + result = policy.remove_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) assert result is None m.assert_called_once() url = m.call_args[0][0] @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): class TestClearAllComposites: def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: - result = write_api.clear_all_composites(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: + result = policy.clear_all_composites(REALM) assert result is None url = m.call_args[0][0] assert url.endswith("/composites") @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ class TestCreateServicePermission: def test_returns_permission_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data", "composite": False, "clientRole": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): - result = write_api.create_service_permission("svc-uuid", "view-data", "desc", REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): + result = policy.create_service_permission("svc-uuid", "view-data", "desc", REALM) assert isinstance(result, Permission) assert result.name == "view-data" @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ class TestCreateServiceScope: def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): - result = write_api.create_service_scope("svc-uuid", "read:data", "desc", REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): + result = policy.create_service_scope("svc-uuid", "read:data", "desc", REALM) assert isinstance(result, Scope) assert result.name == "read:data" @@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): @pytest.mark.parametrize("fn_name,args,method", _WRITE_FUNCTIONS) def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): + with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - getattr(write_api, fn_name)(*args) + getattr(policy, fn_name)(*args) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -134,6 +134,6 @@ def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.write_api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: - write_api.clear_all_composites(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: + policy.clear_all_composites(REALM) assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7073") diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py b/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py index 81b7235d5..8b779393e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/policy/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" import os from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError -from aiac.pdp.policy.keycloak.main import app, get_admin +from aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak.main import app, get_admin REALM = "kagenti" From adbc2997d8cb552d13447acb8c8864fe427c9a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 02:25:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 030/273] refact(aiac): replace keycloak namespace with pdp library and reorganise tests Remove aiac.keycloak service and library (source + tests). Add aiac.pdp.library and aiac.pdp.service under the pdp namespace with PDP-aligned entity names (Subject, Role, Service, Scope, Permission, Assignments). Reorganise tests under test/pdp/ mirroring the source tree; move show_keycloak_data debug script to test/pdp/library/. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py | 74 ------ .../aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py | 111 -------- aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py | 61 ----- aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile | 12 - aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md | 160 ------------ aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py | 103 -------- .../aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt | 4 - aiac/{src/aiac/keycloak => test}/__init__.py | 0 .../keycloak/library => test/pdp}/__init__.py | 0 .../service => test/pdp/library}/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 93 +++++++ .../library/test_configuration.py} | 0 .../library/test_models.py} | 0 .../library/test_policy.py} | 0 aiac/test/pdp/service/__init__.py | 0 .../pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py} | 0 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py | 0 .../pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 .../service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py} | 0 aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py | 93 ------- aiac/test/test_library_api.py | 183 -------------- aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py | 113 --------- aiac/test/test_models.py | 198 --------------- aiac/test/test_service.py | 238 ------------------ 26 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 1350 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt rename aiac/{src/aiac/keycloak => test}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/{src/aiac/keycloak/library => test/pdp}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/{src/aiac/keycloak/service => test/pdp/library}/__init__.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_library_configuration.py => pdp/library/test_configuration.py} (100%) rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_models.py => pdp/library/test_models.py} (100%) rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_library_policy.py => pdp/library/test_policy.py} (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_config_service.py => pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py} (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py rename aiac/test/{test_pdp_policy_service.py => pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py} (100%) delete mode 100644 aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/test_library_api.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/test_models.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/test_service.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2fcc451c1..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -import os -from pathlib import Path - -import requests -from dotenv import load_dotenv - -from .models import User, RealmRole, Client, ClientScope, ClientRole, RoleMappings - -load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") - - -def _base_url() -> str: - return os.getenv("AC_SERVICE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7070") - - -def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: - return {"realm": realm} - - -def _check(resp) -> None: - if not resp.ok: - raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") - - -def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/users", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [User.model_validate(u) for u in resp.json()] - - -def get_realm_roles(realm: str) -> list[RealmRole]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/realm-roles", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [RealmRole.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] - - -def get_clients(realm: str) -> list[Client]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/clients", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Client.model_validate(c) for c in resp.json()] - - -def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/client-scopes", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [ClientScope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] - - -def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, realm: str) -> RoleMappings: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return RoleMappings.model_validate(resp.json()) - - -def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/clients/{client_id}/roles", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [ClientRole.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] - - -def assign_client_roles( - user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str -) -> None: - url = f"{_base_url()}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}" - resp = requests.post(url, json=[r.model_dump() for r in roles], params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - - -def revoke_client_roles( - user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str -) -> None: - url = f"{_base_url()}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}" - resp = requests.delete(url, json=[r.model_dump() for r in roles], params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py deleted file mode 100644 index 54bbe5000..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/api_from_config.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -import os -from pathlib import Path - -import yaml -from dotenv import load_dotenv - -from .models import User, RealmRole, Client, ClientScope, ClientRole, RoleMappings - -load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") - -_CONFIG_ENV_VAR = "AC_CONFIG_PATH" - - -def _load() -> dict: - env_val = os.getenv(_CONFIG_ENV_VAR) - if not env_val: - raise RuntimeError(f"{_CONFIG_ENV_VAR} is not set") - with open(Path(env_val)) as f: - return yaml.safe_load(f) - - -def _parse_client_roles(roles_raw: list) -> list[ClientRole]: - result = [] - for r in roles_raw: - if isinstance(r, dict): - name = r["name"] - description = r.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(r) - description = None - result.append(ClientRole(id=name, name=name, description=description, composite=False, clientRole=True)) - return result - - -def get_users(realm: str) -> list[User]: - raise NotImplementedError("get_users is not supported from config") - - -def get_realm_roles(realm: str) -> list[RealmRole]: - roles_raw = _load().get("realm_roles", []) - result = [] - for r in roles_raw: - if isinstance(r, dict): - name = r["name"] - description = r.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(r) - description = None - result.append(RealmRole(id=name, name=name, description=description, composite=False, clientRole=False)) - return result - - -def get_clients(realm: str) -> list[Client]: - clients_raw = _load().get("clients", []) - result = [] - for c in clients_raw: - if isinstance(c, dict): - client_id = c.get("client_id", "") - name = c.get("name") or None - else: - client_id = str(c) - name = None - result.append(Client(id=client_id, clientId=client_id, name=name, enabled=True, protocol=None, publicClient=False)) - return result - - -def get_client_scopes(realm: str) -> list[ClientScope]: - raise NotImplementedError("get_client_scopes is not supported from config") - - -def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, realm: str) -> RoleMappings: - raise NotImplementedError("get_user_role_mappings is not supported from config") - - -def get_client_roles(client_id: str, realm: str) -> list[ClientRole]: - clients_raw = _load().get("clients", []) - for c in clients_raw: - if isinstance(c, dict) and c.get("client_id") == client_id: - return _parse_client_roles(c.get("roles", [])) - return [] - - -def assign_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: - raise NotImplementedError("assign_client_roles is not supported from config") - - -def revoke_client_roles(user_id: str, client_id: str, roles: list[ClientRole], realm: str) -> None: - raise NotImplementedError("revoke_client_roles is not supported from config") - - -# Convenience helpers (not in api.py) — return dicts for LLM-facing code - -def get_client_roles_map(realm: str) -> dict[str, list[dict]]: - clients_raw = _load().get("clients", []) - result = {} - for c in clients_raw: - if not isinstance(c, dict) or "client_id" not in c: - continue - client_id = c["client_id"] - roles = [] - for r in c.get("roles", []): - if isinstance(r, dict): - roles.append({"name": r["name"], "description": r.get("description", "")}) - else: - roles.append({"name": str(r), "description": ""}) - result[client_id] = roles - return result - - -def get_client_names(realm: str) -> list[str]: - return list(get_client_roles_map(realm).keys()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py deleted file mode 100644 index 0261feb76..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/models.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -from typing import Any - -from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict - - -class User(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - id: str - username: str - email: str | None = None - firstName: str | None = None - lastName: str | None = None - enabled: bool - - -class RealmRole(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - id: str - name: str - description: str | None = None - composite: bool - clientRole: bool - - -class RoleMappings(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - realmMappings: list[RealmRole] = [] - clientMappings: dict[str, Any] = {} - - -class Client(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - id: str - clientId: str - name: str | None = None - enabled: bool - protocol: str | None = None - publicClient: bool - - -class ClientScope(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - id: str - name: str - description: str | None = None - protocol: str | None = None - - -class ClientRole(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - id: str - name: str - description: str | None = None - composite: bool - clientRole: bool \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 24c89d827..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -FROM python:3.14-slim - -WORKDIR /app - -COPY requirements.txt . -RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt - -COPY main.py . - -EXPOSE 7070 - -CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7070"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md deleted file mode 100644 index c4bc22e02..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/INSTALL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,160 +0,0 @@ -# Keycloak Service — Installation Guide - -FastAPI proxy over the Keycloak Admin REST API. Stateless, no caching. -Binds to `0.0.0.0:7070`. - -## Prerequisites - -- Python 3.13+ (local) or Docker/Podman (container) -- A running Keycloak instance with admin credentials -- `kubectl` + a Kind cluster (Kubernetes deploy only) - ---- - -## 1. Local (uvicorn) - -### Configure - -Copy or edit `.env` in the service directory: - -``` -src/aiac/keycloak/service/.env -``` - -```dotenv -KEYCLOAK_URL=http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/ -KEYCLOAK_REALM=kagenti -KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin -KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin -``` - -OS environment variables override `.env` values when both are present. - -### Install dependencies - -```bash -pip install -r src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt -``` - -### Run - -```bash -uvicorn aiac.keycloak.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 -``` - -Run from the `aiac/` directory (the `src/` directory must be on `PYTHONPATH`): - -```bash -cd aiac -PYTHONPATH=src uvicorn aiac.keycloak.service.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 7070 -``` - -### Smoke test - -```bash -curl http://localhost:7070/users -``` - ---- - -## 2. Docker / Podman - -### Build - -```bash -docker build -f src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile \ - -t aiac-keycloak-service:local src/ -``` - -### Run - -```bash -docker run --rm -p 7070:7070 \ - -e KEYCLOAK_URL=http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/ \ - -e KEYCLOAK_REALM=kagenti \ - -e KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ - -e KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin \ - aiac-keycloak-service:local -``` - ---- - -## 3. Kubernetes (Kind) - -### Build and load into Kind - -```bash -docker build -f src/aiac/keycloak/service/Dockerfile \ - -t aiac-keycloak-service:local src/ - -kind load docker-image aiac-keycloak-service:local --name kagenti -``` - -> **Podman note:** `kind load` tags images with a `localhost/` prefix. -> The manifest at `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` already uses -> `localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local` to match this. - -### Deploy - -```bash -kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml -``` - -This creates, in namespace `aiac-system`: - -| Resource | Name | Purpose | -|----------|------|---------| -| Namespace | `aiac-system` | Isolation namespace | -| ConfigMap | `aiac-keycloak-config` | `KEYCLOAK_URL`, `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | -| Secret | `keycloak-admin-secret` | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME`, `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | -| Pod | `aiac-keycloak-service` | The service, port 7070 | - -The ConfigMap uses the in-cluster Keycloak DNS name: - -``` -KEYCLOAK_URL=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080 -``` - -### Verify - -```bash -kubectl get pod aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system -``` - -Expected: `STATUS = Running`, `READY = 1/1`. - -### Smoke test (port-forward) - -```bash -kubectl port-forward -n aiac-system pod/aiac-keycloak-service 7070:7070 -curl http://localhost:7070/users -``` - ---- - -## Endpoints - -| Method | Path | Returns | -|--------|------|---------| -| GET | `/users` | JSON array of users | -| GET | `/realm-roles` | JSON array of realm roles | -| GET | `/clients` | JSON array of clients | -| GET | `/client-scopes` | JSON array of client scopes | -| GET | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | JSON object with `realmMappings` and `clientMappings` | -| GET | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | JSON array of client roles | -| POST | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | 204 No Content | -| DELETE | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | 204 No Content | - -All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on Keycloak errors. - ---- - -## Running tests - -From `aiac/`: - -```bash -.venv/bin/pytest test/test_service.py -v -``` - -No live Keycloak required — `KeycloakAdmin` is mocked. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py deleted file mode 100644 index c4bf2e61d..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/main.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,103 +0,0 @@ -import os -from contextlib import asynccontextmanager -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any - -from dotenv import load_dotenv -from fastapi import Body, Depends, FastAPI, Query -from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin -from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError -from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response - -def get_admin(realm: str = Query(...)) -> KeycloakAdmin: - return KeycloakAdmin( - server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], - realm_name=realm, - username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], - password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - ) - - -@asynccontextmanager -async def _lifespan(application: FastAPI): - load_dotenv(Path(__file__).parent / ".env") - yield - - -app = FastAPI(lifespan=_lifespan) - - -@app.get("/users") -def list_users(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_users() - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.get("/realm-roles") -def list_realm_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_realm_roles() - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.get("/clients") -def list_clients(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_clients() - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.get("/client-scopes") -def list_client_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_client_scopes() - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.get("/users/{user_id}/role-mappings") -def get_user_role_mappings(user_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_all_roles_of_user(user_id) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.get("/clients/{client_id}/roles") -def list_client_roles(client_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_client_roles(client_id) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.post("/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}", status_code=204) -def assign_client_roles( - user_id: str, - client_id: str, - roles: list[Any] = Body(...), - admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), -): - try: - admin.assign_client_role(user_id, client_id, roles) - return Response(status_code=204) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -@app.delete("/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}", status_code=204) -def delete_client_roles( - user_id: str, - client_id: str, - roles: list[Any] = Body(...), - admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), -): - try: - admin.delete_client_roles_of_user(user_id, client_id, roles) - return Response(status_code=204) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0464cb432..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/requirements.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -fastapi -uvicorn[standard] -python-keycloak -python-dotenv diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/test/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/__init__.py rename to aiac/test/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/library/__init__.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/__init__.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/library/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4cf2d47ed --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +"""Print live Keycloak data via aiac-pdp-config-service, exercising all api methods. + +Usage: + python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py + +Requires the service to be reachable at AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL (default: http://localhost:7070). +""" + +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent / "src")) + +from aiac.pdp.library import configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.models import ( + Assignments, + Permission, + Role, + Scope, + Service, + Subject, +) + +REALM = "kagenti" + + +def main() -> None: + # --- Subjects (users) --- + print("=== Subjects ===") + subjects: list[Subject] = configuration.get_subjects(REALM) + for s in subjects: + full_name = " ".join(filter(None, [s.firstName, s.lastName])) or "—" + status = "enabled" if s.enabled else "disabled" + print(f" {s.username:<20} {full_name:<25} email={s.email or '—'} [{status}]") + print(f"Total: {len(subjects)} subject(s)\n") + + # --- Roles --- + print("=== Roles ===") + roles: list[Role] = configuration.get_roles(REALM) + for r in roles: + composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" + print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") + print(f"Total: {len(roles)} role(s)\n") + + # --- Services (clients) --- + print("=== Services ===") + services: list[Service] = configuration.get_services(REALM) + for svc in services: + visibility = "public" if svc.publicClient else "confidential" + status = "enabled" if svc.enabled else "disabled" + print(f" {svc.clientId:<40} protocol={svc.protocol or '—'} [{visibility}] [{status}]") + print(f"Total: {len(services)} service(s)\n") + + # --- Scopes --- + print("=== Scopes ===") + scopes: list[Scope] = configuration.get_scopes(REALM) + for sc in scopes: + print(f" {sc.name:<30} protocol={sc.protocol or '—'} desc={sc.description or '—'}") + print(f"Total: {len(scopes)} scope(s)\n") + + # --- Permissions per service --- + print("=== Service Permissions ===") + for svc in services: + perms: list[Permission] = configuration.get_service_permissions(svc.id, REALM) + if not perms: + continue + print(f" {svc.clientId}:") + for p in perms: + composite = "composite" if p.composite else "simple" + print(f" {p.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={p.description or '—'}") + print() + + # --- Assignments per subject --- + print("=== Subject Assignments ===") + for s in subjects: + assignments: Assignments = configuration.get_subject_assignments(s.id, REALM) + realm_role_names: list[str] = [r.name for r in assignments.realmMappings] + service_map: dict[str, list[str]] = { + svc_name: [r["name"] for r in mapping.get("mappings", [])] + for svc_name, mapping in assignments.serviceMappings.items() + if mapping.get("mappings") + } + print(f" {s.username}:") + if realm_role_names: + print(f" realm : {', '.join(realm_role_names)}") + for svc_name, perm_names in service_map.items(): + print(f" {svc_name:<20}: {', '.join(perm_names)}") + if not realm_role_names and not service_map: + print(" (no assignments)") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_library_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_library_configuration.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_models.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_library_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_library_policy.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_config_service.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/test_pdp_policy_service.py rename to aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py diff --git a/aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2af72d79b..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/show_keycloak_data.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -"""Print live Keycloak data via aiac-keycloak-service, exercising all api methods. - -Usage: - python test/show_keycloak_data.py - -Requires the service to be reachable at AC_SERVICE_URL (default: http://localhost:7070). -""" - -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent / "src")) - -from aiac.keycloak.library import api -from aiac.keycloak.library.models import ( - Client, - ClientRole, - ClientScope, - RealmRole, - RoleMappings, - User, -) - -REALM = "kagenti" - - -def main() -> None: - # --- Users --- - print("=== Users ===") - users: list[User] = api.get_users(realm=REALM) - for u in users: - full_name = " ".join(filter(None, [u.firstName, u.lastName])) or "—" - status = "enabled" if u.enabled else "disabled" - print(f" {u.username:<20} {full_name:<25} email={u.email or '—'} [{status}]") - print(f"Total: {len(users)} user(s)\n") - - # --- Realm roles --- - print("=== Realm Roles ===") - realm_roles: list[RealmRole] = api.get_realm_roles(realm=REALM) - for r in realm_roles: - composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" - print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") - print(f"Total: {len(realm_roles)} realm role(s)\n") - - # --- Clients --- - print("=== Clients ===") - clients: list[Client] = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) - for c in clients: - visibility = "public" if c.publicClient else "confidential" - status = "enabled" if c.enabled else "disabled" - print(f" {c.clientId:<40} protocol={c.protocol or '—'} [{visibility}] [{status}]") - print(f"Total: {len(clients)} client(s)\n") - - # --- Client scopes --- - print("=== Client Scopes ===") - scopes: list[ClientScope] = api.get_client_scopes(realm=REALM) - for s in scopes: - print(f" {s.name:<30} protocol={s.protocol or '—'} desc={s.description or '—'}") - print(f"Total: {len(scopes)} scope(s)\n") - - # --- Client roles per client --- - print("=== Client Roles ===") - for c in clients: - roles: list[ClientRole] = api.get_client_roles(c.id, realm=REALM) - if not roles: - continue - print(f" {c.clientId}:") - for r in roles: - composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" - print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") - print() - - # --- Role mappings per user --- - print("=== User Role Mappings ===") - for u in users: - mappings: RoleMappings = api.get_user_role_mappings(u.id, realm=REALM) - realm_roles_list: list[str] = [r.name for r in mappings.realmMappings] - client_map: dict[str, list[str]] = { - client_name: [r["name"] for r in mapping.get("mappings", [])] - for client_name, mapping in mappings.clientMappings.items() - if mapping.get("mappings") - } - print(f" {u.username}:") - if realm_roles_list: - print(f" realm : {', '.join(realm_roles_list)}") - for client_name, role_names in client_map.items(): - print(f" {client_name:<20}: {', '.join(role_names)}") - if not realm_roles_list and not client_map: - print(" (no roles)") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main() diff --git a/aiac/test/test_library_api.py b/aiac/test/test_library_api.py deleted file mode 100644 index 8d22d46fd..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/test_library_api.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock - -import pytest - -from aiac.keycloak.library.models import ( - User, - RealmRole, - Client, - ClientScope, - ClientRole, - RoleMappings, -) - -BASE = "http://test-service" -REALM = "kagenti" - - -@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) -def service_url(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AC_SERVICE_URL", BASE) - - -def _ok(payload): - m = MagicMock() - m.ok = True - m.json.return_value = payload - return m - - -def _err(status=400): - m = MagicMock() - m.ok = False - m.status_code = status - m.text = "bad request" - return m - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 1: get_users -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_get_users_returns_typed_list(): - payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "email": "a@x.com", "enabled": True}] - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.get_users(realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/users", params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result == [User(id="u1", username="alice", email="a@x.com", enabled=True)] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 2: get_realm_roles -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_get_realm_roles_returns_typed_list(): - payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.get_realm_roles(realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/realm-roles", params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result == [RealmRole(id="r1", name="admin", composite=False, clientRole=False)] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 3: get_clients -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_get_clients_returns_typed_list(): - payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-client", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False}] - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/clients", params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result == [Client(id="c1", clientId="my-client", enabled=True, publicClient=False)] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 4: get_client_scopes -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_get_client_scopes_returns_typed_list(): - payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email", "protocol": "openid-connect"}] - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.get_client_scopes(realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/client-scopes", params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result == [ClientScope(id="s1", name="email", protocol="openid-connect")] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 5: get_user_role_mappings -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_get_user_role_mappings_returns_role_mappings(): - payload = { - "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}], - "clientMappings": {}, - } - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.get_user_role_mappings("user-123", realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with( - f"{BASE}/users/user-123/role-mappings", params={"realm": REALM} - ) - assert isinstance(result, RoleMappings) - assert len(result.realmMappings) == 1 - assert result.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 6: get_client_roles -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_get_client_roles_returns_typed_list(): - payload = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.get_client_roles("client-456", realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/clients/client-456/roles", params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result == [ClientRole(id="cr1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=True)] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 7: assign_client_roles -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_assign_client_roles_posts_and_returns_none(): - roles = [ClientRole(id="cr1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=True)] - with patch("requests.post", return_value=_ok(None)) as mock_post: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.assign_client_roles("user-1", "client-1", roles, realm=REALM) - expected_url = f"{BASE}/users/user-1/role-mappings/clients/client-1" - expected_body = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "viewer", "description": None, "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] - mock_post.assert_called_once_with(expected_url, json=expected_body, params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result is None - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 8: revoke_client_roles -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_revoke_client_roles_deletes_and_returns_none(): - roles = [ClientRole(id="cr1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=True)] - with patch("requests.delete", return_value=_ok(None)) as mock_delete: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - result = api.revoke_client_roles("user-1", "client-1", roles, realm=REALM) - expected_url = f"{BASE}/users/user-1/role-mappings/clients/client-1" - expected_body = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "viewer", "description": None, "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] - mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(expected_url, json=expected_body, params={"realm": REALM}) - assert result is None - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 9: non-2xx raises RuntimeError -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("fn,patch_target,kwargs", [ - ("get_users", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), - ("get_realm_roles", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), - ("get_clients", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), - ("get_client_scopes", "requests.get", {"realm": REALM}), - ("get_user_role_mappings","requests.get", {"user_id": "u1", "realm": REALM}), - ("get_client_roles", "requests.get", {"client_id": "c1", "realm": REALM}), - ("assign_client_roles", "requests.post", {"user_id": "u1", "client_id": "c1", "roles": [], "realm": REALM}), - ("revoke_client_roles", "requests.delete", {"user_id": "u1", "client_id": "c1", "roles": [], "realm": REALM}), -]) -def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn, patch_target, kwargs): - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - with patch(patch_target, return_value=_err(503)): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - getattr(api, fn)(**kwargs) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Cycle 10: AC_SERVICE_URL fallback to http://127.0.0.1:7070 -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.delenv("AC_SERVICE_URL", raising=False) - with patch("requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as mock_get: - from aiac.keycloak.library import api - api.get_users(realm=REALM) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with("http://127.0.0.1:7070/users", params={"realm": REALM}) diff --git a/aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py b/aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py deleted file mode 100644 index 85affdb5d..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/test_library_api_integration.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,113 +0,0 @@ -"""Integration tests against a live aiac-keycloak-service (port-forwarded to localhost:7070). - -Run with: - AC_SERVICE_URL=http://localhost:7070 pytest test/test_library_api_integration.py -v -or simply ensure .env contains AC_SERVICE_URL=http://localhost:7070 and run pytest. - -Skip automatically when the service is unreachable. -""" - -import pytest -import requests as _requests - -from aiac.keycloak.library import api -from aiac.keycloak.library.models import ( - Client, - ClientRole, - ClientScope, - RealmRole, - RoleMappings, - User, -) - -REALM = "kagenti" - - -def _service_reachable() -> bool: - try: - _requests.get("http://localhost:7070/users", timeout=2) - return True - except Exception: - return False - - -live = pytest.mark.skipif(not _service_reachable(), reason="aiac-keycloak-service not reachable on localhost:7070") - - -@live -def test_get_users_returns_users(): - users = api.get_users(realm=REALM) - assert len(users) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(u, User) for u in users) - usernames = {u.username for u in users} - assert "admin" in usernames - - -@live -def test_get_realm_roles_returns_roles(): - roles = api.get_realm_roles(realm=REALM) - assert len(roles) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(r, RealmRole) for r in roles) - - -@live -def test_get_clients_returns_clients(): - clients = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) - assert len(clients) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(c, Client) for c in clients) - client_ids = {c.clientId for c in clients} - assert "account" in client_ids - - -@live -def test_get_client_scopes_returns_scopes(): - scopes = api.get_client_scopes(realm=REALM) - assert len(scopes) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(s, ClientScope) for s in scopes) - - -@live -def test_get_user_role_mappings_returns_role_mappings(): - users = api.get_users(realm=REALM) - user_id = users[0].id - mappings = api.get_user_role_mappings(user_id, realm=REALM) - assert isinstance(mappings, RoleMappings) - - -@live -def test_get_client_roles_returns_roles(): - clients = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) - client = next(c for c in clients if c.clientId == "account") - roles = api.get_client_roles(client.id, realm=REALM) - assert len(roles) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(r, ClientRole) for r in roles) - - -@live -def test_assign_and_revoke_client_roles_roundtrip(): - users = api.get_users(realm=REALM) - user = next(u for u in users if u.username == "alice") - - clients = api.get_clients(realm=REALM) - client = next(c for c in clients if c.clientId == "account") - roles = api.get_client_roles(client.id, realm=REALM) - - role = roles[0] - - api.assign_client_roles(user.id, client.id, [role], realm=REALM) - mappings_after = api.get_user_role_mappings(user.id, realm=REALM) - client_role_names = { - r["name"] - for mapping in mappings_after.clientMappings.values() - for r in mapping.get("mappings", []) - } - assert role.name in client_role_names - - api.revoke_client_roles(user.id, client.id, [role], realm=REALM) - mappings_revoked = api.get_user_role_mappings(user.id, realm=REALM) - client_role_names_after = { - r["name"] - for mapping in mappings_revoked.clientMappings.values() - for r in mapping.get("mappings", []) - } - assert role.name not in client_role_names_after diff --git a/aiac/test/test_models.py b/aiac/test/test_models.py deleted file mode 100644 index d88227a86..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/test_models.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -import pytest -from aiac.keycloak.library.models import User, RealmRole, RoleMappings, ClientRole, Client, ClientScope - - -class TestRoleMappings: - def test_full_payload(self): - rm = RoleMappings.model_validate( - { - "realmMappings": [ - {"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False} - ], - "clientMappings": { - "account": {"id": "a1", "client": "account", "mappings": []} - }, - } - ) - assert len(rm.realmMappings) == 1 - assert rm.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" - assert "account" in rm.clientMappings - - def test_defaults_to_empty(self): - rm = RoleMappings.model_validate({}) - assert rm.realmMappings == [] - assert rm.clientMappings == {} - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - rm = RoleMappings.model_validate({"realmMappings": [], "unknownField": "dropped"}) - assert not hasattr(rm, "unknownField") - - -class TestUser: - def test_full_payload(self): - user = User.model_validate( - { - "id": "u1", - "username": "alice", - "email": "alice@example.com", - "firstName": "Alice", - "lastName": "Smith", - "enabled": True, - } - ) - assert user.id == "u1" - assert user.username == "alice" - assert user.email == "alice@example.com" - assert user.firstName == "Alice" - assert user.lastName == "Smith" - assert user.enabled is True - - def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - user = User.model_validate({"id": "u2", "username": "bob", "enabled": False}) - assert user.email is None - assert user.firstName is None - assert user.lastName is None - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - user = User.model_validate( - {"id": "u3", "username": "carol", "enabled": True, "unknownField": "garbage"} - ) - assert not hasattr(user, "unknownField") - - -class TestRealmRole: - def test_full_payload(self): - role = RealmRole.model_validate( - { - "id": "r1", - "name": "admin", - "description": "Administrator role", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": False, - } - ) - assert role.id == "r1" - assert role.name == "admin" - assert role.description == "Administrator role" - assert role.composite is False - assert role.clientRole is False - - def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - role = RealmRole.model_validate( - {"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} - ) - assert role.description is None - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - role = RealmRole.model_validate( - { - "id": "r3", - "name": "editor", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": False, - "containerId": "master", - } - ) - assert not hasattr(role, "containerId") - - -class TestClient: - def test_full_payload(self): - client = Client.model_validate( - { - "id": "c1", - "clientId": "my-app", - "name": "My Application", - "enabled": True, - "protocol": "openid-connect", - "publicClient": False, - } - ) - assert client.id == "c1" - assert client.clientId == "my-app" - assert client.name == "My Application" - assert client.enabled is True - assert client.protocol == "openid-connect" - assert client.publicClient is False - - def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - client = Client.model_validate( - {"id": "c2", "clientId": "bare-client", "enabled": False, "publicClient": True} - ) - assert client.name is None - assert client.protocol is None - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - client = Client.model_validate( - { - "id": "c3", - "clientId": "extra-client", - "enabled": True, - "publicClient": False, - "surplusField": "ignored", - } - ) - assert not hasattr(client, "surplusField") - - -class TestClientScope: - def test_full_payload(self): - scope = ClientScope.model_validate( - { - "id": "s1", - "name": "email", - "description": "Email scope", - "protocol": "openid-connect", - } - ) - assert scope.id == "s1" - assert scope.name == "email" - assert scope.description == "Email scope" - assert scope.protocol == "openid-connect" - - def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - scope = ClientScope.model_validate({"id": "s2", "name": "profile"}) - assert scope.description is None - assert scope.protocol is None - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - scope = ClientScope.model_validate( - {"id": "s3", "name": "roles", "unknownAttr": "dropped"} - ) - assert not hasattr(scope, "unknownAttr") - - -class TestClientRole: - def test_full_payload(self): - role = ClientRole.model_validate( - { - "id": "cr1", - "name": "view-clients", - "description": "View clients role", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": True, - } - ) - assert role.id == "cr1" - assert role.name == "view-clients" - assert role.description == "View clients role" - assert role.composite is False - assert role.clientRole is True - - def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - role = ClientRole.model_validate( - {"id": "cr2", "name": "manage-clients", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} - ) - assert role.description is None - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - role = ClientRole.model_validate( - { - "id": "cr3", - "name": "query-clients", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": True, - "containerId": "master", - } - ) - assert not hasattr(role, "containerId") \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/test/test_service.py b/aiac/test/test_service.py deleted file mode 100644 index 39ae60353..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/test_service.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac/service/main.py FastAPI application.""" - -import os -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch - -import pytest -from fastapi.testclient import TestClient -from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError - -from aiac.keycloak.service.main import app, get_admin - -REALM = "kagenti" - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Helpers -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def _make_client(admin_mock: MagicMock) -> TestClient: - app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm: admin_mock - return TestClient(app) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# GET /users -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestGetUsers: - def test_returns_json_array(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_users.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.get(f"/users?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] - - -class TestGetRealmRoles: - def test_returns_json_array(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.get(f"/realm-roles?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] - - -class TestGetClients: - def test_returns_json_array(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_clients.return_value = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app"}] - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.get(f"/clients?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app"}] - - -class TestGetClientScopes: - def test_returns_json_array(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.get(f"/client-scopes?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] - - -class TestGetUserRoleMappings: - def test_returns_json_object_with_realm_and_client_mappings(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_all_roles_of_user.return_value = { - "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}], - "clientMappings": {"account": {"id": "a1", "mappings": []}}, - } - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.get(f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - body = resp.json() - assert "realmMappings" in body - assert "clientMappings" in body - - -class TestGetClientRoles: - def test_returns_json_array(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.get(f"/clients/client-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] - - -class TestAssignClientRoleMappings: - def test_post_returns_204(self): - admin = MagicMock() - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.post( - f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", - json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], - ) - - assert resp.status_code == 204 - - def test_delete_returns_204(self): - admin = MagicMock() - client = _make_client(admin) - - resp = client.request( - "DELETE", - f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", - json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], - ) - - assert resp.status_code == 204 - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Realm query parameter: KeycloakAdmin instantiated with the supplied realm -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestRealmQueryParam: - def test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin(self): - """Every request instantiates a KeycloakAdmin bound to the supplied realm.""" - app.dependency_overrides.clear() - - admin_mock = MagicMock() - admin_mock.get_users.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] - - env = { - "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", - "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", - "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", - } - with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ - patch("aiac.keycloak.service.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.get(f"/users?realm={REALM}") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - mock_cls.assert_called_once_with( - server_url="http://keycloak:8080/", - realm_name=REALM, - username="admin", - password="admin", - ) - - def teardown_method(self): - app.dependency_overrides.clear() - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# KeycloakError → 502 on all endpoints -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def _keycloak_error(): - return KeycloakError(error_message="connection refused", response_code=503) - - -class TestKeycloakErrorProduces502: - def test_get_users(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_users.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/users?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_get_realm_roles(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/realm-roles?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_get_clients(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_clients.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/clients?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_get_client_scopes(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_scopes.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/client-scopes?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_get_user_role_mappings(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_all_roles_of_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_get_client_roles(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/clients/client-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_post_client_role_mappings(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.assign_client_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).post( - f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", - json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], - ) - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def test_delete_client_role_mappings(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.delete_client_roles_of_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - resp = _make_client(admin).request( - "DELETE", - f"/users/user-uuid/role-mappings/clients/client-uuid?realm={REALM}", - json=[{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}], - ) - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() From 7edd261cc7c809933a682211e2882fffb67466da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 02:53:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 031/273] docs(aiac): add PDP config service install instructions and update manifest Add KEYCLOAK_REALM to the aiac-keycloak-config ConfigMap (required by the new service implementation). Add installation instructions covering build, Kind load, secret creation, deploy, verify, and redeploy steps. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml | 1 + 2 files changed, 148 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c5bd39291 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +# PDP Configuration Service — Installation + +The PDP Configuration Service is a read-only FastAPI proxy over the Keycloak Admin REST API. +It exposes PDP-domain entity paths (`/subjects`, `/roles`, `/services`, `/scopes`, …) and is +consumed by the AIAC agent and library clients. + +**Port:** 7070 +**Source:** `src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` +**Manifest:** `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` + +## Prerequisites + +- Kubernetes cluster with the `aiac-system` namespace (created by the manifest). +- Keycloak reachable from within the cluster (default: `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080`). +- `kubectl` configured for the target cluster. +- For local Kind clusters: `kind` CLI and `docker`. + +## 1 — Build the image + +```bash +cd aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak +docker build -t localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local . +``` + +## 2 — Load the image into the cluster + +**Kind (local development)** + +```bash +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local --name +``` + +**Remote registry** + +```bash +docker tag localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local /aiac-keycloak-service: +docker push /aiac-keycloak-service: +``` + +Update the `image:` field in `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` to match. + +## 3 — Create the admin secret + +The manifest references a `keycloak-admin-secret` Secret that must exist before the pod starts. +Create it once per cluster: + +```bash +kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ + -n aiac-system \ + --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME= \ + --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD= +``` + +> The manifest contains placeholder credentials for reference only. For any non-local +> environment, create the secret manually as shown above and remove the `stringData` block +> from the manifest. + +## 4 — Configure the environment + +Edit the `aiac-keycloak-config` ConfigMap in `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` to match your +environment: + +| Key | Default | Description | +|-----|---------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | Keycloak base URL (in-cluster) | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | `master` | Default realm used at startup | + +## 5 — Deploy + +```bash +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +``` + +Expected output: + +``` +namespace/aiac-system created (or unchanged) +configmap/aiac-keycloak-config created (or configured) +secret/keycloak-admin-secret configured +pod/aiac-keycloak-service created +``` + +Wait for the pod to be ready: + +```bash +kubectl wait pod/aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system \ + --for=condition=Ready --timeout=60s +``` + +## 6 — Verify + +Port-forward and hit the health endpoint: + +```bash +kubectl port-forward pod/aiac-keycloak-service 7070:7070 -n aiac-system & +curl http://localhost:7070/health +# {"status":"ok"} +``` + +Run the full data smoke test (requires the Python dev environment): + +```bash +cd aiac +python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +``` + +## Redeploying after a code change + +```bash +# 1. Rebuild +cd aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak +docker build -t localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local . + +# 2. Reload into Kind +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local --name + +# 3. Bounce the pod +kubectl delete pod aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +``` + +## API reference + +All endpoints accept an optional `?realm=` query parameter. When supplied, the request +uses a per-request `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm instead of the default startup realm. + +| Method | Path | Description | +|--------|------|-------------| +| GET | `/subjects` | List users | +| GET | `/roles` | List realm roles | +| GET | `/services` | List clients | +| GET | `/scopes` | List client scopes | +| GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | Realm and service role mappings for a user | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | Client roles for a service | +| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | Composite roles for a realm role | +| GET | `/health` | Readiness probe — `200 ok` or `503 unavailable` | + +All list endpoints return a JSON array. `/subjects/{id}/assignments` returns: + +```json +{ + "realmMappings": [...], + "serviceMappings": { "": { "mappings": [...] } } +} +``` + +Errors from Keycloak are returned as `502` with `{"error": ""}`. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml index 890c19e25..1c1ca1d00 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ metadata: namespace: aiac-system data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "master" --- # Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: From 3070ebf296b262227f4b65600745ff43b14c2822 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 03:17:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 032/273] refact(aiac): rename keycloak pod and container to pdp-configuration Rename manifest file, pod, container, ConfigMap, and image tag from aiac-keycloak-service to aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service to align with the PDP namespace convention. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 32 +++++++++---------- ...ml => pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml} | 12 +++---- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) rename aiac/k8s/{keycloak-service-pod.yaml => pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml} (75%) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md index c5bd39291..68490b44d 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ consumed by the AIAC agent and library clients. **Port:** 7070 **Source:** `src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` -**Manifest:** `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` +**Manifest:** `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` ## Prerequisites @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ consumed by the AIAC agent and library clients. ```bash cd aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak -docker build -t localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local . +docker build -t localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local . ``` ## 2 — Load the image into the cluster @@ -27,17 +27,17 @@ docker build -t localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local . **Kind (local development)** ```bash -kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local --name +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local --name ``` **Remote registry** ```bash -docker tag localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local /aiac-keycloak-service: -docker push /aiac-keycloak-service: +docker tag localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local /aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service: +docker push /aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service: ``` -Update the `image:` field in `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` to match. +Update the `image:` field in `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` to match. ## 3 — Create the admin secret @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ ## 4 — Configure the environment -Edit the `aiac-keycloak-config` ConfigMap in `k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml` to match your +Edit the `aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config` ConfigMap in `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` to match your environment: | Key | Default | Description | @@ -68,22 +68,22 @@ environment: ## 5 — Deploy ```bash -kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml ``` Expected output: ``` namespace/aiac-system created (or unchanged) -configmap/aiac-keycloak-config created (or configured) +configmap/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config created (or configured) secret/keycloak-admin-secret configured -pod/aiac-keycloak-service created +pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod created ``` Wait for the pod to be ready: ```bash -kubectl wait pod/aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system \ +kubectl wait pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod -n aiac-system \ --for=condition=Ready --timeout=60s ``` @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ kubectl wait pod/aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system \ Port-forward and hit the health endpoint: ```bash -kubectl port-forward pod/aiac-keycloak-service 7070:7070 -n aiac-system & +kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7070:7070 -n aiac-system & curl http://localhost:7070/health # {"status":"ok"} ``` @@ -109,14 +109,14 @@ python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py ```bash # 1. Rebuild cd aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak -docker build -t localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local . +docker build -t localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local . # 2. Reload into Kind -kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local --name +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local --name # 3. Bounce the pod -kubectl delete pod aiac-keycloak-service -n aiac-system -kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +kubectl delete pod pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod -n aiac-system +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml ``` ## API reference diff --git a/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml similarity index 75% rename from aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml rename to aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml index 1c1ca1d00..e086ed824 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/keycloak-service-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ metadata: apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: - name: aiac-keycloak-config + name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config namespace: aiac-system data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" @@ -35,19 +35,19 @@ stringData: apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: - name: aiac-keycloak-service + name: pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod namespace: aiac-system labels: - app: aiac-keycloak-service + app: pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod spec: containers: - - name: aiac-keycloak-service - image: localhost/aiac-keycloak-service:local + - name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service + image: localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7070 envFrom: - configMapRef: - name: aiac-keycloak-config + name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config - secretRef: name: keycloak-admin-secret From e6272055e9715ce062f01312c6539fea70e65d4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 15:49:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 033/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs(aiac):=20redesign=20deployment=20t?= =?UTF-8?q?opology=20=E2=80=94=20PDP=20Interface=20Pod,=20RAG=20StatefulSe?= =?UTF-8?q?t,=20port=20remapping?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Collapses PDP Configuration and PDP Policy services into a single PDP Interface Pod (two containers, two ClusterIP Services). Converts the RAG Pod from a Deployment to a StatefulSet with a 1 Gi PVC for ChromaDB persistence at /chroma/chroma. Remaps all service ports and adds AIAC_CHROMADB_URL to the ConfigMap template. Port changes: Agent 7071→7070, PDP Config 7070→7071, PDP Policy 7073→7072, RAG Ingest 7072→7073, ChromaDB 7080→8000 (default). Phase 2 OPA transition is now a container image swap within the PDP Interface Pod; pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml is removed from scope. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 92 +++++++++---------- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 8 +- .../requirements/components/event-broker.md | 12 +-- .../requirements/components/library.md | 4 +- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 5 +- .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 7 +- .../components/rag-ingest-service.md | 4 +- .../components/rag-knowledge-base.md | 4 +- 8 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 28b776643..1606bdff3 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -46,29 +46,21 @@ Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imple ``` ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ PDP Configuration Pod │ +│ PDP Interface Pod │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ PDP Configuration │ :7070 ClusterIP │ -│ │ Service (FastAPI) │ aiac-pdp-config-service │ -│ └────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ - │ -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ PDP Policy Pod (Phase 1: Keycloak | Phase 2: OPA) │ -│ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ PDP Policy Service │ :7073 ClusterIP │ -│ │ (FastAPI) │ aiac-pdp-policy-service │ -│ └────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ - │ -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ PDP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ +│ │ Service (FastAPI) │ │ (FastAPI) │ │ +│ │ :7071 ClusterIP │ │ :7072 ClusterIP │ │ +│ │ aiac-pdp-config-svc │ │ aiac-pdp-policy-svc │ │ +│ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ +│ Event Broker Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ │ NATS JetStream │ :4222 ClusterIP │ │ │ │ aiac-event-broker-service │ │ │ stream: aiac-events │ │ @@ -89,7 +81,7 @@ Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imple │ │ creates: aiac-events JetStream stream │ │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) :7071 ClusterIP │ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) :7070 ClusterIP │ │ │ │ LangGraph-based │ │ │ │ + NATS consumer (asyncio background task) │ │ │ │ consumer: aiac-agent-consumer queue group │ │ @@ -98,15 +90,16 @@ Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imple └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ RAG Pod │ │ +│ RAG Pod (StatefulSet) │ │ ▼ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ ChromaDB :7080 │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ -│ │ collections: │ │ (FastAPI) :7072 │ │ +│ │ ChromaDB :8000 │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ +│ │ collections: │ │ (FastAPI) :7073 │ │ │ │ aiac-policies │ │ │ │ │ │ aiac-domain-knowledge │ │ │ │ +│ │ PVC: 1Gi /chroma/chroma │ │ │ │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ -│ ClusterIP: aiac-rag-service (7080 + 7072) │ +│ ClusterIP: aiac-rag-service (8000 + 7073) │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ @@ -180,8 +173,8 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| PDP Configuration Service | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | +| PDP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions | | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances | | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None | @@ -192,10 +185,12 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): ### Key architectural decisions +- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** PDP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. This eliminates the separate PDP Configuration and PDP Policy pods without changing the library's service URL interface. +- **PDP Interface Pod phase transition is a container image swap.** Phase 2 replaces the PDP Policy container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP name and port `:7072` remain unchanged. No new pod or manifest is required — `pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` does not exist. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. -- **PDP Policy Service ClusterIP name is stable across phases.** `aiac-pdp-policy-service` on `:7073` is used in both Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA). Phase transition = deployment swap only. - **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages realm role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a realm role. -- **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 7080 (ChromaDB) and 7072 (RAG Ingest Service). +- **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. +- **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 8000 (ChromaDB default) and 7073 (RAG Ingest Service). - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. - **Event Broker decouples all automated triggers from the Agent.** The Keycloak SPI listener and RAG Ingest Service publish to NATS subjects; the Agent subscribes as a durable competing consumer. This removes all direct dependencies between trigger sources and the Agent. - **`rebuild` bypasses the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via HTTP (`kubectl port-forward`). It is never published to NATS and has no NATS listener. @@ -212,7 +207,7 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): ## 3. Component: PDP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints using generic PDP entity names. Exposes 7 read endpoints. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints using generic PDP entity names. Exposes 7 read endpoints. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. **Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) @@ -220,10 +215,10 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7070`) that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpo ## 4. Component: PDP Policy Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two implementations share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service`): +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the PDP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two container images share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`): -- **Phase 1 — Keycloak:** manages composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. -- **Phase 2 — OPA:** writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Interface TBD (separate PRD). +- **Phase 1 — Keycloak** (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`): manages composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. +- **Phase 2 — OPA** (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`): writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Interface TBD (separate PRD). Phase transition = container image swap within the PDP Interface Pod; no manifest change required. **Phase 1 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) @@ -251,7 +246,7 @@ NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers ## 7. Component: AIAC Agent -FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7071`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: +FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| @@ -267,7 +262,7 @@ All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running wit ## 8. Component: RAG Knowledge Base -ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. +ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. ChromaDB data is persisted on a 1 Gi PVC mounted at `/chroma/chroma`; the RAG Pod is a StatefulSet. **Full spec:** [components/rag-knowledge-base.md](components/rag-knowledge-base.md) @@ -275,7 +270,7 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:7080`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p ## 9. Component: RAG Ingest Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. **Full spec:** [components/rag-ingest-service.md](components/rag-ingest-service.md) @@ -303,24 +298,22 @@ Six separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-config-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Configuration Service Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-policy-keycloak-deployment.yaml` | PDP Policy Service Pod Deployment (Keycloak implementation) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Interface Pod Deployment (PDP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container) + two ClusterIP Services | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/rag-deployment.yaml` | RAG Pod Deployment (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` | PDP Policy Service Pod Deployment (OPA implementation) — Phase 2, TBD | -The PDP Configuration and PDP Policy (Keycloak) Pods mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. +Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. ### Docker images Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash -# Build PDP Configuration Service +# Build PDP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ -# Build PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) +# Build PDP Policy Service — Keycloak implementation (Phase 1 container in the PDP Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) @@ -332,6 +325,8 @@ docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ The Event Broker uses the official `nats` Docker image with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag). No custom build required. +Phase 2 note: replacing the PDP Policy Service with an OPA implementation requires only building a new `aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest` image and updating the Policy container image reference in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`. No other manifest changes are required. + ### `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap template ```yaml @@ -342,10 +337,11 @@ metadata: data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" - AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7070" - AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7073" + AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" + AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" - AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7072" + AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" + AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" ``` Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before applying. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index ed6cf1b75..dc94f88a0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -567,9 +567,9 @@ flowchart TD | Variable | Default | Source | |---|---|---| | `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7070` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7073` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `CHROMA_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7080` | ConfigMap | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | | `LLM_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti ## Runtime - Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn -- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7070` - State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md index cf238f5a6..bd0b5ff26 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md @@ -96,12 +96,12 @@ The init container uses `python:3.12-slim` with `nats-py` and `httpx`. It is ver ### Init Container Configuration -| Variable | Source | -|---|---| -| `NATS_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| Variable | Source | Resolves to | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | +| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `http://aiac-rag-service:7073` | ### Init Container Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 0dc8ca527..d990e439a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Read from a `.env` file co-located with `configuration.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/l | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| -| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | ### Usage @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ def create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, rea | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7073` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | ### Usage diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index bbd12f973..b64c008ce 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): - Framework: FastAPI - Server: uvicorn -- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7070` +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` -- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 19ed6a363..6aaa76218 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Realm roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a realm role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. -This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a Kubernetes Pod behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP — the same service name used by the Phase 2 OPA implementation. Swapping phases is a deployment replacement only; the service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. +This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. ## Endpoints @@ -41,9 +41,10 @@ All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Ad - Framework: FastAPI - Server: uvicorn -- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7073` +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` -- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Configuration Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md index bd8b2de51..e36b4c940 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The AIAC Agent's durable consumer receives the event and acknowledges it after s | Variable | Default | Source | |----------|---------|--------| -| `CHROMA_URL` | `http://localhost:7080` | ConfigMap | +| `CHROMA_URL` | `http://localhost:8000` | ConfigMap | | `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` | `policy,domain-knowledge` | ConfigMap | | `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Adding a third collection is a configuration-only change: add a new slug to `AIA ## Runtime - Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn -- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7073` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md index 127fe29fd..1b4efe807 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ ChromaDB The legal collection set is an open extension point governed by `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` on the RAG Ingest Service. Adding a new collection is a configuration-only change (new slug + ChromaDB name in the slug→name map) with no code modification required. ## Deployment -Kubernetes Deployment in the RAG Pod, co-located with the RAG Ingest Service container. Exposed via the `aiac-rag-service` ClusterIP Service on port 7080. +Kubernetes **StatefulSet** in the RAG Pod, co-located with the RAG Ingest Service container. Exposed via the `aiac-rag-service` ClusterIP Service on port 8000 (ChromaDB default). Manifest: `rag-statefulset.yaml`. + +ChromaDB runs with `IS_PERSISTENT=TRUE` and `PERSIST_DIRECTORY=/chroma/chroma`. Data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma`. On pod recreation the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC; ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The RAG Pod runs as a single replica. ## Access patterns From e25c459a739d227d0a2d70edc4eb5e9bc04f080f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 16:32:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 034/273] Minor formating improvement Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 1606bdff3..945fdb176 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all imple │ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ │ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.configuration — HTTP client → │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.configuration — HTTP client │ │ PDP Configuration Service │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ │ PDP Policy Service │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` From 027c54283d102e67a8b42d7d760daf17b9114830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 16:39:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 035/273] docs(aiac): fix pod and manifest counts after PDP Interface Pod consolidation PDP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod, reducing the Kubernetes Pod count from six to four and the manifest file count from six to four. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 945fdb176..daaa4ab6a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite ma ## 2. Architecture Overview -Six components across six Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. +Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. ### Deployment topology @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal ### Kubernetes manifests -Six separate manifest files: +Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| From 3cfe48414df906721dfca11832221bef49bc7469 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 17:12:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 036/273] fix(aiac): remap PDP service ports and mark dev-only k8s manifest MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit PDP Configuration Service: 7070 → 7071 PDP Policy Service: 7073 → 7072 Matches the port assignments from the PDP Interface Pod redesign. Updated sources and tests: - src/aiac/pdp/library/{configuration,policy}.py — fallback URL defaults - src/aiac/pdp/service/{configuration,policy}/keycloak/Dockerfile — EXPOSE and --port - test/pdp/library/{test_configuration,test_policy}.py — BASE constant and fallback assertions - test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py — doc-comment default URL - src/aiac/pdp/library/.env, test/pdp/library/.env — renamed AC_SERVICE_URL → AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL and updated port (gitignored; on-disk only) Updated deployment docs: - k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml — containerPort updated; dev-only header comment added - k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md — port references updated; dev-only callout added; title clarified In production both PDP services run as containers in the PDP Interface Pod defined in pdp-interface-deployment.yaml (issue 4.2). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 15 +++++++++++---- aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml | 10 +++++++++- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py | 2 +- .../pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile | 4 ++-- .../aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile | 4 ++-- aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 2 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 4 ++-- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py | 4 ++-- 9 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md index 68490b44d..ec255536d 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md @@ -1,10 +1,17 @@ -# PDP Configuration Service — Installation +# PDP Configuration Service — Standalone Dev Installation + +> **Dev / isolated testing only.** +> This guide deploys the PDP Configuration Service as a standalone Pod. +> It does not reflect the production topology. +> +> In production both PDP services run as containers in a single PDP Interface Pod +> defined in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` (issue 4.2). The PDP Configuration Service is a read-only FastAPI proxy over the Keycloak Admin REST API. It exposes PDP-domain entity paths (`/subjects`, `/roles`, `/services`, `/scopes`, …) and is consumed by the AIAC agent and library clients. -**Port:** 7070 +**Port:** 7071 **Source:** `src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` **Manifest:** `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` @@ -92,8 +99,8 @@ kubectl wait pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod -n aiac-system \ Port-forward and hit the health endpoint: ```bash -kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7070:7070 -n aiac-system & -curl http://localhost:7070/health +kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & +curl http://localhost:7071/health # {"status":"ok"} ``` diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml index e086ed824..318ecd47f 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml @@ -1,3 +1,11 @@ +# DEV / ISOLATED TESTING ONLY +# +# This manifest deploys the PDP Configuration Service as a standalone Pod for +# isolated development and testing. It does NOT reflect the production topology. +# +# In production both PDP services run as containers in a single PDP Interface Pod +# defined in pdp-interface-deployment.yaml (issue 4.2). + --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace @@ -45,7 +53,7 @@ spec: image: localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - - containerPort: 7070 + - containerPort: 7071 envFrom: - configMapRef: name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py index ac3fe86e7..0f53b0c85 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ def _base_url() -> str: - return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7070") + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py index ac4487762..ad644475c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ def _base_url() -> str: - return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7073") + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile index 131786fc4..7a6859b16 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile @@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt COPY main.py . -EXPOSE 7070 +EXPOSE 7071 -CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7070"] +CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7071"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile index d7589f4ce..6430018cc 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile @@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt COPY main.py . -EXPOSE 7073 +EXPOSE 7072 -CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7073"] +CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7072"] diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index 4cf2d47ed..6fed046f0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Usage: python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py -Requires the service to be reachable at AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL (default: http://localhost:7070). +Requires the service to be reachable at AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL (default: http://localhost:7071). """ import sys diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index d4ae94d0f..f4ba154fd 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from aiac.pdp.library import configuration REALM = "kagenti" -BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7070" +BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" _ALL_FUNCTIONS = [ ("get_subjects", (REALM,), "get"), @@ -138,4 +138,4 @@ def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: configuration.get_subjects(REALM) - assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7070") + assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7071") diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py index d60baad6e..d3cf632c6 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from aiac.pdp.library import policy REALM = "kagenti" -BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7073" +BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" _WRITE_FUNCTIONS = [ ("add_role_composites", ("admin", [], REALM), "post"), @@ -136,4 +136,4 @@ def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: policy.clear_all_composites(REALM) - assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7073") + assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7072") From 35be1c03a03f2782f833098dd7ac4e1aee81668d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 20:25:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 037/273] Created initial AIAC Architectural Summary Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 227 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 227 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e8a9d4d20 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +# AIAC Architectural Summary + +## Abstract + +AI-based Access Control (AIAC) is a Kagenti platform extension that automates RBAC/ABAC policy +enforcement for AI agents running on Kubernetes. A LangGraph-based AI agent continuously translates +a natural-language access control policy — stored in a vector knowledge base — into concrete +permission configurations in the active Policy Decision Point (PDP), eliminating manual policy +administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. Phase 1 targets Keycloak +as the PDP backend; Phase 2 (planned) replaces only the policy-write layer with OPA/Rego while +leaving all other components unchanged. + +--- + +## Problem Description + +Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Every call must carry a token scoped to +exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. Without a dedicated +policy management layer, access policy ends up scattered across per-deployment configuration, +creating three compounding problems: + +1. **Policy drift** — new services and roles are onboarded without corresponding permission + updates because there is no automated mechanism to apply them. +2. **Distributed policy intent** — no single authoritative source declares what roles may do; + policy knowledge is fragmented across deployments. +3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping Keycloak composite role mappings consistent with + a growing fleet of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. + +--- + +## Problem Solution + +AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concerns: + +| Layer | Component | Responsibility | +|---|---|---| +| **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Evaluates caller entitlements; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | + +The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle +events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG +knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated +PDP Policy Service. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target +`audience`; the PDP resolves entitlements from the composite role mappings AIAC maintains. +**Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod configuration.** + +--- + +## Major Use-Cases + +### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (Agent/Tool On-boarding / Off-boarding) + +**Trigger:** A Realm Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. + +The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves +relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current composite role +state from the PDP, and asks the LLM to compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected +entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to Keycloak. Supports both +**auto-apply** (fully automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. + +**Two-phase implementation — trigger, RAG retrieval, LLM reasoning, and validation are identical in both phases; only the policy-write target differs:** + +- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) +- **Phase 2 (planned):** diff applied as LLM-generated Rego rules written to OPA; PDP Policy container image swap only — no other component changes + +### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation + +**Trigger:** An operator ingests updated documents into the RAG store. + +After ingestion the RAG Ingest Service publishes a build event. The AIAC Agent retrieves all +relevant context, computes a full composite role diff against current PDP state, and applies the +delta. A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all composite mappings before +recomputing from scratch — used when policy changes are too broad for incremental diff. + +### UC-3 · Entitlements Review + +**Trigger:** Operator request (on-demand or scheduled). + +The agent evaluates all current Keycloak composite mappings — including manually added ones that +AIAC did not create — against the policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and +policy-agnostic entitlements, enabling audit and remediation workflows. + +### UC-4 · Access Request + +**Trigger:** User request via chatbot. + +A user requests an entitlement grant. The agent verifies the request against the policy +(permissive approach) and either auto-grants or routes to a human approver (man-in-the-loop). +Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during UC-3 reviews. + +--- + +## AIAC Component Architecture + +Five components across four Kubernetes pods, plus a Python client library: + +| # | Component | Description | +|---|-----------|-------------| +| 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | +| 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 6 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to both PDP services via `configuration` and `policy` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | + +``` + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗘𝗦𝗧 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ + ┌─────────────┴────────────┐ + │ │ + (𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘪𝘨) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺) +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ +│ PDP Interface Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────────┴────────────┐ ┌──────────┴─────────────┐ │ +│ │ PDP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ (Phase 1: Keycloak) │ │ +│ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼─────────┘ + │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ +│ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ +│ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ +└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +``` + +All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via +`kubectl port-forward` (operator/developer) or NATS publish (Keycloak SPI, RAG Ingest). + +--- + +## Kagenti / Keycloak / OPA Interfaces + +**AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** +The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.pdp.library` Python package +is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the PDP. + +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** +The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST read endpoints under generic PDP entity +names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes +composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener +publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. + +**AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** +The PDP Policy Service container image is swapped from the Keycloak implementation to an OPA +implementation. The Kubernetes ClusterIP service name and port are unchanged — no other component +is modified. The OPA implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules in place of composite role +mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. + +**AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** +The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. +Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a dead-letter subject. +See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. + +--- + +## Technical Addendum — Key Interface Surface + +### Event Broker subjects (NATS) + +| Subject | Trigger source | AIAC handler | +|---|---|---| +| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Keycloak SPI (`CLIENT_CREATED`) | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI (role created/updated) | Realm Roles Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.build` | RAG Ingest Service (post-ingest) | Policy Update Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.dlq` | NATS (max redelivery exceeded) | Dead-letter — no handler | + +The `rebuild` trigger is HTTP-only (`POST /apply/rebuild` on the Agent pod via +`kubectl port-forward`); it is never published to NATS. + +### PDP Configuration Service — read endpoints + +| Endpoint | Returns | +|---|---| +| `GET /subjects` | All users mapped to PDP Subject model | +| `GET /roles` | All realm roles | +| `GET /services` | All clients (services) | +| `GET /scopes` | All client scopes | +| `GET /permissions` | All client roles (service permissions) | +| `GET /assignments` | Current realm role → composite mappings | +| `GET /subjects/{id}` | Single subject with role assignments | + +Optional `?realm=` query parameter overrides the default realm on all endpoints. + +### PDP Policy Service — write endpoints (Phase 1 / Keycloak) + +| Endpoint | Operation | +|---|---| +| `POST /permissions` | Create a service permission (Keycloak client role) | +| `POST /scopes` | Create a client scope and bind to a service | +| `POST /composite-roles` | Add composite role mappings (realm role → permissions) | +| `DELETE /composite-roles` | Remove specific composite role mappings | +| `DELETE /composite-roles/all` | Clear all composite mappings (used by `rebuild`) | + +### Python library modules + +| Module | Purpose | +|---|---| +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | Pydantic models — no dependencies beyond `pydantic` | +| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service; returns typed instances | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | HTTP client → PDP Policy Service; stable interface across Phase 1/2 | + +### RAG Ingest Service — endpoint semantics + +| Pattern | Semantics | +|---|---| +| `POST /ingest/{collection}/{text\|file\|url}` | Full collection replacement | +| `POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text\|file\|url}` | Document-level upsert | +| `DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}` | Explicit document removal | + +Collections: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. From 05c7e7e3447a4aee874eb191939602fe95343b77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 20:37:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 038/273] docs(aiac): add UC-1/UC-2 call flows and restructure Technical Addendum Add step-by-step event and call flow diagrams for UC-1a (service on-boarding), UC-1b (realm role on-boarding), UC-2a (incremental policy update), and UC-2b (full rebuild) under a new Call Flows subsection in the Technical Addendum. Restructure the Technical Addendum: promote Key Interface Surface to a named subsection (###) and demote the five endpoint description subsections to ####, keeping Call Flows at the same ### level. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 103 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index e8a9d4d20..41a3e9b15 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -170,9 +170,11 @@ See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. --- -## Technical Addendum — Key Interface Surface +## Technical Addendum -### Event Broker subjects (NATS) +### Key Interface Surface + +#### Event Broker subjects (NATS) | Subject | Trigger source | AIAC handler | |---|---|---| @@ -184,7 +186,7 @@ See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. The `rebuild` trigger is HTTP-only (`POST /apply/rebuild` on the Agent pod via `kubectl port-forward`); it is never published to NATS. -### PDP Configuration Service — read endpoints +#### PDP Configuration Service — read endpoints | Endpoint | Returns | |---|---| @@ -198,7 +200,7 @@ The `rebuild` trigger is HTTP-only (`POST /apply/rebuild` on the Agent pod via Optional `?realm=` query parameter overrides the default realm on all endpoints. -### PDP Policy Service — write endpoints (Phase 1 / Keycloak) +#### PDP Policy Service — write endpoints (Phase 1 / Keycloak) | Endpoint | Operation | |---|---| @@ -208,7 +210,7 @@ Optional `?realm=` query parameter overrides the default realm on all endpoints. | `DELETE /composite-roles` | Remove specific composite role mappings | | `DELETE /composite-roles/all` | Clear all composite mappings (used by `rebuild`) | -### Python library modules +#### Python library modules | Module | Purpose | |---|---| @@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ Optional `?realm=` query parameter overrides the default realm on all endpoints. | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service; returns typed instances | | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | HTTP client → PDP Policy Service; stable interface across Phase 1/2 | -### RAG Ingest Service — endpoint semantics +#### RAG Ingest Service — endpoint semantics | Pattern | Semantics | |---|---| @@ -225,3 +227,92 @@ Optional `?realm=` query parameter overrides the default realm on all endpoints. | `DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}` | Explicit document removal | Collections: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. + +### Call Flows + +#### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ CLIENT_CREATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.service.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ (durable consumer, at-least-once delivery) + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /scopes, /permissions (target service) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff for affected service + │ 7. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. POST /permissions (if new scope/permission required) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 9. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 10. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 11. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-1b · Realm Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ REALM_ROLE_CREATED / REALM_ROLE_UPDATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.realm-role.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected realm role + │ 6. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 8. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 9. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.build`) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /ingest/policy/{text|file|url} + ▼ + RAG Ingest Service + │ 2. upsert documents ──► ChromaDB + │ 3. publish aiac.apply.build + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 4. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 7. [LLM] compute full composite role diff against current PDP state + │ 8. POST /composite-roles (add delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 9. DELETE /composite-roles (remove delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 10. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/rebuild`, operator-only) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /apply/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 2. DELETE /composite-roles/all (clear entire mapping table) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute complete composite role set from scratch + │ 6. POST /composite-roles (write full mapping set) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + ▼ + (synchronous HTTP response to operator) +``` From 72e033907b2da901d180eb27ae3b13f087097c10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 20:55:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 039/273] docs(aiac): add Short-Term Objectives section to architecture summary Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 41a3e9b15..135caa19a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. --- +## Short-Term Objectives + +| # | Objective | Detail | +|---|-----------|--------| +| 1 | **Kagenti integration (UC-1 implementation)** | Plug AIAC into Kagenti and define its lifecycle | +| 2 | **Improve AIAC decision reasoning** | Take into account richer context: User Role description, Agent card, Tool description, Policy digest | +| 3 | **Rego / OPA integration (initially with Keycloak)** | OPA as the PDP; outcome: Rego access rules | +| 4 | **GitHub demo reimplementation with Rego / OPA** | End-to-end demo using OPA as the Policy Decision Point | + +--- + ## Technical Addendum ### Key Interface Surface From b95176e0f99bbeb503ab776fafff35232f1a30e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 21:10:33 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 040/273] docs(aiac): merge architecture summary into PRD and restructure MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Incorporated Abstract, Problem Description, Problem Solution, Major Use-Cases, Component Architecture overview, and Kagenti/Keycloak/OPA Interfaces sections from ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md into PRD.md. Restructured PRD layout: - Removed redundant Purpose section; promoted its design content to standalone Problem Description, Problem Solution, and Design Principles sections - Added Major Use-Cases (UC-1 through UC-4) as a top-level section - Added Component Summary table and data-flow diagram to Architecture Overview - Added Kagenti / Keycloak / OPA Interfaces section - Grouped component sections 7.1–7.8 under a single AIAC System Components parent section - Renumbered all sections 1–10 in document order Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 175 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index daaa4ab6a..9804884fd 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -1,19 +1,51 @@ # PRD: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) -## 1. Purpose +## Abstract -Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Each call must carry a token narrowed to exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. The challenge is where access policy lives: without a dedicated policy management layer, the natural design is a hybrid where AuthBridge (the per-pod enforcement sidecar) declares `token_scopes` in its route configuration — spreading policy intent across per-deployment ConfigMaps rather than maintaining it in a single authoritative place. +AI-based Access Control (AIAC) is a Kagenti platform extension that automates RBAC/ABAC policy +enforcement for AI agents running on Kubernetes. A LangGraph-based AI agent continuously translates +a natural-language access control policy — stored in a vector knowledge base — into concrete +permission configurations in the active Policy Decision Point (PDP), eliminating manual policy +administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. Phase 1 targets Keycloak +as the PDP backend; Phase 2 (planned) replaces only the policy-write layer with OPA/Rego while +leaving all other components unchanged. -AIAC solves this by automating RBAC/ABAC management using a natural-language policy enforced by an AI agent, built around a generic **Policy Decision Point (PDP)** abstraction with Keycloak as the Phase 1 backend. The system comprises six components: +--- + +## 1. Problem Description + +Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Every call must carry a token scoped to +exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. Without a dedicated +policy management layer, access policy ends up scattered across per-deployment configuration, +creating three compounding problems: + +1. **Policy drift** — new services and roles are onboarded without corresponding permission + updates because there is no automated mechanism to apply them. +2. **Distributed policy intent** — no single authoritative source declares what roles may do; + policy knowledge is fragmented across deployments. +3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping Keycloak composite role mappings consistent with + a growing fleet of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. + +--- + +## 2. Problem Solution -1. **PDP Configuration Service** — a REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. -2. **PDP Policy Service** — a REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 implementation writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a deployment swap only. -3. **RAG Knowledge Base** — a ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. -4. **Event Broker** — a NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. -5. **AIAC Agent** — a LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). It retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against the live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. -6. **Python library** — `aiac.pdp.library` provides typed access to both PDP services via `configuration` and `policy` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. +AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concerns: a **Policy +Management** layer (AIAC Agent) that translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration, a +**Policy Decision** layer (Keycloak / OPA) that evaluates caller entitlements, and a **Policy +Enforcement** layer (AuthBridge) that intercepts traffic and exchanges tokens but carries no policy +knowledge of its own. -### Design principle: PDP/PEP separation +The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle +events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG +knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated +PDP Policy Service. **Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod configuration.** + +--- + +## 3. Design Principles + +### PDP/PEP separation AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model across both phases: @@ -38,10 +70,103 @@ Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite ma --- -## 2. Architecture Overview +## 4. Major Use-Cases + +### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (Agent/Tool On-boarding / Off-boarding) + +**Trigger:** A Realm Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. + +The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves +relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current composite role +state from the PDP, and asks the LLM to compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected +entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to Keycloak. Supports both +**auto-apply** (fully automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. + +**Two-phase implementation — trigger, RAG retrieval, LLM reasoning, and validation are identical in both phases; only the policy-write target differs:** + +- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) +- **Phase 2 (planned):** diff applied as LLM-generated Rego rules written to OPA; PDP Policy container image swap only — no other component changes + +### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation + +**Trigger:** An operator ingests updated documents into the RAG store. + +After ingestion the RAG Ingest Service publishes a build event. The AIAC Agent retrieves all +relevant context, computes a full composite role diff against current PDP state, and applies the +delta. A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all composite mappings before +recomputing from scratch — used when policy changes are too broad for incremental diff. + +### UC-3 · Entitlements Review + +**Trigger:** Operator request (on-demand or scheduled). + +The agent evaluates all current Keycloak composite mappings — including manually added ones that +AIAC did not create — against the policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and +policy-agnostic entitlements, enabling audit and remediation workflows. + +### UC-4 · Access Request + +**Trigger:** User request via chatbot. + +A user requests an entitlement grant. The agent verifies the request against the policy +(permissive approach) and either auto-grants or routes to a human approver (man-in-the-loop). +Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during UC-3 reviews. + +--- + +## 5. Architecture Overview Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. +### Component Summary + +| # | Component | Description | +|---|-----------|-------------| +| 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | +| 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 6 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to both PDP services via `configuration` and `policy` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | + +``` + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗘𝗦𝗧 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ + ┌─────────────┴────────────┐ + │ │ + (𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘪𝘨) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺) +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ +│ PDP Interface Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────────┴────────────┐ ┌──────────┴─────────────┐ │ +│ │ PDP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ (Phase 1: Keycloak) │ │ +│ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼─────────┘ + │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ +│ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ +│ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ +└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +``` + +All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via +`kubectl port-forward` (operator/developer) or NATS publish (Keycloak SPI, RAG Ingest). + ### Deployment topology ``` @@ -205,7 +330,35 @@ Role enforcement (event-driven): --- -## 3. Component: PDP Configuration Service +## 6. Kagenti / Keycloak / OPA Interfaces + +**AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** +The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.pdp.library` Python package +is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the PDP. + +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** +The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST read endpoints under generic PDP entity +names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes +composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener +publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. + +**AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** +The PDP Policy Service container image is swapped from the Keycloak implementation to an OPA +implementation. The Kubernetes ClusterIP service name and port are unchanged — no other component +is modified. The OPA implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules in place of composite role +mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. + +**AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** +The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. +Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a dead-letter subject. +See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and handler mapping. + +--- + +## 7. AIAC System Components + +### 7.1 PDP Configuration Service FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints using generic PDP entity names. Exposes 7 read endpoints. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. @@ -213,7 +366,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the * --- -## 4. Component: PDP Policy Service +### 7.2 PDP Policy Service FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the PDP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two container images share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`): @@ -224,7 +377,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the PDP Configuration Service i --- -## 5. Component: Library +### 7.3 Library Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: @@ -236,7 +389,7 @@ Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: --- -## 6. Component: Event Broker +### 7.4 Event Broker NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides at-least-once delivery, replay on pod restart via `WorkQueuePolicy`, and a dead-letter subject (`aiac.apply.dlq`) after 5 failed deliveries. No authentication — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism. Stream: `aiac-events`, subjects `aiac.apply.>`, consumer group `aiac-agent-consumer`. @@ -244,7 +397,7 @@ NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers --- -## 7. Component: AIAC Agent +### 7.5 AIAC Agent FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: @@ -260,7 +413,7 @@ All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running wit --- -## 8. Component: RAG Knowledge Base +### 7.6 RAG Knowledge Base ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. ChromaDB data is persisted on a 1 Gi PVC mounted at `/chroma/chroma`; the RAG Pod is a StatefulSet. @@ -268,7 +421,7 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p --- -## 9. Component: RAG Ingest Service +### 7.7 RAG Ingest Service FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. @@ -276,7 +429,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-p --- -## 10. Component: Keycloak SPI Listener +### 7.8 Keycloak SPI Listener A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into NATS publish calls to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent subject schema is authoritative; the SPI PRD references it. @@ -290,7 +443,7 @@ A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal --- -## 11. Deployment +## 8. Deployment ### Kubernetes manifests @@ -348,7 +501,7 @@ Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before app --- -## 12. Testing +## 9. Testing Tests live in `aiac/test/`. @@ -388,7 +541,7 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only --- -## 13. Conventions and constraints +## 10. Conventions and constraints - Python version: 3.12 - Base Docker image: `python:3.12-slim` From 38f6c04899788f8d70a708f6dd16c5a821abd9f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 21:38:49 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 041/273] docs(aiac): update architecture diagram call labels with specific API semantics Replace generic (read config)/(set policy) labels in both the architecture summary and PRD diagrams with descriptive italic call text matching the PDP interface endpoints. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 4 ++-- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 135caa19a..34db9e1ef 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Five components across four Kubernetes pods, plus a Python client library: ▲ ┌─────────────┴────────────┐ │ │ - (𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘪𝘨) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺) +(𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘵𝘰𝘰𝘭𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦-𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ │ PDP Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Five components across four Kubernetes pods, plus a Python client library: │ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - │ │ + (𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ │ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ │ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 9804884fd..71dd13f90 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl ▲ ┌─────────────┴────────────┐ │ │ - (𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘪𝘨) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺) +(𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘵𝘰𝘰𝘭𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦-𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ │ PDP Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl │ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - │ │ + (𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ │ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ │ From cb80a5ccf95d049062910a4c6fedbc9332ee153f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 20:06:41 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 042/273] docs(aiac): add Red Hat AMQ evaluation as Event Broker alternative Technology-neutral greenfield evaluation of Red Hat AMQ Broker, AMQ Streams, and AMQ Interconnect against the ten functional requirements derived from the AIAC PRD. AMQ Broker satisfies all requirements; selection guidance covers conditions where it is preferred over the PRD's NATS JetStream choice. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md | 197 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 197 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a58c85234 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +# Event Broker Alternatives: Red Hat AMQ Evaluation (Greenfield, Technology-Neutral) + +## Abstract + +This document evaluates Red Hat's AMQ messaging product family as a candidate for the AIAC Event +Broker role. The evaluation assumes a greenfield implementation — no part of the AIAC system +exists yet — and uses exclusively functional requirements derived from the PRD's use cases and +architectural principles. All technology-specific constraints (protocol names, client library +names, image identifiers, API call names) have been removed. The question asked is: can this +product satisfy what the system must do? + +**Conclusion:** AMQ Broker (Artemis) satisfies all functional requirements and is a technically +sound candidate. Remaining differentiators from NATS JetStream are operational: footprint, +configuration surface, and protocol fit for the AIAC event volume. AMQ Streams retains two +structural incompatibilities that cannot be resolved without changing the PRD's routing design. +AMQ Interconnect is disqualified by the durability requirement. + +--- + +## Functional Requirements + +Derived from the PRD's use cases and architectural decisions. All technology-specific language +has been removed — requirements state what the system must do, not how. + +| ID | Functional requirement | PRD source | +|----|------------------------|------------| +| FR1 | Events must survive the Agent pod going down and be re-delivered when it restarts — no silent event loss on transient consumer failure | §5 arch decisions, §7.4 | +| FR2 | Each event must be processed by exactly one Agent instance across competing replicas (work-queue semantics) | §7.4, §5 arch decisions | +| FR3 | Failed event processing must be retried a bounded number of times, then moved to a dead-letter destination for operator inspection — a persistently broken event must not block the queue | §7.4, §9 | +| FR4 | The broker must support per-entity event addressing: a new Keycloak client and a new realm role each produce distinct, independently routable events carrying the entity ID — the consumer must be able to subscribe to a wildcard that covers all entity-scoped events without inspecting message payloads | §7.4, §7.5, §7.8, §5 ("no business logic lives in the consumer") | +| FR5 | The Agent (Python 3.12, FastAPI, asyncio) must be able to consume events asynchronously as a background task; processing must complete before the event is acknowledged | §7.5, §10 | +| FR6 | The RAG Ingest Service (Python 3.12, FastAPI) must be able to publish events to the broker | §7.7 | +| FR7 | The Keycloak SPI (Java) must be able to publish events to the broker | §7.8 | +| FR8 | The broker must be deployable without authentication; Kubernetes ClusterIP network isolation is the intended access control boundary | §7.4, §10 | +| FR9 | The broker must run as a single Kubernetes pod with minimal configuration overhead; no Operator dependency | §8 | +| FR10 | An init container must be able to provision required broker resources idempotently at startup and health-check the broker before the Agent container starts | §5 arch decisions, §9 | + +--- + +## Candidate 1 — AMQ Broker (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis) + +**What it is:** A full-featured message broker with persistent storage (NIO journal), native +dead-letter support, and competing consumer semantics via `anycast` routing. Supports AMQP 1.0, +STOMP, MQTT, and OpenWire. Python client: `python-qpid-proton`. Java client: Artemis JMS or +Qpid Proton Java. + +### Assessment + +| Req | Requirement | Verdict | Detail | +|-----|-------------|---------|--------| +| **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Pass** | NIO journal persists messages to disk. Consumer reconnects and pending messages re-deliver automatically | +| **FR2** | Work-queue: one consumer per event | **Pass** | `anycast` routing type delivers each message to exactly one consumer across competing receivers — equivalent to work-queue semantics | +| **FR3** | Bounded retry + dead-letter | **Pass** | Native `dead-letter-address` + `max-delivery-attempts` configuration in `broker.xml`. Max attempts is a simple numeric setting | +| **FR4** | Per-entity dynamic addressing | **Pass** | Artemis supports hierarchical address wildcards (`aiac.apply.#` for multi-level, `*` for single-level). Addresses are auto-created on first publish when auto-create address policy is enabled — a new entity ID at runtime creates a new routable address automatically. A consumer on the wildcard address receives all matching events without payload inspection | +| **FR5** | Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | **Pass** | `python-qpid-proton` provides asyncio consumer with manual message settlement. Ack-after-processing is the standard AMQP disposition model — the consumer accepts or rejects a message after handler completion | +| **FR6** | Python publisher | **Pass** | `python-qpid-proton` sender is straightforward | +| **FR7** | Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | **Pass** | Artemis JMS client and Qpid Proton Java are both mature and well-supported | +| **FR8** | No-auth deployment | **Pass** | Configurable: `false` in `broker.xml`. One XML element; low friction | +| **FR9** | Single pod, no Operator, low footprint | **Partial** | Artemis runs standalone without an Operator. However, a `broker.xml` configuration file must be authored and mounted via ConfigMap — there is no single-flag enablement. RAM footprint is ~256–300 MB. For AIAC's event volume (tens of lifecycle events per day) this is significantly over-provisioned | +| **FR10** | Init container idempotent provisioning | **Pass** | Addresses and queues can be pre-declared in `broker.xml` — on broker start they exist before any consumer connects, making provisioning declarative and idempotent by design. Alternatively, the Artemis management REST API supports idempotent address creation at runtime. Health-checking via HTTP management endpoint | + +### Residual concern + +**FR9** is the only meaningful remaining differentiator. Artemis is operationally heavier than +warranted for the AIAC use case: + +- `broker.xml` must be authored, maintained, and mounted as a ConfigMap in the Event Broker + deployment manifest +- RAM footprint (~300 MB) is ~15× higher than a comparable lightweight broker for an event bus + that carries a handful of events per day +- Artemis was designed for enterprise JMS workloads with high message throughput and complex + routing topologies; the AIAC Event Broker is a simple lifecycle event bus + +These are operational trade-offs, not functional failures. The system works correctly with +Artemis — it is simply heavier than necessary. + +--- + +## Candidate 2 — AMQ Streams (Apache Kafka / Strimzi) + +**What it is:** A Kafka-based event streaming platform managed by the Strimzi Operator on +Kubernetes. Python client: `aiokafka` or `confluent-kafka-python`. Java client: Kafka producer. + +### Assessment + +| Req | Requirement | Verdict | Detail | +|-----|-------------|---------|--------| +| **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Pass** | Kafka topic retention provides message replay for a configured consumer group | +| **FR2** | Work-queue: one consumer per event | **Partial** | Kafka consumer groups deliver one message per partition. Work-queue semantics emerge only when partition count equals consumer count — it is not a single-setting guarantee and requires careful partition design | +| **FR3** | Bounded retry + dead-letter | **Fail** | Kafka has no native dead-letter queue or `max-delivery-attempts` concept. A DLQ must be implemented as application code: a separate retry topic, a retry consumer service, and a DLQ topic. This is infrastructure the PRD expects the broker to provide natively | +| **FR4** | Per-entity dynamic addressing | **Fail** | Kafka topics are static, pre-declared strings. A runtime-generated entity ID cannot become a new topic without administrator intervention. Per-entity routing collapses to per-type topics (e.g. one topic for all realm-role events), requiring the consumer to inspect message payloads to identify the target entity. The PRD (§5) mandates a consumer that carries no business logic — payload-based routing contradicts this | +| **FR5** | Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | **Pass** | `aiokafka` is a mature asyncio Kafka client; manual commit after processing is idiomatic | +| **FR6** | Python publisher | **Pass** | `aiokafka` or `confluent-kafka-python` | +| **FR7** | Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | **Pass** | Kafka Java producer is the most mature producer client available | +| **FR8** | No-auth deployment | **Partial** | Kafka supports no-auth, but Strimzi configures mutual TLS by default; explicit opt-out via `KafkaListeners` spec is required | +| **FR9** | Single pod, no Operator | **Fail** | Strimzi Operator is the practical Kubernetes deployment path for Kafka. A single-node KRaft deployment without Operator is possible but not maintainable. Minimum footprint: ~1 GB RAM plus Operator pods | +| **FR10** | Init container idempotent provisioning | **Partial** | Kafka `AdminClient` supports idempotent topic creation. Feasible but requires a Kafka bootstrap connection and more setup than a simple health check | + +### Structural incompatibilities + +FR3 and FR4 fail regardless of implementation approach: + +**FR3 — no native DLQ:** Building bounded retry with dead-lettering requires a separate retry +consumer service, a retry topic, and a DLQ topic. This is application infrastructure, not broker +configuration. The PRD (§7.4) treats dead-lettering as a broker-level property. + +**FR4 — static topics vs dynamic addressing:** The PRD's per-entity event addressing is a +first-class routing feature. Collapsing `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` to a static topic and +embedding the entity ID in the message payload changes the consumer contract and adds routing +logic to what §5 explicitly defines as a thin adapter with no business logic. This is a +PRD-level design change, not an implementation detail. + +--- + +## Candidate 3 — AMQ Interconnect (Apache Qpid Dispatch Router) + +**What it is:** A stateless AMQP 1.0 message router. Routes messages between endpoints with no +on-disk persistence. + +### Assessment + +| Req | Requirement | Verdict | Detail | +|-----|-------------|---------|--------| +| **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Hard fail** | Interconnect is stateless by design. Messages in-flight when the Agent pod restarts are permanently lost | + +FR1 is an immediate disqualifier. UC-1 and UC-2 both depend on events surviving transient Agent +failures — this is a first-class architectural decision in §5. AMQ Interconnect can complement +AMQ Broker as a routing mesh but cannot serve as the AIAC Event Broker independently. + +--- + +## Consolidated Scorecard + +| Requirement | PRD anchor | NATS JetStream | AMQ Broker | AMQ Streams | AMQ Interconnect | +|-------------|------------|:--------------:|:----------:|:-----------:|:----------------:| +| FR1 Durable replay on pod restart | §5, §7.4 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| FR2 Work-queue / competing consumers | §7.4, §5 | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | +| FR3 DLQ after bounded retries | §7.4, §9 | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | +| FR4 Per-entity dynamic addressing, wildcard consumer | §7.4, §7.5, §7.8, §5 | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ⚠️ | +| FR5 Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | §7.5, §10 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| FR6 Python publisher | §7.7 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | +| FR7 Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | §7.8 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | +| FR8 No-auth viable | §7.4, §10 | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ | ✅ | +| FR9 Single pod, no Operator, low footprint | §8 | ✅ | ⚠️ | ❌ | ✅ | +| FR10 Init container idempotent provisioning | §5, §9 | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ | ❌ | + +✅ Satisfies requirement · ⚠️ Achievable with configuration trade-off · ❌ Cannot satisfy without design change + +--- + +## Comparative Analysis: AMQ Broker vs NATS JetStream + +With all technology-specific constraints removed, both candidates satisfy every functional +requirement. The decision reduces to operational fit. + +| Dimension | NATS JetStream | AMQ Broker (Artemis) | +|-----------|----------------|----------------------| +| FR1–FR3 delivery semantics | Native, zero-config | Native, `broker.xml` config | +| FR4 per-entity addressing | Hierarchical subjects, auto-routed | Hierarchical addresses, auto-create policy | +| FR5 Python asyncio consumer | Idiomatic, well-documented | Functional, lower-level API | +| FR7 Java publisher | NATS Java client | Artemis JMS / Qpid Proton Java | +| FR8 no-auth | Default, no config needed | One XML element in `broker.xml` | +| FR9 footprint | ~20 MB RAM, single flag | ~300 MB RAM, `broker.xml` ConfigMap | +| FR10 broker provisioning | Single API call, runtime | Declarative via `broker.xml` (no runtime call needed) | +| Protocol lineage | Purpose-built for microservice pub/sub | Enterprise JMS / AMQP 1.0 interoperability | +| Python ecosystem depth | Large community, extensive examples | Smaller community, sparser asyncio docs | +| Design envelope | Lightweight durable pub/sub | High-throughput enterprise queuing | + +The functional gap is closed. AMQ Broker is a technically valid choice. The remaining difference +is that it carries more operational weight (configuration, RAM, XML) than the AIAC Event Broker +role requires. + +--- + +## Conclusion + +**AMQ Broker (Artemis)** satisfies all ten functional requirements in a greenfield build. It +is a technically sound candidate. The single remaining concern — FR9, operational footprint — is +a trade-off, not a disqualifier: Artemis is ~15× heavier in RAM than warranted for an event bus +that carries tens of lifecycle events per day, and its XML-based configuration adds overhead +absent from simpler brokers. + +**AMQ Streams** retains two hard disqualifications regardless of implementation approach: no +native DLQ (FR3) and inability to support dynamic per-entity addressing (FR4). Resolving either +would require changing the PRD's routing design. + +**AMQ Interconnect** is disqualified by FR1. + +**Selection guidance:** + +| Condition | Recommended choice | +|-----------|-------------------| +| No pre-existing AMQ infrastructure; team is starting fresh | Lightweight broker matched to event volume — NATS JetStream | +| Team already operates AMQ Broker for other workloads | AMQ Broker — eliminate a dependency, reuse existing expertise | +| Platform standardised on AMQP 1.0 across services | AMQ Broker — protocol consistency has value | +| Minimising operational surface and configuration files is a priority | NATS JetStream | +| Red Hat support contract covers messaging infrastructure | AMQ Broker | From 1f322808cf5657d3958e66f2657b101b5ed2875d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 20:12:44 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 043/273] docs(aiac): remove Key Interface Surface section and simplify UC-1 title Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 60 +------------------ aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 34db9e1ef..ee2eb3309 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ PDP Policy Service. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only th ## Major Use-Cases -### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (Agent/Tool On-boarding / Off-boarding) +### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (On-boarding / Off-boarding) **Trigger:** A Realm Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Five components across four Kubernetes pods, plus a Python client library: │ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - (𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴) + │ │ ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ │ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ │ @@ -183,62 +183,6 @@ See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. ## Technical Addendum -### Key Interface Surface - -#### Event Broker subjects (NATS) - -| Subject | Trigger source | AIAC handler | -|---|---|---| -| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Keycloak SPI (`CLIENT_CREATED`) | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI (role created/updated) | Realm Roles Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.build` | RAG Ingest Service (post-ingest) | Policy Update Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.dlq` | NATS (max redelivery exceeded) | Dead-letter — no handler | - -The `rebuild` trigger is HTTP-only (`POST /apply/rebuild` on the Agent pod via -`kubectl port-forward`); it is never published to NATS. - -#### PDP Configuration Service — read endpoints - -| Endpoint | Returns | -|---|---| -| `GET /subjects` | All users mapped to PDP Subject model | -| `GET /roles` | All realm roles | -| `GET /services` | All clients (services) | -| `GET /scopes` | All client scopes | -| `GET /permissions` | All client roles (service permissions) | -| `GET /assignments` | Current realm role → composite mappings | -| `GET /subjects/{id}` | Single subject with role assignments | - -Optional `?realm=` query parameter overrides the default realm on all endpoints. - -#### PDP Policy Service — write endpoints (Phase 1 / Keycloak) - -| Endpoint | Operation | -|---|---| -| `POST /permissions` | Create a service permission (Keycloak client role) | -| `POST /scopes` | Create a client scope and bind to a service | -| `POST /composite-roles` | Add composite role mappings (realm role → permissions) | -| `DELETE /composite-roles` | Remove specific composite role mappings | -| `DELETE /composite-roles/all` | Clear all composite mappings (used by `rebuild`) | - -#### Python library modules - -| Module | Purpose | -|---|---| -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | Pydantic models — no dependencies beyond `pydantic` | -| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service; returns typed instances | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | HTTP client → PDP Policy Service; stable interface across Phase 1/2 | - -#### RAG Ingest Service — endpoint semantics - -| Pattern | Semantics | -|---|---| -| `POST /ingest/{collection}/{text\|file\|url}` | Full collection replacement | -| `POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text\|file\|url}` | Document-level upsert | -| `DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}` | Explicit document removal | - -Collections: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. - ### Call Flows #### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 71dd13f90..6ccdbd45e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite ma ## 4. Major Use-Cases -### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (Agent/Tool On-boarding / Off-boarding) +### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (On-boarding / Off-boarding) **Trigger:** A Realm Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. From b9a17ac6f6ffbf3c513d863a7dbd8791141e0503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 20:18:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 044/273] docs(aiac): replace flat call flow with structured UC call flows in PRD Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 137 ++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 6ccdbd45e..65453a084 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -238,60 +238,93 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` -### Call flow +### Call Flows + +#### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ CLIENT_CREATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.service.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ (durable consumer, at-least-once delivery) + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /scopes, /permissions (target service) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff for affected service + │ 7. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. POST /permissions (if new scope/permission required) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 9. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 10. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 11. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-1b · Realm Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ REALM_ROLE_CREATED / REALM_ROLE_UPDATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.realm-role.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected realm role + │ 6. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 8. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 9. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.build`) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /ingest/policy/{text|file|url} + ▼ + RAG Ingest Service + │ 2. upsert documents ──► ChromaDB + │ 3. publish aiac.apply.build + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 4. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 7. [LLM] compute full composite role diff against current PDP state + │ 8. POST /composite-roles (add delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 9. DELETE /composite-roles (remove delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 10. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/rebuild`, operator-only) ``` -Policy / domain knowledge ingestion (operator-driven): - - Developer ──(kubectl port-forward)──► RAG Ingest Service ──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [policy rules] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [org/business context] - ├──► Embedding API (external) - └──► Event Broker aiac.apply.build [trigger policy recompute] - -Role enforcement (event-driven): - - Policy build trigger (aiac.apply.build) → Policy Update Orchestrator: - - Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state + composites] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose diff from policy + domain context + state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate diff] - ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite diff] - └──► NATS ack [message removed from stream] - - Rebuild trigger (operator-only, HTTP direct): - - Operator ──(kubectl port-forward)──► AIAC Agent /apply/rebuild ──┬── policy ──► PDP Policy Service [clear all composite mappings] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge - ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API - ├──► LLM API (external) - ├──► LLM API (external) - └──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API - - Realm role trigger (aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}) → Realm Roles Orchestrator: - - Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read scoped state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings scoped to affected role] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] - └──► NATS ack - - Service onboarding trigger (aiac.apply.service.{id}) → Service Onboarding Orchestrator: - - Event Broker ──► AIAC Agent (NATS consumer) ──┬──► Kubernetes API (in-cluster) [retrieve AgentRuntime/AgentCard CR → ServiceInfo] - ├──► LLM API (external) [analyze agent/tool → ServiceProvision] - ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [provision permissions + scopes] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-policies [retrieve policy chunks] - ├──► ChromaDB aiac-domain-knowledge [retrieve domain context chunks] - ├──► configuration ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [read state] - ├──► LLM API (external) [propose composite mappings for new service] - ├──► LLM API (external) [validate mappings] - ├──► policy ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin API [apply composite mappings] - └──► NATS ack + Operator + │ 1. POST /apply/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 2. DELETE /composite-roles/all (clear entire mapping table) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute complete composite role set from scratch + │ 6. POST /composite-roles (write full mapping set) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + ▼ + (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` ### Component dependencies From f3aa2afb789bc834396e5366bc7e949f571c43c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 20:26:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 045/273] docs(aiac): reorder architecture summary sections and remove Technical Addendum Move Call Flows before Short-Term Objectives for a more logical reading order (structure before goals). Remove the Technical Addendum wrapper, promoting Call Flows to a top-level section. Fix missing blank line before the NATS JetStream interface divider. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 27 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index ee2eb3309..e77b41d36 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -166,24 +166,10 @@ mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a dead-letter subject. -See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. --- -## Short-Term Objectives - -| # | Objective | Detail | -|---|-----------|--------| -| 1 | **Kagenti integration (UC-1 implementation)** | Plug AIAC into Kagenti and define its lifecycle | -| 2 | **Improve AIAC decision reasoning** | Take into account richer context: User Role description, Agent card, Tool description, Policy digest | -| 3 | **Rego / OPA integration (initially with Keycloak)** | OPA as the PDP; outcome: Rego access rules | -| 4 | **GitHub demo reimplementation with Rego / OPA** | End-to-end demo using OPA as the Policy Decision Point | - ---- - -## Technical Addendum - -### Call Flows +## Call Flows #### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) @@ -271,3 +257,14 @@ See the Technical Addendum for subject names and handler mapping. ▼ (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` + +--- + +## Short-Term Objectives + +| # | Objective | Detail | +|---|-----------|--------| +| 1 | **Kagenti integration (UC-1 implementation)** | Plug AIAC into Kagenti and define its lifecycle | +| 2 | **Improve AIAC decision reasoning** | Take into account richer context: User Role description, Agent card, Tool description, Policy digest | +| 3 | **Rego / OPA integration (initially with Keycloak)** | OPA as the PDP; outcome: Rego access rules | +| 4 | **GitHub demo reimplementation with Rego / OPA** | End-to-end demo using OPA as the Policy Decision Point | From a095d96c095ca5c6ceb4975674bd724b0970ba9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:10:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 046/273] minor fix Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 8acbc5ae8..b2e4cf0a5 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -75,8 +75,6 @@ def generate_policy_only( policy_file: Path, config_path: Path, output_file: str ) -> None: """ - Run only the agent's natural-language to YAML step (no Keycloak interaction). - Args: policy_file: Path to file containing natural language policy description config_path: Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML From ef26b2168a4769eea4e24ea36958749e8fa3fce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:46:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 047/273] rego generation Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py | 2 +- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 9 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 347 ++++++++++++++---- .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 83 ++++- 4 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py index 9b419f1e7..9bce3a378 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access to all services") >>> >>> if result["success"]: - ... builder.save_policy(result["yaml_output"], "policy.yaml") + ... builder.save_policy("policy.yaml") For detailed documentation, see README.md in this directory. """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index b2e4cf0a5..2e2dd5ded 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -111,9 +111,14 @@ def generate_policy_only( print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") print("Generated YAML:") print("-" * 80) - print(result["yaml_output"]) + print(builder.get_yaml_output()) print("-" * 80) - builder.save_policy(result["yaml_output"], output_file) + builder.save_policy(output_file) + + # Generate Rego policy files + print("\nGenerating Rego policy files...") + rego_dir = Path(output_file).parent / "rego_policy" + builder.save_policy_rego(str(rego_dir)) else: print("✗ Policy generation failed with errors:") for error in result["errors"]: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 7992432aa..1aa896835 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ get_roles, get_services, get_service_permissions, + get_subjects, + get_subject_assignments, + get_scopes, ) from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -170,61 +173,6 @@ def _build_policy(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: } -def _generate_yaml(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """ - Generate YAML output from the policy structure with comprehensive comments. - - This is the third node in the workflow. - - Args: - state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure', 'description', and 'explanation' - - Returns: - Updated PolicyState with 'yaml_output' field - """ - # Create header comments - header = """# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges -# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - - # Add original policy description as comment - if state.get("description"): - description_lines = state["description"].strip().split('\n') - header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in description_lines: - header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - header += "#\n" - - # Add LLM explanation as comment - if state.get("explanation"): - explanation_lines = state["explanation"].strip().split('\n') - header += "# LLM Mapping Explanation:\n" - for line in explanation_lines: - header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - header += "\n" - - # Generate YAML from policy structure - yaml_content = yaml.dump( - state["policy_structure"], - default_flow_style=False, - sort_keys=False, - allow_unicode=True - ) - - # Add footer - footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" - - # Combine all parts - yaml_output = header + yaml_content + footer - - return { - **state, - "yaml_output": yaml_output - } - def _validate_policy( state: PolicyState, @@ -347,10 +295,6 @@ def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """Build structured policy from mappings.""" return _build_policy(state) - def generate_yaml_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """Generate YAML output with comments.""" - return _generate_yaml(state) - def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """Validate structure and semantics.""" return _validate_policy( @@ -368,14 +312,12 @@ def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: # Add nodes workflow.add_node("parse_and_extract", parse_and_extract_node) workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) - workflow.add_node("generate_yaml", generate_yaml_node) workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) # Define edges workflow.set_entry_point("parse_and_extract") workflow.add_edge("parse_and_extract", "build_policy") - workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "generate_yaml") - workflow.add_edge("generate_yaml", "validate_policy") + workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "validate_policy") # Add conditional edge for retry logic workflow.add_conditional_edges( @@ -406,8 +348,7 @@ class PolicyBuilder: Workflow Stages: 1. parse_and_extract: Parse natural language and extract role mappings 2. build_policy: Build structured policy from mappings - 3. generate_yaml: Generate YAML output with comments - 4. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) + 3. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) Attributes: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance @@ -429,6 +370,7 @@ def __init__( Initialize the policy builder with configuration and LLM. Args: + realm: Realm name for fetching configuration data config_path: Path to config YAML. If None, AC_CONFIG_PATH env var is used. llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. If not provided, creates a new LLM instance using create_llm() @@ -439,6 +381,9 @@ def __init__( FileNotFoundError: If config_path doesn't exist yaml.YAMLError: If config file is invalid YAML """ + # Store realm for later use + self.realm = realm + # Create LLM if not provided # LLM config is in the config directory relative to this file (llm.env) if llm is None: @@ -512,18 +457,17 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: Returns: Dictionary containing: - - yaml_output (str): Complete YAML policy file content - policy_structure (dict): Structured policy data - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-privilege mappings from LLM - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) - success (bool): True if generation succeeded without errors - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred - + Example: >>> builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=Path("config.yaml")) >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access") >>> if result["success"]: - ... print(result["yaml_output"]) + ... builder.save_policy("policy.yaml") """ # Initialize the workflow state initial_state: PolicyState = { @@ -541,9 +485,12 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: # Execute the LangGraph workflow final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) + # Store the policy structure and description for later use + self._last_policy_structure = final_state["policy_structure"] + self._last_description = description + # Extract and return results return { - "yaml_output": final_state["yaml_output"], "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], "errors": final_state["errors"], @@ -551,17 +498,277 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0) } - def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml"): + def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: + """ + Generate YAML output from the stored policy structure. + + This method generates YAML on demand from the stored policy structure. + Must be called after generate_policy(). + + Returns: + Complete YAML policy file content with comments + + Raises: + ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet + """ + if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure'): + raise ValueError("No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") + + # Create header comments + header = """# Access Control Policy +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges +# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) + +""" + + # Add original policy description as comment + if hasattr(self, '_last_description') and self._last_description: + description_lines = self._last_description.strip().split('\n') + header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in description_lines: + header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + header += "#\n" + + # Generate YAML from policy structure + yaml_content = yaml.dump( + self._last_policy_structure, + default_flow_style=False, + sort_keys=False, + allow_unicode=True + ) + + # Add footer + footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" + + # Combine all parts + return header + yaml_content + footer + + def save_policy(self, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml"): """ Save the generated policy YAML to a file. + Uses the last generated policy from instance state (_last_policy_structure). + Args: - yaml_output: YAML content string to save filepath: Output file path (default: "access_control_policy.yaml") + + Raises: + ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet """ + yaml_output = self.get_yaml_output() + with open(filepath, 'w') as f: f.write(yaml_output) print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") + + def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): + """ + Save Rego files with realm roles, privileges maps, and generated policy from configuration. + + Uses the last generated policy from instance state (_last_policy_structure and _last_description). + + Creates three Rego files: + - realm_roles.rego: Maps realm role names to lists of user names + - privileges.rego: Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges and scopes + - generated_policy.rego: Access control policy rules based on the policy structure + + Args: + file_dir: Directory to save Rego files (default: "file_dir") + + Raises: + ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet + """ + # Get policy_structure and description from instance state + if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure'): + raise ValueError("No policy structure available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") + + policy_structure = self._last_policy_structure + description = getattr(self, '_last_description', "") + + # At this point, policy_structure is guaranteed to be a dict + assert policy_structure is not None, "policy_structure should not be None after the check above" + + # Create directory if it doesn't exist + dir_path = Path(file_dir) + dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + + # Build role_to_users mapping using get_subject_assignments + role_to_users = {} + + # Get all subjects and their role assignments + subjects = get_subjects(realm=self.realm) + for subject in subjects: + assignments = get_subject_assignments(subject.id, realm=self.realm) + # Get realm role mappings for this subject + for role in assignments.realmMappings: + role_name = role.name + if role_name not in role_to_users: + role_to_users[role_name] = [] + role_to_users[role_name].append(subject.username) + + # Fetch scopes (if available in config) + scopes = [] + try: + scopes = get_scopes(realm=self.realm) + except Exception: + # If no scopes in config, that's okay - we'll just have empty scope lists + pass + + # Generate realm_roles.rego from self.realm_roles with users + realm_roles_rego = self._generate_realm_roles_rego(self.realm_roles, role_to_users) + realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" + with open(realm_roles_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(realm_roles_rego) + print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") + + # Generate privileges.rego from self.privileges_map with scopes + privileges_rego = self._generate_privileges_rego(self.privileges_map, scopes) + privileges_path = dir_path / "privileges.rego" + with open(privileges_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(privileges_rego) + print(f"Privileges Rego saved to {privileges_path}") + + # Generate generated_policy.rego from policy_structure + policy_rego = self._generate_policy_rego(policy_structure, description) + policy_path = dir_path / "generated_policy.rego" + with open(policy_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(policy_rego) + print(f"Generated policy Rego saved to {policy_path}") + + def _generate_realm_roles_rego(self, realm_roles: list, role_to_users: dict) -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for realm roles mapping. + + Args: + realm_roles: List of realm role dictionaries with 'name' and 'description' + role_to_users: Dictionary mapping role names to lists of usernames + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + rego_content = """package authz.realm_roles + +# Realm Roles Mapping +# Maps realm role names to lists of user names + +""" + + for role in realm_roles: + role_name = role.get("name", "") + + # Get users for this role + users = role_to_users.get(role_name, []) + + # Generate simple mapping: role_name -> [user1, user2, ...] + rego_content += f'realm_role["{role_name}"] := [\n' + for user in users: + # Escape quotes in username + user_escaped = user.replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f' "{user_escaped}",\n' + rego_content += "]\n\n" + + return rego_content + + def _generate_privileges_rego(self, privileges_map: Dict[str, list], scopes: list) -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for privileges mapping by service/client. + + Args: + privileges_map: Dictionary mapping service/client IDs to their privilege lists + Each privilege is a dict with 'name' and 'description' + scopes: List of Scope objects with 'name' and 'description' + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + rego_content = """package authz.privileges + +# Service Privileges Mapping +# Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges + +""" + + # Create a list of scope names for inclusion in privileges + scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] + + for service_id, privileges in privileges_map.items(): + rego_content += f'service["{service_id}"] := [\n' + for priv in privileges: + priv_name = priv.get("name", "") + priv_desc = priv.get("description", "") + # Escape quotes in description + priv_desc = priv_desc.replace('"', '\\"') + + rego_content += f' {{\n' + rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' + rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' + rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' + # Add all available scopes to each privilege + for scope_name in scope_names: + scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' + rego_content += ' ]\n' + rego_content += f' }},\n' + rego_content += "]\n\n" + + return rego_content + + def _generate_policy_rego(self, policy_structure: dict, description: str = "") -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for the access control policy. + + Converts the policy structure (role -> privileges) into Rego allow rules. + Each rule checks if the user has the required role and matches the service/privilege. + + Args: + policy_structure: Dictionary with 'policy' key containing role-to-privileges mapping + description: Original policy description for comments + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + rego_content = """package authbridge.inbound.request + +import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_role + +# Access Control Policy +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges +# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) + +""" + + # Add original policy description as comment + if description: + description_lines = description.strip().split('\n') + rego_content += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in description_lines: + rego_content += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + rego_content += "#\n\n" + + rego_content += "default allow := false\n\n" + + # Extract policy from structure + policy = policy_structure.get("policy", {}) + + # Generate allow rules for each role and their privileges + for role_name, privileges in policy.items(): + for priv in privileges: + service = priv.get("service", "") + privilege = priv.get("privilege", "") + + # Escape quotes in service and privilege names + service_escaped = service.replace('"', '\\"') + privilege_escaped = privilege.replace('"', '\\"') + + rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' + rego_content += f' realm_role["{role_name}"][_] == input.identity.subject\n' + rego_content += f' input.identity.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' + rego_content += f' input.identity.scopes[_] == "{privilege_escaped}"\n' + rego_content += "}\n\n" + + return rego_content # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index 85fe9b09e..36e842753 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -20,7 +20,12 @@ def _load() -> dict: def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: - subjects_raw = _load().get("subjects", []) + config = _load() + # Try "subjects" first, fall back to "users" for backward compatibility + subjects_raw = config.get("subjects", []) + if not subjects_raw: + subjects_raw = config.get("users", []) + result = [] for subject in subjects_raw: if not isinstance(subject, dict): @@ -99,31 +104,71 @@ def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: - scopes_raw = _load().get("scopes", []) + config = _load() + scopes_raw = config.get("scopes", []) result = [] - for scope in scopes_raw: - if isinstance(scope, dict): - name = scope["name"] - description = scope.get("description") or None - protocol = scope.get("protocol") - else: - name = str(scope) - description = None - protocol = None - result.append( - Scope( - id=name, - name=name, - description=description, - protocol=protocol, + + # If explicit scopes section exists, use it + if scopes_raw: + for scope in scopes_raw: + if isinstance(scope, dict): + name = scope["name"] + description = scope.get("description") or None + protocol = scope.get("protocol") + else: + name = str(scope) + description = None + protocol = None + result.append( + Scope( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + protocol=protocol, + ) ) - ) + else: + # If no explicit scopes, derive from service roles (each role gets its own audience scope) + services_raw = config.get("services", []) + for service in services_raw: + if not isinstance(service, dict): + continue + roles = service.get("roles", service.get("permissions", [])) + for role in roles: + if isinstance(role, dict): + role_name = role.get("name") + if role_name: + result.append( + Scope( + id=role_name, + name=role_name, + description=role.get("description"), + protocol=service.get("protocol"), + ) + ) + return result def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: - assignments_raw = _load().get("subject_assignments", {}) + config = _load() + assignments_raw = config.get("subject_assignments", {}) subject_assignments = assignments_raw.get(subject_id, {}) + + # If subject_assignments not found, try to get from users section (backward compatibility) + if not subject_assignments: + users = config.get("users", []) + for user in users: + if isinstance(user, dict): + user_id = user.get("id") or user.get("username") + if user_id == subject_id: + # Convert "roles" list to realmMappings format + subject_assignments = { + "realmMappings": user.get("roles", []), + "serviceMappings": {} + } + break + realm_mappings_raw = subject_assignments.get("realmMappings", []) realm_mappings = [] for role in realm_mappings_raw: From 781759e63cf72b179a66676d06084109e9fe076a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 09:04:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 048/273] improve prompt + better rego Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 235 ++++-------------- .../policy/utils/output_generators.py | 226 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 187 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 1aa896835..ba9b3750c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ - prompt_builder.py: LLM prompt construction - parsers.py: Response parsing utilities - validators.py: Policy validation logic +- output_generators.py: Output file generation utilities - cli.py: Command-line interface Key Features: @@ -34,7 +35,6 @@ from pathlib import Path import os import sys -import yaml from dataclasses import dataclass from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END @@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ ) from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure +from utils.output_generators import ( + generate_yaml_output, + generate_realm_roles_rego, + generate_privileges_rego, + generate_default_rego, + generate_policy_rego, +) @dataclass @@ -514,35 +521,8 @@ def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure'): raise ValueError("No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") - # Create header comments - header = """# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges -# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - - # Add original policy description as comment - if hasattr(self, '_last_description') and self._last_description: - description_lines = self._last_description.strip().split('\n') - header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in description_lines: - header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - header += "#\n" - - # Generate YAML from policy structure - yaml_content = yaml.dump( - self._last_policy_structure, - default_flow_style=False, - sort_keys=False, - allow_unicode=True - ) - - # Add footer - footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" - - # Combine all parts - return header + yaml_content + footer + description = getattr(self, '_last_description', "") + return generate_yaml_output(self._last_policy_structure, description) def save_policy(self, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml"): """ @@ -568,13 +548,12 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): Uses the last generated policy from instance state (_last_policy_structure and _last_description). - Creates three Rego files: - - realm_roles.rego: Maps realm role names to lists of user names - - privileges.rego: Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges and scopes - - generated_policy.rego: Access control policy rules based on the policy structure + Creates multiple Rego files: + - realm_roles.rego: Maps user names to lists of realm role names + - generated_policy_.rego: One access control policy file per service Args: - file_dir: Directory to save Rego files (default: "file_dir") + file_dir: Directory to save Rego files (default: "rego_policy") Raises: ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet @@ -593,19 +572,16 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): dir_path = Path(file_dir) dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - # Build role_to_users mapping using get_subject_assignments - role_to_users = {} + # Build user_to_roles mapping using get_subject_assignments + user_to_roles = {} # Get all subjects and their role assignments subjects = get_subjects(realm=self.realm) for subject in subjects: assignments = get_subject_assignments(subject.id, realm=self.realm) - # Get realm role mappings for this subject - for role in assignments.realmMappings: - role_name = role.name - if role_name not in role_to_users: - role_to_users[role_name] = [] - role_to_users[role_name].append(subject.username) + user_to_roles[subject.username] = [ + role.name for role in assignments.realmMappings + ] # Fetch scopes (if available in config) scopes = [] @@ -615,160 +591,45 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): # If no scopes in config, that's okay - we'll just have empty scope lists pass - # Generate realm_roles.rego from self.realm_roles with users - realm_roles_rego = self._generate_realm_roles_rego(self.realm_roles, role_to_users) + # Generate realm_roles.rego from users with their realm roles + realm_roles_rego = generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles) realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" with open(realm_roles_path, 'w') as f: f.write(realm_roles_rego) print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") # Generate privileges.rego from self.privileges_map with scopes - privileges_rego = self._generate_privileges_rego(self.privileges_map, scopes) - privileges_path = dir_path / "privileges.rego" - with open(privileges_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(privileges_rego) - print(f"Privileges Rego saved to {privileges_path}") - - # Generate generated_policy.rego from policy_structure - policy_rego = self._generate_policy_rego(policy_structure, description) - policy_path = dir_path / "generated_policy.rego" - with open(policy_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(policy_rego) - print(f"Generated policy Rego saved to {policy_path}") - - def _generate_realm_roles_rego(self, realm_roles: list, role_to_users: dict) -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for realm roles mapping. - - Args: - realm_roles: List of realm role dictionaries with 'name' and 'description' - role_to_users: Dictionary mapping role names to lists of usernames - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - rego_content = """package authz.realm_roles - -# Realm Roles Mapping -# Maps realm role names to lists of user names - -""" - - for role in realm_roles: - role_name = role.get("name", "") - - # Get users for this role - users = role_to_users.get(role_name, []) - - # Generate simple mapping: role_name -> [user1, user2, ...] - rego_content += f'realm_role["{role_name}"] := [\n' - for user in users: - # Escape quotes in username - user_escaped = user.replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f' "{user_escaped}",\n' - rego_content += "]\n\n" - - return rego_content - - def _generate_privileges_rego(self, privileges_map: Dict[str, list], scopes: list) -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for privileges mapping by service/client. - - Args: - privileges_map: Dictionary mapping service/client IDs to their privilege lists - Each privilege is a dict with 'name' and 'description' - scopes: List of Scope objects with 'name' and 'description' - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - rego_content = """package authz.privileges - -# Service Privileges Mapping -# Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges - -""" - - # Create a list of scope names for inclusion in privileges - scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] - - for service_id, privileges in privileges_map.items(): - rego_content += f'service["{service_id}"] := [\n' - for priv in privileges: - priv_name = priv.get("name", "") - priv_desc = priv.get("description", "") - # Escape quotes in description - priv_desc = priv_desc.replace('"', '\\"') - - rego_content += f' {{\n' - rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' - rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' - rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' - # Add all available scopes to each privilege - for scope_name in scope_names: - scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' - rego_content += ' ]\n' - rego_content += f' }},\n' - rego_content += "]\n\n" - - return rego_content - - def _generate_policy_rego(self, policy_structure: dict, description: str = "") -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for the access control policy. - - Converts the policy structure (role -> privileges) into Rego allow rules. - Each rule checks if the user has the required role and matches the service/privilege. - - Args: - policy_structure: Dictionary with 'policy' key containing role-to-privileges mapping - description: Original policy description for comments - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - rego_content = """package authbridge.inbound.request - -import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_role - -# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges -# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - - # Add original policy description as comment - if description: - description_lines = description.strip().split('\n') - rego_content += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in description_lines: - rego_content += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - rego_content += "#\n\n" - - rego_content += "default allow := false\n\n" - - # Extract policy from structure + # privileges_rego = generate_privileges_rego(self.privileges_map, scopes) + # privileges_path = dir_path / "privileges.rego" + # with open(privileges_path, 'w') as f: + # f.write(privileges_rego) + # print(f"Privileges Rego saved to {privileges_path}") + + # Generate default.rego with deny-by-default behavior + default_rego_path = dir_path / "default.rego" + with open(default_rego_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(generate_default_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_rego_path}") + + # Generate one policy rego file per service + # First, collect all services that appear in the policy policy = policy_structure.get("policy", {}) - - # Generate allow rules for each role and their privileges + services_in_policy = set() for role_name, privileges in policy.items(): for priv in privileges: service = priv.get("service", "") - privilege = priv.get("privilege", "") - - # Escape quotes in service and privilege names - service_escaped = service.replace('"', '\\"') - privilege_escaped = privilege.replace('"', '\\"') - - rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' - rego_content += f' realm_role["{role_name}"][_] == input.identity.subject\n' - rego_content += f' input.identity.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' - rego_content += f' input.identity.scopes[_] == "{privilege_escaped}"\n' - rego_content += "}\n\n" - - return rego_content + if service: + services_in_policy.add(service) + + # Generate a separate rego file for each service + for service_name in services_in_policy: + policy_rego = generate_policy_rego(policy_structure, description, service_filter=service_name) + # Sanitize service name for filename (replace special chars with underscores) + safe_service_name = service_name.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') + policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_name}.rego" + with open(policy_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(policy_rego) + print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_name}' saved to {policy_path}") # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..edc3a2144 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Output Generators - Policy Output File Generation Utilities + +This module provides utilities for generating output files from policy structures, +including YAML and Rego format generation. + +Functions: + - generate_yaml_output: Generate YAML policy file content + - generate_realm_roles_rego: Generate Rego content for user-to-realm-roles mapping + - generate_privileges_rego: Generate Rego content for privileges mapping + - generate_default_rego: Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior + - generate_policy_rego: Generate Rego content for access control policy +""" + +from typing import Dict, Optional +import yaml + + +def generate_yaml_output(policy_structure: dict, description: str = "") -> str: + """ + Generate YAML output from a policy structure. + + Args: + policy_structure: Dictionary containing the policy structure + description: Original policy description for comments + + Returns: + Complete YAML policy file content with comments + """ + # Create header comments + header = """# Access Control Policy +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges +# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) + +""" + + # Add original policy description as comment + if description: + description_lines = description.strip().split('\n') + header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in description_lines: + header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + header += "#\n" + + # Generate YAML from policy structure + yaml_content = yaml.dump( + policy_structure, + default_flow_style=False, + sort_keys=False, + allow_unicode=True + ) + + # Add footer + footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" + + # Combine all parts + return header + yaml_content + footer + + +def generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles: dict) -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for user-to-realm-roles mapping. + + Args: + user_to_roles: Dictionary mapping usernames to lists of realm role names + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + rego_content = """package authz.realm_roles + +# Realm Roles Mapping +# Maps user names to lists of realm role names + +realm_roles := { +""" + + # Build the dictionary entries + user_entries = [] + for username in sorted(user_to_roles): + username_escaped = username.replace('"', '\\"') + roles = user_to_roles.get(username, []) + role_list = [] + for role_name in roles: + role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') + role_list.append(f'"{role_name_escaped}"') + roles_str = ", ".join(role_list) + user_entries.append(f' "{username_escaped}": [{roles_str}]') + + # Join all entries with commas + rego_content += ",\n".join(user_entries) + rego_content += "\n}\n" + + return rego_content + + +def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, list], scopes: list) -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for privileges mapping by service/client. + + Args: + privileges_map: Dictionary mapping service/client IDs to their privilege lists + Each privilege is a dict with 'name' and 'description' + scopes: List of Scope objects with 'name' and 'description' + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + rego_content = """package authz.privileges + +# Service Privileges Mapping +# Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges + +""" + + # Create a list of scope names for inclusion in privileges + scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] + + for service_id, privileges in privileges_map.items(): + rego_content += f'service["{service_id}"] := [\n' + for priv in privileges: + priv_name = priv.get("name", "") + priv_desc = priv.get("description", "") + # Escape quotes in description + priv_desc = priv_desc.replace('"', '\\"') + + rego_content += f' {{\n' + rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' + rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' + rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' + # Add all available scopes to each privilege + for scope_name in scope_names: + scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' + rego_content += ' ]\n' + rego_content += f' }},\n' + rego_content += "]\n\n" + + return rego_content + + +def generate_default_rego() -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior. + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + return """package authbridge.inbound.request + +default allow := false +""" + + +def generate_policy_rego( + policy_structure: dict, + description: str = "", + service_filter: Optional[str] = None +) -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for the access control policy. + + Converts the policy structure (role -> privileges) into Rego allow rules. + Each rule checks if the user has the required role and matches the service/privilege. + + Args: + policy_structure: Dictionary with 'policy' key containing role-to-privileges mapping + description: Original policy description for comments + service_filter: If provided, only generate rules for this specific service + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + rego_content = """package authbridge.inbound.request + +import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles + +# Access Control Policy +# Uses user -> realm roles mapping to authorize privileges +# Policy entries map realm role names to privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) + +""" + + # Add service filter info if applicable + if service_filter: + rego_content += f"# Service: {service_filter}\n" + + # Add original policy description as comment + if description: + description_lines = description.strip().split('\n') + rego_content += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in description_lines: + rego_content += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + rego_content += "#\n\n" + + # Extract policy from structure + policy = policy_structure.get("policy", {}) + + # Generate allow rules for each role and their privileges + for role_name, privileges in policy.items(): + for priv in privileges: + service = priv.get("service", "") + privilege = priv.get("privilege", "") + + # Skip if service_filter is set and this privilege is for a different service + if service_filter and service != service_filter: + continue + + # Escape quotes in service and privilege names + service_escaped = service.replace('"', '\\"') + privilege_escaped = privilege.replace('"', '\\"') + + role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') + + rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' + rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' + rego_content += f' input.identity.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' + rego_content += f' "{privilege_escaped}" in input.identity.scopes\n' + rego_content += "}\n\n" + + return rego_content + +# Made with Bob From 776044a36f82791c63a3e3a225cdf0120291dcf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 09:22:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 049/273] improve prompt + better rego Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 27 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index 2b0114aaa..2a5f64148 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -91,8 +91,10 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( 2. ENABLING / GATEWAY SERVICES - CRITICAL - READ CAREFULLY: An enabling service is one whose description says it provides access TO another service - or technology (e.g., "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Access to the payment - gateway", "Access to the data pipeline"). + or technology. Common phrasings include: "Access to the X connector", "Provides access + to X services", "Gateway to X", "Enables access to X", "Access to the X agent". + Examples: "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Provides access to GitHub services", + "Access to the payment gateway", "Access to the data pipeline". DOMAIN REQUIREMENT - AN ENABLING SERVICE MUST BE IN THE SAME DOMAIN AS THE POLICY: - "Access to the data warehouse connector" IS an enabling service for a data warehouse policy (same domain) @@ -159,9 +161,13 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about GitHub repos — DIFFERENT → [] (Even though "developers" may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) 2. CLASSIFY this privilege: is it a FINAL resource privilege or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? - - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]" + - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]", + "provides access to [some service/technology]", "gateway to [...]", or similar phrasing + that positions this role as a PREREQUISITE to reach the downstream resource — AND the service is in the same domain as the policy - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]" + NOTE: A privilege named "X-agent" or "X-gateway" with a description like + "Provides access to X services" IS an enabling service, NOT a final resource. 3. IDENTIFY USER CATEGORIES: List all user categories mentioned in the policy. 4. APPLY RULE: - ENABLING/GATEWAY: grant to ALL user categories that need the downstream resource @@ -239,6 +245,21 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( ```json {{"privilege": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} ``` + +Example D — enabling/gateway service using "Provides access to" phrasing: +```explanation +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "GitHub services". Policy domain is +"GitHub repository access". SAME domain (GitHub) — continue. +Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Provides access to GitHub services" positions this +as a prerequisite gateway; without it, no user can reach GitHub repositories at all. +Policy identifies two user categories: R&D (→ developer) gets full access; technical +support (→ tech-support) gets read-only access. Both need ANY level of GitHub access, +so BOTH need this enabling service. Access level does NOT matter for enabling services. +Realm role mapping: developer → R&D, tech-support → technical support. +``` +```json +{{"privilege": "github-agent", "real_roles_with_access": ["developer", "tech-support"]}} +``` """ From 4940d679332b0c37654617a35e708e17d2805807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 21:15:21 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 050/273] docs(aiac): redesign aiac.pdp.library component PRD MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Reshape models, refactor Configuration and Policy to stateful class APIs based on design decisions from grilling session. Models: - Remove Assignments and Permission - Role: drop clientRole; add childRoles (list[Role]), mappedScopes (list[Scope]) - Subject: add roles (list[Role]) - Service: drop clientId, protocol, publicClient; add type (Agent/Tool), roles, scopes - Scope: drop protocol - Definition order: Subject → Role → Service → Scope with model_rebuild() calls Configuration: refactor from module-level functions to stateful Configuration class with for_realm() factory; drop get_subject_assignments, get_service_permissions, get_role_composites Policy: refactor from module-level functions to stateful Policy class with for_realm() factory; drop all composite/permission functions; rename create_service_scope → create_scope Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/library.md | 143 +++++++----------- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index d990e439a..5bcacb2b9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -55,54 +55,47 @@ pydantic All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown fields, ensuring stability across backend version upgrades. +Model definition order in the module: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` all reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. + #### `Subject` Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). -| Field | Type | Keycloak field | -|-------|------|----------------| -| `id` | `str` | `id` | -| `username` | `str` | `username` | -| `email` | `str \| None` | `email` | -| `firstName` | `str \| None` | `firstName` | -| `lastName` | `str \| None` | `lastName` | -| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | +|-------|------|----------------|---------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `username` | `str` | `username` | | +| `email` | `str \| None` | `email` | | +| `firstName` | `str \| None` | `firstName` | | +| `lastName` | `str \| None` | `lastName` | | +| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | +| `roles` | `list[Role]` | `realmRoles` | `[]` | #### `Role` Represents a realm-level role (Keycloak: `realm role`). -| Field | Type | Keycloak field | -|-------|------|----------------| -| `id` | `str` | `id` | -| `name` | `str` | `name` | -| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | -| `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | -| `clientRole` | `bool` | `clientRole` | - -#### `Assignments` - -Represents the current role and permission assignments for a subject (Keycloak: `GET /users/{id}/role-mappings` response). - | Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | |-------|------|----------------|---------| -| `realmMappings` | `list[Role]` | `realmMappings` | `[]` | -| `serviceMappings` | `dict[str, Any]` | `clientMappings` | `{}` | - -`realmMappings` is a typed list of `Role` instances. `serviceMappings` is kept as a raw dict (structure varies by Keycloak version). `Assignments` is defined after `Role` in the module. +| `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `name` | `str` | `name` | | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | | +| `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | | +| `childRoles` | `list[Role]` | `composites.realm` | `[]` | +| `mappedScopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(client scopes mapped to role)_ | `[]` | #### `Service` Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). -| Field | Type | Keycloak field | -|-------|------|----------------| -| `id` | `str` | `id` | -| `clientId` | `str` | `clientId` | -| `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | -| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | -| `protocol` | `str \| None` | `protocol` | -| `publicClient` | `bool` | `publicClient` | +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | +|-------|------|----------------|---------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | | +| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | +| `type` | `Literal["Agent", "Tool"] \| None` | `attributes.type` | `None` | +| `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(realm roles for this client)_ | `[]` | +| `scopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(default client scopes)_ | `[]` | #### `Scope` @@ -113,24 +106,11 @@ Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). | `id` | `str` | `id` | | `name` | `str` | `name` | | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | -| `protocol` | `str \| None` | `protocol` | - -#### `Permission` - -Represents a service permission (Keycloak: `client role`). Used as both the return type of `get_service_permissions` / `get_role_composites` and the payload element for composite add/remove operations. - -| Field | Type | Keycloak field | -|-------|------|----------------| -| `id` | `str` | `id` | -| `name` | `str` | `name` | -| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | -| `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | -| `clientRole` | `bool` | `clientRole` | ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] @@ -150,22 +130,25 @@ pydantic python-dotenv ``` -### Functions +### Class: `Configuration` -All seven functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter, forwarded to the Service as `?realm=`. +Stateful client bound to a single realm. Construct via the factory method or directly. ```python -def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: ... -def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: ... -def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: ... -def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: ... -def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: ... -def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: ... -def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: ... +class Configuration: + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: ... + + @classmethod + def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Configuration": ... + + def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: ... + def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: ... + def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: ... ``` -Each function: -1. Issues `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/` (with path parameters substituted as needed), always appending `?realm=`. +Each method: +1. Issues `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/`, always appending `?realm=`. 2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 3. Parses the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). @@ -180,9 +163,10 @@ Read from a `.env` file co-located with `configuration.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/l ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import get_subjects, get_roles +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration -subjects = get_subjects(realm="kagenti") +cfg = Configuration.for_realm("kagenti") +subjects = cfg.get_subjects() for s in subjects: print(s.username, s.email) ``` @@ -201,36 +185,22 @@ pydantic python-dotenv ``` -### Functions +### Class: `Policy` -All functions require a mandatory `realm: str` parameter. +Stateful client bound to a single realm. Construct via the factory method or directly. ```python -def add_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: ... -def remove_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: ... -def clear_all_composites(realm: str) -> None: ... -def create_service_permission(service_id: str, permission_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> Permission: ... -def create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, realm: str) -> Scope: ... -``` +class Policy: + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: ... -`add_role_composites` and `remove_role_composites`: -1. Issue `POST` / `DELETE {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/roles/{role_name}/composites` with the serialised permission list as JSON body, appending `?realm=`. -2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -3. Return `None` on success. + @classmethod + def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": ... -`clear_all_composites`: -1. Issues `DELETE {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/composites`, appending `?realm=`. -2. The service iterates all realm roles and removes all composite mappings. -3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -4. Returns `None` on success. - -`create_service_permission`: -1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/services/{service_id}/permissions` with body `{"name": permission_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. -2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -3. Returns the created `Permission` instance parsed from the response. + def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: ... +``` -`create_service_scope`: -1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/services/{service_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. +`create_scope`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/services/{service_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. 2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the service as a default scope in a single atomic operation. 3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 4. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. @@ -244,9 +214,8 @@ def create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, rea ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import add_role_composites -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Permission +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy -permissions = [Permission(id="abc", name="editor", description=None, composite=False, clientRole=True)] -add_role_composites(role_name="developer", permissions=permissions, realm="kagenti") +policy = Policy.for_realm("kagenti") +scope = policy.create_scope(service_id="abc123", scope_name="read", description="Read access") ``` From 4489d700ddb8fdc8c1d1fcfe5720751455769571 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 21:28:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 051/273] docs(aiac): add missing description field to Service model in library PRD Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 5bcacb2b9..79831d3b0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). |-------|------|----------------|---------| | `id` | `str` | `id` | | | `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | `None` | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | | `type` | `Literal["Agent", "Tool"] \| None` | `attributes.type` | `None` | | `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(realm roles for this client)_ | `[]` | From 5c14729996bb3f23a42eb55c1c790059596a073d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 22:06:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 052/273] refactor(aiac): Reshape pdp.library into class-based config/policy clients MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Reshape aiac.pdp.library to match the redesigned PRD (issues 1.6, 2.9, 2.10). Implementation done via TDD red-green-refactor cycles. Models (issue 1.6): - Remove Assignments, Permission; remove clientRole from Role; remove clientId/protocol/publicClient from Service; remove protocol from Scope - Add Service.type: Literal["Agent","Tool"] | None - Add nested roles/scopes lists to Subject, Role, Service - Add childRoles/mappedScopes to Role; call model_rebuild() for forward refs Configuration (issue 2.9): - Rewrite module-level functions as Configuration class with for_realm() classmethod factory; reads AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL env var with fallback - get_subjects / get_roles / get_services / get_scopes return typed lists Policy (issue 2.10): - Rewrite as Policy class with for_realm() factory; reads AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL - create_scope POSTs to /services/{id}/scopes and returns Scope Supporting changes: - Empty pdp/__init__.py and pdp/library/__init__.py (no re-exports at pkg root) - Adapt read_api_from_config to new model shapes; stub out-of-scope functions (get_subject_assignments, get_service_permissions, get_role_composites) pending issues 3.5 / 3.7–3.11 - Rewrite test_models.py (31 tests), test_configuration.py (15 tests), test_policy.py (8 tests) — all 54 pass - Update show_keycloak_data.py to the new class-based API; confirmed green against live PDP config service in kind-kagenti cluster Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py | 7 - aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py | 11 - aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py | 76 +++--- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py | 31 +-- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py | 73 ++---- .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 122 +--------- aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 57 +---- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 148 +++++++----- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 220 ++++++++++-------- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py | 134 ++++------- 10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 533 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py index e8e8ee53f..e69de29bb 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/__init__.py @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -from . import library -from . import service - -__all__ = [ - "library", - "service", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py index 8346b7a0d..e69de29bb 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/__init__.py @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -from . import read_api_from_config -from . import configuration -from . import policy -from . import models - -__all__ = [ - "read_api_from_config", - "configuration", - "policy", - "models", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py index 0f53b0c85..8cc679925 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py @@ -4,61 +4,45 @@ import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from .models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission +from .models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") -def _base_url() -> str: - return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") +class Configuration: + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: + self.realm = realm + @classmethod + def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Configuration": + return cls(realm) -def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: - return {"realm": realm} + def _base_url(self) -> str: + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") + def _params(self) -> dict[str, str]: + return {"realm": self.realm} -def _check(resp) -> None: - if not resp.ok: - raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + def _check(self, resp) -> None: + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: + resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/subjects", params=self._params()) + self._check(resp) + return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] -def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/subjects", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: + resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/roles", params=self._params()) + self._check(resp) + return [Role.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] + def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: + resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services", params=self._params()) + self._check(resp) + return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] -def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/roles", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Role.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] - - -def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/services", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] - - -def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/scopes", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Scope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] - - -def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return Assignments.model_validate(resp.json()) - - -def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/services/{service_id}/permissions", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Permission.model_validate(p) for p in resp.json()] - - -def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/roles/{role_name}/composites", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - return [Permission.model_validate(p) for p in resp.json()] + def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: + resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) + self._check(resp) + return [Scope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py index bee3e3452..9169e1b95 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from typing import Any +from typing import Literal from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ class Subject(BaseModel): firstName: str | None = None lastName: str | None = None enabled: bool + roles: list["Role"] = [] class Role(BaseModel): @@ -21,26 +22,20 @@ class Role(BaseModel): name: str description: str | None = None composite: bool - clientRole: bool - - -class Assignments(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - realmMappings: list[Role] = [] - serviceMappings: dict[str, Any] = {} + childRoles: list["Role"] = [] + mappedScopes: list["Scope"] = [] class Service(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") id: str - clientId: str name: str | None = None description: str | None = None enabled: bool - protocol: str | None = None - publicClient: bool + type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] | None = None + roles: list["Role"] = [] + scopes: list["Scope"] = [] class Scope(BaseModel): @@ -49,14 +44,8 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): id: str name: str description: str | None = None - protocol: str | None = None - -class Permission(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - id: str - name: str - description: str | None = None - composite: bool - clientRole: bool +Subject.model_rebuild() +Role.model_rebuild() +Service.model_rebuild() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py index ad644475c..89f6f1892 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py @@ -4,62 +4,35 @@ import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from .models import Permission, Scope +from .models import Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") -def _base_url() -> str: - return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") +class Policy: + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: + self.realm = realm + @classmethod + def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": + return cls(realm) -def _params(realm: str) -> dict[str, str]: - return {"realm": realm} + def _base_url(self) -> str: + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") + def _params(self) -> dict[str, str]: + return {"realm": self.realm} -def _check(resp) -> None: - if not resp.ok: - raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + def _check(self, resp) -> None: + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") - -def add_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: - url = f"{_base_url()}/roles/{role_name}/composites" - resp = requests.post(url, json=[p.model_dump() for p in permissions], params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - - -def remove_role_composites(role_name: str, permissions: list[Permission], realm: str) -> None: - url = f"{_base_url()}/roles/{role_name}/composites" - resp = requests.delete(url, json=[p.model_dump() for p in permissions], params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - - -def clear_all_composites(realm: str) -> None: - resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/composites", params=_params(realm)) - _check(resp) - - -def create_service_permission( - service_id: str, permission_name: str, description: str, realm: str -) -> Permission: - url = f"{_base_url()}/services/{service_id}/permissions" - resp = requests.post( - url, - json={"name": permission_name, "description": description}, - params=_params(realm), - ) - _check(resp) - return Permission.model_validate(resp.json()) - - -def create_service_scope( - service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str, realm: str -) -> Scope: - url = f"{_base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes" - resp = requests.post( - url, - json={"name": scope_name, "description": description}, - params=_params(realm), - ) - _check(resp) - return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) + def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: + url = f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes" + resp = requests.post( + url, + json={"name": scope_name, "description": description}, + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index 36e842753..1c6fd0544 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import yaml from dotenv import load_dotenv -from .models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission +from .models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: subjects_raw = config.get("subjects", []) if not subjects_raw: subjects_raw = config.get("users", []) - + result = [] for subject in subjects_raw: if not isinstance(subject, dict): @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: name=name, description=description, composite=False, - clientRole=False, ) ) return result @@ -75,29 +74,20 @@ def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: for service in services_raw: if isinstance(service, dict): service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or "" - client_id = service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or service_id name = service.get("name") or None description = service.get("description") or None enabled = service.get("enabled", True) - protocol = service.get("protocol") - public_client = service.get("publicClient", False) else: service_id = str(service) - client_id = service_id name = None description = None enabled = True - protocol = None - public_client = False result.append( Service( id=service_id, - clientId=client_id, name=name, description=description, enabled=enabled, - protocol=protocol, - publicClient=public_client, ) ) return result @@ -107,24 +97,21 @@ def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: config = _load() scopes_raw = config.get("scopes", []) result = [] - + # If explicit scopes section exists, use it if scopes_raw: for scope in scopes_raw: if isinstance(scope, dict): name = scope["name"] description = scope.get("description") or None - protocol = scope.get("protocol") else: name = str(scope) description = None - protocol = None result.append( Scope( id=name, name=name, description=description, - protocol=protocol, ) ) else: @@ -143,108 +130,23 @@ def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: id=role_name, name=role_name, description=role.get("description"), - protocol=service.get("protocol"), ) ) - + return result -def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> Assignments: - config = _load() - assignments_raw = config.get("subject_assignments", {}) - subject_assignments = assignments_raw.get(subject_id, {}) - - # If subject_assignments not found, try to get from users section (backward compatibility) - if not subject_assignments: - users = config.get("users", []) - for user in users: - if isinstance(user, dict): - user_id = user.get("id") or user.get("username") - if user_id == subject_id: - # Convert "roles" list to realmMappings format - subject_assignments = { - "realmMappings": user.get("roles", []), - "serviceMappings": {} - } - break - - realm_mappings_raw = subject_assignments.get("realmMappings", []) - realm_mappings = [] - for role in realm_mappings_raw: - if isinstance(role, dict): - name = role["name"] - description = role.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(role) - description = None - realm_mappings.append( - Role( - id=name, - name=name, - description=description, - composite=False, - clientRole=False, - ) - ) - return Assignments( - realmMappings=realm_mappings, - serviceMappings=subject_assignments.get("serviceMappings", {}), - ) +# NOTE: get_subject_assignments, get_service_permissions, and get_role_composites +# used the deleted Assignments/Permission models. They are stubs pending the +# scope-based permissions redesign (see issues 3.5, 3.7-3.11). +def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> dict: + return {"realmMappings": [], "serviceMappings": {}} -def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: - services_raw = _load().get("services", []) - for service in services_raw: - if not isinstance(service, dict): - continue - current_service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") - if current_service_id != service_id: - continue - permissions = [] - for permission in service.get("permissions", service.get("roles", [])): - if isinstance(permission, dict): - name = permission["name"] - description = permission.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(permission) - description = None - permissions.append( - Permission( - id=name, - name=name, - description=description, - composite=False, - clientRole=True, - ) - ) - return permissions + +def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Role]: return [] -def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Permission]: - roles_raw = _load().get("roles", []) - for role in roles_raw: - if not isinstance(role, dict) or role.get("name") != role_name: - continue - composites = [] - for composite in role.get("composites", []): - if isinstance(composite, dict): - name = composite["name"] - description = composite.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(composite) - description = None - composites.append( - Permission( - id=name, - name=name, - description=description, - composite=False, - clientRole=True, - ) - ) - return composites +def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Role]: return [] - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index 6fed046f0..c54e40249 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -11,23 +11,18 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent / "src")) -from aiac.pdp.library import configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.models import ( - Assignments, - Permission, - Role, - Scope, - Service, - Subject, -) +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject REALM = "kagenti" def main() -> None: + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) + # --- Subjects (users) --- print("=== Subjects ===") - subjects: list[Subject] = configuration.get_subjects(REALM) + subjects: list[Subject] = cfg.get_subjects() for s in subjects: full_name = " ".join(filter(None, [s.firstName, s.lastName])) or "—" status = "enabled" if s.enabled else "disabled" @@ -36,7 +31,7 @@ def main() -> None: # --- Roles --- print("=== Roles ===") - roles: list[Role] = configuration.get_roles(REALM) + roles: list[Role] = cfg.get_roles() for r in roles: composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") @@ -44,50 +39,20 @@ def main() -> None: # --- Services (clients) --- print("=== Services ===") - services: list[Service] = configuration.get_services(REALM) + services: list[Service] = cfg.get_services() for svc in services: - visibility = "public" if svc.publicClient else "confidential" status = "enabled" if svc.enabled else "disabled" - print(f" {svc.clientId:<40} protocol={svc.protocol or '—'} [{visibility}] [{status}]") + svc_type = svc.type or "—" + print(f" {svc.name or svc.id:<40} type={svc_type:<8} [{status}] desc={svc.description or '—'}") print(f"Total: {len(services)} service(s)\n") # --- Scopes --- print("=== Scopes ===") - scopes: list[Scope] = configuration.get_scopes(REALM) + scopes: list[Scope] = cfg.get_scopes() for sc in scopes: - print(f" {sc.name:<30} protocol={sc.protocol or '—'} desc={sc.description or '—'}") + print(f" {sc.name:<30} desc={sc.description or '—'}") print(f"Total: {len(scopes)} scope(s)\n") - # --- Permissions per service --- - print("=== Service Permissions ===") - for svc in services: - perms: list[Permission] = configuration.get_service_permissions(svc.id, REALM) - if not perms: - continue - print(f" {svc.clientId}:") - for p in perms: - composite = "composite" if p.composite else "simple" - print(f" {p.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={p.description or '—'}") - print() - - # --- Assignments per subject --- - print("=== Subject Assignments ===") - for s in subjects: - assignments: Assignments = configuration.get_subject_assignments(s.id, REALM) - realm_role_names: list[str] = [r.name for r in assignments.realmMappings] - service_map: dict[str, list[str]] = { - svc_name: [r["name"] for r in mapping.get("mappings", [])] - for svc_name, mapping in assignments.serviceMappings.items() - if mapping.get("mappings") - } - print(f" {s.username}:") - if realm_role_names: - print(f" realm : {', '.join(realm_role_names)}") - for svc_name, perm_names in service_map.items(): - print(f" {svc_name:<20}: {', '.join(perm_names)}") - if not realm_role_names and not service_map: - print(" (no assignments)") - if __name__ == "__main__": main() diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index f4ba154fd..fa65f74cc 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -3,22 +3,12 @@ import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission -from aiac.pdp.library import configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" -_ALL_FUNCTIONS = [ - ("get_subjects", (REALM,), "get"), - ("get_roles", (REALM,), "get"), - ("get_services", (REALM,), "get"), - ("get_scopes", (REALM,), "get"), - ("get_subject_assignments", ("subject-uuid", REALM), "get"), - ("get_service_permissions", ("svc-uuid", REALM), "get"), - ("get_role_composites", ("admin", REALM), "get"), -] - def _ok(json_data, status=200): resp = MagicMock() @@ -37,7 +27,23 @@ def _err(status=500): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Success paths — typed returns +# Factory method +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestForRealm: + def test_returns_configuration_bound_to_realm(self): + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) + assert isinstance(cfg, Configuration) + assert cfg.realm == REALM + + def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): + cfg = Configuration(REALM) + assert cfg.realm == REALM + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_subjects # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -46,86 +52,101 @@ def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: - result = configuration.get_subjects(REALM) + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert isinstance(result[0], Subject) assert result[0].username == "alice" m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/subjects", params={"realm": REALM}) + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + class TestGetRoles: def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = configuration.get_roles(REALM) + payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() assert isinstance(result[0], Role) assert result[0].name == "admin" + m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/roles", params={"realm": REALM}) + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_services +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class TestGetServices: def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = configuration.get_services(REALM) + payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert isinstance(result[0], Service) - assert result[0].clientId == "my-app" + assert result[0].id == "c1" + m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/services", params={"realm": REALM}) + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class TestGetScopes: def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = configuration.get_scopes(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() assert isinstance(result[0], Scope) assert result[0].name == "email" + m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/scopes", params={"realm": REALM}) - -class TestGetSubjectAssignments: - def test_returns_assignments(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = { - "realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}], - "serviceMappings": {}, - } - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = configuration.get_subject_assignments("subject-uuid", REALM) - assert isinstance(result, Assignments) - assert result.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" - - -class TestGetServicePermissions: - def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data", "composite": False, "clientRole": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = configuration.get_service_permissions("svc-uuid", REALM) - assert isinstance(result[0], Permission) - assert result[0].name == "view-data" - - -class TestGetRoleComposites: - def test_returns_list_of_permission(self, monkeypatch): + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False, "clientRole": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): - result = configuration.get_role_composites("admin", REALM) - assert isinstance(result[0], Permission) - assert result[0].name == "viewer" + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Non-2xx → RuntimeError for all functions +# realm forwarded as ?realm= on all methods # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -@pytest.mark.parametrize("fn_name,args,method", _ALL_FUNCTIONS) -def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - getattr(configuration, fn_name)(*args) +class TestRealmParameter: + @pytest.mark.parametrize("method,endpoint", [ + ("get_subjects", "subjects"), + ("get_roles", "roles"), + ("get_services", "services"), + ("get_scopes", "scopes"), + ]) + def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + getattr(Configuration.for_realm(REALM), method)() + m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/{endpoint}", params={"realm": REALM}) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -135,7 +156,6 @@ def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", raising=False) - payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: - configuration.get_subjects(REALM) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7071") diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index d3f729c00..76ac67140 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Assignments, Service, Scope, Permission +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope class TestSubject: @@ -26,6 +26,22 @@ def test_optional_fields_absent(self): assert s.firstName is None assert s.lastName is None + def test_roles_populated(self): + s = Subject.model_validate( + { + "id": "u1", + "username": "alice", + "enabled": True, + "roles": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}], + } + ) + assert len(s.roles) == 1 + assert s.roles[0].name == "admin" + + def test_roles_default_empty(self): + s = Subject.model_validate({"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}) + assert s.roles == [] + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): s = Subject.model_validate( {"id": "u3", "username": "carol", "enabled": True, "unknownField": "garbage"} @@ -41,58 +57,65 @@ def test_full_payload(self): "name": "admin", "description": "Administrator role", "composite": False, - "clientRole": False, } ) assert r.id == "r1" assert r.name == "admin" assert r.description == "Administrator role" assert r.composite is False - assert r.clientRole is False def test_optional_description_absent(self): - r = Role.model_validate( - {"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} - ) + r = Role.model_validate({"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": True}) assert r.description is None - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + def test_child_roles_populated(self): r = Role.model_validate( { - "id": "r3", - "name": "editor", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": False, - "containerId": "master", + "id": "r1", + "name": "admin", + "composite": True, + "childRoles": [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}], } ) - assert not hasattr(r, "containerId") + assert len(r.childRoles) == 1 + assert r.childRoles[0].name == "viewer" + def test_child_roles_default_empty(self): + r = Role.model_validate({"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}) + assert r.childRoles == [] -class TestAssignments: - def test_full_payload(self): - a = Assignments.model_validate( + def test_mapped_scopes_populated(self): + r = Role.model_validate( { - "realmMappings": [ - {"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": False} - ], - "serviceMappings": { - "account": {"id": "a1", "client": "account", "mappings": []} - }, + "id": "r1", + "name": "admin", + "composite": False, + "mappedScopes": [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}], } ) - assert len(a.realmMappings) == 1 - assert a.realmMappings[0].name == "admin" - assert "account" in a.serviceMappings + assert len(r.mappedScopes) == 1 + assert r.mappedScopes[0].name == "email" + + def test_mapped_scopes_default_empty(self): + r = Role.model_validate({"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}) + assert r.mappedScopes == [] - def test_defaults_to_empty(self): - a = Assignments.model_validate({}) - assert a.realmMappings == [] - assert a.serviceMappings == {} + def test_no_clientRole_field(self): + r = Role.model_validate( + {"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False, "clientRole": True} + ) + assert not hasattr(r, "clientRole") def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - a = Assignments.model_validate({"realmMappings": [], "unknownField": "dropped"}) - assert not hasattr(a, "unknownField") + r = Role.model_validate( + { + "id": "r3", + "name": "editor", + "composite": False, + "containerId": "master", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(r, "containerId") class TestService: @@ -100,99 +123,110 @@ def test_full_payload(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c1", - "clientId": "my-app", "name": "My Application", "description": "Does things", "enabled": True, - "protocol": "openid-connect", - "publicClient": False, + "type": "Agent", } ) assert s.id == "c1" - assert s.clientId == "my-app" assert s.name == "My Application" assert s.description == "Does things" assert s.enabled is True - assert s.protocol == "openid-connect" - assert s.publicClient is False + assert s.type == "Agent" + + def test_type_tool(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "name": "tool-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"}) + assert s.type == "Tool" + + def test_type_none_when_absent(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c2", "name": "bare", "enabled": True}) + assert s.type is None def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - s = Service.model_validate( - {"id": "c2", "clientId": "bare-client", "enabled": False, "publicClient": True} - ) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c2", "enabled": False}) assert s.name is None assert s.description is None - assert s.protocol is None + assert s.type is None - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + def test_description_present(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "description": "a desc"}) + assert s.description == "a desc" + + def test_description_absent_is_none(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + assert s.description is None + + def test_roles_populated(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c1", + "enabled": True, + "roles": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}], + } + ) + assert len(s.roles) == 1 + assert s.roles[0].name == "admin" + + def test_roles_default_empty(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + assert s.roles == [] + + def test_scopes_populated(self): s = Service.model_validate( { - "id": "c3", - "clientId": "extra-client", + "id": "c1", "enabled": True, - "publicClient": False, - "surplusField": "ignored", + "scopes": [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}], } ) + assert len(s.scopes) == 1 + assert s.scopes[0].name == "email" + + def test_scopes_default_empty(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + assert s.scopes == [] + + def test_no_clientId_field(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "clientId": "my-app"} + ) + assert not hasattr(s, "clientId") + + def test_no_protocol_field(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "protocol": "openid-connect"} + ) + assert not hasattr(s, "protocol") + + def test_no_publicClient_field(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False} + ) + assert not hasattr(s, "publicClient") + + def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + {"id": "c3", "enabled": True, "surplusField": "ignored"} + ) assert not hasattr(s, "surplusField") class TestScope: def test_full_payload(self): - s = Scope.model_validate( - { - "id": "s1", - "name": "email", - "description": "Email scope", - "protocol": "openid-connect", - } - ) + s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s1", "name": "email", "description": "Email scope"}) assert s.id == "s1" assert s.name == "email" assert s.description == "Email scope" - assert s.protocol == "openid-connect" - def test_optional_fields_absent(self): + def test_optional_description_absent(self): s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s2", "name": "profile"}) assert s.description is None - assert s.protocol is None + + def test_no_protocol_field(self): + s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s1", "name": "email", "protocol": "openid-connect"}) + assert not hasattr(s, "protocol") def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s3", "name": "roles", "unknownAttr": "dropped"}) assert not hasattr(s, "unknownAttr") - - -class TestPermission: - def test_full_payload(self): - p = Permission.model_validate( - { - "id": "cr1", - "name": "view-clients", - "description": "View clients role", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": True, - } - ) - assert p.id == "cr1" - assert p.name == "view-clients" - assert p.description == "View clients role" - assert p.composite is False - assert p.clientRole is True - - def test_optional_description_absent(self): - p = Permission.model_validate( - {"id": "cr2", "name": "manage-clients", "composite": True, "clientRole": True} - ) - assert p.description is None - - def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): - p = Permission.model_validate( - { - "id": "cr3", - "name": "query-clients", - "composite": False, - "clientRole": True, - "containerId": "master", - } - ) - assert not hasattr(p, "containerId") diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py index d3cf632c6..5ced5f619 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py @@ -3,22 +3,14 @@ import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Permission, Scope -from aiac.pdp.library import policy +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Scope +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" -_WRITE_FUNCTIONS = [ - ("add_role_composites", ("admin", [], REALM), "post"), - ("remove_role_composites", ("admin", [], REALM), "delete"), - ("clear_all_composites", (REALM,), "delete"), - ("create_service_permission", ("svc-uuid", "view-data", "desc", REALM), "post"), - ("create_service_scope", ("svc-uuid", "read:data", "desc", REALM), "post"), -] - -def _ok(json_data=None, status=204): +def _ok(json_data=None, status=201): resp = MagicMock() resp.ok = True resp.status_code = status @@ -35,96 +27,67 @@ def _err(status=500): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# add_role_composites +# Factory method # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestAddRoleComposites: - def test_posts_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - perms = [Permission(id="r1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=False)] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: - result = policy.add_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) - assert result is None - m.assert_called_once() - url, kwargs = m.call_args[0][0], m.call_args[1] - assert "/roles/admin/composites" in url - assert "realm" in kwargs.get("params", {}) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# remove_role_composites -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +class TestForRealm: + def test_returns_policy_bound_to_realm(self): + p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) + assert isinstance(p, Policy) + assert p.realm == REALM - -class TestRemoveRoleComposites: - def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - perms = [Permission(id="r1", name="viewer", composite=False, clientRole=False)] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: - result = policy.remove_role_composites("admin", perms, REALM) - assert result is None - m.assert_called_once() - url = m.call_args[0][0] - assert "/roles/admin/composites" in url + def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): + p = Policy(REALM) + assert p.realm == REALM # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# clear_all_composites +# create_scope # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestClearAllComposites: - def test_deletes_and_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: - result = policy.clear_all_composites(REALM) - assert result is None - url = m.call_args[0][0] - assert url.endswith("/composites") - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# create_service_permission -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestCreateServicePermission: - def test_returns_permission_instance(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - created = {"id": "cr1", "name": "view-data", "composite": False, "clientRole": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): - result = policy.create_service_permission("svc-uuid", "view-data", "desc", REALM) - assert isinstance(result, Permission) - assert result.name == "view-data" - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# create_service_scope -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestCreateServiceScope: +class TestCreateScope: def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): - result = policy.create_service_scope("svc-uuid", "read:data", "desc", REALM) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: + result = Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( + service_id="svc-uuid", scope_name="read:data", description="Read access" + ) assert isinstance(result, Scope) assert result.name == "read:data" + assert result.id == "sc1" + def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "write"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-abc", "write", "Write access") + url = m.call_args[0][0] + assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-abc/scopes" -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Non-2xx → RuntimeError for all functions -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") + params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) + assert params == {"realm": REALM} + def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "Read access") + body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) + assert body == {"name": "read", "description": "Read access"} -@pytest.mark.parametrize("fn_name,args,method", _WRITE_FUNCTIONS) -def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - with patch(f"aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.{method}", return_value=_err()): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - getattr(policy, fn_name)(*args) + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -134,6 +97,7 @@ def test_non_2xx_raises_runtime_error(fn_name, args, method, monkeypatch): def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.delete", return_value=_ok()) as m: - policy.clear_all_composites(REALM) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7072") From 7575a49cf0623506a223641b3e021ffa9a2868e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 22:35:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 053/273] docs(aiac): move create_scope from policy to configuration library module Scopes are configuration entities, not policy entities. The library split is by domain: configuration (subjects/roles/services/scopes read+write) vs policy (composite role mappings / Rego rules). Move create_scope and its HTTP endpoint from AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL to AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL. Update PRD.md to remove the read-only characterisation of the PDP Configuration Service and the configuration library module. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 12 +++---- .../requirements/components/library.md | 33 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 65453a084..b2acf367c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -232,9 +232,9 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ │ │ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ │ aiac.pdp.library.configuration — HTTP client │ -│ PDP Configuration Service │ +│ (read/write) PDP Configuration Svc │ │ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ -│ PDP Policy Service │ +│ (read/write) PDP Policy Service │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` @@ -334,8 +334,8 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | PDP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | | PDP Policy Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions | -| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None | +| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes configuration entities) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None (writes policy rules/mappings) | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 PDP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints using generic PDP entity names. Exposes 7 read endpoints. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. **Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the PDP Configuration Service i Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: - **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all PDP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Permission`, `Scope`, `Assignments`). -- **`aiac.pdp.library.configuration`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Configuration Service; returns typed Pydantic instances; all functions require a `realm: str` parameter. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.configuration`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes); returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. - **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service; abstracts Phase 1 (Keycloak composite mappings) and Phase 2 (OPA Rego) behind a stable function interface. **Full spec:** [components/library.md](components/library.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 79831d3b0..721057904 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] ## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` ### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.models`. +HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API. Provides both read and write access to PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.models`. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -146,12 +146,20 @@ class Configuration: def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: ... def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: ... def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: ... + + def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: ... ``` -Each method: -1. Issues `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/`, always appending `?realm=`. -2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -3. Parses the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). +Read methods (`get_*`): +1. Issue `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/`, always appending `?realm=`. +2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Parse the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). + +`create_scope`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the service as a default scope in a single atomic operation. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +4. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. ### Configuration @@ -170,6 +178,8 @@ cfg = Configuration.for_realm("kagenti") subjects = cfg.get_subjects() for s in subjects: print(s.username, s.email) + +scope = cfg.create_scope(service_id="abc123", scope_name="read", description="Read access") ``` --- @@ -177,7 +187,9 @@ for s in subjects: ## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` ### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Policy Service REST API. Abstracts the Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA) policy write backends behind a stable function interface — callers never interact with the backend directly. The active backend is determined by `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, which points to whichever policy service pod is deployed. +HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Policy Service REST API. Abstracts the Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA) policy backends behind a stable function interface — callers never interact with the backend directly. The active backend is determined by `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, which points to whichever policy service pod is deployed. + +Handles policy operations: composite role mappings (Phase 1) and Rego rules (Phase 2). Configuration entity operations (e.g. scope creation) belong to `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -196,15 +208,9 @@ class Policy: @classmethod def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": ... - - def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: ... ``` -`create_scope`: -1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/services/{service_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. -2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the service as a default scope in a single atomic operation. -3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -4. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. +Policy write methods (composite role management and permissions) are defined in the PDP Policy Service component PRD. ### Configuration @@ -218,5 +224,4 @@ class Policy: from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy policy = Policy.for_realm("kagenti") -scope = policy.create_scope(service_id="abc123", scope_name="read", description="Read access") ``` From 3fae309b968405655f34699e2bfb2b6ec8e9878e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 23:05:21 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 054/273] feat(aiac): move create_scope to Configuration; add POST /services/{id}/scopes endpoint MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Add `Configuration.create_scope(service_id, scope_name, description)` to `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` — POSTs to the config service and returns a typed `Scope` instance - Strip `Policy` to a skeleton (`__init__` + `for_realm` only); scope creation belongs to `Configuration`, not `Policy` - Add `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes` to the PDP Configuration Keycloak service: creates a realm-level client scope and assigns it as a default scope to the given service in a single operation (201 on success, 502 on KeycloakError) - Add `pydantic` to the configuration service `requirements.txt` - Update PRD (`pdp-configuration-service.md`) with the new endpoint spec - Full TDD coverage: 93 unit tests pass Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 7 ++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py | 10 +++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py | 20 ----- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 20 ++++- .../configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt | 1 + aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 48 +++++++++++ aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py | 83 ++----------------- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 62 ++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index b64c008ce..d37631872 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Retur | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Permissions (roles) defined for a specific service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a realm role | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` + `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create realm scope and assign as default scope to service | + +The `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes` endpoint accepts a JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: +1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the scope at realm level and get back the scope ID. +2. Calls `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign the new scope as a default scope to the given service. +3. Returns `201 Created` with the created scope JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py index 8cc679925..901d0294a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py @@ -46,3 +46,13 @@ def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) return [Scope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + + def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: + url = f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes" + resp = requests.post( + url, + json={"name": scope_name, "description": description}, + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py index 89f6f1892..ce936051d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py @@ -1,11 +1,8 @@ import os from pathlib import Path -import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from .models import Scope - load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") @@ -19,20 +16,3 @@ def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": def _base_url(self) -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") - - def _params(self) -> dict[str, str]: - return {"realm": self.realm} - - def _check(self, resp) -> None: - if not resp.ok: - raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") - - def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: - url = f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes" - resp = requests.post( - url, - json={"name": scope_name, "description": description}, - params=self._params(), - ) - self._check(resp) - return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 071b15a3a..e16d33d1a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ import os from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any - from dotenv import load_dotenv from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError +from pydantic import BaseModel from starlette.responses import JSONResponse _admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None @@ -39,6 +38,11 @@ async def _lifespan(application: FastAPI): app = FastAPI(lifespan=_lifespan) +class _ScopeCreate(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str = "" + + @app.get("/subjects") def list_subjects(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: @@ -92,6 +96,18 @@ def list_service_permissions(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/scopes", status_code=201) +def create_scope(service_id: str, body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( + {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} + ) + admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id) + return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.get("/roles/{role_name}/composites") def list_role_composites(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt index 0464cb432..056a4a863 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ fastapi uvicorn[standard] python-keycloak python-dotenv +pydantic diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index fa65f74cc..24663cb64 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -130,6 +130,54 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# create_scope +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateScope: + def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( + service_id="svc-uuid", scope_name="read:data", description="Read access" + ) + assert isinstance(result, Scope) + assert result.name == "read:data" + assert result.id == "sc1" + + def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "write"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-abc", "write", "Write access") + url = m.call_args[0][0] + assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-abc/scopes" + + def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") + params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) + assert params == {"realm": REALM} + + def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "Read access") + body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) + assert body == {"name": "read", "description": "Read access"} + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # realm forwarded as ?realm= on all methods # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py index 5ced5f619..186b5e846 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py @@ -1,29 +1,8 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.policy.""" -import pytest -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch - -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Scope from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy REALM = "kagenti" -BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" - - -def _ok(json_data=None, status=201): - resp = MagicMock() - resp.ok = True - resp.status_code = status - resp.json.return_value = json_data or {} - return resp - - -def _err(status=500): - resp = MagicMock() - resp.ok = False - resp.status_code = status - resp.text = "internal error" - return resp # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -43,61 +22,17 @@ def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# create_scope +# Default URL fallback (verifies env var is read) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestCreateScope: - def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: - result = Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( - service_id="svc-uuid", scope_name="read:data", description="Read access" - ) - assert isinstance(result, Scope) - assert result.name == "read:data" - assert result.id == "sc1" - - def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "write"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-abc", "write", "Write access") - url = m.call_args[0][0] - assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-abc/scopes" - - def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") - params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) - assert params == {"realm": REALM} - - def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "Read access") - body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) - assert body == {"name": "read", "description": "Read access"} - - def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_err()): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Default URL fallback -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +def test_default_base_url_fallback(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) + p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) + assert p._base_url() == "http://127.0.0.1:7072" -def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) - created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created)) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") - assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7072") +def test_base_url_reads_from_env(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://custom:9999") + p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) + assert p._base_url() == "http://custom:9999" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index e6b9c1bc5..f0ac8df0c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -203,6 +203,68 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /services/{service_id}/scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateScope: + def test_returns_201_with_scope_json(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.return_value = "new-scope-id" + admin.get_client_scope.return_value = { + "id": "new-scope-id", + "name": "read:data", + "description": "Read access", + } + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 201 + body = resp.json() + assert body["id"] == "new-scope-id" + assert body["name"] == "read:data" + + def test_assigns_scope_as_default_to_service(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.return_value = "scope-id-42" + admin.get_client_scope.return_value = {"id": "scope-id-42", "name": "write"} + _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-abc/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "write", "description": "Write access"}, + ) + admin.add_default_default_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("svc-abc", "scope-id-42") + + def test_creates_scope_with_openid_connect_protocol(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.return_value = "sid" + admin.get_client_scope.return_value = {"id": "sid", "name": "read"} + _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "read", "description": "desc"}, + ) + call_payload = admin.create_client_scope.call_args[0][0] + assert call_payload["protocol"] == "openid-connect" + assert call_payload["name"] == "read" + assert call_payload["description"] == "desc" + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="backend failure", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "read", "description": "desc"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # KeycloakError → 502 on all endpoints # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From 12fcda3652e21c94df3a3698e850a3424957e996 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 23:40:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 055/273] docs(aiac): split create_scope into create/map; add role equivalents Replace the atomic `create_scope(service_id, scope_name, description)` with two separate methods: `create_scope` (realm-level creation) and `map_scope_to_service` (assigns existing scope to a service, returns refreshed Service). Add matching `create_role` / `map_role_to_service` methods for realm-level roles. Update the PDP Configuration Service PRD accordingly: remove the old atomic `POST /services/{id}/scopes`, add `POST /scopes`, `POST /roles`, `POST /services/{id}/scopes/{scope_id}`, `POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id}`, and `GET /services/{id}` endpoints with Keycloak Admin API mappings and 409/502 response semantics. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/library.md | 38 +++++++++++++++--- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 39 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 721057904..4a6d4a584 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -147,7 +147,11 @@ class Configuration: def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: ... def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: ... - def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: ... + def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: ... + def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: ... + + def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: ... + def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: ... ``` Read methods (`get_*`): @@ -156,10 +160,26 @@ Read methods (`get_*`): 3. Parse the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). `create_scope`: -1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service_id}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": description}`, appending `?realm=`. -2. The service creates the scope at realm level and assigns it to the service as a default scope in a single atomic operation. -3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -4. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a scope with that name already exists). +3. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. + +`map_scope_to_service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/scopes/{scope.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if the scope is already mapped to the service). +3. Re-fetches the service via `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response. + +`create_role`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles` with body `{"name": role_name, "description": role_description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a role with that name already exists). +3. Returns the created `Role` instance parsed from the response. + +`map_role_to_service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if the role is already mapped to the service). +3. Re-fetches the service via `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response. ### Configuration @@ -179,7 +199,13 @@ subjects = cfg.get_subjects() for s in subjects: print(s.username, s.email) -scope = cfg.create_scope(service_id="abc123", scope_name="read", description="Read access") +scope = cfg.create_scope(scope_name="read", scope_description="Read access") +services = cfg.get_services() +service = next(s for s in services if s.id == "abc123") +updated_service = cfg.map_scope_to_service(service, scope) + +role = cfg.create_role(role_name="reader", role_description="Read-only access") +updated_service = cfg.map_role_to_service(updated_service, role) ``` --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index d37631872..f2b1701f6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -14,15 +14,44 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Retur | GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | | GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{subject_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and service permission assignments for a subject | | GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Permissions (roles) defined for a specific service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a realm role | -| POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` + `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create realm scope and assign as default scope to service | +| POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | +| POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/scope-mappings/realm` | Assign existing realm role to service | + +`GET /services/{service_id}`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)`. +2. Returns `200 OK` with the client JSON on success. +3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /scopes`: +Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: +1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the scope at realm level. +2. Returns `201 Created` with the created scope JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a scope with that name already exists. +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}`: +1. Calls `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign the scope as a default scope to the service. +2. Returns `201 Created` on success. +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the scope is already assigned to the service. +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /roles`: +Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: +1. Calls `admin.create_realm_role({"name": ..., "description": ...})` to create the role at realm level. +2. Returns `201 Created` with the created role JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a role with that name already exists. +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. -The `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes` endpoint accepts a JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: -1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the scope at realm level and get back the scope ID. -2. Calls `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign the new scope as a default scope to the given service. -3. Returns `201 Created` with the created scope JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). +`POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: +1. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the realm role to the service's scope mappings. +2. Returns `201 Created` on success. +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned to the service. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. From fc43ca5dd48a75d9580dadb8fa99335c206cf6b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:03:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 056/273] feat(aiac): add scope/role write endpoints to config service and library MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add 5 new write endpoints to the PDP Configuration Service (issue 1.9): - GET /services/{service_id} - POST /scopes (creates realm-level scope with protocol openid-connect) - POST /services/{id}/scopes/{scope_id} (assigns scope as default) - POST /roles (creates realm-level role) - POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id} (assigns role to service scope mappings) All endpoints return 409 on conflict and 502 on KeycloakError. Update Configuration library client (issue 2.9) to replace the old create_scope(service_id, ...) with four new write methods: - create_scope(scope_name, scope_description) → POST /scopes - map_scope_to_service(service, scope) → POST + GET re-fetch - create_role(role_name, role_description) → POST /roles - map_role_to_service(service, role) → POST + GET re-fetch Add unit tests for all 5 service endpoints (issue 2.11) and update library configuration tests to cover the new write methods (issue 3.13). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py | 36 ++- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 59 +++++ aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 183 ++++++++++++++- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 216 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 484 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py index 901d0294a..1cc6cd5c7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py @@ -47,12 +47,40 @@ def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: self._check(resp) return [Scope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] - def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: - url = f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes" + def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: resp = requests.post( - url, - json={"name": scope_name, "description": description}, + f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", + json={"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}, params=self._params(), ) self._check(resp) return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) + + def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: + resp = requests.post( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/scopes/{scope.id}", + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + get_resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}", params=self._params()) + self._check(get_resp) + return Service.model_validate(get_resp.json()) + + def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: + resp = requests.post( + f"{self._base_url()}/roles", + json={"name": role_name, "description": role_description}, + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + return Role.model_validate(resp.json()) + + def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: + resp = requests.post( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}", + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + get_resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}", params=self._params()) + self._check(get_resp) + return Service.model_validate(get_resp.json()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index e16d33d1a..6f3323674 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -108,6 +108,65 @@ def create_scope(service_id: str, body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Dep return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.get("/services/{service_id}") +def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client(service_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str = "" + + +@app.post("/scopes", status_code=201) +def create_scope_standalone(body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( + {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} + ) + return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 409: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}", status_code=201) +def assign_scope_to_service(service_id: str, scope_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id) + return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) + except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 409: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/roles", status_code=201) +def create_role(body: _RoleCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + admin.create_realm_role({"name": body.name, "description": body.description}) + return admin.get_realm_role(body.name) + except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 409: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}", status_code=201) +def assign_role_to_service(service_id: str, role_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}]) + return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) + except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 409: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.get("/roles/{role_name}/composites") def list_role_composites(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 24663cb64..397f2dc25 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( - service_id="svc-uuid", scope_name="read:data", description="Read access" + scope_name="read:data", scope_description="Read access" ) assert isinstance(result, Scope) assert result.name == "read:data" @@ -151,15 +151,15 @@ def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "write"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-abc", "write", "Write access") + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("write", "Write access") url = m.call_args[0][0] - assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-abc/scopes" + assert url == f"{BASE}/scopes" def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "desc") params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) assert params == {"realm": REALM} @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "Read access") + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "Read access") body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) assert body == {"name": "read", "description": "Read access"} @@ -175,7 +175,178 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("svc-uuid", "read", "desc") + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "desc") + + def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("dupe", "desc") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# map_scope_to_service +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestMapScopeToService: + def _make_service(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + return Service.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def _make_scope(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"} + return Scope.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + scope = self._make_scope() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}]} + post_resp = _ok({}, 201) + get_resp = _ok(updated) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=get_resp) as get_m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) + assert isinstance(result, Service) + assert result.id == "svc-uuid" + get_m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid", params={"realm": REALM}) + + def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + scope = self._make_scope() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) + url = post_m.call_args[0][0] + assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id" + + def test_raises_on_post_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + scope = self._make_scope() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) + + def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + scope = self._make_scope() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) + assert post_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + assert get_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# create_role +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateRole: + def test_returns_role_instance(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "description": "Read-only", "composite": False} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") + assert isinstance(result, Role) + assert result.name == "reader" + assert result.id == "r1" + + def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") + url = m.call_args[0][0] + assert url == f"{BASE}/roles" + + def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") + assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + + def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") + assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"name": "reader", "description": "Read-only"} + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") + + def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("dupe", "desc") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# map_role_to_service +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestMapRoleToService: + def _make_service(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + return Service.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def _make_role(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "role-id", "name": "reader", "composite": False} + return Role.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + role = self._make_role() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) + assert isinstance(result, Service) + get_m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid", params={"realm": REALM}) + + def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + role = self._make_role() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) + url = post_m.call_args[0][0] + assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id" + + def test_raises_on_post_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) + + def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + role = self._make_role() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) + assert post_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + assert get_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index f0ac8df0c..8c9f9f10d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -265,6 +265,222 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /services/{service_id} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetService: + def test_returns_200_with_client_json(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "my-app"} + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()["id"] == "svc-uuid" + admin.get_client.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.side_effect = KeycloakError(error_message="not found", response_code=404) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateScopeEndpoint: + def test_returns_201_with_scope_json(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.return_value = "new-scope-id" + admin.get_client_scope.return_value = { + "id": "new-scope-id", + "name": "read:data", + "description": "Read access", + } + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/scopes?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 201 + body = resp.json() + assert body["id"] == "new-scope-id" + assert body["name"] == "read:data" + + def test_creates_scope_with_openid_connect_protocol(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.return_value = "sid" + admin.get_client_scope.return_value = {"id": "sid", "name": "read"} + _make_client(admin).post(f"/scopes?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "read", "description": "desc"}) + payload = admin.create_client_scope.call_args[0][0] + assert payload["protocol"] == "openid-connect" + assert payload["name"] == "read" + assert payload["description"] == "desc" + + def test_returns_409_on_duplicate_name(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="Conflict", response_code=409 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/scopes?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "dupe", "description": ""}) + assert resp.status_code == 409 + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="backend failure", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/scopes?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "read", "description": "desc"}) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_realm_override_uses_per_realm_admin(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + admin_mock = MagicMock() + admin_mock.create_client_scope.return_value = "s1" + admin_mock.get_client_scope.return_value = {"id": "s1", "name": "x"} + env = { + "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", + "KEYCLOAK_REALM": "master", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", + } + with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock): + with TestClient(app) as client: + resp = client.post("/scopes?realm=other", json={"name": "x", "description": ""}) + assert resp.status_code == 201 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestAssignScopeToService: + def test_returns_201_on_success(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 201 + admin.add_default_default_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid", "scope-id") + + def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.add_default_default_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="Conflict", response_code=409 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 409 + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.add_default_default_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="failure", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /roles +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateRoleEndpoint: + def test_returns_201_with_role_json(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_realm_role.return_value = "new-role-id" + admin.get_realm_role.return_value = { + "id": "new-role-id", + "name": "reader", + "description": "Read-only", + } + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/roles?realm={REALM}", + json={"name": "reader", "description": "Read-only"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 201 + body = resp.json() + assert body["id"] == "new-role-id" + assert body["name"] == "reader" + + def test_creates_role_with_correct_payload(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_realm_role.return_value = "rid" + admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "reader"} + _make_client(admin).post(f"/roles?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "reader", "description": "desc"}) + payload = admin.create_realm_role.call_args[0][0] + assert payload == {"name": "reader", "description": "desc"} + + def test_returns_409_on_duplicate_name(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_realm_role.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="Conflict", response_code=409 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/roles?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "dupe", "description": ""}) + assert resp.status_code == 409 + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.create_realm_role.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="backend failure", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/roles?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "reader", "description": "desc"}) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestAssignRoleToService: + def test_returns_201_on_success(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 201 + admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope.assert_called_once_with( + "svc-uuid", [{"id": "role-id"}] + ) + + def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="Conflict", response_code=409 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 409 + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="failure", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # KeycloakError → 502 on all endpoints # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From 1c8aa0c20be5e1f37cbd8daf296bcb5e72f1ae95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 08:23:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 057/273] new config API Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 45 +-- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 31 +- .../policy/utils/output_generators.py | 14 +- .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 290 +++++++++++------- aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml | 3 + aiac/test/policy/__init__.py | 3 + .../{ => policy}/test_policy_generation.py | 48 ++- .../{ => policy}/test_service_policy_agent.py | 4 +- 8 files changed, 255 insertions(+), 183 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/__init__.py rename aiac/test/{ => policy}/test_policy_generation.py (90%) rename aiac/test/{ => policy}/test_service_policy_agent.py (99%) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index ba9b3750c..4a48d6458 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -43,14 +43,7 @@ from config import create_llm from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import ( - get_roles, - get_services, - get_service_permissions, - get_subjects, - get_subject_assignments, - get_scopes, -) +from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure from utils.output_generators import ( @@ -132,7 +125,11 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - {'service': service_name, 'privilege': privilege['name']} + { + 'service': service_name, + 'privilege': privilege['name'], + 'service_type': privilege.get('service_type') + } ) parsed_scopes = [ @@ -409,21 +406,27 @@ def __init__( max_retries=max_retries ) - roles_models = get_roles(realm=realm) + config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + + roles_models = config_api.get_roles() self.realm_roles = [ {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} for r in roles_models ] - services = get_services(realm=realm) + services = config_api.get_services() self.privileges_map = {} self.service_names = [] for service in services: - permissions = get_service_permissions(service.id, realm=realm) - self.privileges_map[service.clientId] = [ - {"name": permission.name, "description": permission.description or ""} - for permission in permissions + # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service + self.privileges_map[service.id] = [ + { + "name": role.name, + "description": role.description or "", + "service_type": service.type + } + for role in service.roles ] - self.service_names.append(service.clientId) + self.service_names.append(service.id) # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( @@ -572,21 +575,20 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): dir_path = Path(file_dir) dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - # Build user_to_roles mapping using get_subject_assignments user_to_roles = {} # Get all subjects and their role assignments - subjects = get_subjects(realm=self.realm) + config_api = Configuration.for_realm(self.realm) + subjects = config_api.get_subjects() for subject in subjects: - assignments = get_subject_assignments(subject.id, realm=self.realm) user_to_roles[subject.username] = [ - role.name for role in assignments.realmMappings + role.name for role in subject.roles ] # Fetch scopes (if available in config) scopes = [] try: - scopes = get_scopes(realm=self.realm) + scopes = config_api.get_scopes() except Exception: # If no scopes in config, that's okay - we'll just have empty scope lists pass @@ -645,3 +647,4 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): # Made with Bob + diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 5b6ddea2c..8be999077 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -28,11 +28,7 @@ from config import create_llm from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import ( - get_roles, - get_services, - get_service_permissions, -) +from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -96,7 +92,11 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( for realm_role_name in result.get("real_roles_with_access", []): realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - {"service": service_id, "privilege": privilege["name"]} + { + "service": service_id, + "privilege": privilege["name"], + "service_type": privilege.get("service_type") + } ) parsed_scopes = [ @@ -335,21 +335,28 @@ def __init__( max_retries=max_retries, ) - roles_models = get_roles(realm=realm) + config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + + roles_models = config_api.get_roles() self.realm_roles = [ {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} for r in roles_models ] - services = get_services(realm=realm) + services = config_api.get_services() self.privileges = [] for service in services: - if service.clientId != service_id: + if service.id != service_id: continue - permissions = get_service_permissions(service.id, realm=realm) + # Note: Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service + # These are the roles/scopes that belong to this specific service self.privileges = [ - {"name": permission.name, "description": permission.description or ""} - for permission in permissions + { + "name": role.name, + "description": role.description or "", + "service_type": service.type + } + for role in service.roles ] break diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py index edc3a2144..19ea110f1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ def generate_default_rego() -> str: Returns: Rego file content as string """ - return """package authbridge.inbound.request + return """package authbridge.outbound.request default allow := false """ @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ def generate_policy_rego( Returns: Rego file content as string """ - rego_content = """package authbridge.inbound.request + rego_content = """package authbridge.outbound.request import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles @@ -204,7 +204,15 @@ def generate_policy_rego( for priv in privileges: service = priv.get("service", "") privilege = priv.get("privilege", "") + service_type = priv.get("service_type") + # Determine protocol based on service type + # "msp" for Tool type, "a2a" for Agent type + if service_type == "Tool": + protocol = "mcp" + else: + protocol = "a2a" + # Skip if service_filter is set and this privilege is for a different service if service_filter and service != service_filter: continue @@ -217,7 +225,7 @@ def generate_policy_rego( rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' - rego_content += f' input.identity.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' + rego_content += f' input.{protocol}.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' rego_content += f' "{privilege_escaped}" in input.identity.scopes\n' rego_content += "}\n\n" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index 1c6fd0544..16d70436c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -11,142 +11,200 @@ _CONFIG_ENV_VAR = "AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH" -def _load() -> dict: - env_val = os.getenv(_CONFIG_ENV_VAR) - if not env_val: - raise RuntimeError(f"{_CONFIG_ENV_VAR} is not set") - with open(Path(env_val)) as f: - return yaml.safe_load(f) - - -def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: - config = _load() - # Try "subjects" first, fall back to "users" for backward compatibility - subjects_raw = config.get("subjects", []) - if not subjects_raw: - subjects_raw = config.get("users", []) - - result = [] - for subject in subjects_raw: - if not isinstance(subject, dict): - continue - subject_id = subject.get("id") or subject.get("username") - username = subject.get("username") or subject_id - if not subject_id or not username: - continue - result.append( - Subject( - id=subject_id, - username=username, - email=subject.get("email"), - firstName=subject.get("firstName"), - lastName=subject.get("lastName"), - enabled=subject.get("enabled", True), - ) - ) - return result - - -def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: - roles_raw = _load().get("realm_roles", []) - result = [] - for role in roles_raw: - if isinstance(role, dict): - name = role["name"] - description = role.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(role) - description = None - result.append( - Role( - id=name, - name=name, - description=description, - composite=False, - ) - ) - return result - - -def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: - services_raw = _load().get("services", []) - result = [] - for service in services_raw: - if isinstance(service, dict): - service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or "" - name = service.get("name") or None - description = service.get("description") or None - enabled = service.get("enabled", True) - else: - service_id = str(service) - name = None - description = None - enabled = True - result.append( - Service( - id=service_id, - name=name, - description=description, - enabled=enabled, +class Configuration: + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: + self.realm = realm + + @classmethod + def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Configuration": + return cls(realm) + + def _load(self) -> dict: + env_val = os.getenv(_CONFIG_ENV_VAR) + if not env_val: + raise RuntimeError(f"{_CONFIG_ENV_VAR} is not set") + with open(Path(env_val)) as f: + return yaml.safe_load(f) + + def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: + config = self._load() + # Try "subjects" first, fall back to "users" for backward compatibility + subjects_raw = config.get("subjects", []) + if not subjects_raw: + subjects_raw = config.get("users", []) + + # Get realm roles for mapping + realm_roles_map = {} + for role in self.get_roles(): + realm_roles_map[role.name] = role + + result = [] + for subject in subjects_raw: + if not isinstance(subject, dict): + continue + subject_id = subject.get("id") or subject.get("username") + username = subject.get("username") or subject_id + if not subject_id or not username: + continue + + # Parse roles for this subject + roles_raw = subject.get("roles", []) + roles = [] + for role_name in roles_raw: + if isinstance(role_name, str) and role_name in realm_roles_map: + roles.append(realm_roles_map[role_name]) + + result.append( + Subject( + id=subject_id, + username=username, + email=subject.get("email"), + firstName=subject.get("firstName"), + lastName=subject.get("lastName"), + enabled=subject.get("enabled", True), + roles=roles, + ) ) - ) - return result - - -def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: - config = _load() - scopes_raw = config.get("scopes", []) - result = [] - - # If explicit scopes section exists, use it - if scopes_raw: - for scope in scopes_raw: - if isinstance(scope, dict): - name = scope["name"] - description = scope.get("description") or None + return result + + def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: + roles_raw = self._load().get("realm_roles", []) + result = [] + for role in roles_raw: + if isinstance(role, dict): + name = role["name"] + description = role.get("description") or None else: - name = str(scope) + name = str(role) description = None result.append( - Scope( + Role( id=name, name=name, description=description, + composite=False, ) ) - else: - # If no explicit scopes, derive from service roles (each role gets its own audience scope) - services_raw = config.get("services", []) + return result + + def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: + services_raw = self._load().get("services", []) + result = [] for service in services_raw: - if not isinstance(service, dict): - continue - roles = service.get("roles", service.get("permissions", [])) - for role in roles: - if isinstance(role, dict): - role_name = role.get("name") + if isinstance(service, dict): + service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or "" + name = service.get("name") or None + description = service.get("description") or None + enabled = service.get("enabled", True) + service_type = service.get("type") or None + + # Parse roles for this service + roles_raw = service.get("roles", []) + roles = [] + for role in roles_raw: + if isinstance(role, dict): + role_name = role.get("name", "") + role_description = role.get("description") or None + else: + role_name = str(role) + role_description = None + if role_name: - result.append( - Scope( + roles.append( + Role( id=role_name, name=role_name, - description=role.get("description"), + description=role_description, + composite=False, ) ) + else: + service_id = str(service) + name = None + description = None + enabled = True + service_type = None + roles = [] + + result.append( + Service( + id=service_id, + name=name, + description=description, + enabled=enabled, + type=service_type, + roles=roles, + ) + ) + return result + + def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: + config = self._load() + scopes_raw = config.get("scopes", []) + result = [] + + # If explicit scopes section exists, use it + if scopes_raw: + for scope in scopes_raw: + if isinstance(scope, dict): + name = scope["name"] + description = scope.get("description") or None + else: + name = str(scope) + description = None + result.append( + Scope( + id=name, + name=name, + description=description, + ) + ) + else: + # If no explicit scopes, derive from service roles (each role gets its own audience scope) + services_raw = config.get("services", []) + for service in services_raw: + if not isinstance(service, dict): + continue + roles = service.get("roles", service.get("permissions", [])) + for role in roles: + if isinstance(role, dict): + role_name = role.get("name") + if role_name: + result.append( + Scope( + id=role_name, + name=role_name, + description=role.get("description"), + ) + ) + + return result + + def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: + """ + Create a new scope for a service. + Note: This implementation reads from a static config file and cannot persist changes. + This method is provided for API compatibility but will raise an error. + """ + raise NotImplementedError( + "create_scope is not supported when reading from a static config file. " + "Use the HTTP-based Configuration class instead." + ) - return result +# Backward compatibility: module-level functions that delegate to Configuration class +def get_subjects(realm: str) -> list[Subject]: + return Configuration.for_realm(realm).get_subjects() -# NOTE: get_subject_assignments, get_service_permissions, and get_role_composites -# used the deleted Assignments/Permission models. They are stubs pending the -# scope-based permissions redesign (see issues 3.5, 3.7-3.11). -def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, realm: str) -> dict: - return {"realmMappings": [], "serviceMappings": {}} +def get_roles(realm: str) -> list[Role]: + return Configuration.for_realm(realm).get_roles() -def get_service_permissions(service_id: str, realm: str) -> list[Role]: - return [] +def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: + return Configuration.for_realm(realm).get_services() -def get_role_composites(role_name: str, realm: str) -> list[Role]: - return [] +def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: + return Configuration.for_realm(realm).get_scopes() + diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml index 5379e5167..067e2afad 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml @@ -3,18 +3,21 @@ # Optional 'secret' parameter: if not provided, Keycloak will auto-generate the service secret services: - service_id: "kagenti" + type: "Agent" secret: "demo-ui-secret" direct_access_grants: true roles: - name: "demo-ui" description: "Access to the demo UI interface" - service_id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" + type: "Agent" secret: "github-agent-secret" direct_access_grants: true roles: - name: "github-agent" description: "Provides access to GitHub services" - service_id: "github-tool" + type: "Tool" secret: "github-tool-secret" roles: - name: "github-tool-aud" diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/test/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b251d548d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +"""Policy tests package.""" + +# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py similarity index 90% rename from aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py rename to aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 45321375f..c14862fd0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ @pytest.fixture def fixtures_dir(): """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" - return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" @pytest.fixture def config_file(): """Return path to the main config.yaml file.""" - return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" @pytest.fixture @@ -170,8 +170,11 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, ) continue + # Get YAML output from builder (generated on-demand) + yaml_output = builder.get_yaml_output() + # Parse generated YAML - generated_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(result["yaml_output"]) + generated_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_output) # Compare policies match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) @@ -203,35 +206,22 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): """PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure (bypasses LLM).""" - from full_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml - from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState - - # Create a valid policy state with all required fields - state: PolicyState = { - "description": "Test policy description", - "explanation": "Test explanation", - "policy_structure": { - "policy": { - "developer": [ - {"service": "kagenti", "role": "demo-ui"}, - {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"} - ] - } - }, - "parsed_scopes": [], - "yaml_output": "", - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True + from utils.output_generators import generate_yaml_output + + # Create a valid policy structure + policy_structure = { + "policy": { + "developer": [ + {"service": "kagenti", "privilege": "demo-ui"}, + {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-full-access"} + ] + } } + + description = "Test policy description" # Generate YAML - result_state = _generate_yaml(state) - - # Verify YAML was generated - assert "yaml_output" in result_state - yaml_output = result_state["yaml_output"] + yaml_output = generate_yaml_output(policy_structure, description) # Verify YAML contains expected content assert "policy:" in yaml_output diff --git a/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py similarity index 99% rename from aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py rename to aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py index a3189bfae..76bdf0b79 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_service_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py @@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ @pytest.fixture def fixtures_dir(): """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" - return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" @pytest.fixture def config_file(): """Return path to the main config.yaml file.""" - return Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" @pytest.fixture From 3e9775d9475266971913f7a4571966ed72b09363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 11:17:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 058/273] docs(aiac): split aiac-agent PRD into 3 UC sub-PRDs Extract Service Onboarding, Policy Update, and Role Update (formerly Realm Roles) into dedicated sub-PRDs under components/aiac-agent/. Trim aiac-agent.md to shared infrastructure only (NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Validate Node, Config, Error Handling). Add scoped architecture diagrams to each UC sub-PRD. Rename Realm Roles orchestrator to Role Update across all PRD documents. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 6 +- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 280 +----------------- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 246 +++++++++++++++ .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 201 +++++++++++++ .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 135 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 596 insertions(+), 272 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index b2acf367c..039ac72cd 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Realm Roles / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions @@ -438,9 +438,9 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `aiac.apply.build`, `/apply/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Realm Roles | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | +| Role Update | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | -All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Realm Roles** sub-agent applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index dc94f88a0..61a07d746 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Realm Roles | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | +| Role Update | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ flowchart TD ORC2 --> SA4 end - subgraph RR["Realm Roles"] + subgraph RR["Role Update"] ORC3["Orchestrator"] SA5["Realm Role"] ORC3 --> SA5 @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespa | Subject pattern | Internal handler | |---|---| | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Roles Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Role Update Orchestrator | | `aiac.apply.build` | Policy Update Orchestrator (Build) | ### Ack contract @@ -106,240 +106,15 @@ No business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. --- -## Service Onboarding Orchestrator +## Use Cases -Handles `POST /apply/service/{service_id}`. +Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: -The orchestrator sequences two sub-agents and assembles the final response: - -``` -ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response -``` - -### Service Provision Sub-agent - -``` -START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → format_response → END -``` - -- `classify_service`: determines service type and populates `ServiceInfo`. - 1. **Parse `trigger.service_id`**: - - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract namespace. - - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. - - Unrecognised format → treat as `ServiceType.tool`. - 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - - **Not found** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. - 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Service record is not found for a tool. - - > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. - - > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ServiceType.tool`. - -- `analyze_agent` / `analyze_tool`: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. -- `provision_service`: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. -- `format_response`: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ServiceInfo"] - - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] - - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] - ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION - - PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style CLASSIFY fill:#dbeafe - style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#fef9c3 - style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#fef9c3 - style PROVISION fill:#dcfce7 -``` - -**State:** `OnboardingProvisionState` extends `BaseAgentState` with: - -| Field | Type | Description | +| Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | |---|---|---| -| `service_info` | `ServiceInfo \| None` | Populated by `classify_service` | -| `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | - -### Service Policy Sub-agent - -Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. - -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END -``` - -- Examines all realm roles and determines which realm role → service permission/scope composite mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. -- `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. -- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. -- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in the validated diff. -- `format_response`: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] - START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nroles + composites,\nnew service permissions/scopes"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new service only"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new service only"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 -``` - -**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -**Prompts** (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-service composite mapping context. - ---- - -## Policy Update Orchestrator - -Handles `POST /apply/build` and `POST /apply/rebuild`. Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type. - -The Policy Update agent compares the **current composite role mappings** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing composite mappings and removing stale ones. - -### Build Sub-agent - -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END -``` - -- `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. -- `propose_diff`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. -- `validate_diff`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. -- `apply_diff`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. -- `format_response`: assembles the build result. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nall roles + composites,\nall services + permissions"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live composites"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 -``` - -**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -**Prompts** (`policy_update/build/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. - -### Rebuild Sub-agent - -``` -START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END -``` - -- `clear_composites`: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. `propose_diff` receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` and produces an add-only diff. -- All other nodes: identical in contract to Build sub-agent. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_composites\nclear_all_composites\nrealm-wide wipe"] - - CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nempty role_composites\nafter wipe"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nadd-only: composites are empty"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites only"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style CLEAR fill:#fee2e2 - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 -``` - -**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -**Prompts** (`policy_update/rebuild/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. - ---- - -## Realm Roles Orchestrator - -Handles `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}`. Dispatches to the Realm Role sub-agent. - -### Realm Role Sub-agent - -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END -``` - -- `fetch_pdp_state`: fetches all services and their permissions, all realm roles, and the current composites for the affected realm role. -- `propose_mappings`: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. -- `validate_mappings`: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). -- `apply_mappings`: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. -- `format_response`: assembles the result. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\naffected role composites,\nall services + permissions"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected realm role"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 -``` - -**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -**Prompts** (`realm_roles/realm_role/prompts.py`): `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. +| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | +| Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.build`, `POST /apply/build`, `POST /apply/rebuild` | +| Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`, `POST /apply/realm-role/{id}` | --- @@ -450,40 +225,7 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -#### Service Onboarding types (in `onboarding/provision/state.py`) - -```python -class ServiceType(str, Enum): - agent = "agent" - tool = "tool" - -class Skill(BaseModel): - id: str - name: str - description: str - -class ServiceInfo(BaseModel): - service_type: ServiceType - description: str - skills: list[Skill] = [] - -class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): - name: str - description: str - -class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): - name: str - description: str - -class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): - roles: list[RoleDefinition] - scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] - reasoning: str - -class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): - service_info: ServiceInfo | None = None - service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None -``` +Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `ServiceInfo`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`, etc.) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py` — see [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). --- @@ -542,7 +284,7 @@ flowchart TD |---|---|---|---| | POST | `/apply/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | -| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Realm Roles | Realm Role | +| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Realm Role | | POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | **Success response (Service Onboarding):** diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f5c0e1138 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +# UC1: Service Onboarding + +## Depends on + +- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module (`BaseAgentState`, `PDPSnapshot`, `ProposedDiff`, `CompositeMapping`, `ValidationVerdict`), Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. + +--- + +## Architecture + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.service.{id}"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/service/{service_id}\n(debug)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] + ORC1["Orchestrator"] + SA1["Service Provision"] + SA2["Service Policy"] + ORC1 --> SA1 + ORC1 --> SA2 + end + + CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 +``` + +--- + +## Trigger(s) + +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/service/{service_id}` | + +--- + +## Orchestrator + +`onboarding/orchestrator.py` + +Sequences two sub-agents and assembles the combined response: + +``` +ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response +``` + +**Success response:** +```json +{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } +``` + +**Abort response (validation failure):** +```json +{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } +``` + +--- + +## Sub-agents + +### Service Provision Sub-agent + +`onboarding/provision/` + +``` +START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → format_response → END +``` + +#### Nodes + +- **`classify_service`**: determines service type and populates `ServiceInfo`. + 1. **Parse `trigger.service_id`**: + - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract namespace. + - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. + - Unrecognised format → treat as `ServiceType.tool`. + 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. + - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. + - **Not found** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. + 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Service record is not found for a tool. + + > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. + + > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ServiceType.tool`. + +- **`analyze_agent`** / **`analyze_tool`**: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. +- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. +- **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ServiceInfo"] + + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION + + PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style CLASSIFY fill:#dbeafe + style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#fef9c3 + style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#fef9c3 + style PROVISION fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +#### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` + +Extends `BaseAgentState` with: + +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `service_info` | `ServiceInfo \| None` | Populated by `classify_service` | +| `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | + +#### Types (`onboarding/provision/state.py`) + +```python +class ServiceType(str, Enum): + agent = "agent" + tool = "tool" + +class Skill(BaseModel): + id: str + name: str + description: str + +class ServiceInfo(BaseModel): + service_type: ServiceType + description: str + skills: list[Skill] = [] + +class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + +class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + +class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): + roles: list[RoleDefinition] + scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] + reasoning: str + +class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): + service_info: ServiceInfo | None = None + service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None +``` + +#### Prompts (`onboarding/provision/prompts.py`) + +`ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM`, `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` + +--- + +### Service Policy Sub-agent + +`onboarding/policy/` + +Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +``` + +Examines all realm roles and determines which realm role → service permission/scope composite mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. + +#### Nodes + +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. +- **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. +- **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). +- **`apply_mappings`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in the validated diff. +- **`format_response`**: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] + START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nroles + composites,\nnew service permissions/scopes"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new service only"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new service only"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +#### State + +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +#### Prompts (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`) + +`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-service composite mapping context. + +--- + +## File Structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/ +├── __init__.py +├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy, assembles combined response +├── provision/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph +│ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response +│ ├── prompts.py ← ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM +│ └── state.py ← ServiceType, Skill, ServiceInfo, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState +└── policy/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response + └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +``` + +--- + +## Open Questions + +_None currently._ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0cd92825b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +# UC2: Policy Update + +## Depends on + +- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. + +--- + +## Architecture + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.build"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/build (debug)\nPOST /apply/rebuild (operator)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph PU["Policy Update"] + ORC2["Orchestrator"] + SA3["Build"] + SA4["Rebuild"] + ORC2 -->|"build"| SA3 + ORC2 -->|"rebuild"| SA4 + end + + CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 +``` + +--- + +## Trigger(s) + +| Source | Subject / Path | Sub-agent | +|---|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.build` (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) | Build | +| HTTP (operator only) | `POST /apply/rebuild` (via `kubectl port-forward`) | Rebuild | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/build` | Build | + +--- + +## Orchestrator + +`policy_update/orchestrator.py` + +Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type: +- `build` trigger → Build sub-agent +- `rebuild` trigger → Rebuild sub-agent + +The Policy Update agent compares the **current composite role mappings** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing composite mappings and removing stale ones. + +--- + +## Sub-agents + +### Build Sub-agent + +`policy_update/build/` + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +``` + +#### Nodes + +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. +- **`propose_diff`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. +- **`validate_diff`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). +- **`apply_diff`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. +- **`format_response`**: assembles the build result. + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nall roles + composites,\nall services + permissions"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live composites"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +#### State + +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +#### Prompts (`policy_update/build/prompts.py`) + +`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +--- + +### Rebuild Sub-agent + +`policy_update/rebuild/` + +Identical to the Build sub-agent with one addition: a `clear_composites` node prepended before the fetch fan-out. + +``` +START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +``` + +#### Delta from Build + +- **`clear_composites`**: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` after the wipe. +- **`propose_diff`**: produces an add-only diff (no removals — composites are empty). +- All remaining nodes (`validate_diff`, `apply_diff`, `format_response`): identical contract to Build. + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_composites\nclear_all_composites\nrealm-wide wipe"] + + CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nempty role_composites\nafter wipe"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nadd-only: composites are empty"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites only"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style CLEAR fill:#fee2e2 + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +#### State + +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +#### Prompts (`policy_update/rebuild/prompts.py`) + +`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +--- + +## Response + +**Success:** +```json +{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } +``` + +**Abort (validation failure):** +```json +{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } +``` + +--- + +## File Structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_update/ +├── __init__.py +├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to build or rebuild sub-agent +├── build/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +└── rebuild/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph + ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response + └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +``` + +--- + +## Open Questions + +_None currently._ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..59a74dc65 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +# UC3: Role Update + +## Depends on + +- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. + +--- + +## Architecture + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.realm-role.{id}"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}\n(debug)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph RR["Role Update"] + ORC3["Orchestrator"] + SA5["Realm Role"] + ORC3 --> SA5 + end + + CTRL -->|"realm-role/:id"| ORC3 +``` + +--- + +## Trigger(s) + +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI realm role created/updated) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | + +--- + +## Orchestrator + +`realm_roles/orchestrator.py` + +Dispatches to the Realm Role sub-agent. + +--- + +## Sub-agents + +### Realm Role Sub-agent + +`realm_roles/realm_role/` + +``` +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +``` + +#### Nodes + +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all services and their permissions, all realm roles, and the current composites for the affected realm role. +- **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. +- **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). +- **`apply_mappings`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. +- **`format_response`**: assembles the result. + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) + + START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] + START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] + START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\naffected role composites,\nall services + permissions"] + + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected realm role"] + + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] + + VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style FP fill:#dbeafe + style FDK fill:#dbeafe + style FKC fill:#dbeafe + style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 + style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 + style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 +``` + +#### State + +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). + +#### Prompts (`realm_roles/realm_role/prompts.py`) + +`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. + +--- + +## Response + +**Success:** +```json +{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } +``` + +**Abort (validation failure):** +```json +{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } +``` + +--- + +## File Structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/agent/realm_roles/ +├── __init__.py +├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to realm_role sub-agent +└── realm_role/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── graph.py ← Realm Role StateGraph + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response + └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +``` + +--- + +## Open Questions + +_None currently._ From 883c064526a5ff17c338602944331959b3214997 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 11:32:57 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 059/273] docs(aiac): rename policy update subjects and endpoints MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit aiac.apply.build → aiac.apply.policy.build POST /apply/build → POST /apply/policy/build POST /apply/rebuild → POST /apply/policy/rebuild Updated across uc2-policy-update.md, aiac-agent.md, ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md, PRD.md, event-broker.md, and rag-ingest-service.md. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 8 ++++---- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 18 +++++++++--------- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 14 +++++++------- .../components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 10 +++++----- .../requirements/components/event-broker.md | 6 +++--- .../components/rag-ingest-service.md | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index e77b41d36..fd55e0115 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` -#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.build`) +#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.policy.build`) ``` Operator @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de ▼ RAG Ingest Service │ 2. upsert documents ──► ChromaDB - │ 3. publish aiac.apply.build + │ 3. publish aiac.apply.policy.build ▼ NATS JetStream │ 4. deliver event @@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` -#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/rebuild`, operator-only) +#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/policy/rebuild`, operator-only) ``` Operator - │ 1. POST /apply/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) + │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) ▼ AIAC Agent │ 2. DELETE /composite-roles/all (clear entire mapping table) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 039ac72cd..11bc8391f 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` -#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.build`) +#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.policy.build`) ``` Operator @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ▼ RAG Ingest Service │ 2. upsert documents ──► ChromaDB - │ 3. publish aiac.apply.build + │ 3. publish aiac.apply.policy.build ▼ NATS JetStream │ 4. deliver event @@ -311,11 +311,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` -#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/rebuild`, operator-only) +#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/policy/rebuild`, operator-only) ``` Operator - │ 1. POST /apply/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) + │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) ▼ AIAC Agent │ 2. DELETE /composite-roles/all (clear entire mapping table) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions @@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. - **Event Broker decouples all automated triggers from the Agent.** The Keycloak SPI listener and RAG Ingest Service publish to NATS subjects; the Agent subscribes as a durable competing consumer. This removes all direct dependencies between trigger sources and the Agent. - **`rebuild` bypasses the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via HTTP (`kubectl port-forward`). It is never published to NATS and has no NATS listener. -- **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. -- **Agent `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. +- **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. +- **Agent HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. - **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. - **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. - **`aiac.pdp.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `aiac.apply.build`, `/apply/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | +| Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p ### 7.7 RAG Ingest Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.policy.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. **Full spec:** [components/rag-ingest-service.md](components/rag-ingest-service.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 61a07d746..6674b67b2 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access contr - **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.service.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) - **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI realm role created/updated) -- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.build` subject (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) -- **Operator/admin call** → `POST /apply/rebuild` directly via `kubectl port-forward` (HTTP only — not routed through Event Broker) +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.policy.build` subject (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) +- **Operator/admin call** → `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` directly via `kubectl port-forward` (HTTP only — not routed through Event Broker) The Agent subscribes to the Event Broker as a durable competing consumer (`aiac-agent-consumer` queue group). It acknowledges each message only after successful processing — ensuring at-least-once delivery and automatic replay on pod restart. @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespa |---|---| | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Role Update Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.build` | Policy Update Orchestrator (Build) | +| `aiac.apply.policy.build` | Policy Update Orchestrator (Build) | ### Ack contract @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | -| Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.build`, `POST /apply/build`, `POST /apply/rebuild` | +| Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`, `POST /apply/realm-role/{id}` | --- @@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ flowchart TD | Method | Path | Orchestrator | Sub-agent | |---|---|---|---| -| POST | `/apply/build` | Policy Update | Build | -| POST | `/apply/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | +| POST | `/apply/policy/build` | Policy Update | Build | +| POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | | POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Realm Role | | POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── controller/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ └── routes.py ← FastAPI app + four /apply/* route handlers +│ └── routes.py ← FastAPI app + four route handlers │ ├── onboarding/ │ ├── __init__.py diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 0cd92825b..fcb60226a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ ```mermaid flowchart TD - NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.build"] + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.policy.build"] NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] - TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/build (debug)\nPOST /apply/rebuild (operator)"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/policy/build (debug)\nPOST /apply/policy/rebuild (operator)"] CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER @@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ flowchart TD | Source | Subject / Path | Sub-agent | |---|---|---| -| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.build` (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) | Build | -| HTTP (operator only) | `POST /apply/rebuild` (via `kubectl port-forward`) | Rebuild | -| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/build` | Build | +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.policy.build` (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) | Build | +| HTTP (operator only) | `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` (via `kubectl port-forward`) | Rebuild | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/policy/build` | Build | --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md index bd0b5ff26..5886c2447 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md @@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ The Event Broker is a single-node NATS JetStream instance. It owns no business l |---|---|---|---| | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak `CLIENT_CREATED` event | | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak realm role created/updated | -| `aiac.apply.build` | RAG Ingest Service | AIAC Agent | Post-ingest completion (any collection) | +| `aiac.apply.policy.build` | RAG Ingest Service | AIAC Agent | Post-ingest completion (any collection) | | `aiac.apply.dlq` | NATS JetStream (automatic) | Operator (manual inspection) | Max delivery attempts exceeded | -**`rebuild` is not routed through the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via `POST /apply/rebuild` on the AIAC Agent using `kubectl port-forward`. +**`rebuild` is not routed through the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` on the AIAC Agent using `kubectl port-forward`. --- @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ All messages carry a minimal JSON payload containing only the entity ID: { "id": "" } ``` -For `aiac.apply.build`, the payload is empty (`{}`). The AIAC Agent pulls all required state from the PDP Configuration Service at processing time — the event payload is a trigger, not a data carrier. +For `aiac.apply.policy.build`, the payload is empty (`{}`). The AIAC Agent pulls all required state from the PDP Configuration Service at processing time — the event payload is a trigger, not a data carrier. --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md index e36b4c940..5c8692692 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Accepts knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunks and embeds them, and writes the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance in the same Pod. Supports both access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. Developer-driven ingestion is performed via `kubectl port-forward`. -After every successful ingest operation the service publishes a trigger event to the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) on the `aiac.apply.build` subject. This causes the AIAC Agent to recompute and apply the updated policy against the live PDP state. All three ingest semantics (replace, update, delete) publish `build`; `rebuild` is an explicit operator-only command issued directly to the Agent and is never triggered by the ingest service. +After every successful ingest operation the service publishes a trigger event to the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) on the `aiac.apply.policy.build` subject. This causes the AIAC Agent to recompute and apply the updated policy against the live PDP state. All three ingest semantics (replace, update, delete) publish `build`; `rebuild` is an explicit operator-only command issued directly to the Agent and is never triggered by the ingest service. ## Endpoints @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (defa ## Post-ingest Event Broker notification -After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the service publishes `{"id": ""}` to `aiac.apply.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). The publish is non-blocking: ingest success is reported to the caller before the NATS publish completes. Publish failures are logged but do not cause the ingest endpoint to return an error. This preserves ingest availability even when the Event Broker is temporarily unavailable. +After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the service publishes `{"id": ""}` to `aiac.apply.policy.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). The publish is non-blocking: ingest success is reported to the caller before the NATS publish completes. Publish failures are logged but do not cause the ingest endpoint to return an error. This preserves ingest availability even when the Event Broker is temporarily unavailable. The AIAC Agent's durable consumer receives the event and acknowledges it after successful processing. Delivery guarantees (at-least-once, replay on Agent restart) are managed by the Event Broker — the RAG Ingest Service is fire-and-forget from its perspective. From cd2f577ff943dcf3ed5d28b6e6b15f5f8d49a338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:46:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 060/273] docs(aiac): rename 'realm role' to 'role' across all requirements MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit All AIAC components (Agent, Event Broker, PDP Interface, RAG) now use the domain term 'role'. Keycloak-facing services translate to the Keycloak 'realm role' concept internally at the boundary. - NATS subject: aiac.apply.realm-role.{id} → aiac.apply.role.{id} - HTTP path: /apply/realm-role/{id} → /apply/role/{id} - Python dirs: realm_roles/ → roles/, realm_role/ → role/ - Prose, Mermaid labels, section headings updated across 13 files - python-keycloak method names and Keycloak Admin API URLs unchanged Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 14 +++---- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 31 ++++++++------- .../components/aiac-agent-diagram.md | 18 ++++----- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 26 ++++++------- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 4 +- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 4 +- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 38 +++++++++---------- .../requirements/components/event-broker.md | 2 +- .../components/keycloak-service.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/library.md | 4 +- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 6 +-- .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 10 ++--- .../event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md | 6 +-- 13 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index fd55e0115..cd24ee522 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ PDP Policy Service. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only th ### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (On-boarding / Off-boarding) -**Trigger:** A Realm Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. +**Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current composite role @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to Keycloak. Supp **Two-phase implementation — trigger, RAG retrieval, LLM reasoning, and validation are identical in both phases; only the policy-write target differs:** -- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) +- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions) - **Phase 2 (planned):** diff applied as LLM-generated Rego rules written to OPA; PDP Policy container image swap only — no other component changes ### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Five components across four Kubernetes pods, plus a Python client library: | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | | 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to **AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST read endpoints under generic PDP entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes -composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener +role composite mappings (role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. **AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** @@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` -#### UC-1b · Realm Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`) +#### UC-1b · Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.role.{id}`) ``` Keycloak SPI │ REALM_ROLE_CREATED / REALM_ROLE_UPDATED - │ 1. publish aiac.apply.realm-role.{id} + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.role.{id} ▼ NATS JetStream │ 2. deliver event @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de AIAC Agent │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected realm role + │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected role │ 6. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) │ 7. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 8. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 11bc8391f..c9ecd1727 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model across both phases: | **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Decides what a caller may access; issues scoped tokens | | **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | -The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. The PDP evaluates the caller's realm role and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. +The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. The PDP evaluates the caller's role and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration carries routing intent only (`host` → `target_audience`). Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, kept current by AIAC. @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration | Phase | PDP Policy write target | Write operation | PEP behaviour | |---|---|---|---| -| Phase 1 | Keycloak | Composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) | `audience` only — Keycloak resolves entitlements from composites | +| Phase 1 | Keycloak | Composite role mappings (role → service permissions) | `audience` only — Keycloak resolves entitlements from composites | | Phase 2 | OPA | LLM-generated Rego rules | `audience` only — OPA evaluates Rego; PEP is unchanged | Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite mappings from Keycloak, then the PDP Policy pod is replaced with the OPA implementation. AuthBridge requires no changes — the PEP is identical in both phases. @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite ma ### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (On-boarding / Off-boarding) -**Trigger:** A Realm Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. +**Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current composite role @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to Keycloak. Supp **Two-phase implementation — trigger, RAG retrieval, LLM reasoning, and validation are identical in both phases; only the policy-write target differs:** -- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) +- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions) - **Phase 2 (planned):** diff applied as LLM-generated Rego rules written to OPA; PDP Policy container image swap only — no other component changes ### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | | 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | @@ -265,12 +265,12 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` -#### UC-1b · Realm Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`) +#### UC-1b · Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.role.{id}`) ``` Keycloak SPI │ REALM_ROLE_CREATED / REALM_ROLE_UPDATED - │ 1. publish aiac.apply.realm-role.{id} + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.role.{id} ▼ NATS JetStream │ 2. deliver event @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi AIAC Agent │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected realm role + │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected role │ 6. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) │ 7. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 8. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** PDP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. This eliminates the separate PDP Configuration and PDP Policy pods without changing the library's service URL interface. - **PDP Interface Pod phase transition is a container image swap.** Phase 2 replaces the PDP Policy container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP name and port `:7072` remain unchanged. No new pod or manifest is required — `pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` does not exist. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. -- **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages realm role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a realm role. +- **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a role. - **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. - **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 8000 (ChromaDB default) and 7073 (RAG Ingest Service). - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **`aiac.pdp.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. - **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.library.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy.__init__`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import get_subjects`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. -- **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are realm-role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. +- **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. --- @@ -372,8 +372,7 @@ is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to **AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST read endpoints under generic PDP entity -names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes -composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener +names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes role composite mappings (role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. **AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** @@ -403,7 +402,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the * FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the PDP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two container images share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`): -- **Phase 1 — Keycloak** (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`): manages composite role mappings (realm role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. +- **Phase 1 — Keycloak** (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`): manages role composite mappings (role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. - **Phase 2 — OPA** (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`): writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Interface TBD (separate PRD). Phase transition = container image swap within the PDP Interface Pod; no manifest change required. **Phase 1 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) @@ -438,9 +437,9 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Role Update | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | +| Role Update | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role sub-agent | -All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected realm role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps realm roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) @@ -470,7 +469,7 @@ A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal |---|---| | `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; composite roles handle user permission inheritance automatically) | | `CLIENT_CREATED` | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | -| Realm role created/updated | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | +| Role created/updated | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | **Full spec:** TBD (separate PRD). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md index e7a8ea95c..b165dc396 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md @@ -23,16 +23,16 @@ flowchart TD ORC2 --> SA4 end - subgraph URR["Users and Realm Roles"] + subgraph URR["Users and Roles"] ORC3["Orchestrator"] SA5["Users"] - SA6["Realm Roles"] + SA6["Roles"] ORC3 --> SA5 ORC3 --> SA6 end TRIGGERS --> CTRL - CTRL -->|"user/:id or realm-role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"user/:id or role/:id"| ORC3 CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 CTRL -->|"client/:id"| ORC1 ``` @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ flowchart TD START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nusers, realm roles,\nclient roles/scopes,\nuser role mappings"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nusers, roles,\nclient roles/scopes,\nuser role mappings"] FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new client only"] @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ flowchart TD START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nall users, clients,\nrealm roles, all\nrole mappings"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nall users, clients,\nroles, all\nrole mappings"] FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live state"] @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ flowchart TD --- -## 4. Users & Realm Roles Sub-agents +## 4. Users & Roles Sub-agents Both sub-agents share the same graph shape; only `fetch_keycloak_state` scope differs. @@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ flowchart TD START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\n\nUser: that users\ncurrent mappings\nand all clients/roles\n\nRealm Role: all users\nand all realm roles"] + START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\n\nUser: that users\ncurrent mappings\nand all clients/roles\n\nRole: all users\nand all roles"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected\nuser OR realm role"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected\nuser OR role"] PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected entity only"] @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] Q2["user/:id -> user role assignment rules"] - Q3["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] + Q3["role/:id -> role assignment rules"] Q4["client/:id -> client access control rules"] end diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 6674b67b2..3a009f4a6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) for all automated triggers, and directly via HTTP for the operator-only `rebuild` command: - **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.service.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) -- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI realm role created/updated) +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.role.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI role created/updated) - **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.policy.build` subject (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) - **Operator/admin call** → `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` directly via `kubectl port-forward` (HTTP only — not routed through Event Broker) @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Role Update | `realm-role/{id}` | Realm Role sub-agent | +| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role sub-agent | All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -52,12 +52,12 @@ flowchart TD subgraph RR["Role Update"] ORC3["Orchestrator"] - SA5["Realm Role"] + SA5["Role"] ORC3 --> SA5 end TRIGGERS --> CTRL - CTRL -->|"realm-role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 ``` @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespa | Subject pattern | Internal handler | |---|---| | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Role Update Orchestrator | +| `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role Update Orchestrator | | `aiac.apply.policy.build` | Policy Update Orchestrator (Build) | ### Ack contract @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | -| Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}`, `POST /apply/realm-role/{id}` | +| Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | --- @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] - Q2["realm-role/:id -> realm role assignment rules"] + Q2["role/:id -> role assignment rules"] Q3["service/:id -> service access control rules"] end @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings: |---|---| | `build` | `"all access control rules"` | | `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `realm-role/{id}` | `"realm role assignment rules"` | +| `role/{id}` | `"role assignment rules"` | | `service/{id}` | `"service access control rules"` | Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`). @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ flowchart TD |---|---|---|---| | POST | `/apply/policy/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | -| POST | `/apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Realm Role | +| POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | | POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | **Success response (Service Onboarding):** @@ -385,12 +385,12 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ -├── realm_roles/ +├── roles/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to realm_role sub-agent -│ └── realm_role/ +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to role sub-agent +│ └── role/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Realm Role StateGraph +│ ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index f5c0e1138..aeee36254 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -174,11 +174,11 @@ Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes a START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END ``` -Examines all realm roles and determines which realm role → service permission/scope composite mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. +Examines all roles and determines which role → service permission/scope composite mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. #### Nodes -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. - **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. - **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). - **`apply_mappings`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in the validated diff. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index fcb60226a..a3a0c0046 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop #### Nodes -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all realm roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. - **`propose_diff`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. - **`validate_diff`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). - **`apply_diff`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetc #### Delta from Build -- **`clear_composites`**: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all realm roles. +- **`clear_composites`**: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all roles. - **`fetch_pdp_state`**: receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` after the wipe. - **`propose_diff`**: produces an add-only diff (no removals — composites are empty). - All remaining nodes (`validate_diff`, `apply_diff`, `format_response`): identical contract to Build. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 59a74dc65..f77f444e0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ ```mermaid flowchart TD - NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.realm-role.{id}"] + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.role.{id}"] NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] - TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}\n(debug)"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/role/{role_id}\n(debug)"] CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER @@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ flowchart TD subgraph RR["Role Update"] ORC3["Orchestrator"] - SA5["Realm Role"] + SA5["Role"] ORC3 --> SA5 end - CTRL -->|"realm-role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 ``` --- @@ -34,24 +34,24 @@ flowchart TD | Source | Subject / Path | |---|---| -| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI realm role created/updated) | -| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/realm-role/{role_id}` | +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI role created/updated) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/role/{role_id}` | --- ## Orchestrator -`realm_roles/orchestrator.py` +`roles/orchestrator.py` -Dispatches to the Realm Role sub-agent. +Dispatches to the Role sub-agent. --- ## Sub-agents -### Realm Role Sub-agent +### Role Sub-agent -`realm_roles/realm_role/` +`roles/role/` ``` START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END @@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → prop #### Nodes -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all services and their permissions, all realm roles, and the current composites for the affected realm role. -- **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected realm role. -- **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected realm role). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). +- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all services and their permissions, all roles, and the current composites for the affected role. +- **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected role. +- **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected role). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). - **`apply_mappings`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. - **`format_response`**: assembles the result. @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ flowchart TD START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\naffected role composites,\nall services + permissions"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected realm role"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected role"] PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ flowchart TD `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). -#### Prompts (`realm_roles/realm_role/prompts.py`) +#### Prompts (`roles/role/prompts.py`) `PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. @@ -118,12 +118,12 @@ flowchart TD ## File Structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/agent/realm_roles/ +aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/ ├── __init__.py -├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to realm_role sub-agent -└── realm_role/ +├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to role sub-agent +└── role/ ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← Realm Role StateGraph + ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md index 5886c2447..b0541da86 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The Event Broker is a single-node NATS JetStream instance. It owns no business l | Subject | Publisher | Consumer | Trigger | |---|---|---|---| | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak `CLIENT_CREATED` event | -| `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak realm role created/updated | +| `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak role created/updated | | `aiac.apply.policy.build` | RAG Ingest Service | AIAC Agent | Post-ingest completion (any collection) | | `aiac.apply.dlq` | NATS JetStream (automatic) | Operator (manual inspection) | Max delivery attempts exceeded | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md index 2d759f8e3..e0a3f8305 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns ra | Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | |--------|------|------------------------|-------------| | GET | `/users` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All users in realm | -| GET | `/realm-roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | +| GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | | GET | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and client role mappings for a user | | GET | `/clients` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All clients | | GET | `/client-scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All client scopes | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 4a6d4a584..23b342c46 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). #### `Role` -Represents a realm-level role (Keycloak: `realm role`). +Represents a role (Keycloak: realm role). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | |-------|------|----------------|---------| @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | `None` | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | | `type` | `Literal["Agent", "Tool"] \| None` | `attributes.type` | `None` | -| `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(realm roles for this client)_ | `[]` | +| `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(roles for this client)_ | `[]` | | `scopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(default client scopes)_ | `[]` | #### `Scope` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index f2b1701f6..04141aa5f 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Retur | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Permissions (roles) defined for a specific service | -| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a realm role | +| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | | POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | | POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | -| POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/scope-mappings/realm` | Assign existing realm role to service | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/scope-mappings/realm` | Assign existing role to service | `GET /services/{service_id}`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)`. @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: -1. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the realm role to the service's scope mappings. +1. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the role to the service's scope mappings. 2. Returns `201 Created` on success. 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned to the service. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 6aaa76218..57c47d424 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/` ## Description -A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Realm roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a realm role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. +A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed | Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | |--------|------|------------------------|-------------| -| POST | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Add service permissions (client roles) to a realm role composite | -| DELETE | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Remove service permissions (client roles) from a realm role composite | -| DELETE | `/composites` | loop: `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` → per role `GET .../composites` → `DELETE .../composites` | Revoke all composite mappings from all realm roles (rebuild) | +| POST | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Add service permissions (client roles) to a role composite | +| DELETE | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Remove service permissions (client roles) from a role composite | +| DELETE | `/composites` | loop: `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` → per role `GET .../composites` → `DELETE .../composites` | Revoke all composite mappings from all roles (rebuild) | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Create a new permission (client role) for a specific service | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` then `PUT .../clients/{service_id}/default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create a realm-level scope and assign it to a service as a default scope (atomic) | @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ - `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. - `POST /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.add_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. - `DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. -- `DELETE /composites`: fetch all realm roles via `admin.get_realm_roles()`; for each role call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name)`; if composites are non-empty call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, composites)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /composites`: fetch all roles via `admin.get_realm_roles()`; for each role call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name)`; if composites are non-empty call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, composites)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. - `POST /services/{service_id}/permissions`: call `admin.create_client_role(service_id, {"name": ..., "description": ...})`; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created permission representation. - `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the realm-level scope, then call `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign it to the service; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created scope representation. - On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md index a58c85234..bd2900416 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ has been removed — requirements state what the system must do, not how. | FR1 | Events must survive the Agent pod going down and be re-delivered when it restarts — no silent event loss on transient consumer failure | §5 arch decisions, §7.4 | | FR2 | Each event must be processed by exactly one Agent instance across competing replicas (work-queue semantics) | §7.4, §5 arch decisions | | FR3 | Failed event processing must be retried a bounded number of times, then moved to a dead-letter destination for operator inspection — a persistently broken event must not block the queue | §7.4, §9 | -| FR4 | The broker must support per-entity event addressing: a new Keycloak client and a new realm role each produce distinct, independently routable events carrying the entity ID — the consumer must be able to subscribe to a wildcard that covers all entity-scoped events without inspecting message payloads | §7.4, §7.5, §7.8, §5 ("no business logic lives in the consumer") | +| FR4 | The broker must support per-entity event addressing: a new Keycloak client and a new role each produce distinct, independently routable events carrying the entity ID — the consumer must be able to subscribe to a wildcard that covers all entity-scoped events without inspecting message payloads | §7.4, §7.5, §7.8, §5 ("no business logic lives in the consumer") | | FR5 | The Agent (Python 3.12, FastAPI, asyncio) must be able to consume events asynchronously as a background task; processing must complete before the event is acknowledged | §7.5, §10 | | FR6 | The RAG Ingest Service (Python 3.12, FastAPI) must be able to publish events to the broker | §7.7 | | FR7 | The Keycloak SPI (Java) must be able to publish events to the broker | §7.8 | @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Kubernetes. Python client: `aiokafka` or `confluent-kafka-python`. Java client: | **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Pass** | Kafka topic retention provides message replay for a configured consumer group | | **FR2** | Work-queue: one consumer per event | **Partial** | Kafka consumer groups deliver one message per partition. Work-queue semantics emerge only when partition count equals consumer count — it is not a single-setting guarantee and requires careful partition design | | **FR3** | Bounded retry + dead-letter | **Fail** | Kafka has no native dead-letter queue or `max-delivery-attempts` concept. A DLQ must be implemented as application code: a separate retry topic, a retry consumer service, and a DLQ topic. This is infrastructure the PRD expects the broker to provide natively | -| **FR4** | Per-entity dynamic addressing | **Fail** | Kafka topics are static, pre-declared strings. A runtime-generated entity ID cannot become a new topic without administrator intervention. Per-entity routing collapses to per-type topics (e.g. one topic for all realm-role events), requiring the consumer to inspect message payloads to identify the target entity. The PRD (§5) mandates a consumer that carries no business logic — payload-based routing contradicts this | +| **FR4** | Per-entity dynamic addressing | **Fail** | Kafka topics are static, pre-declared strings. A runtime-generated entity ID cannot become a new topic without administrator intervention. Per-entity routing collapses to per-type topics (e.g. one topic for all role events), requiring the consumer to inspect message payloads to identify the target entity. The PRD (§5) mandates a consumer that carries no business logic — payload-based routing contradicts this | | **FR5** | Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | **Pass** | `aiokafka` is a mature asyncio Kafka client; manual commit after processing is idiomatic | | **FR6** | Python publisher | **Pass** | `aiokafka` or `confluent-kafka-python` | | **FR7** | Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | **Pass** | Kafka Java producer is the most mature producer client available | @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ consumer service, a retry topic, and a DLQ topic. This is application infrastruc configuration. The PRD (§7.4) treats dead-lettering as a broker-level property. **FR4 — static topics vs dynamic addressing:** The PRD's per-entity event addressing is a -first-class routing feature. Collapsing `aiac.apply.realm-role.{id}` to a static topic and +first-class routing feature. Collapsing `aiac.apply.role.{id}` to a static topic and embedding the entity ID in the message payload changes the consumer contract and adds routing logic to what §5 explicitly defines as a thin adapter with no business logic. This is a PRD-level design change, not an implementation detail. From 15bd86d17585c4812a7c48b5b00e5366a27e4a51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 12:13:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 061/273] minor formatting Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman --- .../agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 2 -- .../onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 4a48d6458..ea43d3832 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -645,6 +645,4 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): print(" python main.py ") sys.exit(1) -# Made with Bob - diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index 87d25be99..3bbdd08de 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content: str) -> tuple[str, Optiona return explanation, json_data - def print_explanation_single_role(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True): """ Print the LLM's explanation if verbose mode is enabled. @@ -247,7 +246,6 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( "validation_passed": True # Assume passed until validation runs } - def _validate_role_mapping( state: SinglePrivilegeState, verbose: bool, @@ -326,7 +324,6 @@ def _validate_role_mapping( "retry_count": retry_count } - def _verify_semantic_mapping( state: SinglePrivilegeState, llm: BaseChatModel, @@ -404,7 +401,6 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( # Allow the pipeline to proceed on transient errors (rate limits, etc.) return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} - def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) -> str: """ Route after structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end. @@ -429,7 +425,6 @@ def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_r return END - def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) -> str: """ Determine if semantic verification failure should retry analyze_role_mapping. @@ -450,7 +445,6 @@ def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) return END - # ============================================================================ # GRAPH CONSTRUCTION # ============================================================================ @@ -522,7 +516,6 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: return workflow.compile() - # ============================================================================ # MAIN CLASS # ============================================================================ From d0fcf5c67240392eb59297acd8841b4b1fe9f857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 20:10:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 062/273] feat(agent): implement Role sub-agent, orchestrator, and NATS consumer Closes issues 3.11, 3.12, 3.15 (implementation) and 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 (unit tests). - shared/state.py: TriggerContext, BaseAgentState, PDPSnapshot, Permission, Assignments, CompositeMapping, ProposedDiff, ValidationVerdict - shared/nodes.py: fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge (ChromaDB) - roles/role/nodes.py: fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings (4-check: scope, existence, safety guard, auditor LLM), apply_mappings, format_response - roles/role/graph.py: RoleGraph compiled StateGraph - roles/orchestrator.py: thin dispatcher for role/{id} trigger - controller/nats_consumer.py: JetStream consumer with ack-after-await semantics and connection-loss retry - pdp/library/policy.py: stub add/remove_role_composites (NotImplementedError) - test/agent/: 35 unit tests; all pass with pytest -m "not integration" Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py | 0 .../aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py | 90 ++++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py | 7 + aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py | 40 ++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py | 189 +++++++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py | 21 + aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py | 70 +++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py | 63 +++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py | 6 + aiac/test/agent/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py | 228 ++++++++ aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py | 502 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py | 82 +++ 20 files changed, 1298 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e901021c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +"""NATS JetStream consumer — thin adapter between the Event Broker and internal handlers.""" + +import asyncio +import logging +import os + +try: + import nats +except ImportError: # nats-py not installed in test environment + nats = None # type: ignore + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +_STREAM = "aiac-events" +_CONSUMER_NAME_DEFAULT = "aiac-agent-consumer" + + +async def _dispatch(msg, *, policy_handler, role_handler, service_handler) -> None: + """Dispatch a single NATS message to the appropriate handler, then ack on success.""" + subject: str = msg.subject + handler = None + kwargs: dict = {} + + if subject == "aiac.apply.policy.build": + handler = policy_handler + kwargs = {} + elif subject.startswith("aiac.apply.role."): + role_id = subject[len("aiac.apply.role."):] + handler = role_handler + kwargs = {"role_id": role_id} + elif subject.startswith("aiac.apply.service."): + service_id = subject[len("aiac.apply.service."):] + handler = service_handler + kwargs = {"service_id": service_id} + # aiac.apply.policy.rebuild and unknown subjects: no handler — do not ack + + if handler is None: + if subject not in ("aiac.apply.policy.rebuild",): + logger.warning("Unrecognised NATS subject: %s — message not ack'd", subject) + return + + try: + await handler(**kwargs) + except Exception: + logger.exception("Handler for subject %s raised — message not ack'd for redelivery", subject) + return + + await msg.ack() + + +async def _nats_consumer_loop( + *, + policy_handler, + role_handler, + service_handler, + retry_delay: float = 5.0, +) -> None: + """Connect to NATS, subscribe, and dispatch messages. Retries on connection loss.""" + nats_url = os.getenv("NATS_URL", "nats://localhost:4222") + consumer_name = os.getenv("NATS_CONSUMER_NAME", _CONSUMER_NAME_DEFAULT) + + while True: + nc = None + try: + nc = await nats.connect(nats_url) + js = nc.jetstream() + sub = await js.subscribe( + "aiac.apply.>", + stream=_STREAM, + durable=consumer_name, + queue=consumer_name, + ) + logger.info("NATS consumer connected and subscribed") + while True: + msg = await sub.next_msg() + await _dispatch( + msg, + policy_handler=policy_handler, + role_handler=role_handler, + service_handler=service_handler, + ) + except asyncio.CancelledError: + logger.info("NATS consumer loop cancelled — shutting down") + if nc is not None: + await nc.drain() + raise + except Exception: + logger.exception("NATS consumer error — retrying in %.1fs", retry_delay) + if retry_delay > 0: + await asyncio.sleep(retry_delay) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2cd4c5af0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +from aiac.agent.roles.role.graph import RoleGraph +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState + + +def dispatch(state: BaseAgentState) -> BaseAgentState: + """Dispatch a role/{id} trigger to the Role sub-agent and return the result.""" + return RoleGraph.invoke(state) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..097a2deca --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +from langgraph.graph import END, StateGraph + +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState +from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import ( + apply_mappings, + fetch_pdp_state, + format_response, + propose_mappings, + validate_mappings, +) + + +def _has_errors(state: BaseAgentState) -> str: + return "abort" if state.get("validation_errors") else "continue" + + +def build_role_graph() -> StateGraph: + graph = StateGraph(BaseAgentState) + + graph.add_node("fetch_pdp_state", fetch_pdp_state) + graph.add_node("propose_mappings", propose_mappings) + graph.add_node("validate_mappings", validate_mappings) + graph.add_node("apply_mappings", apply_mappings) + graph.add_node("format_response", format_response) + + graph.set_entry_point("fetch_pdp_state") + graph.add_edge("fetch_pdp_state", "propose_mappings") + graph.add_edge("propose_mappings", "validate_mappings") + graph.add_conditional_edges( + "validate_mappings", + _has_errors, + {"abort": "format_response", "continue": "apply_mappings"}, + ) + graph.add_edge("apply_mappings", "format_response") + graph.add_edge("format_response", END) + + return graph + + +RoleGraph = build_role_graph().compile() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9076c5891 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +import os + +from fastapi import HTTPException +from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI + +from aiac.agent.shared.state import ( + BaseAgentState, + CompositeMapping, + PDPSnapshot, + Permission, + ProposedDiff, + ValidationVerdict, +) +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy + +_MAX_CHANGES_DEFAULT = 50 + + +def fetch_pdp_state(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + realm = state["realm"] + trigger = state["trigger"] + entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] + + try: + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + services = cfg.get_services() + roles = cfg.get_roles() + except Exception as exc: + raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"PDP Configuration Service unavailable: {exc}") from exc + + service_permissions: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} + for svc in services: + service_permissions[svc.id] = [ + Permission(id=r.id, name=r.name, description=r.description) + for r in svc.roles + ] + + role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} + affected_role = next((r for r in roles if r.id == entity_id), None) + if affected_role is not None: + role_composites[affected_role.name] = [ + Permission(id=child.id, name=child.name, description=child.description) + for child in affected_role.childRoles + ] + + snapshot = PDPSnapshot( + roles=roles, + services=services, + service_permissions=service_permissions, + role_composites=role_composites, + ) + return {**state, "pdp_snapshot": snapshot} + + +def propose_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + snapshot: PDPSnapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] + policy_chunks = state["policy_chunks"] + domain_chunks = state["domain_knowledge_chunks"] + trigger = state["trigger"] + entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] + + affected_role = next((r for r in snapshot.roles if r.id == entity_id), None) + role_name = affected_role.name if affected_role else entity_id + + context = "\n".join([ + "## Access Control Policy", + *policy_chunks, + "## Domain Knowledge", + *domain_chunks, + "## Current PDP State", + f"Affected role: {role_name}", + f"Services: {[s.id for s in snapshot.services]}", + f"Permissions: {snapshot.service_permissions}", + f"Current composites for {role_name}: {snapshot.role_composites.get(role_name, [])}", + ]) + + from aiac.agent.roles.role.prompts import PLANNER_SYSTEM + + try: + llm = ChatOpenAI(model=os.getenv("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", "gpt-4o-mini"), temperature=0) + diff: ProposedDiff = llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff).invoke( + [ + {"role": "system", "content": PLANNER_SYSTEM}, + {"role": "user", "content": context}, + ] + ) + except Exception as exc: + raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail=f"LLM unavailable: {exc}") from exc + + return {**state, "proposed_diff": diff} + + +def validate_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + snapshot: PDPSnapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] + diff: ProposedDiff = state["proposed_diff"] + trigger = state["trigger"] + entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] + + affected_role = next((r for r in snapshot.roles if r.id == entity_id), None) + affected_role_name = affected_role.name if affected_role else entity_id + + errors: list[str] = [] + all_mappings = list(diff.add) + list(diff.remove) + + # 1. Scope check — all mappings must be for the affected role + out_of_scope = [m for m in all_mappings if m.role_name != affected_role_name] + if out_of_scope: + names = {m.role_name for m in out_of_scope} + errors.append(f"Scope violation: diff touches roles outside affected role '{affected_role_name}': {names}") + return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} + + # 2. Existence check + known_role_names = {r.name for r in snapshot.roles} + for m in all_mappings: + if m.role_name not in known_role_names: + errors.append(f"Existence: unknown role '{m.role_name}'") + elif m.service_id not in snapshot.service_permissions: + errors.append(f"Existence: unknown service '{m.service_id}'") + elif not any(p.id == m.permission_id for p in snapshot.service_permissions.get(m.service_id, [])): + errors.append(f"Existence: unknown permission '{m.permission_id}' in service '{m.service_id}'") + + if errors: + return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} + + # 3. Safety guard + max_changes = int(os.getenv("MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN", str(_MAX_CHANGES_DEFAULT))) + if len(all_mappings) > max_changes: + errors.append(f"Safety guard: {len(all_mappings)} changes exceeds MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN={max_changes}") + return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} + + # 4. Auditor LLM re-confirmation + from aiac.agent.roles.role.prompts import AUDITOR_SYSTEM + + try: + llm = ChatOpenAI(model=os.getenv("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", "gpt-4o-mini"), temperature=0) + verdict: ValidationVerdict = llm.with_structured_output(ValidationVerdict).invoke( + [ + {"role": "system", "content": AUDITOR_SYSTEM}, + {"role": "user", "content": f"Proposed diff: {diff.model_dump_json()}"}, + ] + ) + except Exception as exc: + raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail=f"LLM unavailable during audit: {exc}") from exc + + if not verdict.approved: + errors.append(f"Auditor rejected: {verdict.reason}") + + return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} + + +def apply_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + if state.get("validation_errors"): + return state + + realm = state["realm"] + diff: ProposedDiff = state["proposed_diff"] + + try: + policy = Policy.for_realm(realm) + if diff.add: + policy.add_role_composites( + diff.add[0].role_name, + [m.model_dump() for m in diff.add], + ) + if diff.remove: + policy.remove_role_composites( + diff.remove[0].role_name, + [m.model_dump() for m in diff.remove], + ) + except HTTPException: + raise + except Exception as exc: + raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Policy Service unavailable: {exc}") from exc + + return {**state, "added": list(diff.add), "removed": list(diff.remove)} + + +def format_response(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + added = state.get("added", []) + removed = state.get("removed", []) + errors = state.get("validation_errors", []) + + if errors: + summary = f"Validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}" + else: + summary = f"Applied {len(added)} additions and {len(removed)} removals." + + return {**state, "summary": summary, "provisioned": None} diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2448c4779 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +PLANNER_SYSTEM = """\ +You are an access control policy enforcer scoped to a single Keycloak realm role. + +Your task: determine which service permissions (client roles) the affected role should composite, +based on the access control policy chunks and domain knowledge provided. + +Produce a ProposedDiff with: +- add: composite mappings that should be created +- remove: composite mappings that should be deleted +- reasoning: a concise explanation of your decision + +Scope your diff strictly to the affected role. Do not modify any other roles. +""" + +AUDITOR_SYSTEM = """\ +You are an auditor reviewing a proposed composite role mapping diff. + +Verify that the proposed changes are consistent with the access control policy. +Return approved=true only if the diff is correct and safe. Otherwise return approved=false +with a clear reason explaining what is wrong. +""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ec0f5b73 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +"""Shared LangGraph nodes used by all policy-applying sub-agents.""" + +import os + +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState + +_CHROMA_N_RESULTS_DEFAULT = 10 +_UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES_DEFAULT = 3 + +_QUERY_BY_TRIGGER: dict[str, str] = { + "build": "all access control rules", + "rebuild": "all access control rules", + "role": "role assignment rules", + "service": "service access control rules", +} + + +def _trigger_key(trigger_type: str) -> str: + prefix = trigger_type.split("/")[0] + return prefix + + +def fetch_policy(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + """Query the aiac-policies ChromaDB collection and store chunks in state.""" + import chromadb + + trigger_type = state["trigger"]["trigger_type"] + query = _QUERY_BY_TRIGGER.get(_trigger_key(trigger_type), "all access control rules") + n_results = int(os.getenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", str(_CHROMA_N_RESULTS_DEFAULT))) + max_retries = int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", str(_UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES_DEFAULT))) + chroma_url = os.getenv("AIAC_CHROMADB_URL", "http://aiac-rag-service:8000") + + last_exc = None + for _ in range(max_retries): + try: + client = chromadb.HttpClient(host=chroma_url.rstrip("/")) + collection = client.get_collection("aiac-policies") + results = collection.query(query_texts=[query], n_results=n_results) + docs = results.get("documents", [[]])[0] + return {**state, "policy_chunks": docs} + except Exception as exc: + last_exc = exc + + raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail=f"ChromaDB unavailable: {last_exc}") + + +def fetch_domain_knowledge(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: + """Query the aiac-domain-knowledge ChromaDB collection. Non-fatal when collection is empty.""" + import chromadb + + trigger_type = state["trigger"]["trigger_type"] + query = _QUERY_BY_TRIGGER.get(_trigger_key(trigger_type), "domain knowledge") + n_results = int(os.getenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", str(_CHROMA_N_RESULTS_DEFAULT))) + max_retries = int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", str(_UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES_DEFAULT))) + chroma_url = os.getenv("AIAC_CHROMADB_URL", "http://aiac-rag-service:8000") + + last_exc = None + for _ in range(max_retries): + try: + client = chromadb.HttpClient(host=chroma_url.rstrip("/")) + collection = client.get_collection("aiac-domain-knowledge") + results = collection.query(query_texts=[query], n_results=n_results) + docs = results.get("documents", [[]])[0] + return {**state, "domain_knowledge_chunks": docs} + except Exception as exc: + last_exc = exc + + raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail=f"ChromaDB unavailable: {last_exc}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e82e63bf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +from __future__ import annotations + +from typing import TypedDict + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject + + +class Permission(BaseModel): + id: str + name: str + description: str | None = None + + +class Assignments(BaseModel): + roles: list[Role] = [] + + +class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): + subjects: list[Subject] = [] + roles: list[Role] = [] + services: list[Service] = [] + service_permissions: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # service_id → permissions + service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] + subject_assignments: dict[str, Assignments] = {} # subject_id → assignments + role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # role_name → current composite permissions + + +class CompositeMapping(BaseModel): + role_name: str + service_id: str + permission_id: str + permission_name: str + + +class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): + add: list[CompositeMapping] = [] + remove: list[CompositeMapping] = [] + reasoning: str = "" + + +class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): + approved: bool + reason: str | None = None + + +class TriggerContext(TypedDict): + trigger_type: str # e.g. "role/{id}", "service/{id}", "build", "rebuild" + entity_id: str | None + + +class BaseAgentState(TypedDict): + trigger: TriggerContext + realm: str + policy_chunks: list[str] + domain_knowledge_chunks: list[str] + pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot | None + proposed_diff: ProposedDiff | None + validation_errors: list[str] + added: list[CompositeMapping] + removed: list[CompositeMapping] + summary: str diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py index ce936051d..8e53564b3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py @@ -16,3 +16,9 @@ def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": def _base_url(self) -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") + + def add_role_composites(self, role_name: str, composites: list[dict]) -> None: + raise NotImplementedError("add_role_composites not yet implemented") + + def remove_role_composites(self, role_name: str, composites: list[dict]) -> None: + raise NotImplementedError("remove_role_composites not yet implemented") diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..86899e323 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer (issue 4.12).""" + +import asyncio +from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + + +def _make_msg(subject: str, data: bytes = b"{}") -> MagicMock: + msg = MagicMock() + msg.subject = subject + msg.data = data + msg.ack = AsyncMock() + return msg + + +def run(coro): + return asyncio.run(coro) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# subject dispatch +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestSubjectDispatch: + def test_policy_build_dispatches_to_policy_handler(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.policy.build") + policy_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) + role_handler = AsyncMock() + service_handler = AsyncMock() + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=policy_handler, role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=service_handler)) + + policy_handler.assert_awaited_once() + role_handler.assert_not_awaited() + service_handler.assert_not_awaited() + + def test_role_subject_dispatches_to_role_handler_with_id(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.role-uuid-1") + role_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) + + role_handler.assert_awaited_once() + call_kwargs = str(role_handler.call_args) + assert "role-uuid-1" in call_kwargs + + def test_service_subject_dispatches_to_service_handler_with_id(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.service.svc-1") + service_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=AsyncMock(), service_handler=service_handler)) + + service_handler.assert_awaited_once() + call_kwargs = str(service_handler.call_args) + assert "svc-1" in call_kwargs + + def test_unknown_subject_no_handler_invoked(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.unknown.thing") + policy_handler = AsyncMock() + role_handler = AsyncMock() + service_handler = AsyncMock() + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=policy_handler, role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=service_handler)) + + policy_handler.assert_not_awaited() + role_handler.assert_not_awaited() + service_handler.assert_not_awaited() + + def test_policy_rebuild_subject_no_handler_invoked(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + # rebuild is HTTP-only; NATS consumer must not dispatch it + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.policy.rebuild") + policy_handler = AsyncMock() + role_handler = AsyncMock() + service_handler = AsyncMock() + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=policy_handler, role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=service_handler)) + + policy_handler.assert_not_awaited() + role_handler.assert_not_awaited() + service_handler.assert_not_awaited() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# ack / nack behaviour +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestAckBehaviour: + def test_successful_handler_issues_ack(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.r1") + role_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) + + msg.ack.assert_awaited_once() + + def test_handler_exception_no_ack(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.r1") + role_handler = AsyncMock(side_effect=Exception("handler failed")) + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) + + msg.ack.assert_not_awaited() + + def test_ack_called_after_handler_completes(self): + """Ack must NOT be issued before the handler returns (no fire-and-forget).""" + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + call_order = [] + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.r1") + + async def handler_recording(*args, **kwargs): + call_order.append("handler") + + async def ack_recording(): + call_order.append("ack") + + msg.ack = ack_recording + role_handler = AsyncMock(side_effect=handler_recording) + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) + + assert call_order == ["handler", "ack"], f"Expected handler before ack, got: {call_order}" + + def test_unknown_subject_no_ack(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch + + msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.something.weird") + + run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=AsyncMock(), service_handler=AsyncMock())) + + msg.ack.assert_not_awaited() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# consumer loop cancellation +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _make_nc_mock(): + """nc is a plain MagicMock: jetstream() is sync, drain() is async.""" + nc = MagicMock() + nc.drain = AsyncMock() + return nc + + +def _make_js_mock(sub_mock): + """js is a plain MagicMock: subscribe() is async.""" + js = MagicMock() + js.subscribe = AsyncMock(return_value=sub_mock) + return js + + +def _make_sub_mock(side_effect=None): + sub = MagicMock() + sub.next_msg = AsyncMock(side_effect=side_effect) + return sub + + +class TestConsumerLoop: + def test_loop_exits_cleanly_on_cancellation(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _nats_consumer_loop + + async def _run(): + mock_sub = _make_sub_mock(side_effect=asyncio.CancelledError()) + mock_nc = _make_nc_mock() + mock_js = _make_js_mock(mock_sub) + mock_nc.jetstream.return_value = mock_js + + with patch("aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer.nats") as mock_nats_module: + mock_nats_module.connect = AsyncMock(return_value=mock_nc) + + try: + await _nats_consumer_loop( + policy_handler=AsyncMock(), + role_handler=AsyncMock(), + service_handler=AsyncMock(), + ) + except asyncio.CancelledError: + pass # loop re-raises CancelledError — acceptable + + run(_run()) + + def test_nats_connection_failure_retries(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _nats_consumer_loop + + async def _run(): + connect_calls = [0] + + with patch("aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer.nats") as mock_nats_module: + async def connect_side_effect(*args, **kwargs): + connect_calls[0] += 1 + if connect_calls[0] == 1: + raise OSError("connection refused") + raise asyncio.CancelledError() + + mock_nats_module.connect = AsyncMock(side_effect=connect_side_effect) + + try: + await _nats_consumer_loop( + policy_handler=AsyncMock(), + role_handler=AsyncMock(), + service_handler=AsyncMock(), + retry_delay=0, + ) + except asyncio.CancelledError: + pass + + return connect_calls[0] + + calls = run(_run()) + assert calls >= 2, "Expected retry after connection failure" diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ebcae310c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py @@ -0,0 +1,502 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes (issue 4.10).""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + +from aiac.agent.shared.state import ( + Assignments, + BaseAgentState, + CompositeMapping, + PDPSnapshot, + Permission, + ProposedDiff, + TriggerContext, + ValidationVerdict, +) +from aiac.pdp.library.models import Role, Service + +REALM = "kagenti" +ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" +ROLE_NAME = "platform-admin" + + +def _make_trigger(role_id: str = ROLE_ID) -> TriggerContext: + return {"trigger_type": f"role/{role_id}", "entity_id": role_id} + + +def _make_state(**overrides) -> BaseAgentState: + defaults: BaseAgentState = { + "trigger": _make_trigger(), + "realm": REALM, + "policy_chunks": ["Policy: admin role gets all permissions"], + "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], + "pdp_snapshot": None, + "proposed_diff": None, + "validation_errors": [], + "added": [], + "removed": [], + "summary": "", + } + defaults.update(overrides) + return defaults + + +def _make_service(sid: str, perm_names: list[str]) -> Service: + perms = [Role(id=f"{sid}-{n}", name=n, composite=False) for n in perm_names] + return Service(id=sid, name=sid, enabled=True, roles=perms) + + +def _make_role(rid: str, name: str, child_names: list[str] = ()) -> Role: + children = [Role(id=f"child-{n}", name=n, composite=False) for n in child_names] + return Role(id=rid, name=name, composite=bool(children), childRoles=list(children)) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# fetch_pdp_state +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestFetchPdpState: + def test_builds_snapshot_with_all_services_and_roles(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state + + svc = _make_service("svc-1", ["read", "write"]) + role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) + state = _make_state() + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: + cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value + cfg_instance.get_services.return_value = [svc] + cfg_instance.get_roles.return_value = [role] + + result = fetch_pdp_state(state) + + snapshot: PDPSnapshot = result["pdp_snapshot"] + assert snapshot is not None + assert len(snapshot.services) == 1 + assert snapshot.services[0].id == "svc-1" + assert len(snapshot.roles) == 1 + assert snapshot.roles[0].name == ROLE_NAME + + def test_builds_service_permissions_dict(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state + + svc = _make_service("svc-1", ["read", "write"]) + role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) + state = _make_state() + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: + cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value + cfg_instance.get_services.return_value = [svc] + cfg_instance.get_roles.return_value = [role] + + result = fetch_pdp_state(state) + + snapshot = result["pdp_snapshot"] + assert "svc-1" in snapshot.service_permissions + perm_names = [p.name for p in snapshot.service_permissions["svc-1"]] + assert "read" in perm_names + assert "write" in perm_names + + def test_populates_role_composites_for_affected_role(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state + + role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME, child_names=["read"]) + state = _make_state() + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: + cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value + cfg_instance.get_services.return_value = [] + cfg_instance.get_roles.return_value = [role] + + result = fetch_pdp_state(state) + + snapshot = result["pdp_snapshot"] + assert ROLE_NAME in snapshot.role_composites + assert any(p.name == "read" for p in snapshot.role_composites[ROLE_NAME]) + + def test_configuration_unavailable_raises_502(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state + from fastapi import HTTPException + + state = _make_state() + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: + cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value + cfg_instance.get_services.side_effect = RuntimeError("connection refused") + + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: + fetch_pdp_state(state) + + assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# propose_mappings +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestProposeMappings: + def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: + svc = _make_service("svc-1", ["read"]) + role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) + return PDPSnapshot( + services=[svc], + roles=[role], + service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="svc-1-read", name="read")]}, + role_composites={}, + ) + + def test_returns_proposed_diff_scoped_to_affected_role(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import propose_mappings + + snapshot = self._make_snapshot() + state = _make_state( + pdp_snapshot=snapshot, + policy_chunks=["admin role gets read on svc-1"], + ) + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, + service_id="svc-1", + permission_id="svc-1-read", + permission_name="read", + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[], reasoning="policy says so") + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: + llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value + llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = diff + + result = propose_mappings(state) + + assert result["proposed_diff"] is not None + assert result["proposed_diff"].add[0].role_name == ROLE_NAME + + def test_llm_unavailable_raises_504(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import propose_mappings + from fastapi import HTTPException + + snapshot = self._make_snapshot() + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=snapshot) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: + llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value + llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.side_effect = Exception("LLM timeout") + + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: + propose_mappings(state) + + assert exc_info.value.status_code == 504 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# validate_mappings — existence check +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestValidateMappingsExistence: + def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: + return PDPSnapshot( + roles=[_make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME)], + service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, + ) + + def test_existence_check_passes_for_valid_mapping(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: + llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value + llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = ValidationVerdict( + approved=True + ) + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert result["validation_errors"] == [] + + def test_existence_check_fails_for_unknown_role(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name="nonexistent-role", service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 + + def test_existence_check_fails_for_unknown_service(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="no-such-svc", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 + + def test_existence_check_fails_for_unknown_permission(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="no-such-perm", permission_name="x" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 + + def test_no_writes_when_existence_check_fails(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name="ghost", service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 + # applied_changes not set means no writes attempted + assert result.get("added", []) == [] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# validate_mappings — safety guard +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestValidateMappingsSafety: + def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: + perms = [Permission(id=f"p{i}", name=f"perm{i}") for i in range(100)] + role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) + return PDPSnapshot( + roles=[role], + service_permissions={"svc-1": perms}, + ) + + def test_safety_guard_fails_when_too_many_changes(self, monkeypatch): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN", "2") + snapshot = self._make_snapshot() + mappings = [ + CompositeMapping(role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id=f"p{i}", permission_name=f"perm{i}") + for i in range(3) + ] + diff = ProposedDiff(add=mappings, remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=snapshot, proposed_diff=diff) + + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert any("safety" in e.lower() or "max" in e.lower() or "changes" in e.lower() for e in result["validation_errors"]) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# validate_mappings — auditor check +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestValidateMappingsAuditor: + def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: + return PDPSnapshot( + roles=[_make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME)], + service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, + ) + + def test_auditor_rejection_aborts_with_errors(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: + llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value + llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = ValidationVerdict( + approved=False, reason="policy violation" + ) + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 + assert result.get("added", []) == [] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# validate_mappings — scope check +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestValidateMappingsScopeCheck: + def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: + return PDPSnapshot( + roles=[ + _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME), + _make_role("other-id", "other-role"), + ], + service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, + ) + + def test_scope_check_fails_when_diff_touches_unrelated_role(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + # Diff contains a mapping for "other-role" which is not the affected role + other_mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name="other-role", service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[other_mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert any("scope" in e.lower() or "other-role" in e for e in result["validation_errors"]) + + def test_scope_check_passes_when_diff_only_touches_affected_role(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: + llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value + llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = ValidationVerdict(approved=True) + result = validate_mappings(state) + + assert result["validation_errors"] == [] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# apply_mappings +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestApplyMappings: + def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: + return PDPSnapshot( + roles=[_make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME)], + service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, + ) + + def test_apply_mappings_calls_add_and_remove(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings + + add_m = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + rm_m = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p2", permission_name="write" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[add_m], remove=[rm_m]) + state = _make_state( + pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), + proposed_diff=diff, + validation_errors=[], + ) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Policy") as MockPolicy: + policy_instance = MockPolicy.for_realm.return_value + result = apply_mappings(state) + + policy_instance.add_role_composites.assert_called_once() + policy_instance.remove_role_composites.assert_called_once() + assert len(result["added"]) == 1 + assert len(result["removed"]) == 1 + + def test_apply_skipped_when_validation_errors_present(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state( + pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), + proposed_diff=diff, + validation_errors=["existence check failed"], + ) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Policy") as MockPolicy: + policy_instance = MockPolicy.for_realm.return_value + apply_mappings(state) + + policy_instance.add_role_composites.assert_not_called() + policy_instance.remove_role_composites.assert_not_called() + + def test_pdp_unavailable_raises_502(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings + from fastapi import HTTPException + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) + state = _make_state( + pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), + proposed_diff=diff, + validation_errors=[], + ) + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Policy") as MockPolicy: + policy_instance = MockPolicy.for_realm.return_value + policy_instance.add_role_composites.side_effect = RuntimeError("service down") + + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: + apply_mappings(state) + + assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# format_response +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestFormatResponse: + def test_format_response_returns_provisioned_null(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import format_response + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + state = _make_state( + added=[mapping], + removed=[], + validation_errors=[], + ) + + result = format_response(state) + + assert result["summary"] is not None + assert "provisioned" in result + assert result["provisioned"] is None + + def test_format_response_includes_added_removed_counts(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import format_response + + mapping = CompositeMapping( + role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" + ) + state = _make_state(added=[mapping], removed=[]) + + result = format_response(state) + + assert result["summary"] != "" diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bf32369b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator (issue 4.11).""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState, TriggerContext + +REALM = "kagenti" +ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" + + +def _make_state(trigger_type: str = f"role/{ROLE_ID}", entity_id: str = ROLE_ID) -> BaseAgentState: + return { + "trigger": {"trigger_type": trigger_type, "entity_id": entity_id}, + "realm": REALM, + "policy_chunks": [], + "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], + "pdp_snapshot": None, + "proposed_diff": None, + "validation_errors": [], + "added": [], + "removed": [], + "summary": "", + } + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# dispatch scenarios +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRoleOrchestrator: + def test_role_trigger_invokes_role_graph(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch + + state = _make_state() + expected_result = {**state, "summary": "done", "provisioned": None} + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: + MockGraph.invoke.return_value = expected_result + result = dispatch(state) + + MockGraph.invoke.assert_called_once_with(state) + assert result == expected_result + + def test_sub_agent_response_returned_unchanged(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch + + state = _make_state() + raw_result = {**state, "summary": "applied 2 additions", "provisioned": None, "added": [], "removed": []} + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: + MockGraph.invoke.return_value = raw_result + result = dispatch(state) + + assert result is raw_result + + def test_sub_agent_http_error_propagated(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch + + state = _make_state() + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: + MockGraph.invoke.side_effect = HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="PDP down") + + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: + dispatch(state) + + assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_sub_agent_generic_error_propagated(self): + from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch + + state = _make_state() + + with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: + MockGraph.invoke.side_effect = RuntimeError("unexpected failure") + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + dispatch(state) From ad3c5d53e12e758b0bc0d612b11d9c710f9af48d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 20:11:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 063/273] feat(agent): implement controller routes, shared nodes, and tests (issues 3.2, 4.1) Add FastAPI controller with four /apply/* routes dispatching to role, policy, and service orchestrators. Fix fetch_domain_knowledge to raise 503 when ChromaDB is unavailable (was silently returning []). Add unit tests for shared nodes and controller routes (20 new tests, 190 total). - controller/routes.py: FastAPI app, lifespan with NATS consumer, stub handlers for policy and service orchestrators - controller/Dockerfile + requirements.txt: python:3.12-slim base, build context aiac/src/ - shared/nodes.py: raise 503 on ChromaDB unavailability in both nodes Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile | 13 ++ .../aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt | 10 + aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py | 100 ++++++++ aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py | 102 ++++++++ aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py | 219 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 444 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..10d036299 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +# Build context is aiac/src/ +COPY aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY aiac/ aiac/ + +EXPOSE 7070 + +CMD ["python", "-m", "aiac.agent.controller.routes"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..72fccbfcc --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +langgraph +langchain-openai +chromadb +tenacity +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +requests +python-dotenv +kubernetes +nats-py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c25cc5d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +"""FastAPI controller — /apply/* route handlers and NATS consumer lifespan.""" + +import asyncio +import os +from contextlib import asynccontextmanager + +from fastapi import FastAPI + +from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _nats_consumer_loop +from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch as roles_dispatch +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState, TriggerContext + + +def _build_state(trigger_type: str, entity_id: str | None) -> BaseAgentState: + return { + "trigger": TriggerContext(trigger_type=trigger_type, entity_id=entity_id), + "realm": os.getenv("AIAC_REALM", "master"), + "policy_chunks": [], + "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], + "pdp_snapshot": None, + "proposed_diff": None, + "validation_errors": [], + "added": [], + "removed": [], + "summary": "", + } + + +async def _handle_policy_build() -> dict: + # Policy Update Orchestrator — stub + return {"status": "accepted", "trigger": "build"} + + +async def _handle_policy_rebuild() -> dict: + # Policy Update Orchestrator — stub + return {"status": "accepted", "trigger": "rebuild"} + + +async def _handle_role(role_id: str) -> dict: + state = _build_state(f"role/{role_id}", role_id) + result = roles_dispatch(state) + return { + "summary": result.get("summary", ""), + "added": len(result.get("added", [])), + "removed": len(result.get("removed", [])), + "errors": len(result.get("validation_errors", [])), + } + + +async def _handle_service(service_id: str) -> dict: + # Service Onboarding Orchestrator — stub + return {"status": "accepted", "trigger": f"service/{service_id}"} + + +@asynccontextmanager +async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): + task = asyncio.create_task( + _nats_consumer_loop( + policy_handler=_handle_policy_build, + role_handler=_handle_role, + service_handler=_handle_service, + ) + ) + try: + yield + finally: + task.cancel() + try: + await task + except asyncio.CancelledError: + pass + + +app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan) + + +@app.post("/apply/policy/build") +async def apply_policy_build() -> dict: + return await _handle_policy_build() + + +@app.post("/apply/policy/rebuild") +async def apply_policy_rebuild() -> dict: + return await _handle_policy_rebuild() + + +@app.post("/apply/role/{role_id}") +async def apply_role(role_id: str) -> dict: + return await _handle_role(role_id) + + +@app.post("/apply/service/{service_id}") +async def apply_service(service_id: str) -> dict: + return await _handle_service(service_id) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + import uvicorn + + uvicorn.run("aiac.agent.controller.routes:app", host="0.0.0.0", port=7070) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2c5973c6a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.controller.routes (issue 4.1).""" + +import warnings +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + +# Suppress starlette httpx deprecation warning +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", category=DeprecationWarning, module="starlette") + +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient + + +def _make_role_result(role_id: str = "r1") -> dict: + return { + "trigger": {"trigger_type": f"role/{role_id}", "entity_id": role_id}, + "realm": "master", + "policy_chunks": [], + "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], + "pdp_snapshot": None, + "proposed_diff": None, + "validation_errors": [], + "added": [], + "removed": [], + "summary": "applied role update", + "provisioned": None, + } + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Route dispatch +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRoutesDispatch: + def test_policy_build_returns_200(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.post("/apply/policy/build") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + + def test_policy_rebuild_returns_200(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.post("/apply/policy/rebuild") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + + def test_role_route_calls_roles_dispatch(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + mock_result = _make_role_result("role-uuid-1") + with patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.roles_dispatch", return_value=mock_result) as mock_dispatch: + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.post("/apply/role/role-uuid-1") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + mock_dispatch.assert_called_once() + + def test_role_route_passes_role_id_to_orchestrator(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + captured = {} + mock_result = _make_role_result("my-role-id") + + def capturing_dispatch(state): + captured["trigger_type"] = state["trigger"]["trigger_type"] + captured["entity_id"] = state["trigger"]["entity_id"] + return mock_result + + with patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.roles_dispatch", side_effect=capturing_dispatch): + client = TestClient(app) + client.post("/apply/role/my-role-id") + + assert captured["trigger_type"] == "role/my-role-id" + assert captured["entity_id"] == "my-role-id" + + def test_service_route_returns_200(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.post("/apply/service/svc-abc") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + + def test_service_route_receives_service_id(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.post("/apply/service/my-service") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + # stub must echo back enough info to verify the right ID was received + body = resp.json() + assert "my-service" in str(body) + + def test_unknown_route_returns_404(self): + from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app + + client = TestClient(app) + resp = client.post("/apply/unknown/foo") + assert resp.status_code == 404 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..68a3a0bfb --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.shared.nodes (issue 4.1).""" + +import sys +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + + +def _make_state(trigger_type: str = "role/r1", realm: str = "kagenti") -> dict: + return { + "trigger": {"trigger_type": trigger_type, "entity_id": None}, + "realm": realm, + "policy_chunks": [], + "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], + "pdp_snapshot": None, + "proposed_diff": None, + "validation_errors": [], + "added": [], + "removed": [], + "summary": "", + } + + +def _make_chroma_module(docs: list[str] | None = None): + """Build a mock chromadb module whose HttpClient returns fake query results.""" + collection = MagicMock() + collection.query.return_value = {"documents": [docs if docs is not None else ["chunk1"]]} + client = MagicMock() + client.get_collection.return_value = collection + mock_chroma = MagicMock() + mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value = client + return mock_chroma + + +def _make_chroma_module_unavailable(exc: Exception | None = None): + """Build a mock chromadb module that raises on every HttpClient call.""" + if exc is None: + exc = OSError("connection refused") + mock_chroma = MagicMock() + mock_chroma.HttpClient.side_effect = exc + return mock_chroma + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# fetch_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestFetchPolicy: + def test_successful_fetch_populates_policy_chunks(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module(docs=["policy-doc-1", "policy-doc-2"]) + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + result = fetch_policy(state) + + assert result["policy_chunks"] == ["policy-doc-1", "policy-doc-2"] + + def test_build_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + state = _make_state(trigger_type="build") + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_policy(state) + + collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value + call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args + assert "all access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) + + def test_rebuild_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + state = _make_state(trigger_type="rebuild") + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_policy(state) + + collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value + call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args + assert "all access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) + + def test_role_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + state = _make_state(trigger_type="role/r1") + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_policy(state) + + collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value + call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args + assert "role assignment rules" in str(call_kwargs) + + def test_service_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + state = _make_state(trigger_type="service/svc-1") + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_policy(state) + + collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value + call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args + assert "service access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) + + def test_chroma_unavailable_raises_503(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + from fastapi import HTTPException + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module_unavailable() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: + fetch_policy(state) + + assert exc_info.value.status_code == 503 + + def test_chroma_n_results_respected(self, monkeypatch): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", "5") + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_policy(state) + + collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value + call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args + assert "5" in str(call_kwargs) or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 5 or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 5 + + def test_queries_aiac_policies_collection(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_policy(state) + + client = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value + client.get_collection.assert_called_with("aiac-policies") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# fetch_domain_knowledge +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestFetchDomainKnowledge: + def test_successful_fetch_populates_domain_knowledge_chunks(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module(docs=["domain-doc-1"]) + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + result = fetch_domain_knowledge(state) + + assert result["domain_knowledge_chunks"] == ["domain-doc-1"] + + def test_empty_collection_returns_empty_list_without_error(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module(docs=[]) # empty result set + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + result = fetch_domain_knowledge(state) + + assert result["domain_knowledge_chunks"] == [] + + def test_chroma_unavailable_raises_503(self): + """ChromaDB being down is fatal for domain knowledge too — raises 503.""" + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge + from fastapi import HTTPException + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module_unavailable() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: + fetch_domain_knowledge(state) + + assert exc_info.value.status_code == 503 + + def test_queries_aiac_domain_knowledge_collection(self): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge + + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_domain_knowledge(state) + + client = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value + client.get_collection.assert_called_with("aiac-domain-knowledge") + + def test_chroma_n_results_respected(self, monkeypatch): + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", "3") + state = _make_state() + mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() + + with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): + fetch_domain_knowledge(state) + + collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value + call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args + assert "3" in str(call_kwargs) or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 3 or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 3 From 85bed5cdadf7a8b692904a8a57d68a89d8485140 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:17:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 064/273] docs: fix Mermaid node colors for dark theme readability Replace light pastel fills (#dbeafe, #fef9c3, #dcfce7, #fee2e2) with dark equivalents and add explicit text/stroke colors so node labels are legible in VS Code dark theme markdown preview. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/aiac-agent-diagram.md | 64 +++++++++---------- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 6 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 64 ++++++++----------- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 26 ++++---- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 12 ++-- 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md index b165dc396..3b7941d6c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md @@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ flowchart TD FORMAT --> END(("END")) %% State annotations - style CLASSIFY fill:#dbeafe - style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#fef9c3 - style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#fef9c3 - style PROVISION fill:#dcfce7 + style CLASSIFY fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style PROVISION fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` **State:** `OnboardingProvisionState` — adds `client_info: ClientInfo | None` and `client_provision: ClientProvision | None` to `BaseAgentState`. @@ -83,12 +83,12 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` **State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions). @@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` ### 3b. Rebuild @@ -141,13 +141,13 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style CLEAR fill:#fee2e2 - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style CLEAR fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` **Rebuild differs from Build only by the `clear_assignments` node before the fan-out.** @@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` --- @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ flowchart TD C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] - style ABORT fill:#fee2e2 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 - style C3 fill:#fef9c3 + style ABORT fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 + style C3 fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 3a009f4a6..0dddb245d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -266,9 +266,9 @@ flowchart TD C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] - style ABORT fill:#fee2e2 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 - style C3 fill:#fef9c3 + style ABORT fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 + style C3 fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 ``` 1. **Existence check** — every `role_name`, `service_id`, `permission_id` in the diff exists in `pdp_snapshot`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index aeee36254..75d621503 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -51,16 +51,6 @@ Sequences two sub-agents and assembles the combined response: ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response ``` -**Success response:** -```json -{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } -``` - -**Abort response (validation failure):** -```json -{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } -``` - --- ## Sub-agents @@ -73,6 +63,27 @@ ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble resp START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → format_response → END ``` +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ServiceInfo"] + + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION + + PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) + + style CLASSIFY fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style PROVISION fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 +``` + #### Nodes - **`classify_service`**: determines service type and populates `ServiceInfo`. @@ -93,27 +104,6 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. - **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ServiceInfo"] - - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] - - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] - ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION - - PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style CLASSIFY fill:#dbeafe - style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#fef9c3 - style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#fef9c3 - style PROVISION fill:#dcfce7 -``` - #### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` Extends `BaseAgentState` with: @@ -202,12 +192,12 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index a3a0c0046..253c482f4 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -90,12 +90,12 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State @@ -143,13 +143,13 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style CLEAR fill:#fee2e2 - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style CLEAR fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index f77f444e0..2504b1d32 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -83,12 +83,12 @@ flowchart TD APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - style FP fill:#dbeafe - style FDK fill:#dbeafe - style FKC fill:#dbeafe - style PROPOSE fill:#fef9c3 - style VALIDATE fill:#fef9c3 - style APPLY fill:#dcfce7 + style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 + style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 + style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State From 3140aa9c8358733ab9b10c0800d1b3560fb686b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:26:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 065/273] docs: remove unreferenced aiac-agent-diagram.md The diagram file had no inbound references from PRD.md or any sub-component spec, making it an orphaned visual supplement. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/aiac-agent-diagram.md | 249 ------------------ 1 file changed, 249 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md deleted file mode 100644 index 3b7941d6c..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent-diagram.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,249 +0,0 @@ -# AIAC Agent — Visual Diagrams - -## 1. Top-Level Architecture - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*"] - CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] - - subgraph CO["Client Onboarding"] - ORC1["Orchestrator"] - SA1["Client Provision"] - SA2["Client Policy"] - ORC1 --> SA1 - ORC1 --> SA2 - end - - subgraph PU["Policy Update"] - ORC2["Orchestrator"] - SA3["Build"] - SA4["Rebuild"] - ORC2 --> SA3 - ORC2 --> SA4 - end - - subgraph URR["Users and Roles"] - ORC3["Orchestrator"] - SA5["Users"] - SA6["Roles"] - ORC3 --> SA5 - ORC3 --> SA6 - end - - TRIGGERS --> CTRL - CTRL -->|"user/:id or role/:id"| ORC3 - CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 - CTRL -->|"client/:id"| ORC1 -``` - ---- - -## 2. Client Onboarding Sub-agents - -### 2a. Client Provision - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_client\n\n1. Parse client_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ClientInfo"] - - CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] - CLASSIFY -->|"client_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ClientProvision"] - - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_client\n\ncreate_client_role\ncreate_client_scope\nper ClientProvision entry"] - ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION - - PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - %% State annotations - style CLASSIFY fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style PROVISION fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 -``` - -**State:** `OnboardingProvisionState` — adds `client_info: ClientInfo | None` and `client_provision: ClientProvision | None` to `BaseAgentState`. - -### 2b. Client Policy - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nusers, roles,\nclient roles/scopes,\nuser role mappings"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new client only"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new client only"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 -``` - -**State:** `BaseAgentState` (no extensions). - ---- - -## 3. Policy Update Sub-agents - -### 3a. Build - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nall users, clients,\nroles, all\nrole mappings"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live state"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 -``` - -### 3b. Rebuild - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_assignments\nrevoke_all_role_assignments\nrealm-wide wipe"] - - CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\nempty snapshot\nafter wipe"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nassign-only state is empty"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nassign_client_roles only"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style CLEAR fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 -``` - -**Rebuild differs from Build only by the `clear_assignments` node before the fan-out.** - ---- - -## 4. Users & Roles Sub-agents - -Both sub-agents share the same graph shape; only `fetch_keycloak_state` scope differs. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_keycloak_state\n\nUser: that users\ncurrent mappings\nand all clients/roles\n\nRole: all users\nand all roles"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected\nuser OR role"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected entity only"] - - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nassign_client_roles\nrevoke_client_roles"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 -``` - ---- - -## 5. Shared Module - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - subgraph SHARED["shared - used by all policy-applying sub-agents"] - FP["fetch_policy\nQuery: aiac-policies collection\nReturns: policy_chunks\nFails: 503 after UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES"] - FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nQuery: aiac-domain-knowledge collection\nReturns: domain_knowledge_chunks\nFails: non-fatal"] - end - - subgraph STATE["BaseAgentState"] - S1["trigger: TriggerContext"] - S2["realm: str"] - S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] - S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] - S5["keycloak_snapshot: KeycloakSnapshot"] - S6["proposed_diff: ProposedDiff or None"] - S7["validation_errors: list of str"] - S8["applied / revoked: list of RoleAssignment"] - S9["summary: str"] - end - - subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] - Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] - Q2["user/:id -> user role assignment rules"] - Q3["role/:id -> role assignment rules"] - Q4["client/:id -> client access control rules"] - end - - FP & FDK --> STATE - QUERY_KEYS --> FP - QUERY_KEYS --> FDK -``` - ---- - -## 6. Validate Node — Common Checks - -All `validate_*` nodes execute the same four checks (binary abort on any failure): - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - IN["proposed_diff\n+ keycloak_snapshot"] --> C1 - - C1{"1. Existence check\nEvery user_id, client_id,\nrole_id in diff exists\nin keycloak_snapshot"} - C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\napplied and revoked empty"] - C1 -->|"pass"| C2 - - C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal changes\nassign + revoke\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} - C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C2 -->|"pass"| C3 - - C3{"3. LLM re-confirmation\nAuditor system prompt\n-> ValidationVerdict\napproved bool + reason str"} - C3 -->|"approved=false"| ABORT - C3 -->|"approved=true"| C4 - - C4{"4. Scope check\nDiff bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} - C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] - - style ABORT fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 - style C3 fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 -``` From ebaf2dff192f2b69b897c05a3973b9b37a69d333 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 15:43:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 066/273] docs: Remove mermaid element styles from aiac-agent requirement docs Strip all style directives from mermaid flowchart blocks in the aiac-agent component PRD and its three use-case sub-PRDs so graphs render with the viewer's default theme. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 4 ---- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 12 ------------ .../components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 15 --------------- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 7 ------- 4 files changed, 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 0dddb245d..79ac7aaf2 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -265,10 +265,6 @@ flowchart TD C4{"4. Scope check\nDiff bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] - - style ABORT fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 - style C3 fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 ``` 1. **Existence check** — every `role_name`, `service_id`, `permission_id` in the diff exists in `pdp_snapshot`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 75d621503..2247894d0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -77,11 +77,6 @@ flowchart TD PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style CLASSIFY fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style ANALYZE_AGENT fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style ANALYZE_TOOL fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style PROVISION fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### Nodes @@ -191,13 +186,6 @@ flowchart TD VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 253c482f4..2a13567e1 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -89,13 +89,6 @@ flowchart TD VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State @@ -142,14 +135,6 @@ flowchart TD VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites only"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style CLEAR fill:#7f1d1d,color:#fee2e2,stroke:#f87171 - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 2504b1d32..06cc51796 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -82,13 +82,6 @@ flowchart TD VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) - - style FP fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FDK fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style FKC fill:#1e3a8a,color:#e2e8f0,stroke:#5a9fd4 - style PROPOSE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style VALIDATE fill:#713f12,color:#fef3c7,stroke:#d97706 - style APPLY fill:#14532d,color:#dcfce7,stroke:#4ade80 ``` #### State From 5558968ef12af5ab3bb4cbdbbeb4b27de5a8f2eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 23:10:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 067/273] docs: refine classify_service spec with AgentRuntime LIST lookup and legacy label fallback Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 33 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 2247894d0..d58ddca79 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. Lookup AgentRuntime CR K8s\n3. Populate ServiceInfo"] + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. LIST AgentRuntime CRs, filter by targetRef.name\n3. Fallback: check pod kagenti.io/type label\n4. Populate ServiceInfo"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent\n(full or partial)"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision\n(handles empty description/skills)"] CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] @@ -83,19 +83,28 @@ flowchart TD - **`classify_service`**: determines service type and populates `ServiceInfo`. 1. **Parse `trigger.service_id`**: - - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract namespace. + - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workloadName = serviceAccount`. The SPIFFE service account name matches the workload name and the pod's `ServiceAccount` name 1:1 (confirmed against `spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent`). - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. - Unrecognised format → treat as `ServiceType.tool`. - 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) by namespace + name via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: read the `AgentCard` CR; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - - **Not found** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. - 3. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the Service record is not found for a tool. + 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. + - **Do not** GET by CR name — `AgentRuntime` CR names are user-chosen (e.g. `weather-agent-runtime`) and do not match the workload name. Instead, **LIST** all `AgentRuntime` CRs in the namespace and find the one whose `spec.targetRef.name == workloadName`. + - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: find the corresponding `AgentCard` CR in the same namespace (also LIST, filter by `spec.targetRef.name == workloadName`); populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. + - **Not found** → proceed to step 3 (legacy agent check). + 3. **Legacy agent check** (SPIFFE-format `service_id` only): if no `AgentRuntime` CR was found, look up the pod in the namespace whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workloadName`. + - **Pod found with `kagenti.io/type: agent` label** → `service_type = agent` (legacy deployment pattern — no `AgentCard` available): populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description="", skills=[])`. This signals to downstream nodes that classification is partial. + - **Pod not found or label absent** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. + 4. For short or unrecognised `service_id` formats, skip step 3 and go directly to the tool lookup in step 3's else branch. + 5. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the `Service` record is not found for a tool. - > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev` and `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`. + > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev`, `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`, and `pods` (core API group) in the target namespace. - > **kagenti-operator note:** The operator does not expose an HTTP API. `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) are stored alongside workloads. Absence of an `AgentRuntime` CR is the authoritative signal for `ServiceType.tool`. + > **AgentRuntime CR naming:** The CR name is user-chosen and does not match the workload. The workload is referenced via `spec.targetRef.name`. Always use a LIST + filter, never a GET by name. -- **`analyze_agent`** / **`analyze_tool`**: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. + > **Two deployment patterns:** The kagenti-operator supports two patterns: (1) **AgentRuntime-managed** — an `AgentRuntime` CR is created first; the operator injects sidecars and creates an `AgentCard` CR automatically. (2) **Legacy label-based** — the deployment carries `kagenti.io/inject: enabled` and `kagenti.io/type: agent` labels directly; the operator injects sidecars but no `AgentRuntime` or `AgentCard` CR is created. Both patterns produce a running pod with `kagenti.io/type: agent` label (applied by the webhook); only the first produces structured `AgentCard` data. `classify_service` must handle both. + + > **`kagenti.io/type` label authority:** This label is applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook, not by the workload itself. It is safe to treat as authoritative for service type classification when no `AgentRuntime` CR is present. + +- **`analyze_agent`** / **`analyze_tool`**: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. `analyze_agent` must handle the partial-data case: when `ServiceInfo.description` is empty and `skills` is empty (legacy deployment, no `AgentCard`), the LLM should derive a minimal provision from the workload name alone rather than failing. The `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` prompt must instruct the LLM to treat an empty description/skills list as "insufficient data — produce conservative minimal permissions only, and set `reasoning` to indicate the classification was partial". - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. - **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. @@ -221,4 +230,6 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/ ## Open Questions -_None currently._ +1. **`analyze_agent` with partial data — downstream quality**: When `ServiceInfo.description` and `skills` are both empty (legacy deployment), the LLM in `analyze_agent` produces conservative minimal permissions. Should the orchestrator surface a warning to the caller that the onboarding result is based on incomplete service metadata? Or is silent degraded output acceptable? + +2. **AgentCard lookup for legacy pattern**: Once a legacy workload is migrated to the AgentRuntime-managed pattern (an `AgentRuntime` CR is created retroactively), the next trigger will find the CR and use full AgentCard data. No spec change needed, but the transition has no explicit re-onboarding trigger — is that acceptable, or should `classify_service` re-check and re-provision if it previously produced a partial result? From a01708286c749a9b5867704b60445ab354ef4dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:20:49 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 068/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs:=20redesign=20UC1=20Service=20Prov?= =?UTF-8?q?ision=20nodes=20=E2=80=94=20remove=20LLM,=20deterministic=20map?= =?UTF-8?q?ping?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit classify_service: pod kagenti.io/type label check only (no AgentRuntime CR lookup). analyze_agent: non-LLM; LIST AgentCard CRs → one role + one scope per skill; legacy fallback (no AgentCard) produces {workload}.access scope. analyze_tool: non-LLM; K8s Service label lookup → tools/list → one scope per MCP tool. Remove ServiceInfo/Skill types and prompts.py from provision sub-agent. Naming convention: {workload}.{skill}/{tool} for scopes, {workload}.agent for role. ServiceProvision.reasoning kept as machine-generated provenance string. Update aiac-agent.md and PRD.md for consistency. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 7 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 94 +++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index c9ecd1727..9dd692033 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th | Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role sub-agent | -All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (via the Kubernetes in-cluster API to read `AgentRuntime`/`AgentCard` CRs), then maps roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (classifies the service via the pod's `kagenti.io/type` label; for agents reads the `AgentCard` CR; for tools calls `tools/list` on the MCP endpoint discovered via K8s Service label lookup), then maps roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 79ac7aaf2..5e2849bf9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `ServiceInfo`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`, etc.) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py` — see [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). +Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py` — see [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). --- @@ -238,8 +238,6 @@ Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants i - **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped PDP snapshot summary. - **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. -Service Provision sub-agent additionally defines `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` and `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` in `onboarding/provision/prompts.py`. - --- ## Validate Node — Common Checks (All Agents) @@ -359,8 +357,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph │ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response -│ │ ├── prompts.py ← ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM -│ │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, Skill, ServiceInfo, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState +│ │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState │ └── policy/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index d58ddca79..2b5c8ccfb 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. LIST AgentRuntime CRs, filter by targetRef.name\n3. Fallback: check pod kagenti.io/type label\n4. Populate ServiceInfo"] + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. LIST pods, find by SA name\n3. Check kagenti.io/type label\n4. Route on service_type"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent\n(full or partial)"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLLM -> ServiceProvision\n(handles empty description/skills)"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nLLM -> ServiceProvision"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLIST AgentCard CRs\n→ ServiceProvision\n(roles + scopes per skill)"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nK8s Service lookup\n+ tools/list\n→ ServiceProvision\n(scopes per tool)"] ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION @@ -81,30 +81,48 @@ flowchart TD #### Nodes -- **`classify_service`**: determines service type and populates `ServiceInfo`. +- **`classify_service`**: determines service type only; does not populate `ServiceProvision`. 1. **Parse `trigger.service_id`**: - - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workloadName = serviceAccount`. The SPIFFE service account name matches the workload name and the pod's `ServiceAccount` name 1:1 (confirmed against `spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent`). + - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workloadName = serviceAccount`. - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. - - Unrecognised format → treat as `ServiceType.tool`. - 2. **Look up `AgentRuntime` CR** (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) via the in-cluster Kubernetes API. - - **Do not** GET by CR name — `AgentRuntime` CR names are user-chosen (e.g. `weather-agent-runtime`) and do not match the workload name. Instead, **LIST** all `AgentRuntime` CRs in the namespace and find the one whose `spec.targetRef.name == workloadName`. - - **Found** → `service_type = agent`: find the corresponding `AgentCard` CR in the same namespace (also LIST, filter by `spec.targetRef.name == workloadName`); populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description=card.description, skills=[Skill(id, name, description) for each AgentSkill])`. - - **Not found** → proceed to step 3 (legacy agent check). - 3. **Legacy agent check** (SPIFFE-format `service_id` only): if no `AgentRuntime` CR was found, look up the pod in the namespace whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workloadName`. - - **Pod found with `kagenti.io/type: agent` label** → `service_type = agent` (legacy deployment pattern — no `AgentCard` available): populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=agent, description="", skills=[])`. This signals to downstream nodes that classification is partial. - - **Pod not found or label absent** → `service_type = tool`: call `get_services(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`; locate the `Service` by `service_id`; populate `ServiceInfo(service_type=tool, description=service.description or service.name, skills=[])`. - 4. For short or unrecognised `service_id` formats, skip step 3 and go directly to the tool lookup in step 3's else branch. - 5. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the `Service` record is not found for a tool. + - Unrecognised format → `service_type = tool`. + 2. **Find the pod**: LIST pods in `namespace`, find one whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workloadName`. + 3. **Check `kagenti.io/type` label** on the pod (applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook — authoritative): + - `kagenti.io/type: agent` → `service_type = agent`. + - Label absent or any other value → `service_type = tool`. + 4. Routes to `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` on `service_type`. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the pod is not found. + + > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `get`/`list` on `pods` (core API group) in the target namespace. + + > **`kagenti.io/type` label authority:** Applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook, not by the workload itself. Safe to treat as authoritative for service type classification. + +- **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR and maps directly to `ServiceProvision`. + 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one whose `spec.targetRef.name == workloadName`. + 2. **AgentCard found** → produce `ServiceProvision`: + - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{skill.name}", description=skill.description) for skill in card.skills]` + - `reasoning`: `f"derived from AgentCard: {len(skills)} skills"` + 3. **AgentCard not found** (legacy deployment — operator injected sidecars via label only, no AgentCard CR created) → produce minimal `ServiceProvision`: + - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.access", description="Default access scope")]` + - `reasoning`: `"partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned"` + + > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. + +- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools via the tool's service endpoint and maps to `ServiceProvision`. + 1. LIST `v1/Services` in `namespace`; find the one whose `spec.selector` includes `app: {workloadName}`. + 2. Construct the MCP endpoint: `http://{service.name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{service.spec.ports[0].port}/mcp` + 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on that endpoint. + 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: + - `roles`: `[]` (tools are reactive — they do not initiate further calls) + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` + - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` + 5. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure, service not found, or MCP call failure. + + > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `services` (core API group) in the target namespace. + + > **MCP path convention:** All MCP tool services in the kagenti platform must serve at `/mcp`. - > **Kubernetes API access:** The agent pod `ServiceAccount` requires `get`/`list` on `agentruntimes.agent.kagenti.dev`, `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev`, and `pods` (core API group) in the target namespace. - - > **AgentRuntime CR naming:** The CR name is user-chosen and does not match the workload. The workload is referenced via `spec.targetRef.name`. Always use a LIST + filter, never a GET by name. - - > **Two deployment patterns:** The kagenti-operator supports two patterns: (1) **AgentRuntime-managed** — an `AgentRuntime` CR is created first; the operator injects sidecars and creates an `AgentCard` CR automatically. (2) **Legacy label-based** — the deployment carries `kagenti.io/inject: enabled` and `kagenti.io/type: agent` labels directly; the operator injects sidecars but no `AgentRuntime` or `AgentCard` CR is created. Both patterns produce a running pod with `kagenti.io/type: agent` label (applied by the webhook); only the first produces structured `AgentCard` data. `classify_service` must handle both. - - > **`kagenti.io/type` label authority:** This label is applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook, not by the workload itself. It is safe to treat as authoritative for service type classification when no `AgentRuntime` CR is present. - -- **`analyze_agent`** / **`analyze_tool`**: LLM node producing a `ServiceProvision` from `ServiceInfo`. Routing is a conditional edge on `ServiceInfo.service_type`. `analyze_agent` must handle the partial-data case: when `ServiceInfo.description` is empty and `skills` is empty (legacy deployment, no `AgentCard`), the LLM should derive a minimal provision from the workload name alone rather than failing. The `ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM` prompt must instruct the LLM to treat an empty description/skills list as "insufficient data — produce conservative minimal permissions only, and set `reasoning` to indicate the classification was partial". - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. - **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. @@ -114,7 +132,6 @@ Extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| -| `service_info` | `ServiceInfo \| None` | Populated by `classify_service` | | `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | #### Types (`onboarding/provision/state.py`) @@ -124,16 +141,6 @@ class ServiceType(str, Enum): agent = "agent" tool = "tool" -class Skill(BaseModel): - id: str - name: str - description: str - -class ServiceInfo(BaseModel): - service_type: ServiceType - description: str - skills: list[Skill] = [] - class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): name: str description: str @@ -145,17 +152,12 @@ class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): roles: list[RoleDefinition] scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] - reasoning: str + reasoning: str # machine-generated provenance string class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): - service_info: ServiceInfo | None = None service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None ``` -#### Prompts (`onboarding/provision/prompts.py`) - -`ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM`, `ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM` - --- ### Service Policy Sub-agent @@ -217,8 +219,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response -│ ├── prompts.py ← ANALYZE_AGENT_SYSTEM, ANALYZE_TOOL_SYSTEM -│ └── state.py ← ServiceType, Skill, ServiceInfo, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState +│ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState └── policy/ ├── __init__.py ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph @@ -226,10 +227,3 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM ``` ---- - -## Open Questions - -1. **`analyze_agent` with partial data — downstream quality**: When `ServiceInfo.description` and `skills` are both empty (legacy deployment), the LLM in `analyze_agent` produces conservative minimal permissions. Should the orchestrator surface a warning to the caller that the onboarding result is based on incomplete service metadata? Or is silent degraded output acceptable? - -2. **AgentCard lookup for legacy pattern**: Once a legacy workload is migrated to the AgentRuntime-managed pattern (an `AgentRuntime` CR is created retroactively), the next trigger will find the CR and use full AgentCard data. No spec change needed, but the transition has no explicit re-onboarding trigger — is that acceptable, or should `classify_service` re-check and re-provision if it previously produced a partial result? From b9fb9823d48b96dbda8a5acaf12ff492ace5f6ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 01:19:50 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 069/273] docs: Mark analyze_tool lookup strategy as TBD in UC1 spec Tool client_id format is undefined (non-SPIFFE); namespace and workload_name cannot be parsed from it. The kagenti-operator does not manage tools, so no operator-stamped metadata is available. The K8s Service discovery steps are struck through pending a design decision tracked in issue 6.2. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 2b5c8ccfb..e8301490a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -109,17 +109,20 @@ flowchart TD > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. -- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools via the tool's service endpoint and maps to `ServiceProvision`. - 1. LIST `v1/Services` in `namespace`; find the one whose `spec.selector` includes `app: {workloadName}`. - 2. Construct the MCP endpoint: `http://{service.name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{service.spec.ports[0].port}/mcp` - 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on that endpoint. +- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools and maps to `ServiceProvision`. + + > **TBD** — The lookup strategy for tool services is unresolved. Tool `client_id` format is undefined (not SPIFFE); `namespace` and `workload_name` cannot be parsed from it. The kagenti-operator does not manage tools, so no operator-stamped K8s labels or attributes are available. The K8s Service discovery approach below (steps 1–5) assumes parseable coordinates and **cannot be implemented as-is**. See issue [6.2](../../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md) for the design decision. + + 1. ~~LIST `v1/Services` in `namespace`; find the one whose `spec.selector` includes `app: {workloadName}`.~~ + 2. ~~Construct the MCP endpoint: `http://{service.name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{service.spec.ports[0].port}/mcp`~~ + 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[]` (tools are reactive — they do not initiate further calls) - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` - 5. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure, service not found, or MCP call failure. + 5. Returns `502` on lookup failure or MCP call failure. - > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `services` (core API group) in the target namespace. + > **Kubernetes API access:** TBD — depends on lookup strategy decision in issue 6.2. > **MCP path convention:** All MCP tool services in the kagenti platform must serve at `/mcp`. From 4d9ae86ff86c9e5bea0fb1704c7167cd0665c798 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 02:10:12 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 070/273] docs: Update UC1 spec with agreed design decisions from grilling session - classify_service: store client_id from trigger.entity_id; SPIFFE-only path does K8s pod lookup + kagenti.io/type label validation; non-SPIFFE routes directly to tool path with namespace/workload_name=None; SPIFFE with missing/wrong label returns 502 - analyze_tool: resolve workload_name via get_service(client_id) from config API (client.name); MCP endpoint discovery remains TBD (issue 6.2) - provision_service: rename create_service_permission to create_service_role; propagate client_id from state to both library calls - OnboardingProvisionState: add client_id, namespace, workload_name, service_type fields; update flowchart labels Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 49 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index e8301490a..b3f0315e8 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. Parse service_id format\n2. LIST pods, find by SA name\n3. Check kagenti.io/type label\n4. Route on service_type"] + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. client_id = trigger.entity_id\n2. SPIFFE? → parse ns + workload_name\n3. LIST pods, validate kagenti.io/type\n4. non-SPIFFE → service_type=tool\n5. Route on service_type"] CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLIST AgentCard CRs\n→ ServiceProvision\n(roles + scopes per skill)"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nK8s Service lookup\n+ tools/list\n→ ServiceProvision\n(scopes per tool)"] + CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nconfig API: get_service\n+ tools/list (TBD)\n→ ServiceProvision\n(scopes per tool)"] - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_permission\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] + ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_role\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] @@ -81,18 +81,17 @@ flowchart TD #### Nodes -- **`classify_service`**: determines service type only; does not populate `ServiceProvision`. - 1. **Parse `trigger.service_id`**: - - SPIFFE format `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workloadName = serviceAccount`. - - Short format `{namespace}/{workloadName}` → split on first `/`. - - Unrecognised format → `service_type = tool`. - 2. **Find the pod**: LIST pods in `namespace`, find one whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workloadName`. - 3. **Check `kagenti.io/type` label** on the pod (applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook — authoritative): - - `kagenti.io/type: agent` → `service_type = agent`. - - Label absent or any other value → `service_type = tool`. - 4. Routes to `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` on `service_type`. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if the pod is not found. +- **`classify_service`**: determines service type; stores parsed coordinates in state; does not populate `ServiceProvision`. + 1. **Store `client_id`**: `state.client_id = trigger.entity_id` (the Keycloak `client_id` as received — the NATS payload carries `{ "id": "" }` which is the Keycloak `client_id`). + 2. **Check format**: + - **SPIFFE format** `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workload_name = serviceAccount`; store both in state; continue to step 3. + - **Any other format** → `state.service_type = tool`; `state.namespace = None`; `state.workload_name = None`; route to `analyze_tool`. No K8s access. + 3. **Find the pod** (SPIFFE path only): LIST pods in `namespace`, find one whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workload_name`. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if pod not found. + 4. **Validate `kagenti.io/type` label** (SPIFFE path only) on the pod (applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook): + - `kagenti.io/type: agent` → `state.service_type = agent`; route to `analyze_agent`. + - Label absent or any other value → returns `502` (SPIFFE ID registered in Keycloak without operator label is an inconsistent deployment — surface as error rather than mis-classify). - > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `get`/`list` on `pods` (core API group) in the target namespace. + > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `pods` (core API group) in the target namespace. Agent path only — tool path performs no K8s access. > **`kagenti.io/type` label authority:** Applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook, not by the workload itself. Safe to treat as authoritative for service type classification. @@ -111,22 +110,20 @@ flowchart TD - **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools and maps to `ServiceProvision`. - > **TBD** — The lookup strategy for tool services is unresolved. Tool `client_id` format is undefined (not SPIFFE); `namespace` and `workload_name` cannot be parsed from it. The kagenti-operator does not manage tools, so no operator-stamped K8s labels or attributes are available. The K8s Service discovery approach below (steps 1–5) assumes parseable coordinates and **cannot be implemented as-is**. See issue [6.2](../../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md) for the design decision. - - 1. ~~LIST `v1/Services` in `namespace`; find the one whose `spec.selector` includes `app: {workloadName}`.~~ - 2. ~~Construct the MCP endpoint: `http://{service.name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{service.spec.ports[0].port}/mcp`~~ + 1. **Resolve `workload_name`**: call `get_service(client_id)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` → `state.workload_name = client.name`. No K8s access. + 2. **Locate MCP endpoint**: **TBD** — how `analyze_tool` reaches the MCP endpoint is unresolved. See issue [6.2](../../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md). Steps 3–4 depend on this being resolved. 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[]` (tools are reactive — they do not initiate further calls) - - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` - 5. Returns `502` on lookup failure or MCP call failure. + 5. Returns `502` on config API failure, endpoint lookup failure, or MCP call failure. - > **Kubernetes API access:** TBD — depends on lookup strategy decision in issue 6.2. + > **Kubernetes API access:** None — tool path uses config API only (pending issue 6.2 resolution). > **MCP path convention:** All MCP tool services in the kagenti platform must serve at `/mcp`. -- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_permission` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. +- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role(client_id, role)` and `create_service_scope(client_id, scope)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `client_id` from state. - **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. #### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` @@ -135,6 +132,10 @@ Extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| +| `client_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id`; set by `classify_service` | +| `namespace` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI; set by `classify_service` for agents; `None` for tools | +| `workload_name` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI (agents) or `client.name` from config API (tools); set by `classify_service` or `analyze_tool` | +| `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; set by `classify_service`; used by conditional edge routing | | `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | #### Types (`onboarding/provision/state.py`) @@ -158,6 +159,10 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): reasoning: str # machine-generated provenance string class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): + client_id: str | None = None # Keycloak client_id = trigger.entity_id + namespace: str | None = None # agents only; None for tools + workload_name: str | None = None # agents: from SPIFFE; tools: client.name via config API + service_type: ServiceType | None = None # routing field; set by classify_service service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None ``` From f8641668069791d1a4e7f6cabe76375d3eea7c72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 02:45:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 071/273] docs: rename OnboardingProvisionState.client_id to service_id in UC1 spec State field renamed to service_id throughout; Keycloak concept references (client_id in comments and prose) preserved as-is. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index b3f0315e8..8120f87d7 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. client_id = trigger.entity_id\n2. SPIFFE? → parse ns + workload_name\n3. LIST pods, validate kagenti.io/type\n4. non-SPIFFE → service_type=tool\n5. Route on service_type"] + START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. service_id = trigger.entity_id\n2. SPIFFE? → parse ns + workload_name\n3. LIST pods, validate kagenti.io/type\n4. non-SPIFFE → service_type=tool\n5. Route on service_type"] CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLIST AgentCard CRs\n→ ServiceProvision\n(roles + scopes per skill)"] CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nconfig API: get_service\n+ tools/list (TBD)\n→ ServiceProvision\n(scopes per tool)"] @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ flowchart TD #### Nodes - **`classify_service`**: determines service type; stores parsed coordinates in state; does not populate `ServiceProvision`. - 1. **Store `client_id`**: `state.client_id = trigger.entity_id` (the Keycloak `client_id` as received — the NATS payload carries `{ "id": "" }` which is the Keycloak `client_id`). + 1. **Store `service_id`**: `state.service_id = trigger.entity_id` (the Keycloak `client_id` as received — the NATS payload carries `{ "id": "" }` which is the Keycloak `client_id`). 2. **Check format**: - **SPIFFE format** `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workload_name = serviceAccount`; store both in state; continue to step 3. - **Any other format** → `state.service_type = tool`; `state.namespace = None`; `state.workload_name = None`; route to `analyze_tool`. No K8s access. @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ flowchart TD - **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools and maps to `ServiceProvision`. - 1. **Resolve `workload_name`**: call `get_service(client_id)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` → `state.workload_name = client.name`. No K8s access. + 1. **Resolve `workload_name`**: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` → `state.workload_name = client.name`. No K8s access. 2. **Locate MCP endpoint**: **TBD** — how `analyze_tool` reaches the MCP endpoint is unresolved. See issue [6.2](../../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md). Steps 3–4 depend on this being resolved. 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ flowchart TD > **MCP path convention:** All MCP tool services in the kagenti platform must serve at `/mcp`. -- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role(client_id, role)` and `create_service_scope(client_id, scope)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `client_id` from state. +- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role(service_id, role)` and `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. - **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. #### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ Extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| -| `client_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id`; set by `classify_service` | +| `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id`; set by `classify_service` | | `namespace` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI; set by `classify_service` for agents; `None` for tools | | `workload_name` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI (agents) or `client.name` from config API (tools); set by `classify_service` or `analyze_tool` | | `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; set by `classify_service`; used by conditional edge routing | @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): reasoning: str # machine-generated provenance string class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): - client_id: str | None = None # Keycloak client_id = trigger.entity_id + service_id: str | None = None # Keycloak client_id = trigger.entity_id namespace: str | None = None # agents only; None for tools workload_name: str | None = None # agents: from SPIFFE; tools: client.name via config API service_type: ServiceType | None = None # routing field; set by classify_service From 1b1e24c4d4f9fa1a049f1b9387227a5b32edbe0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:24:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 072/273] docs: Refactor UC1 Service Onboarding policy sub-agent into PolicyModel + shared apply sub-agent MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Split Service Policy sub-agent: removes apply_mappings/format_response nodes; propose_mappings → propose_policy, validate_mappings → validate_policy; sub-agent now produces PolicyModel in state without committing to PDP - Add Policy Apply sub-agent (agent/shared/apply/): apply_policy + format_response; shared across all policy-producing sub-agents - Orchestrator sequences three sub-agents: ServiceProvision → ServicePolicy → PolicyApply - Replace proposed_diff/ProposedDiff with policy_model/PolicyModel in BaseAgentState - Restructure aiac/pdp/library/: split models.py into configuration/{models,api} and policy/{models,api} sub-packages - PolicyStatement shape and get_policy API remain TBD - Future human-in-the-loop gate documented as LangGraph interrupt() insertion point Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 110 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 8120f87d7..43573a309 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## Depends on -- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module (`BaseAgentState`, `PDPSnapshot`, `ProposedDiff`, `CompositeMapping`, `ValidationVerdict`), Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module (`BaseAgentState`, `PDPSnapshot`, `PolicyModel`, `ValidationVerdict`), Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. --- @@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ flowchart TD ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] SA2["Service Policy"] + SA3["Policy Apply"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 + ORC1 --> SA3 end CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 @@ -45,10 +47,10 @@ flowchart TD `onboarding/orchestrator.py` -Sequences two sub-agents and assembles the combined response: +Sequences three sub-agents and assembles the combined response: ``` -ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → assemble response +ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → PolicyApplyGraph.invoke() → assemble response ``` --- @@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ flowchart TD - **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools and maps to `ServiceProvision`. - 1. **Resolve `workload_name`**: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` → `state.workload_name = client.name`. No K8s access. + 1. **Resolve `workload_name`**: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` → `state.workload_name = client.name`. No K8s access. 2. **Locate MCP endpoint**: **TBD** — how `analyze_tool` reaches the MCP endpoint is unresolved. See issue [6.2](../../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md). Steps 3–4 depend on this being resolved. 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: @@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ flowchart TD > **MCP path convention:** All MCP tool services in the kagenti platform must serve at `/mcp`. -- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role(service_id, role)` and `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. +- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role(service_id, role)` and `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. - **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. #### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` @@ -175,18 +177,16 @@ class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END ``` -Examines all roles and determines which role → service permission/scope composite mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. +Examines all roles and determines which role → service permission/scope mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. Produces a `PolicyModel` written to state; does not commit to the PDP Policy Service. #### Nodes - **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. -- **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the new service only. -- **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). -- **`apply_mappings`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` for each entry in the validated diff. -- **`format_response`**: assembles the policy result for the orchestrator. +- **`propose_policy`**: LLM node; produces `PolicyModel` scoped to the new service only. Writes `policy_model` to state. +- **`validate_policy`**: existence check (entities resolved via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`) + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). `PolicyStatement` shape must carry sufficient information for entity resolution against the Configuration API. #### Graph @@ -198,40 +198,88 @@ flowchart TD START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nroles + composites,\nnew service permissions/scopes"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to new service only"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nscoped to new service only"] - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new service only"] + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check (via Configuration API)\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new service only"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) + VALIDATE --> END(("END")) ``` #### State -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Uses `policy_model: PolicyModel | None` field (replaces `proposed_diff`; defined in `BaseAgentState` — see [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md)). #### Prompts (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`) -`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-service composite mapping context. +`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-service `PolicyModel` generation context. + +--- + +### Policy Apply Sub-agent + +`agent/shared/apply/` — shared across all policy-producing sub-agents. + +Receives a validated `PolicyModel` from state and commits it to the PDP Policy Service. The PDP Policy Service handles translation to the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules). + +``` +START → apply_policy → format_response → END +``` + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_policy\naiac.pdp.library.policy.api\napply_policy(PolicyModel)"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) +``` + +#### Nodes + +- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api`. The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules) and commits. +- **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. + +#### State + +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `policy_model` and `realm`; writes `summary`. + +> **Future extension:** This sub-agent is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_policy` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `PolicyModel` before commit. --- ## File Structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/ -├── __init__.py -├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy, assembles combined response -├── provision/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response -│ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState -└── policy/ - ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph - ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response - └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +aiac/src/aiac/ +├── pdp/library/ +│ ├── configuration/ +│ │ ├── __init__.py +│ │ ├── models.py ← Subject, Role, Service, Scope +│ │ └── api.py ← Configuration Service client +│ └── policy/ +│ ├── __init__.py +│ ├── models.py ← PolicyModel, PolicyStatement (TBD) +│ └── api.py ← Policy abstract class + apply_policy() +└── agent/ + ├── shared/ + │ └── apply/ + │ ├── __init__.py + │ ├── graph.py ← PolicyApplyGraph + │ └── nodes.py ← apply_policy, format_response + └── onboarding/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy → apply, assembles combined response + ├── provision/ + │ ├── __init__.py + │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph + │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response + │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState + └── policy/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy + └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM ``` +> **Note:** `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (flat file) is replaced by the `configuration/` and `policy/` sub-packages above. All import sites updated in the same pass. + From b4c16463692d6ffc292c5e44595cc0425b465664 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:36:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 073/273] docs: update aiac-agent.md spec for policy sub-agent refactor MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Replace proposed_diff/ProposedDiff/CompositeMapping with PolicyModel in BaseAgentState - Add PolicyApplyGraph shared sub-agent to Service Onboarding orchestrator sequence - Rename propose_mappings→propose_policy, validate_mappings→validate_policy in Service Policy sub-agent - Update validate node to resolve entities via aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api - Update file structure to include shared/apply/ and reflect node renames Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 47 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 5e2849bf9..5b3d9bc4c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | +| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy → Policy Apply (sequential) | | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role sub-agent | @@ -38,8 +38,10 @@ flowchart TD ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] SA2["Service Policy"] + SA3["Policy Apply"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 + ORC1 --> SA3 end subgraph PU["Policy Update"] @@ -183,7 +185,7 @@ All type definitions shared across agents: | `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` | | `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Domain context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` | | `pdp_snapshot` | `PDPSnapshot` | Scoped PDP data for this trigger | -| `proposed_diff` | `ProposedDiff \| None` | LLM output | +| `policy_model` | `PolicyModel \| None` | Validated policy to commit; produced by policy-proposing sub-agents | | `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from validate node | | `added` | `list[CompositeMapping]` | Executed composite additions | | `removed` | `list[CompositeMapping]` | Executed composite removals | @@ -202,20 +204,11 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # role_name → current composite permissions ``` -#### `ProposedDiff` and `CompositeMapping` +#### `PolicyModel` -```python -class CompositeMapping(BaseModel): - role_name: str - service_id: str - permission_id: str - permission_name: str - -class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): - add: list[CompositeMapping] - remove: list[CompositeMapping] - reasoning: str -``` +Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the shared Policy Apply sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Service via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. The PDP Policy Service handles translation to the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules). + +`PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py`. `PolicyStatement` shape is TBD — must carry sufficient information for entity existence resolution via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. #### `ValidationVerdict` @@ -225,7 +218,7 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py` — see [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). +Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. `PolicyModel` and `PolicyStatement` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py`. See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). --- @@ -246,13 +239,13 @@ All `validate_*` / `validate_mappings` nodes perform the same four checks. Binar ```mermaid flowchart TD - IN["proposed_diff\n+ pdp_snapshot"] --> C1 + IN["policy_model\n+ pdp_snapshot"] --> C1 - C1{"1. Existence check\nEvery role_name, service_id,\npermission_id in diff exists\nin pdp_snapshot"} + C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by PolicyModel\nstatements resolved via\naiac.pdp.library.configuration.api"} C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nadded and removed empty"] C1 -->|"pass"| C2 - C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal changes\nadd + remove\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} + C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal statements\nin PolicyModel\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT C2 -->|"pass"| C3 @@ -265,10 +258,10 @@ flowchart TD C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] ``` -1. **Existence check** — every `role_name`, `service_id`, `permission_id` in the diff exists in `pdp_snapshot`. -2. **Safety guard rails** — total changes (`add` + `remove`) ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. +1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `PolicyModel` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. +2. **Safety guard rails** — total statements in `PolicyModel` ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. 3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. -4. **Scope check** — diff is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. +4. **Scope check** — `PolicyModel` is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. --- @@ -352,7 +345,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── onboarding/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy, assembles combined response +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy → apply, assembles combined response │ ├── provision/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph @@ -361,7 +354,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ └── policy/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ ├── policy_update/ @@ -390,7 +383,11 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ └── shared/ ├── __init__.py ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge - └── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, ProposedDiff, CompositeMapping, ValidationVerdict + ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, PolicyModel, ValidationVerdict + └── apply/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── graph.py ← PolicyApplyGraph (shared by all policy-producing sub-agents) + └── nodes.py ← apply_policy, format_response ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): From fd4b1703cfb53e65f38506518c54ee78df64b292 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:39:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 074/273] docs: fix Mermaid node ID conflict in aiac-agent.md SA3 was duplicated across Service Onboarding and Policy Update subgraphs. Renumber Policy Update as SA4/SA5 and Role Update as SA6. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 20 ++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 5b3d9bc4c..a1c95032e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -46,16 +46,16 @@ flowchart TD subgraph PU["Policy Update"] ORC2["Orchestrator"] - SA3["Build"] - SA4["Rebuild"] - ORC2 --> SA3 + SA4["Build"] + SA5["Rebuild"] ORC2 --> SA4 + ORC2 --> SA5 end subgraph RR["Role Update"] ORC3["Orchestrator"] - SA5["Role"] - ORC3 --> SA5 + SA6["Role"] + ORC3 --> SA6 end TRIGGERS --> CTRL @@ -137,10 +137,9 @@ flowchart TD S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] S5["pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot"] - S6["proposed_diff: ProposedDiff or None"] + S6["policy_model: PolicyModel or None"] S7["validation_errors: list of str"] - S8["added / removed: list of CompositeMapping"] - S9["summary: str"] + S8["summary: str"] end subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] @@ -198,10 +197,7 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): subjects: list[Subject] = [] roles: list[Role] = [] services: list[Service] = [] - service_permissions: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # service_id → permissions service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] - subject_assignments: dict[str, Assignments] = {} # subject_id → assignments - role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # role_name → current composite permissions ``` #### `PolicyModel` @@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ flowchart TD | POST | `/apply/policy/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | | POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | -| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | +| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy → Apply | **Success response (Service Onboarding):** ```json From b6bdf4752da885b4d962e9504072a3d7842c23ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:44:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 075/273] docs: Restructure library PRD into configuration/ and policy/ sub-packages MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Split flat aiac.pdp.library layout into two sub-packages: - configuration/{models,api}.py — Subject, Role, Service, Scope + Configuration client - policy/{models,api}.py — PolicyModel, PolicyStatement + Policy client with apply_policy() Adds apply_policy(PolicyModel) method and documents PolicyStatement shape constraint (TBD; must carry enough info for entity existence check via configuration.api). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../requirements/components/library.md | 80 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 23b342c46..cb5c0d59a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -13,9 +13,14 @@ aiac/src/ ├── __init__.py # empty ├── library/ │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ ├── models.py # Pydantic model definitions only - │ ├── configuration.py # HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service - │ └── policy.py # HTTP client → PDP Policy Service + │ ├── configuration/ + │ │ ├── __init__.py # empty + │ │ ├── models.py # Pydantic model definitions (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) + │ │ └── api.py # HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service + │ └── policy/ + │ ├── __init__.py # empty + │ ├── models.py # PolicyModel, PolicyStatement + │ └── api.py # HTTP client → PDP Policy Service + apply_policy() └── service/ ├── __init__.py # empty ├── configuration/ @@ -33,18 +38,18 @@ aiac/src/ ├── Dockerfile └── requirements.txt aiac/test/ -└── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.models +└── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models aiac/pyproject.toml # pytest config: testpaths=["test"], pythonpath=["src"] ``` -`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.pdp`, `aiac.pdp.library`, `aiac.pdp.service`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. +`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.pdp`, `aiac.pdp.library`, `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.service`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.models` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models` ### Description -Data structures and schema library. Contains only Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic PDP entities. No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. +Data structures and schema library. Contains only Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -111,7 +116,7 @@ Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] @@ -119,10 +124,10 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` ### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API. Provides both read and write access to PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.models`. +HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API. Provides both read and write access to PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models`. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ Read methods (`get_*`): ### Configuration -Read from a `.env` file co-located with `configuration.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| @@ -192,7 +197,7 @@ Read from a `.env` file co-located with `configuration.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/l ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration cfg = Configuration.for_realm("kagenti") subjects = cfg.get_subjects() @@ -210,12 +215,44 @@ updated_service = cfg.map_role_to_service(updated_service, role) --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models` + +### Description +Data structures for PDP policy representation. Contains PDP-agnostic Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses that decouple agent graph nodes from any specific policy backend. The PDP Policy Service translates these models internally (Keycloak composite mappings for Phase 1, Rego rules for Phase 2) — no translation logic lives in the agent. + +### Dependencies +``` +pydantic +``` + +### Pydantic models + +#### `PolicyStatement` + +Represents a single policy assertion. **Shape is TBD.** Constraint: must carry sufficient information for the Policy Apply sub-agent to verify entity existence via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` (roles, service IDs, and scopes in Keycloak) before committing. + +#### `PolicyModel` + +A collection of `PolicyStatement` instances representing a complete proposed policy for a service or role. Produced by the Service Policy sub-agent and consumed by the shared Policy Apply sub-agent. + +| Field | Type | Notes | +|-------|------|-------| +| `statements` | `list[PolicyStatement]` | Ordered list of policy statements | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel, PolicyStatement +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` ### Description HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Policy Service REST API. Abstracts the Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA) policy backends behind a stable function interface — callers never interact with the backend directly. The active backend is determined by `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, which points to whichever policy service pod is deployed. -Handles policy operations: composite role mappings (Phase 1) and Rego rules (Phase 2). Configuration entity operations (e.g. scope creation) belong to `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`. +Handles policy operations: committing `PolicyModel` instances (both phases), composite role mappings (Phase 1), and Rego rules (Phase 2). Configuration entity operations (e.g. scope creation) belong to `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -234,12 +271,21 @@ class Policy: @classmethod def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": ... + + def apply_policy(self, policy: PolicyModel) -> None: ... ``` -Policy write methods (composite role management and permissions) are defined in the PDP Policy Service component PRD. +`apply_policy`: +1. Translates the PDP-agnostic `PolicyModel` into the backend-specific representation (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules — handled internally by the PDP Policy Service). +2. Issues the appropriate request(s) to `{AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}`, appending `?realm=`. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. + +Additional policy write methods (composite role management and permissions) are defined in the PDP Policy Service component PRD. ### Configuration +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. + | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | @@ -247,7 +293,9 @@ Policy write methods (composite role management and permissions) are defined in ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel policy = Policy.for_realm("kagenti") +policy.apply_policy(policy_model) ``` From 56282027ef237fc8f8ad25ab3157a9c027b6ddae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 05:07:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 076/273] refactor(pdp): restructure library into configuration/ and policy/ sub-packages MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Issues 1.6, 2.9, 2.10: split flat library files into proper sub-packages. - Move models.py → configuration/models.py (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) - Move configuration.py → configuration/api.py (Configuration HTTP client) - Move policy.py → policy/api.py; add policy/models.py (PolicyModel, PolicyStatement) - Delete all three flat files - Update all import sites: state.py, nodes.py, read_api_from_config.py, test_nodes.py - Rewrite test_policy.py with full TDD coverage: PolicyStatement, PolicyModel, Policy.apply_policy (url, realm param, json serialisation, error handling) - Update test_models.py and test_configuration.py to new import paths + patch targets 193 tests passing (138 pdp + 55 agent). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py | 4 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py | 2 +- .../pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py | 0 .../api.py} | 2 +- .../pdp/library/{ => configuration}/models.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py | 0 .../pdp/library/{policy.py => policy/api.py} | 16 ++- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py | 10 ++ .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 2 +- aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py | 2 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 4 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 76 +++++----- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 2 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py | 131 +++++++++++++++++- 14 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/{configuration.py => configuration/api.py} (97%) rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/{ => configuration}/models.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py rename aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/{policy.py => policy/api.py} (51%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py index 9076c5891..ce1ce419c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ ProposedDiff, ValidationVerdict, ) -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy _MAX_CHANGES_DEFAULT = 50 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py index e82e63bf7..e945769bc 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject class Permission(BaseModel): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py similarity index 97% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index 1cc6cd5c7..310f4fead 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from .models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/models.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py similarity index 51% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py index 8e53564b3..dc5c57865 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py @@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ import os from pathlib import Path +import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel + load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") @@ -17,8 +20,11 @@ def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": def _base_url(self) -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") - def add_role_composites(self, role_name: str, composites: list[dict]) -> None: - raise NotImplementedError("add_role_composites not yet implemented") - - def remove_role_composites(self, role_name: str, composites: list[dict]) -> None: - raise NotImplementedError("remove_role_composites not yet implemented") + def apply_policy(self, policy: PolicyModel) -> None: + resp = requests.post( + f"{self._base_url()}/policy", + json=policy.model_dump(), + params={"realm": self.realm}, + ) + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c2558007c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +from pydantic import BaseModel + + +class PolicyStatement(BaseModel): + statement_type: str + entity_refs: list[str] + + +class PolicyModel(BaseModel): + statements: list[PolicyStatement] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index 16d70436c..83fbf03d3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import yaml from dotenv import load_dotenv -from .models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py index ebcae310c..55c24746c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ TriggerContext, ValidationVerdict, ) -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Role, Service +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Service REALM = "kagenti" ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index c54e40249..821834e64 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent / "src")) -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject REALM = "kagenti" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 397f2dc25..15d07e912 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ class TestGetSubjects: def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert isinstance(result[0], Subject) assert result[0].username == "alice" @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ class TestGetRoles: def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() assert isinstance(result[0], Role) assert result[0].name == "admin" @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ class TestGetServices: def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert isinstance(result[0], Service) assert result[0].id == "c1" @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ class TestGetScopes: def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() assert isinstance(result[0], Scope) assert result[0].name == "email" @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ class TestCreateScope: def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( scope_name="read:data", scope_description="Read access" ) @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "write"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("write", "Write access") url = m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/scopes" @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "desc") params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) assert params == {"realm": REALM} @@ -166,20 +166,20 @@ def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "Read access") body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) assert body == {"name": "read", "description": "Read access"} def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "desc") def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("dupe", "desc") @@ -205,8 +205,8 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}]} post_resp = _ok({}, 201) get_resp = _ok(updated) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=get_resp) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=get_resp) as get_m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) assert isinstance(result, Service) assert result.id == "svc-uuid" @@ -217,8 +217,8 @@ def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) url = post_m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id" @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ def test_raises_on_post_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) @@ -236,8 +236,8 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) assert post_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} assert get_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ class TestCreateRole: def test_returns_role_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "description": "Read-only", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") assert isinstance(result, Role) assert result.name == "reader" @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ def test_returns_role_instance(self, monkeypatch): def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") url = m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/roles" @@ -269,26 +269,26 @@ def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"name": "reader", "description": "Read-only"} def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("dupe", "desc") @@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)), \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) assert isinstance(result, Service) get_m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid", params={"realm": REALM}) @@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) url = post_m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id" @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ def test_raises_on_post_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) @@ -342,8 +342,8 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) assert post_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} assert get_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ class TestRealmParameter: ]) def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: getattr(Configuration.for_realm(REALM), method)() m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/{endpoint}", params={"realm": REALM}) @@ -375,6 +375,6 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", raising=False) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7071") diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index 76ac67140..c0976122b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope class TestSubject: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py index 186b5e846..9ba93a08c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py @@ -1,12 +1,87 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.policy.""" -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import Policy +import pytest +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel, PolicyStatement +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy REALM = "kagenti" +BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" + + +def _ok(json_data=None, status=200): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.ok = True + resp.status_code = status + resp.json.return_value = json_data or {} + return resp + + +def _err(status=500): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.ok = False + resp.status_code = status + resp.text = "internal error" + return resp + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# PolicyStatement model +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestPolicyStatement: + def test_has_statement_type_and_entity_refs(self): + s = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["reader", "abc123"]) + assert s.statement_type == "role_mapping" + assert s.entity_refs == ["reader", "abc123"] + + def test_entity_refs_accepts_empty_list(self): + s = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=[]) + assert s.entity_refs == [] + + def test_model_validate(self): + s = PolicyStatement.model_validate( + {"statement_type": "role_mapping", "entity_refs": ["r1"]} + ) + assert s.statement_type == "role_mapping" + assert s.entity_refs == ["r1"] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# PolicyModel model +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestPolicyModel: + def test_has_statements_list(self): + stmt = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["r1"]) + m = PolicyModel(statements=[stmt]) + assert len(m.statements) == 1 + assert m.statements[0].statement_type == "role_mapping" + + def test_statements_default_empty(self): + m = PolicyModel(statements=[]) + assert m.statements == [] + + def test_no_realm_field(self): + m = PolicyModel(statements=[]) + assert not hasattr(m, "realm") + + def test_no_reasoning_field(self): + m = PolicyModel(statements=[]) + assert not hasattr(m, "reasoning") + + def test_model_dump_serializable(self): + stmt = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["r1", "svc2"]) + m = PolicyModel(statements=[stmt]) + d = m.model_dump() + assert d == {"statements": [{"statement_type": "role_mapping", "entity_refs": ["r1", "svc2"]}]} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Factory method +# Policy factory method # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -22,7 +97,7 @@ def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Default URL fallback (verifies env var is read) +# Default URL fallback # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -36,3 +111,53 @@ def test_base_url_reads_from_env(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://custom:9999") p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) assert p._base_url() == "http://custom:9999" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Policy.apply_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestApplyPolicy: + def _make_model(self) -> PolicyModel: + return PolicyModel( + statements=[PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["reader", "svc1"])] + ) + + def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + model = self._make_model() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) + url = m.call_args[0][0] + assert url == f"{BASE}/policy" + + def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + model = self._make_model() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) + params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) + assert params == {"realm": REALM} + + def test_serializes_policy_model_as_json(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + model = self._make_model() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) + body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) + assert body == model.model_dump() + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + model = self._make_model() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) + + def test_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) + model = self._make_model() + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()): + result = Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) + assert result is None From fd2d2514135158411d7c9bdd3e7828b291aa14be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 05:26:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 077/273] docs: Fix PDP config service install guide for local dev - Use .venv/bin/python for smoke test (system python lacks pydantic) - Add port-forward start and pkill cleanup to smoke test block - Add pkill cleanup to the verify health-check block Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md index ec255536d..d3281fbbc 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md @@ -102,13 +102,18 @@ Port-forward and hit the health endpoint: kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & curl http://localhost:7071/health # {"status":"ok"} + +# When done, kill the port-forward: +pkill -f "port-forward.*7071" ``` -Run the full data smoke test (requires the Python dev environment): +Run the full data smoke test using the project virtual environment: ```bash +kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & cd aiac -python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +.venv/bin/python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +pkill -f "port-forward.*7071" ``` ## Redeploying after a code change From 52c7882afd7b24b4b6df1ae811e91e6e37f53f59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 05:48:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 078/273] chore: untrack Claude Code files and add to .gitignore Remove CLAUDE.md, .claude/, and docs/agents/ from version control. Add all three paths to .gitignore so they stay local only. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .claude/settings.json | 26 - .claude/skills/demo.md | 193 ------- .claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md | 158 ------ .claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md | 411 -------------- .claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md | 152 ----- .claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md | 224 -------- .claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md | 125 ----- .claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md | 220 -------- .claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md | 523 ------------------ .claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md | 213 ------- .claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md | 159 ------ .claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md | 56 -- .claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md | 261 --------- .claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md | 151 ----- .claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md | 297 ---------- .gitignore | 5 + CLAUDE.md | 374 ------------- 17 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3543 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .claude/settings.json delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/demo.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 CLAUDE.md diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json deleted file mode 100644 index 192ee4cc1..000000000 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -{ - "permissions": { - "allow": [ - "Bash(git status:*)", - "Bash(git log:*)", - "Bash(git diff:*)", - "Bash(git branch:*)", - "Bash(ls:*)", - "Bash(make lint:*)", - "Bash(make fmt:*)", - "Bash(make help:*)", - "Bash(make test-webhook:*)", - "Bash(make build-webhook:*)", - "Bash(pre-commit run:*)", - "Bash(go fmt:*)", - "Bash(go vet:*)", - "Bash(go test:*)", - "Bash(go build:*)", - "Bash(kubectl get:*)", - "Bash(kubectl describe:*)", - "Bash(kubectl logs:*)", - "Bash(helm template:*)", - "Bash(helm lint:*)" - ] - } -} diff --git a/.claude/skills/demo.md b/.claude/skills/demo.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0bbd2e191..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/demo.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -# Skill: AuthBridge Demo Development - -This skill captures knowledge from building, debugging, and running AuthBridge demos end-to-end on Kind clusters with SPIFFE/SPIRE, Keycloak, and Istio ambient mesh. - -## Repository Context - -- **Repo:** `kagenti/kagenti-extensions` (monorepo) -- **Container registry:** `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/` -- **Agent examples repo:** `kagenti/agent-examples` (separate repo, images NOT published to GHCR) -- **Demo guides:** `authbridge/demos//demo-manual.md` (manual kubectl) and `demo-ui.md` (UI-driven) - -## Demo Directory Convention - -Each demo lives under `authbridge/demos//`: - -``` -demos// -├── k8s/ -│ ├── configmaps.yaml # All 4 required ConfigMaps (environments, authbridge-config, spiffe-helper-config, envoy-config) -│ ├── -deployment.yaml # Agent Deployment + Service -│ └── -deployment.yaml # Tool Deployment + Service (if applicable) -├── setup_keycloak.py # Keycloak realm/client/scope/user setup -├── demo.md # Index page linking manual + UI guides -├── demo-manual.md # Full manual deployment guide (kubectl only) -└── demo-ui.md # UI-driven deployment guide -``` - -## Building and Loading Images for Kind - -Agent/tool images from `kagenti/agent-examples` must be built locally and loaded into Kind: - -```bash -# Build from agent-examples repo -docker build -t ghcr.io/kagenti/agent-examples/:latest ./a2a// -docker build -t ghcr.io/kagenti/agent-examples/:latest ./mcp// - -# Build AuthBridge sidecar images -cd kagenti-extensions/authbridge/authproxy -docker build -f Dockerfile.init -t ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/proxy-init:latest . -docker build -f Dockerfile.envoy -t ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/envoy-with-processor:latest . - -# Load into Kind -kind load docker-image --name kagenti -``` - -Use fully qualified image names in Dockerfiles (e.g., `docker.io/library/golang:1.24.9-bookworm`) to avoid Podman/Buildah "short-name resolution enforced" errors in Shipwright builds. - -## Envoy Config: Five Files with Inbound Listener - -All five envoy configs in the repo share the same inbound listener pattern. When modifying the inbound listener, update ALL of them: - -1. `authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/configmaps.yaml` -2. `authbridge/demos/single-target/k8s/configmaps-webhook.yaml` -3. `authbridge/demos/single-target/k8s/authbridge-deployment.yaml` -4. `authbridge/demos/single-target/k8s/authbridge-deployment-no-spiffe.yaml` -5. `authbridge/authproxy/k8s/auth-proxy-deployment.yaml` - -## Critical Bugs and Fixes - -### 1. iptables Backend Mismatch (proxy-init) - -**Symptom:** Inbound traffic bypasses Envoy — requests reach the agent without JWT validation. - -**Root cause:** Alpine 3.18's default `iptables` uses the **nf_tables** backend. Kind/kubeadm use **iptables-legacy**. Rules set via nft have no effect when the cluster uses legacy. - -**Fix:** `init-iptables.sh` auto-detects the backend via `detect_iptables_cmd()` (prefers `iptables-legacy`). All iptables calls use `${IPT}` variable. Override with `IPTABLES_CMD` env var if needed. - -**Verification:** proxy-init logs must show `Using iptables command: iptables-legacy`. - -**Diagnosis:** -```bash -docker exec iptables --version # Check node backend -docker exec bash -c ' # Inspect pod's rules - PID=$(crictl inspect $(crictl ps --name envoy-proxy -q | head -1) | jq -r .info.pid) - nsenter -t $PID -n iptables -t nat -L PREROUTING -n -v - nsenter -t $PID -n iptables -t nat -L PROXY_INBOUND -n -v' -``` - -### 2. Envoy Filter Ordering (ext_proc never sees direction header) - -**Symptom:** ext_proc logs `=== Outbound Request Headers ===` for INBOUND traffic. All requests treated as outbound. - -**Root cause:** `x-authbridge-direction: inbound` was at the **route level** (`request_headers_to_add` in `virtual_hosts`). Route headers are applied by the **router filter** — the LAST in the HTTP filter chain. ext_proc runs BEFORE router and never sees the header. - -**Fix:** Add a **Lua filter** BEFORE ext_proc in the inbound listener: -```yaml -http_filters: -- name: envoy.filters.http.lua - typed_config: - "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.lua.v3.Lua - inline_code: | - function envoy_on_request(request_handle) - request_handle:headers():add("x-authbridge-direction", "inbound") - end -- name: envoy.filters.http.ext_proc - ... -- name: envoy.filters.http.router - ... -``` - -**Key lesson:** Envoy HTTP filter execution order is: Lua → ext_proc → router. Route-level `request_headers_to_add` only takes effect during routing. Always use a filter to inject headers ext_proc needs. - -### 3. SPIFFE File Permission Denied - -**Symptom:** `cat: /opt/jwt_svid.token: Permission denied` in client-registration. - -**Root cause:** spiffe-helper ran as root, wrote file with `0600`. client-registration runs as UID 1000. - -**Fix:** Set `RunAsUser: 1000`, `RunAsGroup: 1000` on spiffe-helper's SecurityContext in `container_builder.go`. - -### 4. Istio Ambient Mesh Inbound Path - -With Istio ambient mesh, inbound traffic enters via **OUTPUT** (ztunnel delivery), NOT PREROUTING. `init-iptables.sh` PROXY_OUTPUT rule 1 (mark 0x539 + !uid 1337 + dst LOCAL) handles this correctly. - -**Diagnosis:** If PROXY_INBOUND REDIRECT has 0 packets but PROXY_OUTPUT rule 1 has non-zero, ambient mesh is active. - -## Debugging Techniques - -### Inbound Validation - -```bash -# Direct to inbound port (bypasses iptables, tests ext_proc only) -AGENT_POD_IP=$(kubectl get pod -n -l app= -o jsonpath='{.items[0].status.podIP}') -kubectl exec test-client -n -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://$AGENT_POD_IP:15124/.well-known/agent.json -# Expected: 401 - -# Through service (full path: iptables + ext_proc) -kubectl exec test-client -n -- curl -s http://:8000/.well-known/agent.json -# Expected: {"error":"unauthorized","message":"missing Authorization header"} -``` - -### ext_proc Direction Classification - -```bash -kubectl logs deployment/ -n -c envoy-proxy --since=30s 2>&1 | head -40 -# "=== Inbound Request Headers ===" → correctly classified -# "=== Outbound Request Headers ===" → Lua filter missing or misconfigured -# "Traffic direction INBOUND" → Envoy knows it's inbound (from listener) -``` - -### AuthBridge Logs - -```bash -# Inbound JWT validation -kubectl logs deployment/ -n -c envoy-proxy 2>&1 | grep "\[Inbound\]" -# Token exchange (outbound) -kubectl logs deployment/ -n -c envoy-proxy 2>&1 | grep "\[Token Exchange\]" -``` - -### Client Registration - -```bash -kubectl logs deployment/ -n -c kagenti-client-registration - -# Query Keycloak (use --data-urlencode for SPIFFE IDs) -curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \ - --data-urlencode "clientId=spiffe://localtest.me/ns//sa/" \ - --get "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/admin/realms/kagenti/clients" | jq '.[0].clientId' -``` - -## Demo Deployment Checklist - -1. **ConfigMaps FIRST** — Apply before deploying agents. Stale ConfigMaps cause silent registration failures. -2. **Rebuild after code changes** — `init-iptables.sh` changes → rebuild proxy-init. `configmaps.yaml` changes → `kubectl apply` + restart pods. -3. **Verify proxy-init backend** — Logs must show `Using iptables command: iptables-legacy`. -4. **Agent env vars** — git-issue-agent uses `MCP_URL` (NOT `MCP_SERVER_URL`) and needs `JWKS_URI`. -5. **Envoy timeout** — Set to `300s` for LLM agents. Default 15s causes `upstream request timeout`. -6. **Ollama** — Must be running (`ollama serve`) before end-to-end queries with local LLM. -7. **A2A protocol** — git-issue-agent uses v0.3.0 with method `message/send` (NOT `tasks/send`). Requires `messageId` field. -8. **Keycloak client ID with SPIRE** — Full SPIFFE ID (e.g., `spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent`), not a short name. -9. **webhook-rollout.sh** — Set `AUTHBRIDGE_K8S_DIR=authbridge/demos//k8s`. -10. **Keycloak scopes** — `github-full-access` is OPTIONAL; must be explicitly requested in token requests. -11. **ISSUER vs TOKEN_URL** — `ISSUER` = Keycloak frontend URL (in token `iss` claim). `TOKEN_URL` = internal service URL. They differ in K8s. -12. **Keycloak port 8080** — Must be in `OUTBOUND_PORTS_EXCLUDE` to prevent ext_proc token exchange redirect loop. - -## PR and Issue Conventions - -- PR titles MUST follow conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, etc. -- Demo documentation PRs use `docs:` prefix. -- Bug fix PRs use `fix:` prefix. -- Split large changes into reviewable PRs (e.g., manual demo separate from UI demo, AuthProxy fixes separate from demo docs). - -## What Triggers a Rebuild - -| Change | Action | -|--------|--------| -| `init-iptables.sh` or `Dockerfile.init` | Rebuild proxy-init image, `kind load`, delete pod | -| `authlib/` or `cmd/authbridge/` | Rebuild authbridge-unified image, `kind load`, delete pod | -| `configmaps.yaml` (envoy-config section) | `kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml`, delete pod | -| `configmaps.yaml` (other sections) | `kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml`, delete pod | -| `*-deployment.yaml` | `kubectl apply -f ` (rolling update) | -| `setup_keycloak.py` | Re-run `python setup_keycloak.py` | -| `container_builder.go` (webhook) | Rebuild webhook, redeploy, then delete agent pod for re-injection | diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 747963871..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate -description: Enhance any repository with CI, tests, skills, and security through phased PRs - self-replicating ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate"]) --> HAS_SCAN{Has scan report?} - - HAS_SCAN -->|No| SCAN["orchestrate:scan"]:::orch - SCAN --> PLAN["orchestrate:plan"]:::orch - HAS_SCAN -->|Yes| HAS_PLAN{Has plan?} - - HAS_PLAN -->|No| PLAN - HAS_PLAN -->|Yes| NEXT_PHASE{Next phase?} - - NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 2| PRECOMMIT["orchestrate:precommit
PR #1"]:::orch - NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 3| TESTS["orchestrate:tests
PR #2"]:::orch - NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 4| CI["orchestrate:ci
PR #3"]:::orch - NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 5| SECURITY["orchestrate:security
PR #4"]:::orch - NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 6| REPLICATE["orchestrate:replicate
PR #5"]:::orch - NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 7| REVIEW["orchestrate:review"]:::orch - - PRECOMMIT --> TESTS - TESTS --> CI - CI --> SECURITY - SECURITY --> REPLICATE - REPLICATE --> REVIEW - REVIEW -->|optional| ONBOARD_LINK["onboard:link"]:::onb - ONBOARD_LINK --> ONBOARD_STD["onboard:standards"]:::onb - REVIEW --> DONE([All phases complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white - classDef onb fill:#9C27B0,stroke:#333,color:white - classDef check fill:#FFC107,stroke:#333,color:black - class HAS_SCAN,HAS_PLAN,NEXT_PHASE check -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate Skills - -Enhance any repository with CI, tests, skills, and security through a series of phased PRs. Each phase produces a focused, reviewable PR of 600-700 lines. - -## Entry Point Routing - -When `/orchestrate` is invoked, determine the action: - -``` -What was provided? - | - +-- /orchestrate - | New target. Clone or locate the repo, then start from scan. - | Example: /orchestrate .repos/my-service - | - +-- /orchestrate - | Jump to a specific phase. Requires scan + plan to already exist. - | Example: /orchestrate ci - | - +-- /orchestrate status - Show current orchestration state for all tracked targets. -``` - -### Route logic - -1. **`/orchestrate `** -- If the path points to a git repository, derive the target name from the directory basename. Check `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//` for existing state. If no scan report exists, invoke `orchestrate:scan`. If scan exists but no plan, invoke `orchestrate:plan`. If both exist, determine the next incomplete phase and invoke it. - -2. **`/orchestrate `** -- Validate that `scan-report.md` and `plan.md` exist for the current target. If missing, instruct the user to run `/orchestrate ` first. Otherwise invoke the requested phase skill directly (e.g., `orchestrate:precommit`). - -3. **`/orchestrate status`** -- List all directories under `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/`, read each target's `phase-status.md`, and display a summary table showing target name, current phase, and completion percentage. - -## Phase Status Tracking - -All orchestration state is persisted under `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//`: - -| File | Purpose | -|------|---------| -| `scan-report.md` | Output of `orchestrate:scan` -- repo structure, tech stack, gaps | -| `plan.md` | Output of `orchestrate:plan` -- enhancement plan with phases and PR scope | -| `phase-status.md` | Tracks which phases are complete, in-progress, or pending | - -The `phase-status.md` file uses this format: - -```markdown -# Orchestration Status: - -| Phase | Status | PR | Updated | -|-------|--------|----|---------| -| scan | complete | -- | 2025-01-15 | -| plan | complete | -- | 2025-01-15 | -| precommit | complete | #42 | 2025-01-16 | -| tests | in-progress | #43 | 2025-01-17 | -| ci | pending | -- | -- | -| security | pending | -- | -- | -| replicate | pending | -- | -- | -| review | pending | -- | -- | -``` - -Each phase skill is responsible for updating `phase-status.md` when it starts and completes. - -## Phase Overview - -| Phase | Skill | PR | Description | -|-------|-------|-----|-------------| -| 0 | orchestrate:scan | -- | Assess target repo structure, tech stack, and gaps | -| 1 | orchestrate:plan | -- | Brainstorm enhancements and produce a phased plan | -| 2 | orchestrate:precommit | PR #1 | Pre-commit hooks, linting, and code formatting | -| 3 | orchestrate:tests | PR #2 | Test infrastructure and initial test coverage | -| 4 | orchestrate:ci | PR #3 | Comprehensive CI: lint, test, build, security scanning, dependabot, scorecard | -| 5 | orchestrate:security | PR #4 | Security governance: CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE | -| 6 | orchestrate:replicate | PR #5 | Bootstrap Claude Code skills into the target repo | -| 7 | orchestrate:review | -- | Review all orchestration PRs before merge | - -Phases are sequential. Each PR builds on the previous one. Tests come before CI (so CI can run them) and before security (so code refactoring for security fixes has test coverage as a safety net). The scan and plan phases do not produce PRs -- they produce artifacts that guide all subsequent phases. - -## Self-Replication - -Phase 6 (`orchestrate:replicate`) is what makes this system fractal. It copies a starter set of Claude Code skills into the target repository, including a tailored version of the orchestrate skill itself. Once replicated, the target repo can orchestrate other repos using the same phased approach. - -This means every repository that goes through orchestration gains the ability to orchestrate others. The skills adapt to the target's tech stack (the scan report informs what language-specific linters, test frameworks, and CI patterns to use). - -## Quick Start - -```bash -# Clone target repo into a working directory -git clone git@github.com:org/repo.git .repos/repo-name - -# Run the full orchestration pipeline -# /orchestrate .repos/repo-name - -# Or jump to a specific phase (if scan + plan already exist) -# /orchestrate precommit - -# Check status across all targets -# /orchestrate status -``` - -## Related Skills - -### Orchestrate sub-skills - -| Skill | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `orchestrate:scan` | Assess target repo structure and identify gaps | -| `orchestrate:plan` | Produce a phased enhancement plan | -| `orchestrate:precommit` | Add pre-commit hooks, linters, formatters | -| `orchestrate:ci` | Comprehensive CI: lint, test, build, security scanning, dependabot, scorecard | -| `orchestrate:tests` | Add test infrastructure and initial test coverage | -| `orchestrate:security` | Security governance: CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE | -| `orchestrate:replicate` | Bootstrap Claude Code skills into the target | -| `orchestrate:review` | Review all orchestration PRs before merge | - -### Onboard skills - -| Skill | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `onboard:link` | Link a newly-orchestrated repo to Kagenti | -| `onboard:standards` | Apply organizational standards and conventions | diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 1d9fd05be..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,411 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:ci -description: Add comprehensive CI workflows to a target repo - lint, test, build, security scanning, dependabot, scorecard, action pinning ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:ci"]) --> READ["Read plan + scan report"]:::orch - READ --> DETECT["Detect tech stack + CI gaps"]:::orch - DETECT --> T1["Tier 1: Universal checks"]:::orch - T1 --> T2{"Tier 2 needed?"} - T2 -->|Yes| T2_GEN["Tier 2: Conditional checks"]:::orch - T2 -->|No| T3 - T2_GEN --> T3{"Tier 3 needed?"} - T3 -->|Yes| T3_GEN["Tier 3: Advanced patterns"]:::orch - T3 -->|No| BRANCH - T3_GEN --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch - BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} - SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch - SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch - SPLIT --> PR - PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: CI - -Add comprehensive CI workflows to a target repository. This is Phase 4 and -produces PR #3. Encodes the kagenti/kagenti gold standard: lint, test, build, -security scanning, dependency management, and supply chain hardening. - -## When to Use - -- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies CI as a needed phase -- After precommit and tests phases (so CI can run the test suite) - -## Prerequisites - -- Plan exists at `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//plan.md` -- Scan report at `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//scan-report.md` -- Target repo in `.repos//` - -## Read Scan Report First - -Before generating anything, read the scan report to determine: -- Tech stack (Python, Go, Node, Ansible, Rust, multi-language) -- Existing CI workflows (what to preserve vs replace) -- Dockerfiles present (triggers container build workflows) -- Existing dependabot config (what ecosystems are covered) -- Existing security scanning (what's already in place) - ---- - -## Tier 1: Universal Checks (Always Generate) - -Every repo gets these regardless of tech stack. - -### 1.1 Core CI Workflow (`ci.yml`) - -**Trigger:** `pull_request` on `main` and `push` to `main` - -Adapt to tech stack from scan report: - -| Language | Lint | Test | Build | -|----------|------|------|-------| -| Python | `ruff check .` + `ruff format --check .` | `pytest -v` | `uv build` (if pyproject.toml has build-system) | -| Go | `golangci-lint run` | `go test ./... -v -race` | `go build ./...` | -| Node | `npm run lint` | `npm test` | `npm run build` | -| Rust | `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` | `cargo test` | `cargo build --release` | -| Ansible | `ansible-lint` | `molecule test` (if molecule config exists) | — | - -For multi-language repos, create separate jobs per language. - -All CI workflows MUST include: -- `permissions: contents: read` (explicit least-privilege) -- `timeout-minutes: 15` (prevent hung jobs) -- Language-appropriate dependency caching -- Pre-commit run (if `.pre-commit-config.yaml` exists): `pre-commit run --all-files` - -For simpler single-language repos, combine lint + test + build into one `ci.yml`. -For larger repos, split into `lint.yml`, `test.yml`, `build.yml`. - -### 1.2 Security Scans Workflow (`security-scans.yml`) - -**Trigger:** `pull_request` on `main` - -Generate parallel jobs based on what's in the repo. Always include dependency -review. Add language-specific SAST and file-type linters only when relevant files -exist. - -**Required permissions pattern:** - -```yaml -permissions: {} # Top-level: deny all - -jobs: - dependency-review: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - permissions: - contents: read - pull-requests: write - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@ # Always SHA-pinned - - uses: actions/dependency-review-action@ - with: - fail-on-severity: moderate - deny-licenses: GPL-3.0, AGPL-3.0 -``` - -**Conditional jobs (include only when relevant files exist):** - -| Job | When to Include | Tool | -|-----|----------------|------| -| Dependency review | Always | `actions/dependency-review-action` | -| Trivy filesystem | Always | `aquasecurity/trivy-action` (fs scan, CRITICAL+HIGH) | -| CodeQL | Python or Go or JS/TS | `github/codeql-action` with `security-extended` | -| Bandit | Python files exist | `PyCQA/bandit` (HIGH severity blocks) | -| gosec | Go files exist | `securego/gosec` | -| Hadolint | Dockerfiles exist | `hadolint/hadolint-action` | -| Shellcheck | `.sh` files exist | `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` | -| YAML lint | `.yml`/`.yaml` in workflows/charts | `ibiqlik/action-yamllint` | -| Helm lint | `Chart.yaml` exists | `helm lint` | -| Action pinning | `.github/workflows/` exists | Custom step or `zgosalvez/github-actions-ensure-sha-pinned-actions` | - -**Trivy reference config:** - -```yaml - trivy-scan: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - permissions: - contents: read - security-events: write - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@ - - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ - with: - scan-type: fs - scan-ref: . - severity: CRITICAL,HIGH - exit-code: 1 - format: sarif - output: trivy-results.sarif - - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@ - if: always() - with: - sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif -``` - -**CodeQL reference config:** - -```yaml - codeql: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - permissions: - security-events: write - contents: read - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@ - - uses: github/codeql-action/init@ - with: - languages: ${{ matrix.language }} - queries: security-extended - - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@ -``` - -### 1.3 Dependabot Configuration (`dependabot.yml`) - -Generate `.github/dependabot.yml` covering ALL detected ecosystems: - -```yaml -version: 2 -updates: - # Always include GitHub Actions - - package-ecosystem: github-actions - directory: / - schedule: - interval: weekly -``` - -**Add per detected ecosystem:** - -| Marker File | Ecosystem | Directory | -|-------------|-----------|-----------| -| `pyproject.toml` or `requirements.txt` | `pip` | `/` (or subdir) | -| `go.mod` | `gomod` | `/` (or subdir) | -| `package.json` | `npm` | `/` (or subdir) | -| `Cargo.toml` | `cargo` | `/` (or subdir) | -| `Dockerfile` | `docker` | `/` (or subdir with Dockerfiles) | - -For monorepo structures with multiple `go.mod` or `pyproject.toml` files, -add separate entries for each directory. - -### 1.4 OpenSSF Scorecard Workflow (`scorecard.yml`) - -```yaml -name: Scorecard -on: - push: - branches: [main] - schedule: - - cron: "30 6 * * 1" # Weekly Monday 6:30 AM UTC - workflow_dispatch: - -permissions: read-all - -jobs: - analysis: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - permissions: - security-events: write - id-token: write - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@ - with: - persist-credentials: false - - uses: ossf/scorecard-action@ - with: - results_file: results.sarif - results_format: sarif - publish_results: true - - uses: actions/upload-artifact@ - with: - name: scorecard-results - path: results.sarif - retention-days: 30 - - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@ - with: - sarif_file: results.sarif -``` - -### 1.5 Action Pinning Check - -Add as a job in `security-scans.yml` or standalone: - -```yaml - action-pinning: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - permissions: - contents: read - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@ - - name: Check action pinning - uses: zgosalvez/github-actions-ensure-sha-pinned-actions@ - with: - allowlist: | - actions/ -``` - -Start as informational (`continue-on-error: true`). Recommend tightening -after all actions are SHA-pinned. - ---- - -## Tier 2: Conditional Checks (Based on Scan Report) - -### 2.1 Container Build Workflow (`build.yml`) - -**Include when:** Dockerfiles detected in scan report. - -**Trigger:** Tag push (`v*`) and `workflow_dispatch` - -Generate multi-arch build matrix: - -```yaml -strategy: - matrix: - image: - - name: - context: - file: -``` - -Use `docker/build-push-action` with: -- QEMU for multi-arch (amd64 + arm64) -- Buildx -- GHCR push (`ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}/`) -- OCI labels via `docker/metadata-action` - -### 2.2 Stale Issues Workflow (`stale.yml`) - -**Include when:** Repo is actively maintained (has recent commits). - -Use the kagenti org reusable workflow: - -```yaml -name: Close Stale Issues and PRs -on: - schedule: - - cron: "30 6 * * *" - workflow_dispatch: - -jobs: - stale: - uses: kagenti/.github/.github/workflows/stale.yaml@main -``` - -### 2.3 PR Title Verification - -**Include when:** Repo follows conventional commit format. - -Use the org reusable workflow or `amannn/action-semantic-pull-request`. - ---- - -## Tier 3: Advanced Patterns (User Confirms) - -Flag these in the PR description as optional. Only generate if the scan report -indicates they are needed AND the user confirms. - -### 3.1 Comment-Triggered E2E (`e2e-pr.yml`) - -For repos with expensive E2E tests that require secrets: - -- Use `issue_comment` trigger (not `pull_request_target`) -- Authorization job: check commenter has write permission -- Add `safe-to-test` label flow -- Pair with `remove-safe-to-test.yml` for TOCTOU protection - -### 3.2 Post-Merge Security Scan (`security-post-merge.yml`) - -For repos where PR security scans are informational but post-merge should -upload to GitHub Security tab: - -- Trigger on push to main (path-filtered to dependency files) -- Full Trivy scan with SARIF upload -- `continue-on-error: true` (never blocks main) - -### 3.3 TOCTOU Protection (`remove-safe-to-test.yml`) - -Pair with comment-triggered E2E: - -- Trigger: `pull_request_target` on `synchronize` -- Remove `safe-to-test` label on new commits -- Post security checklist comment for maintainers - ---- - -## Action Version Reference - -When generating workflows, use the latest SHA-pinned versions. Look up current -SHAs from the kagenti/kagenti main repo's workflows as the reference. All -actions MUST be SHA-pinned with a version comment: - -```yaml -- uses: actions/checkout@ # v4 -``` - -**Never use tag-only references** like `@v4`. - ---- - -## Skills to Push Alongside - -Include in the target's `.claude/skills/`: -- `ci:status` — Check CI pipeline status -- `rca:ci` — Root cause analysis from CI logs - ---- - -## Branch and PR Workflow - -```bash -git -C .repos/ checkout -b orchestrate/ci -``` - -### PR size check - -```bash -git -C .repos/ diff --stat | tail -1 -``` - -Target ~600-700 lines. If over 700, split: -- PR 3a: `ci.yml` + `dependabot.yml` -- PR 3b: `security-scans.yml` + `scorecard.yml` -- PR 3c: Container builds (if applicable) - -### Commit and push - -```bash -git -C .repos/ add -A -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ commit -s -m "feat: add comprehensive CI workflows (lint, test, build, security, dependabot, scorecard)" -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ push -u origin orchestrate/ci -``` - -### Create PR - -```bash -gh pr create --repo org/repo --title "Add comprehensive CI workflows" --body "Phase 4 of repo orchestration. Adds GitHub Actions for lint, test, build, security scanning (Trivy, CodeQL, SAST), dependabot for all ecosystems, OpenSSF Scorecard, and action pinning verification." -``` - -## Update Phase Status - -Set ci to `complete` in `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//phase-status.md`. - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:tests` — Previous phase (test suite to run in CI) -- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines CI phase tasks -- `orchestrate:security` — Next phase: governance hardening -- `ci:status` — Monitor CI pipelines -- `rca:ci` — Debug CI failures diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 75727b4bf..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,152 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:plan -description: Brainstorm and create phased enhancement plan for a target repo - PR sizing, phase selection, task breakdown ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:plan"]) --> READ["Read scan report"]:::orch - READ --> PRESENT["Present findings"]:::orch - PRESENT --> BRAINSTORM["Brainstorm with developer"]:::orch - BRAINSTORM --> SELECT["Select applicable phases"]:::orch - SELECT --> SIZE["Size PRs (600-700 lines)"]:::orch - SIZE --> WRITE["Write plan document"]:::orch - WRITE --> DONE([Plan complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Plan - -Take the scan report and turn it into a concrete phased enhancement plan. This -is Phase 1 — interactive brainstorming with the developer, no PRs. - -## When to Use - -- After `orchestrate:scan` has produced a scan report -- Before starting any PR-producing phase - -## Prerequisites - -Scan report must exist: - -```bash -cat /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//scan-report.md -``` - -## Planning Process - -### 1. Read the scan report - -Review the Gap Summary and Recommended Phases sections. - -### 2. Present findings to developer - -Summarize the key gaps in plain language. Use AskUserQuestion to confirm -understanding and gather context about the repo's priorities. - -### 3. Brainstorm which phases apply - -Not all repos need all phases. Use AskUserQuestion to decide: - -| Gap Found | Phase | Default | -|-----------|-------|---------| -| No pre-commit config | `orchestrate:precommit` | Always (foundation) | -| No/incomplete CI workflows or security scanning | `orchestrate:ci` | Yes if missing | -| No/few tests (<5 test files) | `orchestrate:tests` | Yes if low coverage | -| No CODEOWNERS/SECURITY.md/LICENSE | `orchestrate:security` | Recommended | -| No `.claude/skills/` directory | `orchestrate:replicate` | Always (last phase) | - -### 4. Determine phase order - -Default order: precommit → tests → ci → security → replicate - -Tests come before CI (so CI can run them) and before security (so code -refactoring for security fixes has test coverage as a safety net). Pre-commit -is always first (it validates subsequent PRs). Replicate is always last. - -### 5. Size PRs - -Target 600-700 lines per PR. For each phase: -- If estimated >700 lines: split into sub-PRs by concern -- If estimated <300 lines: merge with adjacent phase -- Skills pushed alongside each phase count toward the total - -### 6. Write the plan document - -## Plan Output - -Save to `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//plan.md`: - -```markdown -# Enhancement Plan: - -**Generated from scan:** YYYY-MM-DD -**Tech stack:** -**Phases:** - -## Phase 2: Pre-commit (PR #1, ~NNN lines) -- [ ] Add .pre-commit-config.yaml -- [ ] Add linting config -- [ ] Create CLAUDE.md -- [ ] Create .claude/settings.json -- [ ] Add repo:commit skill - -## Phase 3: Tests (PR #2, ~NNN lines) -- [ ] Set up test framework -- [ ] Add test configuration -- [ ] Write initial tests for critical paths -- [ ] Add test:write and tdd:ci skills - -## Phase 4: CI (PR #3, ~NNN lines) -- [ ] Add lint/test/build workflow (ci.yml) -- [ ] Add security scanning workflow (security-scans.yml) -- [ ] Add dependabot.yml (all detected ecosystems) -- [ ] Add scorecard workflow -- [ ] Add action pinning verification -- [ ] Add container build workflow (if Dockerfiles exist) -- [ ] Add ci:status and rca:ci skills - -## Phase 5: Security Governance (PR #4, ~NNN lines) -- [ ] Create CODEOWNERS -- [ ] Create SECURITY.md -- [ ] Create CONTRIBUTING.md -- [ ] Verify/add LICENSE -- [ ] Audit .gitignore - -## Phase 6: Replicate (PR #5) -- [ ] Copy orchestrate:* skills to target -- [ ] Adapt references -- [ ] Update CLAUDE.md -- [ ] Validate skills -``` - -## After Planning - -Initialize phase tracking: - -```bash -cat > /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//phase-status.md << 'EOF' -# Phase Status: - -| Phase | Status | PR | Date | -|-------|--------|----|------| -| scan | complete | — | YYYY-MM-DD | -| plan | complete | — | YYYY-MM-DD | -| precommit | pending | | | -| tests | pending | | | -| ci | pending | | | -| security | pending | | | -| replicate | pending | | | -EOF -``` - -Then invoke the first applicable phase skill (usually `orchestrate:precommit`). - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:scan` — Prerequisite: produces the scan report -- `orchestrate:precommit` — Usually the first PR-producing phase diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index cddfd92ea..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:precommit -description: Add pre-commit hooks, linting, CLAUDE.md, and foundational .claude/ setup to a target repo ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:precommit"]) --> DETECT["Detect language"]:::orch - DETECT --> PRECOMMIT["Generate .pre-commit-config.yaml"]:::orch - PRECOMMIT --> LINT["Generate lint config"]:::orch - LINT --> MAKEFILE["Add Makefile targets"]:::orch - MAKEFILE --> CLAUDE_MD["Create CLAUDE.md"]:::orch - CLAUDE_MD --> SETTINGS["Create .claude/settings.json"]:::orch - SETTINGS --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch - BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} - SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch - SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch - SPLIT --> PR - PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Pre-commit - -Establish the code quality baseline for a target repo. This is Phase 2 and -produces PR #1 — the foundation that validates all subsequent PRs. - -## When to Use - -- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies precommit as a needed phase -- Always the first PR-producing phase - -## Prerequisites - -- Plan exists at `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//plan.md` -- Target repo cloned in `.repos//` - -## Step 1: Detect Language - -Use the scan report or check directly: - -```bash -ls .repos//go.mod .repos//pyproject.toml .repos//package.json .repos//requirements.yml 2>/dev/null -``` - -## Step 2: Generate Pre-commit Config - -Create `.pre-commit-config.yaml` with language-appropriate hooks. - -### Python hooks - -- `ruff` — lint + format -- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer`, `check-yaml` -- `check-added-large-files` - -### Go hooks - -- `golangci-lint` -- `gofmt`, `govet` -- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer` - -### Node hooks - -- `eslint`, `prettier` -- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer` - -### Ansible hooks - -- `ansible-lint`, `yamllint` -- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer` - -## Step 3: Generate Lint Config - -### Python (`pyproject.toml`) - -```toml -[tool.ruff] -line-length = 120 -target-version = "py311" - -[tool.ruff.lint] -select = ["E", "F", "I", "W"] -``` - -### Go (`.golangci.yml`) - -```yaml -linters: - enable: - - errcheck - - govet - - staticcheck - - unused -run: - timeout: 5m -``` - -### Node (`.eslintrc.json`) - -```json -{ - "extends": ["eslint:recommended"], - "env": { "node": true, "es2022": true } -} -``` - -## Step 4: Add Makefile Targets - -If no Makefile exists, create one. If it exists, add targets: - -```makefile -.PHONY: lint fmt - -lint: - pre-commit run --all-files - -fmt: - # language-specific formatter command -``` - -## Step 5: Create CLAUDE.md - -Template for the target repo: - -```markdown -# - -## Overview - - -## Repository Structure - - -## Key Commands -| Task | Command | -|------|---------| -| Lint | `make lint` | -| Format | `make fmt` | -| Test | | -| Build | | - -## Code Style -- with -- Pre-commit hooks: `pre-commit install` -- Sign-off required: `git commit -s` -``` - -## Step 6: Create .claude/settings.json - -```json -{ - "permissions": { - "allow": [ - "Bash(git status:*)", - "Bash(git log:*)", - "Bash(git diff:*)", - "Bash(git branch:*)", - "Bash(ls:*)", - "Bash(cat:*)", - "Bash(find:*)", - "Bash(make lint:*)", - "Bash(make fmt:*)", - "Bash(pre-commit run:*)" - ] - } -} -``` - -## Step 7: Create Branch and PR - -Create branch in the target repo: - -```bash -git -C .repos/ checkout -b orchestrate/precommit -``` - -### PR size check - -```bash -git -C .repos/ diff --stat | tail -1 -``` - -Target ~600-700 lines. Split if over 700. - -### Skills to push alongside - -Include initial skills in `.claude/skills/` within the target repo: -- `repo:commit` — commit message conventions adapted for the target - -### Commit and push - -```bash -git -C .repos/ add -A -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ commit -s -m "feat: add pre-commit hooks, linting, and Claude Code setup" -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ push -u origin orchestrate/precommit -``` - -### Create PR - -```bash -gh pr create --repo org/repo --title "Add pre-commit hooks and code quality baseline" --body "Phase 2 of repo orchestration. Adds pre-commit hooks, linting config, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/ setup." -``` - -## Update Phase Status - -Update `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//phase-status.md`: -- Set precommit to `complete` -- Record PR number and date - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:scan` — Provides tech stack detection -- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines precommit phase tasks -- `orchestrate:tests` — Next phase: test infrastructure diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 26dc28798..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:replicate -description: Bootstrap orchestrate skills into a target repo - making it self-sufficient for orchestrating its own related repos ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:replicate"]) --> COPY["Copy orchestrate skills"]:::orch - COPY --> ADAPT["Adapt references"]:::orch - ADAPT --> UPDATE["Update target CLAUDE.md"]:::orch - UPDATE --> VALIDATE["Validate skills"]:::orch - VALIDATE --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch - BRANCH --> PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch - PR --> DONE([Target self-sufficient]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Replicate - -The final orchestration phase. Copies orchestrate skills into the target repo, -making it fully self-sufficient. This is Phase 6. - -## When to Use - -- Final phase of orchestration -- After at least precommit + CI phases are complete -- When you want the target repo to orchestrate its own related repos - -## Prerequisites - -- `orchestrate:precommit` and `orchestrate:ci` complete (at minimum) -- Target repo has `.claude/` directory - -## What Gets Copied - -| Skill | Purpose | -|-------|---------| -| `orchestrate/` | Router — entry point | -| `orchestrate:scan/` | Assess repos | -| `orchestrate:plan/` | Create phased plans | -| `orchestrate:precommit/` | Add pre-commit hooks | -| `orchestrate:ci/` | Add CI workflows | -| `orchestrate:tests/` | Add test infrastructure | -| `orchestrate:security/` | Add security hardening | -| `orchestrate:replicate/` | This skill (self!) | -| `skills:scan/` | Discover skills in a repo | -| `skills:write/` | Author new skills | -| `skills:validate/` | Validate skill structure | - -## Adaptation Steps - -After copying, adapt the skills: - -1. **Remove source-specific references** — strip kagenti-specific paths or - assumptions that don't apply -2. **Verify frontmatter** — every `name:` field must match its directory name -3. **Update Related Skills** — only reference skills that exist in the copied set -4. **Preserve generality** — skills should work in any repo context - -## Update Target CLAUDE.md - -Add an orchestration section: - -```markdown -## Orchestration - -This repo includes orchestrate skills for enhancing related repos: - -| Skill | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `orchestrate` | Run `/orchestrate ` to start | -| `orchestrate:scan` | Assess repo structure and gaps | -| `orchestrate:plan` | Create phased enhancement plan | -| `orchestrate:replicate` | Bootstrap skills into target | -``` - -## The Fractal Concept - -This phase makes the system self-replicating: - -1. **Repo A** orchestrates **Repo B** through all phases -2. Phase 6 copies orchestrate skills into **Repo B** -3. **Repo B** can now orchestrate **Repo C** -4. **Repo C** can orchestrate **Repo D**, and so on - -Each copy is independent. No runtime dependency on the original hub. The -skills adapt to whatever tech stack the scan discovers. - -## Validation - -After copying, verify: - -1. **Frontmatter match** — `name:` matches directory for each skill -2. **No broken references** — Related Skills point to existing skills -3. **No source-specific content** — grep for original repo name -4. **Structure** — every directory has exactly one `SKILL.md` - -## Branch and PR Workflow - -```bash -git -C .repos/ checkout -b orchestrate/replicate -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ add .claude/skills/orchestrate* .claude/skills/skills* -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ commit -s -m "feat: bootstrap orchestrate skills for self-sufficient orchestration" -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/ push -u origin orchestrate/replicate -``` - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:security` — Previous phase -- `skills:scan` — Discover skills (gets copied) -- `skills:write` — Author skills (gets copied) -- `skills:validate` — Validate skills (gets copied) diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 379ccd76a..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,220 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:review -description: Review all orchestration PRs before merge - per-PR checks, cross-PR consistency, and coordinated approval ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:review"]) --> GATHER["List open orchestration PRs"]:::orch - GATHER --> PER_PR["Per-PR review"]:::orch - PER_PR --> CROSS["Cross-PR consistency checks"]:::orch - CROSS --> DRAFT["Draft review summary"]:::orch - DRAFT --> APPROVE{User approves?} - APPROVE -->|Yes| SUBMIT["Post reviews via gh api"]:::orch - APPROVE -->|No| REVISE["Revise reviews"]:::orch - REVISE --> DRAFT - SUBMIT --> STATUS["Update phase-status.md"]:::orch - STATUS --> DONE([Review complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white - classDef check fill:#FFC107,stroke:#333,color:black - class APPROVE check -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Review - -Phase 7 quality gate. Review all orchestration PRs created by phases 2-6 before -merge. Checks each PR individually, then validates cross-PR consistency, and -submits reviews after user approval. - -## When to Use - -- After all orchestration phases (2-6) have created their PRs -- Before merging any orchestration PRs into the target repo -- When `/orchestrate review` is invoked from the router - -## Prerequisites - -- `scan-report.md` and `plan.md` exist in `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate//` -- Phases 2-6 are complete (or at least the phases that were planned) -- PRs are open on the target repo - -## Phase 1: Gather - -List open PRs for the target repo and collect metadata: - -```bash -# List open PRs created by orchestration (look for orchestrate-related branch names or labels) -gh pr list --repo / --state open --json number,title,headRefName,additions,deletions,files -``` - -For each PR, fetch the diff: - -```bash -gh pr diff --repo / -``` - -Record PR metadata in a working table: - -| PR | Title | Branch | Files | +/- | -|----|-------|--------|-------|-----| -| #N | ... | orchestrate/... | N | +X/-Y | - -## Phase 2: Per-PR Review - -For each PR, run the review checklist: - -### Commit Conventions -- Signed-off (`Signed-off-by:` trailer present) -- Emoji prefix on commit message (if repo convention requires it) -- Imperative mood in subject line -- Body explains "why" not just "what" - -### PR Format -- Title under 70 characters -- Summary section in PR body -- Links to relevant issues or plan - -### Area-Specific Checks - -| PR Phase | Checks | -|----------|--------| -| precommit (Phase 2) | `.pre-commit-config.yaml` valid YAML, hooks match detected languages, no conflicting formatters | -| tests (Phase 3) | Test files follow naming conventions, fixtures are reusable, no hardcoded secrets in tests | -| ci (Phase 4) | Actions SHA-pinned, permissions least-privilege, no secrets in logs, workflows valid YAML | -| security (Phase 5) | CODEOWNERS paths exist, SECURITY.md has contact info, LICENSE matches repo intent | -| replicate (Phase 6) | Skills have frontmatter, SKILL.md files are valid markdown, paths reference target repo correctly | - -### Security Review -- No secrets, tokens, or credentials in diff -- No overly permissive file permissions -- No `eval`, `exec`, or injection-prone patterns in scripts -- Container images use specific tags (not `:latest`) - -## Phase 3: Cross-PR Consistency - -Check alignment across all orchestration PRs: - -### Pre-commit ↔ CI Alignment -- Linters configured in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` (Phase 2) should match lint steps - in CI workflows (Phase 4) -- Example: if pre-commit runs `ruff`, CI should also run `ruff` (or at least not - run a conflicting linter like `flake8`) - -```bash -# Extract pre-commit hooks -grep "repo:\|id:" .repos//.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null -# Compare with CI lint steps -grep -A5 "lint\|check\|format" .repos//.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null -``` - -### Tests ↔ CI Alignment -- Tests added in Phase 3 should be executed by CI workflows added in Phase 4 -- Check that test commands in CI match the test framework detected - -```bash -# Test framework from Phase 3 -grep -r "pytest\|go test\|vitest\|jest" .repos//.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null -``` - -### CODEOWNERS ↔ Paths -- Paths in CODEOWNERS (Phase 5) should cover directories created by earlier phases - -```bash -# Check CODEOWNERS paths exist -cat .repos//CODEOWNERS 2>/dev/null | grep -v "^#" | awk '{print $1}' | while read path; do - ls .repos//$path 2>/dev/null || echo "MISSING: $path" -done -``` - -### Skills ↔ Repo Paths -- Skills replicated in Phase 6 should reference correct paths for the target repo -- Skill frontmatter should be valid - -```bash -# Check skill files have valid frontmatter -find .repos//.claude/skills -name "SKILL.md" -exec head -5 {} \; 2>/dev/null -``` - -## Phase 4: Draft - -Present a review summary to the user. Format: - -```markdown -# Orchestration Review: - -## Per-PR Verdicts - -| PR | Title | Verdict | Issues | -|----|-------|---------|--------| -| #N | precommit: ... | approve | 0 | -| #N | tests: ... | request-changes | 2 | -| #N | ci: ... | approve | 0 | -| #N | security: ... | comment | 1 | -| #N | replicate: ... | approve | 0 | - -## Issues Found - -### PR #N: -1. **[severity]** Description of issue - - File: `path/to/file` - - Recommendation: ... - -## Cross-PR Consistency - -| Check | Status | Notes | -|-------|--------|-------| -| Pre-commit ↔ CI lint | aligned/misaligned | details | -| Tests ↔ CI execution | aligned/misaligned | details | -| CODEOWNERS ↔ paths | aligned/misaligned | details | -| Skills ↔ repo paths | aligned/misaligned | details | -``` - -Present this to the user and wait for approval before submitting. - -## Phase 5: Submit - -After user approval, post reviews via GitHub API: - -```bash -# For each PR, post the review -gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/pulls/<number>/reviews \ - --method POST \ - -f event="APPROVE" \ - -f body="Orchestration review: all checks passed. ..." - -# Or for request-changes: -gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/pulls/<number>/reviews \ - --method POST \ - -f event="REQUEST_CHANGES" \ - -f body="Orchestration review: issues found. ..." -``` - -For PRs with inline comments, use the review comments API: - -```bash -gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/pulls/<number>/reviews \ - --method POST \ - -f event="REQUEST_CHANGES" \ - -f body="..." \ - --input comments.json -``` - -Where `comments.json` contains file-level comments. - -## Status Update - -Update `phase-status.md` when complete: - -```bash -# Update phase-status.md -sed -i '' 's/| review .*/| review | complete | -- | YYYY-MM-DD |/' /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/phase-status.md -``` - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` -- Parent router -- `orchestrate:scan` -- Scan report used for cross-referencing -- `orchestrate:plan` -- Plan used to verify all phases were executed diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 10ecd9fde..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,523 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:scan -description: Scan and assess a target repository - tech stack, CI maturity, security posture, test coverage, supply chain health ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:scan"]) --> TECH["Detect tech stack"]:::orch - TECH --> CI["Check CI maturity"]:::orch - CI --> SEC_SCAN["Check security scanning"]:::orch - SEC_SCAN --> DEPS["Check dependency management"]:::orch - DEPS --> TESTS["Check test coverage"]:::orch - TESTS --> SUPPLY["Check supply chain health"]:::orch - SUPPLY --> CVE["Run cve:scan"]:::cve - CVE --> SEC_GOV["Check security governance"]:::orch - SEC_GOV --> CLAUDE["Check Claude Code readiness"]:::orch - CLAUDE --> REPORT["Generate scan report"]:::orch - REPORT --> DONE([Scan complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white - classDef cve fill:#D32F2F,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Scan - -Assess a target repository's current state to determine what orchestration -phases are needed. This is Phase 0 — produces artifacts only, no PRs. - -## When to Use - -- First step when orchestrating a new repo -- Re-run after major changes to reassess gaps -- Before running `orchestrate:plan` - -## Prerequisites - -Target repo cloned into `.repos/<target>/`: - -```bash -git clone git@github.com:org/repo.git .repos/<target> -``` - -## Technology Detection - -Check for marker files to identify the tech stack: - -```bash -ls .repos/<target>/go.mod .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml .repos/<target>/package.json .repos/<target>/Cargo.toml .repos/<target>/requirements.yml 2>/dev/null -``` - -| Marker | Language | Lint Tool | Test Tool | Build Tool | -|--------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------| -| `go.mod` | Go | golangci-lint | go test | go build | -| `pyproject.toml` | Python | ruff | pytest | uv build | -| `package.json` | Node.js | eslint | jest/vitest | npm build | -| `Cargo.toml` | Rust | clippy | cargo test | cargo build | -| `requirements.yml` | Ansible | ansible-lint | molecule | — | - -For multi-language repos (e.g., Go + Python + Helm), note all detected stacks. - -Also check for: -- Dockerfiles: `find .repos/<target> -name "Dockerfile*" -type f` -- Helm charts: `find .repos/<target> -name "Chart.yaml" -type f` -- Shell scripts: `find .repos/<target> -name "*.sh" -type f` -- Makefiles: `ls .repos/<target>/Makefile` - -## Scan Checks - -### CI Status - -```bash -ls .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null -``` - -For each workflow found, read it and categorize: - -| Category | What to Check | -|----------|---------------| -| Lint | Does a workflow run linters? Which ones? | -| Test | Does a workflow run tests? Are they commented out? | -| Build | Does a workflow build artifacts/images? | -| Security | Does a workflow run security scans? | -| Release | Does a workflow handle releases/tags? | - -### Security Scanning Coverage - -Check which security tools are configured in CI: - -| Tool | How to Detect | Purpose | -|------|---------------|---------| -| Trivy | `trivy-action` in workflows | Filesystem/container/IaC scanning | -| CodeQL | `codeql-action` in workflows | SAST for supported languages | -| Bandit | `bandit` in workflows or pre-commit | Python SAST | -| gosec | `gosec` in workflows | Go SAST | -| Hadolint | `hadolint` in workflows or pre-commit | Dockerfile linting | -| Shellcheck | `shellcheck` in workflows or pre-commit | Shell script linting | -| Dependency review | `dependency-review-action` in workflows | PR dependency audit | -| Scorecard | `scorecard-action` in workflows | OpenSSF supply chain | -| Gitleaks | `gitleaks` in workflows or pre-commit | Secret detection | - -Score: count how many of the applicable tools are present vs expected. - -### Dependency Management - -```bash -cat .repos/<target>/.github/dependabot.yml 2>/dev/null || echo "MISSING" -``` - -Check which ecosystems are covered vs what's in the repo: - -| In Repo | Expected Ecosystem | Covered? | -|---------|-------------------|----------| -| `pyproject.toml` | pip | ? | -| `go.mod` | gomod | ? | -| `package.json` | npm | ? | -| `Dockerfile` | docker | ? | -| `.github/workflows/` | github-actions | ? | - -### Action Pinning Compliance - -```bash -grep -r "uses:" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null | grep -v "@[a-f0-9]\{40\}" | head -20 -``` - -Count actions pinned to SHA vs tag-only. Report compliance percentage. - -### Permissions Model - -Check workflow files for: -- Top-level `permissions: {}` or `permissions: read-all` (good) -- Per-job `permissions:` blocks (good) -- No permissions declaration (bad — gets full default token permissions) - -```bash -grep -l "^permissions:" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null -``` - -### Test Coverage - -Categorize tests into 4 areas. For each, detect frameworks, count files/functions, -check coverage tooling, and verify CI execution. - -#### Backend Tests - -Detect framework from marker files: - -```bash -# Python -grep -q "pytest" .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null && echo "pytest" -# Go -ls .repos/<target>/go.mod 2>/dev/null && echo "go test" -# Go + Ginkgo -grep -q "ginkgo" .repos/<target>/go.mod 2>/dev/null && echo "ginkgo" -``` - -Count test files and functions: - -```bash -find .repos/<target> -type f -name "test_*.py" -o -name "*_test.py" 2>/dev/null | wc -l -find .repos/<target> -type f -name "*_test.go" 2>/dev/null | wc -l -grep -rc "def test_\|func Test" .repos/<target> --include="*.py" --include="*.go" 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' -``` - -Check coverage tooling: - -```bash -# Python: pytest-cov in dependencies -grep -q "pytest-cov" .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null && echo "pytest-cov found" -# Python: coverage config -grep -q "\[tool.coverage" .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null && echo "coverage config found" -# Go: -coverprofile in Makefile or CI -grep -r "\-coverprofile" .repos/<target>/Makefile .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null -``` - -When coverage tooling is missing, recommend the appropriate tool: -- Python: add `pytest-cov>=4.0` to dev deps and `[tool.coverage.run] source = ["src"]` to pyproject.toml -- Go: add `-coverprofile=coverage.out` to `go test` invocation in Makefile/CI - -#### UI Tests - -Detect framework from package.json: - -```bash -grep -E "playwright|jest|vitest" .repos/<target>/*/package.json .repos/<target>/package.json 2>/dev/null -``` - -Count spec files and test blocks: - -```bash -find .repos/<target> -type f \( -name "*.spec.ts" -o -name "*.spec.tsx" -o -name "*.test.ts" -o -name "*.test.tsx" \) 2>/dev/null | wc -l -grep -rc "test(\|it(\|describe(" .repos/<target> --include="*.spec.*" --include="*.test.*" 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' -``` - -Note: for Playwright E2E-style UI tests, code coverage is typically not applicable. -For unit-test-style UI tests (jest/vitest), check for istanbul/c8 coverage config. - -#### E2E Tests - -Count test files and functions: - -```bash -find .repos/<target> -path "*/e2e/*" -type f -name "test_*.py" 2>/dev/null | wc -l -grep -rc "def test_" .repos/<target>/*/tests/e2e/ .repos/<target>/tests/e2e/ 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' -``` - -Build a feature coverage map by scanning test filenames and imports: - -```bash -# List E2E test files to identify which features are covered -find .repos/<target> -path "*/e2e/*" -name "test_*.py" -exec basename {} \; 2>/dev/null | sort -``` - -Map each test file to a platform feature (e.g., `test_keycloak.py` → Keycloak auth, -`test_shipwright_build.py` → Shipwright builds). Identify features present in the -codebase that lack E2E tests. - -Build a CI trigger matrix: - -```bash -# Which workflows run E2E tests, on which triggers and platforms? -grep -l "e2e\|E2E" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null -``` - -For each E2E workflow, note the trigger events (push/PR/manual) and target -platforms (Kind/OCP/HyperShift). - -#### Infra Tests - -Infra testing is about variant coverage, not code coverage. Score as a variant matrix. - -Scan for deployment targets: - -```bash -# Which platforms appear in CI workflows and scripts? -grep -rl "kind\|Kind\|KIND" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null -grep -rl "openshift\|OpenShift\|OCP" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null -grep -rl "hypershift\|HyperShift" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null -``` - -Scan values files for toggle combos: - -```bash -# Which feature toggles exist in Helm values files? -find .repos/<target> -path "*/envs/*" -name "values*.yaml" 2>/dev/null -# Check for toggle patterns -grep -r "enabled:" .repos/<target>/deployments/envs/ .repos/<target>/charts/*/values.yaml 2>/dev/null | head -20 -``` - -Check static validation in CI: - -```bash -grep -rl "helm lint\|helm template" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null && echo "helm lint: in CI" -grep -rl "shellcheck" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null && echo "shellcheck: in CI" -grep -rl "hadolint" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null && echo "hadolint: in CI" -grep -rl "yamllint" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null && echo "yamllint: in CI" -``` - -### CVE Scan - -Invoke `cve:scan` against the target repo to detect known vulnerabilities in -dependencies. This runs the full cve:scan procedure (inventory → Trivy → LLM + -WebSearch → findings report). - -The scan operates on the target repo working directory: - -```bash -cd .repos/<target> -``` - -Then follow the `cve:scan` skill workflow: -1. **Inventory** — find all dependency files (pyproject.toml, go.mod, package.json, - Dockerfile, Chart.yaml, requirements*.txt, uv.lock) -2. **Trivy** (if installed) — filesystem scan with `--severity HIGH,CRITICAL` -3. **LLM + WebSearch** — cross-reference dependencies against NVD/OSV/GitHub - Advisory Database -4. **Classify** — confirmed / suspected / false positive - -Write CVE findings to `/tmp/kagenti/cve/<target>/scan-report.json` (never to -git-tracked files). Include a summary in the scan report. - -Key areas to focus on: -- Crypto/auth libraries (cryptography, pyjwt, golang.org/x/crypto, oauth2) -- Network libraries (httpx, requests, grpcio, golang.org/x/net) -- Serialization (protobuf, pydantic) -- Container base images (EOL versions, unpinned tags) -- Abandoned/deprecated libraries (e.g., dgrijalva/jwt-go) - -### Pre-commit Hooks - -```bash -cat .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null -``` - -If present, list which hooks are configured. - -### Security Governance - -```bash -ls .repos/<target>/CODEOWNERS .repos/<target>/.github/CODEOWNERS 2>/dev/null -ls .repos/<target>/SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null -ls .repos/<target>/CONTRIBUTING.md 2>/dev/null -ls .repos/<target>/LICENSE 2>/dev/null -``` - -### Claude Code Readiness - -```bash -ls .repos/<target>/CLAUDE.md .repos/<target>/.claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null -``` - -```bash -ls .repos/<target>/.claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null -``` - -### Git Health - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> log --oneline -5 -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> remote -v -``` - -## Output Format - -Save scan report to `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/scan-report.md`: - -```bash -mkdir -p /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target> -``` - -Report template: - -```markdown -# Scan Report: <target> - -**Date:** YYYY-MM-DD -**Tech Stack:** <languages, frameworks> -**Maturity Score:** N/5 - -## CI Status -- Workflows found: [list or "none"] -- Covers: lint / test / build / security / release -- Tests in CI: running / commented out / missing - -## Security Scanning -| Tool | Status | Notes | -|------|--------|-------| -| Trivy | present/missing | | -| CodeQL | present/missing/n-a | | -| Bandit/gosec | present/missing/n-a | | -| Hadolint | present/missing/n-a | | -| Shellcheck | present/missing/n-a | | -| Dependency review | present/missing | | -| Scorecard | present/missing | | -| Gitleaks | present/missing | | - -## Dependency Management -- Dependabot config: yes/no -- Ecosystems covered: [list] -- Ecosystems missing: [list] - -## Supply Chain Health -- Action pinning: N% SHA-pinned (N/M actions) -- Permissions model: least-privilege / default / mixed -- Unpinned actions: [list top offenders] - -## Test Coverage - -### Backend Tests -- Framework: [pytest X.x / go test / ginkgo vX.x / none] -- Test files: N -- Test functions: ~M -- Coverage tool: [pytest-cov / -coverprofile / missing] -- Coverage config: [present / missing (recommend: ...)] -- CI execution: [running in workflow.yaml / missing] - -### UI Tests -- Framework: [Playwright X.x / jest / vitest / none] -- Spec files: N -- Test blocks: ~M -- Coverage tool: [istanbul / c8 / n/a (E2E)] -- CI execution: [running in workflow.yaml / missing] - -### E2E Tests -- Test files: N -- Test functions: ~M -- Feature coverage: - | Feature | Test File | Status | - |---------|-----------|--------| - | [feature] | [test file] | covered/missing | -- CI trigger matrix: - | Platform | Push | PR | Manual | - |----------|------|-----|--------| - | [platform] | [workflow] | [workflow] | — | - -### Infra Tests -- Deployment variants tested: - | Variant | CI Workflow | Values File | - |---------|------------|-------------| - | [platform + version] | [workflow] | [values file] | -- Value variant coverage: - | Feature Toggle | Tested On | Tested Off | - |---------------|-----------|------------| - | [toggle] | [platforms] | [platforms or —] | -- Static validation: - | Check | Status | - |-------|--------| - | Helm lint | in CI / missing | - | shellcheck | in CI / missing | - | hadolint | in CI / missing / n-a | - | yamllint | in CI / missing | - -## Pre-commit -- Config found: yes/no -- Hooks: [list or "none"] - -## Security Governance -- CODEOWNERS: yes/no -- SECURITY.md: yes/no -- CONTRIBUTING.md: yes/no -- LICENSE: yes/no (type if present) -- .gitignore secrets patterns: adequate/needs-review - -## Claude Code Readiness -- CLAUDE.md: yes/no -- .claude/settings.json: yes/no -- Skills count: N - -## Container Infrastructure -- Dockerfiles: N found [list paths] -- Multi-arch builds: yes/no -- Container registry: [ghcr.io/etc or "none"] -- Base image pinning: digest / tag / unpinned -- EOL base images: [list or "none"] - -## Dependency Vulnerabilities (cve:scan) -- Scan method: [Trivy + LLM + WebSearch / LLM + WebSearch / LLM only] -- Full report: `/tmp/kagenti/cve/<target>/scan-report.json` - -| Severity | Count | -|----------|-------| -| CRITICAL | N | -| HIGH | N | -| MEDIUM | N | -| Suspected | N | - -### Confirmed Findings -| Package | Version | Severity | Issue | Fix | -|---------|---------|----------|-------|-----| -| [package] | [version] | CRITICAL/HIGH | [brief description — no CVE IDs in public output] | [fixed version or action] | - -### Architectural Security Concerns -| Concern | Severity | Details | -|---------|----------|---------| -| [e.g., insecure port, no input validation] | HIGH/MEDIUM | [brief description] | - -> **Note:** CVE IDs and detailed descriptions are in `/tmp/kagenti/cve/<target>/scan-report.json` only. -> Do NOT copy CVE IDs into git-tracked files, PRs, or issues. - -## Gap Summary -| Area | Status | Action Needed | -|------|--------|---------------| -| Pre-commit | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:precommit | -| Tests (backend) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:tests | -| Tests (UI) | missing/partial/ok/n-a | orchestrate:tests | -| Tests (E2E) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:tests | -| Tests (infra) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | -| CI (lint/test/build) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | -| CI (security scanning) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | -| CI (dependabot) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | -| CI (scorecard) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | -| CI (supply chain) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | -| Dep vulnerabilities | clean/findings/critical | cve:brainstorm / dep bump | -| Container base images | pinned/unpinned/eol | orchestrate:ci | -| Governance | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:security | -| Skills | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:replicate | - -## Recommended Phases -1. [ordered list of phases based on gaps] -``` - -## Gap Analysis - -Determine which phases are needed based on findings: - -| Finding | Phase Needed | -|---------|-------------| -| No `.pre-commit-config.yaml` | `orchestrate:precommit` | -| No CI workflows or missing lint/test | `orchestrate:ci` | -| No security scanning in CI | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Dependabot missing or incomplete | `orchestrate:ci` | -| No scorecard workflow | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Actions not SHA-pinned | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Permissions not least-privilege | `orchestrate:ci` | -| No backend test files or <5 test functions | `orchestrate:tests` | -| Backend coverage tool missing | `orchestrate:tests` | -| No UI test specs (when UI code exists) | `orchestrate:tests` | -| No E2E tests or low feature coverage | `orchestrate:tests` | -| E2E tests not triggered in CI | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Only one deployment variant tested | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Missing static validation (helm lint, shellcheck, etc.) | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Confirmed CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs in dependencies | `cve:brainstorm` (fix before public issues) | -| Abandoned/deprecated libraries | dependency bump PR | -| EOL container base images | `orchestrate:ci` | -| Unpinned container base image tags | `orchestrate:ci` | -| No CODEOWNERS or SECURITY.md | `orchestrate:security` | -| No LICENSE | `orchestrate:security` | -| No `.claude/skills/` | `orchestrate:replicate` | - -All repos get `orchestrate:precommit` (foundation) and `orchestrate:replicate` -(self-sufficiency). Other phases depend on the scan results. - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:plan` — Next step: create phased plan from scan results -- `cve:scan` — Dependency vulnerability scanning (invoked during this scan) -- `cve:brainstorm` — Disclosure planning when CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs are found -- `skills:scan` — Similar pattern for scanning skills specifically diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 2f687ab37..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,213 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:security -description: Add security governance to a target repo - CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE, .gitignore audit ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:security"]) --> READ["Read plan + scan report"]:::orch - READ --> CODEOWNERS["Create CODEOWNERS"]:::orch - CODEOWNERS --> SECURITY_MD["Create SECURITY.md"]:::orch - SECURITY_MD --> CONTRIBUTING["Create CONTRIBUTING.md"]:::orch - CONTRIBUTING --> LICENSE["Verify/add LICENSE"]:::orch - LICENSE --> GITIGNORE["Audit .gitignore"]:::orch - GITIGNORE --> BRANCH_PROT["Document branch protection"]:::orch - BRANCH_PROT --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch - BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} - SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch - SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch - SPLIT --> PR - PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Security Governance - -Add security governance files to a target repository. This is Phase 5 and -produces PR #4. Focuses on governance and policy files — CI-related security -(scanning, dependabot, scorecard) is handled by `orchestrate:ci`. - -## When to Use - -- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies security governance as a needed phase -- After precommit, tests, and CI phases - -## Prerequisites - -- Plan exists with security phase -- Scan report exists (to know what's missing) -- Target repo in `.repos/<target>/` - -## Step 1: CODEOWNERS - -Create `CODEOWNERS` at repo root or `.github/CODEOWNERS`: - -``` -# Default owners for everything -* @org/team-leads - -# Platform and CI -.github/ @org/platform -Makefile @org/platform - -# Documentation -docs/ @org/docs-team -*.md @org/docs-team -``` - -Adapt teams and paths based on: -- The scan report's identified tech stack -- The org's team structure (check other repos for patterns) -- Key directories that need specialized review - -## Step 2: SECURITY.md - -Create `SECURITY.md` with vulnerability reporting guidance: - -```markdown -# Security Policy - -## Reporting a Vulnerability - -Please report security vulnerabilities through GitHub Security Advisories: -**[Report a vulnerability](https://github.com/org/repo/security/advisories/new)** - -Do NOT open public issues for security vulnerabilities. - -## Response Timeline - -- **Acknowledgment:** Within 48 hours -- **Initial assessment:** Within 7 days -- **Fix timeline:** Based on severity - -## Security Controls - -This repository uses: -- CI security scanning (Trivy, CodeQL) -- Dependency updates via Dependabot -- OpenSSF Scorecard monitoring -- Pre-commit hooks for local checks -``` - -Adapt the security controls list based on what `orchestrate:ci` actually -deployed to this repo. - -## Step 3: CONTRIBUTING.md - -Create `CONTRIBUTING.md` with development workflow: - -```markdown -# Contributing - -## Development Setup - -[Adapt to tech stack from scan report] - -## Pull Request Process - -1. Fork the repository -2. Create a feature branch from `main` -3. Make your changes with tests -4. Run pre-commit hooks: `pre-commit run --all-files` -5. Submit a pull request - -## Commit Messages - -Use conventional commit format: -- `feat:` New features -- `fix:` Bug fixes -- `docs:` Documentation changes -- `chore:` Maintenance tasks - -All commits must be signed off (`git commit -s`). - -## Code of Conduct - -[Link to org-level CoC if exists] -``` - -## Step 4: LICENSE - -Check if LICENSE exists. If missing: -- Check the org's standard license (most kagenti repos use Apache 2.0) -- Add the appropriate LICENSE file -- If unsure, flag in the PR for maintainer decision - -## Step 5: .gitignore Audit - -Check for missing patterns and add them: - -**Secrets and credentials:** -- `.env`, `.env.*`, `.env.local` -- `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*.p12`, `*.jks` -- `credentials.*`, `secrets.*` -- `kubeconfig`, `*kubeconfig*` - -**IDE and OS files:** -- `.idea/`, `.vscode/` -- `.DS_Store`, `Thumbs.db` - -**Build artifacts (language-specific):** -- Python: `__pycache__/`, `*.pyc`, `.ruff_cache/`, `dist/`, `*.egg-info/` -- Go: binary names from `go.mod` module path -- Node: `node_modules/`, `dist/`, `.next/` - -Do not remove existing patterns. Only add missing ones. - -## Step 6: Branch Protection Documentation - -Document in the PR description (can't auto-apply via PR): - -**Recommended branch protection rules for `main`:** -- Require PR reviews (minimum 1 approval) -- Require status checks to pass (list the CI checks from `orchestrate:ci`) -- Require signed commits (if org policy) -- Disable force push to main -- Require branches to be up to date before merging -- Require conversation resolution before merging - -## Branch and PR Workflow - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/security -``` - -### PR size check - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> diff --stat | tail -1 -``` - -### Commit and push - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> add -A -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: add security governance (CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, .gitignore)" -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/security -``` - -### Create PR - -```bash -gh pr create --repo org/repo --title "Add security governance files" --body "Phase 5 of repo orchestration. Adds CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE verification, and .gitignore hardening." -``` - -## Update Phase Status - -Set security to `complete` in phase-status.md. - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:ci` — Previous phase (CI-related security is there) -- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines security phase tasks -- `orchestrate:replicate` — Next phase: bootstrap skills diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index a77f3d4bd..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,159 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: orchestrate:tests -description: Add test infrastructure and initial test coverage to a target repo ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/orchestrate:tests"]) --> READ["Read plan"]:::orch - READ --> DETECT["Detect test framework"]:::orch - DETECT --> CONFIG["Create test config"]:::orch - CONFIG --> CRITICAL["Identify critical paths"]:::orch - CRITICAL --> WRITE["Write initial tests"]:::orch - WRITE --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch - BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} - SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch - SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch - SPLIT --> PR - PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) - - classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Orchestrate: Tests - -Add test infrastructure and initial test coverage. This is Phase 3 and -produces PR #2. Tests come before CI and security — good test coverage is -a safety net for the code refactoring that security/quality fixes require. - -## When to Use - -- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies tests as a needed phase -- After precommit phase (linting is the foundation) - -## Prerequisites - -- Plan exists with tests phase -- Target repo in `.repos/<target>/` - -## Step 1: Detect Test Framework - -| Marker | Language | Framework | Assertion | -|--------|----------|-----------|-----------| -| `pyproject.toml` | Python | pytest | built-in assert | -| `go.mod` | Go | testing (stdlib) | testify | -| `package.json` | Node | jest or vitest | built-in expect | -| `requirements.yml` | Ansible | molecule | testinfra | - -Check existing tests: - -```bash -find .repos/<target> -type f \( -name "test_*.py" -o -name "*_test.go" -o -name "*.test.*" \) 2>/dev/null -``` - -## Step 2: Create Test Configuration - -### Python - -- `tests/conftest.py` — shared fixtures -- `tests/__init__.py` — package marker -- `pyproject.toml` — add `[tool.pytest.ini_options]` with `testpaths = ["tests"]` - -### Go - -- `*_test.go` files alongside source -- `testdata/` for fixtures -- `internal/testutil/` for shared helpers - -### Node - -- `jest.config.ts` or `vitest.config.ts` at root -- `__tests__/` directory or `*.test.ts` alongside source - -### Ansible - -- `molecule/default/` with `molecule.yml`, `converge.yml`, `verify.yml` - -## Step 3: Identify Critical Paths - -From the scan report, find highest-impact areas: - -1. **API endpoints** — HTTP handlers, REST routes -2. **Core logic** — main algorithms, data transformations -3. **Integration points** — database, external APIs -4. **Config parsing** — loading, validation, defaults -5. **Error handling** — paths affecting users or data - -Prioritize smoke tests across areas over exhaustive coverage of one area. - -## Step 4: Write Initial Tests - -### Strategy - -- Start with smoke tests (happy path) -- Add edge cases for most critical functions -- Target 5-15 test functions -- Do not aim for 100% coverage -- Each test must be independent - -### Test naming - -| Language | Convention | Example | -|----------|-----------|---------| -| Python | `test_<what>_<condition>` | `test_create_user_returns_201` | -| Go | `Test<What><Condition>` | `TestCreateUserReturns201` | -| Node | `describe/it` blocks | `it('returns 201 when creating user')` | - -### Test structure (AAA) - -1. **Arrange** — set up test data -2. **Act** — call function under test -3. **Assert** — verify with specific assertions - -## Step 5: Branch and PR - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/tests -``` - -### PR size check - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> diff --stat | tail -1 -``` - -If over 700 lines, split: framework setup in PR #3a, tests in PR #3b. - -### Skills to push alongside - -- `test:write` — guide for writing new tests -- `tdd:ci` — workflow for iterating on CI test failures - -### Commit and push - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> add -A -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: add test infrastructure and initial test coverage" -``` - -```bash -git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/tests -``` - -## Update Phase Status - -Set tests to `complete` in phase-status.md. - -## Related Skills - -- `orchestrate` — Parent router -- `orchestrate:precommit` — Previous phase (linting foundation) -- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines test phase tasks -- `orchestrate:ci` — Next phase (automates running these tests) -- `test:write` — Detailed test writing guide -- `tdd:ci` — CI-driven TDD workflow diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index b9342c3a5..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: skills -description: Skill management - create, validate, and improve Claude Code skills ---- - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/skills"]) --> NEED{"What do you need?"} - NEED -->|New skill| WORKTREE["git:worktree"]:::git - NEED -->|Edit skill| WORKTREE - NEED -->|Audit all| SCAN["skills:scan"]:::skills - WORKTREE --> WRITE["skills:write"]:::skills - WRITE --> VALIDATE["skills:validate"]:::skills - VALIDATE -->|Issues| WRITE - VALIDATE -->|Pass| PR["Create PR"]:::git - - SCAN -->|Gaps found| WORKTREE - - classDef skills fill:#607D8B,stroke:#333,color:white - classDef git fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -> Follow this diagram as the workflow. - -# Skills Management - -Skills for managing the skill system itself. **All skill development starts in a worktree** — never edit skills directly on main. - -## Worktree-First Gate - -Before creating or editing any skill, create a worktree: - -```bash -git fetch upstream main -``` - -```bash -git worktree add .worktrees/skills-<topic> -b docs/skills-<topic> upstream/main -``` - -Then work in the worktree, validate, and create a PR. - -## Available Skills - -| Skill | Purpose | -|-------|---------| -| `skills:write` | Create new skills or edit existing ones following the standard template | -| `skills:validate` | Validate skill format, naming, and structure | -| `skills:scan` | Audit repository skills — gaps, quality, connections, diagrams | - -## Related Skills - -- `skills:write` - Create new skills following the standard -- `skills:validate` - Validate skill format compliance -- `skills:scan` - Audit repository skills -- `orchestrate` - Orchestrate related repositories diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index d76fffad7..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,261 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: skills:scan -description: Scan a repository to bootstrap new skills or audit and update existing ones ---- - -# Scan Repository for Skills - -Bootstrap skills for a new repo, or audit and update skills in an existing one. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/skills:scan"]) --> MODE{"Repo has skills?"} - MODE -->|No| NP1["Analyze Repo"]:::skills - MODE -->|Yes| EP1["Validate Existing"]:::skills - - NP1 --> NP2["Identify Categories"]:::skills - NP2 --> NP3["Generate Core Skills"]:::skills - NP3 --> NP4["Generate settings.json"]:::skills - NP4 --> DONE([Skills bootstrapped]) - - EP1 --> EP2["Gap Analysis"]:::skills - EP2 --> EP3["Content Quality"]:::skills - EP3 --> EP4["Connection Analysis"]:::skills - EP4 --> EP5["Usefulness Rating"]:::skills - EP5 --> EP6["Generate Report"]:::skills - EP6 --> EP7["Update README"]:::skills - - EP1 -->|Issues| WRITE["skills:write"]:::skills - EP6 -->|Gaps| WRITE - - classDef skills fill:#607D8B,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -## When to Use - -- Setting up Claude Code skills in a new repository -- Auditing an existing repo for skill gaps -- Updating skills after the repo's tech stack or workflows changed -- Onboarding to a new codebase - -## Mode: New Repo (no `.claude/skills/` exists) - -### Phase 1: Analyze Repository Structure - -Scan for technology markers: - -```bash -ls -la Makefile pyproject.toml package.json Cargo.toml go.mod pom.xml 2>/dev/null -``` - -Check CI configuration: - -```bash -ls .github/workflows/ .gitlab-ci.yml Jenkinsfile .circleci/ 2>/dev/null -``` - -Check deployment patterns: - -```bash -ls -d charts/ helm/ k8s/ kubernetes/ deployments/ docker-compose* Dockerfile 2>/dev/null -``` - -Check test structure: - -```bash -find . -type d -name "tests" -o -name "test" -o -name "__tests__" -o -name "e2e" 2>/dev/null | head -10 -``` - -### Phase 2: Identify Skill Categories - -Based on findings, propose categories: - -| Marker | Suggested Skills | -|--------|-----------------| -| `.github/workflows/` | `ci:status`, `ci:monitoring`, `tdd:ci`, `rca:ci` | -| `charts/` or `helm/` | `helm:debug` | -| `Dockerfile` | `docker:build`, `docker:debug` | -| `tests/e2e/` | `tdd:ci`, `rca:ci` | -| `deployments/` | `deploy:*` | -| Kubernetes manifests | `k8s:health`, `k8s:pods`, `k8s:logs` | - -### Phase 3: Generate Core Skills - -Every repo should have these (create with `skills:write`): - -| Skill | Purpose | -|-------|---------| -| `skills:write` | How to create skills | -| `skills:validate` | How to validate skills | -| `skills:scan` | This skill (self-referential) | -| `tdd:ci` | CI-driven development loop (if CI exists) | -| `rca:ci` | Root cause analysis from CI logs (if CI exists) | -| `git:worktree` | Parallel development (if git repo) | - -### Phase 4: Generate settings.json - -Create `.claude/settings.json` with auto-approve patterns: -- Read operations (kubectl get, logs, describe) → auto-approve -- Sandbox write operations (kubectl apply on dev clusters) → auto-approve -- Management/destructive operations → require approval - -## Mode: Existing Repo (`.claude/skills/` exists) - -### Phase 1: Validate Existing Skills - -Run `skills:validate` on every skill: - -```bash -for f in .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md; do - dir=$(basename $(dirname "$f")) - name=$(grep '^name:' "$f" | sed 's/name: //' | tr -d ' ') - [ "$dir" = "$name" ] || echo "MISMATCH: $dir != $name" -done -``` - -Check for issues: -- Frontmatter name/directory mismatches -- Old-style references (dashes instead of colons) -- Missing Related Skills sections -- Chained commands in sandbox skills (breaks auto-approve) - -### Phase 2: Gap Analysis - -Compare existing skills against the repo's actual tech stack: - -1. Run Phase 1 of the "New Repo" flow to detect technology markers -2. Compare detected categories against existing skill categories -3. List categories that exist in the repo but have no skills -4. List skills that reference tools/patterns no longer in use - -### Phase 3: Content Quality Review - -For each existing skill, assess: - -| Check | Criteria | -|-------|----------| -| Actionability | Commands are copy-pasteable, not just documentation | -| Length | 80-200 lines (300 max). Split if too long | -| Freshness | Commands and paths still match current repo structure | -| Cross-links | Related Skills use colon notation and link to real skills | -| Auto-approve | Sandbox commands match settings.json patterns | -| Mermaid diagram | Workflow/router skills have embedded diagram matching textual flow | -| Dev docs consistency | Claims in `docs/developer/claude-code-skills.md` match actual skill behavior | - -### Phase 3b: Developer Docs Consistency - -If `docs/developer/claude-code-skills.md` exists, verify: - -1. **Skills listed in dev docs match actual skills** — no stale references -2. **Workflow diagrams in dev docs match skill diagrams** — same nodes, same flow -3. **Best practices in dev docs are enforced by skills** — worktree gate, checklist items -4. **Sub-skill table is accurate** — inputs, outputs, invocations match reality - -### Phase 4: Connection Analysis - -For each skill, determine: -- **Outgoing links**: Skills referenced in Related Skills section -- **Incoming links**: Which other skills reference this one (search all files) -- **Broken refs**: References to skills that don't exist -- **Orphans**: Skills with no incoming references (only parent links) - -Key metrics: -- Most connected skills (highest incoming refs) = hub skills -- Orphaned skills = may need cross-linking or deletion -- Broken refs = must fix before committing - -### Phase 5: Usefulness Assessment - -Rate each skill 1-5: - -| Rating | Criteria | -|--------|----------| -| 5 | Decision trees, copy-paste commands, troubleshooting, used daily | -| 4 | Good reference with commands, covers edge cases | -| 3 | Useful but needs more actionability or is too long | -| 2 | Bare index or needs significant improvement | -| 1 | Redundant or too vague to help | - -### Phase 6: Generate Report - -Save to `/tmp/skills-scan/`: - -```bash -mkdir -p /tmp/skills-scan -``` - -Output a structured report: - -```markdown -## Skill Scan Report - -### Inventory: X total (Y parents + Z leaves) -- Rated 5: N skills -- Rated 4: N skills -- Rated 3 or below: N skills (list) - -### Validation Issues -- Failing validation: [list with specific issues] -- Broken references: [source → broken target] -- Over 300 lines: [list with line counts] - -### Connection Analysis -- Most connected (hub skills): [top 5 with incoming ref count] -- Orphaned skills: [list with only parent refs] -- Workflow paths: TDD escalation, RCA escalation, Deploy chain - -### Gap Analysis -- Missing skills for detected tech: [list] -- Stale skills referencing removed tech: [list] - -### Diagram Coverage -- Skills with diagrams: [count] -- Skills needing diagrams: [list] - -### Recommendations -1. Create: [new skills needed] -2. Update: [skills with issues] -3. Delete: [obsolete skills] -4. Merge: [overlapping skills] -5. Cross-link: [orphaned skills that should connect to workflows] -``` - -## Phase 7: Update Skills README - -After completing the scan, update `.claude/skills/README.md`: - -1. Regenerate the **Complete Skill Tree** (ASCII listing of all categories and leaves) -2. Update **Mermaid workflow diagrams** for root flows: - - Skills meta workflow (skills:scan → skills:write → skills:validate) - - Orchestrate workflow (orchestrate:scan → orchestrate:plan → phases → orchestrate:review) - - Any repo-specific workflows discovered during the scan -3. Update the **Auto-Approve Policy** table -4. Verify all skills appear in the tree and diagrams -5. Check that no orphaned skills exist (every leaf should be reachable from a root flow) - -The README is the main entry point for understanding the skills system. -It should always reflect the current state after a scan. - -## Output (New Repo) - -``` -.claude/ -├── settings.json -└── skills/ - ├── README.md # Generated by skills:scan - ├── skills/SKILL.md - ├── skills:write/SKILL.md - ├── skills:validate/SKILL.md - ├── skills:scan/SKILL.md - ├── tdd/SKILL.md - ├── tdd:ci/SKILL.md - ├── rca/SKILL.md - ├── rca:ci/SKILL.md - └── <detected>/SKILL.md -``` - -## Related Skills - -- `skills:write` - Create individual skills -- `skills:validate` - Validate skill format -- `orchestrate` - Orchestrate related repositories diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5ade71b23..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,151 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: skills:validate -description: Validate skill files meet the standard format and naming conventions ---- - -# Validate Skill - -## When to Use - -- After creating or editing a skill -- Before committing skill changes -- When auditing all skills for consistency - -## Validation Checks - -### Required - -- [ ] **Frontmatter**: Has `name:` and `description:` fields -- [ ] **Colon naming**: `name:` uses colon notation (e.g., `tdd:ci` not `tdd-ci`) -- [ ] **Directory match**: Directory name matches frontmatter `name:` field -- [ ] **Title**: Has `# Skill Name` as first heading -- [ ] **When to Use**: Has "When to Use" or "Overview" section -- [ ] **Related Skills**: Has "Related Skills" section at the end -- [ ] **Mermaid diagram**: Workflow/router skills have an embedded mermaid diagram -- [ ] **Diagram colors**: classDef colors match README color legend - -### Command Format (Required) - -- [ ] **Sandbox classification**: Skill is classified as sandbox or management (see below) -- [ ] **Single commands**: Sandbox skills use one command per code block (no `&&` chaining) -- [ ] **Auto-approve coverage**: All commands in sandbox skills match a pattern in `.claude/settings.json` -- [ ] **No multiline bash**: Sandbox skills avoid heredocs, multiline pipes, or `for` loops in commands - -### Recommended - -- [ ] **TOC**: Table of Contents present if skill > 50 lines -- [ ] **Placeholders**: All commands are copy-pasteable (no unexplained placeholders) -- [ ] **Task tracking**: TDD/RCA skills have "Task Tracking" section -- [ ] **Parent ref**: Parent category `SKILL.md` references this skill -- [ ] **Imperative voice**: Uses "Run X" not "You should run X" -- [ ] **Length**: Leaf skills are 80-200 lines (300 max) -- [ ] **Diagram-text match**: Diagram nodes correspond to textual flow steps - -## Sandbox vs Management Classification - -Skills operate on either **sandbox** (safe) or **management** (requires approval) targets: - -| Type | Target | Auto-approve? | Command format | -|------|--------|---------------|----------------| -| **Sandbox** | Local Kind cluster, custom HyperShift hosted cluster | YES | Single commands, one per step | -| **Management** | Management cluster, AWS resources, git push, destructive ops | NO | Can chain commands (user approves anyway) | - -### Sandbox skills (auto-approved) -Commands target `localtest.me`, `KUBECONFIG=~/clusters/hcp/kagenti-hypershift-custom-*`, or Kind clusters. - -**IMPORTANT**: Run each command separately — not chained with `&&`. Chained or multiline commands break Claude Code's auto-approve pattern matching. - -```markdown -## GOOD (each command runs separately, matches auto-approve patterns) - -Check pod status: -```bash -kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system -``` - -Check logs: -```bash -kubectl logs -n kagenti-system deployment/mlflow -``` - -## BAD (chained commands won't match auto-approve patterns) - -```bash -kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system && kubectl logs -n kagenti-system deployment/mlflow -``` -``` - -### Management skills (require approval) -Commands target management clusters, AWS APIs, or perform destructive operations. These can use any command format since the user must approve each one. - -## How to Validate - -### Single Skill - -```bash -# Check frontmatter -head -5 .claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md - -# Check name matches directory -DIR_NAME=$(basename $(dirname .claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md)) -SKILL_NAME=$(grep '^name:' .claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md | sed 's/name: //') -[ "$DIR_NAME" = "$SKILL_NAME" ] && echo "OK" || echo "MISMATCH: dir=$DIR_NAME name=$SKILL_NAME" -``` - -### All Skills - -```bash -# Check all frontmatter name-vs-directory -for f in .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md; do - dir=$(basename $(dirname "$f")) - name=$(grep '^name:' "$f" | sed 's/name: //' | tr -d ' ') - [ "$dir" = "$name" ] || echo "MISMATCH: $dir != $name" -done -``` - -### Check Command Format (sandbox skills) - -```bash -# Find chained commands in sandbox skills (potential auto-approve issues) -grep -rn ' && ' .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md -``` - -### Check Mermaid Diagram Presence - -```bash -for f in .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md; do - dir=$(basename $(dirname "$f")) - case "$dir" in git|auth|meta|repo) continue ;; esac - if ! grep -q '```mermaid' "$f"; then - echo "MISSING DIAGRAM: $dir" - fi -done -``` - -### Verify settings.json Coverage - -For each command in a sandbox skill, verify it matches a pattern in `.claude/settings.json`: - -| Command prefix | settings.json pattern | -|----------------|----------------------| -| `kubectl get` | `Bash(kubectl get:*)` | -| `kubectl describe` | `Bash(kubectl describe:*)` | -| `kubectl logs` | `Bash(kubectl logs:*)` | -| `helm list` | `Bash(helm list:*)` | -| `KUBECONFIG=~/clusters/hcp/... kubectl` | `Bash(KUBECONFIG=*/clusters/hcp/kagenti-hypershift-custom-*/auth/kubeconfig kubectl:*)` | -| `uv run pytest` | `Bash(uv run pytest:*)` | - -If a command is NOT covered, add the pattern to `.claude/settings.json` in the `allow` array. - -## Task Tracking - -When validating multiple skills: - -``` -TaskCreate: "kagenti | skills | <category> | Verify | Validate <skill-name>" -``` - -## Related Skills - -- `skills:write` - Create new skills following the standard -- `skills:scan` - Audit repository skills diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index fe07a2c0f..000000000 --- a/.claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,297 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: skills:write -description: Create or edit skills with proper structure, task tracking, and naming conventions ---- - -# Write / Edit Skill - -Create new skills or edit existing ones. Both follow the same checklist and conventions. - -## Worktree Gate - -**All skill work MUST happen in a worktree.** Before proceeding, verify you are in a worktree: - -```bash -git worktree list -``` - -If not in a worktree, create one first: - -```bash -git fetch upstream main -``` - -```bash -git worktree add .worktrees/skills-<topic> -b docs/skills-<topic> upstream/main -``` - -## Table of Contents - -- [Skill Structure](#skill-structure) -- [Frontmatter](#frontmatter) -- [Content Guidelines](#content-guidelines) -- [Task Tracking Standard](#task-tracking-standard) -- [Checklist](#checklist) -- [Template](#template) - -## New vs Edit - -| Action | Steps | -|--------|-------| -| **New skill** | Create directory + SKILL.md from template, fill in content, validate | -| **Edit skill** | Read existing file first, apply changes, re-validate, ensure diagram still matches text | - -For edits: always read the skill FIRST, then edit. Never overwrite without reading. - -## Skill Structure - -``` -.claude/skills/<category>:<skill-name>/ -└── SKILL.md -``` - -**IMPORTANT**: Use colon notation in directory names (e.g., `auth:my-skill/`). Required for Claude Code skill discovery. - -Categories: Use a short, descriptive prefix (e.g., `ci`, `git`, `k8s`, `auth`, `orchestrate`, `skills`). New categories can be created as needed. - -## Frontmatter - -```yaml ---- -name: category:skill-name -description: One-line description (what it does, not how) ---- -``` - -Use colon notation in `name:` field. Directory name must match. - -## Content Guidelines - -1. **Title**: `# Skill Name` -2. **TOC**: Include for skills over 50 lines -3. **Length**: Target 80-200 lines (300 max). Split longer skills. -4. **Sections**: - - When to Use - - Steps/Workflow - - Workflow Diagram (required for workflow/router skills) - - Task Tracking (required for workflow skills) - - Troubleshooting - - Related Skills -5. **Style**: - - Imperative voice ("Run X", not "You should run X") - - Real, copy-pasteable commands - - Include expected output where helpful - -## Command Format and Auto-Approve - -Skills must classify as **sandbox** or **management** to determine command format: - -| Type | Target | Auto-approve? | -|------|--------|---------------| -| **Sandbox** | Kind cluster, custom HyperShift hosted cluster | YES | -| **Management** | Management cluster, AWS resources, git push, destructive ops | NO | - -### Sandbox skills: One command per code block - -Claude Code auto-approves commands by matching the first token against `.claude/settings.json` patterns. Chained commands (`&&`), multiline scripts, heredocs, and `for` loops break pattern matching. - -**IMPORTANT**: Write each command as a separate code block: - -```markdown -Check pod status: -```bash -kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system -``` - -Check logs: -```bash -kubectl logs -n kagenti-system deployment/mlflow -``` -``` - -Do NOT chain: `kubectl get pods && kubectl logs ...` - -For HyperShift, prefix each command individually: - -```markdown -```bash -KUBECONFIG=~/clusters/hcp/kagenti-hypershift-custom-$CLUSTER/auth/kubeconfig kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system -``` -``` - -### Management skills: Any format - -Commands targeting management clusters or AWS need user approval anyway, so multiline/chained format is acceptable. - -### Temporary Files - -Skills that download logs, artifacts, or save analysis output should use `/tmp/kagenti/<skill-category>/` as the working directory: - -```bash -mkdir -p /tmp/kagenti/rca -``` - -This path is auto-approved for read/write in `.claude/settings.json`. - -### Update settings.json - -After writing a skill, verify all sandbox commands are covered by `.claude/settings.json` patterns. If a new command prefix is used, add it: - -```json -{ - "permissions": { - "allow": [ - "Bash(new-command:*)" - ] - } -} -``` - -See `skills:validate` for the full pattern reference table. - -## Workflow Diagrams - -Workflow skills (skills with phases, decision trees, or routing logic) MUST include: - -1. **Embedded mermaid diagram** in the SKILL.md -2. **Companion `.mmd` template file** in the skill directory (for debug mode, TDD skills only) -3. Diagram MUST match textual flow exactly -4. Use README color scheme: - -| Category | classDef | -|----------|----------| -| TDD | `classDef tdd fill:#4CAF50,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| RCA | `classDef rca fill:#FF5722,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| CI | `classDef ci fill:#2196F3,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| Test | `classDef test fill:#9C27B0,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| Git | `classDef git fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| K8s | `classDef k8s fill:#00BCD4,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| Deploy | `classDef deploy fill:#795548,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| Skills | `classDef skills fill:#607D8B,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| GitHub | `classDef github fill:#E91E63,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| HyperShift | `classDef hypershift fill:#3F51B5,stroke:#333,color:white` | -| Playwright | `classDef pw fill:#8BC34A,stroke:#333,color:white` | - -**Exempt** from diagram requirement: pure index parents that only list sub-skills with no routing logic (e.g., `git/`, `k8s/`, `auth/`) - -## Task Tracking Standard - -Every workflow skill (tdd, rca, ci, etc.) MUST include a Task Tracking section. This is the canonical reference for how Claude Code task lists work across all skills. - -### Task Naming Convention - -``` -<worktree> | <PR> | <plan-doc> | <topic> | <phase> | <task description> -``` - -- **worktree**: git worktree name (e.g., `mlflow-ci`) or `kagenti` for main repo -- **PR**: PR reference (e.g., `PR#569`) or `none` -- **plan-doc**: plan filename (e.g., `calm-toast.md`) or `ad-hoc` if no plan -- **topic**: area of work (e.g., `Kind CI`, `MLflow init`, `CodeQL`) -- **phase**: from planning doc section/step, or blank if ad-hoc -- **task**: brief description - -Examples: -- `mlflow-ci | PR#569 | calm-toast.md | MLflow init | Phase 2: Fix | Use parameterized SQL` -- `mlflow-ci | PR#569 | ad-hoc | Kind CI | | Bind Ollama to 0.0.0.0` -- `main | none | calm-toast.md | skills | Step 1 | Create ci:status skill` - -### Task Lifecycle - -``` -1. On skill invocation: - - TaskList → check existing tasks for this worktree/PR - - Update completed items - - Create new items for discovered work - -2. Task metadata: - - plan: path to plan doc or "ad-hoc" if none - - runner: main-session | subagent | background - -3. Dependencies: - - Use addBlockedBy for sequential tasks - - Parallel tasks have no blockers - -4. Status reporting - always show plan doc in task name: - | # | Status | Task (includes plan doc) | - |---|--------|-------------------------| - | #26 | in_progress | main \| none \| calm-toast.md \| skills \| Create \| ci:status | - | #32 | completed | mlflow-ci \| PR#569 \| ad-hoc \| Kind CI \| Fix \| Ollama bind | -``` - -### Plan Doc Reference - -Every task should reference its parent planning document: -- Tasks from a plan: `metadata.plan = "<plan-file-path>"` -- Ad-hoc tasks: `metadata.plan = "ad-hoc"` -- Tasks without a plan doc indicate work that needs retroactive documentation - -## Checklist - -Before committing a new skill: - -- [ ] Frontmatter has `name` and `description` -- [ ] Directory uses colon notation -- [ ] Name in frontmatter matches directory name -- [ ] TOC included if over 50 lines -- [ ] Commands are copy-pasteable -- [ ] Task Tracking section present (for workflow skills) -- [ ] Troubleshooting section exists -- [ ] Related Skills section exists -- [ ] Mermaid diagram present (for workflow/router skills) -- [ ] Diagram matches textual workflow exactly -- [ ] Diagram uses classDef colors from README color legend -- [ ] Parent category SKILL.md updated with reference - -## Template - -```markdown ---- -name: category:skill-name -description: Brief description of what this skill does ---- - -# Skill Name - -## When to Use - -- Condition 1 -- Condition 2 - -## Workflow - -1. Step one -2. Step two - -## Workflow Diagram - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(["/category:skill"]) --> STEP1["Step 1"]:::category - STEP1 --> STEP2["Step 2"]:::category - - classDef category fill:#COLOR,stroke:#333,color:white -``` - -## Task Tracking - -On invocation: -1. TaskList - check existing tasks -2. TaskCreate with naming: `<worktree> | <PR> | <topic> | <phase> | <task>` -3. TaskUpdate as work progresses - -## Troubleshooting - -### Problem: Description -**Symptom**: What you see -**Fix**: How to resolve - -## Related Skills - -- `category:related-skill` -``` - -## Related Skills - -- `skills:validate` - Check skill format compliance -- `skills:scan` - Audit repository skills diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 015b22237..c8c3550f8 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -71,3 +71,8 @@ kagenti-webhook/bin/ # AIAC working artefacts (regenerated; not source of truth) aiac/inception/issues/ + +# Claude Code / AI assistant files +CLAUDE.md +.claude/ +docs/agents/ diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md deleted file mode 100644 index e7e1ad726..000000000 --- a/CLAUDE.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,374 +0,0 @@ -# CLAUDE.md - Kagenti Extensions - -This file provides context for Claude (AI assistant) when working with the `kagenti-extensions` monorepo. - -## AI Assistant Instructions - -- **Use `Assisted-By` for attribution** — never add `Co-Authored-By`, `Generated with Claude Code`, or similar trailers. See [Commit Attribution Policy](#commit-attribution-policy) below. - -## Repository Overview - -**kagenti-extensions** contains Kubernetes security extensions for the [Kagenti](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti) ecosystem. It provides **zero-trust authentication** for Kubernetes workloads through transparent token exchange and dynamic Keycloak client registration using SPIFFE/SPIRE identities. - -The sidecar injection webhook lives in a separate repo: [kagenti/kagenti-operator](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-operator). - -**GitHub:** `github.com/kagenti/kagenti-extensions` -**Container registry:** `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/<image-name>` -**License:** Apache 2.0 - -## Top-Level Directory Structure - -``` -kagenti-extensions/ -├── authbridge/ # Authentication bridge components -│ ├── authlib/ # Shared auth building blocks (Go module) -│ │ ├── validation/ # JWKS-backed JWT verifier -│ │ ├── exchange/ # RFC 8693 token exchange client -│ │ ├── cache/ # SHA-256 keyed token cache -│ │ ├── bypass/ # Path pattern matcher -│ │ ├── spiffe/ # SPIFFE credential sources -│ │ ├── routing/ # Host-to-audience router -│ │ ├── auth/ # HandleInbound + HandleOutbound composition -│ │ └── config/ # Mode presets, YAML config, validation -│ ├── cmd/authbridge-proxy/ # proxy-sidecar mode (default): HTTP forward + reverse -│ │ │ # proxies, full plugin set including parsers -│ │ ├── main.go -│ │ ├── Dockerfile # proxy-sidecar combined image -│ │ └── entrypoint.sh -│ ├── cmd/authbridge-envoy/ # envoy-sidecar mode: ext_proc gRPC server, full plugin set -│ │ ├── main.go -│ │ ├── Dockerfile # envoy-sidecar combined image -│ │ └── entrypoint.sh -│ ├── cmd/authbridge-lite/ # proxy-sidecar mode, lite plugin set (no parsers) -│ │ │ # for size-optimized deployments -│ │ ├── main.go -│ │ ├── Dockerfile # proxy-sidecar lite combined image -│ │ └── entrypoint.sh -│ ├── proxy-init/ # iptables init container (envoy-sidecar mode only) -│ │ ├── init-iptables.sh -│ │ ├── Dockerfile.init -│ │ ├── Makefile -│ │ └── README.md -│ ├── demos/ # Demo scenarios (weather-agent, github-issue, token-exchange-routes, mcp-parser) -│ └── keycloak_sync.py # Declarative Keycloak sync tool -├── tests/ # Python tests (keycloak_sync) -├── .github/ -│ ├── workflows/ # CI/CD (ci.yaml, build.yaml, security-scans, scorecard, spellcheck) -│ └── ISSUE_TEMPLATE/ # Bug report, feature request, epic templates -├── .pre-commit-config.yaml # Pre-commit hooks (trailing whitespace, go fmt/vet, ruff) -└── CLAUDE.md # This file -``` - -## Major Components - -### 1. AuthBridge Binaries (Go) - -**Three mode-specific binaries** providing transparent traffic interception for both inbound JWT validation and outbound OAuth 2.0 token exchange (RFC 8693). Each binary is hardcoded to its deployment shape; mode is no longer selected at runtime. - -**Library:** `authbridge/authlib/` (shared) -**Language:** Go 1.25 -**Detailed guide:** [`authbridge/CLAUDE.md`](authbridge/CLAUDE.md) - -**Binaries:** -- `cmd/authbridge-proxy/` — proxy-sidecar mode (default): HTTP forward + reverse proxies, full plugin set (jwt-validation, token-exchange, a2a-parser, mcp-parser, inference-parser). No Envoy / no gRPC. -- `cmd/authbridge-envoy/` — envoy-sidecar mode: ext_proc gRPC server hooked into Envoy, full plugin set. -- `cmd/authbridge-lite/` — proxy-sidecar mode, lite plugin set (auth gates only, parsers dropped) for size-optimized deployments. - -**Common:** -- `authlib/` — shared auth library (JWT validation, token exchange, caching, routing, all listener implementations, all plugins). -- `proxy-init/init-iptables.sh` — traffic interception setup (Istio ambient mesh compatible). Used by envoy-sidecar mode only. -- `proxy-init/Dockerfile.init` — proxy-init container image. - -**Ports (envoy-sidecar):** 15123 (outbound), 15124 (inbound), 9090 (ext-proc), 9901 (admin) -**Ports (proxy-sidecar / lite):** 8080 (reverse proxy), 8081 (forward proxy), 9091 (health), 9093 (stats), 9094 (session API) - -### 2. Client Registration - -Keycloak client registration for workloads is handled by the -**kagenti-operator** (separate repo) — see `kagenti-operator/docs/operator-managed-client-registration.md`. -The operator creates a Secret with `client-id.txt` + `client-secret.txt` -and the webhook mounts it at `/shared/` in the workload pod. The -in-pod `client-registration` sidecar that previously lived in this -repo has been removed. - -## How the Components Work Together - -The kagenti-operator (in a separate repo) injects AuthBridge sidecars -into workload pods. Default deployment shape (proxy-sidecar mode): - -``` - ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ WORKLOAD POD │ - │ │ - │ spiffe-helper ──► SPIRE Agent │ (in-container, - │ │ writes JWT SVID │ conditional on - │ ▼ │ SPIRE_ENABLED) - │ authbridge-proxy │ - │ - Reverse proxy: inbound JWT │ - │ - Forward proxy: outbound │ - │ token exchange │ - │ │ │ - │ Your Application │ - │ (HTTP_PROXY → forward proxy) │ - └────────────────────────────────────┘ - - The operator also creates a Secret with client-id + - client-secret and mounts it at /shared/. - - For envoy-sidecar mode, replace authbridge-proxy with - the authbridge-envoy image (Envoy + ext_proc + spiffe-helper) - and add a proxy-init container for iptables. -``` - -## AuthBridge Binaries - -Three mode-specific binaries, one Dockerfile per binary: - -| Binary | Mode | Listeners | Plugins | -|--------|------|-----------|---------| -| `cmd/authbridge-proxy/` | proxy-sidecar (default) | HTTP forward + reverse proxies | full (incl. parsers) | -| `cmd/authbridge-envoy/` | envoy-sidecar | gRPC ext_proc on :9090 | full (incl. parsers) | -| `cmd/authbridge-lite/` | proxy-sidecar | HTTP forward + reverse proxies | auth-only (jwt-validation + token-exchange, no parsers) | - -**Go modules:** -- `authbridge/authlib/` — pure library: validation, exchange, cache, bypass, spiffe, routing, auth, config, all listener implementations, all plugins. -- `authbridge/cmd/authbridge-{proxy,envoy,lite}/` — thin main packages that import authlib and start the listeners they need. -- `authbridge/go.work` — workspace linking authlib + the binaries for local development. - -**Config format:** YAML with `${ENV_VAR}` expansion, mode presets, and startup validation. Supports `keycloak_url` + `keycloak_realm` derivation for operator compatibility. The `mode` field in YAML must match the binary (each binary rejects mismatched modes at boot). - -## CI/CD Workflows - -| Workflow | Trigger | Purpose | -|----------|---------|---------| -| `ci.yaml` | PR to main/release-* | Pre-commit, Go fmt/vet/build/test for authlib and the cmd/authbridge-* binaries; Python tests | -| `build.yaml` | Tag push (`v*`) or manual | Multi-arch Docker builds for: proxy-init, authbridge (proxy-sidecar combined), authbridge-envoy (envoy-sidecar combined), authbridge-lite (proxy-sidecar lite combined) | -| `security-scans.yaml` | PR to main | Dependency review, shellcheck, YAML lint, Hadolint, Bandit, Trivy, CodeQL | -| `scorecard.yaml` | Weekly / push to main | OpenSSF Scorecard security health metrics | -| `spellcheck_action.yml` | PR | Spellcheck on markdown files | - -### PR Title Convention - -PRs must follow **conventional commits** format: - -``` -<type>: <Subject starting with uppercase> -``` - -Types: `feat`, `fix`, `docs`, `style`, `refactor`, `perf`, `test`, `build`, `ci`, `chore`, `revert` - -## Container Images - -All images are pushed to `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/` from -`.github/workflows/build.yaml`: - -| Image | Source | Description | -|-------|--------|-------------| -| **`authbridge`** | **`authbridge/cmd/authbridge-proxy/Dockerfile`** | **proxy-sidecar combined image (default mode): authbridge-proxy (full plugin set incl. parsers) + spiffe-helper. No Envoy.** | -| `authbridge-envoy` | `authbridge/cmd/authbridge-envoy/Dockerfile` | envoy-sidecar combined image: Envoy + authbridge-envoy (ext_proc, full plugin set) + spiffe-helper | -| `authbridge-lite` | `authbridge/cmd/authbridge-lite/Dockerfile` | proxy-sidecar lite combined image: authbridge-lite (auth gates only, parsers dropped) + spiffe-helper. Same listener layout as `authbridge`; not yet referenced by the operator's default config | -| `proxy-init` | `authbridge/proxy-init/Dockerfile.init` | Alpine + iptables init container (envoy-sidecar mode only) | - -In all three combined images, `spiffe-helper` is started conditionally -based on the `SPIRE_ENABLED` env var (set by the operator when SPIRE -identity is enabled for the workload). - -The legacy `authbridge-unified`, `authbridge-light`, `client-registration`, -`spiffe-helper`, `auth-proxy`, and `demo-app` standalone images have -been removed from CI (the auth-proxy / demo-app source is still in-tree -for the standalone quickstart). Older release tags continue to publish -the old images. - -## Pre-commit Hooks - -Install: `pre-commit install` - -Hooks: -- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer`, `check-added-large-files` (max 1024KB), `check-yaml`, `check-json`, `check-merge-conflict`, `mixed-line-ending` -- `ai-assisted-by-trailer` — Rewrites `Co-Authored-By` to `Assisted-By` (commit-msg stage) -- `ruff`, `ruff-format` — Python linting/formatting on `authbridge/` files -- `go-fmt`, `go-vet` — Runs on `authbridge/proxy-init/` Go files - -## Languages and Tech Stack - -| Area | Technology | -|------|------------| -| AuthBridge unified binary | Go 1.25, envoy-control-plane, lestrrat-go/jwx | -| Client Registration | Python 3.12, python-keycloak, PyJWT | -| Proxy | Envoy 1.28 | -| Traffic interception | iptables (via init container) | -| Identity | SPIFFE/SPIRE (JWT-SVIDs) | -| Auth provider | Keycloak (OAuth2/OIDC, token exchange RFC 8693) | -| Packaging | Docker | -| CI | GitHub Actions | - -## External Dependencies and Services - -| Service | Required | Purpose | -|---------|----------|---------| -| Kubernetes | Yes | Target platform (v1.25+ recommended) | -| [kagenti-operator](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-operator) | Yes | Injects AuthBridge sidecars into workload pods | -| Keycloak | Yes | OAuth2/OIDC provider, token exchange | -| SPIRE | Optional | SPIFFE identity (JWT-SVIDs) for workloads | - -## ConfigMaps and Secrets Expected at Runtime - -When the operator injects sidecars, the target namespace needs these resources: - -| Resource | Kind | Used by | Keys | -|----------|------|---------|------| -| `authbridge-config` | ConfigMap | client-registration, authbridge | `KEYCLOAK_URL`, `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, `PLATFORM_CLIENT_IDS` (optional), `TOKEN_URL` (optional, derived from KEYCLOAK_URL+KEYCLOAK_REALM), `ISSUER` (optional, derived or explicit for split-horizon DNS), `DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_POLICY` (optional, defaults to `passthrough`). Inbound audience validation uses `CLIENT_ID` from `/shared/client-id.txt`. Target audience and scopes are configured per-route in `authproxy-routes`. | -| `keycloak-admin-secret` | Secret | client-registration | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME`, `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | -| `authproxy-routes` | ConfigMap (optional) | authbridge | `routes.yaml` -- per-host token exchange rules (see authbridge/CLAUDE.md for format) | -| `spiffe-helper-config` | ConfigMap | spiffe-helper | SPIFFE helper configuration file | -| `envoy-config` | ConfigMap | envoy-proxy | Envoy YAML configuration | - -**Note:** `authproxy-routes` is optional. Without it, all outbound traffic passes through unchanged (the default policy is `passthrough`). Only create it when the agent needs to call services that require token exchange. Set `DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_POLICY: "exchange"` in `authbridge-config` to restore the legacy behavior. - -## Common Development Tasks - -### Building Everything Locally - -The repo-root `local-build-and-test.sh` orchestrates every image -the platform needs (`spiffe-idp-setup` from kagenti, plus -`authbridge`, `authbridge-envoy`, `authbridge-lite`, `proxy-init` -from this repo) and loads them into a Kind cluster: - -```bash -KAGENTI_DIR=../kagenti ./local-build-and-test.sh -``` - -To build a single image directly: - -```bash -# proxy-init (iptables init container, envoy-sidecar mode) -cd authbridge/proxy-init && make docker-build-init - -# Combined sidecars (proxy-sidecar default / envoy-sidecar / lite) -cd authbridge && podman build -f cmd/authbridge-proxy/Dockerfile -t authbridge:latest . -cd authbridge && podman build -f cmd/authbridge-envoy/Dockerfile -t authbridge-envoy:latest . -cd authbridge && podman build -f cmd/authbridge-lite/Dockerfile -t authbridge-lite:latest . -``` - -### Running the Full Demo - -1. Set up a Kind cluster with SPIRE + Keycloak (use [Kagenti Ansible installer](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti/blob/main/docs/install.md)) -2. Deploy the webhook via [kagenti-operator](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-operator) -3. See the [AuthBridge demos index](authbridge/demos/README.md) for a recommended learning path: - - **Getting started**: `authbridge/demos/weather-agent/demo-ui.md` (inbound validation, UI deployment) - - **Full flow**: `authbridge/demos/github-issue/demo-ui.md` (token exchange + scope-based access) - - **Routes config reference**: `authbridge/demos/token-exchange-routes/README.md` (single + multi-target route patterns) - -### Adding a New Component Image to CI - -1. Add entry to `.github/workflows/build.yaml` matrix (`image_config` array) -2. Provide `name`, `context`, and `dockerfile` fields -3. Image will be pushed to `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/<name>` - -## Code Style and Conventions - -### Go Code (AuthProxy) -- Use `go fmt` (enforced by pre-commit and CI) -- Use `go vet` (enforced by pre-commit and CI) - -### Python Code (client-registration) -- Python 3.12+ syntax (type hints with `str | None`) -- Dependencies in `requirements.txt` (version-pinned, e.g. `python-keycloak==5.3.1`) - -### Kubernetes Manifests -- Example deployment YAMLs in `authbridge/demos/*/k8s/` - -### Shell Scripts -- `set -euo pipefail` (strict mode) -- Extensive inline documentation (especially `init-iptables.sh`) - -## Important Cross-Component Relationships - -1. **UID/GID Sync:** The `client-registration` Dockerfile creates a user with UID/GID 1000. The operator's webhook sets `runAsUser: 1000` / `runAsGroup: 1000` when injecting the client-registration container. These MUST match. In combined mode (`authbridge` container), everything runs as UID 1337 instead. - -2. **Envoy Proxy UID:** Envoy runs as UID 1337. The `proxy-init` iptables rules exclude this UID from redirection to prevent loops. The combined `authbridge` container also runs as UID 1337. - -3. **Shared Volume Contract:** The sidecars communicate through shared volumes: - - `/opt/jwt_svid.token` — spiffe-helper writes, client-registration reads - - `/shared/client-id.txt` — client-registration writes, envoy-proxy reads - - `/shared/client-secret.txt` — client-registration writes, envoy-proxy reads - -4. **Port Coordination:** Envoy listens on 15123 (outbound) and 15124 (inbound). The ext-proc listens on 9090. The `proxy-init` iptables rules redirect to these ports. - -## Gotchas and Known Issues - -1. **One Go module:** The repo has a single Go module at `authbridge/proxy-init/go.mod` (Go 1.25). - -2. **Avoid committing venvs:** Virtual environment directories (e.g. `authbridge/proxy-init/quickstart/venv/`) should be gitignored (the repo's `.gitignore` has a `venv` pattern). Do not create and commit new virtual environments under version control. - -3. **Envoy config not embedded:** The envoy-proxy sidecar mounts `envoy-config` ConfigMap at `/etc/envoy`. This ConfigMap must exist in the target namespace before workloads are created. - -4. **Outbound policy is passthrough by default:** AuthBridge defaults to passing outbound traffic through unchanged. Token exchange only happens for hosts explicitly listed in the `authproxy-routes` ConfigMap. Target audience and scopes are configured per-route in `authproxy-routes`. - -5. **Route host patterns use short service names:** The `host` field in `authproxy-routes` matches against the HTTP `Host` header, which is typically just the short Kubernetes service name (e.g., `github-tool-mcp`), not the FQDN. Glob patterns (`*`) are supported but the most common case is a plain service name. - -## DCO Sign-Off (Mandatory) - -All commits **must** include a `Signed-off-by` trailer (Developer Certificate of Origin). -Always use the `-s` flag when committing: - -```sh -git commit -s -m "feat: Add new feature" -``` - -This adds a line like `Signed-off-by: Your Name <your@email.com>` to the commit message. -PRs without DCO sign-off will fail CI checks. To retroactively sign-off existing commits: - -```sh -git rebase --signoff main -``` - -## Orchestration - -This repo includes orchestrate skills for enhancing related repositories. -Run `/orchestrate <repo-url>` to start. - -| Skill | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `orchestrate` | Entry point — scan, plan, execute phases | -| `orchestrate:scan` | Assess repo structure, CI, security gaps | -| `orchestrate:plan` | Create phased enhancement plan | -| `orchestrate:precommit` | Add pre-commit hooks and linting | -| `orchestrate:tests` | Add test infrastructure | -| `orchestrate:ci` | Add CI/CD workflows | -| `orchestrate:security` | Add security governance files | -| `orchestrate:replicate` | Bootstrap skills into target repo | -| `orchestrate:review` | Review all orchestration PRs before merge | - -Skills management: - -| Skill | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `skills` | Skills router — create, validate, scan | -| `skills:write` | Create or edit skills with proper structure | -| `skills:validate` | Validate skill format and naming | -| `skills:scan` | Audit repo for skill gaps | - -## Commit Attribution Policy - -When creating git commits, do NOT use `Co-Authored-By` trailers for AI attribution. -Instead, use `Assisted-By` to acknowledge AI assistance without inflating contributor stats: - - Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> - -Never add `Co-authored-by`, `Made-with`, or similar trailers that GitHub parses as co-authorship. - -### PR Bodies - -PR descriptions should end with the same `Assisted-By` trailer: - - Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> - -Do not use `🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)` or similar. - -A `commit-msg` hook in `scripts/hooks/commit-msg` enforces this automatically for commits. -Install it via pre-commit: - -```sh -pre-commit install --hook-type pre-commit --hook-type commit-msg -``` From ff6e6f6ba27afc2b49d7f0e712e21ead8c4150d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 06:00:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 079/273] revert: restore .claude/ tracking in kagenti-extensions Keep CLAUDE.md and docs/agents/ untracked (as intended), but restore .claude/ to version control and remove it from .gitignore. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .claude/settings.json | 26 + .claude/skills/demo.md | 193 +++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md | 158 ++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md | 411 ++++++++++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md | 152 +++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md | 224 ++++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md | 125 +++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md | 220 ++++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md | 523 ++++++++++++++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md | 213 +++++++ .claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md | 159 ++++++ .claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md | 56 ++ .claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md | 261 +++++++++ .claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md | 151 +++++ .claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md | 297 ++++++++++ .gitignore | 1 - 16 files changed, 3169 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 .claude/settings.json create mode 100644 .claude/skills/demo.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md create mode 100644 .claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..192ee4cc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "permissions": { + "allow": [ + "Bash(git status:*)", + "Bash(git log:*)", + "Bash(git diff:*)", + "Bash(git branch:*)", + "Bash(ls:*)", + "Bash(make lint:*)", + "Bash(make fmt:*)", + "Bash(make help:*)", + "Bash(make test-webhook:*)", + "Bash(make build-webhook:*)", + "Bash(pre-commit run:*)", + "Bash(go fmt:*)", + "Bash(go vet:*)", + "Bash(go test:*)", + "Bash(go build:*)", + "Bash(kubectl get:*)", + "Bash(kubectl describe:*)", + "Bash(kubectl logs:*)", + "Bash(helm template:*)", + "Bash(helm lint:*)" + ] + } +} diff --git a/.claude/skills/demo.md b/.claude/skills/demo.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0bbd2e191 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/demo.md @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +# Skill: AuthBridge Demo Development + +This skill captures knowledge from building, debugging, and running AuthBridge demos end-to-end on Kind clusters with SPIFFE/SPIRE, Keycloak, and Istio ambient mesh. + +## Repository Context + +- **Repo:** `kagenti/kagenti-extensions` (monorepo) +- **Container registry:** `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/<image-name>` +- **Agent examples repo:** `kagenti/agent-examples` (separate repo, images NOT published to GHCR) +- **Demo guides:** `authbridge/demos/<demo-name>/demo-manual.md` (manual kubectl) and `demo-ui.md` (UI-driven) + +## Demo Directory Convention + +Each demo lives under `authbridge/demos/<demo-name>/`: + +``` +demos/<demo-name>/ +├── k8s/ +│ ├── configmaps.yaml # All 4 required ConfigMaps (environments, authbridge-config, spiffe-helper-config, envoy-config) +│ ├── <agent>-deployment.yaml # Agent Deployment + Service +│ └── <tool>-deployment.yaml # Tool Deployment + Service (if applicable) +├── setup_keycloak.py # Keycloak realm/client/scope/user setup +├── demo.md # Index page linking manual + UI guides +├── demo-manual.md # Full manual deployment guide (kubectl only) +└── demo-ui.md # UI-driven deployment guide +``` + +## Building and Loading Images for Kind + +Agent/tool images from `kagenti/agent-examples` must be built locally and loaded into Kind: + +```bash +# Build from agent-examples repo +docker build -t ghcr.io/kagenti/agent-examples/<agent>:latest ./a2a/<agent>/ +docker build -t ghcr.io/kagenti/agent-examples/<tool>:latest ./mcp/<tool>/ + +# Build AuthBridge sidecar images +cd kagenti-extensions/authbridge/authproxy +docker build -f Dockerfile.init -t ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/proxy-init:latest . +docker build -f Dockerfile.envoy -t ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/envoy-with-processor:latest . + +# Load into Kind +kind load docker-image <image> --name kagenti +``` + +Use fully qualified image names in Dockerfiles (e.g., `docker.io/library/golang:1.24.9-bookworm`) to avoid Podman/Buildah "short-name resolution enforced" errors in Shipwright builds. + +## Envoy Config: Five Files with Inbound Listener + +All five envoy configs in the repo share the same inbound listener pattern. When modifying the inbound listener, update ALL of them: + +1. `authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/configmaps.yaml` +2. `authbridge/demos/single-target/k8s/configmaps-webhook.yaml` +3. `authbridge/demos/single-target/k8s/authbridge-deployment.yaml` +4. `authbridge/demos/single-target/k8s/authbridge-deployment-no-spiffe.yaml` +5. `authbridge/authproxy/k8s/auth-proxy-deployment.yaml` + +## Critical Bugs and Fixes + +### 1. iptables Backend Mismatch (proxy-init) + +**Symptom:** Inbound traffic bypasses Envoy — requests reach the agent without JWT validation. + +**Root cause:** Alpine 3.18's default `iptables` uses the **nf_tables** backend. Kind/kubeadm use **iptables-legacy**. Rules set via nft have no effect when the cluster uses legacy. + +**Fix:** `init-iptables.sh` auto-detects the backend via `detect_iptables_cmd()` (prefers `iptables-legacy`). All iptables calls use `${IPT}` variable. Override with `IPTABLES_CMD` env var if needed. + +**Verification:** proxy-init logs must show `Using iptables command: iptables-legacy`. + +**Diagnosis:** +```bash +docker exec <control-plane> iptables --version # Check node backend +docker exec <control-plane> bash -c ' # Inspect pod's rules + PID=$(crictl inspect $(crictl ps --name envoy-proxy -q | head -1) | jq -r .info.pid) + nsenter -t $PID -n iptables -t nat -L PREROUTING -n -v + nsenter -t $PID -n iptables -t nat -L PROXY_INBOUND -n -v' +``` + +### 2. Envoy Filter Ordering (ext_proc never sees direction header) + +**Symptom:** ext_proc logs `=== Outbound Request Headers ===` for INBOUND traffic. All requests treated as outbound. + +**Root cause:** `x-authbridge-direction: inbound` was at the **route level** (`request_headers_to_add` in `virtual_hosts`). Route headers are applied by the **router filter** — the LAST in the HTTP filter chain. ext_proc runs BEFORE router and never sees the header. + +**Fix:** Add a **Lua filter** BEFORE ext_proc in the inbound listener: +```yaml +http_filters: +- name: envoy.filters.http.lua + typed_config: + "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.lua.v3.Lua + inline_code: | + function envoy_on_request(request_handle) + request_handle:headers():add("x-authbridge-direction", "inbound") + end +- name: envoy.filters.http.ext_proc + ... +- name: envoy.filters.http.router + ... +``` + +**Key lesson:** Envoy HTTP filter execution order is: Lua → ext_proc → router. Route-level `request_headers_to_add` only takes effect during routing. Always use a filter to inject headers ext_proc needs. + +### 3. SPIFFE File Permission Denied + +**Symptom:** `cat: /opt/jwt_svid.token: Permission denied` in client-registration. + +**Root cause:** spiffe-helper ran as root, wrote file with `0600`. client-registration runs as UID 1000. + +**Fix:** Set `RunAsUser: 1000`, `RunAsGroup: 1000` on spiffe-helper's SecurityContext in `container_builder.go`. + +### 4. Istio Ambient Mesh Inbound Path + +With Istio ambient mesh, inbound traffic enters via **OUTPUT** (ztunnel delivery), NOT PREROUTING. `init-iptables.sh` PROXY_OUTPUT rule 1 (mark 0x539 + !uid 1337 + dst LOCAL) handles this correctly. + +**Diagnosis:** If PROXY_INBOUND REDIRECT has 0 packets but PROXY_OUTPUT rule 1 has non-zero, ambient mesh is active. + +## Debugging Techniques + +### Inbound Validation + +```bash +# Direct to inbound port (bypasses iptables, tests ext_proc only) +AGENT_POD_IP=$(kubectl get pod -n <ns> -l app=<agent> -o jsonpath='{.items[0].status.podIP}') +kubectl exec test-client -n <ns> -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://$AGENT_POD_IP:15124/.well-known/agent.json +# Expected: 401 + +# Through service (full path: iptables + ext_proc) +kubectl exec test-client -n <ns> -- curl -s http://<agent-service>:8000/.well-known/agent.json +# Expected: {"error":"unauthorized","message":"missing Authorization header"} +``` + +### ext_proc Direction Classification + +```bash +kubectl logs deployment/<agent> -n <ns> -c envoy-proxy --since=30s 2>&1 | head -40 +# "=== Inbound Request Headers ===" → correctly classified +# "=== Outbound Request Headers ===" → Lua filter missing or misconfigured +# "Traffic direction INBOUND" → Envoy knows it's inbound (from listener) +``` + +### AuthBridge Logs + +```bash +# Inbound JWT validation +kubectl logs deployment/<agent> -n <ns> -c envoy-proxy 2>&1 | grep "\[Inbound\]" +# Token exchange (outbound) +kubectl logs deployment/<agent> -n <ns> -c envoy-proxy 2>&1 | grep "\[Token Exchange\]" +``` + +### Client Registration + +```bash +kubectl logs deployment/<agent> -n <ns> -c kagenti-client-registration + +# Query Keycloak (use --data-urlencode for SPIFFE IDs) +curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \ + --data-urlencode "clientId=spiffe://localtest.me/ns/<ns>/sa/<sa>" \ + --get "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/admin/realms/kagenti/clients" | jq '.[0].clientId' +``` + +## Demo Deployment Checklist + +1. **ConfigMaps FIRST** — Apply before deploying agents. Stale ConfigMaps cause silent registration failures. +2. **Rebuild after code changes** — `init-iptables.sh` changes → rebuild proxy-init. `configmaps.yaml` changes → `kubectl apply` + restart pods. +3. **Verify proxy-init backend** — Logs must show `Using iptables command: iptables-legacy`. +4. **Agent env vars** — git-issue-agent uses `MCP_URL` (NOT `MCP_SERVER_URL`) and needs `JWKS_URI`. +5. **Envoy timeout** — Set to `300s` for LLM agents. Default 15s causes `upstream request timeout`. +6. **Ollama** — Must be running (`ollama serve`) before end-to-end queries with local LLM. +7. **A2A protocol** — git-issue-agent uses v0.3.0 with method `message/send` (NOT `tasks/send`). Requires `messageId` field. +8. **Keycloak client ID with SPIRE** — Full SPIFFE ID (e.g., `spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent`), not a short name. +9. **webhook-rollout.sh** — Set `AUTHBRIDGE_K8S_DIR=authbridge/demos/<demo-name>/k8s`. +10. **Keycloak scopes** — `github-full-access` is OPTIONAL; must be explicitly requested in token requests. +11. **ISSUER vs TOKEN_URL** — `ISSUER` = Keycloak frontend URL (in token `iss` claim). `TOKEN_URL` = internal service URL. They differ in K8s. +12. **Keycloak port 8080** — Must be in `OUTBOUND_PORTS_EXCLUDE` to prevent ext_proc token exchange redirect loop. + +## PR and Issue Conventions + +- PR titles MUST follow conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, etc. +- Demo documentation PRs use `docs:` prefix. +- Bug fix PRs use `fix:` prefix. +- Split large changes into reviewable PRs (e.g., manual demo separate from UI demo, AuthProxy fixes separate from demo docs). + +## What Triggers a Rebuild + +| Change | Action | +|--------|--------| +| `init-iptables.sh` or `Dockerfile.init` | Rebuild proxy-init image, `kind load`, delete pod | +| `authlib/` or `cmd/authbridge/` | Rebuild authbridge-unified image, `kind load`, delete pod | +| `configmaps.yaml` (envoy-config section) | `kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml`, delete pod | +| `configmaps.yaml` (other sections) | `kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml`, delete pod | +| `*-deployment.yaml` | `kubectl apply -f <file>` (rolling update) | +| `setup_keycloak.py` | Re-run `python setup_keycloak.py` | +| `container_builder.go` (webhook) | Rebuild webhook, redeploy, then delete agent pod for re-injection | diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..747963871 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate +description: Enhance any repository with CI, tests, skills, and security through phased PRs - self-replicating +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate"]) --> HAS_SCAN{Has scan report?} + + HAS_SCAN -->|No| SCAN["orchestrate:scan"]:::orch + SCAN --> PLAN["orchestrate:plan"]:::orch + HAS_SCAN -->|Yes| HAS_PLAN{Has plan?} + + HAS_PLAN -->|No| PLAN + HAS_PLAN -->|Yes| NEXT_PHASE{Next phase?} + + NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 2| PRECOMMIT["orchestrate:precommit<br/>PR #1"]:::orch + NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 3| TESTS["orchestrate:tests<br/>PR #2"]:::orch + NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 4| CI["orchestrate:ci<br/>PR #3"]:::orch + NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 5| SECURITY["orchestrate:security<br/>PR #4"]:::orch + NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 6| REPLICATE["orchestrate:replicate<br/>PR #5"]:::orch + NEXT_PHASE -->|Phase 7| REVIEW["orchestrate:review"]:::orch + + PRECOMMIT --> TESTS + TESTS --> CI + CI --> SECURITY + SECURITY --> REPLICATE + REPLICATE --> REVIEW + REVIEW -->|optional| ONBOARD_LINK["onboard:link"]:::onb + ONBOARD_LINK --> ONBOARD_STD["onboard:standards"]:::onb + REVIEW --> DONE([All phases complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white + classDef onb fill:#9C27B0,stroke:#333,color:white + classDef check fill:#FFC107,stroke:#333,color:black + class HAS_SCAN,HAS_PLAN,NEXT_PHASE check +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate Skills + +Enhance any repository with CI, tests, skills, and security through a series of phased PRs. Each phase produces a focused, reviewable PR of 600-700 lines. + +## Entry Point Routing + +When `/orchestrate` is invoked, determine the action: + +``` +What was provided? + | + +-- /orchestrate <repo-path> + | New target. Clone or locate the repo, then start from scan. + | Example: /orchestrate .repos/my-service + | + +-- /orchestrate <phase> + | Jump to a specific phase. Requires scan + plan to already exist. + | Example: /orchestrate ci + | + +-- /orchestrate status + Show current orchestration state for all tracked targets. +``` + +### Route logic + +1. **`/orchestrate <repo-path>`** -- If the path points to a git repository, derive the target name from the directory basename. Check `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/` for existing state. If no scan report exists, invoke `orchestrate:scan`. If scan exists but no plan, invoke `orchestrate:plan`. If both exist, determine the next incomplete phase and invoke it. + +2. **`/orchestrate <phase>`** -- Validate that `scan-report.md` and `plan.md` exist for the current target. If missing, instruct the user to run `/orchestrate <repo-path>` first. Otherwise invoke the requested phase skill directly (e.g., `orchestrate:precommit`). + +3. **`/orchestrate status`** -- List all directories under `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/`, read each target's `phase-status.md`, and display a summary table showing target name, current phase, and completion percentage. + +## Phase Status Tracking + +All orchestration state is persisted under `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/`: + +| File | Purpose | +|------|---------| +| `scan-report.md` | Output of `orchestrate:scan` -- repo structure, tech stack, gaps | +| `plan.md` | Output of `orchestrate:plan` -- enhancement plan with phases and PR scope | +| `phase-status.md` | Tracks which phases are complete, in-progress, or pending | + +The `phase-status.md` file uses this format: + +```markdown +# Orchestration Status: <target> + +| Phase | Status | PR | Updated | +|-------|--------|----|---------| +| scan | complete | -- | 2025-01-15 | +| plan | complete | -- | 2025-01-15 | +| precommit | complete | #42 | 2025-01-16 | +| tests | in-progress | #43 | 2025-01-17 | +| ci | pending | -- | -- | +| security | pending | -- | -- | +| replicate | pending | -- | -- | +| review | pending | -- | -- | +``` + +Each phase skill is responsible for updating `phase-status.md` when it starts and completes. + +## Phase Overview + +| Phase | Skill | PR | Description | +|-------|-------|-----|-------------| +| 0 | orchestrate:scan | -- | Assess target repo structure, tech stack, and gaps | +| 1 | orchestrate:plan | -- | Brainstorm enhancements and produce a phased plan | +| 2 | orchestrate:precommit | PR #1 | Pre-commit hooks, linting, and code formatting | +| 3 | orchestrate:tests | PR #2 | Test infrastructure and initial test coverage | +| 4 | orchestrate:ci | PR #3 | Comprehensive CI: lint, test, build, security scanning, dependabot, scorecard | +| 5 | orchestrate:security | PR #4 | Security governance: CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE | +| 6 | orchestrate:replicate | PR #5 | Bootstrap Claude Code skills into the target repo | +| 7 | orchestrate:review | -- | Review all orchestration PRs before merge | + +Phases are sequential. Each PR builds on the previous one. Tests come before CI (so CI can run them) and before security (so code refactoring for security fixes has test coverage as a safety net). The scan and plan phases do not produce PRs -- they produce artifacts that guide all subsequent phases. + +## Self-Replication + +Phase 6 (`orchestrate:replicate`) is what makes this system fractal. It copies a starter set of Claude Code skills into the target repository, including a tailored version of the orchestrate skill itself. Once replicated, the target repo can orchestrate other repos using the same phased approach. + +This means every repository that goes through orchestration gains the ability to orchestrate others. The skills adapt to the target's tech stack (the scan report informs what language-specific linters, test frameworks, and CI patterns to use). + +## Quick Start + +```bash +# Clone target repo into a working directory +git clone git@github.com:org/repo.git .repos/repo-name + +# Run the full orchestration pipeline +# /orchestrate .repos/repo-name + +# Or jump to a specific phase (if scan + plan already exist) +# /orchestrate precommit + +# Check status across all targets +# /orchestrate status +``` + +## Related Skills + +### Orchestrate sub-skills + +| Skill | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| `orchestrate:scan` | Assess target repo structure and identify gaps | +| `orchestrate:plan` | Produce a phased enhancement plan | +| `orchestrate:precommit` | Add pre-commit hooks, linters, formatters | +| `orchestrate:ci` | Comprehensive CI: lint, test, build, security scanning, dependabot, scorecard | +| `orchestrate:tests` | Add test infrastructure and initial test coverage | +| `orchestrate:security` | Security governance: CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE | +| `orchestrate:replicate` | Bootstrap Claude Code skills into the target | +| `orchestrate:review` | Review all orchestration PRs before merge | + +### Onboard skills + +| Skill | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| `onboard:link` | Link a newly-orchestrated repo to Kagenti | +| `onboard:standards` | Apply organizational standards and conventions | diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1d9fd05be --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:ci/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,411 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:ci +description: Add comprehensive CI workflows to a target repo - lint, test, build, security scanning, dependabot, scorecard, action pinning +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:ci"]) --> READ["Read plan + scan report"]:::orch + READ --> DETECT["Detect tech stack + CI gaps"]:::orch + DETECT --> T1["Tier 1: Universal checks"]:::orch + T1 --> T2{"Tier 2 needed?"} + T2 -->|Yes| T2_GEN["Tier 2: Conditional checks"]:::orch + T2 -->|No| T3 + T2_GEN --> T3{"Tier 3 needed?"} + T3 -->|Yes| T3_GEN["Tier 3: Advanced patterns"]:::orch + T3 -->|No| BRANCH + T3_GEN --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch + BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} + SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch + SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch + SPLIT --> PR + PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: CI + +Add comprehensive CI workflows to a target repository. This is Phase 4 and +produces PR #3. Encodes the kagenti/kagenti gold standard: lint, test, build, +security scanning, dependency management, and supply chain hardening. + +## When to Use + +- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies CI as a needed phase +- After precommit and tests phases (so CI can run the test suite) + +## Prerequisites + +- Plan exists at `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/plan.md` +- Scan report at `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/scan-report.md` +- Target repo in `.repos/<target>/` + +## Read Scan Report First + +Before generating anything, read the scan report to determine: +- Tech stack (Python, Go, Node, Ansible, Rust, multi-language) +- Existing CI workflows (what to preserve vs replace) +- Dockerfiles present (triggers container build workflows) +- Existing dependabot config (what ecosystems are covered) +- Existing security scanning (what's already in place) + +--- + +## Tier 1: Universal Checks (Always Generate) + +Every repo gets these regardless of tech stack. + +### 1.1 Core CI Workflow (`ci.yml`) + +**Trigger:** `pull_request` on `main` and `push` to `main` + +Adapt to tech stack from scan report: + +| Language | Lint | Test | Build | +|----------|------|------|-------| +| Python | `ruff check .` + `ruff format --check .` | `pytest -v` | `uv build` (if pyproject.toml has build-system) | +| Go | `golangci-lint run` | `go test ./... -v -race` | `go build ./...` | +| Node | `npm run lint` | `npm test` | `npm run build` | +| Rust | `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` | `cargo test` | `cargo build --release` | +| Ansible | `ansible-lint` | `molecule test` (if molecule config exists) | — | + +For multi-language repos, create separate jobs per language. + +All CI workflows MUST include: +- `permissions: contents: read` (explicit least-privilege) +- `timeout-minutes: 15` (prevent hung jobs) +- Language-appropriate dependency caching +- Pre-commit run (if `.pre-commit-config.yaml` exists): `pre-commit run --all-files` + +For simpler single-language repos, combine lint + test + build into one `ci.yml`. +For larger repos, split into `lint.yml`, `test.yml`, `build.yml`. + +### 1.2 Security Scans Workflow (`security-scans.yml`) + +**Trigger:** `pull_request` on `main` + +Generate parallel jobs based on what's in the repo. Always include dependency +review. Add language-specific SAST and file-type linters only when relevant files +exist. + +**Required permissions pattern:** + +```yaml +permissions: {} # Top-level: deny all + +jobs: + dependency-review: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + contents: read + pull-requests: write + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@<SHA> # Always SHA-pinned + - uses: actions/dependency-review-action@<SHA> + with: + fail-on-severity: moderate + deny-licenses: GPL-3.0, AGPL-3.0 +``` + +**Conditional jobs (include only when relevant files exist):** + +| Job | When to Include | Tool | +|-----|----------------|------| +| Dependency review | Always | `actions/dependency-review-action` | +| Trivy filesystem | Always | `aquasecurity/trivy-action` (fs scan, CRITICAL+HIGH) | +| CodeQL | Python or Go or JS/TS | `github/codeql-action` with `security-extended` | +| Bandit | Python files exist | `PyCQA/bandit` (HIGH severity blocks) | +| gosec | Go files exist | `securego/gosec` | +| Hadolint | Dockerfiles exist | `hadolint/hadolint-action` | +| Shellcheck | `.sh` files exist | `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` | +| YAML lint | `.yml`/`.yaml` in workflows/charts | `ibiqlik/action-yamllint` | +| Helm lint | `Chart.yaml` exists | `helm lint` | +| Action pinning | `.github/workflows/` exists | Custom step or `zgosalvez/github-actions-ensure-sha-pinned-actions` | + +**Trivy reference config:** + +```yaml + trivy-scan: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + contents: read + security-events: write + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@<SHA> + - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@<SHA> + with: + scan-type: fs + scan-ref: . + severity: CRITICAL,HIGH + exit-code: 1 + format: sarif + output: trivy-results.sarif + - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@<SHA> + if: always() + with: + sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif +``` + +**CodeQL reference config:** + +```yaml + codeql: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + security-events: write + contents: read + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@<SHA> + - uses: github/codeql-action/init@<SHA> + with: + languages: ${{ matrix.language }} + queries: security-extended + - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<SHA> +``` + +### 1.3 Dependabot Configuration (`dependabot.yml`) + +Generate `.github/dependabot.yml` covering ALL detected ecosystems: + +```yaml +version: 2 +updates: + # Always include GitHub Actions + - package-ecosystem: github-actions + directory: / + schedule: + interval: weekly +``` + +**Add per detected ecosystem:** + +| Marker File | Ecosystem | Directory | +|-------------|-----------|-----------| +| `pyproject.toml` or `requirements.txt` | `pip` | `/` (or subdir) | +| `go.mod` | `gomod` | `/` (or subdir) | +| `package.json` | `npm` | `/` (or subdir) | +| `Cargo.toml` | `cargo` | `/` (or subdir) | +| `Dockerfile` | `docker` | `/` (or subdir with Dockerfiles) | + +For monorepo structures with multiple `go.mod` or `pyproject.toml` files, +add separate entries for each directory. + +### 1.4 OpenSSF Scorecard Workflow (`scorecard.yml`) + +```yaml +name: Scorecard +on: + push: + branches: [main] + schedule: + - cron: "30 6 * * 1" # Weekly Monday 6:30 AM UTC + workflow_dispatch: + +permissions: read-all + +jobs: + analysis: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + security-events: write + id-token: write + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@<SHA> + with: + persist-credentials: false + - uses: ossf/scorecard-action@<SHA> + with: + results_file: results.sarif + results_format: sarif + publish_results: true + - uses: actions/upload-artifact@<SHA> + with: + name: scorecard-results + path: results.sarif + retention-days: 30 + - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@<SHA> + with: + sarif_file: results.sarif +``` + +### 1.5 Action Pinning Check + +Add as a job in `security-scans.yml` or standalone: + +```yaml + action-pinning: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + contents: read + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@<SHA> + - name: Check action pinning + uses: zgosalvez/github-actions-ensure-sha-pinned-actions@<SHA> + with: + allowlist: | + actions/ +``` + +Start as informational (`continue-on-error: true`). Recommend tightening +after all actions are SHA-pinned. + +--- + +## Tier 2: Conditional Checks (Based on Scan Report) + +### 2.1 Container Build Workflow (`build.yml`) + +**Include when:** Dockerfiles detected in scan report. + +**Trigger:** Tag push (`v*`) and `workflow_dispatch` + +Generate multi-arch build matrix: + +```yaml +strategy: + matrix: + image: + - name: <image-name> + context: <path-to-dockerfile-dir> + file: <Dockerfile-path> +``` + +Use `docker/build-push-action` with: +- QEMU for multi-arch (amd64 + arm64) +- Buildx +- GHCR push (`ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}/<image>`) +- OCI labels via `docker/metadata-action` + +### 2.2 Stale Issues Workflow (`stale.yml`) + +**Include when:** Repo is actively maintained (has recent commits). + +Use the kagenti org reusable workflow: + +```yaml +name: Close Stale Issues and PRs +on: + schedule: + - cron: "30 6 * * *" + workflow_dispatch: + +jobs: + stale: + uses: kagenti/.github/.github/workflows/stale.yaml@main +``` + +### 2.3 PR Title Verification + +**Include when:** Repo follows conventional commit format. + +Use the org reusable workflow or `amannn/action-semantic-pull-request`. + +--- + +## Tier 3: Advanced Patterns (User Confirms) + +Flag these in the PR description as optional. Only generate if the scan report +indicates they are needed AND the user confirms. + +### 3.1 Comment-Triggered E2E (`e2e-pr.yml`) + +For repos with expensive E2E tests that require secrets: + +- Use `issue_comment` trigger (not `pull_request_target`) +- Authorization job: check commenter has write permission +- Add `safe-to-test` label flow +- Pair with `remove-safe-to-test.yml` for TOCTOU protection + +### 3.2 Post-Merge Security Scan (`security-post-merge.yml`) + +For repos where PR security scans are informational but post-merge should +upload to GitHub Security tab: + +- Trigger on push to main (path-filtered to dependency files) +- Full Trivy scan with SARIF upload +- `continue-on-error: true` (never blocks main) + +### 3.3 TOCTOU Protection (`remove-safe-to-test.yml`) + +Pair with comment-triggered E2E: + +- Trigger: `pull_request_target` on `synchronize` +- Remove `safe-to-test` label on new commits +- Post security checklist comment for maintainers + +--- + +## Action Version Reference + +When generating workflows, use the latest SHA-pinned versions. Look up current +SHAs from the kagenti/kagenti main repo's workflows as the reference. All +actions MUST be SHA-pinned with a version comment: + +```yaml +- uses: actions/checkout@<full-sha> # v4 +``` + +**Never use tag-only references** like `@v4`. + +--- + +## Skills to Push Alongside + +Include in the target's `.claude/skills/`: +- `ci:status` — Check CI pipeline status +- `rca:ci` — Root cause analysis from CI logs + +--- + +## Branch and PR Workflow + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/ci +``` + +### PR size check + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> diff --stat | tail -1 +``` + +Target ~600-700 lines. If over 700, split: +- PR 3a: `ci.yml` + `dependabot.yml` +- PR 3b: `security-scans.yml` + `scorecard.yml` +- PR 3c: Container builds (if applicable) + +### Commit and push + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> add -A +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: add comprehensive CI workflows (lint, test, build, security, dependabot, scorecard)" +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/ci +``` + +### Create PR + +```bash +gh pr create --repo org/repo --title "Add comprehensive CI workflows" --body "Phase 4 of repo orchestration. Adds GitHub Actions for lint, test, build, security scanning (Trivy, CodeQL, SAST), dependabot for all ecosystems, OpenSSF Scorecard, and action pinning verification." +``` + +## Update Phase Status + +Set ci to `complete` in `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/phase-status.md`. + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:tests` — Previous phase (test suite to run in CI) +- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines CI phase tasks +- `orchestrate:security` — Next phase: governance hardening +- `ci:status` — Monitor CI pipelines +- `rca:ci` — Debug CI failures diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..75727b4bf --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:plan/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:plan +description: Brainstorm and create phased enhancement plan for a target repo - PR sizing, phase selection, task breakdown +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:plan"]) --> READ["Read scan report"]:::orch + READ --> PRESENT["Present findings"]:::orch + PRESENT --> BRAINSTORM["Brainstorm with developer"]:::orch + BRAINSTORM --> SELECT["Select applicable phases"]:::orch + SELECT --> SIZE["Size PRs (600-700 lines)"]:::orch + SIZE --> WRITE["Write plan document"]:::orch + WRITE --> DONE([Plan complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Plan + +Take the scan report and turn it into a concrete phased enhancement plan. This +is Phase 1 — interactive brainstorming with the developer, no PRs. + +## When to Use + +- After `orchestrate:scan` has produced a scan report +- Before starting any PR-producing phase + +## Prerequisites + +Scan report must exist: + +```bash +cat /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/scan-report.md +``` + +## Planning Process + +### 1. Read the scan report + +Review the Gap Summary and Recommended Phases sections. + +### 2. Present findings to developer + +Summarize the key gaps in plain language. Use AskUserQuestion to confirm +understanding and gather context about the repo's priorities. + +### 3. Brainstorm which phases apply + +Not all repos need all phases. Use AskUserQuestion to decide: + +| Gap Found | Phase | Default | +|-----------|-------|---------| +| No pre-commit config | `orchestrate:precommit` | Always (foundation) | +| No/incomplete CI workflows or security scanning | `orchestrate:ci` | Yes if missing | +| No/few tests (<5 test files) | `orchestrate:tests` | Yes if low coverage | +| No CODEOWNERS/SECURITY.md/LICENSE | `orchestrate:security` | Recommended | +| No `.claude/skills/` directory | `orchestrate:replicate` | Always (last phase) | + +### 4. Determine phase order + +Default order: precommit → tests → ci → security → replicate + +Tests come before CI (so CI can run them) and before security (so code +refactoring for security fixes has test coverage as a safety net). Pre-commit +is always first (it validates subsequent PRs). Replicate is always last. + +### 5. Size PRs + +Target 600-700 lines per PR. For each phase: +- If estimated >700 lines: split into sub-PRs by concern +- If estimated <300 lines: merge with adjacent phase +- Skills pushed alongside each phase count toward the total + +### 6. Write the plan document + +## Plan Output + +Save to `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/plan.md`: + +```markdown +# Enhancement Plan: <target> + +**Generated from scan:** YYYY-MM-DD +**Tech stack:** <language> +**Phases:** <count> + +## Phase 2: Pre-commit (PR #1, ~NNN lines) +- [ ] Add .pre-commit-config.yaml +- [ ] Add linting config +- [ ] Create CLAUDE.md +- [ ] Create .claude/settings.json +- [ ] Add repo:commit skill + +## Phase 3: Tests (PR #2, ~NNN lines) +- [ ] Set up test framework +- [ ] Add test configuration +- [ ] Write initial tests for critical paths +- [ ] Add test:write and tdd:ci skills + +## Phase 4: CI (PR #3, ~NNN lines) +- [ ] Add lint/test/build workflow (ci.yml) +- [ ] Add security scanning workflow (security-scans.yml) +- [ ] Add dependabot.yml (all detected ecosystems) +- [ ] Add scorecard workflow +- [ ] Add action pinning verification +- [ ] Add container build workflow (if Dockerfiles exist) +- [ ] Add ci:status and rca:ci skills + +## Phase 5: Security Governance (PR #4, ~NNN lines) +- [ ] Create CODEOWNERS +- [ ] Create SECURITY.md +- [ ] Create CONTRIBUTING.md +- [ ] Verify/add LICENSE +- [ ] Audit .gitignore + +## Phase 6: Replicate (PR #5) +- [ ] Copy orchestrate:* skills to target +- [ ] Adapt references +- [ ] Update CLAUDE.md +- [ ] Validate skills +``` + +## After Planning + +Initialize phase tracking: + +```bash +cat > /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/phase-status.md << 'EOF' +# Phase Status: <target> + +| Phase | Status | PR | Date | +|-------|--------|----|------| +| scan | complete | — | YYYY-MM-DD | +| plan | complete | — | YYYY-MM-DD | +| precommit | pending | | | +| tests | pending | | | +| ci | pending | | | +| security | pending | | | +| replicate | pending | | | +EOF +``` + +Then invoke the first applicable phase skill (usually `orchestrate:precommit`). + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:scan` — Prerequisite: produces the scan report +- `orchestrate:precommit` — Usually the first PR-producing phase diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cddfd92ea --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:precommit/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:precommit +description: Add pre-commit hooks, linting, CLAUDE.md, and foundational .claude/ setup to a target repo +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:precommit"]) --> DETECT["Detect language"]:::orch + DETECT --> PRECOMMIT["Generate .pre-commit-config.yaml"]:::orch + PRECOMMIT --> LINT["Generate lint config"]:::orch + LINT --> MAKEFILE["Add Makefile targets"]:::orch + MAKEFILE --> CLAUDE_MD["Create CLAUDE.md"]:::orch + CLAUDE_MD --> SETTINGS["Create .claude/settings.json"]:::orch + SETTINGS --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch + BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} + SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch + SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch + SPLIT --> PR + PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Pre-commit + +Establish the code quality baseline for a target repo. This is Phase 2 and +produces PR #1 — the foundation that validates all subsequent PRs. + +## When to Use + +- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies precommit as a needed phase +- Always the first PR-producing phase + +## Prerequisites + +- Plan exists at `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/plan.md` +- Target repo cloned in `.repos/<target>/` + +## Step 1: Detect Language + +Use the scan report or check directly: + +```bash +ls .repos/<target>/go.mod .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml .repos/<target>/package.json .repos/<target>/requirements.yml 2>/dev/null +``` + +## Step 2: Generate Pre-commit Config + +Create `.pre-commit-config.yaml` with language-appropriate hooks. + +### Python hooks + +- `ruff` — lint + format +- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer`, `check-yaml` +- `check-added-large-files` + +### Go hooks + +- `golangci-lint` +- `gofmt`, `govet` +- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer` + +### Node hooks + +- `eslint`, `prettier` +- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer` + +### Ansible hooks + +- `ansible-lint`, `yamllint` +- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer` + +## Step 3: Generate Lint Config + +### Python (`pyproject.toml`) + +```toml +[tool.ruff] +line-length = 120 +target-version = "py311" + +[tool.ruff.lint] +select = ["E", "F", "I", "W"] +``` + +### Go (`.golangci.yml`) + +```yaml +linters: + enable: + - errcheck + - govet + - staticcheck + - unused +run: + timeout: 5m +``` + +### Node (`.eslintrc.json`) + +```json +{ + "extends": ["eslint:recommended"], + "env": { "node": true, "es2022": true } +} +``` + +## Step 4: Add Makefile Targets + +If no Makefile exists, create one. If it exists, add targets: + +```makefile +.PHONY: lint fmt + +lint: + pre-commit run --all-files + +fmt: + # language-specific formatter command +``` + +## Step 5: Create CLAUDE.md + +Template for the target repo: + +```markdown +# <Repo Name> + +## Overview +<brief description from README or scan> + +## Repository Structure +<key directories and their purpose> + +## Key Commands +| Task | Command | +|------|---------| +| Lint | `make lint` | +| Format | `make fmt` | +| Test | <detected test command> | +| Build | <detected build command> | + +## Code Style +- <language> with <linter> +- Pre-commit hooks: `pre-commit install` +- Sign-off required: `git commit -s` +``` + +## Step 6: Create .claude/settings.json + +```json +{ + "permissions": { + "allow": [ + "Bash(git status:*)", + "Bash(git log:*)", + "Bash(git diff:*)", + "Bash(git branch:*)", + "Bash(ls:*)", + "Bash(cat:*)", + "Bash(find:*)", + "Bash(make lint:*)", + "Bash(make fmt:*)", + "Bash(pre-commit run:*)" + ] + } +} +``` + +## Step 7: Create Branch and PR + +Create branch in the target repo: + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/precommit +``` + +### PR size check + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> diff --stat | tail -1 +``` + +Target ~600-700 lines. Split if over 700. + +### Skills to push alongside + +Include initial skills in `.claude/skills/` within the target repo: +- `repo:commit` — commit message conventions adapted for the target + +### Commit and push + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> add -A +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: add pre-commit hooks, linting, and Claude Code setup" +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/precommit +``` + +### Create PR + +```bash +gh pr create --repo org/repo --title "Add pre-commit hooks and code quality baseline" --body "Phase 2 of repo orchestration. Adds pre-commit hooks, linting config, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/ setup." +``` + +## Update Phase Status + +Update `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/phase-status.md`: +- Set precommit to `complete` +- Record PR number and date + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:scan` — Provides tech stack detection +- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines precommit phase tasks +- `orchestrate:tests` — Next phase: test infrastructure diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..26dc28798 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:replicate/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:replicate +description: Bootstrap orchestrate skills into a target repo - making it self-sufficient for orchestrating its own related repos +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:replicate"]) --> COPY["Copy orchestrate skills"]:::orch + COPY --> ADAPT["Adapt references"]:::orch + ADAPT --> UPDATE["Update target CLAUDE.md"]:::orch + UPDATE --> VALIDATE["Validate skills"]:::orch + VALIDATE --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch + BRANCH --> PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch + PR --> DONE([Target self-sufficient]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Replicate + +The final orchestration phase. Copies orchestrate skills into the target repo, +making it fully self-sufficient. This is Phase 6. + +## When to Use + +- Final phase of orchestration +- After at least precommit + CI phases are complete +- When you want the target repo to orchestrate its own related repos + +## Prerequisites + +- `orchestrate:precommit` and `orchestrate:ci` complete (at minimum) +- Target repo has `.claude/` directory + +## What Gets Copied + +| Skill | Purpose | +|-------|---------| +| `orchestrate/` | Router — entry point | +| `orchestrate:scan/` | Assess repos | +| `orchestrate:plan/` | Create phased plans | +| `orchestrate:precommit/` | Add pre-commit hooks | +| `orchestrate:ci/` | Add CI workflows | +| `orchestrate:tests/` | Add test infrastructure | +| `orchestrate:security/` | Add security hardening | +| `orchestrate:replicate/` | This skill (self!) | +| `skills:scan/` | Discover skills in a repo | +| `skills:write/` | Author new skills | +| `skills:validate/` | Validate skill structure | + +## Adaptation Steps + +After copying, adapt the skills: + +1. **Remove source-specific references** — strip kagenti-specific paths or + assumptions that don't apply +2. **Verify frontmatter** — every `name:` field must match its directory name +3. **Update Related Skills** — only reference skills that exist in the copied set +4. **Preserve generality** — skills should work in any repo context + +## Update Target CLAUDE.md + +Add an orchestration section: + +```markdown +## Orchestration + +This repo includes orchestrate skills for enhancing related repos: + +| Skill | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| `orchestrate` | Run `/orchestrate <repo-path>` to start | +| `orchestrate:scan` | Assess repo structure and gaps | +| `orchestrate:plan` | Create phased enhancement plan | +| `orchestrate:replicate` | Bootstrap skills into target | +``` + +## The Fractal Concept + +This phase makes the system self-replicating: + +1. **Repo A** orchestrates **Repo B** through all phases +2. Phase 6 copies orchestrate skills into **Repo B** +3. **Repo B** can now orchestrate **Repo C** +4. **Repo C** can orchestrate **Repo D**, and so on + +Each copy is independent. No runtime dependency on the original hub. The +skills adapt to whatever tech stack the scan discovers. + +## Validation + +After copying, verify: + +1. **Frontmatter match** — `name:` matches directory for each skill +2. **No broken references** — Related Skills point to existing skills +3. **No source-specific content** — grep for original repo name +4. **Structure** — every directory has exactly one `SKILL.md` + +## Branch and PR Workflow + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/replicate +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> add .claude/skills/orchestrate* .claude/skills/skills* +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: bootstrap orchestrate skills for self-sufficient orchestration" +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/replicate +``` + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:security` — Previous phase +- `skills:scan` — Discover skills (gets copied) +- `skills:write` — Author skills (gets copied) +- `skills:validate` — Validate skills (gets copied) diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..379ccd76a --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:review/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:review +description: Review all orchestration PRs before merge - per-PR checks, cross-PR consistency, and coordinated approval +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:review"]) --> GATHER["List open orchestration PRs"]:::orch + GATHER --> PER_PR["Per-PR review"]:::orch + PER_PR --> CROSS["Cross-PR consistency checks"]:::orch + CROSS --> DRAFT["Draft review summary"]:::orch + DRAFT --> APPROVE{User approves?} + APPROVE -->|Yes| SUBMIT["Post reviews via gh api"]:::orch + APPROVE -->|No| REVISE["Revise reviews"]:::orch + REVISE --> DRAFT + SUBMIT --> STATUS["Update phase-status.md"]:::orch + STATUS --> DONE([Review complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white + classDef check fill:#FFC107,stroke:#333,color:black + class APPROVE check +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Review + +Phase 7 quality gate. Review all orchestration PRs created by phases 2-6 before +merge. Checks each PR individually, then validates cross-PR consistency, and +submits reviews after user approval. + +## When to Use + +- After all orchestration phases (2-6) have created their PRs +- Before merging any orchestration PRs into the target repo +- When `/orchestrate review` is invoked from the router + +## Prerequisites + +- `scan-report.md` and `plan.md` exist in `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/` +- Phases 2-6 are complete (or at least the phases that were planned) +- PRs are open on the target repo + +## Phase 1: Gather + +List open PRs for the target repo and collect metadata: + +```bash +# List open PRs created by orchestration (look for orchestrate-related branch names or labels) +gh pr list --repo <org>/<repo> --state open --json number,title,headRefName,additions,deletions,files +``` + +For each PR, fetch the diff: + +```bash +gh pr diff <number> --repo <org>/<repo> +``` + +Record PR metadata in a working table: + +| PR | Title | Branch | Files | +/- | +|----|-------|--------|-------|-----| +| #N | ... | orchestrate/... | N | +X/-Y | + +## Phase 2: Per-PR Review + +For each PR, run the review checklist: + +### Commit Conventions +- Signed-off (`Signed-off-by:` trailer present) +- Emoji prefix on commit message (if repo convention requires it) +- Imperative mood in subject line +- Body explains "why" not just "what" + +### PR Format +- Title under 70 characters +- Summary section in PR body +- Links to relevant issues or plan + +### Area-Specific Checks + +| PR Phase | Checks | +|----------|--------| +| precommit (Phase 2) | `.pre-commit-config.yaml` valid YAML, hooks match detected languages, no conflicting formatters | +| tests (Phase 3) | Test files follow naming conventions, fixtures are reusable, no hardcoded secrets in tests | +| ci (Phase 4) | Actions SHA-pinned, permissions least-privilege, no secrets in logs, workflows valid YAML | +| security (Phase 5) | CODEOWNERS paths exist, SECURITY.md has contact info, LICENSE matches repo intent | +| replicate (Phase 6) | Skills have frontmatter, SKILL.md files are valid markdown, paths reference target repo correctly | + +### Security Review +- No secrets, tokens, or credentials in diff +- No overly permissive file permissions +- No `eval`, `exec`, or injection-prone patterns in scripts +- Container images use specific tags (not `:latest`) + +## Phase 3: Cross-PR Consistency + +Check alignment across all orchestration PRs: + +### Pre-commit ↔ CI Alignment +- Linters configured in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` (Phase 2) should match lint steps + in CI workflows (Phase 4) +- Example: if pre-commit runs `ruff`, CI should also run `ruff` (or at least not + run a conflicting linter like `flake8`) + +```bash +# Extract pre-commit hooks +grep "repo:\|id:" .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null +# Compare with CI lint steps +grep -A5 "lint\|check\|format" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null +``` + +### Tests ↔ CI Alignment +- Tests added in Phase 3 should be executed by CI workflows added in Phase 4 +- Check that test commands in CI match the test framework detected + +```bash +# Test framework from Phase 3 +grep -r "pytest\|go test\|vitest\|jest" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null +``` + +### CODEOWNERS ↔ Paths +- Paths in CODEOWNERS (Phase 5) should cover directories created by earlier phases + +```bash +# Check CODEOWNERS paths exist +cat .repos/<target>/CODEOWNERS 2>/dev/null | grep -v "^#" | awk '{print $1}' | while read path; do + ls .repos/<target>/$path 2>/dev/null || echo "MISSING: $path" +done +``` + +### Skills ↔ Repo Paths +- Skills replicated in Phase 6 should reference correct paths for the target repo +- Skill frontmatter should be valid + +```bash +# Check skill files have valid frontmatter +find .repos/<target>/.claude/skills -name "SKILL.md" -exec head -5 {} \; 2>/dev/null +``` + +## Phase 4: Draft + +Present a review summary to the user. Format: + +```markdown +# Orchestration Review: <target> + +## Per-PR Verdicts + +| PR | Title | Verdict | Issues | +|----|-------|---------|--------| +| #N | precommit: ... | approve | 0 | +| #N | tests: ... | request-changes | 2 | +| #N | ci: ... | approve | 0 | +| #N | security: ... | comment | 1 | +| #N | replicate: ... | approve | 0 | + +## Issues Found + +### PR #N: <title> +1. **[severity]** Description of issue + - File: `path/to/file` + - Recommendation: ... + +## Cross-PR Consistency + +| Check | Status | Notes | +|-------|--------|-------| +| Pre-commit ↔ CI lint | aligned/misaligned | details | +| Tests ↔ CI execution | aligned/misaligned | details | +| CODEOWNERS ↔ paths | aligned/misaligned | details | +| Skills ↔ repo paths | aligned/misaligned | details | +``` + +Present this to the user and wait for approval before submitting. + +## Phase 5: Submit + +After user approval, post reviews via GitHub API: + +```bash +# For each PR, post the review +gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/pulls/<number>/reviews \ + --method POST \ + -f event="APPROVE" \ + -f body="Orchestration review: all checks passed. ..." + +# Or for request-changes: +gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/pulls/<number>/reviews \ + --method POST \ + -f event="REQUEST_CHANGES" \ + -f body="Orchestration review: issues found. ..." +``` + +For PRs with inline comments, use the review comments API: + +```bash +gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/pulls/<number>/reviews \ + --method POST \ + -f event="REQUEST_CHANGES" \ + -f body="..." \ + --input comments.json +``` + +Where `comments.json` contains file-level comments. + +## Status Update + +Update `phase-status.md` when complete: + +```bash +# Update phase-status.md +sed -i '' 's/| review .*/| review | complete | -- | YYYY-MM-DD |/' /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/phase-status.md +``` + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` -- Parent router +- `orchestrate:scan` -- Scan report used for cross-referencing +- `orchestrate:plan` -- Plan used to verify all phases were executed diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..10ecd9fde --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:scan/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,523 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:scan +description: Scan and assess a target repository - tech stack, CI maturity, security posture, test coverage, supply chain health +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:scan"]) --> TECH["Detect tech stack"]:::orch + TECH --> CI["Check CI maturity"]:::orch + CI --> SEC_SCAN["Check security scanning"]:::orch + SEC_SCAN --> DEPS["Check dependency management"]:::orch + DEPS --> TESTS["Check test coverage"]:::orch + TESTS --> SUPPLY["Check supply chain health"]:::orch + SUPPLY --> CVE["Run cve:scan"]:::cve + CVE --> SEC_GOV["Check security governance"]:::orch + SEC_GOV --> CLAUDE["Check Claude Code readiness"]:::orch + CLAUDE --> REPORT["Generate scan report"]:::orch + REPORT --> DONE([Scan complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white + classDef cve fill:#D32F2F,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Scan + +Assess a target repository's current state to determine what orchestration +phases are needed. This is Phase 0 — produces artifacts only, no PRs. + +## When to Use + +- First step when orchestrating a new repo +- Re-run after major changes to reassess gaps +- Before running `orchestrate:plan` + +## Prerequisites + +Target repo cloned into `.repos/<target>/`: + +```bash +git clone git@github.com:org/repo.git .repos/<target> +``` + +## Technology Detection + +Check for marker files to identify the tech stack: + +```bash +ls .repos/<target>/go.mod .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml .repos/<target>/package.json .repos/<target>/Cargo.toml .repos/<target>/requirements.yml 2>/dev/null +``` + +| Marker | Language | Lint Tool | Test Tool | Build Tool | +|--------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------| +| `go.mod` | Go | golangci-lint | go test | go build | +| `pyproject.toml` | Python | ruff | pytest | uv build | +| `package.json` | Node.js | eslint | jest/vitest | npm build | +| `Cargo.toml` | Rust | clippy | cargo test | cargo build | +| `requirements.yml` | Ansible | ansible-lint | molecule | — | + +For multi-language repos (e.g., Go + Python + Helm), note all detected stacks. + +Also check for: +- Dockerfiles: `find .repos/<target> -name "Dockerfile*" -type f` +- Helm charts: `find .repos/<target> -name "Chart.yaml" -type f` +- Shell scripts: `find .repos/<target> -name "*.sh" -type f` +- Makefiles: `ls .repos/<target>/Makefile` + +## Scan Checks + +### CI Status + +```bash +ls .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null +``` + +For each workflow found, read it and categorize: + +| Category | What to Check | +|----------|---------------| +| Lint | Does a workflow run linters? Which ones? | +| Test | Does a workflow run tests? Are they commented out? | +| Build | Does a workflow build artifacts/images? | +| Security | Does a workflow run security scans? | +| Release | Does a workflow handle releases/tags? | + +### Security Scanning Coverage + +Check which security tools are configured in CI: + +| Tool | How to Detect | Purpose | +|------|---------------|---------| +| Trivy | `trivy-action` in workflows | Filesystem/container/IaC scanning | +| CodeQL | `codeql-action` in workflows | SAST for supported languages | +| Bandit | `bandit` in workflows or pre-commit | Python SAST | +| gosec | `gosec` in workflows | Go SAST | +| Hadolint | `hadolint` in workflows or pre-commit | Dockerfile linting | +| Shellcheck | `shellcheck` in workflows or pre-commit | Shell script linting | +| Dependency review | `dependency-review-action` in workflows | PR dependency audit | +| Scorecard | `scorecard-action` in workflows | OpenSSF supply chain | +| Gitleaks | `gitleaks` in workflows or pre-commit | Secret detection | + +Score: count how many of the applicable tools are present vs expected. + +### Dependency Management + +```bash +cat .repos/<target>/.github/dependabot.yml 2>/dev/null || echo "MISSING" +``` + +Check which ecosystems are covered vs what's in the repo: + +| In Repo | Expected Ecosystem | Covered? | +|---------|-------------------|----------| +| `pyproject.toml` | pip | ? | +| `go.mod` | gomod | ? | +| `package.json` | npm | ? | +| `Dockerfile` | docker | ? | +| `.github/workflows/` | github-actions | ? | + +### Action Pinning Compliance + +```bash +grep -r "uses:" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null | grep -v "@[a-f0-9]\{40\}" | head -20 +``` + +Count actions pinned to SHA vs tag-only. Report compliance percentage. + +### Permissions Model + +Check workflow files for: +- Top-level `permissions: {}` or `permissions: read-all` (good) +- Per-job `permissions:` blocks (good) +- No permissions declaration (bad — gets full default token permissions) + +```bash +grep -l "^permissions:" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null +``` + +### Test Coverage + +Categorize tests into 4 areas. For each, detect frameworks, count files/functions, +check coverage tooling, and verify CI execution. + +#### Backend Tests + +Detect framework from marker files: + +```bash +# Python +grep -q "pytest" .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null && echo "pytest" +# Go +ls .repos/<target>/go.mod 2>/dev/null && echo "go test" +# Go + Ginkgo +grep -q "ginkgo" .repos/<target>/go.mod 2>/dev/null && echo "ginkgo" +``` + +Count test files and functions: + +```bash +find .repos/<target> -type f -name "test_*.py" -o -name "*_test.py" 2>/dev/null | wc -l +find .repos/<target> -type f -name "*_test.go" 2>/dev/null | wc -l +grep -rc "def test_\|func Test" .repos/<target> --include="*.py" --include="*.go" 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' +``` + +Check coverage tooling: + +```bash +# Python: pytest-cov in dependencies +grep -q "pytest-cov" .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null && echo "pytest-cov found" +# Python: coverage config +grep -q "\[tool.coverage" .repos/<target>/pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null && echo "coverage config found" +# Go: -coverprofile in Makefile or CI +grep -r "\-coverprofile" .repos/<target>/Makefile .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null +``` + +When coverage tooling is missing, recommend the appropriate tool: +- Python: add `pytest-cov>=4.0` to dev deps and `[tool.coverage.run] source = ["src"]` to pyproject.toml +- Go: add `-coverprofile=coverage.out` to `go test` invocation in Makefile/CI + +#### UI Tests + +Detect framework from package.json: + +```bash +grep -E "playwright|jest|vitest" .repos/<target>/*/package.json .repos/<target>/package.json 2>/dev/null +``` + +Count spec files and test blocks: + +```bash +find .repos/<target> -type f \( -name "*.spec.ts" -o -name "*.spec.tsx" -o -name "*.test.ts" -o -name "*.test.tsx" \) 2>/dev/null | wc -l +grep -rc "test(\|it(\|describe(" .repos/<target> --include="*.spec.*" --include="*.test.*" 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' +``` + +Note: for Playwright E2E-style UI tests, code coverage is typically not applicable. +For unit-test-style UI tests (jest/vitest), check for istanbul/c8 coverage config. + +#### E2E Tests + +Count test files and functions: + +```bash +find .repos/<target> -path "*/e2e/*" -type f -name "test_*.py" 2>/dev/null | wc -l +grep -rc "def test_" .repos/<target>/*/tests/e2e/ .repos/<target>/tests/e2e/ 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' +``` + +Build a feature coverage map by scanning test filenames and imports: + +```bash +# List E2E test files to identify which features are covered +find .repos/<target> -path "*/e2e/*" -name "test_*.py" -exec basename {} \; 2>/dev/null | sort +``` + +Map each test file to a platform feature (e.g., `test_keycloak.py` → Keycloak auth, +`test_shipwright_build.py` → Shipwright builds). Identify features present in the +codebase that lack E2E tests. + +Build a CI trigger matrix: + +```bash +# Which workflows run E2E tests, on which triggers and platforms? +grep -l "e2e\|E2E" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null +``` + +For each E2E workflow, note the trigger events (push/PR/manual) and target +platforms (Kind/OCP/HyperShift). + +#### Infra Tests + +Infra testing is about variant coverage, not code coverage. Score as a variant matrix. + +Scan for deployment targets: + +```bash +# Which platforms appear in CI workflows and scripts? +grep -rl "kind\|Kind\|KIND" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null +grep -rl "openshift\|OpenShift\|OCP" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null +grep -rl "hypershift\|HyperShift" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null +``` + +Scan values files for toggle combos: + +```bash +# Which feature toggles exist in Helm values files? +find .repos/<target> -path "*/envs/*" -name "values*.yaml" 2>/dev/null +# Check for toggle patterns +grep -r "enabled:" .repos/<target>/deployments/envs/ .repos/<target>/charts/*/values.yaml 2>/dev/null | head -20 +``` + +Check static validation in CI: + +```bash +grep -rl "helm lint\|helm template" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null && echo "helm lint: in CI" +grep -rl "shellcheck" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null && echo "shellcheck: in CI" +grep -rl "hadolint" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null && echo "hadolint: in CI" +grep -rl "yamllint" .repos/<target>/.github/workflows/ .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null && echo "yamllint: in CI" +``` + +### CVE Scan + +Invoke `cve:scan` against the target repo to detect known vulnerabilities in +dependencies. This runs the full cve:scan procedure (inventory → Trivy → LLM + +WebSearch → findings report). + +The scan operates on the target repo working directory: + +```bash +cd .repos/<target> +``` + +Then follow the `cve:scan` skill workflow: +1. **Inventory** — find all dependency files (pyproject.toml, go.mod, package.json, + Dockerfile, Chart.yaml, requirements*.txt, uv.lock) +2. **Trivy** (if installed) — filesystem scan with `--severity HIGH,CRITICAL` +3. **LLM + WebSearch** — cross-reference dependencies against NVD/OSV/GitHub + Advisory Database +4. **Classify** — confirmed / suspected / false positive + +Write CVE findings to `/tmp/kagenti/cve/<target>/scan-report.json` (never to +git-tracked files). Include a summary in the scan report. + +Key areas to focus on: +- Crypto/auth libraries (cryptography, pyjwt, golang.org/x/crypto, oauth2) +- Network libraries (httpx, requests, grpcio, golang.org/x/net) +- Serialization (protobuf, pydantic) +- Container base images (EOL versions, unpinned tags) +- Abandoned/deprecated libraries (e.g., dgrijalva/jwt-go) + +### Pre-commit Hooks + +```bash +cat .repos/<target>/.pre-commit-config.yaml 2>/dev/null +``` + +If present, list which hooks are configured. + +### Security Governance + +```bash +ls .repos/<target>/CODEOWNERS .repos/<target>/.github/CODEOWNERS 2>/dev/null +ls .repos/<target>/SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null +ls .repos/<target>/CONTRIBUTING.md 2>/dev/null +ls .repos/<target>/LICENSE 2>/dev/null +``` + +### Claude Code Readiness + +```bash +ls .repos/<target>/CLAUDE.md .repos/<target>/.claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null +``` + +```bash +ls .repos/<target>/.claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null +``` + +### Git Health + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> log --oneline -5 +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> remote -v +``` + +## Output Format + +Save scan report to `/tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target>/scan-report.md`: + +```bash +mkdir -p /tmp/kagenti/orchestrate/<target> +``` + +Report template: + +```markdown +# Scan Report: <target> + +**Date:** YYYY-MM-DD +**Tech Stack:** <languages, frameworks> +**Maturity Score:** N/5 + +## CI Status +- Workflows found: [list or "none"] +- Covers: lint / test / build / security / release +- Tests in CI: running / commented out / missing + +## Security Scanning +| Tool | Status | Notes | +|------|--------|-------| +| Trivy | present/missing | | +| CodeQL | present/missing/n-a | | +| Bandit/gosec | present/missing/n-a | | +| Hadolint | present/missing/n-a | | +| Shellcheck | present/missing/n-a | | +| Dependency review | present/missing | | +| Scorecard | present/missing | | +| Gitleaks | present/missing | | + +## Dependency Management +- Dependabot config: yes/no +- Ecosystems covered: [list] +- Ecosystems missing: [list] + +## Supply Chain Health +- Action pinning: N% SHA-pinned (N/M actions) +- Permissions model: least-privilege / default / mixed +- Unpinned actions: [list top offenders] + +## Test Coverage + +### Backend Tests +- Framework: [pytest X.x / go test / ginkgo vX.x / none] +- Test files: N +- Test functions: ~M +- Coverage tool: [pytest-cov / -coverprofile / missing] +- Coverage config: [present / missing (recommend: ...)] +- CI execution: [running in workflow.yaml / missing] + +### UI Tests +- Framework: [Playwright X.x / jest / vitest / none] +- Spec files: N +- Test blocks: ~M +- Coverage tool: [istanbul / c8 / n/a (E2E)] +- CI execution: [running in workflow.yaml / missing] + +### E2E Tests +- Test files: N +- Test functions: ~M +- Feature coverage: + | Feature | Test File | Status | + |---------|-----------|--------| + | [feature] | [test file] | covered/missing | +- CI trigger matrix: + | Platform | Push | PR | Manual | + |----------|------|-----|--------| + | [platform] | [workflow] | [workflow] | — | + +### Infra Tests +- Deployment variants tested: + | Variant | CI Workflow | Values File | + |---------|------------|-------------| + | [platform + version] | [workflow] | [values file] | +- Value variant coverage: + | Feature Toggle | Tested On | Tested Off | + |---------------|-----------|------------| + | [toggle] | [platforms] | [platforms or —] | +- Static validation: + | Check | Status | + |-------|--------| + | Helm lint | in CI / missing | + | shellcheck | in CI / missing | + | hadolint | in CI / missing / n-a | + | yamllint | in CI / missing | + +## Pre-commit +- Config found: yes/no +- Hooks: [list or "none"] + +## Security Governance +- CODEOWNERS: yes/no +- SECURITY.md: yes/no +- CONTRIBUTING.md: yes/no +- LICENSE: yes/no (type if present) +- .gitignore secrets patterns: adequate/needs-review + +## Claude Code Readiness +- CLAUDE.md: yes/no +- .claude/settings.json: yes/no +- Skills count: N + +## Container Infrastructure +- Dockerfiles: N found [list paths] +- Multi-arch builds: yes/no +- Container registry: [ghcr.io/etc or "none"] +- Base image pinning: digest / tag / unpinned +- EOL base images: [list or "none"] + +## Dependency Vulnerabilities (cve:scan) +- Scan method: [Trivy + LLM + WebSearch / LLM + WebSearch / LLM only] +- Full report: `/tmp/kagenti/cve/<target>/scan-report.json` + +| Severity | Count | +|----------|-------| +| CRITICAL | N | +| HIGH | N | +| MEDIUM | N | +| Suspected | N | + +### Confirmed Findings +| Package | Version | Severity | Issue | Fix | +|---------|---------|----------|-------|-----| +| [package] | [version] | CRITICAL/HIGH | [brief description — no CVE IDs in public output] | [fixed version or action] | + +### Architectural Security Concerns +| Concern | Severity | Details | +|---------|----------|---------| +| [e.g., insecure port, no input validation] | HIGH/MEDIUM | [brief description] | + +> **Note:** CVE IDs and detailed descriptions are in `/tmp/kagenti/cve/<target>/scan-report.json` only. +> Do NOT copy CVE IDs into git-tracked files, PRs, or issues. + +## Gap Summary +| Area | Status | Action Needed | +|------|--------|---------------| +| Pre-commit | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:precommit | +| Tests (backend) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:tests | +| Tests (UI) | missing/partial/ok/n-a | orchestrate:tests | +| Tests (E2E) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:tests | +| Tests (infra) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | +| CI (lint/test/build) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | +| CI (security scanning) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | +| CI (dependabot) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | +| CI (scorecard) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | +| CI (supply chain) | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:ci | +| Dep vulnerabilities | clean/findings/critical | cve:brainstorm / dep bump | +| Container base images | pinned/unpinned/eol | orchestrate:ci | +| Governance | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:security | +| Skills | missing/partial/ok | orchestrate:replicate | + +## Recommended Phases +1. [ordered list of phases based on gaps] +``` + +## Gap Analysis + +Determine which phases are needed based on findings: + +| Finding | Phase Needed | +|---------|-------------| +| No `.pre-commit-config.yaml` | `orchestrate:precommit` | +| No CI workflows or missing lint/test | `orchestrate:ci` | +| No security scanning in CI | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Dependabot missing or incomplete | `orchestrate:ci` | +| No scorecard workflow | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Actions not SHA-pinned | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Permissions not least-privilege | `orchestrate:ci` | +| No backend test files or <5 test functions | `orchestrate:tests` | +| Backend coverage tool missing | `orchestrate:tests` | +| No UI test specs (when UI code exists) | `orchestrate:tests` | +| No E2E tests or low feature coverage | `orchestrate:tests` | +| E2E tests not triggered in CI | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Only one deployment variant tested | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Missing static validation (helm lint, shellcheck, etc.) | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Confirmed CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs in dependencies | `cve:brainstorm` (fix before public issues) | +| Abandoned/deprecated libraries | dependency bump PR | +| EOL container base images | `orchestrate:ci` | +| Unpinned container base image tags | `orchestrate:ci` | +| No CODEOWNERS or SECURITY.md | `orchestrate:security` | +| No LICENSE | `orchestrate:security` | +| No `.claude/skills/` | `orchestrate:replicate` | + +All repos get `orchestrate:precommit` (foundation) and `orchestrate:replicate` +(self-sufficiency). Other phases depend on the scan results. + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:plan` — Next step: create phased plan from scan results +- `cve:scan` — Dependency vulnerability scanning (invoked during this scan) +- `cve:brainstorm` — Disclosure planning when CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs are found +- `skills:scan` — Similar pattern for scanning skills specifically diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f687ab37 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:security/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:security +description: Add security governance to a target repo - CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE, .gitignore audit +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:security"]) --> READ["Read plan + scan report"]:::orch + READ --> CODEOWNERS["Create CODEOWNERS"]:::orch + CODEOWNERS --> SECURITY_MD["Create SECURITY.md"]:::orch + SECURITY_MD --> CONTRIBUTING["Create CONTRIBUTING.md"]:::orch + CONTRIBUTING --> LICENSE["Verify/add LICENSE"]:::orch + LICENSE --> GITIGNORE["Audit .gitignore"]:::orch + GITIGNORE --> BRANCH_PROT["Document branch protection"]:::orch + BRANCH_PROT --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch + BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} + SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch + SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch + SPLIT --> PR + PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Security Governance + +Add security governance files to a target repository. This is Phase 5 and +produces PR #4. Focuses on governance and policy files — CI-related security +(scanning, dependabot, scorecard) is handled by `orchestrate:ci`. + +## When to Use + +- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies security governance as a needed phase +- After precommit, tests, and CI phases + +## Prerequisites + +- Plan exists with security phase +- Scan report exists (to know what's missing) +- Target repo in `.repos/<target>/` + +## Step 1: CODEOWNERS + +Create `CODEOWNERS` at repo root or `.github/CODEOWNERS`: + +``` +# Default owners for everything +* @org/team-leads + +# Platform and CI +.github/ @org/platform +Makefile @org/platform + +# Documentation +docs/ @org/docs-team +*.md @org/docs-team +``` + +Adapt teams and paths based on: +- The scan report's identified tech stack +- The org's team structure (check other repos for patterns) +- Key directories that need specialized review + +## Step 2: SECURITY.md + +Create `SECURITY.md` with vulnerability reporting guidance: + +```markdown +# Security Policy + +## Reporting a Vulnerability + +Please report security vulnerabilities through GitHub Security Advisories: +**[Report a vulnerability](https://github.com/org/repo/security/advisories/new)** + +Do NOT open public issues for security vulnerabilities. + +## Response Timeline + +- **Acknowledgment:** Within 48 hours +- **Initial assessment:** Within 7 days +- **Fix timeline:** Based on severity + +## Security Controls + +This repository uses: +- CI security scanning (Trivy, CodeQL) +- Dependency updates via Dependabot +- OpenSSF Scorecard monitoring +- Pre-commit hooks for local checks +``` + +Adapt the security controls list based on what `orchestrate:ci` actually +deployed to this repo. + +## Step 3: CONTRIBUTING.md + +Create `CONTRIBUTING.md` with development workflow: + +```markdown +# Contributing + +## Development Setup + +[Adapt to tech stack from scan report] + +## Pull Request Process + +1. Fork the repository +2. Create a feature branch from `main` +3. Make your changes with tests +4. Run pre-commit hooks: `pre-commit run --all-files` +5. Submit a pull request + +## Commit Messages + +Use conventional commit format: +- `feat:` New features +- `fix:` Bug fixes +- `docs:` Documentation changes +- `chore:` Maintenance tasks + +All commits must be signed off (`git commit -s`). + +## Code of Conduct + +[Link to org-level CoC if exists] +``` + +## Step 4: LICENSE + +Check if LICENSE exists. If missing: +- Check the org's standard license (most kagenti repos use Apache 2.0) +- Add the appropriate LICENSE file +- If unsure, flag in the PR for maintainer decision + +## Step 5: .gitignore Audit + +Check for missing patterns and add them: + +**Secrets and credentials:** +- `.env`, `.env.*`, `.env.local` +- `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*.p12`, `*.jks` +- `credentials.*`, `secrets.*` +- `kubeconfig`, `*kubeconfig*` + +**IDE and OS files:** +- `.idea/`, `.vscode/` +- `.DS_Store`, `Thumbs.db` + +**Build artifacts (language-specific):** +- Python: `__pycache__/`, `*.pyc`, `.ruff_cache/`, `dist/`, `*.egg-info/` +- Go: binary names from `go.mod` module path +- Node: `node_modules/`, `dist/`, `.next/` + +Do not remove existing patterns. Only add missing ones. + +## Step 6: Branch Protection Documentation + +Document in the PR description (can't auto-apply via PR): + +**Recommended branch protection rules for `main`:** +- Require PR reviews (minimum 1 approval) +- Require status checks to pass (list the CI checks from `orchestrate:ci`) +- Require signed commits (if org policy) +- Disable force push to main +- Require branches to be up to date before merging +- Require conversation resolution before merging + +## Branch and PR Workflow + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/security +``` + +### PR size check + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> diff --stat | tail -1 +``` + +### Commit and push + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> add -A +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: add security governance (CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, .gitignore)" +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/security +``` + +### Create PR + +```bash +gh pr create --repo org/repo --title "Add security governance files" --body "Phase 5 of repo orchestration. Adds CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, LICENSE verification, and .gitignore hardening." +``` + +## Update Phase Status + +Set security to `complete` in phase-status.md. + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:ci` — Previous phase (CI-related security is there) +- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines security phase tasks +- `orchestrate:replicate` — Next phase: bootstrap skills diff --git a/.claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a77f3d4bd --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/orchestrate:tests/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +--- +name: orchestrate:tests +description: Add test infrastructure and initial test coverage to a target repo +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/orchestrate:tests"]) --> READ["Read plan"]:::orch + READ --> DETECT["Detect test framework"]:::orch + DETECT --> CONFIG["Create test config"]:::orch + CONFIG --> CRITICAL["Identify critical paths"]:::orch + CRITICAL --> WRITE["Write initial tests"]:::orch + WRITE --> BRANCH["Create branch"]:::orch + BRANCH --> SIZE{Under 700 lines?} + SIZE -->|Yes| PR["Commit + open PR"]:::orch + SIZE -->|No| SPLIT["Split into sub-PRs"]:::orch + SPLIT --> PR + PR --> DONE([Phase complete]) + + classDef orch fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Orchestrate: Tests + +Add test infrastructure and initial test coverage. This is Phase 3 and +produces PR #2. Tests come before CI and security — good test coverage is +a safety net for the code refactoring that security/quality fixes require. + +## When to Use + +- After `orchestrate:plan` identifies tests as a needed phase +- After precommit phase (linting is the foundation) + +## Prerequisites + +- Plan exists with tests phase +- Target repo in `.repos/<target>/` + +## Step 1: Detect Test Framework + +| Marker | Language | Framework | Assertion | +|--------|----------|-----------|-----------| +| `pyproject.toml` | Python | pytest | built-in assert | +| `go.mod` | Go | testing (stdlib) | testify | +| `package.json` | Node | jest or vitest | built-in expect | +| `requirements.yml` | Ansible | molecule | testinfra | + +Check existing tests: + +```bash +find .repos/<target> -type f \( -name "test_*.py" -o -name "*_test.go" -o -name "*.test.*" \) 2>/dev/null +``` + +## Step 2: Create Test Configuration + +### Python + +- `tests/conftest.py` — shared fixtures +- `tests/__init__.py` — package marker +- `pyproject.toml` — add `[tool.pytest.ini_options]` with `testpaths = ["tests"]` + +### Go + +- `*_test.go` files alongside source +- `testdata/` for fixtures +- `internal/testutil/` for shared helpers + +### Node + +- `jest.config.ts` or `vitest.config.ts` at root +- `__tests__/` directory or `*.test.ts` alongside source + +### Ansible + +- `molecule/default/` with `molecule.yml`, `converge.yml`, `verify.yml` + +## Step 3: Identify Critical Paths + +From the scan report, find highest-impact areas: + +1. **API endpoints** — HTTP handlers, REST routes +2. **Core logic** — main algorithms, data transformations +3. **Integration points** — database, external APIs +4. **Config parsing** — loading, validation, defaults +5. **Error handling** — paths affecting users or data + +Prioritize smoke tests across areas over exhaustive coverage of one area. + +## Step 4: Write Initial Tests + +### Strategy + +- Start with smoke tests (happy path) +- Add edge cases for most critical functions +- Target 5-15 test functions +- Do not aim for 100% coverage +- Each test must be independent + +### Test naming + +| Language | Convention | Example | +|----------|-----------|---------| +| Python | `test_<what>_<condition>` | `test_create_user_returns_201` | +| Go | `Test<What><Condition>` | `TestCreateUserReturns201` | +| Node | `describe/it` blocks | `it('returns 201 when creating user')` | + +### Test structure (AAA) + +1. **Arrange** — set up test data +2. **Act** — call function under test +3. **Assert** — verify with specific assertions + +## Step 5: Branch and PR + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> checkout -b orchestrate/tests +``` + +### PR size check + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> diff --stat | tail -1 +``` + +If over 700 lines, split: framework setup in PR #3a, tests in PR #3b. + +### Skills to push alongside + +- `test:write` — guide for writing new tests +- `tdd:ci` — workflow for iterating on CI test failures + +### Commit and push + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> add -A +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> commit -s -m "feat: add test infrastructure and initial test coverage" +``` + +```bash +git -C .repos/<target> push -u origin orchestrate/tests +``` + +## Update Phase Status + +Set tests to `complete` in phase-status.md. + +## Related Skills + +- `orchestrate` — Parent router +- `orchestrate:precommit` — Previous phase (linting foundation) +- `orchestrate:plan` — Defines test phase tasks +- `orchestrate:ci` — Next phase (automates running these tests) +- `test:write` — Detailed test writing guide +- `tdd:ci` — CI-driven TDD workflow diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b9342c3a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/skills/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +--- +name: skills +description: Skill management - create, validate, and improve Claude Code skills +--- + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/skills"]) --> NEED{"What do you need?"} + NEED -->|New skill| WORKTREE["git:worktree"]:::git + NEED -->|Edit skill| WORKTREE + NEED -->|Audit all| SCAN["skills:scan"]:::skills + WORKTREE --> WRITE["skills:write"]:::skills + WRITE --> VALIDATE["skills:validate"]:::skills + VALIDATE -->|Issues| WRITE + VALIDATE -->|Pass| PR["Create PR"]:::git + + SCAN -->|Gaps found| WORKTREE + + classDef skills fill:#607D8B,stroke:#333,color:white + classDef git fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +> Follow this diagram as the workflow. + +# Skills Management + +Skills for managing the skill system itself. **All skill development starts in a worktree** — never edit skills directly on main. + +## Worktree-First Gate + +Before creating or editing any skill, create a worktree: + +```bash +git fetch upstream main +``` + +```bash +git worktree add .worktrees/skills-<topic> -b docs/skills-<topic> upstream/main +``` + +Then work in the worktree, validate, and create a PR. + +## Available Skills + +| Skill | Purpose | +|-------|---------| +| `skills:write` | Create new skills or edit existing ones following the standard template | +| `skills:validate` | Validate skill format, naming, and structure | +| `skills:scan` | Audit repository skills — gaps, quality, connections, diagrams | + +## Related Skills + +- `skills:write` - Create new skills following the standard +- `skills:validate` - Validate skill format compliance +- `skills:scan` - Audit repository skills +- `orchestrate` - Orchestrate related repositories diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d76fffad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/skills:scan/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +--- +name: skills:scan +description: Scan a repository to bootstrap new skills or audit and update existing ones +--- + +# Scan Repository for Skills + +Bootstrap skills for a new repo, or audit and update skills in an existing one. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/skills:scan"]) --> MODE{"Repo has skills?"} + MODE -->|No| NP1["Analyze Repo"]:::skills + MODE -->|Yes| EP1["Validate Existing"]:::skills + + NP1 --> NP2["Identify Categories"]:::skills + NP2 --> NP3["Generate Core Skills"]:::skills + NP3 --> NP4["Generate settings.json"]:::skills + NP4 --> DONE([Skills bootstrapped]) + + EP1 --> EP2["Gap Analysis"]:::skills + EP2 --> EP3["Content Quality"]:::skills + EP3 --> EP4["Connection Analysis"]:::skills + EP4 --> EP5["Usefulness Rating"]:::skills + EP5 --> EP6["Generate Report"]:::skills + EP6 --> EP7["Update README"]:::skills + + EP1 -->|Issues| WRITE["skills:write"]:::skills + EP6 -->|Gaps| WRITE + + classDef skills fill:#607D8B,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +## When to Use + +- Setting up Claude Code skills in a new repository +- Auditing an existing repo for skill gaps +- Updating skills after the repo's tech stack or workflows changed +- Onboarding to a new codebase + +## Mode: New Repo (no `.claude/skills/` exists) + +### Phase 1: Analyze Repository Structure + +Scan for technology markers: + +```bash +ls -la Makefile pyproject.toml package.json Cargo.toml go.mod pom.xml 2>/dev/null +``` + +Check CI configuration: + +```bash +ls .github/workflows/ .gitlab-ci.yml Jenkinsfile .circleci/ 2>/dev/null +``` + +Check deployment patterns: + +```bash +ls -d charts/ helm/ k8s/ kubernetes/ deployments/ docker-compose* Dockerfile 2>/dev/null +``` + +Check test structure: + +```bash +find . -type d -name "tests" -o -name "test" -o -name "__tests__" -o -name "e2e" 2>/dev/null | head -10 +``` + +### Phase 2: Identify Skill Categories + +Based on findings, propose categories: + +| Marker | Suggested Skills | +|--------|-----------------| +| `.github/workflows/` | `ci:status`, `ci:monitoring`, `tdd:ci`, `rca:ci` | +| `charts/` or `helm/` | `helm:debug` | +| `Dockerfile` | `docker:build`, `docker:debug` | +| `tests/e2e/` | `tdd:ci`, `rca:ci` | +| `deployments/` | `deploy:*` | +| Kubernetes manifests | `k8s:health`, `k8s:pods`, `k8s:logs` | + +### Phase 3: Generate Core Skills + +Every repo should have these (create with `skills:write`): + +| Skill | Purpose | +|-------|---------| +| `skills:write` | How to create skills | +| `skills:validate` | How to validate skills | +| `skills:scan` | This skill (self-referential) | +| `tdd:ci` | CI-driven development loop (if CI exists) | +| `rca:ci` | Root cause analysis from CI logs (if CI exists) | +| `git:worktree` | Parallel development (if git repo) | + +### Phase 4: Generate settings.json + +Create `.claude/settings.json` with auto-approve patterns: +- Read operations (kubectl get, logs, describe) → auto-approve +- Sandbox write operations (kubectl apply on dev clusters) → auto-approve +- Management/destructive operations → require approval + +## Mode: Existing Repo (`.claude/skills/` exists) + +### Phase 1: Validate Existing Skills + +Run `skills:validate` on every skill: + +```bash +for f in .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md; do + dir=$(basename $(dirname "$f")) + name=$(grep '^name:' "$f" | sed 's/name: //' | tr -d ' ') + [ "$dir" = "$name" ] || echo "MISMATCH: $dir != $name" +done +``` + +Check for issues: +- Frontmatter name/directory mismatches +- Old-style references (dashes instead of colons) +- Missing Related Skills sections +- Chained commands in sandbox skills (breaks auto-approve) + +### Phase 2: Gap Analysis + +Compare existing skills against the repo's actual tech stack: + +1. Run Phase 1 of the "New Repo" flow to detect technology markers +2. Compare detected categories against existing skill categories +3. List categories that exist in the repo but have no skills +4. List skills that reference tools/patterns no longer in use + +### Phase 3: Content Quality Review + +For each existing skill, assess: + +| Check | Criteria | +|-------|----------| +| Actionability | Commands are copy-pasteable, not just documentation | +| Length | 80-200 lines (300 max). Split if too long | +| Freshness | Commands and paths still match current repo structure | +| Cross-links | Related Skills use colon notation and link to real skills | +| Auto-approve | Sandbox commands match settings.json patterns | +| Mermaid diagram | Workflow/router skills have embedded diagram matching textual flow | +| Dev docs consistency | Claims in `docs/developer/claude-code-skills.md` match actual skill behavior | + +### Phase 3b: Developer Docs Consistency + +If `docs/developer/claude-code-skills.md` exists, verify: + +1. **Skills listed in dev docs match actual skills** — no stale references +2. **Workflow diagrams in dev docs match skill diagrams** — same nodes, same flow +3. **Best practices in dev docs are enforced by skills** — worktree gate, checklist items +4. **Sub-skill table is accurate** — inputs, outputs, invocations match reality + +### Phase 4: Connection Analysis + +For each skill, determine: +- **Outgoing links**: Skills referenced in Related Skills section +- **Incoming links**: Which other skills reference this one (search all files) +- **Broken refs**: References to skills that don't exist +- **Orphans**: Skills with no incoming references (only parent links) + +Key metrics: +- Most connected skills (highest incoming refs) = hub skills +- Orphaned skills = may need cross-linking or deletion +- Broken refs = must fix before committing + +### Phase 5: Usefulness Assessment + +Rate each skill 1-5: + +| Rating | Criteria | +|--------|----------| +| 5 | Decision trees, copy-paste commands, troubleshooting, used daily | +| 4 | Good reference with commands, covers edge cases | +| 3 | Useful but needs more actionability or is too long | +| 2 | Bare index or needs significant improvement | +| 1 | Redundant or too vague to help | + +### Phase 6: Generate Report + +Save to `/tmp/skills-scan/`: + +```bash +mkdir -p /tmp/skills-scan +``` + +Output a structured report: + +```markdown +## Skill Scan Report + +### Inventory: X total (Y parents + Z leaves) +- Rated 5: N skills +- Rated 4: N skills +- Rated 3 or below: N skills (list) + +### Validation Issues +- Failing validation: [list with specific issues] +- Broken references: [source → broken target] +- Over 300 lines: [list with line counts] + +### Connection Analysis +- Most connected (hub skills): [top 5 with incoming ref count] +- Orphaned skills: [list with only parent refs] +- Workflow paths: TDD escalation, RCA escalation, Deploy chain + +### Gap Analysis +- Missing skills for detected tech: [list] +- Stale skills referencing removed tech: [list] + +### Diagram Coverage +- Skills with diagrams: [count] +- Skills needing diagrams: [list] + +### Recommendations +1. Create: [new skills needed] +2. Update: [skills with issues] +3. Delete: [obsolete skills] +4. Merge: [overlapping skills] +5. Cross-link: [orphaned skills that should connect to workflows] +``` + +## Phase 7: Update Skills README + +After completing the scan, update `.claude/skills/README.md`: + +1. Regenerate the **Complete Skill Tree** (ASCII listing of all categories and leaves) +2. Update **Mermaid workflow diagrams** for root flows: + - Skills meta workflow (skills:scan → skills:write → skills:validate) + - Orchestrate workflow (orchestrate:scan → orchestrate:plan → phases → orchestrate:review) + - Any repo-specific workflows discovered during the scan +3. Update the **Auto-Approve Policy** table +4. Verify all skills appear in the tree and diagrams +5. Check that no orphaned skills exist (every leaf should be reachable from a root flow) + +The README is the main entry point for understanding the skills system. +It should always reflect the current state after a scan. + +## Output (New Repo) + +``` +.claude/ +├── settings.json +└── skills/ + ├── README.md # Generated by skills:scan + ├── skills/SKILL.md + ├── skills:write/SKILL.md + ├── skills:validate/SKILL.md + ├── skills:scan/SKILL.md + ├── tdd/SKILL.md + ├── tdd:ci/SKILL.md + ├── rca/SKILL.md + ├── rca:ci/SKILL.md + └── <detected>/SKILL.md +``` + +## Related Skills + +- `skills:write` - Create individual skills +- `skills:validate` - Validate skill format +- `orchestrate` - Orchestrate related repositories diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5ade71b23 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/skills:validate/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +--- +name: skills:validate +description: Validate skill files meet the standard format and naming conventions +--- + +# Validate Skill + +## When to Use + +- After creating or editing a skill +- Before committing skill changes +- When auditing all skills for consistency + +## Validation Checks + +### Required + +- [ ] **Frontmatter**: Has `name:` and `description:` fields +- [ ] **Colon naming**: `name:` uses colon notation (e.g., `tdd:ci` not `tdd-ci`) +- [ ] **Directory match**: Directory name matches frontmatter `name:` field +- [ ] **Title**: Has `# Skill Name` as first heading +- [ ] **When to Use**: Has "When to Use" or "Overview" section +- [ ] **Related Skills**: Has "Related Skills" section at the end +- [ ] **Mermaid diagram**: Workflow/router skills have an embedded mermaid diagram +- [ ] **Diagram colors**: classDef colors match README color legend + +### Command Format (Required) + +- [ ] **Sandbox classification**: Skill is classified as sandbox or management (see below) +- [ ] **Single commands**: Sandbox skills use one command per code block (no `&&` chaining) +- [ ] **Auto-approve coverage**: All commands in sandbox skills match a pattern in `.claude/settings.json` +- [ ] **No multiline bash**: Sandbox skills avoid heredocs, multiline pipes, or `for` loops in commands + +### Recommended + +- [ ] **TOC**: Table of Contents present if skill > 50 lines +- [ ] **Placeholders**: All commands are copy-pasteable (no unexplained placeholders) +- [ ] **Task tracking**: TDD/RCA skills have "Task Tracking" section +- [ ] **Parent ref**: Parent category `SKILL.md` references this skill +- [ ] **Imperative voice**: Uses "Run X" not "You should run X" +- [ ] **Length**: Leaf skills are 80-200 lines (300 max) +- [ ] **Diagram-text match**: Diagram nodes correspond to textual flow steps + +## Sandbox vs Management Classification + +Skills operate on either **sandbox** (safe) or **management** (requires approval) targets: + +| Type | Target | Auto-approve? | Command format | +|------|--------|---------------|----------------| +| **Sandbox** | Local Kind cluster, custom HyperShift hosted cluster | YES | Single commands, one per step | +| **Management** | Management cluster, AWS resources, git push, destructive ops | NO | Can chain commands (user approves anyway) | + +### Sandbox skills (auto-approved) +Commands target `localtest.me`, `KUBECONFIG=~/clusters/hcp/kagenti-hypershift-custom-*`, or Kind clusters. + +**IMPORTANT**: Run each command separately — not chained with `&&`. Chained or multiline commands break Claude Code's auto-approve pattern matching. + +```markdown +## GOOD (each command runs separately, matches auto-approve patterns) + +Check pod status: +```bash +kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system +``` + +Check logs: +```bash +kubectl logs -n kagenti-system deployment/mlflow +``` + +## BAD (chained commands won't match auto-approve patterns) + +```bash +kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system && kubectl logs -n kagenti-system deployment/mlflow +``` +``` + +### Management skills (require approval) +Commands target management clusters, AWS APIs, or perform destructive operations. These can use any command format since the user must approve each one. + +## How to Validate + +### Single Skill + +```bash +# Check frontmatter +head -5 .claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md + +# Check name matches directory +DIR_NAME=$(basename $(dirname .claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md)) +SKILL_NAME=$(grep '^name:' .claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md | sed 's/name: //') +[ "$DIR_NAME" = "$SKILL_NAME" ] && echo "OK" || echo "MISMATCH: dir=$DIR_NAME name=$SKILL_NAME" +``` + +### All Skills + +```bash +# Check all frontmatter name-vs-directory +for f in .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md; do + dir=$(basename $(dirname "$f")) + name=$(grep '^name:' "$f" | sed 's/name: //' | tr -d ' ') + [ "$dir" = "$name" ] || echo "MISMATCH: $dir != $name" +done +``` + +### Check Command Format (sandbox skills) + +```bash +# Find chained commands in sandbox skills (potential auto-approve issues) +grep -rn ' && ' .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md +``` + +### Check Mermaid Diagram Presence + +```bash +for f in .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md; do + dir=$(basename $(dirname "$f")) + case "$dir" in git|auth|meta|repo) continue ;; esac + if ! grep -q '```mermaid' "$f"; then + echo "MISSING DIAGRAM: $dir" + fi +done +``` + +### Verify settings.json Coverage + +For each command in a sandbox skill, verify it matches a pattern in `.claude/settings.json`: + +| Command prefix | settings.json pattern | +|----------------|----------------------| +| `kubectl get` | `Bash(kubectl get:*)` | +| `kubectl describe` | `Bash(kubectl describe:*)` | +| `kubectl logs` | `Bash(kubectl logs:*)` | +| `helm list` | `Bash(helm list:*)` | +| `KUBECONFIG=~/clusters/hcp/... kubectl` | `Bash(KUBECONFIG=*/clusters/hcp/kagenti-hypershift-custom-*/auth/kubeconfig kubectl:*)` | +| `uv run pytest` | `Bash(uv run pytest:*)` | + +If a command is NOT covered, add the pattern to `.claude/settings.json` in the `allow` array. + +## Task Tracking + +When validating multiple skills: + +``` +TaskCreate: "kagenti | skills | <category> | Verify | Validate <skill-name>" +``` + +## Related Skills + +- `skills:write` - Create new skills following the standard +- `skills:scan` - Audit repository skills diff --git a/.claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fe07a2c0f --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/skills:write/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +--- +name: skills:write +description: Create or edit skills with proper structure, task tracking, and naming conventions +--- + +# Write / Edit Skill + +Create new skills or edit existing ones. Both follow the same checklist and conventions. + +## Worktree Gate + +**All skill work MUST happen in a worktree.** Before proceeding, verify you are in a worktree: + +```bash +git worktree list +``` + +If not in a worktree, create one first: + +```bash +git fetch upstream main +``` + +```bash +git worktree add .worktrees/skills-<topic> -b docs/skills-<topic> upstream/main +``` + +## Table of Contents + +- [Skill Structure](#skill-structure) +- [Frontmatter](#frontmatter) +- [Content Guidelines](#content-guidelines) +- [Task Tracking Standard](#task-tracking-standard) +- [Checklist](#checklist) +- [Template](#template) + +## New vs Edit + +| Action | Steps | +|--------|-------| +| **New skill** | Create directory + SKILL.md from template, fill in content, validate | +| **Edit skill** | Read existing file first, apply changes, re-validate, ensure diagram still matches text | + +For edits: always read the skill FIRST, then edit. Never overwrite without reading. + +## Skill Structure + +``` +.claude/skills/<category>:<skill-name>/ +└── SKILL.md +``` + +**IMPORTANT**: Use colon notation in directory names (e.g., `auth:my-skill/`). Required for Claude Code skill discovery. + +Categories: Use a short, descriptive prefix (e.g., `ci`, `git`, `k8s`, `auth`, `orchestrate`, `skills`). New categories can be created as needed. + +## Frontmatter + +```yaml +--- +name: category:skill-name +description: One-line description (what it does, not how) +--- +``` + +Use colon notation in `name:` field. Directory name must match. + +## Content Guidelines + +1. **Title**: `# Skill Name` +2. **TOC**: Include for skills over 50 lines +3. **Length**: Target 80-200 lines (300 max). Split longer skills. +4. **Sections**: + - When to Use + - Steps/Workflow + - Workflow Diagram (required for workflow/router skills) + - Task Tracking (required for workflow skills) + - Troubleshooting + - Related Skills +5. **Style**: + - Imperative voice ("Run X", not "You should run X") + - Real, copy-pasteable commands + - Include expected output where helpful + +## Command Format and Auto-Approve + +Skills must classify as **sandbox** or **management** to determine command format: + +| Type | Target | Auto-approve? | +|------|--------|---------------| +| **Sandbox** | Kind cluster, custom HyperShift hosted cluster | YES | +| **Management** | Management cluster, AWS resources, git push, destructive ops | NO | + +### Sandbox skills: One command per code block + +Claude Code auto-approves commands by matching the first token against `.claude/settings.json` patterns. Chained commands (`&&`), multiline scripts, heredocs, and `for` loops break pattern matching. + +**IMPORTANT**: Write each command as a separate code block: + +```markdown +Check pod status: +```bash +kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system +``` + +Check logs: +```bash +kubectl logs -n kagenti-system deployment/mlflow +``` +``` + +Do NOT chain: `kubectl get pods && kubectl logs ...` + +For HyperShift, prefix each command individually: + +```markdown +```bash +KUBECONFIG=~/clusters/hcp/kagenti-hypershift-custom-$CLUSTER/auth/kubeconfig kubectl get pods -n kagenti-system +``` +``` + +### Management skills: Any format + +Commands targeting management clusters or AWS need user approval anyway, so multiline/chained format is acceptable. + +### Temporary Files + +Skills that download logs, artifacts, or save analysis output should use `/tmp/kagenti/<skill-category>/` as the working directory: + +```bash +mkdir -p /tmp/kagenti/rca +``` + +This path is auto-approved for read/write in `.claude/settings.json`. + +### Update settings.json + +After writing a skill, verify all sandbox commands are covered by `.claude/settings.json` patterns. If a new command prefix is used, add it: + +```json +{ + "permissions": { + "allow": [ + "Bash(new-command:*)" + ] + } +} +``` + +See `skills:validate` for the full pattern reference table. + +## Workflow Diagrams + +Workflow skills (skills with phases, decision trees, or routing logic) MUST include: + +1. **Embedded mermaid diagram** in the SKILL.md +2. **Companion `.mmd` template file** in the skill directory (for debug mode, TDD skills only) +3. Diagram MUST match textual flow exactly +4. Use README color scheme: + +| Category | classDef | +|----------|----------| +| TDD | `classDef tdd fill:#4CAF50,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| RCA | `classDef rca fill:#FF5722,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| CI | `classDef ci fill:#2196F3,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| Test | `classDef test fill:#9C27B0,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| Git | `classDef git fill:#FF9800,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| K8s | `classDef k8s fill:#00BCD4,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| Deploy | `classDef deploy fill:#795548,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| Skills | `classDef skills fill:#607D8B,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| GitHub | `classDef github fill:#E91E63,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| HyperShift | `classDef hypershift fill:#3F51B5,stroke:#333,color:white` | +| Playwright | `classDef pw fill:#8BC34A,stroke:#333,color:white` | + +**Exempt** from diagram requirement: pure index parents that only list sub-skills with no routing logic (e.g., `git/`, `k8s/`, `auth/`) + +## Task Tracking Standard + +Every workflow skill (tdd, rca, ci, etc.) MUST include a Task Tracking section. This is the canonical reference for how Claude Code task lists work across all skills. + +### Task Naming Convention + +``` +<worktree> | <PR> | <plan-doc> | <topic> | <phase> | <task description> +``` + +- **worktree**: git worktree name (e.g., `mlflow-ci`) or `kagenti` for main repo +- **PR**: PR reference (e.g., `PR#569`) or `none` +- **plan-doc**: plan filename (e.g., `calm-toast.md`) or `ad-hoc` if no plan +- **topic**: area of work (e.g., `Kind CI`, `MLflow init`, `CodeQL`) +- **phase**: from planning doc section/step, or blank if ad-hoc +- **task**: brief description + +Examples: +- `mlflow-ci | PR#569 | calm-toast.md | MLflow init | Phase 2: Fix | Use parameterized SQL` +- `mlflow-ci | PR#569 | ad-hoc | Kind CI | | Bind Ollama to 0.0.0.0` +- `main | none | calm-toast.md | skills | Step 1 | Create ci:status skill` + +### Task Lifecycle + +``` +1. On skill invocation: + - TaskList → check existing tasks for this worktree/PR + - Update completed items + - Create new items for discovered work + +2. Task metadata: + - plan: path to plan doc or "ad-hoc" if none + - runner: main-session | subagent | background + +3. Dependencies: + - Use addBlockedBy for sequential tasks + - Parallel tasks have no blockers + +4. Status reporting - always show plan doc in task name: + | # | Status | Task (includes plan doc) | + |---|--------|-------------------------| + | #26 | in_progress | main \| none \| calm-toast.md \| skills \| Create \| ci:status | + | #32 | completed | mlflow-ci \| PR#569 \| ad-hoc \| Kind CI \| Fix \| Ollama bind | +``` + +### Plan Doc Reference + +Every task should reference its parent planning document: +- Tasks from a plan: `metadata.plan = "<plan-file-path>"` +- Ad-hoc tasks: `metadata.plan = "ad-hoc"` +- Tasks without a plan doc indicate work that needs retroactive documentation + +## Checklist + +Before committing a new skill: + +- [ ] Frontmatter has `name` and `description` +- [ ] Directory uses colon notation +- [ ] Name in frontmatter matches directory name +- [ ] TOC included if over 50 lines +- [ ] Commands are copy-pasteable +- [ ] Task Tracking section present (for workflow skills) +- [ ] Troubleshooting section exists +- [ ] Related Skills section exists +- [ ] Mermaid diagram present (for workflow/router skills) +- [ ] Diagram matches textual workflow exactly +- [ ] Diagram uses classDef colors from README color legend +- [ ] Parent category SKILL.md updated with reference + +## Template + +```markdown +--- +name: category:skill-name +description: Brief description of what this skill does +--- + +# Skill Name + +## When to Use + +- Condition 1 +- Condition 2 + +## Workflow + +1. Step one +2. Step two + +## Workflow Diagram + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(["/category:skill"]) --> STEP1["Step 1"]:::category + STEP1 --> STEP2["Step 2"]:::category + + classDef category fill:#COLOR,stroke:#333,color:white +``` + +## Task Tracking + +On invocation: +1. TaskList - check existing tasks +2. TaskCreate with naming: `<worktree> | <PR> | <topic> | <phase> | <task>` +3. TaskUpdate as work progresses + +## Troubleshooting + +### Problem: Description +**Symptom**: What you see +**Fix**: How to resolve + +## Related Skills + +- `category:related-skill` +``` + +## Related Skills + +- `skills:validate` - Check skill format compliance +- `skills:scan` - Audit repository skills diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index c8c3550f8..b6b0ef1cf 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -74,5 +74,4 @@ aiac/inception/issues/ # Claude Code / AI assistant files CLAUDE.md -.claude/ docs/agents/ From 3f6dd71e8bf66071b8d0fa417cddb85dbcd26572 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 06:04:19 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 080/273] revert: restore CLAUDE.md tracking in kagenti-extensions Remove CLAUDE.md from .gitignore and restore it to version control. Only docs/agents/ remains untracked. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .gitignore | 1 - CLAUDE.md | 374 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 374 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 CLAUDE.md diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index b6b0ef1cf..525792893 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -73,5 +73,4 @@ kagenti-webhook/bin/ aiac/inception/issues/ # Claude Code / AI assistant files -CLAUDE.md docs/agents/ diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7e1ad726 --- /dev/null +++ b/CLAUDE.md @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +# CLAUDE.md - Kagenti Extensions + +This file provides context for Claude (AI assistant) when working with the `kagenti-extensions` monorepo. + +## AI Assistant Instructions + +- **Use `Assisted-By` for attribution** — never add `Co-Authored-By`, `Generated with Claude Code`, or similar trailers. See [Commit Attribution Policy](#commit-attribution-policy) below. + +## Repository Overview + +**kagenti-extensions** contains Kubernetes security extensions for the [Kagenti](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti) ecosystem. It provides **zero-trust authentication** for Kubernetes workloads through transparent token exchange and dynamic Keycloak client registration using SPIFFE/SPIRE identities. + +The sidecar injection webhook lives in a separate repo: [kagenti/kagenti-operator](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-operator). + +**GitHub:** `github.com/kagenti/kagenti-extensions` +**Container registry:** `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/<image-name>` +**License:** Apache 2.0 + +## Top-Level Directory Structure + +``` +kagenti-extensions/ +├── authbridge/ # Authentication bridge components +│ ├── authlib/ # Shared auth building blocks (Go module) +│ │ ├── validation/ # JWKS-backed JWT verifier +│ │ ├── exchange/ # RFC 8693 token exchange client +│ │ ├── cache/ # SHA-256 keyed token cache +│ │ ├── bypass/ # Path pattern matcher +│ │ ├── spiffe/ # SPIFFE credential sources +│ │ ├── routing/ # Host-to-audience router +│ │ ├── auth/ # HandleInbound + HandleOutbound composition +│ │ └── config/ # Mode presets, YAML config, validation +│ ├── cmd/authbridge-proxy/ # proxy-sidecar mode (default): HTTP forward + reverse +│ │ │ # proxies, full plugin set including parsers +│ │ ├── main.go +│ │ ├── Dockerfile # proxy-sidecar combined image +│ │ └── entrypoint.sh +│ ├── cmd/authbridge-envoy/ # envoy-sidecar mode: ext_proc gRPC server, full plugin set +│ │ ├── main.go +│ │ ├── Dockerfile # envoy-sidecar combined image +│ │ └── entrypoint.sh +│ ├── cmd/authbridge-lite/ # proxy-sidecar mode, lite plugin set (no parsers) +│ │ │ # for size-optimized deployments +│ │ ├── main.go +│ │ ├── Dockerfile # proxy-sidecar lite combined image +│ │ └── entrypoint.sh +│ ├── proxy-init/ # iptables init container (envoy-sidecar mode only) +│ │ ├── init-iptables.sh +│ │ ├── Dockerfile.init +│ │ ├── Makefile +│ │ └── README.md +│ ├── demos/ # Demo scenarios (weather-agent, github-issue, token-exchange-routes, mcp-parser) +│ └── keycloak_sync.py # Declarative Keycloak sync tool +├── tests/ # Python tests (keycloak_sync) +├── .github/ +│ ├── workflows/ # CI/CD (ci.yaml, build.yaml, security-scans, scorecard, spellcheck) +│ └── ISSUE_TEMPLATE/ # Bug report, feature request, epic templates +├── .pre-commit-config.yaml # Pre-commit hooks (trailing whitespace, go fmt/vet, ruff) +└── CLAUDE.md # This file +``` + +## Major Components + +### 1. AuthBridge Binaries (Go) + +**Three mode-specific binaries** providing transparent traffic interception for both inbound JWT validation and outbound OAuth 2.0 token exchange (RFC 8693). Each binary is hardcoded to its deployment shape; mode is no longer selected at runtime. + +**Library:** `authbridge/authlib/` (shared) +**Language:** Go 1.25 +**Detailed guide:** [`authbridge/CLAUDE.md`](authbridge/CLAUDE.md) + +**Binaries:** +- `cmd/authbridge-proxy/` — proxy-sidecar mode (default): HTTP forward + reverse proxies, full plugin set (jwt-validation, token-exchange, a2a-parser, mcp-parser, inference-parser). No Envoy / no gRPC. +- `cmd/authbridge-envoy/` — envoy-sidecar mode: ext_proc gRPC server hooked into Envoy, full plugin set. +- `cmd/authbridge-lite/` — proxy-sidecar mode, lite plugin set (auth gates only, parsers dropped) for size-optimized deployments. + +**Common:** +- `authlib/` — shared auth library (JWT validation, token exchange, caching, routing, all listener implementations, all plugins). +- `proxy-init/init-iptables.sh` — traffic interception setup (Istio ambient mesh compatible). Used by envoy-sidecar mode only. +- `proxy-init/Dockerfile.init` — proxy-init container image. + +**Ports (envoy-sidecar):** 15123 (outbound), 15124 (inbound), 9090 (ext-proc), 9901 (admin) +**Ports (proxy-sidecar / lite):** 8080 (reverse proxy), 8081 (forward proxy), 9091 (health), 9093 (stats), 9094 (session API) + +### 2. Client Registration + +Keycloak client registration for workloads is handled by the +**kagenti-operator** (separate repo) — see `kagenti-operator/docs/operator-managed-client-registration.md`. +The operator creates a Secret with `client-id.txt` + `client-secret.txt` +and the webhook mounts it at `/shared/` in the workload pod. The +in-pod `client-registration` sidecar that previously lived in this +repo has been removed. + +## How the Components Work Together + +The kagenti-operator (in a separate repo) injects AuthBridge sidecars +into workload pods. Default deployment shape (proxy-sidecar mode): + +``` + ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ WORKLOAD POD │ + │ │ + │ spiffe-helper ──► SPIRE Agent │ (in-container, + │ │ writes JWT SVID │ conditional on + │ ▼ │ SPIRE_ENABLED) + │ authbridge-proxy │ + │ - Reverse proxy: inbound JWT │ + │ - Forward proxy: outbound │ + │ token exchange │ + │ │ │ + │ Your Application │ + │ (HTTP_PROXY → forward proxy) │ + └────────────────────────────────────┘ + + The operator also creates a Secret with client-id + + client-secret and mounts it at /shared/. + + For envoy-sidecar mode, replace authbridge-proxy with + the authbridge-envoy image (Envoy + ext_proc + spiffe-helper) + and add a proxy-init container for iptables. +``` + +## AuthBridge Binaries + +Three mode-specific binaries, one Dockerfile per binary: + +| Binary | Mode | Listeners | Plugins | +|--------|------|-----------|---------| +| `cmd/authbridge-proxy/` | proxy-sidecar (default) | HTTP forward + reverse proxies | full (incl. parsers) | +| `cmd/authbridge-envoy/` | envoy-sidecar | gRPC ext_proc on :9090 | full (incl. parsers) | +| `cmd/authbridge-lite/` | proxy-sidecar | HTTP forward + reverse proxies | auth-only (jwt-validation + token-exchange, no parsers) | + +**Go modules:** +- `authbridge/authlib/` — pure library: validation, exchange, cache, bypass, spiffe, routing, auth, config, all listener implementations, all plugins. +- `authbridge/cmd/authbridge-{proxy,envoy,lite}/` — thin main packages that import authlib and start the listeners they need. +- `authbridge/go.work` — workspace linking authlib + the binaries for local development. + +**Config format:** YAML with `${ENV_VAR}` expansion, mode presets, and startup validation. Supports `keycloak_url` + `keycloak_realm` derivation for operator compatibility. The `mode` field in YAML must match the binary (each binary rejects mismatched modes at boot). + +## CI/CD Workflows + +| Workflow | Trigger | Purpose | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `ci.yaml` | PR to main/release-* | Pre-commit, Go fmt/vet/build/test for authlib and the cmd/authbridge-* binaries; Python tests | +| `build.yaml` | Tag push (`v*`) or manual | Multi-arch Docker builds for: proxy-init, authbridge (proxy-sidecar combined), authbridge-envoy (envoy-sidecar combined), authbridge-lite (proxy-sidecar lite combined) | +| `security-scans.yaml` | PR to main | Dependency review, shellcheck, YAML lint, Hadolint, Bandit, Trivy, CodeQL | +| `scorecard.yaml` | Weekly / push to main | OpenSSF Scorecard security health metrics | +| `spellcheck_action.yml` | PR | Spellcheck on markdown files | + +### PR Title Convention + +PRs must follow **conventional commits** format: + +``` +<type>: <Subject starting with uppercase> +``` + +Types: `feat`, `fix`, `docs`, `style`, `refactor`, `perf`, `test`, `build`, `ci`, `chore`, `revert` + +## Container Images + +All images are pushed to `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/` from +`.github/workflows/build.yaml`: + +| Image | Source | Description | +|-------|--------|-------------| +| **`authbridge`** | **`authbridge/cmd/authbridge-proxy/Dockerfile`** | **proxy-sidecar combined image (default mode): authbridge-proxy (full plugin set incl. parsers) + spiffe-helper. No Envoy.** | +| `authbridge-envoy` | `authbridge/cmd/authbridge-envoy/Dockerfile` | envoy-sidecar combined image: Envoy + authbridge-envoy (ext_proc, full plugin set) + spiffe-helper | +| `authbridge-lite` | `authbridge/cmd/authbridge-lite/Dockerfile` | proxy-sidecar lite combined image: authbridge-lite (auth gates only, parsers dropped) + spiffe-helper. Same listener layout as `authbridge`; not yet referenced by the operator's default config | +| `proxy-init` | `authbridge/proxy-init/Dockerfile.init` | Alpine + iptables init container (envoy-sidecar mode only) | + +In all three combined images, `spiffe-helper` is started conditionally +based on the `SPIRE_ENABLED` env var (set by the operator when SPIRE +identity is enabled for the workload). + +The legacy `authbridge-unified`, `authbridge-light`, `client-registration`, +`spiffe-helper`, `auth-proxy`, and `demo-app` standalone images have +been removed from CI (the auth-proxy / demo-app source is still in-tree +for the standalone quickstart). Older release tags continue to publish +the old images. + +## Pre-commit Hooks + +Install: `pre-commit install` + +Hooks: +- `trailing-whitespace`, `end-of-file-fixer`, `check-added-large-files` (max 1024KB), `check-yaml`, `check-json`, `check-merge-conflict`, `mixed-line-ending` +- `ai-assisted-by-trailer` — Rewrites `Co-Authored-By` to `Assisted-By` (commit-msg stage) +- `ruff`, `ruff-format` — Python linting/formatting on `authbridge/` files +- `go-fmt`, `go-vet` — Runs on `authbridge/proxy-init/` Go files + +## Languages and Tech Stack + +| Area | Technology | +|------|------------| +| AuthBridge unified binary | Go 1.25, envoy-control-plane, lestrrat-go/jwx | +| Client Registration | Python 3.12, python-keycloak, PyJWT | +| Proxy | Envoy 1.28 | +| Traffic interception | iptables (via init container) | +| Identity | SPIFFE/SPIRE (JWT-SVIDs) | +| Auth provider | Keycloak (OAuth2/OIDC, token exchange RFC 8693) | +| Packaging | Docker | +| CI | GitHub Actions | + +## External Dependencies and Services + +| Service | Required | Purpose | +|---------|----------|---------| +| Kubernetes | Yes | Target platform (v1.25+ recommended) | +| [kagenti-operator](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-operator) | Yes | Injects AuthBridge sidecars into workload pods | +| Keycloak | Yes | OAuth2/OIDC provider, token exchange | +| SPIRE | Optional | SPIFFE identity (JWT-SVIDs) for workloads | + +## ConfigMaps and Secrets Expected at Runtime + +When the operator injects sidecars, the target namespace needs these resources: + +| Resource | Kind | Used by | Keys | +|----------|------|---------|------| +| `authbridge-config` | ConfigMap | client-registration, authbridge | `KEYCLOAK_URL`, `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, `PLATFORM_CLIENT_IDS` (optional), `TOKEN_URL` (optional, derived from KEYCLOAK_URL+KEYCLOAK_REALM), `ISSUER` (optional, derived or explicit for split-horizon DNS), `DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_POLICY` (optional, defaults to `passthrough`). Inbound audience validation uses `CLIENT_ID` from `/shared/client-id.txt`. Target audience and scopes are configured per-route in `authproxy-routes`. | +| `keycloak-admin-secret` | Secret | client-registration | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME`, `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | +| `authproxy-routes` | ConfigMap (optional) | authbridge | `routes.yaml` -- per-host token exchange rules (see authbridge/CLAUDE.md for format) | +| `spiffe-helper-config` | ConfigMap | spiffe-helper | SPIFFE helper configuration file | +| `envoy-config` | ConfigMap | envoy-proxy | Envoy YAML configuration | + +**Note:** `authproxy-routes` is optional. Without it, all outbound traffic passes through unchanged (the default policy is `passthrough`). Only create it when the agent needs to call services that require token exchange. Set `DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_POLICY: "exchange"` in `authbridge-config` to restore the legacy behavior. + +## Common Development Tasks + +### Building Everything Locally + +The repo-root `local-build-and-test.sh` orchestrates every image +the platform needs (`spiffe-idp-setup` from kagenti, plus +`authbridge`, `authbridge-envoy`, `authbridge-lite`, `proxy-init` +from this repo) and loads them into a Kind cluster: + +```bash +KAGENTI_DIR=../kagenti ./local-build-and-test.sh +``` + +To build a single image directly: + +```bash +# proxy-init (iptables init container, envoy-sidecar mode) +cd authbridge/proxy-init && make docker-build-init + +# Combined sidecars (proxy-sidecar default / envoy-sidecar / lite) +cd authbridge && podman build -f cmd/authbridge-proxy/Dockerfile -t authbridge:latest . +cd authbridge && podman build -f cmd/authbridge-envoy/Dockerfile -t authbridge-envoy:latest . +cd authbridge && podman build -f cmd/authbridge-lite/Dockerfile -t authbridge-lite:latest . +``` + +### Running the Full Demo + +1. Set up a Kind cluster with SPIRE + Keycloak (use [Kagenti Ansible installer](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti/blob/main/docs/install.md)) +2. Deploy the webhook via [kagenti-operator](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-operator) +3. See the [AuthBridge demos index](authbridge/demos/README.md) for a recommended learning path: + - **Getting started**: `authbridge/demos/weather-agent/demo-ui.md` (inbound validation, UI deployment) + - **Full flow**: `authbridge/demos/github-issue/demo-ui.md` (token exchange + scope-based access) + - **Routes config reference**: `authbridge/demos/token-exchange-routes/README.md` (single + multi-target route patterns) + +### Adding a New Component Image to CI + +1. Add entry to `.github/workflows/build.yaml` matrix (`image_config` array) +2. Provide `name`, `context`, and `dockerfile` fields +3. Image will be pushed to `ghcr.io/kagenti/kagenti-extensions/<name>` + +## Code Style and Conventions + +### Go Code (AuthProxy) +- Use `go fmt` (enforced by pre-commit and CI) +- Use `go vet` (enforced by pre-commit and CI) + +### Python Code (client-registration) +- Python 3.12+ syntax (type hints with `str | None`) +- Dependencies in `requirements.txt` (version-pinned, e.g. `python-keycloak==5.3.1`) + +### Kubernetes Manifests +- Example deployment YAMLs in `authbridge/demos/*/k8s/` + +### Shell Scripts +- `set -euo pipefail` (strict mode) +- Extensive inline documentation (especially `init-iptables.sh`) + +## Important Cross-Component Relationships + +1. **UID/GID Sync:** The `client-registration` Dockerfile creates a user with UID/GID 1000. The operator's webhook sets `runAsUser: 1000` / `runAsGroup: 1000` when injecting the client-registration container. These MUST match. In combined mode (`authbridge` container), everything runs as UID 1337 instead. + +2. **Envoy Proxy UID:** Envoy runs as UID 1337. The `proxy-init` iptables rules exclude this UID from redirection to prevent loops. The combined `authbridge` container also runs as UID 1337. + +3. **Shared Volume Contract:** The sidecars communicate through shared volumes: + - `/opt/jwt_svid.token` — spiffe-helper writes, client-registration reads + - `/shared/client-id.txt` — client-registration writes, envoy-proxy reads + - `/shared/client-secret.txt` — client-registration writes, envoy-proxy reads + +4. **Port Coordination:** Envoy listens on 15123 (outbound) and 15124 (inbound). The ext-proc listens on 9090. The `proxy-init` iptables rules redirect to these ports. + +## Gotchas and Known Issues + +1. **One Go module:** The repo has a single Go module at `authbridge/proxy-init/go.mod` (Go 1.25). + +2. **Avoid committing venvs:** Virtual environment directories (e.g. `authbridge/proxy-init/quickstart/venv/`) should be gitignored (the repo's `.gitignore` has a `venv` pattern). Do not create and commit new virtual environments under version control. + +3. **Envoy config not embedded:** The envoy-proxy sidecar mounts `envoy-config` ConfigMap at `/etc/envoy`. This ConfigMap must exist in the target namespace before workloads are created. + +4. **Outbound policy is passthrough by default:** AuthBridge defaults to passing outbound traffic through unchanged. Token exchange only happens for hosts explicitly listed in the `authproxy-routes` ConfigMap. Target audience and scopes are configured per-route in `authproxy-routes`. + +5. **Route host patterns use short service names:** The `host` field in `authproxy-routes` matches against the HTTP `Host` header, which is typically just the short Kubernetes service name (e.g., `github-tool-mcp`), not the FQDN. Glob patterns (`*`) are supported but the most common case is a plain service name. + +## DCO Sign-Off (Mandatory) + +All commits **must** include a `Signed-off-by` trailer (Developer Certificate of Origin). +Always use the `-s` flag when committing: + +```sh +git commit -s -m "feat: Add new feature" +``` + +This adds a line like `Signed-off-by: Your Name <your@email.com>` to the commit message. +PRs without DCO sign-off will fail CI checks. To retroactively sign-off existing commits: + +```sh +git rebase --signoff main +``` + +## Orchestration + +This repo includes orchestrate skills for enhancing related repositories. +Run `/orchestrate <repo-url>` to start. + +| Skill | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| `orchestrate` | Entry point — scan, plan, execute phases | +| `orchestrate:scan` | Assess repo structure, CI, security gaps | +| `orchestrate:plan` | Create phased enhancement plan | +| `orchestrate:precommit` | Add pre-commit hooks and linting | +| `orchestrate:tests` | Add test infrastructure | +| `orchestrate:ci` | Add CI/CD workflows | +| `orchestrate:security` | Add security governance files | +| `orchestrate:replicate` | Bootstrap skills into target repo | +| `orchestrate:review` | Review all orchestration PRs before merge | + +Skills management: + +| Skill | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| `skills` | Skills router — create, validate, scan | +| `skills:write` | Create or edit skills with proper structure | +| `skills:validate` | Validate skill format and naming | +| `skills:scan` | Audit repo for skill gaps | + +## Commit Attribution Policy + +When creating git commits, do NOT use `Co-Authored-By` trailers for AI attribution. +Instead, use `Assisted-By` to acknowledge AI assistance without inflating contributor stats: + + Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> + +Never add `Co-authored-by`, `Made-with`, or similar trailers that GitHub parses as co-authorship. + +### PR Bodies + +PR descriptions should end with the same `Assisted-By` trailer: + + Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> + +Do not use `🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)` or similar. + +A `commit-msg` hook in `scripts/hooks/commit-msg` enforces this automatically for commits. +Install it via pre-commit: + +```sh +pre-commit install --hook-type pre-commit --hook-type commit-msg +``` From 2b189190137aced02909d686eaf44726f90fd30d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 06:59:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 081/273] docs: Refactor PolicyApplyGraph and PolicyModel as shared across all UC orchestrators MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Move PolicyApplyGraph spec from uc1 to aiac-agent.md Shared Module section - Add shared/apply/ subsection with graph, nodes, state, orchestrator contract - Update top-level Mermaid diagram: shared APPLY node with policy_model arrows from all three orchestrators (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update) - Update orchestrator table: Policy Update and Role Update show → Policy Apply - UC1: collapse Policy Apply Sub-agent section to a pointer; remove shared/apply/ from file structure - UC2 Build/Rebuild: rename propose_diff→propose_policy, validate_diff→validate_policy; remove apply_diff and format_response nodes; graphs now terminate at validate_policy - UC3 Role: rename propose_mappings→propose_policy, validate_mappings→validate_policy; remove apply_mappings and format_response nodes - Eliminate ProposedDiff type: PolicyModel is now the single output type across all policy-producing sub-graphs - All UC orchestrators gate on policy_model is None before calling PolicyApplyGraph - Update all per-UC architecture Mermaid diagrams to show shared APPLY node Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 44 +++++++++++++++-- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 39 +++------------ .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 48 +++++++++---------- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 30 +++++++----- 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index a1c95032e..8ac7bb4e1 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| | Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy → Policy Apply (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role sub-agent | +| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build → Policy Apply or Rebuild → Policy Apply (alternative, then apply) | +| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role → Policy Apply (sequential) | All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -38,10 +38,8 @@ flowchart TD ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] SA2["Service Policy"] - SA3["Policy Apply"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 - ORC1 --> SA3 end subgraph PU["Policy Update"] @@ -58,6 +56,12 @@ flowchart TD ORC3 --> SA6 end + APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] + + ORC1 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + ORC2 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + ORC3 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + TRIGGERS --> CTRL CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 @@ -218,6 +222,38 @@ Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `S --- +### `shared/apply/` + +`PolicyApplyGraph` — shared by all policy-producing sub-agents (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update). Called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a validated `PolicyModel` in state. Commits to the PDP Policy Service. + +``` +START → apply_policy → format_response → END +``` + +#### Graph + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_policy\naiac.pdp.library.policy.api\napply_policy(PolicyModel)"] + APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] + FORMAT --> END(("END")) +``` + +#### Nodes + +- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api`. The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules) and commits. +- **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. + +#### State + +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `policy_model` and `realm`; writes `summary`. + +> **Orchestrator contract:** The calling orchestrator must gate on `policy_model is None` before invoking `PolicyApplyGraph`. If the producing sub-graph's `validate_policy` failed (leaving `policy_model` unset), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyApplyGraph`. + +> **Future extension:** This sub-agent is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_policy` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `PolicyModel` before commit. Since `PolicyApplyGraph` is shared, this gate applies uniformly to all use cases. + +--- + ## LLM Integration All `propose_*` and `validate_*` nodes use `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`) via `llm.with_structured_output()`. Target endpoint must support tool calling. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 43573a309..fba420655 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -23,12 +23,14 @@ flowchart TD ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] SA2["Service Policy"] - SA3["Policy Apply"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 - ORC1 --> SA3 end + APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] + + ORC1 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 ``` @@ -217,33 +219,9 @@ flowchart TD ### Policy Apply Sub-agent -`agent/shared/apply/` — shared across all policy-producing sub-agents. - -Receives a validated `PolicyModel` from state and commits it to the PDP Policy Service. The PDP Policy Service handles translation to the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules). - -``` -START → apply_policy → format_response → END -``` - -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_policy\naiac.pdp.library.policy.api\napply_policy(PolicyModel)"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) -``` - -#### Nodes - -- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api`. The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules) and commits. -- **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. - -#### State - -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `policy_model` and `realm`; writes `summary`. +`agent/shared/apply/` — see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply) in `aiac-agent.md`. -> **Future extension:** This sub-agent is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_policy` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `PolicyModel` before commit. +Receives the validated `PolicyModel` produced by `validate_policy` and commits it to the PDP Policy Service. Called by the orchestrator after `ServicePolicyGraph` completes, gated on `policy_model is not None`. --- @@ -261,11 +239,6 @@ aiac/src/aiac/ │ ├── models.py ← PolicyModel, PolicyStatement (TBD) │ └── api.py ← Policy abstract class + apply_policy() └── agent/ - ├── shared/ - │ └── apply/ - │ ├── __init__.py - │ ├── graph.py ← PolicyApplyGraph - │ └── nodes.py ← apply_policy, format_response └── onboarding/ ├── __init__.py ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy → apply, assembles combined response diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 2a13567e1..0aa377c57 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ flowchart TD ORC2 -->|"rebuild"| SA4 end + APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] + + ORC2 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 ``` @@ -46,9 +50,11 @@ flowchart TD `policy_update/orchestrator.py` -Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type: -- `build` trigger → Build sub-agent -- `rebuild` trigger → Rebuild sub-agent +Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type, then sequences `PolicyApplyGraph` (see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply)): +- `build` trigger → Build sub-agent → Policy Apply +- `rebuild` trigger → Rebuild sub-agent → Policy Apply + +If the sub-agent's `validate_policy` fails (`policy_model is None`), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyApplyGraph`. The Policy Update agent compares the **current composite role mappings** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing composite mappings and removing stale ones. @@ -61,16 +67,14 @@ The Policy Update agent compares the **current composite role mappings** (author `policy_update/build/` ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END ``` #### Nodes - **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. -- **`propose_diff`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. -- **`validate_diff`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). -- **`apply_diff`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. -- **`format_response`**: assembles the build result. +- **`propose_policy`**: LLM node; produces `PolicyModel` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py` (see [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md)). +- **`validate_policy`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). Writes `policy_model` to state on success; leaves it `None` on failure. #### Graph @@ -82,13 +86,11 @@ flowchart TD START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nall roles + composites,\nall services + permissions"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nminimal delta vs live composites"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nminimal delta vs live composites"] - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) + VALIDATE --> END(("END")) ``` #### State @@ -108,15 +110,15 @@ flowchart TD Identical to the Build sub-agent with one addition: a `clear_composites` node prepended before the fetch fan-out. ``` -START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_diff → validate_diff → apply_diff → format_response → END +START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END ``` #### Delta from Build - **`clear_composites`**: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all roles. - **`fetch_pdp_state`**: receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` after the wipe. -- **`propose_diff`**: produces an add-only diff (no removals — composites are empty). -- All remaining nodes (`validate_diff`, `apply_diff`, `format_response`): identical contract to Build. +- **`propose_policy`**: produces an add-only `PolicyModel` (no removals — composites are empty). +- **`validate_policy`**: identical contract to Build. #### Graph @@ -128,13 +130,11 @@ flowchart TD CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nempty role_composites\nafter wipe"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_diff\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nadd-only: composites are empty"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nadd-only: composites are empty"] - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_diff\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_diff\nadd_role_composites only"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) + VALIDATE --> END(("END")) ``` #### State @@ -166,16 +166,16 @@ flowchart TD ``` aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_update/ ├── __init__.py -├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to build or rebuild sub-agent +├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to build or rebuild sub-agent, then sequences PolicyApplyGraph ├── build/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM └── rebuild/ ├── __init__.py ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph - ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response + ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 06cc51796..1a5e0e265 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ flowchart TD ORC3 --> SA5 end + APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] + + ORC3 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 ``` @@ -43,7 +47,11 @@ flowchart TD `roles/orchestrator.py` -Dispatches to the Role sub-agent. +Dispatches to the Role sub-agent, then sequences `PolicyApplyGraph` (see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply)): + +- Role sub-agent → Policy Apply + +If the sub-agent's `validate_policy` fails (`policy_model is None`), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyApplyGraph`. --- @@ -54,16 +62,14 @@ Dispatches to the Role sub-agent. `roles/role/` ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_mappings → validate_mappings → apply_mappings → format_response → END +START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END ``` #### Nodes - **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all services and their permissions, all roles, and the current composites for the affected role. -- **`propose_mappings`**: LLM node; produces `ProposedDiff` scoped to the affected role. -- **`validate_mappings`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected role). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). -- **`apply_mappings`**: calls `add_role_composites` / `remove_role_composites` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. -- **`format_response`**: assembles the result. +- **`propose_policy`**: LLM node; produces `PolicyModel` scoped to the affected role. `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py` (see [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md)). +- **`validate_policy`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected role). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). Writes `policy_model` to state on success; leaves it `None` on failure. #### Graph @@ -75,13 +81,11 @@ flowchart TD START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\naffected role composites,\nall services + permissions"] - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_mappings\nPlanner LLM -> ProposedDiff\nscoped to affected role"] + FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nscoped to affected role"] - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_mappings\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] + PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] - VALIDATE --> APPLY["apply_mappings\nadd_role_composites\nremove_role_composites"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) + VALIDATE --> END(("END")) ``` #### State @@ -113,11 +117,11 @@ flowchart TD ``` aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/ ├── __init__.py -├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to role sub-agent +├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to role sub-agent, then sequences PolicyApplyGraph └── role/ ├── __init__.py ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph - ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM ``` From e08c65b4ea346b5124e755acf6ffec25243425f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 10:18:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 082/273] allow for both i nbound and outbound Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 59 +++++++++----- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 36 +++++---- .../policy/utils/output_generators.py | 76 ++++++++++++------- .../onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 15 ++-- 4 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index ea43d3832..7de10899b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -43,14 +43,15 @@ from config import create_llm from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure from utils.output_generators import ( generate_yaml_output, generate_realm_roles_rego, generate_privileges_rego, - generate_default_rego, + generate_default_inbound_rego, + generate_default_outbound_rego, generate_policy_rego, ) @@ -109,8 +110,8 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": X, "privilege": Y} dicts realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} - for service_name, privileges in privileges_map.items(): - for privilege in privileges: + for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): + for privilege in service_info["roles"]: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state['description'], service_name=service_name, @@ -128,7 +129,6 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( { 'service': service_name, 'privilege': privilege['name'], - 'service_type': privilege.get('service_type') } ) @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ class PolicyBuilder: def __init__( self, - realm: str = "", + realm: str = "demo", config_path: Optional[Path] = None, llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, verbose: bool = True, @@ -417,15 +417,15 @@ def __init__( self.privileges_map = {} self.service_names = [] for service in services: - # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service - self.privileges_map[service.id] = [ - { - "name": role.name, - "description": role.description or "", - "service_type": service.type - } - for role in service.roles - ] + # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. + # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. + self.privileges_map[service.id] = { + "service_type": service.type, + "roles": [ + {"name": role.name, "description": role.description or ""} + for role in service.roles + ], + } self.service_names.append(service.id) # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine @@ -608,11 +608,18 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): # print(f"Privileges Rego saved to {privileges_path}") # Generate default.rego with deny-by-default behavior - default_rego_path = dir_path / "default.rego" - with open(default_rego_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(generate_default_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_rego_path}") + default_rego_inbound_path = dir_path / "default_inbound.rego" + with open(default_rego_inbound_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(generate_default_inbound_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_rego_inbound_path}") + + # Generate default.rego with deny-by-default behavior + default_rego_outbound_path = dir_path / "default_outbound.rego" + with open(default_rego_outbound_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(generate_default_outbound_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_rego_outbound_path}") + # Generate one policy rego file per service # First, collect all services that appear in the policy policy = policy_structure.get("policy", {}) @@ -623,9 +630,21 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): if service: services_in_policy.add(service) + # Build service_types from privileges_map — service_type is a property of + # the service, not of individual privileges, so it is not stored in the policy. + service_types = { + svc_id: svc_info["service_type"] + for svc_id, svc_info in self.privileges_map.items() + } + # Generate a separate rego file for each service for service_name in services_in_policy: - policy_rego = generate_policy_rego(policy_structure, description, service_filter=service_name) + policy_rego = generate_policy_rego( + policy_structure, + service_name, + service_types, + description + ) # Sanitize service name for filename (replace special chars with underscores) safe_service_name = service_name.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_name}.rego" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 8be999077..1104bda7a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ from config import create_llm from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( state: ServicePolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, + service_type: str, privileges: list, verbose: bool, ) -> ServicePolicyState: @@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_id') llm: LLM instance realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] + service_type: Service type (e.g. 'Tool', 'Agent') — property of the service, not each privilege privileges: Privileges belonging to the target service [{'name': str, 'description': str}] verbose: Whether to print detailed output @@ -95,7 +97,6 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( { "service": service_id, "privilege": privilege["name"], - "service_type": privilege.get("service_type") } ) @@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ def _validate_policy( llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, service_id: str, + service_type: str, privileges: list, verbose: bool, max_retries: int, @@ -184,7 +186,13 @@ def _validate_policy( retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) service_names = [service_id] - privileges_map = {service_id: privileges} + + privileges_map = { + service_id: { + "service_type": service_type, + "roles": privileges, + } + } structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( policy, realm_roles, service_names, privileges_map @@ -228,6 +236,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, service_id: str, + service_type: str, privileges: list, ): """ @@ -237,6 +246,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] service_id: Target Keycloak service ID + service_type: Service type (e.g. 'Tool', 'Agent') — property of the service privileges: Privileges of the target service [{name, description}] Returns: @@ -245,7 +255,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( def filter_and_extract_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, privileges, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_type, privileges, config.verbose ) def build_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: @@ -256,7 +266,7 @@ def generate_yaml_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: def validate_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_id, privileges, + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_id, service_type, privileges, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) @@ -304,7 +314,7 @@ class ServicePolicyBuilder: def __init__( self, service_id: str, - realm: str = "", + realm: str = "demo", config_path: Optional[Path] = None, llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, verbose: bool = True, @@ -344,18 +354,17 @@ def __init__( ] services = config_api.get_services() + self.service_type: str = "Tool" # Default to "Tool" if not found self.privileges = [] for service in services: if service.id != service_id: continue - # Note: Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service - # These are the roles/scopes that belong to this specific service + # Handle None case by defaulting to "Tool" + self.service_type = service.type or "Tool" + # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. + # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges. self.privileges = [ - { - "name": role.name, - "description": role.description or "", - "service_type": service.type - } + {"name": role.name, "description": role.description or ""} for role in service.roles ] break @@ -364,6 +373,7 @@ def __init__( self.config, self.realm_roles, self.service_id, + self.service_type, self.privileges, ) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py index 19ea110f1..0273b88f1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py @@ -96,15 +96,16 @@ def generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles: dict) -> str: return rego_content -def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, list], scopes: list) -> str: +def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, dict], scopes: list) -> str: """ Generate Rego content for privileges mapping by service/client. - + Args: - privileges_map: Dictionary mapping service/client IDs to their privilege lists - Each privilege is a dict with 'name' and 'description' + privileges_map: Dict mapping service IDs to their service info. + Each value is ``{"service_type": str, "roles": [{"name": str, "description": str}]}``. + service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. scopes: List of Scope objects with 'name' and 'description' - + Returns: Rego file content as string """ @@ -114,13 +115,13 @@ def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, list], scopes: list) -> s # Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges """ - + # Create a list of scope names for inclusion in privileges scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] - - for service_id, privileges in privileges_map.items(): + + for service_id, service_info in privileges_map.items(): rego_content += f'service["{service_id}"] := [\n' - for priv in privileges: + for priv in service_info["roles"]: priv_name = priv.get("name", "") priv_desc = priv.get("description", "") # Escape quotes in description @@ -141,7 +142,19 @@ def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, list], scopes: list) -> s return rego_content -def generate_default_rego() -> str: +def generate_default_inbound_rego() -> str: + """ + Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior. + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + return """package authbridge.inbound.request + +default allow := false +""" + +def generate_default_outbound_rego() -> str: """ Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior. @@ -156,24 +169,32 @@ def generate_default_rego() -> str: def generate_policy_rego( policy_structure: dict, + service_filter: str, + service_types: Dict[str, str], description: str = "", - service_filter: Optional[str] = None ) -> str: """ Generate Rego content for the access control policy. - + Converts the policy structure (role -> privileges) into Rego allow rules. Each rule checks if the user has the required role and matches the service/privilege. - + Args: - policy_structure: Dictionary with 'policy' key containing role-to-privileges mapping + policy_structure: Dictionary with 'policy' key containing role-to-privileges mapping. + Privilege dicts contain only 'service' and 'privilege' keys. description: Original policy description for comments service_filter: If provided, only generate rules for this specific service - + service_types: Dict mapping service IDs to their type ('Tool' or 'Agent'). + service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges. + Used to determine the protocol field in Rego rules ('mcp' for Tool, 'a2a' for Agent). + Defaults to 'a2a' when a service is not present in the map. + Returns: Rego file content as string """ - rego_content = """package authbridge.outbound.request + package = "outbound" if service_types.get(service_filter) == "Tool" else "inbound" + + rego_content = f"""package authbridge.{package}.request import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles @@ -185,8 +206,7 @@ def generate_policy_rego( """ # Add service filter info if applicable - if service_filter: - rego_content += f"# Service: {service_filter}\n" + rego_content += f"# Service: {service_filter}\n" # Add original policy description as comment if description: @@ -204,17 +224,15 @@ def generate_policy_rego( for priv in privileges: service = priv.get("service", "") privilege = priv.get("privilege", "") - service_type = priv.get("service_type") - - # Determine protocol based on service type - # "msp" for Tool type, "a2a" for Agent type - if service_type == "Tool": - protocol = "mcp" - else: - protocol = "a2a" + + # Determine protocol from the service-level service_types map. + # "mcp" for Tool type, "a2a" for Agent type (default). + service_type = service_types.get(service) + protocol = "mcp" if service_type == "Tool" else "a2a" + service_name = "tool" if service_type == "Tool" else "agent" # Skip if service_filter is set and this privilege is for a different service - if service_filter and service != service_filter: + if service != service_filter: continue # Escape quotes in service and privilege names @@ -223,6 +241,10 @@ def generate_policy_rego( role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f"# User with role of **{role_name_escaped}**\n" + rego_content += f"# may access {service_name} with id **{service_escaped}**\n" + rego_content += f"# if the access token contains **{privilege_escaped}** scope\n" + rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' rego_content += f' input.{protocol}.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index cd76f1237..beaf932b1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -13,20 +13,22 @@ def validate_policy_structure( policy: Dict[str, Any], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], service_names: List[str], - privileges_map: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, str]]] + privileges_map: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] ) -> List[str]: """ Perform structural validation on the policy. - + Checks that all realm roles, services, and privileges exist in the configuration and that the policy structure is valid. - + Args: policy: The policy dictionary to validate realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles service_names: List of valid service names - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to list of privilege dicts with 'name' and 'description' - + privileges_map: Dict mapping service IDs to their service info. + Each value is ``{"service_type": str, "roles": [{"name": str, "description": str}]}``. + service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. + Returns: List of error messages (empty if validation passed) """ @@ -85,8 +87,7 @@ def validate_policy_structure( f"Found empty privilege name for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" ) elif service in privileges_map: - # Extract privilege names from the privileges map - privilege_names = [p['name'] for p in privileges_map[service]] + privilege_names = [p['name'] for p in privileges_map[service]["roles"]] if privilege not in privilege_names: available_privileges = ( ', '.join(privilege_names) From 63579cfa3f5825f28f932ec8d3b0305ad7836aa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 17:59:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 083/273] fix: resolve Keycloak clientId and service type in Service model MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Map clientId to name when name is absent or a localisation placeholder (e.g. ${client_account}) - Resolve service type from attributes["kagenti.service.type"] when set; fall back to SPIFFE-format clientId detection (spiffe:// prefix → Agent) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py | 30 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py index 9169e1b95..46d1d142b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -from typing import Literal +from typing import Any, Literal -from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, model_validator class Subject(BaseModel): @@ -37,6 +37,32 @@ class Service(BaseModel): roles: list["Role"] = [] scopes: list["Scope"] = [] + @model_validator(mode="before") + @classmethod + def _resolve_keycloak_fields(cls, data: Any) -> Any: + if not isinstance(data, dict): + return data + updates: dict[str, Any] = {} + + # Keycloak uses clientId as the identifier; name is a display name + # that is often a localisation placeholder like ${client_account}. + client_id = data.get("clientId") + name = data.get("name") + if client_id and (not name or str(name).startswith("${")): + updates["name"] = client_id + + # Resolve service type: explicit Keycloak attribute takes precedence, + # then SPIFFE-format clientId implies an agent workload. + if data.get("type") is None: + attrs = data.get("attributes") or {} + stored_type = attrs.get("kagenti.service.type") + if stored_type in ("Agent", "Tool"): + updates["type"] = stored_type + elif client_id and str(client_id).startswith("spiffe://"): + updates["type"] = "Agent" + + return {**data, **updates} if updates else data + class Scope(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") From ce494a9506447293246077b4edc4d6ac0138b5d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 18:14:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 084/273] test: Expand show_keycloak_data smoke test to display all model fields Show all fields from Subject, Role, Service, and Scope models including nested collections (roles with childRoles/mappedScopes, service scopes). Add _fmt_roles and _fmt_scopes helpers for consistent nested rendering. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 73 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index 821834e64..b1138e051 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -17,6 +17,30 @@ REALM = "kagenti" +def _fmt_roles(roles: list[Role], indent: int = 4) -> str: + if not roles: + return " " * indent + "—" + pad = " " * indent + lines = [] + for r in roles: + composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" + lines.append(f"{pad}{r.name} (id={r.id}) [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") + if r.childRoles: + for cr in r.childRoles: + lines.append(f"{pad} child: {cr.name} (id={cr.id})") + if r.mappedScopes: + for ms in r.mappedScopes: + lines.append(f"{pad} scope: {ms.name} (id={ms.id})") + return "\n".join(lines) + + +def _fmt_scopes(scopes: list[Scope], indent: int = 4) -> str: + if not scopes: + return " " * indent + "—" + pad = " " * indent + return "\n".join(f"{pad}{sc.name} (id={sc.id}) desc={sc.description or '—'}" for sc in scopes) + + def main() -> None: cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) @@ -26,7 +50,16 @@ def main() -> None: for s in subjects: full_name = " ".join(filter(None, [s.firstName, s.lastName])) or "—" status = "enabled" if s.enabled else "disabled" - print(f" {s.username:<20} {full_name:<25} email={s.email or '—'} [{status}]") + print(f" id={s.id}") + print(f" username : {s.username}") + print(f" name : {full_name}") + print(f" email : {s.email or '—'}") + print(f" status : {status}") + if s.roles: + print(" roles:") + print(_fmt_roles(s.roles, indent=6)) + else: + print(" roles : —") print(f"Total: {len(subjects)} subject(s)\n") # --- Roles --- @@ -34,7 +67,22 @@ def main() -> None: roles: list[Role] = cfg.get_roles() for r in roles: composite = "composite" if r.composite else "simple" - print(f" {r.name:<30} [{composite}] desc={r.description or '—'}") + print(f" id={r.id}") + print(f" name : {r.name}") + print(f" description : {r.description or '—'}") + print(f" type : {composite}") + if r.childRoles: + print(" childRoles:") + for cr in r.childRoles: + print(f" {cr.name} (id={cr.id})") + else: + print(" childRoles : —") + if r.mappedScopes: + print(" mappedScopes:") + for ms in r.mappedScopes: + print(f" {ms.name} (id={ms.id}) desc={ms.description or '—'}") + else: + print(" mappedScopes: —") print(f"Total: {len(roles)} role(s)\n") # --- Services (clients) --- @@ -42,15 +90,30 @@ def main() -> None: services: list[Service] = cfg.get_services() for svc in services: status = "enabled" if svc.enabled else "disabled" - svc_type = svc.type or "—" - print(f" {svc.name or svc.id:<40} type={svc_type:<8} [{status}] desc={svc.description or '—'}") + print(f" id={svc.id}") + print(f" name : {svc.name or '—'}") + print(f" description : {svc.description or '—'}") + print(f" status : {status}") + print(f" type : {svc.type or '—'}") + if svc.roles: + print(" roles:") + print(_fmt_roles(svc.roles, indent=6)) + else: + print(" roles : —") + if svc.scopes: + print(" scopes:") + print(_fmt_scopes(svc.scopes, indent=6)) + else: + print(" scopes : —") print(f"Total: {len(services)} service(s)\n") # --- Scopes --- print("=== Scopes ===") scopes: list[Scope] = cfg.get_scopes() for sc in scopes: - print(f" {sc.name:<30} desc={sc.description or '—'}") + print(f" id={sc.id}") + print(f" name : {sc.name}") + print(f" description : {sc.description or '—'}") print(f"Total: {len(scopes)} scope(s)\n") From ddd968f692b1da0d4e0422367a0e8747429ad3cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 18:20:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 085/273] feat: persist kagenti.service.type via PATCH /services and extend model tests - Add PATCH /services/{service_id} endpoint that writes kagenti.service.type into the Keycloak client attribute bag - Add Configuration.set_service_type() library method - Add 12 new model tests: TestServiceNameResolution, TestServiceTypeResolution, and TestKeycloakRealWorldPayloads covering the two parser fixes from b9f09a6 Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py | 10 + .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 16 ++ aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 198 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 224 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index 310f4fead..99c16fa50 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import os from pathlib import Path +from typing import Literal import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv @@ -75,6 +76,15 @@ def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: self._check(resp) return Role.model_validate(resp.json()) + def set_service_type(self, service_id: str, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service: + resp = requests.patch( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}", + json={"type": service_type}, + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + return Service.model_validate(resp.json()) + def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: resp = requests.post( f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}", diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 6f3323674..9ce52996a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError from pydantic import BaseModel +from typing import Literal from starlette.responses import JSONResponse _admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None @@ -116,6 +117,21 @@ def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +class _ServicePatch(BaseModel): + type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] + + +@app.patch("/services/{service_id}", status_code=200) +def patch_service(service_id: str, body: _ServicePatch, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + client = admin.get_client(service_id) + existing_attrs = client.get("attributes") or {} + admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {**existing_attrs, "kagenti.service.type": body.type}}) + return admin.get_client(service_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): name: str description: str = "" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index c0976122b..1c85af159 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -212,6 +212,204 @@ def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): assert not hasattr(s, "surplusField") +class TestServiceNameResolution: + def test_placeholder_name_replaced_by_clientId(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "abc123", + "clientId": "account", + "name": "${client_account}", + "enabled": True, + } + ) + assert s.name == "account" + + def test_absent_name_resolved_from_clientId(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "abc456", + "clientId": "mlflow", + "enabled": True, + } + ) + assert s.name == "mlflow" + + def test_valid_display_name_not_replaced_by_clientId(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "abc789", + "clientId": "github-tool", + "name": "GitHub Tool", + "enabled": True, + } + ) + assert s.name == "GitHub Tool" + + +class TestServiceTypeResolution: + def test_type_agent_from_kagenti_attribute(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c1", + "clientId": "some-agent", + "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"kagenti.service.type": "Agent"}, + } + ) + assert s.type == "Agent" + + def test_type_tool_from_kagenti_attribute(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c2", + "clientId": "github-tool", + "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"kagenti.service.type": "Tool"}, + } + ) + assert s.type == "Tool" + + def test_type_agent_from_spiffe_clientId(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c3", + "clientId": "spiffe://cluster.local/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent", + "enabled": True, + } + ) + assert s.type == "Agent" + + def test_explicit_type_not_overridden_by_validator(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c4", + "clientId": "spiffe://cluster.local/ns/team1/sa/some-agent", + "enabled": True, + "type": "Tool", + } + ) + assert s.type == "Tool" + + def test_unknown_kagenti_attribute_value_gives_none(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c5", + "clientId": "mlflow", + "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"kagenti.service.type": "Unknown"}, + } + ) + assert s.type is None + + +class TestKeycloakRealWorldPayloads: + """Each model parsed against a realistic Keycloak API payload including extra noise fields.""" + + def test_subject_keycloak_user(self): + s = Subject.model_validate( + { + "id": "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0d1e-2f3a-4b5c6d7e8f90", + "username": "alice", + "email": "alice@kagenti.org", + "firstName": "Alice", + "lastName": "Kagenti", + "enabled": True, + "emailVerified": True, + "createdTimestamp": 1700000000, + "roles": [ + { + "id": "r-admin-uuid", + "name": "kagenti-admin", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": False, + } + ], + } + ) + assert s.id == "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0d1e-2f3a-4b5c6d7e8f90" + assert s.username == "alice" + assert s.email == "alice@kagenti.org" + assert s.firstName == "Alice" + assert s.lastName == "Kagenti" + assert s.enabled is True + assert len(s.roles) == 1 + assert s.roles[0].name == "kagenti-admin" + + def test_role_keycloak_composite_with_child_and_scope(self): + r = Role.model_validate( + { + "id": "r-dev-lead-uuid", + "name": "dev-lead", + "description": "Developer lead with admin and viewer permissions", + "composite": True, + "clientRole": False, + "containerId": "kagenti", + "childRoles": [ + { + "id": "r-dev-uuid", + "name": "developer", + "composite": False, + "clientRole": False, + } + ], + "mappedScopes": [ + {"id": "sc-read-uuid", "name": "read"}, + ], + } + ) + assert r.id == "r-dev-lead-uuid" + assert r.name == "dev-lead" + assert r.description == "Developer lead with admin and viewer permissions" + assert r.composite is True + assert len(r.childRoles) == 1 + assert r.childRoles[0].id == "r-dev-uuid" + assert r.childRoles[0].name == "developer" + assert r.childRoles[0].composite is False + assert len(r.mappedScopes) == 1 + assert r.mappedScopes[0].name == "read" + + def test_service_keycloak_system_client_account(self): + """Keycloak system 'account' client: placeholder name resolved, no kagenti type.""" + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "account-client-uuid", + "clientId": "account", + "name": "${client_account}", + "description": "${client_account_description}", + "enabled": True, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "publicClient": False, + "attributes": {}, + } + ) + assert s.id == "account-client-uuid" + assert s.name == "account" + assert s.description == "${client_account_description}" + assert s.enabled is True + assert s.type is None + assert s.roles == [] + assert s.scopes == [] + + def test_scope_keycloak_email_scope(self): + """Standard OpenID Connect 'email' client scope as Keycloak returns it.""" + s = Scope.model_validate( + { + "id": "sc-email-uuid", + "name": "email", + "description": "OpenID Connect built-in scope: email", + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "attributes": { + "consent.screen.text": "${emailScopeConsentText}", + "display.on.consent.screen": "true", + "include.in.token.scope": "true", + }, + } + ) + assert s.id == "sc-email-uuid" + assert s.name == "email" + assert s.description == "OpenID Connect built-in scope: email" + + class TestScope: def test_full_payload(self): s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s1", "name": "email", "description": "Email scope"}) From 5f602e4a6cc11401f1ccb1db8f1dd5acbb98eb68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 15:45:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 086/273] temp Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 6 +++++- .../agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 7de10899b..6977b5b2d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ def __init__( """ # Store realm for later use self.realm = realm - + # Create LLM if not provided # LLM config is in the config directory relative to this file (llm.env) if llm is None: @@ -419,6 +419,9 @@ def __init__( for service in services: # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. + if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): + continue + print (f"Service {service.id} added: {service.description}") self.privileges_map[service.id] = { "service_type": service.type, "roles": [ @@ -503,6 +506,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: return { "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], + "explanation": final_state.get("explanation", ""), "errors": final_state["errors"], "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 1104bda7a..6c6382424 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: "yaml_output": final_state["yaml_output"], "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], + "explanation": final_state.get("explanation", ""), "errors": final_state["errors"], "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), From 28f48367530a373196435c2ae992454decd14969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:43:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 087/273] remove python path Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 2e2dd5ded..b0da91836 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ import sys from pathlib import Path -# Add current directory to path to allow importing local modules +# Add policy dir and src/ to path to allow importing local and aiac.* modules sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent)) +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parents[4])) from dotenv import load_dotenv From 5330f5301be25d42f936d509d2c3f90740e6dee3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 22:23:39 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 088/273] feat: populate Service.roles/scopes and Role.childRoles/mappedScopes in PDP config API - Add GET /services/{id}/roles endpoint (realm roles via get_realm_roles_of_client_scope, replacing get_client_roles which returned client-specific roles) - Add GET /services/{id}/scopes endpoint (realm client scopes via get_client_default_client_scopes) - Add GET /roles/{name}/scopes endpoint (reverse-maps realm roles to their client scopes) - Rename GET /services/{id}/permissions -> /roles for consistency - Fix library get_services() to enrich each Service with per-service roles and scopes - Fix library get_roles() to populate Role.childRoles (composites) and Role.mappedScopes Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++-- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 29 +++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index 99c16fa50..2664f2215 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -36,12 +36,39 @@ def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/roles", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) - return [Role.model_validate(r) for r in resp.json()] + roles = [] + for raw in resp.json(): + role_data = dict(raw) + if raw.get("composite"): + composites_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/roles/{raw['name']}/composites", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(composites_resp) + role_data["childRoles"] = composites_resp.json() + scopes_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/roles/{raw['name']}/scopes", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(scopes_resp) + role_data["mappedScopes"] = scopes_resp.json() + roles.append(Role.model_validate(role_data)) + return roles def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) - return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + services = [] + for raw in resp.json(): + service_id = raw["id"] + roles_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/roles", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(roles_resp) + scopes_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(scopes_resp) + services.append(Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles_resp.json(), "scopes": scopes_resp.json()})) + return services def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 9ce52996a..d4effce26 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -89,10 +89,18 @@ def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_ return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.get("/services/{service_id}/permissions") -def list_service_permissions(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +@app.get("/services/{service_id}/roles") +def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - return admin.get_client_roles(service_id) + return admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.get("/services/{service_id}/scopes") +def list_service_scopes(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -191,6 +199,21 @@ def list_role_composites(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admi return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.get("/roles/{role_name}/scopes") +def list_role_scopes(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + role = admin.get_realm_role(role_name) + role_id = role["id"] + mapped = [] + for scope in admin.get_client_scopes(): + scope_roles = admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"]) + if any(r["id"] == role_id for r in scope_roles): + mapped.append(scope) + return mapped + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.get("/health") def health(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: From 5427e615e42750873c6c370c1cb1c28e21bce9ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 22:57:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 089/273] test: add unit tests for get_roles() secondary calls and GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes - Fix TestGetRoles.test_returns_list_of_role to use side_effect for multiple HTTP calls now made by get_roles() - Add 6 tests covering childRoles/mappedScopes population, non-composite skips composites call, and secondary-call error paths - Add TestGetRoleScopes with 4 tests covering happy path, scope filtering, get_realm_role/get_client_scopes/get_realm_roles_of_client_scope call chain, and 502 error path - Add test_get_role_scopes to TestKeycloakErrorProduces502 sweep Closes criteria from issues 2.7 and 3.13. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 60 +++++++++++++++++- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 15d07e912..d06775c41 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -73,11 +73,12 @@ class TestGetRoles: def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([])]) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() assert isinstance(result[0], Role) assert result[0].name == "admin" - m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/roles", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert m.call_args_list[0][0][0] == f"{BASE}/roles" def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) @@ -85,6 +86,61 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + def test_non_composite_role_populates_mapped_scopes(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(scopes)]): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert result[0].mappedScopes[0].name == "read:data" + assert result[0].childRoles == [] + + def test_non_composite_role_skips_composites_call(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok([])]) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + urls = [c[0][0] for c in m.call_args_list] + assert all("/composites" not in u for u in urls) + + def test_composite_role_populates_child_roles(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}] + child_roles = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "profile"}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles), _ok(scopes)]): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert result[0].childRoles[0].name == "viewer" + + def test_composite_role_populates_mapped_scopes(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}] + child_roles = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "profile"}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles), _ok(scopes)]): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert result[0].mappedScopes[0].name == "profile" + + def test_raises_if_scopes_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _err(502)]): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + + def test_raises_if_composites_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}] + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _err(502)]): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_services diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 8c9f9f10d..4b25a7ec9 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -121,6 +121,62 @@ def test_returns_json_array(self): admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.assert_called_once_with(role_name="admin") +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetRoleScopes: + def test_returns_scopes_mapped_to_role(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "role-id-1", "name": "admin"} + admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [ + {"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}, + {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}, + ] + + def _scope_roles(scope_id): + return [{"id": "role-id-1"}] if scope_id == "sc1" else [] + + admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.side_effect = _scope_roles + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert len(body) == 1 + assert body[0]["name"] == "profile" + + def test_filters_out_unmatched_scopes(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "r1"} + admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1"}, {"id": "sc2"}] + admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = [] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/viewer/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [] + + def test_verifies_call_chain(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} + admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1", "name": "read"}] + admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = [{"id": "rid"}] + _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/viewer/scopes?realm={REALM}") + admin.get_realm_role.assert_called_once_with("viewer") + admin.get_client_scopes.assert_called_once() + admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("sc1") + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="not found", response_code=404 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/missing/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Realm query parameter: optional, singleton at startup # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -526,5 +582,10 @@ def test_get_role_composites(self): admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + def test_get_role_scopes(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/scopes?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() From 6d105e49169c5f6b4c57e1efb0d2212ae8ed5b15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:03:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 090/273] docs: update PRD and component specs for get_roles() childRoles/mappedScopes fix MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - PRD.md: reflect new GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes endpoint and secondary call behaviour in get_roles() - library.md: document childRoles and mappedScopes population logic - pdp-configuration-service.md: add new endpoint to API surface and acceptance criteria; acceptance count 7→8 Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 8 ++--- .../requirements/components/library.md | 20 ++++++++++++- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 30 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 9dd692033..0e9fec33b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| -| 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. | +| 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, composite mappings) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the interface is stable across phases. | | 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | | 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ▼ AIAC Agent │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 4. GET /scopes, /permissions (target service) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB │ 6. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff for affected service │ 7. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) @@ -371,8 +371,8 @@ extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.pdp.library` is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the PDP. **AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** -The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST read endpoints under generic PDP entity -names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes role composite mappings (role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener +The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic PDP entity +names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. The PDP Policy Service writes role composite mappings (role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. **AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index cb5c0d59a..aebc8f493 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -159,11 +159,29 @@ class Configuration: def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: ... ``` -Read methods (`get_*`): +Read methods (`get_subjects`, `get_scopes`): 1. Issue `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/<endpoint>`, always appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 3. Parse the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). +`get_services()` — enriched read (N+1 per service): +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch all services. +2. For each service, issue two additional requests to populate `Service.roles` and `Service.scopes`: + - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` → `Service.roles` + - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=<self.realm>` → `Service.scopes` +3. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +4. Return `list[Service]` with `roles` and `scopes` populated. + +> **Performance note:** `get_services()` issues 2N+1 HTTP requests where N is the number of services. If this becomes a bottleneck, the service's `GET /services` endpoint should be enriched server-side instead. `Service.roles` elements are not further hydrated (their `mappedScopes` are empty); call `get_roles()` for fully hydrated role objects. + +`get_roles()` — enriched read (2 extra calls per role): +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch all realm roles. +2. For each role, issue additional requests: + - If `role.composite` is `True`: `GET /roles/{name}/composites?realm=<self.realm>` → `Role.childRoles` + - For every role: `GET /roles/{name}/scopes?realm=<self.realm>` → `Role.mappedScopes` +3. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +4. Return `list[Role]` with `childRoles` and `mappedScopes` populated. + `create_scope`: 1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a scope with that name already exists). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index 04141aa5f..950ddf094 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Retur | GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | -| GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Permissions (roles) defined for a specific service | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service via scope mappings | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | +| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/scopes` | _(iterates all realm client scopes; filters to those with role mapped)_ | Scopes that have this realm role mapped | | POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | | POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | @@ -48,6 +50,27 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a role with that name already exists. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. +`GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: +1. Calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` to return the realm roles assigned to the service via scope mappings. +2. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of realm role objects. +3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +> **Note:** This endpoint returns *realm roles* assigned through the client-scope mapping API (consistent with how `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` assigns them via `assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope`). It does **not** use `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions rather than realm role assignments. + +`GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` to return the realm-level client scopes assigned as defaults to the service. +2. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client scope objects. +3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: +1. Calls `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)` to resolve the role's ID. +2. Iterates all realm client scopes via `admin.get_client_scopes()`. +3. For each scope, calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])` and includes the scope if the role's ID appears in the result. +4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client scope objects that have this realm role mapped. +5. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +> **Performance note:** This is an O(scopes) endpoint — one Keycloak call per realm client scope. Suitable for infrequent enrichment calls; not intended for high-throughput polling. + `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: 1. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the role to the service's scope mappings. 2. Returns `201 Created` on success. @@ -106,5 +129,8 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ - `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. When `realm` is `None` it returns the startup singleton; when `realm` is set it returns a new `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm. - Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. -- `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`; return the result as `JSONResponse`. +- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` — returns realm roles assigned to the service via the client-scope mapping API (not `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions). +- `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. +- `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. +- `GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: resolve role ID via `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)`, then iterate `admin.get_client_scopes()` and filter to scopes where the role ID appears in `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])`. - On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. From ba751b467d2e3e59dc03b0a6f6b565f3274a4a2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:28:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 091/273] fix: fix PDP config service scope-mappings and sync stale tests - Replace get_realm_roles_of_client_scope with get_all_roles_of_client_scope in list_role_scopes; the former calls /clients/{id}/... which fails for client-scope IDs ("Could not find client"), while the latter correctly calls /client-scopes/{id}/scope-mappings/realm via python-keycloak 7.1.1 - Update TestGetRoleScopes to mock get_all_roles_of_client_scope returning {"realmMappings": [...]} instead of the old flat-list mock - Fix TestGetServicePermissions + TestKeycloakErrorProduces502: rename stale /permissions path to /roles and get_client_roles to get_realm_roles_of_client_scope; add missing teardown_method - Fix TestGetServices.test_returns_list_of_service: mock all 3 requests.get calls (services list + roles + scopes per service) via side_effect since get_services() now issues multiple requests per service Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 5 ++-- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 10 ++++++-- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 23 +++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index d4effce26..8153bceb5 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -206,8 +206,9 @@ def list_role_scopes(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): role_id = role["id"] mapped = [] for scope in admin.get_client_scopes(): - scope_roles = admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"]) - if any(r["id"] == role_id for r in scope_roles): + all_mappings = admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"]) + realm_mappings = all_mappings.get("realmMappings", []) + if any(r["id"] == role_id for r in realm_mappings): mapped.append(scope) return mapped except KeycloakError as e: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index d06775c41..988826352 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -151,11 +151,17 @@ class TestGetServices: def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([])], + ) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert isinstance(result[0], Service) assert result[0].id == "c1" - m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/services", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert m.call_args_list[0] == ( + (f"{BASE}/services",), + {"params": {"realm": REALM}}, + ) def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 4b25a7ec9..496f7c914 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -100,11 +100,14 @@ def test_returns_object_with_realm_and_service_mappings(self): class TestGetServicePermissions: def test_returns_json_array(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/permissions?realm={REALM}") + admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json() == [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /roles/{role_name}/composites @@ -135,10 +138,10 @@ def test_returns_scopes_mapped_to_role(self): {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}, ] - def _scope_roles(scope_id): - return [{"id": "role-id-1"}] if scope_id == "sc1" else [] + def _all_mappings(scope_id): + return {"realmMappings": [{"id": "role-id-1"}]} if scope_id == "sc1" else {} - admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.side_effect = _scope_roles + admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.side_effect = _all_mappings resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/scopes?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 body = resp.json() @@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ def test_filters_out_unmatched_scopes(self): admin = MagicMock() admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "r1"} admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1"}, {"id": "sc2"}] - admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = [] + admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = {} resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/viewer/scopes?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json() == [] @@ -158,11 +161,11 @@ def test_verifies_call_chain(self): admin = MagicMock() admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1", "name": "read"}] - admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = [{"id": "rid"}] + admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = {"realmMappings": [{"id": "rid"}]} _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/viewer/scopes?realm={REALM}") admin.get_realm_role.assert_called_once_with("viewer") admin.get_client_scopes.assert_called_once() - admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("sc1") + admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("sc1") def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): admin = MagicMock() @@ -574,8 +577,8 @@ def test_get_subject_assignments(self): def test_get_service_permissions(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/permissions?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/roles?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 def test_get_role_composites(self): admin = MagicMock() From 870c36b5fa54c0e6643f98dacfd58186dd17dd08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:04:00 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 092/273] refactor: reorder Keycloak config API endpoints by functionality Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 130 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 8153bceb5..981df01b9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -44,6 +44,15 @@ class _ScopeCreate(BaseModel): description: str = "" +class _ServicePatch(BaseModel): + type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] + + +class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str = "" + + @app.get("/subjects") def list_subjects(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: @@ -52,10 +61,15 @@ def list_subjects(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.get("/roles") -def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +@app.get("/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments") +def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - return admin.get_realm_roles() + raw = admin.get_all_roles_of_user(subject_id) + # Remap clientMappings → serviceMappings for PDP naming + return { + "realmMappings": raw.get("realmMappings", []), + "serviceMappings": raw.get("clientMappings", {}), + } except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -68,23 +82,21 @@ def list_services(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.get("/scopes") -def list_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +@app.get("/services/{service_id}") +def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - return admin.get_client_scopes() + return admin.get_client(service_id) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.get("/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments") -def get_subject_assignments(subject_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +@app.patch("/services/{service_id}", status_code=200) +def patch_service(service_id: str, body: _ServicePatch, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - raw = admin.get_all_roles_of_user(subject_id) - # Remap clientMappings → serviceMappings for PDP naming - return { - "realmMappings": raw.get("realmMappings", []), - "serviceMappings": raw.get("clientMappings", {}), - } + client = admin.get_client(service_id) + existing_attrs = client.get("attributes") or {} + admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {**existing_attrs, "kagenti.service.type": body.type}}) + return admin.get_client(service_id) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -97,6 +109,17 @@ def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}", status_code=201) +def assign_role_to_service(service_id: str, role_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}]) + return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) + except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 409: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.get("/services/{service_id}/scopes") def list_service_scopes(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: @@ -117,47 +140,6 @@ def create_scope(service_id: str, body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Dep return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.get("/services/{service_id}") -def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - return admin.get_client(service_id) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -class _ServicePatch(BaseModel): - type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] - - -@app.patch("/services/{service_id}", status_code=200) -def patch_service(service_id: str, body: _ServicePatch, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - client = admin.get_client(service_id) - existing_attrs = client.get("attributes") or {} - admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {**existing_attrs, "kagenti.service.type": body.type}}) - return admin.get_client(service_id) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - -class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): - name: str - description: str = "" - - -@app.post("/scopes", status_code=201) -def create_scope_standalone(body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( - {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} - ) - return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) - except KeycloakError as e: - if e.response_code == 409: - return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - @app.post("/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}", status_code=201) def assign_scope_to_service(service_id: str, scope_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: @@ -169,22 +151,19 @@ def assign_scope_to_service(service_id: str, scope_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.post("/roles", status_code=201) -def create_role(body: _RoleCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +@app.get("/roles") +def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - admin.create_realm_role({"name": body.name, "description": body.description}) - return admin.get_realm_role(body.name) + return admin.get_realm_roles() except KeycloakError as e: - if e.response_code == 409: - return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.post("/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}", status_code=201) -def assign_role_to_service(service_id: str, role_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +@app.post("/roles", status_code=201) +def create_role(body: _RoleCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}]) - return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) + admin.create_realm_role({"name": body.name, "description": body.description}) + return admin.get_realm_role(body.name) except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 409: return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -215,6 +194,27 @@ def list_role_scopes(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.get("/scopes") +def list_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + return admin.get_client_scopes() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +@app.post("/scopes", status_code=201) +def create_scope_standalone(body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): + try: + scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( + {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} + ) + return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 409: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.get("/health") def health(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: From 31a193d56411d6d09ea765ffec3f381fb861439a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 16:04:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 093/273] fix: use service account user API for service roles endpoints MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit GET /services/{id}/roles and POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id} were calling the client-scope role-mapping API instead of the service account user API. Fixed to use get_client_service_account_user → get_realm_roles_of_user and assign_realm_roles respectively. Also removes the unused PATCH /services/{id} endpoint. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 24 +++++-------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 981df01b9..4bfd4cb91 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError from pydantic import BaseModel -from typing import Literal from starlette.responses import JSONResponse _admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None @@ -44,10 +43,6 @@ class _ScopeCreate(BaseModel): description: str = "" -class _ServicePatch(BaseModel): - type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] - - class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): name: str description: str = "" @@ -90,21 +85,12 @@ def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.patch("/services/{service_id}", status_code=200) -def patch_service(service_id: str, body: _ServicePatch, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - client = admin.get_client(service_id) - existing_attrs = client.get("attributes") or {} - admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {**existing_attrs, "kagenti.service.type": body.type}}) - return admin.get_client(service_id) - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - @app.get("/services/{service_id}/roles") def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - return admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id) + sa_user = admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id) + user_id = sa_user["id"] + return admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -112,7 +98,9 @@ def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin @app.post("/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}", status_code=201) def assign_role_to_service(service_id: str, role_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}]) + sa_user = admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id) + user_id = sa_user["id"] + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}]) return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 409: From 860057000039364b7405d17ed59857729a37ad42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:39:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 094/273] temp Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 36 ++++++++------- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 44 +++++++++---------- .../policy/service_policy_agent/state.py | 4 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 4 +- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 6977b5b2d..ef8af0421 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ - Retry mechanism with semantic verification """ +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service from typing import Dict, Any, Optional from pathlib import Path import os @@ -121,13 +122,13 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( if result.get('explanation'): explanations.append( - f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" + f"{service_id}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" ) for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { - 'service': service_name, + 'service': service_id, 'privilege': privilege['name'], } ) @@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ def _validate_policy( state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure' and 'description' llm: LLM instance for semantic verification realm_roles: List of available realm roles - service_names: List of service names + service_names: List of service ids privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges verbose: Whether to print detailed output max_retries: Maximum retry attempts @@ -282,7 +283,7 @@ def create_policy_builder_graph( config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm roles privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - service_names: List of service names + service_names: List of service ids Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow @@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ class PolicyBuilder: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm role names privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to their available privileges - service_names: List of service names + service_names: List of service ids graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine """ @@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ def __init__( {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} for r in roles_models ] - services = config_api.get_services() + services: list[Service] = config_api.get_services() self.privileges_map = {} self.service_names = [] for service in services: @@ -421,15 +422,16 @@ def __init__( # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): continue - print (f"Service {service.id} added: {service.description}") - self.privileges_map[service.id] = { + service_name = service.name or service.id + print (f"Service {service_name} added: {service.description}") + self.privileges_map[service.name] = { "service_type": service.type, - "roles": [ - {"name": role.name, "description": role.description or ""} - for role in service.roles + "scopes": [ + {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description or ""} + for scope in service.scopes ], } - self.service_names.append(service.id) + self.service_names.append(service_name) # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( @@ -642,19 +644,19 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): } # Generate a separate rego file for each service - for service_name in services_in_policy: + for service_id in services_in_policy: policy_rego = generate_policy_rego( policy_structure, - service_name, + service_id, service_types, description ) # Sanitize service name for filename (replace special chars with underscores) - safe_service_name = service_name.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') - policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_name}.rego" + safe_service_id = service_id.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') + policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_id}.rego" with open(policy_path, 'w') as f: f.write(policy_rego) - print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_name}' saved to {policy_path}") + print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_id}' saved to {policy_path}") # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 6c6382424..70fed83ce 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Generates a partial access control policy that contains only the rules relevant for a single specified Keycloak service. Inputs are a natural -language policy description and a service ID; output is a YAML policy +language policy description and a service name; output is a YAML policy with realm-role → service-role mappings scoped to that service. Workflow: @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( results into the {role to privileges} structure used by _build_policy. Args: - state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_id') + state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_name') llm: LLM instance realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] service_type: Service type (e.g. 'Tool', 'Agent') — property of the service, not each privilege @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( Returns: Updated ServicePolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation """ - service_id = state["service_id"] + service_name = state["service_name"] mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations: list[str] = [] @@ -84,18 +84,18 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( for privilege in privileges: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state["description"], - service_name=service_id, + service_name=service_name, privilege=privilege, realm_roles=realm_roles, ) if result.get("explanation"): - explanations.append(f"{service_id}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}") + explanations.append(f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}") for realm_role_name in result.get("real_roles_with_access", []): realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { - "service": service_id, + "service": service_name, "privilege": privilege["name"], } ) @@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ def _generate_yaml(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: Returns: Updated ServicePolicyState with yaml_output """ - service_id = state.get("service_id", "") + service_name = state.get("service_name", "") header = ( "# Partial Access Control Policy\n" - f"# Scoped to service: {service_id}\n" + f"# Scoped to service: {service_name}\n" "# Maps realm roles to the privileges they may access.\n\n" ) @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ def _validate_policy( state: ServicePolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - service_id: str, + service_name: str, service_type: str, privileges: list, verbose: bool, @@ -185,10 +185,10 @@ def _validate_policy( """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - service_names = [service_id] + service_names = [service_name] privileges_map = { - service_id: { + service_name: { "service_type": service_type, "roles": privileges, } @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ def _should_retry(state: ServicePolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, - service_id: str, + service_name: str, service_type: str, privileges: list, ): @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( Args: config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] - service_id: Target Keycloak service ID + service_name: Service name service_type: Service type (e.g. 'Tool', 'Agent') — property of the service privileges: Privileges of the target service [{name, description}] @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ def generate_yaml_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: def validate_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_id, service_type, privileges, + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_name, service_type, privileges, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ class ServicePolicyBuilder: """ AI-powered policy builder scoped to a single Keycloak service. - Given a natural language policy description and a service ID, produces + Given a natural language policy description and a service name, produces a YAML access control policy that contains only the realm-role → privilege mappings relevant to that service. @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ class ServicePolicyBuilder: def __init__( self, - service_id: str, + service_name: str, realm: str = "demo", config_path: Optional[Path] = None, llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, @@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ def __init__( ): """ Args: - service_id: Keycloak service ID to scope the policy to - realm: Keycloak realm name (empty string uses the default realm) + service_name: service name to scope the policy to + realm: realm name config_path: Path to the AC config YAML; falls back to AC_CONFIG_PATH env var llm: LangChain LLM instance; created automatically if not provided verbose: Print LLM explanations and validation details @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ def __init__( if config_path is not None: os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) - self.service_id = service_id + self.service_name = service_name self.config = ServicePolicyBuilderConfig( llm=llm_instance, verbose=verbose, @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ def __init__( self.service_type: str = "Tool" # Default to "Tool" if not found self.privileges = [] for service in services: - if service.id != service_id: + if service.id != service_name: continue # Handle None case by defaulting to "Tool" self.service_type = service.type or "Tool" @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ def __init__( self.graph = create_service_policy_builder_graph( self.config, self.realm_roles, - self.service_id, + self.service_name, self.service_type, self.privileges, ) @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: """ initial_state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": description, - "service_id": self.service_id, + "service_name": self.service_name, "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], "policy_structure": {}, diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py index c8d361621..37dda5f42 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): Attributes: description: Natural language policy description - service_id: Keycloak service ID to scope the policy to + service_name: Keycloak service name to scope the policy to explanation: LLM explanation of the privilege mappings parsed_scopes: List of {role, privileges} mappings (realm-role to privileges) policy_structure: Structured policy dict ready for YAML conversion @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded """ description: str - service_id: str + service_name: str explanation: str parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] policy_structure: Dict[str, Any] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py index 6197a0836..d8d624700 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class SinglePrivilegeState(TypedDict): Attributes: policy_description: Natural language policy description (context for the mapping) - service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege + service_id: Name of the service that owns the privilege privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege to analyze realm_roles: List of available realm roles with descriptions explanation: LLM's explanation of which real roles should have access @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ class SinglePrivilegeState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded """ policy_description: str - service_name: str + service_id: str privilege: Dict[str, str] realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]] explanation: str From 7b7a02558721e101235e8e9fad2c183c127a068f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 16:32:39 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 095/273] fix: use service account user for realm role operations on services GET /services/{id}/roles: call get_client_service_account_user to resolve the SA user, then get_realm_roles_of_user on the extracted id. Keycloak 400 (service account not enabled) returns [] instead of 502. POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id}: same SA lookup, then assign_realm_roles. Unit tests updated to match the service account pattern: - TestListServiceRoles (was TestGetServicePermissions): asserts both get_client_service_account_user and get_realm_roles_of_user calls - TestAssignRoleToService: asserts get_client_service_account_user then assign_realm_roles; error tests target the correct mock methods - TestKeycloakErrorProduces502.test_get_service_permissions: now raises on get_client_service_account_user (the first call in the chain) Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 2 ++ .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 32 +++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 4bfd4cb91..115bc904d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin user_id = sa_user["id"] return admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id) except KeycloakError as e: + if e.response_code == 400: + return [] return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 496f7c914..368024c39 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -93,17 +93,29 @@ def test_returns_object_with_realm_and_service_mappings(self): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# GET /services/{service_id}/permissions +# GET /services/{service_id}/roles # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestGetServicePermissions: +class TestListServiceRoles: def test_returns_json_array(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-user-id"} + admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json() == [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + admin.get_client_service_account_user.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.assert_called_once_with("sa-user-id") + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="not found", response_code=404 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() @@ -513,15 +525,16 @@ def teardown_method(self): class TestAssignRoleToService: def test_returns_201_on_success(self): admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-user-id"} resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 201 - admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope.assert_called_once_with( - "svc-uuid", [{"id": "role-id"}] - ) + admin.get_client_service_account_user.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + admin.assign_realm_roles.assert_called_once_with("sa-user-id", [{"id": "role-id"}]) def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-user-id"} + admin.assign_realm_roles.side_effect = KeycloakError( error_message="Conflict", response_code=409 ) resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") @@ -529,7 +542,8 @@ def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-user-id"} + admin.assign_realm_roles.side_effect = KeycloakError( error_message="failure", response_code=500 ) resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") @@ -577,7 +591,7 @@ def test_get_subject_assignments(self): def test_get_service_permissions(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/roles?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 def test_get_role_composites(self): From c6393849b7e582a9dc87489f5b3bc8721b45c216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 18:01:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 096/273] feat: Add serviceId field to Service model from Keycloak clientId MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add serviceId: str | None = None to the Service Pydantic model, populated from the Keycloak clientId by _resolve_keycloak_fields. This exposes the human-readable client identifier alongside the opaque UUID stored in id. - models.py: new field + validator logic (reuses existing client_id local) - read_api_from_config.py: YAML-backed get_services() passes serviceId through - test_models.py: two new tests + updated existing assertions (43 → 45) - test_configuration.py: new test asserting serviceId populated via HTTP path - library.md: Service field table updated Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md | 1 + aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py | 5 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 9 ++++++--- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 10 ++++++++++ aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 12 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index aebc8f493..c81514899 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). | Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | |-------|------|----------------|---------| | `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `serviceId` | `str \| None` | `clientId` | `None` | | `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | | | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | `None` | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py index 46d1d142b..f2a7d59c4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ class Service(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") id: str + serviceId: str | None = None name: str | None = None description: str | None = None enabled: bool @@ -51,6 +52,10 @@ def _resolve_keycloak_fields(cls, data: Any) -> Any: if client_id and (not name or str(name).startswith("${")): updates["name"] = client_id + # Surface Keycloak's human-readable clientId as serviceId (id stays the UUID). + if client_id and not data.get("serviceId"): + updates["serviceId"] = client_id + # Resolve service type: explicit Keycloak attribute takes precedence, # then SPIFFE-format clientId implies an agent workload. if data.get("type") is None: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index 83fbf03d3..15e4562cb 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -93,11 +93,12 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: for service in services_raw: if isinstance(service, dict): service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or "" + service_id_field = service.get("serviceId") or service.get("service_id") or None name = service.get("name") or None description = service.get("description") or None enabled = service.get("enabled", True) service_type = service.get("type") or None - + # Parse roles for this service roles_raw = service.get("roles", []) roles = [] @@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: else: role_name = str(role) role_description = None - + if role_name: roles.append( Role( @@ -120,15 +121,17 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: ) else: service_id = str(service) + service_id_field = None name = None description = None enabled = True service_type = None roles = [] - + result.append( Service( id=service_id, + serviceId=service_id_field, name=name, description=description, enabled=enabled, diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 988826352..fb52f2a7c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -163,6 +163,16 @@ def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): {"params": {"realm": REALM}}, ) + def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "mlflow", "enabled": True}] + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([])], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() + assert result[0].serviceId == "mlflow" + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index 1c85af159..71840df7b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -187,11 +187,22 @@ def test_scopes_default_empty(self): s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) assert s.scopes == [] + def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "clientId": "my-app"} + ) + assert s.serviceId == "my-app" + + def test_serviceId_none_when_clientId_absent(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + assert s.serviceId is None + def test_no_clientId_field(self): s = Service.model_validate( {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "clientId": "my-app"} ) assert not hasattr(s, "clientId") + assert s.serviceId == "my-app" def test_no_protocol_field(self): s = Service.model_validate( @@ -383,6 +394,7 @@ def test_service_keycloak_system_client_account(self): } ) assert s.id == "account-client-uuid" + assert s.serviceId == "account" assert s.name == "account" assert s.description == "${client_account_description}" assert s.enabled is True From 191a2a86e6b8d7b3dc41e56ab2962baad9a3fcde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 18:10:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 097/273] feat: Print serviceId in show_keycloak_data.py services output Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index b1138e051..6340011c6 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ def main() -> None: for svc in services: status = "enabled" if svc.enabled else "disabled" print(f" id={svc.id}") + print(f" serviceId : {svc.serviceId or '—'}") print(f" name : {svc.name or '—'}") print(f" description : {svc.description or '—'}") print(f" status : {status}") From f27e77a29b55a660e5f1748540063133bc36e71c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 18:40:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 098/273] fix: populate Scope descriptions and Role details in get_services get_services() now calls get_scopes() and get_roles() upfront to obtain fully-populated objects, then filters them by ID for each service instead of using the bare dicts returned by the per-service endpoints (which lack description and mappedScopes fields). Tests updated to reflect the new call sequence and two new tests added to cover scope description and role detail propagation. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py | 8 +++- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 41 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index 2664f2215..7b45d5ddf 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) + all_scopes = {s.id: s for s in self.get_scopes()} + all_roles = {r.id: r for r in self.get_roles()} services = [] for raw in resp.json(): service_id = raw["id"] @@ -67,7 +69,11 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() ) self._check(scopes_resp) - services.append(Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles_resp.json(), "scopes": scopes_resp.json()})) + service_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in roles_resp.json()} + roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] + service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} + scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] + services.append(Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes})) return services def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index fb52f2a7c..767456f08 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -148,12 +148,15 @@ def test_raises_if_composites_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): class TestGetServices: + # Call order: GET /services, GET /scopes (get_scopes), GET /roles (get_roles), + # GET /services/{id}/roles, GET /services/{id}/scopes — per service. + def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([])], + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([])], ) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert isinstance(result[0], Service) @@ -168,11 +171,37 @@ def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self, monkeypatch): payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "mlflow", "enabled": True}] with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([])], + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([])], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert result[0].serviceId == "mlflow" + def test_scope_descriptions_populated_from_get_scopes(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] + service_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_scopes), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok(service_scopes)], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() + assert result[0].scopes[0].description == "Read access" + + def test_role_details_populated_from_get_roles(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] + service_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}] + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(all_roles), _ok(role_scopes), _ok(service_roles), _ok([])], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() + assert result[0].roles[0].name == "viewer" + assert result[0].roles[0].mappedScopes[0].description == "Read access" + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): @@ -430,7 +459,6 @@ class TestRealmParameter: @pytest.mark.parametrize("method,endpoint", [ ("get_subjects", "subjects"), ("get_roles", "roles"), - ("get_services", "services"), ("get_scopes", "scopes"), ]) def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): @@ -439,6 +467,13 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): getattr(Configuration.for_realm(REALM), method)() m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/{endpoint}", params={"realm": REALM}) + def test_get_services_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + from unittest.mock import call + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() + assert call(f"{BASE}/services", params={"realm": REALM}) in m.call_args_list + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Default URL fallback From ca057b12b37a9bf449942715a347d2548346415f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 09:34:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 099/273] fixes for new api Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 10 +++-- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 38 ++++++++++++------- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 1 - 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 6977b5b2d..bf1124a9f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -409,11 +409,13 @@ def __init__( config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) roles_models = config_api.get_roles() + print (f"Got {len(roles_models)} roles") self.realm_roles = [ {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} for r in roles_models ] services = config_api.get_services() + print (f"Got {len(services)} services") self.privileges_map = {} self.service_names = [] for service in services: @@ -421,15 +423,17 @@ def __init__( # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): continue - print (f"Service {service.id} added: {service.description}") - self.privileges_map[service.id] = { + print (f"Service {service.name} added: {service.description}") + print (f"Service {service}") + self.privileges_map[service.name] = { "service_type": service.type, "roles": [ {"name": role.name, "description": role.description or ""} for role in service.roles ], } - self.service_names.append(service.id) + print (f"{service.name} , {service.name} -> {service.type} {service.roles}") + self.service_names.append(service.name) # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index 2a5f64148..34f2d340b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -265,7 +265,6 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( def build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, - service_name: str, privilege: Dict[str, str], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], real_roles_with_access: List[str], @@ -275,7 +274,6 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description - service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned @@ -285,7 +283,7 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( """ privilege_name = privilege['name'] privilege_desc = privilege.get('description', '') - privilege_info = privilege_name + (f" ({privilege_desc})" if privilege_desc else "") + privilege_info = privilege_name + (f": {privilege_desc}" if privilege_desc else "") realm_roles_context = "\n".join( f" - {r['name']}" + (f": {r.get('description', '')}" if r.get('description') else "") @@ -300,8 +298,7 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( {policy_description} PRIVILEGE BEING ANALYZED: - Service: {service_name} - Privilege: {privilege_info} + {privilege_info} CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this privilege): {assigned_roles} @@ -310,21 +307,36 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( {realm_roles_context} VALIDATION TASK: -Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to privilege '{privilege_name}' \ -from service '{service_name}' to realm roles [{assigned_roles}] is correct. +Verify whether the assigned realm roles are correct for privilege '{privilege_name}', \ +given the policy description AND the privilege's own name and description. + +CRITICAL RULES — read carefully before evaluating: + +1. DOMAIN CHECK FIRST: Determine the domain of this privilege from its name and description + (e.g., "GitHub repositories", "data warehouse", "UI dashboard"). + If the policy description does NOT explicitly address this privilege's domain, the mapping + cannot be evaluated against the policy — accept any assignment including empty and return + MAPPING_CORRECT: YES. + +2. DO NOT RE-DERIVE THE FULL MAPPING: You are verifying an existing mapping, not computing + a new one. Only flag the mapping as wrong if you can point to a specific privilege + description + policy statement that directly contradicts what was assigned. + +3. EMPTY IS VALID BY DEFAULT: An empty assignment [] is acceptable unless the privilege + description explicitly requires certain realm roles AND the policy confirms those users + need access to this specific privilege. -Consider: -- Are the correct user groups (realm roles) included? -- Are any user groups incorrectly included or excluded? -- Does the mapping match the access requirements stated in the policy description? +4. FOCUS ON THIS PRIVILEGE ONLY: Do not reason about what roles are required by the policy + in general. Only ask: "Is the mapping for THIS specific privilege consistent with its + description and the policy?" Respond in this EXACT format: MAPPING_CORRECT: YES -EXPLANATION: Brief explanation of why the mapping is correct. +EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. OR if incorrect: MAPPING_CORRECT: NO -EXPLANATION: Specific description of what is wrong with the mapping.""" +EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" def build_single_role_retry_prompt( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index 3bbdd08de..e8f418de0 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -352,7 +352,6 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( verification_prompt = build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), - service_name=state.get("service_name", ""), privilege=state["privilege"], realm_roles=state["realm_roles"], real_roles_with_access=real_roles_with_access, From 9f8f1821e6ac1b9b18e6e1e80835ed92eb3406d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 09:36:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 100/273] scopes initial Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 21 ++++++---- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 40 ++++++++++++------- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 4 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 2 +- .../onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 2 +- 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index ef8af0421..73dcd53c1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): - for privilege in service_info["roles"]: + for privilege in service_info["scopes"]: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state['description'], service_name=service_name, @@ -122,13 +122,13 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( if result.get('explanation'): explanations.append( - f"{service_id}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" + f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" ) for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { - 'service': service_id, + 'service': service_name, 'privilege': privilege['name'], } ) @@ -411,8 +411,9 @@ def __init__( roles_models = config_api.get_roles() self.realm_roles = [ - {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} + {"name": r.name, "description": r.description} for r in roles_models + if r.description ] services: list[Service] = config_api.get_services() self.privileges_map = {} @@ -424,12 +425,16 @@ def __init__( continue service_name = service.name or service.id print (f"Service {service_name} added: {service.description}") + described_scopes = [ + {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description} + for scope in service.scopes + if scope.description + ] + if not described_scopes: + continue self.privileges_map[service.name] = { "service_type": service.type, - "scopes": [ - {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description or ""} - for scope in service.scopes - ], + "scopes": described_scopes, } self.service_names.append(service_name) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index 2a5f64148..a4b0bd4d8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], privilege: Dict[str, str], policy_description: str = "", - service_name: str = "", ) -> str: """ Build a system prompt for mapping a single privilege to realm roles. @@ -26,7 +25,6 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege to analyze policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context - service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege Returns: Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption @@ -265,7 +263,6 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( def build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, - service_name: str, privilege: Dict[str, str], realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], real_roles_with_access: List[str], @@ -275,7 +272,6 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description - service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned @@ -285,7 +281,7 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( """ privilege_name = privilege['name'] privilege_desc = privilege.get('description', '') - privilege_info = privilege_name + (f" ({privilege_desc})" if privilege_desc else "") + privilege_info = privilege_name + (f": {privilege_desc}" if privilege_desc else "") realm_roles_context = "\n".join( f" - {r['name']}" + (f": {r.get('description', '')}" if r.get('description') else "") @@ -300,8 +296,7 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( {policy_description} PRIVILEGE BEING ANALYZED: - Service: {service_name} - Privilege: {privilege_info} + {privilege_info} CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this privilege): {assigned_roles} @@ -310,21 +305,36 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( {realm_roles_context} VALIDATION TASK: -Based on the policy description, verify if granting access to privilege '{privilege_name}' \ -from service '{service_name}' to realm roles [{assigned_roles}] is correct. +Verify whether the assigned realm roles are correct for privilege '{privilege_name}', \ +given the policy description AND the privilege's own name and description. -Consider: -- Are the correct user groups (realm roles) included? -- Are any user groups incorrectly included or excluded? -- Does the mapping match the access requirements stated in the policy description? +CRITICAL RULES — read carefully before evaluating: + +1. DOMAIN CHECK FIRST: Determine the domain of this privilege from its name and description + (e.g., "GitHub repositories", "data warehouse", "UI dashboard"). + If the policy description does NOT explicitly address this privilege's domain, the mapping + cannot be evaluated against the policy — accept any assignment including empty and return + MAPPING_CORRECT: YES. + +2. DO NOT RE-DERIVE THE FULL MAPPING: You are verifying an existing mapping, not computing + a new one. Only flag the mapping as wrong if you can point to a specific privilege + description + policy statement that directly contradicts what was assigned. + +3. EMPTY IS VALID BY DEFAULT: An empty assignment [] is acceptable unless the privilege + description explicitly requires certain realm roles AND the policy confirms those users + need access to this specific privilege. + +4. FOCUS ON THIS PRIVILEGE ONLY: Do not reason about what roles are required by the policy + in general. Only ask: "Is the mapping for THIS specific privilege consistent with its + description and the policy?" Respond in this EXACT format: MAPPING_CORRECT: YES -EXPLANATION: Brief explanation of why the mapping is correct. +EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. OR if incorrect: MAPPING_CORRECT: NO -EXPLANATION: Specific description of what is wrong with the mapping.""" +EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" def build_single_role_retry_prompt( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index 3bbdd08de..53f3488af 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -168,8 +168,7 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( system_prompt = build_single_role_system_prompt( state['realm_roles'], state['privilege'], - state.get('policy_description', ''), - state.get('service_name', ''), + state.get('policy_description', '') ) user_prompt = ( @@ -352,7 +351,6 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( verification_prompt = build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), - service_name=state.get("service_name", ""), privilege=state["privilege"], realm_roles=state["realm_roles"], real_roles_with_access=real_roles_with_access, diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py index d8d624700..6964be9ea 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ class SinglePrivilegeState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded """ policy_description: str - service_id: str + service_name: str privilege: Dict[str, str] realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]] explanation: str diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index beaf932b1..d5053e849 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def validate_policy_structure( f"Found empty privilege name for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" ) elif service in privileges_map: - privilege_names = [p['name'] for p in privileges_map[service]["roles"]] + privilege_names = [p['name'] for p in privileges_map[service]["scopes"]] if privilege not in privilege_names: available_privileges = ( ', '.join(privilege_names) From 7c2bf91b3b984a2032e68a1655fcf03fa07f2295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 08:45:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 101/273] better prompt Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 8 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 18 +- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 95 ++++++++- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 9 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 2 +- .../policy/utils/output_generators.py | 4 +- .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 180 ++++++++---------- aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml | 11 +- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 51 ++++- aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py | 78 +++++--- 10 files changed, 284 insertions(+), 172 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index b0da91836..cd0794959 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ For programmatic usage, import PolicyBuilder directly: from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder - builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=Path("config.yaml")) result = builder.generate_policy("policy description") """ @@ -78,9 +77,12 @@ def generate_policy_only( """ Args: policy_file: Path to file containing natural language policy description - config_path: Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML + config_path: Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML (when its is used for configuration reading) output_file: Path where generated YAML policy will be saved """ + + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) + if not policy_file.exists(): raise FileNotFoundError(f"Policy file not found: {policy_file}") @@ -98,7 +100,7 @@ def generate_policy_only( llm = create_llm(model_name=default_model, verbose=False) # Create PolicyBuilder with the LLM instance - builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_path, llm=llm) + builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=llm) print("=" * 80) print("Generating access rule from textual policy...") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index f3d6f7fe4..d0d2004a4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -366,7 +366,6 @@ class PolicyBuilder: def __init__( self, realm: str = "demo", - config_path: Optional[Path] = None, llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, verbose: bool = True, max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES @@ -376,14 +375,12 @@ def __init__( Args: realm: Realm name for fetching configuration data - config_path: Path to config YAML. If None, AC_CONFIG_PATH env var is used. llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. If not provided, creates a new LLM instance using create_llm() verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts Raises: - FileNotFoundError: If config_path doesn't exist yaml.YAMLError: If config file is invalid YAML """ # Store realm for later use @@ -397,9 +394,6 @@ def __init__( else: llm_instance = llm - if config_path is not None: - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) - # Create configuration object self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( llm=llm_instance, @@ -427,7 +421,6 @@ def __init__( continue service_name = service.name or service.id print (f"Service {service_name} added: {service.description}") - print (f"Service {service}") described_scopes = [ {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description} for scope in service.scopes @@ -487,7 +480,6 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred Example: - >>> builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=Path("config.yaml")) >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access") >>> if result["success"]: ... builder.save_policy("policy.yaml") @@ -652,19 +644,19 @@ def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): } # Generate a separate rego file for each service - for service_id in services_in_policy: + for service_name in services_in_policy: policy_rego = generate_policy_rego( policy_structure, - service_id, + service_name, service_types, description ) # Sanitize service name for filename (replace special chars with underscores) - safe_service_id = service_id.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') - policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_id}.rego" + safe_service_name = service_name.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') + policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_name}.rego" with open(policy_path, 'w') as f: f.write(policy_rego) - print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_id}' saved to {policy_path}") + print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_name}' saved to {policy_path}") # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index a4b0bd4d8..bd6104d91 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -147,7 +147,50 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - Use ONLY the exact role names from the "Available Real Roles" list - Do not modify, abbreviate, or create new role names +6. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY — FILTER BEFORE ANALYSIS: + The available realm roles list may contain a mix of role types. You MUST classify each role + before using it and ONLY include USER-FACING ROLES in real_roles_with_access. + + HOW TO CLASSIFY: + - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM + (e.g., "R&D team members", "Sales team members", "Technical support staff"). + These represent human principals who receive access. ONLY these are eligible. + - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE CAPABILITY — + phrases like "Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", "Enables X". + These represent service identities or token audiences, NOT human principals. + NEVER include them in real_roles_with_access. + - SYSTEM/INTERNAL ROLE: The description is a placeholder (e.g., starts with "${{"), + or the role is clearly an infrastructure / identity-provider internal construct. + NEVER include them in real_roles_with_access. + + NAMING CONFLICT WARNING: A realm role may share the same name or description as the + privilege being analysed. Do NOT assign the privilege to such a role on that basis alone. + Apply the classification above; if the role is a technical/capability or system role, exclude it. + TASK STEPS: +0. PRE-ANALYSIS CHECKS (two parts — do both before any further analysis): + a. PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: Determine whether the privilege being analyzed is a real + service capability or a system/internal identity-provider construct. + System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient to disqualify): + * Name starts with "default-roles-" (Keycloak default realm composite role) + * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", "internal", or is absent + and the name itself does not describe a service capability + * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure or identity-provider artifact rather than + a meaningful access scope (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) + If ANY indicator applies → you MUST still output the required fenced blocks below + with an empty list, then stop. Do NOT skip the JSON block. Do NOT continue to further steps. + + Required output when any indicator applies: + ```explanation + Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: [reason it is a system/internal privilege]. Returning [] immediately. + ``` + ```json + {{"privilege": "[privilege-name]", "real_roles_with_access": []}} + ``` + System/internal privileges must never be granted to any realm role. + b. PRE-FILTER REALM ROLES: Scan the full available realm roles list and identify ONLY the + USER-FACING ROLES (those describing human principals / teams). Record this filtered set. + All subsequent steps operate on this filtered set ONLY. 1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this privilege (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. Do NOT continue to the next steps. @@ -170,8 +213,10 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( 4. APPLY RULE: - ENABLING/GATEWAY: grant to ALL user categories that need the downstream resource - FINAL RESOURCE: grant only to categories with explicit access to this specific capability -5. MAP TO REALM ROLES: For each included user category, find matching realm role(s). -6. VERIFY: Every included user category maps to at least one realm role. +5. MAP TO REALM ROLES: For each included user category, find matching realm role(s) from the + USER-FACING ROLES identified in step 0. Do NOT use technical/capability or system roles. +6. VERIFY: Every included user category maps to at least one user-facing realm role, and no + technical/capability or system roles appear in the result. 7. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the domain check, classification, policy evidence, and mapping. 8. OUTPUT JSON: List of realm role names that should have access. @@ -258,6 +303,17 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( ```json {{"privilege": "github-agent", "real_roles_with_access": ["developer", "tech-support"]}} ``` + +Example E — system/internal privilege (starts with "default-roles-"): +```explanation +Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "default-roles-demo" starts with +"default-roles-", which marks it as a Keycloak default realm composite role — a +system/internal identity-provider construct, not a user-facing service capability. +Returning [] immediately. No further analysis is performed. +``` +```json +{{"privilege": "default-roles-demo", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +``` """ @@ -310,6 +366,17 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( CRITICAL RULES — read carefully before evaluating: +0. PRIVILEGE SYSTEM-ROLE CHECK (evaluated FIRST, overrides all other rules): + Determine whether the privilege is a system/internal identity-provider construct. + System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient): + * Name starts with "default-roles-" (Keycloak default realm composite role) + * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" + * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure artifact, not a service access scope + If ANY indicator applies: + - The ONLY correct mapping is an empty list []. + - If the current mapping is non-empty, respond MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and cite this rule. + - Do NOT evaluate the mapping against any other rules. + 1. DOMAIN CHECK FIRST: Determine the domain of this privilege from its name and description (e.g., "GitHub repositories", "data warehouse", "UI dashboard"). If the policy description does NOT explicitly address this privilege's domain, the mapping @@ -328,6 +395,12 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( in general. Only ask: "Is the mapping for THIS specific privilege consistent with its description and the policy?" +5. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY: Verify that every assigned role represents a human principal or + team (e.g., its description characterises a group of people such as "R&D team members"). + If any assigned role is a technical/capability role (description: "Access to X", + "Provides access to X", "Enables X") or a system/internal role (placeholder description + starting with "${{"), mark MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and explain which role is invalid. + Respond in this EXACT format: MAPPING_CORRECT: YES EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. @@ -356,13 +429,16 @@ def build_single_role_retry_prompt( return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. -Please provide the mapping again using ONLY these preset names: +You MUST output BOTH fenced code blocks below — the explanation block AND the json block. +Do NOT skip the json block, even when the list is empty. + - Available real roles: {", ".join(realm_role_names) if realm_role_names else "(none)"} - Privilege to analyze: {privilege_name} -Remember: Return a list of real role names that should have access to the privilege. +If the privilege is a system/internal role (e.g., name starts with "default-roles-"), +output an empty list in the json block and stop. -Return in this format: +Return in this format (both blocks are required): ```explanation [Your brief explanation] ``` @@ -370,9 +446,8 @@ def build_single_role_retry_prompt( ```json {{ "privilege": "{privilege_name}", - "real_roles_with_access": [ - "exact-realm-role-name-1", - "exact-realm-role-name-2" - ] + "real_roles_with_access": [] }} -```""" +``` + +Replace [] with the actual role names that should have access, or leave it empty if none.""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 70fed83ce..ebb581380 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ def _validate_policy( privileges_map = { service_name: { "service_type": service_type, - "roles": privileges, + "scopes": privileges, } } @@ -315,7 +315,6 @@ def __init__( self, service_name: str, realm: str = "demo", - config_path: Optional[Path] = None, llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, verbose: bool = True, max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, @@ -324,7 +323,6 @@ def __init__( Args: service_name: service name to scope the policy to realm: realm name - config_path: Path to the AC config YAML; falls back to AC_CONFIG_PATH env var llm: LangChain LLM instance; created automatically if not provided verbose: Print LLM explanations and validation details max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts @@ -335,9 +333,6 @@ def __init__( else: llm_instance = llm - if config_path is not None: - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) - self.service_name = service_name self.config = ServicePolicyBuilderConfig( llm=llm_instance, @@ -357,7 +352,7 @@ def __init__( self.service_type: str = "Tool" # Default to "Tool" if not found self.privileges = [] for service in services: - if service.id != service_name: + if service.serviceId != service_name: continue # Handle None case by defaulting to "Tool" self.service_type = service.type or "Tool" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py index 6964be9ea..6197a0836 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class SinglePrivilegeState(TypedDict): Attributes: policy_description: Natural language policy description (context for the mapping) - service_id: Name of the service that owns the privilege + service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege to analyze realm_roles: List of available realm roles with descriptions explanation: LLM's explanation of which real roles should have access diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py index 0273b88f1..623badf38 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, dict], scopes: list) -> s # Create a list of scope names for inclusion in privileges scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] - for service_id, service_info in privileges_map.items(): - rego_content += f'service["{service_id}"] := [\n' + for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): + rego_content += f'service["{service_name}"] := [\n' for priv in service_info["roles"]: priv_name = priv.get("name", "") priv_desc = priv.get("description", "") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index 15e4562cb..ed2865b15 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -28,15 +28,9 @@ def _load(self) -> dict: def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: config = self._load() - # Try "subjects" first, fall back to "users" for backward compatibility - subjects_raw = config.get("subjects", []) - if not subjects_raw: - subjects_raw = config.get("users", []) + subjects_raw = config.get("subjects", config.get("users", [])) - # Get realm roles for mapping - realm_roles_map = {} - for role in self.get_roles(): - realm_roles_map[role.name] = role + realm_roles_map = {role.name: role for role in self.get_roles()} result = [] for subject in subjects_raw: @@ -46,14 +40,13 @@ def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: username = subject.get("username") or subject_id if not subject_id or not username: continue - - # Parse roles for this subject - roles_raw = subject.get("roles", []) - roles = [] - for role_name in roles_raw: - if isinstance(role_name, str) and role_name in realm_roles_map: - roles.append(realm_roles_map[role_name]) - + + roles = [ + realm_roles_map[role_name] + for role_name in subject.get("roles", []) + if isinstance(role_name, str) and role_name in realm_roles_map + ] + result.append( Subject( id=subject_id, @@ -91,52 +84,64 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: services_raw = self._load().get("services", []) result = [] for service in services_raw: - if isinstance(service, dict): - service_id = service.get("id") or service.get("service_id") or service.get("serviceId") or "" - service_id_field = service.get("serviceId") or service.get("service_id") or None - name = service.get("name") or None - description = service.get("description") or None - enabled = service.get("enabled", True) - service_type = service.get("type") or None - - # Parse roles for this service - roles_raw = service.get("roles", []) - roles = [] - for role in roles_raw: - if isinstance(role, dict): - role_name = role.get("name", "") - role_description = role.get("description") or None - else: - role_name = str(role) - role_description = None - - if role_name: - roles.append( - Role( - id=role_name, - name=role_name, - description=role_description, - composite=False, - ) + if not isinstance(service, dict): + service_id = str(service) + result.append( + Service( + id=service_id, + serviceId=service_id, + enabled=True, + ) + ) + continue + + service_id = service.get("id") or "" + + roles = [] + for role in service.get("roles", []): + if isinstance(role, dict): + role_name = role.get("name", "") + role_description = role.get("description") or None + else: + role_name = str(role) + role_description = None + if role_name: + roles.append( + Role( + id=role_name, + name=role_name, + description=role_description, + composite=False, ) + ) + + # Scopes are explicit if provided; otherwise each role maps to a scope of the same name. + scopes_raw = service.get("scopes") + if scopes_raw is not None: + scopes = [ + Scope( + id=s["name"] if isinstance(s, dict) else str(s), + name=s["name"] if isinstance(s, dict) else str(s), + description=s.get("description") if isinstance(s, dict) else None, + ) + for s in scopes_raw + ] else: - service_id = str(service) - service_id_field = None - name = None - description = None - enabled = True - service_type = None - roles = [] + scopes = [ + Scope(id=r.name, name=r.name, description=r.description) + for r in roles + ] result.append( Service( id=service_id, - serviceId=service_id_field, - name=name, - description=description, - enabled=enabled, - type=service_type, + serviceId=service_id, + name=service.get("name") or None, + description=service.get("description") or None, + enabled=service.get("enabled", True), + type=service.get("type") or None, roles=roles, + scopes=scopes, ) ) return result @@ -144,51 +149,35 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: config = self._load() scopes_raw = config.get("scopes", []) - result = [] - - # If explicit scopes section exists, use it if scopes_raw: - for scope in scopes_raw: - if isinstance(scope, dict): - name = scope["name"] - description = scope.get("description") or None - else: - name = str(scope) - description = None - result.append( - Scope( - id=name, - name=name, - description=description, - ) + return [ + Scope( + id=s["name"] if isinstance(s, dict) else str(s), + name=s["name"] if isinstance(s, dict) else str(s), + description=s.get("description") if isinstance(s, dict) else None, ) - else: - # If no explicit scopes, derive from service roles (each role gets its own audience scope) - services_raw = config.get("services", []) - for service in services_raw: - if not isinstance(service, dict): - continue - roles = service.get("roles", service.get("permissions", [])) - for role in roles: - if isinstance(role, dict): - role_name = role.get("name") - if role_name: - result.append( - Scope( - id=role_name, - name=role_name, - description=role.get("description"), - ) - ) + for s in scopes_raw + ] + # Derive from service roles when no top-level scopes section exists. + seen: set[str] = set() + result = [] + for service in config.get("services", []): + if not isinstance(service, dict): + continue + for role in service.get("roles", service.get("permissions", [])): + if isinstance(role, dict): + role_name = role.get("name") + description = role.get("description") + else: + role_name = str(role) + description = None + if role_name and role_name not in seen: + seen.add(role_name) + result.append(Scope(id=role_name, name=role_name, description=description)) return result - def create_scope(self, service_id: str, scope_name: str, description: str) -> Scope: - """ - Create a new scope for a service. - Note: This implementation reads from a static config file and cannot persist changes. - This method is provided for API compatibility but will raise an error. - """ + def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: raise NotImplementedError( "create_scope is not supported when reading from a static config file. " "Use the HTTP-based Configuration class instead." @@ -210,4 +199,3 @@ def get_services(realm: str) -> list[Service]: def get_scopes(realm: str) -> list[Scope]: return Configuration.for_realm(realm).get_scopes() - diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml index 067e2afad..295392dbc 100644 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml +++ b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml @@ -2,21 +2,21 @@ # Each service can have multiple roles, each role gets its own audience scope # Optional 'secret' parameter: if not provided, Keycloak will auto-generate the service secret services: - - service_id: "kagenti" + - id: "kagenti" type: "Agent" secret: "demo-ui-secret" direct_access_grants: true roles: - name: "demo-ui" description: "Access to the demo UI interface" - - service_id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" + - id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" type: "Agent" secret: "github-agent-secret" direct_access_grants: true roles: - name: "github-agent" description: "Provides access to GitHub services" - - service_id: "github-tool" + - id: "github-tool" type: "Tool" secret: "github-tool-secret" roles: @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ realm_roles: - name: "sales" description: "Sales team members managing customer relationships" -# User configurations -users: +# Subjects (users/workloads) +subjects: - username: "alice" roles: - "developer" @@ -47,4 +47,3 @@ users: - username: "charlie" roles: - "sales" - diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index c14862fd0..7e60764ee 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ 3. Run: pytest test/test_policy_generation.py::test_generate_policy_from_fixtures -v """ +import os import pytest import yaml from pathlib import Path @@ -67,7 +68,20 @@ def llm_model_name(request): @pytest.fixture def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - """Create LLM instance from YAML config.""" + """Create LLM instance from YAML config, skip if the endpoint is unreachable.""" + import socket + from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml + cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) + if cfg.endpoint: + parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) + host = parsed.hostname or "" + port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) + try: + with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): + pass + except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: + pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) @@ -137,8 +151,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, if not policy_files: pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + # Create PolicyBuilder instance with the parametrized LLM - builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) + builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) failures = [] @@ -180,10 +196,17 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) if not match: + explanation = result.get("explanation", "") + explanation_lines = ( + "\n LLM explanation:\n" + + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in explanation.splitlines()) + if explanation else "" + ) failures.append( f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " "policy mismatch:\n" + "\n".join(f" - {diff}" for diff in differences) + + explanation_lines ) except Exception as exc: @@ -250,9 +273,10 @@ def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): ``` """ mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) # Create PolicyBuilder with mock LLM - builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) + builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) # Generate policy result = builder.generate_policy("Invalid policy description") @@ -265,22 +289,31 @@ def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): """PolicyBuilder initializes correctly with config file.""" - builder = PolicyBuilder(config_path=config_file, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + + builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) # Verify configuration was loaded # realm_roles are now dicts with 'name' and 'description' realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in builder.realm_roles] - assert realm_role_names == ["developer", "tech-support", "sales"] + assert "developer" in realm_role_names + assert "tech-support" in realm_role_names + assert "sales" in realm_role_names # Verify services were loaded assert "kagenti" in builder.privileges_map assert "github-tool" in builder.privileges_map assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.privileges_map - # Verify privileges are dicts with 'name' and 'description' - kagenti_privileges = builder.privileges_map["kagenti"] - assert len(kagenti_privileges) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(priv, dict) and 'name' in priv for priv in kagenti_privileges) + # privileges_map values are {service_type, scopes} — service_type is per-service, not per-scope + kagenti_info = builder.privileges_map["kagenti"] + assert isinstance(kagenti_info, dict) + assert "service_type" in kagenti_info + assert "scopes" in kagenti_info + assert len(kagenti_info["scopes"]) > 0 + assert all(isinstance(r, dict) and 'name' in r for r in kagenti_info["scopes"]) + # service_type must not appear inside individual scope entries + assert all('service_type' not in r for r in kagenti_info["scopes"]) # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py index 76bdf0b79..1f6c7e404 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py @@ -19,13 +19,14 @@ 3. Run: pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py::test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures -v """ +import os import pytest import yaml from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock from service_policy_agent import ServicePolicyBuilder -from service_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy, _filter_and_extract_scopes +from service_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState from config import create_llm @@ -69,7 +70,20 @@ def llm_model_name(request): @pytest.fixture def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - """Create LLM instance from YAML config.""" + """Create LLM instance from YAML config, skip if the endpoint is unreachable.""" + import socket + from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml + cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) + if cfg.endpoint: + parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) + host = parsed.hostname or "" + port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) + try: + with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): + pass + except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: + pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) @@ -142,7 +156,7 @@ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure (bypasses LLM).""" state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", - "service_id": "github-tool", + "service_name": "github-tool", "explanation": "Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", "policy_structure": { "policy": { @@ -178,7 +192,7 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): """_build_policy assembles policy_structure correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", - "service_id": "github-tool", + "service_name": "github-tool", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [ { @@ -219,7 +233,7 @@ def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): """_build_policy produces an empty policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", - "service_id": "kagenti", + "service_name": "kagenti", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], "policy_structure": {}, @@ -236,14 +250,15 @@ def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): """ServicePolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified service.""" + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) - assert builder.service_id == "github-tool" + assert builder.service_name == "github-tool" # Realm roles come from config regardless of scoping realm_role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.realm_roles] assert "developer" in realm_role_names @@ -257,12 +272,17 @@ def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): assert "demo-ui" not in privilege_names assert "github-agent" not in privilege_names + # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges + assert hasattr(builder, "service_type") + assert builder.service_type != "" + assert all("service_type" not in p for p in builder.privileges) + def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock_llm): """ServicePolicyBuilder with an unknown service_id yields an empty privilege list.""" + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="does-not-exist", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="does-not-exist", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -272,9 +292,10 @@ def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -310,10 +331,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file, mock_llm): "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" ) mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -334,10 +355,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" ) mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -355,10 +376,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_service_only(config_file, mock_llm): "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" ) mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -384,10 +405,10 @@ def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): ``` """ mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -421,10 +442,10 @@ def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_service_role(config_file, ``` """ mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - config_path=config_file, + service_name="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -463,9 +484,10 @@ def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy # Collect all service IDs from config config_data = yaml.safe_load((config_file).read_text()) - all_service_ids = [c["service_id"] for c in config_data.get("services", [])] + all_service_ids = [c["id"] for c in config_data.get("services", [])] failures = [] + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) for policy_file in policy_files: policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() @@ -484,8 +506,7 @@ def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy try: builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id=service_id, - config_path=config_file, + service_name=service_id, llm=llm_instance, verbose=False, ) @@ -502,10 +523,17 @@ def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy match, diffs = compare_policies(generated_partial, expected_partial) if not match: + explanation = result.get("explanation", "") + explanation_lines = ( + "\n LLM explanation:\n" + + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in explanation.splitlines()) + if explanation else "" + ) failures.append( f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " "policy mismatch:\n" + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in diffs) + + explanation_lines ) except Exception as exc: From 663469ca595137e2578238c94e74c7ba768f6b5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 10:46:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 102/273] minor prompt fixes for weaker models Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 7 +-- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 52 +++++++++++++++++-- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 5 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 23 ++++---- 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index d0d2004a4..56a5fb40f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -120,12 +120,13 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( realm_roles=realm_roles, ) - if result.get('explanation'): + roles_with_access = result.get('real_roles_with_access', []) + if roles_with_access and result.get('explanation'): explanations.append( f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" ) - for realm_role_name in result.get('real_roles_with_access', []): + for realm_role_name in roles_with_access: realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { 'service': service_name, @@ -420,7 +421,7 @@ def __init__( if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): continue service_name = service.name or service.id - print (f"Service {service_name} added: {service.description}") + print (f"Service {service_name} added: <{service.description}> <{service.type}>") described_scopes = [ {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description} for scope in service.scopes diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index bd6104d91..a3511c7da 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -172,11 +172,22 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( a. PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: Determine whether the privilege being analyzed is a real service capability or a system/internal identity-provider construct. System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient to disqualify): - * Name starts with "default-roles-" (Keycloak default realm composite role) + * Name starts with "default-roles-" (identity-provider default realm composite role) * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", "internal", or is absent and the name itself does not describe a service capability * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure or identity-provider artifact rather than a meaningful access scope (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) + * The privilege's primary function is to MODIFY TOKEN STRUCTURE or ENABLE A CLIENT + AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM rather than to grant access to a downstream resource. + Indicators of this pattern: + - Description says "add X to the access token" or "adds X to the token" + (the privilege is modifying what goes into a token, not granting resource access) + - Description says "scope for a client enabled for [some mechanism]" + (the privilege enables a client-side authentication mechanism, not resource access) + - Description says "adds claims", "adds X claims to", "authentication context", + "allowed web origins to the access token" + ANY of these indicate an identity-provider infrastructure scope — NOT a service + capability. Treat them the same as offline_access or uma_authorization. If ANY indicator applies → you MUST still output the required fenced blocks below with an empty list, then stop. Do NOT skip the JSON block. Do NOT continue to further steps. @@ -191,6 +202,11 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( b. PRE-FILTER REALM ROLES: Scan the full available realm roles list and identify ONLY the USER-FACING ROLES (those describing human principals / teams). Record this filtered set. All subsequent steps operate on this filtered set ONLY. + CRITICAL: A role whose description says "Access to X", "Access to the X interface", + "Access to X services", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", or similar + service-capability phrases is a TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE, NOT a human principal, + even if the role name might imply users (e.g., "demo-ui" → description "Access to the + demo UI interface" → TECHNICAL, exclude it). Do NOT include such roles as user-facing. 1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this privilege (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. Do NOT continue to the next steps. @@ -307,13 +323,36 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Example E — system/internal privilege (starts with "default-roles-"): ```explanation Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "default-roles-demo" starts with -"default-roles-", which marks it as a Keycloak default realm composite role — a -system/internal identity-provider construct, not a user-facing service capability. +"default-roles-", which marks it as an identity-provider default realm composite role — +a system/internal construct, not a user-facing service capability. Returning [] immediately. No further analysis is performed. ``` ```json {{"privilege": "default-roles-demo", "real_roles_with_access": []}} ``` + +Example F — token-modifying scope (adds origins/claims to the token, not a service capability): +```explanation +Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "web-origins" has description +"add allowed web origins to the access token". Its primary function is to modify +token structure — it adds data to the token rather than granting access to any +downstream resource or service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure scope. +Returning [] immediately. +``` +```json +{{"privilege": "web-origins", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +``` + +Example G — client-mechanism scope (enables an authentication mechanism, not resource access): +```explanation +Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "service_account" has description +"Specific scope for a client enabled for service accounts". Its function is to enable +a client authentication mechanism, not to grant access to a downstream resource or +service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure scope. Returning [] immediately. +``` +```json +{{"privilege": "service_account", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +``` """ @@ -369,9 +408,14 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( 0. PRIVILEGE SYSTEM-ROLE CHECK (evaluated FIRST, overrides all other rules): Determine whether the privilege is a system/internal identity-provider construct. System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient): - * Name starts with "default-roles-" (Keycloak default realm composite role) + * Name starts with "default-roles-" (identity-provider default realm composite role) * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure artifact, not a service access scope + * Description says "add X to the access token", "adds X to the token", + "adds X claims", or "add allowed ... to the access token" — the privilege modifies + token structure rather than granting resource access + * Description says "scope for a client enabled for [mechanism]" — the privilege + enables a client authentication mechanism, not resource access If ANY indicator applies: - The ONLY correct mapping is an empty list []. - If the current mapping is non-empty, respond MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and cite this rule. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index ebb581380..6d7502f42 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -89,10 +89,11 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( realm_roles=realm_roles, ) - if result.get("explanation"): + roles_with_access = result.get("real_roles_with_access", []) + if roles_with_access and result.get("explanation"): explanations.append(f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}") - for realm_role_name in result.get("real_roles_with_access", []): + for realm_role_name in roles_with_access: realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { "service": service_name, diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index 53f3488af..a5d6ab18c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -189,23 +189,20 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( response = llm.invoke(messages) content = response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content) - - # Print explanation if available - print_explanation_single_role(explanation, verbose=verbose) - + # Retry once if parsing failed if not parsed_data: retry_prompt = build_single_role_retry_prompt( state['realm_roles'], state['privilege'] ) - + retry_messages = [ *messages, response, HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt) ] - + retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) retry_content = ( retry_response.content @@ -213,17 +210,14 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( else str(retry_response.content) ) explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(retry_content) - - # Print retry explanation - print_explanation_single_role(explanation, is_retry=True, verbose=verbose) - + # If still failed after retry, raise exception if not parsed_data: raise ValueError( f"Failed to parse valid JSON from LLM response after retry.\n" f"Last response: {retry_content[:500]}..." ) - + # Extract real roles with access # Handle both dict format (new) and list format (old/mock) if isinstance(parsed_data, dict): @@ -233,6 +227,11 @@ def _analyze_role_mapping( real_roles_with_access = parsed_data else: real_roles_with_access = [] + + # Only print the explanation when the privilege was actually mapped to roles. + # Privileges filtered out at step 0a always return [] — their explanations are noise. + if real_roles_with_access: + print_explanation_single_role(explanation, verbose=verbose) # Return updated state return { @@ -366,7 +365,7 @@ def _verify_semantic_mapping( mapping_correct = mapping_match.group(1).upper() == 'YES' if mapping_match else False explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() if explanation_match else content - if verbose: + if verbose and (real_roles_with_access or not mapping_correct): status = 'YES' if mapping_correct else 'NO' print( f"\nSemantic verification [{state['service_name']}/{state['privilege']['name']}]:" From c4166188a073d51b1a73055061f199e1ed8b77bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 10:01:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 103/273] fix: Infer Service type from description in get_services Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index 7b45d5ddf..d63940bb4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -73,7 +73,15 @@ def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] - services.append(Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes})) + # TEMP: infer type from description when not set by Keycloak attributes + desc = raw.get("description") or "" + inferred_type: str | None = None + if "Agent" in desc: + inferred_type = "Agent" + elif "Tool" in desc: + inferred_type = "Tool" + patch = {"type": inferred_type} if inferred_type and not raw.get("type") else {} + services.append(Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes, **patch})) return services def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: From 4eda0669febd4b7ab2abf7813c85c4de9e31204e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 10:37:50 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 104/273] refactor: remove per-request realm override from PDP Configuration Service get_admin() now returns the startup singleton unconditionally; realm is fixed to the KEYCLOAK_REALM environment variable. Remove the Query import and the dual-path realm/no-realm logic. Update docs and PRDs accordingly: install guide API reference, component PRD, and main PRD section 7.1. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 2 +- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 4 ++-- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 3 +-- .../aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 13 +++---------- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 0e9fec33b..d7aad43f9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 PDP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless, no caching. Supports per-request realm override via optional `?realm=` query parameter. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless, no caching. Realm is fixed to the `KEYCLOAK_REALM` environment variable; there is no per-request realm override. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. **Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index 950ddf094..10417ec34 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned to the service. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. -Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. +All endpoints use the realm configured via the `KEYCLOAK_REALM` environment variable. There is no per-request realm override. All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ ## `main.py` behaviour notes - Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. -- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. When `realm` is `None` it returns the startup singleton; when `realm` is set it returns a new `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm. +- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency with no parameters — it returns the startup singleton. - Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` — returns realm roles assigned to the service via the client-scope mapping API (not `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions). diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md index d3281fbbc..82c1f4021 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md @@ -133,8 +133,7 @@ kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml ## API reference -All endpoints accept an optional `?realm=<realm>` query parameter. When supplied, the request -uses a per-request `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm instead of the default startup realm. +All endpoints use the realm configured via the `KEYCLOAK_REALM` environment variable. | Method | Path | Description | |--------|------|-------------| diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 115bc904d..99941ad63 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from pathlib import Path from dotenv import load_dotenv -from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query +from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError from pydantic import BaseModel @@ -11,15 +11,8 @@ _admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None -def get_admin(realm: str | None = Query(None)) -> KeycloakAdmin: - if realm is None: - return _admin - return KeycloakAdmin( - server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], - realm_name=realm, - username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], - password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - ) +def get_admin() -> KeycloakAdmin: + return _admin @asynccontextmanager From 62e2c1d1c638c09663748fbb0d3ea97276dba231 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 11:20:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 105/273] feat: per-request realm support with lazy KeycloakAdmin cache in PDP Configuration Service - Replace fixed KEYCLOAK_REALM singleton with lazy dict[str, KeycloakAdmin] cache - All endpoints now require ?realm=<realm> query param; 422 if absent - Add KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM env var (user_realm_name for all KeycloakAdmin instances) - Remove KEYCLOAK_REALM from configuration service env; no startup pre-warm - Thread-safe double-checked locking on cache misses - Update PRD, pdp-configuration-service.md, and k8s dev manifest Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 5 +-- .../components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 8 ++--- aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml | 2 +- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 33 ++++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index d7aad43f9..0862adf88 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 PDP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless, no caching. Realm is fixed to the `KEYCLOAK_REALM` environment variable; there is no per-request realm override. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. **Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ Four separate manifest files: | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. +Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The PDP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. ### Docker images @@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ metadata: data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index 10417ec34..6f08afd25 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned to the service. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. -All endpoints use the realm configured via the `KEYCLOAK_REALM` environment variable. There is no per-request realm override. +All endpoints require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter specifying the Keycloak realm to operate in. Returns `422 Unprocessable Entity` if the parameter is absent. All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): | Variable | Required | Description | |----------|----------|-------------| | `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | -| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Yes | Realm name, e.g. `kagenti` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Yes | Realm where the admin credentials live, e.g. `master` | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | @@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ ## `main.py` behaviour notes -- Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. -- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency with no parameters — it returns the startup singleton. +- Maintain a `dict[str, KeycloakAdmin]` cache keyed by realm name, protected by a `threading.Lock`. +- `get_admin(realm: str = Query(...))` is a FastAPI dependency. On each call it checks the cache; on a miss it acquires the lock, double-checks, and constructs a new `KeycloakAdmin(realm_name=realm, user_realm_name=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM, ...)`. FastAPI returns `422` automatically if `realm` is absent. - Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` — returns realm roles assigned to the service via the client-scope mapping API (not `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions). diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml index 318ecd47f..b6dcc05b9 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ metadata: namespace: aiac-system data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" - KEYCLOAK_REALM: "master" + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" --- # Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 99941ad63..4f4ce8f66 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -1,30 +1,39 @@ import os +import threading from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from pathlib import Path from dotenv import load_dotenv -from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI +from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError from pydantic import BaseModel from starlette.responses import JSONResponse -_admin: KeycloakAdmin | None = None +_cache: dict[str, KeycloakAdmin] = {} +_lock = threading.Lock() -def get_admin() -> KeycloakAdmin: - return _admin +def _get_or_create_admin(realm: str) -> KeycloakAdmin: + if realm not in _cache: + with _lock: + if realm not in _cache: + _cache[realm] = KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=realm, + user_realm_name=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"], + username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + return _cache[realm] + + +def get_admin(realm: str = Query(...)) -> KeycloakAdmin: + return _get_or_create_admin(realm) @asynccontextmanager -async def _lifespan(application: FastAPI): - global _admin +async def _lifespan(_app: FastAPI): load_dotenv(Path(__file__).parent / ".env") - _admin = KeycloakAdmin( - server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], - realm_name=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_REALM"], - username=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], - password=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - ) yield From 44c08fbcca59b96fe74975e69d780c8fb1e4a589 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 11:25:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 106/273] test: update config service tests for required realm param and lazy cache - Replace test_no_realm_returns_200 with test_missing_realm_returns_422 (realm is now a required Query(...) parameter; 422 returned before dependency runs) - Rename test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin to test_realm_param_creates_admin_with_admin_realm; swap KEYCLOAK_REALM env var for KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM and assert user_realm_name is passed to KeycloakAdmin - Replace test_startup_creates_singleton_with_keycloak_realm with test_second_request_same_realm_hits_cache; verifies the lazy dict cache (_cache) prevents a second KeycloakAdmin construction for the same realm - Update test_realm_override_uses_per_realm_admin to use KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM and clear _cache in setup to avoid cross-test pollution - Import _cache from main and call _cache.clear() in all affected teardowns Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 43 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 368024c39..e194ff97a 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError -from aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import app, get_admin +from aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import app, get_admin, _cache REALM = "kagenti" @@ -193,25 +193,24 @@ def teardown_method(self): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Realm query parameter: optional, singleton at startup +# Realm query parameter: required, lazy per-realm cache # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class TestRealmQueryParam: - def test_no_realm_returns_200(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_users.return_value = [] - app.dependency_overrides[get_admin] = lambda realm=None: admin + def test_missing_realm_returns_422(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() resp = TestClient(app).get("/subjects") - assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.status_code == 422 - def test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin(self): + def test_realm_param_creates_admin_with_admin_realm(self): + _cache.clear() app.dependency_overrides.clear() admin_mock = MagicMock() admin_mock.get_users.return_value = [] env = { "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", - "KEYCLOAK_REALM": "master", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM": "master", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } @@ -220,30 +219,35 @@ def test_realm_param_creates_per_realm_admin(self): with TestClient(app) as client: resp = client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 - # First call is the startup singleton; second is per-realm - calls = mock_cls.call_args_list - per_realm = [c for c in calls if c.kwargs.get("realm_name") == REALM] - assert len(per_realm) == 1 + mock_cls.assert_called_once_with( + server_url="http://keycloak:8080/", + realm_name=REALM, + user_realm_name="master", + username="admin", + password="admin", + ) - def test_startup_creates_singleton_with_keycloak_realm(self): + def test_second_request_same_realm_hits_cache(self): + _cache.clear() app.dependency_overrides.clear() admin_mock = MagicMock() admin_mock.get_users.return_value = [] env = { "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", - "KEYCLOAK_REALM": "master", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM": "master", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: with TestClient(app) as client: - pass # lifespan runs - startup_calls = [c for c in mock_cls.call_args_list if c.kwargs.get("realm_name") == "master"] - assert len(startup_calls) == 1 + client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") + client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") + assert mock_cls.call_count == 1 def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() + _cache.clear() # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -412,13 +416,14 @@ def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): assert "error" in resp.json() def test_realm_override_uses_per_realm_admin(self): + _cache.clear() app.dependency_overrides.clear() admin_mock = MagicMock() admin_mock.create_client_scope.return_value = "s1" admin_mock.get_client_scope.return_value = {"id": "s1", "name": "x"} env = { "KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://keycloak:8080/", - "KEYCLOAK_REALM": "master", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM": "master", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME": "admin", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } From 53e5eff4a70a5b73f58a743af8e151217b1a2f28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 11:41:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 107/273] fix: remove realm query param from /health, use KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM /health no longer requires a ?realm= query parameter. It now calls _get_or_create_admin directly with os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"], making the endpoint zero-config for readiness probes. TestHealth updated to patch _get_or_create_admin instead of the get_admin FastAPI dependency; adds test_uses_admin_realm_env_var to pin the env-var lookup behaviour. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 3 ++- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 4f4ce8f66..28103ded0 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -208,7 +208,8 @@ def create_scope_standalone(body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(g @app.get("/health") -def health(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +def health(): + admin = _get_or_create_admin(os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]) try: admin.get_server_info() return {"status": "ok"} diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index e194ff97a..e2117c661 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -255,10 +255,15 @@ def teardown_method(self): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +_HEALTH_ENV = {"KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM": "master"} +_HEALTH_TARGET = "aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main._get_or_create_admin" + + class TestHealth: def test_returns_200_when_keycloak_reachable(self): admin = MagicMock() - resp = _make_client(admin).get("/health") + with patch(_HEALTH_TARGET, return_value=admin), patch.dict(os.environ, _HEALTH_ENV): + resp = TestClient(app).get("/health") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json() == {"status": "ok"} admin.get_server_info.assert_called_once() @@ -268,14 +273,19 @@ def test_returns_503_when_keycloak_unreachable(self): admin.get_server_info.side_effect = KeycloakError( error_message="connection refused", response_code=503 ) - resp = _make_client(admin).get("/health") + with patch(_HEALTH_TARGET, return_value=admin), patch.dict(os.environ, _HEALTH_ENV): + resp = TestClient(app).get("/health") assert resp.status_code == 503 body = resp.json() assert body["status"] == "unavailable" assert "error" in body - def teardown_method(self): - app.dependency_overrides.clear() + def test_uses_admin_realm_env_var(self): + admin = MagicMock() + with patch(_HEALTH_TARGET, return_value=admin) as mock_factory, \ + patch.dict(os.environ, {"KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM": "master"}): + TestClient(app).get("/health") + mock_factory.assert_called_once_with("master") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From e9923907c69d34d2ebc5c9a81ebbd175f2d85f10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 11:46:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 108/273] docs: update PRD and component spec for /health realm-param removal MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit /health no longer requires ?realm= — uses KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM directly. Updated in: - requirements/PRD.md (section 7.1) - requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md (endpoint table, realm-param paragraph, main.py behaviour notes) Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 0862adf88..30c5f49e5 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 PDP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. **Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md index 6f08afd25..afd16af92 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Retur | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | | POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/scope-mappings/realm` | Assign existing role to service | +| GET | `/health` | `admin.get_server_info()` — uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`; no `?realm=` param | Readiness probe | `GET /services/{service_id}`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)`. @@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned to the service. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. -All endpoints require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter specifying the Keycloak realm to operate in. Returns `422 Unprocessable Entity` if the parameter is absent. +All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter specifying the Keycloak realm to operate in. Returns `422 Unprocessable Entity` if the parameter is absent. `/health` accepts no realm parameter — it calls `_get_or_create_admin(os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"])` directly. All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. @@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ - Maintain a `dict[str, KeycloakAdmin]` cache keyed by realm name, protected by a `threading.Lock`. - `get_admin(realm: str = Query(...))` is a FastAPI dependency. On each call it checks the cache; on a miss it acquires the lock, double-checks, and constructs a new `KeycloakAdmin(realm_name=realm, user_realm_name=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM, ...)`. FastAPI returns `422` automatically if `realm` is absent. -- Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. +- All endpoints except `/health` declare `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. `/health` calls `_get_or_create_admin` directly with `os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]` — no FastAPI dependency, no realm query param. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` — returns realm roles assigned to the service via the client-scope mapping API (not `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions). - `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. From 0217d2fe17872fe624f5be129d87d2c73ee31437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 20:38:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 109/273] feat: add get_service and refactor service enrichment into _build_service helper - Add Configuration.get_service(service_id) to expose GET /services/{service_id} with the same role/scope enrichment as get_services() - Extract duplicated per-service enrichment logic into _build_service() - Add _all_roles_map() / _all_scopes_map() helpers so callers pre-fetch once Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py | 65 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index d63940bb4..d85b09676 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -53,36 +53,47 @@ def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: roles.append(Role.model_validate(role_data)) return roles + def _build_service(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role], all_scopes: dict[str, Scope]) -> Service: + service_id = raw["id"] + roles_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/roles", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(roles_resp) + scopes_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(scopes_resp) + service_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in roles_resp.json()} + roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] + service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} + scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] + # TEMP: infer type from description when not set by Keycloak attributes + desc = raw.get("description") or "" + inferred_type: str | None = None + if "Agent" in desc: + inferred_type = "Agent" + elif "Tool" in desc: + inferred_type = "Tool" + patch = {"type": inferred_type} if inferred_type and not raw.get("type") else {} + return Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes, **patch}) + + def _all_roles_map(self) -> dict[str, Role]: + return {r.id: r for r in self.get_roles()} + + def _all_scopes_map(self) -> dict[str, Scope]: + return {s.id: s for s in self.get_scopes()} + def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) - all_scopes = {s.id: s for s in self.get_scopes()} - all_roles = {r.id: r for r in self.get_roles()} - services = [] - for raw in resp.json(): - service_id = raw["id"] - roles_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/roles", params=self._params() - ) - self._check(roles_resp) - scopes_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() - ) - self._check(scopes_resp) - service_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in roles_resp.json()} - roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] - service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} - scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] - # TEMP: infer type from description when not set by Keycloak attributes - desc = raw.get("description") or "" - inferred_type: str | None = None - if "Agent" in desc: - inferred_type = "Agent" - elif "Tool" in desc: - inferred_type = "Tool" - patch = {"type": inferred_type} if inferred_type and not raw.get("type") else {} - services.append(Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes, **patch})) - return services + all_roles = self._all_roles_map() + all_scopes = self._all_scopes_map() + return [self._build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes) for raw in resp.json()] + + def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: + resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}", params=self._params()) + self._check(resp) + return self._build_service(resp.json(), self._all_roles_map(), self._all_scopes_map()) def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) From 4c4bac8618c3f1471ca600452b6f64f4bf8182a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 20:46:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 110/273] docs: add get_service and document _build_service refactor in library PRD Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/library.md | 30 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index c81514899..41ba28ed4 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ class Configuration: def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: ... def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: ... def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: ... def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: ... def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: ... @@ -165,15 +166,25 @@ Read methods (`get_subjects`, `get_scopes`): 2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 3. Parse the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). -`get_services()` — enriched read (N+1 per service): -1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch all services. -2. For each service, issue two additional requests to populate `Service.roles` and `Service.scopes`: - - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` → `Service.roles` - - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=<self.realm>` → `Service.scopes` -3. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. -4. Return `list[Service]` with `roles` and `scopes` populated. +`get_services()` — fully-enriched read: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch the base service list. +2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` once upfront to build `{id: Role}` and `{id: Scope}` lookup maps (includes composite roles and scope mappings). +3. For each service, delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)` which issues: + - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` → filter `all_roles` map → `Service.roles` + - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=<self.realm>` → filter `all_scopes` map → `Service.scopes` +4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +5. Return `list[Service]` with fully-enriched `roles` (including `childRoles` and `mappedScopes`) and `scopes` (including `description`). + +> **Performance note:** `get_services()` issues 2N + 1 + (roles overhead) HTTP requests where N is the number of services. `get_roles()` is called once and its fully-enriched objects are shared across all services. If this becomes a bottleneck, enrichment should be moved server-side. + +`get_service(service_id)` — fetch a single service with the same full enrichment: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service_id}?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch the single service. +2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` to build lookup maps (same as `get_services()`). +3. Delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)`. +4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +5. Return a single enriched `Service`. -> **Performance note:** `get_services()` issues 2N+1 HTTP requests where N is the number of services. If this becomes a bottleneck, the service's `GET /services` endpoint should be enriched server-side instead. `Service.roles` elements are not further hydrated (their `mappedScopes` are empty); call `get_roles()` for fully hydrated role objects. +> **Note:** Callers that previously called `get_services()` and filtered by ID should be switched to `get_service(service_id)` to avoid fetching the full list. `get_roles()` — enriched read (2 extra calls per role): 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch all realm roles. @@ -224,8 +235,7 @@ for s in subjects: print(s.username, s.email) scope = cfg.create_scope(scope_name="read", scope_description="Read access") -services = cfg.get_services() -service = next(s for s in services if s.id == "abc123") +service = cfg.get_service("abc123") # preferred over get_services() + filter updated_service = cfg.map_scope_to_service(service, scope) role = cfg.create_role(role_name="reader", role_description="Read-only access") From fa139e7c5370080ce1aad86eade55342581fff7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 21:10:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 111/273] test: add TestGetService and TestSetServiceType; fix TestGetServices mock order MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add TestGetService (6 tests) covering enriched-service return, TEMP type-inference from description, non-2xx on primary fetch / service-roles / service-scopes calls, and realm forwarded on every request. Add TestSetServiceType (5 tests) covering correct PATCH URL, body key "type" (not "kagenti.service.type"), Service return type, realm param, and non-2xx raises. Fix two pre-existing TestGetServices failures: mock side_effect order had scopes before roles, but _build_service refactor (commit 7591338) flipped the order — roles (_all_roles_map) are now fetched before scopes. Update the stale call-order comment accordingly. 244 unit tests, 0 failures. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 154 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 150 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 767456f08..9666a6b81 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ def test_raises_if_composites_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): class TestGetServices: - # Call order: GET /services, GET /scopes (get_scopes), GET /roles (get_roles), - # GET /services/{id}/roles, GET /services/{id}/scopes — per service. + # Call order: GET /services, GET /roles (get_roles, + per-role secondary calls), + # GET /scopes (get_scopes), GET /services/{id}/roles, GET /services/{id}/scopes — per service. def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ def test_scope_descriptions_populated_from_get_scopes(self, monkeypatch): service_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_scopes), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok(service_scopes)], + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(all_scopes), _ok([]), _ok(service_scopes)], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert result[0].scopes[0].description == "Read access" @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ def test_role_details_populated_from_get_roles(self, monkeypatch): service_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}] with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(all_roles), _ok(role_scopes), _ok(service_roles), _ok([])], + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok(role_scopes), _ok([]), _ok(service_roles), _ok([])], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert result[0].roles[0].name == "viewer" @@ -209,6 +209,152 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_service +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Call order: GET /services/{id}, GET /roles (+ per-role /scopes calls), +# GET /scopes, GET /services/{id}/roles, GET /services/{id}/scopes + + +class TestGetService: + SERVICE_ID = "svc-001" + + def test_returns_single_enriched_service(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] + all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] + service_roles = [{"id": "r1"}] + service_scopes = [{"id": "s1"}] + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 + _ok(all_roles), # GET /roles + _ok(role_scopes), # GET /roles/viewer/scopes + _ok(all_scopes), # GET /scopes + _ok(service_roles), # GET /services/svc-001/roles + _ok(service_scopes), # GET /services/svc-001/scopes + ], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + assert isinstance(result, Service) + assert result.id == self.SERVICE_ID + assert result.roles[0].name == "viewer" + assert result.scopes[0].name == "read:data" + + def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-agent", "description": "An Agent service", "enabled": True} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 + _ok([]), # GET /roles + _ok([]), # GET /scopes + _ok([]), # GET /services/svc-001/roles + _ok([]), # GET /services/svc-001/scopes + ], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + assert result.type == "Agent" + + def test_raises_when_primary_fetch_returns_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(404)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + + def test_raises_when_service_roles_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 + _ok([]), # GET /roles + _ok([]), # GET /scopes + _err(500), # GET /services/svc-001/roles → error + ], + ): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + + def test_raises_when_service_scopes_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 + _ok([]), # GET /roles + _ok([]), # GET /scopes + _ok([]), # GET /services/svc-001/roles → ok + _err(500), # GET /services/svc-001/scopes → error + ], + ): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + + def test_realm_forwarded_on_every_request(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(raw), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), + ], + ) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + for c in m.call_args_list: + assert c[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# set_service_type +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestSetServiceType: + SERVICE_ID = "svc-001" + + def test_issues_patch_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services/{self.SERVICE_ID}" + + def test_json_body_uses_type_key(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") + assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"type": "Agent"} + + def test_returns_service_instance(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") + assert isinstance(result, Service) + assert result.type == "Tool" + + def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") + assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_err()): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_scopes # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From 9a1d7d999c7a271a736ea66d477f4024bd5dfa87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 19:11:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 112/273] model Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 41 +-- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 336 ++++++------------ .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 16 +- .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 142 +++++--- .../policy/service_policy_agent/state.py | 11 +- .../policy/utils/output_generators.py | 103 +++++- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 90 +++-- aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py | 128 ++++--- 8 files changed, 487 insertions(+), 380 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index cd0794959..9b7818a71 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm +from utils.output_generators import save_policy, save_policy_rego load_dotenv(dotenv_path="aiac.env", override=True) @@ -108,34 +109,30 @@ def generate_policy_only( print(f"\nPolicy file: {policy_file}") print(f"\nDescription:\n{policy_text}\n") - result = builder.generate_policy(description=policy_text) - - if result["success"]: - print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") - print("Generated YAML:") - print("-" * 80) - print(builder.get_yaml_output()) - print("-" * 80) - builder.save_policy(output_file) - - # Generate Rego policy files - print("\nGenerating Rego policy files...") - rego_dir = Path(output_file).parent / "rego_policy" - builder.save_policy_rego(str(rego_dir)) - else: - print("✗ Policy generation failed with errors:") - for error in result["errors"]: - print(f" - {error}") + try: + policy = builder.generate_policy(description=policy_text) + except ValueError as exc: + print(f"✗ Policy generation failed: {exc}") + return + + print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") + print("Generated YAML:") + print("-" * 80) + print(builder.get_yaml_output()) + print("-" * 80) + save_policy(policy, output_file) + + print("\nGenerating Rego policy files...") + rego_dir = Path(output_file).parent / "rego_policy" + save_policy_rego(policy, str(rego_dir), realm=builder.realm) print("\n" + "=" * 80) print("Parsed Role-to-Privilege Mappings:") print("=" * 80) - for role_mapping in result["parsed_scopes"]: - realm_role = role_mapping["role"] - privileges = role_mapping.get("privileges", []) + for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items(): print(f" {realm_role}:") for priv in privileges: - print(f" - {priv['service']}: {priv['privilege']}") + print(f" - {priv.name}: {', '.join(svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id for svc in priv.services)}") def main() -> None: gen_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 56a5fb40f..496e5b358 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ """ from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service -from typing import Dict, Any, Optional +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge +from typing import Optional, Dict, Any from pathlib import Path import os import sys @@ -47,14 +48,7 @@ from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure -from utils.output_generators import ( - generate_yaml_output, - generate_realm_roles_rego, - generate_privileges_rego, - generate_default_inbound_rego, - generate_default_outbound_rego, - generate_policy_rego, -) +from utils.output_generators import generate_yaml_output @dataclass @@ -85,7 +79,8 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, privileges_map: dict, - verbose: bool + verbose: bool, + services_by_name: Dict[str, Service], ) -> PolicyState: """ Map each privilege to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate @@ -95,12 +90,16 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, privileges: [...]}. + The 'service' key in each privilege dict holds a Service object (not a string) + so that _build_policy can construct a typed Policy directly. + Args: state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field llm: LLM instance for processing realm_roles: List of available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges verbose: Whether to print detailed output + services_by_name: Mapping of service name → Service object Returns: Updated PolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation @@ -108,10 +107,11 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations = [] - # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": X, "privilege": Y} dicts + # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": Service, "privilege": str} dicts realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): + service_obj = services_by_name.get(service_name) for privilege in service_info["scopes"]: result = mapper.map_role( policy_description=state['description'], @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( for realm_role_name in roles_with_access: realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { - 'service': service_name, + 'service': service_obj, 'privilege': privilege['name'], } ) @@ -152,31 +152,37 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( def _build_policy(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: """ - Build structured policy dictionary from extracted role mappings. - - This is the second node in the workflow. - + Build a typed Policy model from extracted role mappings. + + Reads parsed_scopes (where each privilege dict carries a Service object + under 'service') and produces a Policy with Priviledge objects grouped + by privilege name so each Priviledge holds a list of Service objects. + Args: state: PolicyState with 'parsed_scopes' field - + Returns: - Updated PolicyState with 'policy_structure' field + Updated PolicyState with 'policy_structure' set to a Policy instance """ - policy = {} - - # Transform parsed scopes into policy structure + raw: Dict[str, list] = {} for role_info in state["parsed_scopes"]: role_name = role_info.get("role", "") privileges = role_info.get("privileges", []) - policy[role_name] = privileges - - # Wrap in policy structure - policy_structure = {"policy": policy} - - return { - **state, - "policy_structure": policy_structure - } + priv_to_services: Dict[str, list] = {} + for p in privileges: + svc = p["service"] # Service object stored by _parse_and_extract_scopes + priv_to_services.setdefault(p["privilege"], []).append(svc) + raw[role_name] = [ + Priviledge(name=priv_name, services=svcs) + for priv_name, svcs in priv_to_services.items() + ] + + policy = Policy( + name=state["description"], + policy=raw, + explanation=state.get("explanation", ""), + ) + return {**state, "policy_structure": policy} @@ -190,14 +196,14 @@ def _validate_policy( max_retries: int ) -> PolicyState: """ - Validate the generated policy structure and verify it matches the description. + Validate the generated Policy model against structural rules. - This is the fourth and final node in the workflow. It performs structural - validation and semantic verification. + Converts the Policy back to a raw dict for validate_policy_structure, + which expects {realm_role: [{"service": str, "privilege": str}]}. Args: - state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure' and 'description' - llm: LLM instance for semantic verification + state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure' as a Policy instance + llm: LLM instance (reserved for future semantic verification) realm_roles: List of available realm roles service_names: List of service names privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges @@ -208,17 +214,27 @@ def _validate_policy( Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - - # Perform structural validation + policy_obj: Optional[Policy] = state.get("policy_structure") + + if policy_obj is None: + raw_policy: Dict[str, Any] = {} + else: + raw_policy = { + realm_role: [ + {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + for priv in privileges + for svc in priv.services + ] + for realm_role, privileges in policy_obj.policy.items() + } + structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy, + raw_policy, realm_roles, service_names, privileges_map ) - - # If there are structural errors and we can retry, trigger retry + if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: return { **state, @@ -226,8 +242,7 @@ def _validate_policy( "validation_passed": False, "retry_count": retry_count + 1 } - - # Return final result; semantic validation is handled per-privilege in SingleRoleMapper + return { **state, "errors": structural_errors, @@ -272,44 +287,39 @@ def create_policy_builder_graph( config: PolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, privileges_map: dict, - service_names: list + service_names: list, + services_by_name: Dict[str, Service], ): """ Create and compile the policy builder graph. - Following LangGraph patterns, this function separates graph construction - from the agent class, making it easier to test and visualize. - Args: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance realm_roles: List of available realm roles privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges service_names: List of service names + services_by_name: Mapping of service name → Service object (threaded into + _parse_and_extract_scopes so parsed_scopes carries Service objects) Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow """ - # Define node functions as closures with access to config def parse_and_extract_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """Parse natural language and extract privilege mappings.""" return _parse_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, privileges_map, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, privileges_map, config.verbose, services_by_name ) def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """Build structured policy from mappings.""" return _build_policy(state) - + def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """Validate structure and semantics.""" return _validate_policy( state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_names, privileges_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) - + def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: - """Determine if validation should retry.""" return _should_retry_validation(state, config.max_retries) # Build the graph @@ -415,12 +425,13 @@ def __init__( print (f"Got {len(services)} services") self.privileges_map = {} self.service_names = [] + self.services_by_name: Dict[str, Service] = {} for service in services: # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): continue - service_name = service.name or service.id + service_name = service.name or service.id print (f"Service {service_name} added: <{service.description}> <{service.type}>") described_scopes = [ {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description} @@ -429,18 +440,19 @@ def __init__( ] if not described_scopes: continue - self.privileges_map[service.name] = { + self.privileges_map[service_name] = { "service_type": service.type, "scopes": described_scopes, } self.service_names.append(service_name) + self.services_by_name[service_name] = service - # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( self.config, self.realm_roles, self.privileges_map, - self.service_names + self.service_names, + self.services_by_name, ) # ======================================================================== @@ -463,201 +475,75 @@ def get_graph(self): # PUBLIC API METHODS # ======================================================================== - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Policy: """ Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. - + This is the main public API method. It executes the complete workflow. - + Args: description: Natural language description of the access control policy - + Returns: - Dictionary containing: - - policy_structure (dict): Structured policy data - - parsed_scopes (list): Raw role-to-privilege mappings from LLM - - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) - - success (bool): True if generation succeeded without errors - - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred - + Policy model instance with the generated policy and explanation. + + Raises: + ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. + Example: - >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access") - >>> if result["success"]: - ... builder.save_policy("policy.yaml") + >>> policy = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access") """ - # Initialize the workflow state initial_state: PolicyState = { "description": description, "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], - "policy_structure": {}, + "policy_structure": None, "yaml_output": "", "messages": [], "errors": [], "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True + "validation_passed": True, } - - # Execute the LangGraph workflow + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - # Store the policy structure and description for later use - self._last_policy_structure = final_state["policy_structure"] - self._last_description = description - - # Extract and return results - return { - "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], - "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], - "explanation": final_state.get("explanation", ""), - "errors": final_state["errors"], - "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, - "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0) - } + + errors = final_state.get("errors", []) + if errors: + raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") + + self._last_policy_structure: Optional[Policy] = final_state["policy_structure"] + + return final_state["policy_structure"] def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: """ - Generate YAML output from the stored policy structure. - - This method generates YAML on demand from the stored policy structure. + Generate YAML output from the stored Policy model. + Must be called after generate_policy(). - + Returns: Complete YAML policy file content with comments - - Raises: - ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet - """ - if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure'): - raise ValueError("No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") - - description = getattr(self, '_last_description', "") - return generate_yaml_output(self._last_policy_structure, description) - def save_policy(self, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml"): - """ - Save the generated policy YAML to a file. - - Uses the last generated policy from instance state (_last_policy_structure). - - Args: - filepath: Output file path (default: "access_control_policy.yaml") - - Raises: - ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet - """ - yaml_output = self.get_yaml_output() - - with open(filepath, 'w') as f: - f.write(yaml_output) - print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") - - def save_policy_rego(self, file_dir: str = "rego_policy"): - """ - Save Rego files with realm roles, privileges maps, and generated policy from configuration. - - Uses the last generated policy from instance state (_last_policy_structure and _last_description). - - Creates multiple Rego files: - - realm_roles.rego: Maps user names to lists of realm role names - - generated_policy_<service>.rego: One access control policy file per service - - Args: - file_dir: Directory to save Rego files (default: "rego_policy") - Raises: ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet """ - # Get policy_structure and description from instance state - if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure'): - raise ValueError("No policy structure available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") - - policy_structure = self._last_policy_structure - description = getattr(self, '_last_description', "") - - # At this point, policy_structure is guaranteed to be a dict - assert policy_structure is not None, "policy_structure should not be None after the check above" - - # Create directory if it doesn't exist - dir_path = Path(file_dir) - dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - - user_to_roles = {} - - # Get all subjects and their role assignments - config_api = Configuration.for_realm(self.realm) - subjects = config_api.get_subjects() - for subject in subjects: - user_to_roles[subject.username] = [ - role.name for role in subject.roles - ] - - # Fetch scopes (if available in config) - scopes = [] - try: - scopes = config_api.get_scopes() - except Exception: - # If no scopes in config, that's okay - we'll just have empty scope lists - pass - - # Generate realm_roles.rego from users with their realm roles - realm_roles_rego = generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles) - realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" - with open(realm_roles_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(realm_roles_rego) - print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") - - # Generate privileges.rego from self.privileges_map with scopes - # privileges_rego = generate_privileges_rego(self.privileges_map, scopes) - # privileges_path = dir_path / "privileges.rego" - # with open(privileges_path, 'w') as f: - # f.write(privileges_rego) - # print(f"Privileges Rego saved to {privileges_path}") - - # Generate default.rego with deny-by-default behavior - default_rego_inbound_path = dir_path / "default_inbound.rego" - with open(default_rego_inbound_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(generate_default_inbound_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_rego_inbound_path}") - - # Generate default.rego with deny-by-default behavior - default_rego_outbound_path = dir_path / "default_outbound.rego" - with open(default_rego_outbound_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(generate_default_outbound_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_rego_outbound_path}") - - - # Generate one policy rego file per service - # First, collect all services that appear in the policy - policy = policy_structure.get("policy", {}) - services_in_policy = set() - for role_name, privileges in policy.items(): - for priv in privileges: - service = priv.get("service", "") - if service: - services_in_policy.add(service) - - # Build service_types from privileges_map — service_type is a property of - # the service, not of individual privileges, so it is not stored in the policy. - service_types = { - svc_id: svc_info["service_type"] - for svc_id, svc_info in self.privileges_map.items() - } + if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure') or self._last_policy_structure is None: + raise ValueError("No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") - # Generate a separate rego file for each service - for service_name in services_in_policy: - policy_rego = generate_policy_rego( - policy_structure, - service_name, - service_types, - description - ) - # Sanitize service name for filename (replace special chars with underscores) - safe_service_name = service_name.replace('/', '_').replace('\\', '_').replace(' ', '_') - policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_service_name}.rego" - with open(policy_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(policy_rego) - print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_name}' saved to {policy_path}") + policy = self._last_policy_structure + return generate_yaml_output( + { + "policy": { + realm_role: [ + {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + for priv in privileges + for svc in priv.services + ] + for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() + } + }, + policy.name, + ) # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py index 5dc0a583a..356e57faa 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py @@ -6,22 +6,22 @@ workflow for policy generation. """ -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any, Optional from operator import add +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + class PolicyState(TypedDict): """ State dictionary for the policy building LangGraph workflow. - - This TypedDict defines the state that flows through the state machine. - Each node in the graph can read from and write to these fields. - + Attributes: description: Original natural language policy description explanation: LLM's explanation of how it mapped the policy - parsed_scopes: List of role-to-privilege mappings built by aggregating SingleRoleMapper results - policy_structure: Structured policy dictionary ready for YAML conversion + parsed_scopes: List of role-to-privilege mappings; each privilege dict + carries a 'service' key holding a Service object (not a string) + policy_structure: Fully constructed Policy model (set by _build_policy) yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ class PolicyState(TypedDict): description: str explanation: str parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] - policy_structure: Dict[str, Any] + policy_structure: Optional[Policy] yaml_output: str messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py index 6d7502f42..2eeb17815 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry. """ -from typing import Dict, Any, Optional +from typing import Optional from pathlib import Path import os import sys @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure @@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( state: ServicePolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - service_type: str, + service: Optional[Service], privileges: list, verbose: bool, ) -> ServicePolicyState: @@ -64,11 +66,14 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( Run SingleRoleMapper for every privilege of the target service and invert the results into the {role to privileges} structure used by _build_policy. + The 'service' key in each privilege dict holds the Service object (not a string) + so that _build_policy can construct a typed Policy directly. + Args: state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_name') llm: LLM instance realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - service_type: Service type (e.g. 'Tool', 'Agent') — property of the service, not each privilege + service: Service object for this scope (None if service was not found in config) privileges: Privileges belonging to the target service [{'name': str, 'description': str}] verbose: Whether to print detailed output @@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( for realm_role_name in roles_with_access: realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( { - "service": service_name, + "service": service, # Service object — may be None if service not found "privilege": privilege["name"], } ) @@ -119,21 +124,40 @@ def _filter_and_extract_scopes( def _build_policy(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: """ - Assemble the structured policy dict from parsed_scopes. + Build a typed Policy model from parsed_scopes. + + Each privilege dict carries a Service object under 'service'; privileges + are grouped by name so each Priviledge holds a list of Service objects. Returns: - Updated ServicePolicyState with policy_structure + Updated ServicePolicyState with policy_structure set to a Policy instance """ - policy: dict = {} + raw: dict = {} for entry in state["parsed_scopes"]: - policy[entry["role"]] = entry["privileges"] + role_name = entry["role"] + priv_to_services: dict = {} + for p in entry["privileges"]: + svc = p["service"] # Service object stored by _filter_and_extract_scopes + priv_to_services.setdefault(p["privilege"], []).append(svc) + raw[role_name] = [ + Priviledge(name=priv_name, services=svcs) + for priv_name, svcs in priv_to_services.items() + ] - return {**state, "policy_structure": {"policy": policy}} + policy = Policy( + name=state["description"], + policy=raw, + explanation=state.get("explanation", ""), + ) + return {**state, "policy_structure": policy} def _generate_yaml(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: """ - Render the policy structure as a YAML string with explanatory comments. + Render the Policy model as a YAML string with explanatory comments. + + Converts policy_structure (a Policy instance) to a plain dict before + passing to yaml.dump so the output matches the expected YAML format. Returns: Updated ServicePolicyState with yaml_output @@ -157,8 +181,23 @@ def _generate_yaml(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" header += "\n" + policy_obj: Optional[Policy] = state.get("policy_structure") + if policy_obj is None: + policy_dict: dict = {"policy": {}} + else: + policy_dict = { + "policy": { + realm_role: [ + {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + for priv in privileges + for svc in priv.services + ] + for realm_role, privileges in policy_obj.policy.items() + } + } + yaml_content = yaml.dump( - state["policy_structure"], + policy_dict, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False, allow_unicode=True, @@ -173,20 +212,35 @@ def _validate_policy( llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, service_name: str, - service_type: str, + service: Optional[Service], privileges: list, verbose: bool, max_retries: int, ) -> ServicePolicyState: """ - Structural validation of the generated policy. + Structural validation of the generated Policy model. + + Converts the Policy back to a raw dict for validate_policy_structure, + which expects {realm_role: [{"service": str, "privilege": str}]}. Returns: Updated ServicePolicyState with errors and validation_passed """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy = state["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - service_names = [service_name] + policy_obj: Optional[Policy] = state.get("policy_structure") + service_type = (service.type or "Tool") if service else "Tool" + + if policy_obj is None: + raw_policy: dict = {} + else: + raw_policy = { + realm_role: [ + {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + for priv in privs + for svc in priv.services + ] + for realm_role, privs in policy_obj.policy.items() + } privileges_map = { service_name: { @@ -196,7 +250,7 @@ def _validate_policy( } structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy, realm_roles, service_names, privileges_map + raw_policy, realm_roles, [service_name], privileges_map ) # An empty policy is valid for a service-scoped agent: the policy description # may simply not grant any permissions to this service's privileges. @@ -237,7 +291,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, realm_roles: list, service_name: str, - service_type: str, + service: Optional[Service], privileges: list, ): """ @@ -247,7 +301,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] service_name: Service name - service_type: Service type (e.g. 'Tool', 'Agent') — property of the service + service: Service object (None if the service was not found in config) privileges: Privileges of the target service [{name, description}] Returns: @@ -256,7 +310,7 @@ def create_service_policy_builder_graph( def filter_and_extract_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_type, privileges, config.verbose + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service, privileges, config.verbose ) def build_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: @@ -267,7 +321,7 @@ def generate_yaml_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: def validate_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_name, service_type, privileges, + state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_name, service, privileges, config.verbose, config.max_retries ) @@ -342,7 +396,7 @@ def __init__( ) config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - + roles_models = config_api.get_roles() self.realm_roles = [ {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} @@ -352,11 +406,13 @@ def __init__( services = config_api.get_services() self.service_type: str = "Tool" # Default to "Tool" if not found self.privileges = [] + self._service_obj: Optional[Service] = None for service in services: if service.serviceId != service_name: continue # Handle None case by defaulting to "Tool" self.service_type = service.type or "Tool" + self._service_obj = service # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges. self.privileges = [ @@ -369,7 +425,7 @@ def __init__( self.config, self.realm_roles, self.service_name, - self.service_type, + self._service_obj, self.privileges, ) @@ -377,7 +433,7 @@ def get_graph(self): """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" return self.graph - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Policy: """ Generate a service-scoped access control policy from a natural language description. @@ -385,20 +441,17 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: description: Natural language policy description Returns: - dict with keys: - yaml_output (str) — YAML policy file content - policy_structure (dict) — structured policy data - parsed_scopes (list) — raw realm-role → privilege mappings - errors (list) — validation errors (empty on success) - success (bool) — True when no validation errors - retry_count (int) — number of validation retries + Policy model instance with the generated policy and explanation. + + Raises: + ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. """ initial_state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": description, "service_name": self.service_name, "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], - "policy_structure": {}, + "policy_structure": None, "yaml_output": "", "messages": [], "errors": [], @@ -408,15 +461,24 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - return { - "yaml_output": final_state["yaml_output"], - "policy_structure": final_state["policy_structure"], - "parsed_scopes": final_state["parsed_scopes"], - "explanation": final_state.get("explanation", ""), - "errors": final_state["errors"], - "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, - "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), - } + errors = final_state.get("errors", []) + if errors: + raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") + + self._last_yaml_output = final_state["yaml_output"] + + return final_state["policy_structure"] + + def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: + """ + Return the YAML output from the last generate_policy() call. + + Raises: + ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet. + """ + if not hasattr(self, "_last_yaml_output"): + raise ValueError("No policy available. Call generate_policy() first.") + return self._last_yaml_output def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "service_policy.yaml"): """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py index 37dda5f42..920b907c8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py @@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak service. """ -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any, Optional from operator import add +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): """ @@ -18,8 +20,9 @@ class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): description: Natural language policy description service_name: Keycloak service name to scope the policy to explanation: LLM explanation of the privilege mappings - parsed_scopes: List of {role, privileges} mappings (realm-role to privileges) - policy_structure: Structured policy dict ready for YAML conversion + parsed_scopes: List of {role, privileges} mappings; each privilege dict + carries a 'service' key holding a Service object (not a string) + policy_structure: Fully constructed Policy model (set by _build_policy) yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string messages: Accumulated LLM messages errors: Validation errors - replaced on each validation attempt @@ -30,7 +33,7 @@ class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): service_name: str explanation: str parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] - policy_structure: Dict[str, Any] + policy_structure: Optional[Policy] yaml_output: str messages: Annotated[List, add] errors: List[str] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py index 623badf38..e42157eaf 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py @@ -13,9 +13,12 @@ - generate_policy_rego: Generate Rego content for access control policy """ -from typing import Dict, Optional +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any, Dict, Optional import yaml +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + def generate_yaml_output(policy_structure: dict, description: str = "") -> str: """ @@ -253,4 +256,102 @@ def generate_policy_rego( return rego_content +def save_policy(policy: Policy, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml") -> None: + """ + Save a Policy as YAML to a file. + + Args: + policy: Policy model instance + filepath: Output file path + """ + yaml_output = generate_yaml_output( + { + "policy": { + realm_role: [ + {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + for priv in privileges + for svc in priv.services + ] + for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() + } + }, + policy.name, + ) + with open(filepath, "w") as f: + f.write(yaml_output) + print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") + + +def save_policy_rego( + policy: Policy, + file_dir: str = "rego_policy", + realm: str = "demo", +) -> None: + """ + Save Rego files for realm roles, defaults, and per-service access policy. + + Creates: + - realm_roles.rego: user → realm-role mapping + - default_inbound.rego / default_outbound.rego: deny-by-default rules + - generated_policy_<service>.rego: one allow-rule file per service in the policy + + Args: + policy: Policy model instance + file_dir: Directory to save Rego files + realm: Keycloak realm name (used to fetch user-to-roles mapping) + """ + from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration + + dir_path = Path(file_dir) + dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + + config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + user_to_roles: dict = {} + for subject in config_api.get_subjects(): + user_to_roles[subject.username] = [role.name for role in subject.roles] + + realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" + with open(realm_roles_path, "w") as f: + f.write(generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles)) + print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") + + default_inbound_path = dir_path / "default_inbound.rego" + with open(default_inbound_path, "w") as f: + f.write(generate_default_inbound_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_inbound_path}") + + default_outbound_path = dir_path / "default_outbound.rego" + with open(default_outbound_path, "w") as f: + f.write(generate_default_outbound_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_outbound_path}") + + # Deduplicate services by ID (Service is not hashable — cannot use a set) + unique_services: Dict[str, Any] = {} + for privs in policy.policy.values(): + for priv in privs: + for svc in priv.services: + svc_id = svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id + unique_services[svc_id] = svc + + service_types = {svc_id: svc.type for svc_id, svc in unique_services.items()} + policy_structure = { + "policy": { + realm_role: [ + {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + for priv in privileges + for svc in priv.services + ] + for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() + } + } + + for svc_id in unique_services: + policy_rego = generate_policy_rego(policy_structure, svc_id, service_types, policy.name) + safe_name = svc_id.replace("/", "_").replace("\\", "_").replace(" ", "_") + policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_name}.rego" + with open(policy_path, "w") as f: + f.write(policy_rego) + print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{svc_id}' saved to {policy_path}") + + # Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 7e60764ee..0f9768296 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -177,18 +177,11 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, # Generate policy try: - result = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - - if not result["success"]: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " - f"generation failed: {result['errors']}" - ) - continue + policy = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) # Get YAML output from builder (generated on-demand) yaml_output = builder.get_yaml_output() - + # Parse generated YAML generated_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_output) @@ -196,11 +189,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) if not match: - explanation = result.get("explanation", "") explanation_lines = ( "\n LLM explanation:\n" - + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in explanation.splitlines()) - if explanation else "" + + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in policy.explanation.splitlines()) + if policy.explanation else "" ) failures.append( f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " @@ -227,6 +219,69 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, # UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) # ============================================================================ +def test_save_policy_creates_yaml_file(tmp_path): + """save_policy writes valid YAML to the specified path.""" + from utils.output_generators import save_policy + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge + from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service + + svc = Service(id="kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") + policy = Policy( + name="Test policy", + policy={"developer": [Priviledge(name="demo-ui", services=[svc])]}, + explanation="", + ) + + output_file = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" + save_policy(policy, str(output_file)) + + assert output_file.exists() + content = output_file.read_text() + assert "policy:" in content + assert "developer:" in content + assert "kagenti" in content + assert "demo-ui" in content + assert "# Access Control Policy" in content + assert "Test policy" in content + + +def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file): + """save_policy_rego writes realm_roles and default Rego files to the directory.""" + from utils.output_generators import save_policy_rego + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge + from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service + import os + + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + + svc_kagenti = Service(id="kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") + svc_github = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") + policy = Policy( + name="Test policy", + policy={ + "developer": [ + Priviledge(name="demo-ui", services=[svc_kagenti]), + Priviledge(name="github-full-access", services=[svc_github]), + ] + }, + explanation="", + ) + + save_policy_rego(policy, str(tmp_path), realm="demo") + + assert (tmp_path / "realm_roles.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").exists() + # One file per service referenced in the policy + assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_kagenti.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_github-tool.rego").exists() + + inbound_content = (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").read_text() + assert "default allow := false" in inbound_content + outbound_content = (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").read_text() + assert "default allow := false" in outbound_content + + def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): """PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure (bypasses LLM).""" from utils.output_generators import generate_yaml_output @@ -258,7 +313,6 @@ def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): """Invalid policies are caught by validation (uses mock LLM).""" - # Mock LLM returns an invalid policy (unknown role) mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = """ ```json @@ -275,16 +329,10 @@ def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - # Create PolicyBuilder with mock LLM builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - # Generate policy - result = builder.generate_policy("Invalid policy description") - - # Verify validation caught the error - assert not result["success"], "Expected validation to fail for unknown role" - assert len(result["errors"]) > 0 - assert any("unknown-role" in str(err).lower() for err in result["errors"]) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unknown-role"): + builder.generate_policy("Invalid policy description") def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py index 1f6c7e404..5350947a9 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py @@ -154,18 +154,24 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: def test_generate_yaml_unit(): """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure (bypasses LLM).""" + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge + from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service + + svc = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", "service_name": "github-tool", "explanation": "Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", - "policy_structure": { - "policy": { + "policy_structure": Policy( + name="Developers get full GitHub access.", + policy={ "developer": [ - {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-tool-aud"}, - {"service": "github-tool", "role": "github-full-access"}, + Priviledge(name="github-tool-aud", services=[svc]), + Priviledge(name="github-full-access", services=[svc]), ] - } - }, + }, + explanation="Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", + ), "parsed_scopes": [], "yaml_output": "", "messages": [], @@ -181,15 +187,17 @@ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): assert "developer:" in output assert "github-tool" in output assert "github-full-access" in output - # Header must mention the scoped service - assert "github-tool" in output assert "# Partial Access Control Policy" in output assert "# Original Policy Description:" in output assert "Developers get full GitHub access." in output def test_build_policy_unit(): - """_build_policy assembles policy_structure correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" + """_build_policy assembles a Policy model correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service + + svc = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", "service_name": "github-tool", @@ -198,18 +206,18 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): { "role": "developer", "privileges": [ - {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-full-access"}, - {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, + {"service": svc, "privilege": "github-full-access"}, + {"service": svc, "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, ], }, { "role": "tech-support", "privileges": [ - {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, + {"service": svc, "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, ], }, ], - "policy_structure": {}, + "policy_structure": None, "yaml_output": "", "messages": [], "errors": [], @@ -219,24 +227,34 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): result = _build_policy(state) - policy = result["policy_structure"]["policy"] - assert "developer" in policy - assert "tech-support" in policy - assert {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-full-access"} in policy["developer"] - assert {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-tool-aud"} in policy["tech-support"] - # No other services should appear - all_services = {m["service"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} + policy = result["policy_structure"] + assert isinstance(policy, Policy) + assert "developer" in policy.policy + assert "tech-support" in policy.policy + developer_priv_names = {priv.name for priv in policy.policy["developer"]} + assert "github-full-access" in developer_priv_names + assert "github-tool-aud" in developer_priv_names + tech_support_priv_names = {priv.name for priv in policy.policy["tech-support"]} + assert "github-tool-aud" in tech_support_priv_names + all_services = { + s.serviceId + for privileges in policy.policy.values() + for priv in privileges + for s in priv.services + } assert all_services == {"github-tool"} def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): - """_build_policy produces an empty policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" + """_build_policy produces an empty Policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", "service_name": "kagenti", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], - "policy_structure": {}, + "policy_structure": None, "yaml_output": "", "messages": [], "errors": [], @@ -245,7 +263,9 @@ def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): } result = _build_policy(state) - assert result["policy_structure"] == {"policy": {}} + policy = result["policy_structure"] + assert isinstance(policy, Policy) + assert policy.policy == {} def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): """ServicePolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified service.""" @@ -324,8 +344,9 @@ def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, service_id: str, role_name: str) -> """ -def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file, mock_llm): - """generate_policy result contains all documented keys.""" +def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(config_file, mock_llm): + """generate_policy returns a Policy model with name, policy, and explanation.""" + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" @@ -340,16 +361,14 @@ def test_generate_policy_returns_expected_keys(config_file, mock_llm): ) result = builder.generate_policy("Developers access public repos.") - assert "yaml_output" in result - assert "policy_structure" in result - assert "parsed_scopes" in result - assert "errors" in result - assert "success" in result - assert "retry_count" in result + assert isinstance(result, Policy) + assert result.name == "Developers access public repos." + assert isinstance(result.policy, dict) + assert isinstance(result.explanation, str) def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): - """yaml_output in the result must be parseable YAML.""" + """get_yaml_output() after generate_policy() returns parseable YAML.""" mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" @@ -362,9 +381,9 @@ def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) - result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") + builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") - parsed = yaml.safe_load(result["yaml_output"]) + parsed = yaml.safe_load(builder.get_yaml_output()) assert isinstance(parsed, dict) assert "policy" in parsed @@ -385,11 +404,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_service_only(config_file, mock_llm): ) result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") - policy = result["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - for mappings in policy.values(): - for mapping in mappings: - assert mapping["service"] == "github-tool", ( - f"Mapping for a different service leaked in: {mapping}" + for privileges in result.policy.values(): + for priv in privileges: + assert all(svc.serviceId == "github-tool" for svc in priv.services), ( + f"Mapping for a different service leaked in: {priv}" ) @@ -412,12 +430,9 @@ def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) - result = builder.generate_policy("Some policy description.") - assert not result["success"], "Validation should fail for an unknown realm role" - assert any( - "nonexistent-realm-role" in str(err) for err in result["errors"] - ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="nonexistent-realm-role"): + builder.generate_policy("Some policy description.") def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_service_role(config_file, mock_llm): @@ -452,9 +467,12 @@ def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_service_role(config_file, result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") # The mapping is structurally valid: developer → github-tool roles - assert result["success"], f"Unexpected errors: {result['errors']}" - policy = result["policy_structure"].get("policy", {}) - all_services = {m["service"] for mappings in policy.values() for m in mappings} + all_services = { + svc.serviceId + for privileges in result.policy.values() + for priv in privileges + for svc in priv.services + } assert all_services == {"github-tool"}, ( f"Foreign service leaked into output: {all_services}" ) @@ -510,24 +528,16 @@ def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy llm=llm_instance, verbose=False, ) - result = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - - if not result["success"]: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " - f"generation failed: {result['errors']}" - ) - continue + policy = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - generated_partial = normalize_policy_yaml(result["yaml_output"]) + generated_partial = normalize_policy_yaml(builder.get_yaml_output()) match, diffs = compare_policies(generated_partial, expected_partial) if not match: - explanation = result.get("explanation", "") explanation_lines = ( "\n LLM explanation:\n" - + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in explanation.splitlines()) - if explanation else "" + + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in policy.explanation.splitlines()) + if policy.explanation else "" ) failures.append( f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " From 5f352e3e58b039a415b85960285211e183d7e5e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 19:15:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 113/273] model Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..45b1a9901 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict + +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service + +class Priviledge(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + name: str + services: list[Service] + +class Policy(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + name: str + policy: dict[str, list[Priviledge]] + explanation: str = "" From 29d6b699477c3bdf5097292576c2f9bdfdf7114c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 23:28:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 114/273] feat: populate Subject.roles from Keycloak realm role assignments Add _build_subject() helper to Configuration that fetches /subjects/{id}/assignments and hydrates Subject.roles from the returned realmMappings, matching role IDs against the pre-built all_roles map. Mirrors the existing _build_service() pattern. Update TestGetSubjects to use side_effect call sequences for the multi-request flow and add coverage for role hydration, unassigned role filtering, assignment error propagation, and realm forwarding. Split get_subjects out of the single-call parametrize in TestRealmParameter. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py | 13 +++- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 70 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py index d85b09676..134431a1a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py @@ -28,10 +28,21 @@ def _check(self, resp) -> None: if not resp.ok: raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + def _build_subject(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role]) -> Subject: + subject_id = raw["id"] + assignments_resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments", params=self._params() + ) + self._check(assignments_resp) + realm_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in assignments_resp.json().get("realmMappings", [])} + roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in realm_role_ids] + return Subject.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles}) + def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/subjects", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) - return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + all_roles = self._all_roles_map() + return [self._build_subject(raw, all_roles) for raw in resp.json()] def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/roles", params=self._params()) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 9666a6b81..8ebe88010 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -48,14 +48,50 @@ def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): class TestGetSubjects: + # Call order: GET /subjects, GET /roles (+ per-role /scopes), GET /subjects/{id}/assignments — per subject. + def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + assignments = {"realmMappings": [], "serviceMappings": {}} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(assignments)], + ) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert isinstance(result[0], Subject) assert result[0].username == "alice" - m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/subjects", params={"realm": REALM}) + assert m.call_args_list[0] == ((f"{BASE}/subjects",), {"params": {"realm": REALM}}) + + def test_roles_populated_from_keycloak_assignments(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] + assignments = {"realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}], "serviceMappings": {}} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok(role_scopes), _ok(assignments)], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + assert len(result[0].roles) == 1 + assert result[0].roles[0].name == "viewer" + + def test_unassigned_roles_not_included(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + all_roles = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}, + {"id": "r2", "name": "admin", "composite": False}, + ] + assignments = {"realmMappings": [{"id": "r1"}], "serviceMappings": {}} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok(assignments)], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + assert len(result[0].roles) == 1 + assert result[0].roles[0].id == "r1" def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) @@ -63,6 +99,28 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + def test_raises_when_assignments_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _err(502)], + ): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + + def test_realm_forwarded_on_all_calls(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + assignments = {"realmMappings": [], "serviceMappings": {}} + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(assignments)], + ) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + for c in m.call_args_list: + assert c[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_roles @@ -603,7 +661,6 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): class TestRealmParameter: @pytest.mark.parametrize("method,endpoint", [ - ("get_subjects", "subjects"), ("get_roles", "roles"), ("get_scopes", "scopes"), ]) @@ -613,6 +670,13 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): getattr(Configuration.for_realm(REALM), method)() m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/{endpoint}", params={"realm": REALM}) + def test_get_subjects_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + from unittest.mock import call + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() + assert call(f"{BASE}/subjects", params={"realm": REALM}) in m.call_args_list + def test_get_services_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): from unittest.mock import call monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) From fa6fea9386d0479daac3f6f2c09b93a2665dbd8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 23:34:12 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 115/273] docs: update library.md for get_subjects() role enrichment MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Correct Subject.roles source annotation — Keycloak's get_users() does not include role assignments; roles are populated via GET /subjects/{id}/assignments → realmMappings by the library client. Replace the shared 'simple read methods' paragraph with separate get_scopes() and get_subjects() descriptions; get_subjects() now documents the _build_subject() delegation and multi-call flow, matching the existing get_services() spec style. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md index 41ba28ed4..9a3904629 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). | `firstName` | `str \| None` | `firstName` | | | `lastName` | `str \| None` | `lastName` | | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | -| `roles` | `list[Role]` | `realmRoles` | `[]` | +| `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(populated by `Configuration.get_subjects()` from `GET /subjects/{id}/assignments` → `realmMappings`; not present in the raw Keycloak user object)_ | `[]` | #### `Role` @@ -161,10 +161,16 @@ class Configuration: def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: ... ``` -Read methods (`get_subjects`, `get_scopes`): -1. Issue `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/<endpoint>`, always appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. +`get_scopes()` — simple read: +1. Issue `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes`, always appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. -3. Parse the response into the appropriate Pydantic model(s). +3. Parse the response into `list[Scope]` and return. + +`get_subjects()` — enriched with per-subject realm role assignments: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch the base user list. Keycloak does not include role assignments in the user representation. +2. Call `_all_roles_map()` once to build a `{id: Role}` lookup (fully hydrated via `get_roles()`). +3. For each subject, delegate to `_build_subject(raw, all_roles)` which issues `GET /subjects/{id}/assignments?realm=<self.realm>`, extracts `realmMappings` role IDs, filters the roles map, and returns a validated `Subject` with `roles` populated. +4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx HTTP status (primary or secondary calls). `get_services()` — fully-enriched read: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch the base service list. From 45bf798495f71ac27998e33e654982aa07c3d927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 16:42:41 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 116/273] docs: Add Phase 2 PDP Policy Service (OPA) component PRD MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Defines the OPA-based PDP Policy Service that replaces the Keycloak composite role implementation in Phase 2. Covers: - Policy Model hierarchy: PolicyModel → AgentPolicyModel → PolicyRule(role, scope) - Two Rego packages per agent (authz.{slug}.inbound / .outbound) - Inbound/outbound input contracts and embedded data maps - 5 REST endpoints, no realm parameter - aiac.pdp.library.policy library (4 module-level functions) - aiac.pdp.library.models Pydantic types (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) - aiac.idp.* / aiac.pdp.* namespace split - Phase transition: container image swap only Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md | 273 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 273 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de5af1ddc --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Service — OPA Implementation (Phase 2) + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that translates a **Policy Model** into OPA Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resource. The OPA plugin embedded in each AuthBridge instance fetches the Rego packages relevant to its pod from this CR at startup. + +This is the **Phase 2** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase transition from Phase 1 = container image swap only (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`). The service name, port, and manifest are unchanged. + +The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads and composite role management from Phase 1) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). + +--- + +## Namespace changes introduced in Phase 2 + +Phase 2 introduces a clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split across the library: + +| Phase 1 path | Phase 2 path | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | Renamed; content unchanged | +| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Renamed; Phase 1 policy functions merged in | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | New module; holds Phase 2 policy model types | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | New module; Phase 2 HTTP client functions | +| PDP Configuration Service | **IdP Configuration Service** | Renamed; absorbs Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints | +| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) | **PDP Policy Service (OPA)** | Container image swap; same ClusterIP name and port | + +--- + +## Pydantic models (`aiac.pdp.library.models`) + +Dependency-free (only `pydantic`). Importable by any consumer without pulling in HTTP client dependencies. + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. + +### `PolicyRule` + +A single access rule: a `(role, scope)` tuple. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `role` | `str` | +| `scope` | `str` | + +### `AgentPolicyModel` + +Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `PolicyRule` entries plus supporting data maps used by the Rego packages. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | +| `agent_roles` | `list[str]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | +| `agent_scopes` | `list[str]` | Scopes this agent exposes | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps inbound source service ID → list of realm roles | +| `scope_targets` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps outbound scope → list of permitted target service IDs | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | + +**Inbound rule semantics:** a caller with realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent requesting scope `scope`. + +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. + +### `PolicyModel` + +A partial or full system policy model. When sent to the PDP Policy Service, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule +``` + +--- + +## Endpoints + +No `?realm=` parameter — the service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. + +| Method | Path | Body | Operation | +|--------|------|------|-----------| +| `POST` | `/policy` | `PolicyModel` | Upsert Rego packages for all agents in the partial model | +| `POST` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `AgentPolicyModel` | Upsert Rego packages for a single agent | +| `DELETE` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | Remove all Rego packages for a specific agent (off-boarding) | +| `DELETE` | `/policy` | — | Clear all Rego packages from the CR (rebuild pre-step) | +| `GET` | `/health` | — | Readiness probe | + +### Status codes + +| Endpoint | Success | Error | +|----------|---------|-------| +| `POST /policy` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` if CR write fails | +| `POST /policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` if CR write fails | +| `DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` if CR write fails | +| `DELETE /policy` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` if CR write fails | +| `GET /health` | `200 OK` `{"status": "ok"}` | `503 Service Unavailable` if CR is unreachable | + +--- + +## Rego package structure + +For each `AgentPolicyModel`, the service generates **two Rego packages**: one for the inbound pipeline and one for the outbound pipeline. The `agent_id` is slugified for use in the package name (hyphens → underscores, lowercase). + +### Inbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.inbound` + +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **inbound pipeline**. Input document: `{subject: str, source: str, scope: str}` where `subject` is the end-user ID, `source` is the calling service ID, and `scope` is the requested scope. + +```rego +package authz.{agent_slug}.inbound + +source_roles := { + "{source_id}": ["{role}", ...], + ... +} + +default allow := false + +allow if { + some role in source_roles[input.source] + role == "{rule.role}" + input.scope == "{rule.scope}" +} +# ... one allow block per inbound PolicyRule +``` + +### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` + +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline**. Input document: `{subject: str, target: str, role: str, scope: str}` where `subject` is the end-user ID, `target` is the called service ID, `role` is this agent's own realm role, and `scope` is the requested scope. + +```rego +package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound + +scope_targets := { + "{scope}": ["{target_id}", ...], + ... +} + +default allow := false + +allow if { + input.role == "{rule.role}" + input.scope == "{rule.scope}" + input.target in scope_targets["{rule.scope}"] +} +# ... one allow block per outbound PolicyRule +``` + +--- + +## Library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` + +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Service REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +```python +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy +``` + +### Dependencies + +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule + +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) +``` + +--- + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_NAME` | TBD | Name of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to patch | +| `AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_NAMESPACE` | TBD | Namespace of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR | + +Authentication to the Kubernetes API: in-cluster service account (auto-detected by the `kubernetes` Python client). The pod's `ServiceAccount` must be bound to a `ClusterRole` granting `get`/`patch`/`update` on `AuthorizationPolicy` resources. The `ServiceAccount`, `ClusterRole`, and `ClusterRoleBinding` are declared in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`. + +For local development, the `kubernetes` client falls back to `~/.kube/config` automatically. + +> **Note:** `AuthorizationPolicy` CR schema and ConfigMap source for env vars are TBD. + +--- + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` +- Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) + +--- + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +kubernetes +pydantic +``` + +--- + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ +├── __init__.py +└── policy/ + ├── __init__.py + └── opa/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── Dockerfile + ├── requirements.txt + └── main.py + +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/ +├── __init__.py +└── library/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + └── policy.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +``` + +Build command: +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ +``` + +--- + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Load Kubernetes in-cluster config at startup via `kubernetes.config.load_incluster_config()`; fall back to `kubernetes.config.load_kube_config()` for local development. +- Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. +- `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: replace hyphens with underscores, lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment. +- `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string from the model's `source_roles` map and `inbound_rules`. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string from the model's `scope_targets` map and `outbound_rules`. +- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. +- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. +- `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. +- `POST /policy`: iterate `model.agents`; for each call `_generate_inbound_rego` + `_generate_outbound_rego` + `_upsert_agent`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `POST /policy/agents/{agent_id}`: call `_generate_inbound_rego` + `_generate_outbound_rego` + `_upsert_agent`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id}`: call `_delete_agent(agent_id)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /policy`: call `_delete_all()`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- On Kubernetes API error, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. +- `GET /health`: attempt to `get` the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR; return `200 {"status": "ok"}` on success, `503` on failure. From ecd2682dcc97fcc12483aa63cc74c2dfe4e56dcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 17:05:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 117/273] docs: Update PRD for Phase 2 OPA architecture and idp/pdp namespace split MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Rename PDP Configuration Service → IdP Configuration Service (pdp-configuration-service.md → idp-configuration-service.md) - Split library.md into library-idp.md (aiac.idp.library.configuration.*) and library-pdp.md (aiac.pdp.library.models / aiac.pdp.library.policy) - Update PRD.md component table, deployment topology, dependency table, and section links for Phase 2 namespace split - Update aiac-agent.md orchestrator table with Phase 1 vs Phase 2 columns, Phase 2 Policy and Policy Builder sub-agent descriptions - Update keycloak-service.md superseded notice with new component names - Add handoff document capturing Phase 2 OPA design decisions and TBDs Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 94 ++++++----- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 31 ++-- ...ervice.md => idp-configuration-service.md} | 19 ++- .../components/keycloak-service.md | 2 +- .../components/{library.md => library-idp.md} | 158 +++--------------- .../requirements/components/library-pdp.md | 154 +++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-) rename aiac/inception/requirements/components/{pdp-configuration-service.md => idp-configuration-service.md} (88%) rename aiac/inception/requirements/components/{library.md => library-idp.md} (56%) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 30c5f49e5..9eeb89d8d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| -| 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, composite mappings) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the interface is stable across phases. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, composite mappings) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the interface is stable across phases. In Phase 2 this service also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints (composite role management). Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions) via `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`. Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR via `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | | 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | @@ -230,11 +230,15 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.configuration — HTTP client │ -│ (read/write) PDP Configuration Svc │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ -│ (read/write) PDP Policy Service │ +│ Phase 1 / shared: │ +│ aiac.idp.library.configuration.models — Pydantic only │ +│ aiac.idp.library.configuration.api — HTTP client │ +│ (read/write) IdP Configuration Svc │ +│ │ +│ Phase 2 (OPA): │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only (Phase 2) │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ +│ (write) PDP Policy Service (OPA) │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` @@ -331,20 +335,23 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| PDP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions | -| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes configuration entities) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances or None (writes policy rules/mappings) | +| IdP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Service — Phase 1: Keycloak (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` (merged in Phase 2) | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | +| PDP Policy Service — Phase 2: OPA (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | +| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes configuration entities + Phase 1 composite role management) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for Phase 2 policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules; Phase 2 only) | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.pdp.library.*`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` (Phase 1) / `aiac.pdp.library.policy` (Phase 2), ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff (Phase 1) or Rego policy (Phase 2); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** PDP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. This eliminates the separate PDP Configuration and PDP Policy pods without changing the library's service URL interface. +- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. This eliminates the separate configuration and policy pods without changing the library's service URL interface. - **PDP Interface Pod phase transition is a container image swap.** Phase 2 replaces the PDP Policy container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP name and port `:7072` remain unchanged. No new pod or manifest is required — `pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` does not exist. +- **Phase 2 introduces a clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. The Phase 1 composite role management endpoints and their library are merged into the IdP Configuration Service and `aiac.idp.library.configuration` respectively. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a role. - **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. @@ -355,9 +362,9 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. - **Agent HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. - **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. -- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. -- **`aiac.pdp.library.models` is dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import it without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. -- **`aiac.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.library.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.__init__`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy.__init__`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak.__init__` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.pdp.library.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.configuration import get_subjects`. +- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. +- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` and `aiac.pdp.library.models` are dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import them without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. +- **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. - **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. @@ -367,19 +374,13 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi **AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to -extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.pdp.library` Python package -is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the PDP. +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library.configuration` and `aiac.pdp.library.policy` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the IdP and PDP respectively. -**AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** -The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic PDP entity -names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. The PDP Policy Service writes role composite mappings (role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener -publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak (both phases)** +The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. In Phase 1 it also applies composite role mappings (role → service permissions); in Phase 2 that responsibility moves to the OPA PDP Policy Service. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. -**AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** -The PDP Policy Service container image is swapped from the Keycloak implementation to an OPA -implementation. The Kubernetes ClusterIP service name and port are unchanged — no other component -is modified. The OPA implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules in place of composite role -mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. +**AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2)** +The PDP Policy Service container image is swapped from the Keycloak implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`) to the OPA implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`). The Kubernetes ClusterIP service name and port are unchanged — no other component is modified. The OPA implementation writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR in place of composite role mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. Full spec: [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md). **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. @@ -390,34 +391,40 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ## 7. AIAC System Components -### 7.1 PDP Configuration Service +### 7.1 IdP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. In Phase 2, also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints (composite role management). Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. -**Full spec:** [components/pdp-configuration-service.md](components/pdp-configuration-service.md) +**Full spec:** [components/idp-configuration-service.md](components/idp-configuration-service.md) --- ### 7.2 PDP Policy Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the PDP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two container images share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`): +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two container images share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`): -- **Phase 1 — Keycloak** (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`): manages role composite mappings (role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. -- **Phase 2 — OPA** (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`): writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Interface TBD (separate PRD). Phase transition = container image swap within the PDP Interface Pod; no manifest change required. +- **Phase 1 — Keycloak** (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`): manages role composite mappings (role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. In Phase 2, these endpoints are folded into the IdP Configuration Service. +- **Phase 2 — OPA** (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`): writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. Phase transition = container image swap within the PDP Interface Pod; no manifest change required. **Phase 1 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) +**Phase 2 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md) + --- ### 7.3 Library -Python package at `aiac/src/`. Three submodules: +Python package at `aiac/src/`. Phase 2 introduces a clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: -- **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for all PDP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Permission`, `Scope`, `Assignments`). -- **`aiac.pdp.library.configuration`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes); returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. -- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service; abstracts Phase 1 (Keycloak composite mappings) and Phase 2 (OPA Rego) behind a stable function interface. +**IdP library** (Keycloak entity management — both phases): +- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). Renamed from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models`. +- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities plus Phase 1 composite role management; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. Renamed from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. -**Full spec:** [components/library.md](components/library.md) +**PDP library** (OPA policy management — Phase 2 only): +- **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for Phase 2 policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`). Replaces `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models`. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. Replaces `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api`. + +**Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp.md](components/library-pdp.md) --- @@ -495,12 +502,15 @@ Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash -# Build PDP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ +# Build IdP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ # Build PDP Policy Service — Keycloak implementation (Phase 1 container in the PDP Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ +# Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (Phase 2 container in the PDP Interface Pod) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ + # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ @@ -510,7 +520,7 @@ docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ The Event Broker uses the official `nats` Docker image with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag). No custom build required. -Phase 2 note: replacing the PDP Policy Service with an OPA implementation requires only building a new `aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest` image and updating the Policy container image reference in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`. No other manifest changes are required. +Phase 2 note: replacing the PDP Policy Service with the OPA implementation requires building `aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest` (see command above) and updating the Policy container image reference in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`. The IdP Configuration Service source also moves from `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak` to `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak` but the container image name and K8s service remain unchanged. No other manifest changes are required. ### `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap template diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 8ac7bb4e1..b66bb114c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -15,11 +15,15 @@ The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NA The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: -| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | -|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy → Policy Apply (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build → Policy Apply or Rebuild → Policy Apply (alternative, then apply) | -| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role → Policy Apply (sequential) | +| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents (Phase 1) | Sub-agents (Phase 2) | +|---|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy → Policy Apply (sequential) | Service Provision → **Policy** → **Policy Builder** (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build → Policy Apply or Rebuild → Policy Apply (alternative, then apply) | Build → **Policy Builder** or Rebuild → **Policy Builder** | +| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role → Policy Apply (sequential) | Role → **Policy Builder** | + +**Phase 2 new sub-agents (TBD — to be specified in a separate PRD or added to sub-agent PRDs):** +- **Policy sub-agent** — creates an `AgentPolicyModel` delta scoped to the triggered service, including `source_roles`, `scope_targets`, and `PolicyRule` sets for inbound and outbound pipelines. +- **Policy Builder sub-agent** — merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and calls `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy` (or `apply_agent_policy` for single-agent updates). All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -122,6 +126,8 @@ Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | +> **Phase 2 TBD:** The Phase 2 Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent need dedicated sub-PRDs. These will be added to this table once defined via `/grill-me` or `/to-prd`. + --- ## Shared Module @@ -206,9 +212,10 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): #### `PolicyModel` -Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the shared Policy Apply sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Service via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. The PDP Policy Service handles translation to the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules). +Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the shared Policy Apply sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Service via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. -`PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py`. `PolicyStatement` shape is TBD — must carry sufficient information for entity existence resolution via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. +- **Phase 1:** `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py` (`statements: list[PolicyStatement]`). `PolicyStatement` shape is TBD — must carry sufficient information for entity existence resolution via `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`. +- **Phase 2:** `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (`agents: list[AgentPolicyModel]`). Full spec: [pdp-policy-opa-service.md](pdp-policy-opa-service.md). #### `ValidationVerdict` @@ -218,7 +225,7 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. `PolicyModel` and `PolicyStatement` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py`. See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). +Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. Phase 1: `PolicyModel` and `PolicyStatement` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py`. Phase 2: `PolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyRule` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py`. See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). --- @@ -241,7 +248,7 @@ flowchart TD #### Nodes -- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api`. The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules) and commits. +- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` (Phase 2) or `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` (Phase 1). The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings in Phase 1, Rego packages written to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR in Phase 2). - **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. #### State @@ -290,7 +297,7 @@ flowchart TD C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] ``` -1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `PolicyModel` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. +1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `PolicyModel` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`. 2. **Safety guard rails** — total statements in `PolicyModel` ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. 3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. 4. **Scope check** — `PolicyModel` is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. @@ -328,8 +335,8 @@ flowchart TD | Variable | Default | Source | |---|---|---| | `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.pdp.library.policy` (Phase 2) | | `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md similarity index 88% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index afd16af92..a196dbf6d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -1,10 +1,14 @@ -# Component PRD: PDP Configuration Service +# Component PRD: IdP Configuration Service + +**Phase 1 name:** PDP Configuration Service ## Location -`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` +`aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/` + +**Phase 1 location:** `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` — source package is renamed in Phase 2; the container image name and Kubernetes ClusterIP service (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`) are unchanged. ## Description -A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API read endpoints. Returns PDP entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2; the read interface is stable across phases. +A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns IdP (Keycloak) entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. In Phase 2 this service also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints (composite role management), consolidating all Keycloak interactions into a single container. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. ## Endpoints @@ -101,6 +105,7 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` - Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` (Phase 2) / `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` (Phase 1) ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) @@ -113,7 +118,7 @@ python-keycloak ## File structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ +aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/ ├── __init__.py └── configuration/ ├── __init__.py @@ -124,6 +129,12 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ └── main.py ``` +Build command: +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ +``` + ## `main.py` behaviour notes - Maintain a `dict[str, KeycloakAdmin]` cache keyed by realm name, protected by a `threading.Lock`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md index e0a3f8305..fd1a7ccc8 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # ~~Component PRD: Keycloak Configuration Service~~ > **Superseded.** This component has been replaced by two separate services: -> - **PDP Configuration Service** (read endpoints) — see [pdp-configuration-service.md](pdp-configuration-service.md) +> - **IdP Configuration Service** (read endpoints) — see [idp-configuration-service.md](idp-configuration-service.md) > - **PDP Policy Service — Keycloak Implementation** (write endpoints) — see [pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) > > The content below is retained for reference only. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md similarity index 56% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index 9a3904629..86df74f0b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -1,55 +1,36 @@ -# Component PRD: Library +# Component PRD: IdP Library (`aiac.idp.library`) + +**Phase 1 name:** `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.*` — renamed in Phase 2; content is equivalent with the addition of composite role management functions. ## Location -`aiac/src/` +`aiac/src/aiac/idp/library/` ## Package structure ``` -aiac/src/ -└── aiac/ +aiac/src/aiac/idp/ +├── __init__.py # empty +└── library/ ├── __init__.py # empty - └── pdp/ + └── configuration/ ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── library/ - │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ ├── configuration/ - │ │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ │ ├── models.py # Pydantic model definitions (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) - │ │ └── api.py # HTTP client → PDP Configuration Service - │ └── policy/ - │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ ├── models.py # PolicyModel, PolicyStatement - │ └── api.py # HTTP client → PDP Policy Service + apply_policy() - └── service/ - ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── configuration/ - │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ └── keycloak/ - │ ├── __init__.py # empty - │ ├── main.py # FastAPI app (Keycloak read service) - │ ├── Dockerfile - │ └── requirements.txt - └── policy/ - ├── __init__.py # empty - └── keycloak/ - ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── main.py # FastAPI app (Keycloak write service) - ├── Dockerfile - └── requirements.txt -aiac/test/ -└── test_models.py # unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models -aiac/pyproject.toml # pytest config: testpaths=["test"], pythonpath=["src"] + ├── models.py # Subject, Role, Service, Scope + └── api.py # Configuration class — reads + writes IdP entities ``` -`aiac` is a regular package with an empty `__init__.py`. `aiac.pdp`, `aiac.pdp.library`, `aiac.pdp.library.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.service`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration`, `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak`, `aiac.pdp.service.policy`, and `aiac.pdp.service.policy.keycloak` are regular packages with empty `__init__.py` files. Callers must use explicit submodule paths. +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +``` --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models` +## Submodule: `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` ### Description -Data structures and schema library. Contains only Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. +Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically; stable across phases. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -58,9 +39,9 @@ pydantic ### Pydantic models -All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown fields, ensuring stability across backend version upgrades. +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown fields. -Model definition order in the module: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` all reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. +Model definition order: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. #### `Subject` @@ -117,7 +98,7 @@ Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] @@ -125,10 +106,12 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` +## Submodule: `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` ### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Configuration Service REST API. Provides both read and write access to PDP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models`. +HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides read and write access to IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`. + +In Phase 2 this module also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service functions (composite role management). All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Service (OPA) no longer touches Keycloak directly. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -224,7 +207,7 @@ class Configuration: ### Configuration -Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/idp/library/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| @@ -233,7 +216,7 @@ Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/con ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.library.configuration.api import Configuration cfg = Configuration.for_realm("kagenti") subjects = cfg.get_subjects() @@ -247,90 +230,3 @@ updated_service = cfg.map_scope_to_service(service, scope) role = cfg.create_role(role_name="reader", role_description="Read-only access") updated_service = cfg.map_role_to_service(updated_service, role) ``` - ---- - -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models` - -### Description -Data structures for PDP policy representation. Contains PDP-agnostic Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses that decouple agent graph nodes from any specific policy backend. The PDP Policy Service translates these models internally (Keycloak composite mappings for Phase 1, Rego rules for Phase 2) — no translation logic lives in the agent. - -### Dependencies -``` -pydantic -``` - -### Pydantic models - -#### `PolicyStatement` - -Represents a single policy assertion. **Shape is TBD.** Constraint: must carry sufficient information for the Policy Apply sub-agent to verify entity existence via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` (roles, service IDs, and scopes in Keycloak) before committing. - -#### `PolicyModel` - -A collection of `PolicyStatement` instances representing a complete proposed policy for a service or role. Produced by the Service Policy sub-agent and consumed by the shared Policy Apply sub-agent. - -| Field | Type | Notes | -|-------|------|-------| -| `statements` | `list[PolicyStatement]` | Ordered list of policy statements | - -### Usage - -```python -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel, PolicyStatement -``` - ---- - -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` - -### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the PDP Policy Service REST API. Abstracts the Phase 1 (Keycloak) and Phase 2 (OPA) policy backends behind a stable function interface — callers never interact with the backend directly. The active backend is determined by `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, which points to whichever policy service pod is deployed. - -Handles policy operations: committing `PolicyModel` instances (both phases), composite role mappings (Phase 1), and Rego rules (Phase 2). Configuration entity operations (e.g. scope creation) belong to `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. - -### Dependencies -``` -requests -pydantic -python-dotenv -``` - -### Class: `Policy` - -Stateful client bound to a single realm. Construct via the factory method or directly. - -```python -class Policy: - def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: ... - - @classmethod - def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": ... - - def apply_policy(self, policy: PolicyModel) -> None: ... -``` - -`apply_policy`: -1. Translates the PDP-agnostic `PolicyModel` into the backend-specific representation (Keycloak composite mappings or Rego rules — handled internally by the PDP Policy Service). -2. Issues the appropriate request(s) to `{AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. -3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. - -Additional policy write methods (composite role management and permissions) are defined in the PDP Policy Service component PRD. - -### Configuration - -Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. - -| Variable | Default | -|----------|---------| -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | - -### Usage - -```python -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel - -policy = Policy.for_realm("kagenti") -policy.apply_policy(policy_model) -``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1c75058e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Library (`aiac.pdp.library`) + +**Phase 2 only.** These modules replace the Phase 1 `aiac.pdp.library.policy.*` submodules. They have no dependency on Keycloak — all IdP operations use `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/ +├── __init__.py # empty +└── library/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + └── policy.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +``` + +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.models` + +### Description +Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses for Phase 2 policy representation. Importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Consumed by the AIAC Agent's policy-producing sub-agents and the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` HTTP client. + +**Replaces:** `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models` (Phase 1, which held a TBD `PolicyStatement` / `PolicyModel`). + +### Dependencies +``` +pydantic +``` + +### Pydantic models + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. + +#### `PolicyRule` + +A single access rule: a `(role, scope)` tuple. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `role` | `str` | +| `scope` | `str` | + +#### `AgentPolicyModel` + +Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `PolicyRule` entries plus supporting data maps used by the Rego packages. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | +| `agent_roles` | `list[str]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | +| `agent_scopes` | `list[str]` | Scopes this agent exposes | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps inbound source service ID → list of realm roles | +| `scope_targets` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps outbound scope → list of permitted target service IDs | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | + +**Inbound rule semantics:** a caller with realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent requesting scope `scope`. + +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. + +#### `PolicyModel` + +A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy`, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule + +rule = PolicyRule(role="weather-reader", scope="read") +agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="weather-agent", + agent_roles=["weather-reader"], + agent_scopes=["read"], + source_roles={"dashboard-agent": ["weather-reader"]}, + scope_targets={"read": ["weather-api"]}, + inbound_rules=[rule], + outbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role="weather-reader", scope="read")], +) +model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` + +### Description +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA) REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +No `realm` parameter — the OPA service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. + +**Replaces:** `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` (Phase 1, which had a realm-bound `Policy` class with a single `apply_policy` method). + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +```python +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy — upsert Rego packages for all agents in the partial model + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} — upsert Rego packages for a single agent + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} — remove all Rego packages for agent (off-boarding) + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy — clear all Rego packages (rebuild pre-step) +``` + +### Configuration + +Read from `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `policy.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule + +# Single-agent update (service onboarding / role change) +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) + +# Full rebuild pre-step: clear all, then reapply +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) + +# Off-boarding +delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") +``` From 7f97ad4f0b3e98a18c9429fa6c03517aae2309d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 12:03:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 118/273] docs: Remove Phase 1/2 duality from PRD and component specs OPA is now the sole described architecture. All Phase 1 (Keycloak composite role mappings) content and Phase 1/Phase 2 dual-description language removed from PRD.md and five component spec files. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 192 ++++++++---------- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 59 +++--- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 8 +- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 6 +- .../requirements/components/library-pdp.md | 8 +- .../components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md | 21 +- 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 177 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 9eeb89d8d..98a2532f2 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ AI-based Access Control (AIAC) is a Kagenti platform extension that automates RB enforcement for AI agents running on Kubernetes. A LangGraph-based AI agent continuously translates a natural-language access control policy — stored in a vector knowledge base — into concrete permission configurations in the active Policy Decision Point (PDP), eliminating manual policy -administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. Phase 1 targets Keycloak -as the PDP backend; Phase 2 (planned) replaces only the policy-write layer with OPA/Rego while -leaving all other components unchanged. +administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. The PDP backend is OPA, +which evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; Keycloak remains the identity provider for entity +management (subjects, roles, services). --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ creating three compounding problems: updates because there is no automated mechanism to apply them. 2. **Distributed policy intent** — no single authoritative source declares what roles may do; policy knowledge is fragmented across deployments. -3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping Keycloak composite role mappings consistent with - a growing fleet of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. +3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping OPA policy rules consistent with a growing fleet + of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. --- @@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ creating three compounding problems: AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concerns: a **Policy Management** layer (AIAC Agent) that translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration, a -**Policy Decision** layer (Keycloak / OPA) that evaluates caller entitlements, and a **Policy -Enforcement** layer (AuthBridge) that intercepts traffic and exchanges tokens but carries no policy -knowledge of its own. +**Policy Decision** layer (OPA) that evaluates caller entitlements, and a **Policy Enforcement** +layer (AuthBridge) that intercepts traffic and exchanges tokens but carries no policy knowledge of +its own. The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG @@ -47,26 +47,17 @@ PDP Policy Service. **Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod co ### PDP/PEP separation -AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model across both phases: +AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model: | Layer | Component | Role | |---|---|---| | **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | -| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Decides what a caller may access; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; decides what a caller may access | | **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | -The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. The PDP evaluates the caller's role and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. +The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. -This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration carries routing intent only (`host` → `target_audience`). Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, kept current by AIAC. - -### Implementation phases - -| Phase | PDP Policy write target | Write operation | PEP behaviour | -|---|---|---|---| -| Phase 1 | Keycloak | Composite role mappings (role → service permissions) | `audience` only — Keycloak resolves entitlements from composites | -| Phase 2 | OPA | LLM-generated Rego rules | `audience` only — OPA evaluates Rego; PEP is unchanged | - -Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite mappings from Keycloak, then the PDP Policy pod is replaced with the OPA implementation. AuthBridge requires no changes — the PEP is identical in both phases. +This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration carries routing intent only (`host` → `target_audience`). Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC. --- @@ -77,31 +68,26 @@ Phase transition: before Phase 2 is activated, the agent clears all composite ma **Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves -relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current composite role -state from the PDP, and asks the LLM to compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected -entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to Keycloak. Supports both -**auto-apply** (fully automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. - -**Two-phase implementation — trigger, RAG retrieval, LLM reasoning, and validation are identical in both phases; only the policy-write target differs:** - -- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions) -- **Phase 2 (planned):** diff applied as LLM-generated Rego rules written to OPA; PDP Policy container image swap only — no other component changes +relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current OPA policy state, and asks the LLM to +compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected entity. The diff is validated by a +second LLM pass and applied to OPA as updated Rego rules. Supports both **auto-apply** (fully +automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. ### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation **Trigger:** An operator ingests updated documents into the RAG store. After ingestion the RAG Ingest Service publishes a build event. The AIAC Agent retrieves all -relevant context, computes a full composite role diff against current PDP state, and applies the -delta. A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all composite mappings before +relevant context, computes a full policy diff against current OPA state, and applies the delta. +A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all OPA policy rules before recomputing from scratch — used when policy changes are too broad for incremental diff. ### UC-3 · Entitlements Review **Trigger:** Operator request (on-demand or scheduled). -The agent evaluates all current Keycloak composite mappings — including manually added ones that -AIAC did not create — against the policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and +The agent evaluates all current OPA policy rules — including manually added ones that AIAC did not +create — against the natural-language policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and policy-agnostic entitlements, enabling audit and remediation workflows. ### UC-4 · Access Request @@ -122,8 +108,8 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| -| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, composite mappings) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the interface is stable across phases. In Phase 2 this service also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints (composite role management). Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions) via `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`. Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR via `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes `AgentPolicyModel` instances to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`). Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | | 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | @@ -139,8 +125,8 @@ Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all impl │ PDP Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────────┴────────────┐ ┌──────────┴─────────────┐ │ -│ │ PDP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ (Phase 1: Keycloak) │ │ +│ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ (OPA) │ │ │ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ @@ -174,7 +160,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ PDP Interface Pod │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ PDP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ +│ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ │ │ Service (FastAPI) │ │ (FastAPI) │ │ │ │ :7071 ClusterIP │ │ :7072 ClusterIP │ │ │ │ aiac-pdp-config-svc │ │ aiac-pdp-policy-svc │ │ @@ -230,13 +216,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Python library (aiac/src/) │ │ │ -│ Phase 1 / shared: │ │ aiac.idp.library.configuration.models — Pydantic only │ │ aiac.idp.library.configuration.api — HTTP client │ │ (read/write) IdP Configuration Svc │ │ │ -│ Phase 2 (OPA): │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only (Phase 2) │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ │ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ │ (write) PDP Policy Service (OPA) │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ @@ -256,15 +240,13 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 2. deliver event ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 6. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff for affected service - │ 7. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 8. POST /permissions (if new scope/permission required) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 9. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 10. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 11. ACK message + │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute AgentPolicyModel for new service (inbound + outbound rules) + │ 7. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` @@ -280,13 +262,12 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 2. deliver event ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected role - │ 6. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 7. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 8. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 9. ACK message + │ 5. [LLM] compute PolicyModel delta for all services affected by the role change + │ 6. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` @@ -305,12 +286,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 4. deliver event ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB - │ 7. [LLM] compute full composite role diff against current PDP state - │ 8. POST /composite-roles (add delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 9. DELETE /composite-roles (remove delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 10. ACK message + │ 7. [LLM] compute full PolicyModel delta against current OPA state + │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` @@ -322,11 +302,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 2. DELETE /composite-roles/all (clear entire mapping table) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute complete composite role set from scratch - │ 6. POST /composite-roles (write full mapping set) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. [LLM] compute complete PolicyModel from scratch + │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR ▼ (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` @@ -336,24 +316,22 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| | IdP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Service — Phase 1: Keycloak (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` (merged in Phase 2) | Keycloak Admin REST API | 204/201 on success | -| PDP Policy Service — Phase 2: OPA (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| PDP Policy Service — OPA (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | -| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes configuration entities + Phase 1 composite role management) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for Phase 2 policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules; Phase 2 only) | +| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` (Phase 1) / `aiac.pdp.library.policy` (Phase 2), ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Applied composite diff (Phase 1) or Rego policy (Phase 2); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. This eliminates the separate configuration and policy pods without changing the library's service URL interface. -- **PDP Interface Pod phase transition is a container image swap.** Phase 2 replaces the PDP Policy container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP name and port `:7072` remain unchanged. No new pod or manifest is required — `pdp-policy-opa-deployment.yaml` does not exist. -- **Phase 2 introduces a clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. The Phase 1 composite role management endpoints and their library are merged into the IdP Configuration Service and `aiac.idp.library.configuration` respectively. +- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. +- **Clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. -- **Phase 1 RBAC via composite roles.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings at the role level, not per-user. Users inherit permissions automatically when assigned a role. +- **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. - **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. - **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 8000 (ChromaDB default) and 7073 (RAG Ingest Service). - **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. @@ -366,7 +344,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` and `aiac.pdp.library.models` are dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import them without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. - **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. -- **`user/{id}` trigger removed.** Composite role mappings are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — composites apply automatically. +- **`user/{id}` trigger not implemented.** OPA rules are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — OPA rule evaluation resolves entitlements from the caller's role automatically. --- @@ -376,11 +354,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library.configuration` and `aiac.pdp.library.policy` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the IdP and PDP respectively. -**AIAC ↔ Keycloak (both phases)** -The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. In Phase 1 it also applies composite role mappings (role → service permissions); in Phase 2 that responsibility moves to the OPA PDP Policy Service. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak** +The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. -**AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2)** -The PDP Policy Service container image is swapped from the Keycloak implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`) to the OPA implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`). The Kubernetes ClusterIP service name and port are unchanged — no other component is modified. The OPA implementation writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR in place of composite role mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. Full spec: [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md). +**AIAC ↔ OPA** +The PDP Policy Service (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each agent pod embeds two OPA plugin instances inside AuthBridge (one for the inbound pipeline, one for the outbound pipeline); each plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. AuthBridge requires no changes when policy rules are updated. Full spec: [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md). **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. @@ -393,7 +371,7 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 IdP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. In Phase 2, also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints (composite role management). Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. Backed by Keycloak in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. **Full spec:** [components/idp-configuration-service.md](components/idp-configuration-service.md) @@ -401,28 +379,23 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the * ### 7.2 PDP Policy Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Two container images share the same Kubernetes ClusterIP name (`aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`): - -- **Phase 1 — Keycloak** (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`): manages role composite mappings (role → service permissions) via Keycloak Admin API. 5 write endpoints. In Phase 2, these endpoints are folded into the IdP Configuration Service. -- **Phase 2 — OPA** (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`): writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. Phase transition = container image swap within the PDP Interface Pod; no manifest change required. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin instance fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. -**Phase 1 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) - -**Phase 2 full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md) +**Full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md) --- ### 7.3 Library -Python package at `aiac/src/`. Phase 2 introduces a clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: +Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: -**IdP library** (Keycloak entity management — both phases): -- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). Renamed from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models`. -- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities plus Phase 1 composite role management; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. Renamed from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`. +**IdP library** (Keycloak entity management): +- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). +- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. -**PDP library** (OPA policy management — Phase 2 only): -- **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for Phase 2 policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`). Replaces `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models`. -- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. Replaces `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api`. +**PDP library** (OPA policy management): +- **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for OPA policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`). +- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. **Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp.md](components/library-pdp.md) @@ -446,7 +419,7 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th | Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role sub-agent | -All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live composite role state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all composite mappings before computing the diff. The **Role Update** orchestrator applies scoped composite mappings for a single affected role. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator first provisions service permissions/scopes (classifies the service via the pod's `kagenti.io/type` label; for agents reads the `AgentCard` CR; for tools calls `tools/list` on the MCP endpoint discovered via K8s Service label lookup), then maps roles to the new service's permissions via composite role additions. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal `PolicyModel` delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live OPA state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all OPA policy rules before recomputing the full `PolicyModel`. The **Role Update** orchestrator recomputes the `PolicyModel` for all services affected by the role change. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator classifies the new service via the pod's `kagenti.io/type` label (for agents reads the `AgentCard` CR; for tools calls `tools/list` on the MCP endpoint discovered via K8s Service label lookup), then computes and writes an `AgentPolicyModel` for the new service. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) @@ -474,7 +447,7 @@ A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal | Keycloak Event | Event Broker subject | |---|---| -| `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; composite roles handle user permission inheritance automatically) | +| `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; OPA rules are role-scoped and resolve entitlements from the caller's role automatically) | | `CLIENT_CREATED` | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | | Role created/updated | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | @@ -490,12 +463,12 @@ Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Interface Pod Deployment (PDP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container) + two ClusterIP Services | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container) + two ClusterIP Services | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The PDP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. +Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. ### Docker images @@ -505,10 +478,7 @@ Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. # Build IdP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ -# Build PDP Policy Service — Keycloak implementation (Phase 1 container in the PDP Interface Pod) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ - -# Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (Phase 2 container in the PDP Interface Pod) +# Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) @@ -520,8 +490,6 @@ docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ The Event Broker uses the official `nats` Docker image with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag). No custom build required. -Phase 2 note: replacing the PDP Policy Service with the OPA implementation requires building `aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest` (see command above) and updating the Policy container image reference in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`. The IdP Configuration Service source also moves from `aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak` to `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak` but the container image name and K8s service remain unchanged. No other manifest changes are required. - ### `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap template ```yaml @@ -552,10 +520,10 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | Target | What to mock | What to assert | |--------|-------------|----------------| -| PDP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | -| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods | 204 on write success, 201 on create, 502 on Keycloak error | +| IdP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | +| PDP Policy Service (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | -| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` functions | PDP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | | Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | @@ -573,7 +541,7 @@ Require a live Keycloak instance. Controlled by env vars: | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Admin username | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Admin password | -Integration tests call the live PDP Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. Event Broker integration tests require a live NATS JetStream instance. +Integration tests call the live IdP Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. Event Broker integration tests require a live NATS JetStream instance. Use a pytest marker (e.g. `@pytest.mark.integration`) so unit tests and integration tests can be run independently: @@ -590,7 +558,7 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only - Base Docker image: `python:3.12-slim` - Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) - Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` -- No auth on PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism -- PDP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- No auth on IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism +- IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes - `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package - NATS consumer must **await** handler completion before issuing ack — fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is prohibited; premature ack breaks at-least-once delivery guarantees diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index b66bb114c..2a66d34c3 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NA The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: -| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents (Phase 1) | Sub-agents (Phase 2) | -|---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy → Policy Apply (sequential) | Service Provision → **Policy** → **Policy Builder** (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build → Policy Apply or Rebuild → Policy Apply (alternative, then apply) | Build → **Policy Builder** or Rebuild → **Policy Builder** | -| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role → Policy Apply (sequential) | Role → **Policy Builder** | +| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | +|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → **Policy** → **Policy Builder** (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build → **Policy Builder** or Rebuild → **Policy Builder** | +| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role → **Policy Builder** | -**Phase 2 new sub-agents (TBD — to be specified in a separate PRD or added to sub-agent PRDs):** +**New sub-agents (TBD — to be specified in a separate PRD or added to sub-agent PRDs):** - **Policy sub-agent** — creates an `AgentPolicyModel` delta scoped to the triggered service, including `source_roles`, `scope_targets`, and `PolicyRule` sets for inbound and outbound pipelines. - **Policy Builder sub-agent** — merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and calls `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy` (or `apply_agent_policy` for single-agent updates). @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] - SA2["Service Policy"] + SA2["Policy"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 end @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ flowchart TD ORC3 --> SA6 end - APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] + APPLY["Policy Builder\nagent/shared/apply/\n(TBD)"] ORC1 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY ORC2 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | -> **Phase 2 TBD:** The Phase 2 Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent need dedicated sub-PRDs. These will be added to this table once defined via `/grill-me` or `/to-prd`. +> **TBD:** The Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent need dedicated sub-PRDs. These will be added to this table once defined via `/grill-me` or `/to-prd`. --- @@ -196,8 +196,6 @@ All type definitions shared across agents: | `pdp_snapshot` | `PDPSnapshot` | Scoped PDP data for this trigger | | `policy_model` | `PolicyModel \| None` | Validated policy to commit; produced by policy-proposing sub-agents | | `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from validate node | -| `added` | `list[CompositeMapping]` | Executed composite additions | -| `removed` | `list[CompositeMapping]` | Executed composite removals | | `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation | #### `PDPSnapshot` @@ -212,10 +210,9 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): #### `PolicyModel` -Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the shared Policy Apply sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Service via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. +Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the Policy Builder sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Service via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. -- **Phase 1:** `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py` (`statements: list[PolicyStatement]`). `PolicyStatement` shape is TBD — must carry sufficient information for entity existence resolution via `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`. -- **Phase 2:** `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (`agents: list[AgentPolicyModel]`). Full spec: [pdp-policy-opa-service.md](pdp-policy-opa-service.md). +`PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (`agents: list[AgentPolicyModel]`). Full spec: [library-pdp.md](library-pdp.md). #### `ValidationVerdict` @@ -225,13 +222,13 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. Phase 1: `PolicyModel` and `PolicyStatement` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py`. Phase 2: `PolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyRule` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py`. See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). +Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. `PolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyRule` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py`. See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). --- ### `shared/apply/` -`PolicyApplyGraph` — shared by all policy-producing sub-agents (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update). Called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a validated `PolicyModel` in state. Commits to the PDP Policy Service. +Policy Builder sub-agent — shared by all policy-producing sub-agents (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update). Called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a validated `PolicyModel` in state. Merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and commits to the PDP Policy Service. Full spec TBD. ``` START → apply_policy → format_response → END @@ -241,23 +238,23 @@ START → apply_policy → format_response → END ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_policy\naiac.pdp.library.policy.api\napply_policy(PolicyModel)"] + START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_policy\naiac.pdp.library.policy\napply_policy(PolicyModel)"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) ``` #### Nodes -- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` (Phase 2) or `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` (Phase 1). The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into the appropriate backend format (Keycloak composite mappings in Phase 1, Rego packages written to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR in Phase 2). +- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. - **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. #### State `BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `policy_model` and `realm`; writes `summary`. -> **Orchestrator contract:** The calling orchestrator must gate on `policy_model is None` before invoking `PolicyApplyGraph`. If the producing sub-graph's `validate_policy` failed (leaving `policy_model` unset), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyApplyGraph`. +> **Orchestrator contract:** The calling orchestrator must gate on `policy_model is None` before invoking `PolicyBuilderGraph`. If the producing sub-graph's `validate_policy` failed (leaving `policy_model` unset), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyBuilderGraph`. -> **Future extension:** This sub-agent is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_policy` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `PolicyModel` before commit. Since `PolicyApplyGraph` is shared, this gate applies uniformly to all use cases. +> **Future extension:** This sub-agent is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_policy` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `PolicyModel` before commit. Since `PolicyBuilderGraph` is shared, this gate applies uniformly to all use cases. --- @@ -274,13 +271,13 @@ Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants i ## Validate Node — Common Checks (All Agents) -All `validate_*` / `validate_mappings` nodes perform the same four checks. Binary abort on any failure: +All `validate_*` nodes perform the same four checks. Binary abort on any failure: ```mermaid flowchart TD IN["policy_model\n+ pdp_snapshot"] --> C1 - C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by PolicyModel\nstatements resolved via\naiac.pdp.library.configuration.api"} + C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by PolicyModel\nstatements resolved via\naiac.idp.library.configuration.api"} C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nadded and removed empty"] C1 -->|"pass"| C2 @@ -315,17 +312,17 @@ flowchart TD **Success response (Service Onboarding):** ```json -{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } +{ "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } ``` **Success response (all other agents):** ```json -{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } +{ "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } ``` **Abort response (validation failure, all agents):** ```json -{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } +{ "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } ``` --- @@ -336,7 +333,7 @@ flowchart TD |---|---|---| | `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.pdp.library.policy` (Phase 2) | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | | `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | @@ -358,7 +355,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti | Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | |---|---| | ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | -| PDP Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| IdP Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | | PDP Policy Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | | Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | @@ -392,7 +389,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState │ └── policy/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph +│ ├── graph.py ← Policy StateGraph │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ @@ -407,7 +404,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ └── rebuild/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_policy, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ ├── roles/ @@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ └── role/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_mappings, validate_mappings, apply_mappings, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy, apply_policy, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ └── shared/ @@ -425,7 +422,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, PolicyModel, ValidationVerdict └── apply/ ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← PolicyApplyGraph (shared by all policy-producing sub-agents) + ├── graph.py ← PolicyBuilderGraph (shared by all policy-producing sub-agents) └── nodes.py ← apply_policy, format_response ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index a196dbf6d..a72bcee6a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -1,14 +1,10 @@ # Component PRD: IdP Configuration Service -**Phase 1 name:** PDP Configuration Service - ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/` -**Phase 1 location:** `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` — source package is renamed in Phase 2; the container image name and Kubernetes ClusterIP service (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`) are unchanged. - ## Description -A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns IdP (Keycloak) entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. In Phase 2 this service also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints (composite role management), consolidating all Keycloak interactions into a single container. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. +A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns IdP (Keycloak) entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. Consolidates all Keycloak interactions into a single container. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak. ## Endpoints @@ -105,7 +101,7 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` - Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) -- Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` (Phase 2) / `aiac.pdp.library.configuration` (Phase 1) +- Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index 86df74f0b..29797df6e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ # Component PRD: IdP Library (`aiac.idp.library`) -**Phase 1 name:** `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.*` — renamed in Phase 2; content is equivalent with the addition of composite role management functions. - ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/idp/library/` @@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ from aiac.idp.library.configuration.api import Configuration ## Submodule: `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` ### Description -Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically; stable across phases. +Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -111,7 +109,7 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] ### Description HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides read and write access to IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`. -In Phase 2 this module also absorbs the Phase 1 PDP Policy Service functions (composite role management). All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Service (OPA) no longer touches Keycloak directly. +All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Service (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. ### Dependencies ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md index 1c75058e5..418930414 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Component PRD: PDP Library (`aiac.pdp.library`) -**Phase 2 only.** These modules replace the Phase 1 `aiac.pdp.library.policy.*` submodules. They have no dependency on Keycloak — all IdP operations use `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. +These modules have no dependency on Keycloak — all IdP operations use `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/` @@ -28,9 +28,7 @@ from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_age ## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.models` ### Description -Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses for Phase 2 policy representation. Importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Consumed by the AIAC Agent's policy-producing sub-agents and the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` HTTP client. - -**Replaces:** `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models` (Phase 1, which held a TBD `PolicyStatement` / `PolicyModel`). +Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses for policy representation. Importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Consumed by the AIAC Agent's policy-producing sub-agents and the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` HTTP client. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -103,8 +101,6 @@ HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA) REST API. Exposes four No `realm` parameter — the OPA service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. -**Replaces:** `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` (Phase 1, which had a realm-bound `Policy` class with a single `apply_policy` method). - ### Dependencies ``` requests diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md index de5af1ddc..48b2678e3 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Component PRD: PDP Policy Service — OPA Implementation (Phase 2) +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Service (OPA) ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/` @@ -6,24 +6,9 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that translates a **Policy Model** into OPA Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resource. The OPA plugin embedded in each AuthBridge instance fetches the Rego packages relevant to its pod from this CR at startup. -This is the **Phase 2** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase transition from Phase 1 = container image swap only (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`). The service name, port, and manifest are unchanged. +The service is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. -The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads and composite role management from Phase 1) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). - ---- - -## Namespace changes introduced in Phase 2 - -Phase 2 introduces a clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split across the library: - -| Phase 1 path | Phase 2 path | Notes | -|---|---|---| -| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | Renamed; content unchanged | -| `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Renamed; Phase 1 policy functions merged in | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | New module; holds Phase 2 policy model types | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | New module; Phase 2 HTTP client functions | -| PDP Configuration Service | **IdP Configuration Service** | Renamed; absorbs Phase 1 PDP Policy Service endpoints | -| PDP Policy Service (Keycloak) | **PDP Policy Service (OPA)** | Container image swap; same ClusterIP name and port | +The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). --- From 8b4a452d5b7899c25859a65415eb44f334bdcb3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 15:39:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 119/273] docs: add State Management Service and state library PRDs; update master PRD - Add components/state-management-service.md: FastAPI service owning AgentPolicy CRs as the authoritative structured policy store, co-located in the PDP Interface Pod at :7074 - Add components/library-state.md: aiac.pdp.library.state.api HTTP client library (extracted from state-management-service.md to match library-idp.md / library-pdp.md convention) - Update PRD.md: seven components, State Management Service in component summary and section 7.3, state library in 7.4, third container in PDP Interface Pod topology, ConfigMap with AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL and AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE, Docker build command, unit test rows, two-CRs architectural decision, component dependencies table Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 62 +++++-- .../requirements/components/library-state.md | 114 +++++++++++++ .../components/state-management-service.md | 159 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 98a2532f2..4f7cca474 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -102,18 +102,19 @@ Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during ## 5. Architecture Overview -Six components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. +Seven components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. ### Component Summary | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes `AgentPolicyModel` instances to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`). Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | -| 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | -| 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 6 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to both PDP services via `configuration` and `policy` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | +| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Co-located in the PDP Interface Pod at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to all three PDP Interface Pod services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗘𝗦𝗧 𝗔𝗣𝗜) @@ -165,6 +166,10 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ │ :7071 ClusterIP │ │ :7072 ClusterIP │ │ │ │ aiac-pdp-config-svc │ │ aiac-pdp-policy-svc │ │ │ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ State Management Service (FastAPI) │ │ +│ │ :7074 ClusterIP aiac-pdp-state-service │ │ +│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ │ │ @@ -223,6 +228,8 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ │ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ │ (write) PDP Policy Service (OPA) │ +│ aiac.pdp.library.state — HTTP client → │ +│ (read/write) State Management Svc │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` @@ -317,18 +324,21 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| | IdP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | | PDP Policy Service — OPA (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| State Management Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | Kubernetes CR (`AgentPolicy`) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.state` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | State Management Service (HTTP) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; None on write/delete | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to AgentPolicy CRs; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in one pod, sharing the same Keycloak credentials. Two separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) select the same pod. +- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and State Management Service run as three containers in one pod, sharing the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. Three separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) select the same pod. +- **Two CRs, two owners, distinct purposes.** The `AgentPolicy` CR (one per agent, owned by the State Management Service) holds structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Service) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. - **Clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. @@ -385,7 +395,15 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP --- -### 7.3 Library +### 7.3 State Management Service + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs (one per agent) as the authoritative structured policy store. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts and is inspectable via `kubectl get agentpolicies`. The PDP Policy Service has no dependency on the State Management Service; the two CRs are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. + +**Full spec:** [components/state-management-service.md](components/state-management-service.md) + +--- + +### 7.4 Library Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: @@ -396,12 +414,13 @@ Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: **PDP library** (OPA policy management): - **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for OPA policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`). - **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.state`** — HTTP client wrapping the State Management Service. Six module-level functions: `get_policy`, `get_agent_policy`, `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Returns `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` directly. -**Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp.md](components/library-pdp.md) +**Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp.md](components/library-pdp.md) · [components/library-state.md](components/library-state.md) --- -### 7.4 Event Broker +### 7.5 Event Broker NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides at-least-once delivery, replay on pod restart via `WorkQueuePolicy`, and a dead-letter subject (`aiac.apply.dlq`) after 5 failed deliveries. No authentication — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism. Stream: `aiac-events`, subjects `aiac.apply.>`, consumer group `aiac-agent-consumer`. @@ -409,7 +428,7 @@ NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers --- -### 7.5 AIAC Agent +### 7.6 AIAC Agent FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: @@ -425,7 +444,7 @@ All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running wit --- -### 7.6 RAG Knowledge Base +### 7.7 RAG Knowledge Base ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. ChromaDB data is persisted on a 1 Gi PVC mounted at `/chroma/chroma`; the RAG Pod is a StatefulSet. @@ -433,7 +452,7 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p --- -### 7.7 RAG Ingest Service +### 7.8 RAG Ingest Service FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.policy.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. @@ -441,7 +460,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-p --- -### 7.8 Keycloak SPI Listener +### 7.9 Keycloak SPI Listener A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into NATS publish calls to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent subject schema is authoritative; the SPI PRD references it. @@ -463,12 +482,12 @@ Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + PDP Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container) + two ClusterIP Services | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + `AgentPolicy` CRD + PDP Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container + State Management Service container) + three ClusterIP Services | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -Both containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. +All three containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The State Management Service uses `AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE` from the ConfigMap to determine which namespace to read and write `AgentPolicy` CRs. ### Docker images @@ -481,6 +500,9 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t a # Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ +# Build State Management Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ + # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ @@ -503,6 +525,8 @@ data: KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" + AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-state-service:7074" + AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE: "default" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" @@ -522,6 +546,8 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. |--------|-------------|----------------| | IdP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | | PDP Policy Service (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | +| State Management Service endpoints | `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` | Correct CR read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on Kubernetes API error; 503 on `/health` failure | +| `aiac.pdp.library.state` functions | State Management Service HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a3c03d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +# Component PRD: State Library (`aiac.pdp.library.state`) + +Companion library for the [AIAC State Management Service](state-management-service.md). Follows the same pattern as `aiac.pdp.library.policy` — module-level functions, URL from env var via `python-dotenv`, `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/state/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/ +├── models.py +├── policy.py +└── state/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── api.py # six module-level functions +``` + +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.state.api import ( + get_policy, get_agent_policy, + apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, + delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, +) +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.state.api` + +### Description +HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC State Management Service](state-management-service.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +```python +def get_policy() -> PolicyModel + # GET /policy + +def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel + # GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy +``` + +### Configuration + +Read from `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `api.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.state.api import ( + get_policy, get_agent_policy, + apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, + delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, +) +from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel + +# Read current state for diff +current = get_agent_policy("weather-agent") + +# Write updated state +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", updated_model) + +# Full rebuild +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) + +# Off-boarding +delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") +``` + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +**Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL`. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Service HTTP; cover module-level functions). + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `get_policy()` issues `GET /policy`; response body deserialized to `PolicyModel`. +- `get_agent_policy(id)` issues `GET /policy/agents/{id}`; response body deserialized to `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `apply_policy(model)` issues `POST /policy` with serialized `PolicyModel`. +- `apply_agent_policy(id, model)` issues `POST /policy/agents/{id}` with serialized `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `delete_agent_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`. +- `delete_policy()` issues `DELETE /policy`. +- Any non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. +- `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7074`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5fa791d91 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +# Component PRD: AIAC State Management Service + +## Problem Statement + +The AIAC Agent's Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Service translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: + +- The Policy Builder sub-agent cannot read current policy state for diff computation — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. +- Off-boarded agents leave no structured record of their removal. +- Policy state is not inspectable via standard Kubernetes tooling. +- Pod restarts lose any in-flight policy construction context. + +## Solution + +A dedicated **AIAC State Management Service** owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resources (one per `AgentPolicyModel`) as the authoritative structured policy store. A companion library [`aiac.pdp.library.state.api`](library-state.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` pattern, used by AIAC Agent sub-agents to read and write policy state without Kubernetes client boilerplate. + +The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the State Management Service. The two CRs serve distinct purposes and are written by distinct services: + +| CR | Owner | Contents | +|---|---|---| +| `AgentPolicy` (one per agent) | State Management Service | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth | +| `AuthorizationPolicy` (one total) | PDP Policy Service | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | + +--- + +## User Stories + +1. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to read the current `AgentPolicyModel` for a specific agent, so that I can compute an accurate delta without re-deriving state from the PDP snapshot. +2. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to read the full `PolicyModel` (all agents), so that I can execute a whole-system policy rebuild. +3. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to write an `AgentPolicyModel` to persistent storage, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. +4. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. +5. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. +6. As an AIAC sub-agent developer, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing Kubernetes client code. +7. As an operator, I want to inspect current policy state using `kubectl get agentpolicies`, so that I can audit access control configuration without specialized tooling. +8. As an operator, I want the State Management Service to be co-located in the PDP Interface Pod, so that policy-related services are deployed together and share the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. + +--- + +## Implementation Decisions + +### State Management Service + +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/` + +**Port:** `0.0.0.0:7074` + +**ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` + +**Deployment:** third container in the PDP Interface Pod (alongside IdP Configuration Service `:7071` and PDP Policy Service `:7072`) + +**Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. + +**Kubernetes client:** `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` with `load_incluster_config()` falling back to `load_kube_config()`. + +**CRD identity:** + +| Field | Value | +|---|---| +| Group | `aiac.kagenti.io` | +| Version | `v1` | +| Kind | `AgentPolicy` | +| Plural | `agentpolicies` | +| CR name | `agent_id` value | +| CR `spec` | `AgentPolicyModel.model_dump()` (snake_case) | + +**Upsert strategy:** server-side apply — `patch_namespaced_custom_object` with `Content-Type: application/apply-patch+yaml`, `field_manager`, and `force=True`. Idempotent; no separate create/update logic. + +**DELETE /policy:** list all CRs via `list_namespaced_custom_object`, then delete each via `delete_namespaced_custom_object`. No collection delete. + +**Endpoints:** + +| Method | Path | Body | Returns | +|---|---|---|---| +| `GET` | `/policy` | — | `PolicyModel` (all agents) | +| `GET` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | `AgentPolicyModel` | +| `POST` | `/policy` | `PolicyModel` | `204 No Content` | +| `POST` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `AgentPolicyModel` | `204 No Content` | +| `DELETE` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | `204 No Content` | +| `DELETE` | `/policy` | — | `204 No Content` | +| `GET` | `/health` | — | `200` / `503` | + +**Error responses:** +- `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "agent {id} not found"}` when GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} finds no CR. +- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on Kubernetes API failure for all write endpoints. +- `503 Service Unavailable` if GET /health cannot reach the Kubernetes API. + +**`main.py` functions:** + +- `_cr_body(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> dict` — build server-side apply body with `apiVersion`, `kind`, `metadata.name`, `metadata.namespace`, `spec = model.model_dump()`. +- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel)` — call `patch_namespaced_custom_object` with server-side apply. +- `_get_agent(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel` — call `get_namespaced_custom_object`; raise 404 if not found. +- `_list_all() -> PolicyModel` — call `list_namespaced_custom_object`; deserialize each item's `spec` to `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)` — call `delete_namespaced_custom_object`. +- `_delete_all()` — call `_list_all()`, then `_delete_agent` for each. + +**Configuration:** + +| Variable | Source | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | Required | + +**Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `kubernetes`, `pydantic` + +**File structure:** + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/ +├── __init__.py +├── Dockerfile +├── requirements.txt +└── main.py +``` + +Build command (run from repo root): +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ +``` + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +Good tests assert external behavior at the system boundary — not internal implementation details such as private helpers or field serialization choices. + +### State Management Service + +**Seam:** `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` — mock this class entirely. + +**Prior art:** `2.13-unit-tests-pdp-policy-opa-service.md` (mock `CustomObjectsApi`; all endpoints + error paths). + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `GET /policy/agents/{id}`: `get_namespaced_custom_object` called with correct args; CR `spec` deserialized to `AgentPolicyModel`; `404` returned when CR not found. +- `GET /policy`: `list_namespaced_custom_object` called; all items deserialized; empty list yields `PolicyModel(agents=[])`. +- `POST /policy/agents/{id}`: `patch_namespaced_custom_object` called with server-side apply body; `spec` contains `AgentPolicyModel.model_dump()`. +- `POST /policy`: `patch_namespaced_custom_object` called once per agent. +- `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`: `delete_namespaced_custom_object` called with correct name. +- `DELETE /policy`: `list_namespaced_custom_object` called, then `delete_namespaced_custom_object` per item. +- Kubernetes API exception on write endpoints → `502`. +- Kubernetes API exception on `GET /health` → `503`. + +See [library-state.md](library-state.md) for the companion library testing decisions. + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- **Controller/watch pattern:** the State Management Service is a REST service, not a Kubernetes controller. It does not watch `AgentPolicy` CRs or react to changes. +- **CRD schema validation (OpenAPI v3):** deferred to the K8s manifests issue. +- **Triggering Rego generation:** the State Management Service writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Service remains the AIAC Agent's responsibility via `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. +- **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full CR list fits within a single Kubernetes API list response. +- **In-cluster mTLS between AIAC Agent and State Management Service:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The `AgentPolicy` CRD must exist in the cluster before the State Management Service starts. The CRD manifest and RBAC (`get`, `list`, `patch`, `delete` on `agentpolicies` in the `aiac.kagenti.io` API group) should be created in the K8s manifests issue that extends the PDP Interface Pod. +- `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) rather than Kubernetes camelCase convention. This avoids a translation layer and is consistent with the approach in the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. +- The `agent_id` is used as the CR `metadata.name`. Since Kubernetes resource names must be valid DNS subdomain names, `agent_id` values must be lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens only — this is already the convention for service IDs in the AIAC trigger events (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`). From 3de803dc5cfccc50b80b0972876b516093436775 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 16:59:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 120/273] docs: rename Kubernetes Interface Pod to Kagenti Interface Pod, add State Mgmt Service to overview diagram - Replace all 14 occurrences of 'Kubernetes Interface Pod' with 'Kagenti Interface Pod' - Add State Management Service block between IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service in component overview ASCII diagram - Update deployment topology diagram pod label - Update component dependencies table, architectural decisions section, and service descriptions Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 66 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 4f7cca474..59a37e876 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -110,31 +110,31 @@ Seven components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | | 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Co-located in the PDP Interface Pod at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | | 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to all three PDP Interface Pod services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to all three Kagenti Interface Pod services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` - (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗘𝗦𝗧 𝗔𝗣𝗜) - ▲ - ┌─────────────┴────────────┐ - │ │ -(𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘵𝘰𝘰𝘭𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦-𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴) -┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ -│ PDP Interface Pod │ │ -│ │ │ │ -│ ┌───────────┴────────────┐ ┌──────────┴─────────────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ (OPA) │ │ -│ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - (𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴) -┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ ▲ + | | + │ ┌───────┴─────────┐ +(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (policy model) (OPA bundle) +┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ +│ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌───────┴────────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ State Mgmt │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼────────────┼────────────────┼─────────────┘ + │ │ │ +┌──────────────┼────────────┼────────────────┼─────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────┘ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ ┌───────────────────────┘ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ │ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ``` ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ PDP Interface Pod │ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ @@ -322,9 +322,9 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| IdP Configuration Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Service — OPA (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | -| State Management Service (in PDP Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | Kubernetes CR (`AgentPolicy`) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | +| IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Service — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| State Management Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | Kubernetes CR (`AgentPolicy`) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ### Key architectural decisions -- **PDP services are co-located in a single PDP Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and State Management Service run as three containers in one pod, sharing the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. Three separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) select the same pod. +- **PDP services are co-located in a single Kagenti Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and State Management Service run as three containers in one pod, sharing the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. Three separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) select the same pod. - **Two CRs, two owners, distinct purposes.** The `AgentPolicy` CR (one per agent, owned by the State Management Service) holds structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Service) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. - **Clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 IdP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. **Full spec:** [components/idp-configuration-service.md](components/idp-configuration-service.md) @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the * ### 7.2 PDP Policy Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin instance fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin instance fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. **Full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md) @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP ### 7.3 State Management Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service in the **PDP Interface Pod**. Owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs (one per agent) as the authoritative structured policy store. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts and is inspectable via `kubectl get agentpolicies`. The PDP Policy Service has no dependency on the State Management Service; the two CRs are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs (one per agent) as the authoritative structured policy store. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts and is inspectable via `kubectl get agentpolicies`. The PDP Policy Service has no dependency on the State Management Service; the two CRs are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. **Full spec:** [components/state-management-service.md](components/state-management-service.md) @@ -482,25 +482,25 @@ Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + `AgentPolicy` CRD + PDP Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container + State Management Service container) + three ClusterIP Services | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + `AgentPolicy` CRD + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container + State Management Service container) + three ClusterIP Services | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -All three containers in the PDP Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The State Management Service uses `AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE` from the ConfigMap to determine which namespace to read and write `AgentPolicy` CRs. +All three containers in the Kagenti Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The State Management Service uses `AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE` from the ConfigMap to determine which namespace to read and write `AgentPolicy` CRs. ### Docker images Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash -# Build IdP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) +# Build IdP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ -# Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) +# Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ -# Build State Management Service (deployed as a container in the PDP Interface Pod) +# Build State Management Service (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) From a22252af6e1d0f53eb00428486782fd790b20c73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 18:25:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 121/273] docs: update requirements to reflect OPA-first architecture and Kagenti Interface Pod naming - ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY: remove Phase 1/2 framing; OPA is the current PDP backend - ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY: rename PDP Configuration Service to IdP Configuration Service - ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY: add State Management Service (component 3 of 7) - ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY: update component overview diagram, call flows, and interfaces section - PRD: fix component diagram connector column alignment for 3-service pod - component specs: rename PDP Interface Pod to Kagenti Interface Pod throughout Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 169 +++++++++--------- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 24 +-- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 2 +- .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 4 +- .../components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md | 4 +- .../components/state-management-service.md | 6 +- 6 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index cd24ee522..0ab5d2e71 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ AI-based Access Control (AIAC) is a Kagenti platform extension that automates RB enforcement for AI agents running on Kubernetes. A LangGraph-based AI agent continuously translates a natural-language access control policy — stored in a vector knowledge base — into concrete permission configurations in the active Policy Decision Point (PDP), eliminating manual policy -administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. Phase 1 targets Keycloak -as the PDP backend; Phase 2 (planned) replaces only the policy-write layer with OPA/Rego while -leaving all other components unchanged. +administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. The PDP backend is OPA, +which evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; Keycloak remains the identity provider for entity +management (subjects, roles, services). --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ creating three compounding problems: updates because there is no automated mechanism to apply them. 2. **Distributed policy intent** — no single authoritative source declares what roles may do; policy knowledge is fragmented across deployments. -3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping Keycloak composite role mappings consistent with - a growing fleet of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. +3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping OPA policy rules consistent with a growing fleet + of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. --- @@ -35,15 +35,16 @@ AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concern | Layer | Component | Responsibility | |---|---|---| | **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | -| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Evaluates caller entitlements; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; issues scoped tokens | | **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated PDP Policy Service. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target -`audience`; the PDP resolves entitlements from the composite role mappings AIAC maintains. -**Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod configuration.** +`audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and +issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. +**Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC.** --- @@ -54,31 +55,26 @@ PDP Policy Service. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only th **Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves -relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current composite role -state from the PDP, and asks the LLM to compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected -entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to Keycloak. Supports both -**auto-apply** (fully automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. - -**Two-phase implementation — trigger, RAG retrieval, LLM reasoning, and validation are identical in both phases; only the policy-write target differs:** - -- **Phase 1 (current):** diff applied as Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions) -- **Phase 2 (planned):** diff applied as LLM-generated Rego rules written to OPA; PDP Policy container image swap only — no other component changes +relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current OPA policy state, and asks the LLM to +compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected entity. The diff is validated by a +second LLM pass and applied to OPA as updated Rego rules. Supports both **auto-apply** (fully +automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. ### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation **Trigger:** An operator ingests updated documents into the RAG store. After ingestion the RAG Ingest Service publishes a build event. The AIAC Agent retrieves all -relevant context, computes a full composite role diff against current PDP state, and applies the -delta. A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all composite mappings before +relevant context, computes a full policy diff against current OPA state, and applies the delta. +A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all OPA policy rules before recomputing from scratch — used when policy changes are too broad for incremental diff. ### UC-3 · Entitlements Review **Trigger:** Operator request (on-demand or scheduled). -The agent evaluates all current Keycloak composite mappings — including manually added ones that -AIAC did not create — against the policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and +The agent evaluates all current OPA policy rules — including manually added ones that AIAC did +not create — against the natural-language policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and policy-agnostic entitlements, enabling audit and remediation workflows. ### UC-4 · Access Request @@ -93,42 +89,43 @@ Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during ## AIAC Component Architecture -Five components across four Kubernetes pods, plus a Python client library: +Seven components across four Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12: | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| -| 1 | **PDP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes PDP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, composite mappings) for read operations. Backed by Keycloak in both phases; the read interface is stable across phases. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies policy changes to the active PDP backend. Phase 1 writes Keycloak composite role mappings (role → service permissions). Phase 2 writes LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA. Both implementations expose the same Kubernetes ClusterIP service name — switching phases is a container image swap only. | -| 3 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | -| 4 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | -| 5 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 6 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to both PDP services via `configuration` and `policy` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | +| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the AIAC Agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to all three Kagenti Interface Pod services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` - (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗘𝗦𝗧 𝗔𝗣𝗜) - ▲ - ┌─────────────┴────────────┐ - │ │ -(𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘵𝘰𝘰𝘭𝘴) (𝘴𝘦𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦-𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘱𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴) -┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ -│ PDP Interface Pod │ │ -│ │ │ │ -│ ┌───────────┴────────────┐ ┌──────────┴─────────────┐ │ -│ │ PDP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ (Phase 1: Keycloak) │ │ -│ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - │ │ -┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ -│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼─────────┘ + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ ▲ + | | + │ ┌───────┴─────────┐ +(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (policy model) (OPA bundle) +┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ +│ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌───────┴────────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ State Mgmt │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┘ + │ │ │ +┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌──────────┘ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ ┌─────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) @@ -148,20 +145,20 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi **AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to -extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.pdp.library` Python package -is the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the PDP. +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library` and +`aiac.pdp.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components +needing typed access to IdP configuration and PDP policy state. -**AIAC ↔ Keycloak (Phase 1)** -The PDP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST read endpoints under generic PDP entity -names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, permissions, assignments). The PDP Policy Service writes -role composite mappings (role → service permissions) to Keycloak. The Keycloak SPI listener -publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak** +The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic IdP entity +names (subjects, roles, services, scopes). The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle +events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. -**AIAC ↔ OPA (Phase 2, planned)** -The PDP Policy Service container image is swapped from the Keycloak implementation to an OPA -implementation. The Kubernetes ClusterIP service name and port are unchanged — no other component -is modified. The OPA implementation writes LLM-generated Rego rules in place of composite role -mappings. AuthBridge requires no changes. +**AIAC ↔ OPA** +The PDP Policy Service writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. +Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. The State Management +Service writes structured `AgentPolicyModel` data to `AgentPolicy` CRs — the source of truth for +policy state that the AIAC Agent diffs against before writing updated Rego rules to OPA. **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. @@ -183,15 +180,13 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 2. deliver event ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 4. GET /scopes, /permissions (target service) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 6. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff for affected service - │ 7. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 8. POST /permissions (if new scope/permission required) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 9. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 10. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 11. ACK message + │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute AgentPolicyModel for new service (inbound + outbound rules) + │ 7. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` @@ -207,13 +202,12 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 2. deliver event ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute minimal permission diff scoped to affected role - │ 6. [LLM] validate diff against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 7. POST /composite-roles (add mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 8. DELETE /composite-roles (remove mappings from diff) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 9. ACK message + │ 5. [LLM] compute PolicyModel delta for all services affected by the role change + │ 6. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` @@ -232,12 +226,11 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 4. deliver event ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB - │ 7. [LLM] compute full composite role diff against current PDP state - │ 8. POST /composite-roles (add delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 9. DELETE /composite-roles (remove delta mappings) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 10. ACK message + │ 7. [LLM] compute full PolicyModel delta against current OPA state + │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) ``` @@ -249,11 +242,11 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 2. DELETE /composite-roles/all (clear entire mapping table) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► PDP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute complete composite role set from scratch - │ 6. POST /composite-roles (write full mapping set) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. [LLM] compute complete PolicyModel from scratch + │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR ▼ (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 59a37e876..cd6e8e6c0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -129,18 +129,18 @@ Seven components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ IdP Config │ │ State Mgmt │ │ PDP Policy │ │ │ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ │ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼────────────┼────────────────┼─────────────┘ - │ │ │ -┌──────────────┼────────────┼────────────────┼─────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌─────────┘ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ ┌───────────────────────┘ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ -│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼─────────┘ +│ ▲ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┘ + │ │ │ +┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌──────────┘ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ ┌─────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index a72bcee6a..61e4e655b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` -- Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) - Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 57c47d424..8e0ac2ae9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. -This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. +This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. ## Endpoints @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Ad - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` -- Deployment: co-located with PDP Configuration Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md index 48b2678e3..e28416dfc 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that translates a **Policy Model** into OPA Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resource. The OPA plugin embedded in each AuthBridge instance fetches the Rego packages relevant to its pod from this CR at startup. -The service is deployed as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. +The service is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ For local development, the `kubernetes` client falls back to `~/.kube/config` au - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` -- Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **PDP Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md index 5fa791d91..84ac206ea 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R 5. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. 6. As an AIAC sub-agent developer, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing Kubernetes client code. 7. As an operator, I want to inspect current policy state using `kubectl get agentpolicies`, so that I can audit access control configuration without specialized tooling. -8. As an operator, I want the State Management Service to be co-located in the PDP Interface Pod, so that policy-related services are deployed together and share the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. +8. As an operator, I want the State Management Service to be co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod, so that policy-related services are deployed together and share the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. --- @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R **ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` -**Deployment:** third container in the PDP Interface Pod (alongside IdP Configuration Service `:7071` and PDP Policy Service `:7072`) +**Deployment:** third container in the Kagenti Interface Pod (alongside IdP Configuration Service `:7071` and PDP Policy Service `:7072`) **Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. @@ -154,6 +154,6 @@ See [library-state.md](library-state.md) for the companion library testing decis ## Further Notes -- The `AgentPolicy` CRD must exist in the cluster before the State Management Service starts. The CRD manifest and RBAC (`get`, `list`, `patch`, `delete` on `agentpolicies` in the `aiac.kagenti.io` API group) should be created in the K8s manifests issue that extends the PDP Interface Pod. +- The `AgentPolicy` CRD must exist in the cluster before the State Management Service starts. The CRD manifest and RBAC (`get`, `list`, `patch`, `delete` on `agentpolicies` in the `aiac.kagenti.io` API group) should be created in the K8s manifests issue that extends the Kagenti Interface Pod. - `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) rather than Kubernetes camelCase convention. This avoids a translation layer and is consistent with the approach in the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. - The `agent_id` is used as the CR `metadata.name`. Since Kubernetes resource names must be valid DNS subdomain names, `agent_id` values must be lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens only — this is already the convention for service IDs in the AIAC trigger events (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`). From 14e4d77c39efb69a7f390ddddcb9621fdec35ffe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 18:28:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 122/273] docs: rename PDP Interface Pod to Kagenti Interface Pod in standalone install guide Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md index 82c1f4021..285992022 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ > This guide deploys the PDP Configuration Service as a standalone Pod. > It does not reflect the production topology. > -> In production both PDP services run as containers in a single PDP Interface Pod +> In production both PDP services run as containers in a single Kagenti Interface Pod > defined in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` (issue 4.2). The PDP Configuration Service is a read-only FastAPI proxy over the Keycloak Admin REST API. From f043e3bc8869ac17be8096ca1b80690ef852adc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:45:12 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 123/273] docs(aiac): update state management PRD for SQLite + StatefulSet MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Replace AgentPolicy CR/etcd persistence with SQLite cache-first model (in-memory PolicyModel + write-through to /data/state.db on a dedicated PVC). Move State Management Service from Kagenti Interface Pod to a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) with a volumeClaimTemplate PVC (1Gi, ReadWriteOnce, mounted at /data). Changes across three docs: - state-management-service.md: full rewrite — remove CustomObjectsApi / CRD identity / AgentPolicy CR; add SQLite schema, cache architecture, transaction strategy, StatefulSet deployment; AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE -> AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH; test seam -> sqlite3 :memory: - PRD.md: pod count 4->5, component table, both ASCII diagrams, K8s manifests table, ConfigMap template, testing table, key decisions, section 7.3 - ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md: pod count, component table row 3, ASCII diagram, interfaces section (new AIAC<->State Mgmt paragraph) AuthorizationPolicy CR (Rego/OPA, owned by PDP Policy Service) is unchanged — only AgentPolicy persistence moves to SQLite. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 57 ++++++---- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 96 ++++++++++------- .../components/state-management-service.md | 101 +++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 0ab5d2e71..7f21776c5 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -89,37 +89,49 @@ Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during ## AIAC Component Architecture -Seven components across four Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12: +Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12: | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | | 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the AIAC Agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite (`/data` PVC) as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the AIAC Agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | | 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to all three Kagenti Interface Pod services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) ▲ ▲ | | - │ ┌───────┴─────────┐ -(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (policy model) (OPA bundle) -┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ -│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ -│ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌───────┴────────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Config │ │ State Mgmt │ │ PDP Policy │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ -│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┘ - │ │ │ -┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌──────────┘ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ ┌─────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ + │ (OPA bundle) +(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ + │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ │ State Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ + │ │ │ + │ │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ + │ │ │ State Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ + │ │ │ │ │ │ + │ │ │ ▼ │ │ + │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite /data/state.db) │ │ + │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ + │ │ ▲ │ + │ └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ │ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ @@ -156,9 +168,12 @@ events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. **AIAC ↔ OPA** The PDP Policy Service writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. -Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. The State Management -Service writes structured `AgentPolicyModel` data to `AgentPolicy` CRs — the source of truth for -policy state that the AIAC Agent diffs against before writing updated Rego rules to OPA. +Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. + +**AIAC ↔ State Management Service** +The State Management Service writes structured `AgentPolicyModel` data to a SQLite store +(in-memory cache + write-through to `/data/state.db` on a dedicated PVC) — the source of truth +for policy state that the AIAC Agent diffs against before writing updated Rego rules to OPA. **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index cd6e8e6c0..a7bda4be2 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during ## 5. Architecture Overview -Seven components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. +Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. ### Component Summary @@ -110,37 +110,51 @@ Seven components across four Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | | 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | | 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to all three Kagenti Interface Pod services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) ▲ ▲ | | - │ ┌───────┴─────────┐ -(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (policy model) (OPA bundle) -┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ -│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ -│ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌───────┴────────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Config │ │ State Mgmt │ │ PDP Policy │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ -│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┘ - │ │ │ -┌──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌──────────┘ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ ┌─────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ -│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ + │ (OPA bundle) +(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ + │ ┌───────────────┘ + │ │ + │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ │ State Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ + │ │ │ + │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ │ + │ │ │ State Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ + │ │ │ │ │ │ + │ │ │ ▼ │ │ + │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite state.db) │ │ + │ │ └──────────────────────────────┘ │ + │ │ ▲ │ + │ └──────────────┼───────────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────┼───────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent │◄────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) @@ -166,13 +180,20 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ │ :7071 ClusterIP │ │ :7072 ClusterIP │ │ │ │ aiac-pdp-config-svc │ │ aiac-pdp-policy-svc │ │ │ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ +│ State Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ +│ │ │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ State Management Service (FastAPI) │ │ │ │ :7074 ClusterIP aiac-pdp-state-service │ │ +│ │ /data ──► PVC (SQLite /data/state.db) │ │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - │ │ +│ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ + │ ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ │ Event Broker Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ @@ -324,7 +345,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| | IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | | PDP Policy Service — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | -| State Management Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | Kubernetes CR (`AgentPolicy`) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | +| State Management Service (StatefulSet `aiac-pdp-state`) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | @@ -333,12 +354,12 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to AgentPolicy CRs; provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to State Management Service (SQLite); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **PDP services are co-located in a single Kagenti Interface Pod.** IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and State Management Service run as three containers in one pod, sharing the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. Three separate ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) select the same pod. -- **Two CRs, two owners, distinct purposes.** The `AgentPolicy` CR (one per agent, owned by the State Management Service) holds structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Service) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. +- **Stateless PDP services are co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod; the stateful State Management Service is separate.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in the Interface Pod, sharing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. The State Management Service is a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with its own PVC — decoupled from the Interface Pod's restart lifecycle. Three ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) provide stable addressing. +- **One CR + one SQLite store, distinct owners, distinct purposes.** The State Management Service owns a SQLite `agent_policies` table (backed by a 1 Gi RWO PVC) holding structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state, served from an in-memory cache. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Service) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. - **Clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. @@ -397,7 +418,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP ### 7.3 State Management Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes CRs (one per agent) as the authoritative structured policy store. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts and is inspectable via `kubectl get agentpolicies`. The PDP Policy Service has no dependency on the State Management Service; the two CRs are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`) mounted at `/data`. Owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database (`/data/state.db`) as the authoritative structured policy store. All GET requests are served from the in-memory cache; mutations write through to SQLite synchronously; on pod restart the cache is repopulated from SQLite. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts. The PDP Policy Service has no dependency on the State Management Service; the SQLite store and `AuthorizationPolicy` CR are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. **Full spec:** [components/state-management-service.md](components/state-management-service.md) @@ -482,12 +503,13 @@ Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + `AgentPolicy` CRD + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container + State Management Service container) + three ClusterIP Services | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | +| `aiac/k8s/state-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet (State Management Service container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -All three containers in the Kagenti Interface Pod mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The State Management Service uses `AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE` from the ConfigMap to determine which namespace to read and write `AgentPolicy` CRs. +The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The State Management Service container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. ### Docker images @@ -500,7 +522,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t a # Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ -# Build State Management Service (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) +# Build State Management Service (deployed as a StatefulSet aiac-pdp-state) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) @@ -526,7 +548,7 @@ data: AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-state-service:7074" - AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE: "default" + AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" @@ -546,7 +568,7 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. |--------|-------------|----------------| | IdP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | | PDP Policy Service (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | -| State Management Service endpoints | `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` | Correct CR read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on Kubernetes API error; 503 on `/health` failure | +| State Management Service endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | | `aiac.pdp.library.state` functions | State Management Service HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md index 84ac206ea..994211c13 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md @@ -6,19 +6,18 @@ The AIAC Agent's Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge - The Policy Builder sub-agent cannot read current policy state for diff computation — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. - Off-boarded agents leave no structured record of their removal. -- Policy state is not inspectable via standard Kubernetes tooling. - Pod restarts lose any in-flight policy construction context. ## Solution -A dedicated **AIAC State Management Service** owns `AgentPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resources (one per `AgentPolicyModel`) as the authoritative structured policy store. A companion library [`aiac.pdp.library.state.api`](library-state.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` pattern, used by AIAC Agent sub-agents to read and write policy state without Kubernetes client boilerplate. +A dedicated **AIAC State Management Service** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.pdp.library.state.api`](library-state.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` pattern, used by AIAC Agent sub-agents to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. -The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the State Management Service. The two CRs serve distinct purposes and are written by distinct services: +The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the State Management Service. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: -| CR | Owner | Contents | +| Artifact | Owner | Contents | |---|---|---| -| `AgentPolicy` (one per agent) | State Management Service | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth | -| `AuthorizationPolicy` (one total) | PDP Policy Service | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | +| SQLite `agent_policies` table | State Management Service | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | +| `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total) | PDP Policy Service | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | --- @@ -29,9 +28,8 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R 3. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to write an `AgentPolicyModel` to persistent storage, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. 4. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. 5. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. -6. As an AIAC sub-agent developer, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing Kubernetes client code. -7. As an operator, I want to inspect current policy state using `kubectl get agentpolicies`, so that I can audit access control configuration without specialized tooling. -8. As an operator, I want the State Management Service to be co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod, so that policy-related services are deployed together and share the same Kubernetes ServiceAccount. +6. As an AIAC sub-agent developer, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. +7. As an operator, I want the State Management Service deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. --- @@ -45,26 +43,31 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R **ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` -**Deployment:** third container in the Kagenti Interface Pod (alongside IdP Configuration Service `:7071` and PDP Policy Service `:7072`) +**Deployment:** dedicated single-replica `StatefulSet` `aiac-pdp-state`, with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, cluster-default StorageClass) mounted at `/data`. Fronted by a headless Service for stable pod DNS plus the `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP for clients. Not co-located with IdP Config / PDP Policy Services. **Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. -**Kubernetes client:** `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` with `load_incluster_config()` falling back to `load_kube_config()`. +**Storage backend:** SQLite via `sqlite3` stdlib (zero extra dependency — `sqlite3` ships with the Python standard library). Database file: `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`). -**CRD identity:** +**Schema:** -| Field | Value | -|---|---| -| Group | `aiac.kagenti.io` | -| Version | `v1` | -| Kind | `AgentPolicy` | -| Plural | `agentpolicies` | -| CR name | `agent_id` value | -| CR `spec` | `AgentPolicyModel.model_dump()` (snake_case) | +```sql +CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies ( + agent_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, + spec TEXT NOT NULL -- AgentPolicyModel.model_dump() as JSON +); +``` + +**In-memory cache:** the service owns a full `PolicyModel` in memory as the authoritative serving layer: +- All `GET` requests served from memory (storage never queried at runtime). +- Every mutation writes through to SQLite synchronously before returning `204`. +- On pod restart: load all rows from SQLite → populate cache → begin serving. -**Upsert strategy:** server-side apply — `patch_namespaced_custom_object` with `Content-Type: application/apply-patch+yaml`, `field_manager`, and `force=True`. Idempotent; no separate create/update logic. +**Transaction strategy:** +- Full rebuild (`POST /policy`): `BEGIN` → `DELETE FROM agent_policies` → per-agent `INSERT` → `COMMIT`. Crash before `COMMIT` leaves the prior state intact (SQLite WAL rollback). +- Per-agent upsert (`POST /policy/agents/{id}`): `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies VALUES (?, ?)`. -**DELETE /policy:** list all CRs via `list_namespaced_custom_object`, then delete each via `delete_namespaced_custom_object`. No collection delete. +**Future normalization:** migrate to `agent_policies` + `policy_rules(agent_id, role, scope)` tables once `AgentPolicyModel`/`PolicyRule` schema stabilizes — a future observability UI will need queryable columns. JSON column in the current schema avoids migration churn during active development. **Endpoints:** @@ -79,26 +82,27 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R | `GET` | `/health` | — | `200` / `503` | **Error responses:** -- `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "agent {id} not found"}` when GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} finds no CR. -- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on Kubernetes API failure for all write endpoints. -- `503 Service Unavailable` if GET /health cannot reach the Kubernetes API. +- `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "agent {id} not found"}` when `GET /policy/agents/{agent_id}` finds no entry in cache. +- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on SQLite write error for all write endpoints. +- `503 Service Unavailable` if `GET /health` cannot open or query the SQLite file. **`main.py` functions:** -- `_cr_body(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> dict` — build server-side apply body with `apiVersion`, `kind`, `metadata.name`, `metadata.namespace`, `spec = model.model_dump()`. -- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel)` — call `patch_namespaced_custom_object` with server-side apply. -- `_get_agent(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel` — call `get_namespaced_custom_object`; raise 404 if not found. -- `_list_all() -> PolicyModel` — call `list_namespaced_custom_object`; deserialize each item's `spec` to `AgentPolicyModel`. -- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)` — call `delete_namespaced_custom_object`. -- `_delete_all()` — call `_list_all()`, then `_delete_agent` for each. +- `_get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection` — open `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` with `check_same_thread=False`; run `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` on first open. +- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel)` — `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`. +- `_get_agent(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel` — read from in-memory cache; raise `404` if absent. +- `_list_all() -> PolicyModel` — return in-memory cache directly. +- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)` — `DELETE FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?`; remove from cache. +- `_delete_all()` — `DELETE FROM agent_policies`; replace cache with empty `PolicyModel`. +- `_rebuild(model: PolicyModel)` — `BEGIN` → `DELETE FROM agent_policies` → per-agent `INSERT` → `COMMIT`; replace cache atomically. **Configuration:** | Variable | Source | Default | |---|---|---| -| `AGENTPOLICY_NAMESPACE` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | Required | +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `/data/state.db` | -**Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `kubernetes`, `pydantic` +**Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `pydantic`. `sqlite3` is stdlib (no new dependency; remove `kubernetes` from requirements). **File structure:** @@ -124,19 +128,17 @@ Good tests assert external behavior at the system boundary — not internal impl ### State Management Service -**Seam:** `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` — mock this class entirely. - -**Prior art:** `2.13-unit-tests-pdp-policy-opa-service.md` (mock `CustomObjectsApi`; all endpoints + error paths). +**Seam:** SQLite `:memory:` database — pass an in-memory connection to the service on startup instead of opening `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH`. All behavioral assertions remain valid; only the storage seam changes. Key behaviors to assert: -- `GET /policy/agents/{id}`: `get_namespaced_custom_object` called with correct args; CR `spec` deserialized to `AgentPolicyModel`; `404` returned when CR not found. -- `GET /policy`: `list_namespaced_custom_object` called; all items deserialized; empty list yields `PolicyModel(agents=[])`. -- `POST /policy/agents/{id}`: `patch_namespaced_custom_object` called with server-side apply body; `spec` contains `AgentPolicyModel.model_dump()`. -- `POST /policy`: `patch_namespaced_custom_object` called once per agent. -- `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`: `delete_namespaced_custom_object` called with correct name. -- `DELETE /policy`: `list_namespaced_custom_object` called, then `delete_namespaced_custom_object` per item. -- Kubernetes API exception on write endpoints → `502`. -- Kubernetes API exception on `GET /health` → `503`. +- `GET /policy/agents/{id}`: returns `AgentPolicyModel` deserialized from cache; `404` when agent not in cache. +- `GET /policy`: returns `PolicyModel` for all agents; empty `PolicyModel(agents=[])` when cache is empty. +- `POST /policy/agents/{id}`: `spec` stored in SQLite; cache updated; `204` returned. +- `POST /policy` (rebuild): SQLite `DELETE` + per-agent `INSERT` issued inside one transaction; cache replaced atomically; `204` returned. +- `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`: row removed from SQLite; removed from cache; `204`. +- `DELETE /policy`: all rows removed from SQLite; cache empty; `204`. +- SQLite write error on any write endpoint → `502`. +- SQLite file cannot be opened/queried on `GET /health` → `503`. See [library-state.md](library-state.md) for the companion library testing decisions. @@ -144,16 +146,15 @@ See [library-state.md](library-state.md) for the companion library testing decis ## Out of Scope -- **Controller/watch pattern:** the State Management Service is a REST service, not a Kubernetes controller. It does not watch `AgentPolicy` CRs or react to changes. -- **CRD schema validation (OpenAPI v3):** deferred to the K8s manifests issue. - **Triggering Rego generation:** the State Management Service writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Service remains the AIAC Agent's responsibility via `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. -- **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full CR list fits within a single Kubernetes API list response. +- **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full result fits within one SQLite query and one HTTP response. - **In-cluster mTLS between AIAC Agent and State Management Service:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. +- **Multi-writer / replica scale-out:** the current design is single-writer (single-replica StatefulSet, RWO PVC, SQLite). Future migration to a shared DB (e.g. PostgreSQL) is a backend swap; the HTTP contract is unchanged. --- ## Further Notes -- The `AgentPolicy` CRD must exist in the cluster before the State Management Service starts. The CRD manifest and RBAC (`get`, `list`, `patch`, `delete` on `agentpolicies` in the `aiac.kagenti.io` API group) should be created in the K8s manifests issue that extends the Kagenti Interface Pod. -- `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) rather than Kubernetes camelCase convention. This avoids a translation layer and is consistent with the approach in the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. -- The `agent_id` is used as the CR `metadata.name`. Since Kubernetes resource names must be valid DNS subdomain names, `agent_id` values must be lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens only — this is already the convention for service IDs in the AIAC trigger events (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`). +- The K8s manifests issue must create the `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet, its `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`), and a headless Service. No CRD or RBAC on `agentpolicies` is needed — the service no longer touches the Kubernetes API. +- `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) — consistent with the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR convention. The JSON column avoids a translation layer. +- `agent_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. DNS-subdomain character constraints no longer apply at the storage layer, but the `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. From 266451a2205e913a329b72a6612bb04e462e4eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 15:05:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 124/273] docs(aiac): rename State Management Service and PDP Policy Service MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Rename display names throughout PRD documentation: - State Management Service → Policy Management Service - PDP Policy Service → PDP Policy Writer Rename component spec files: - state-management-service.md → policy-management-service.md - pdp-policy-opa-service.md → pdp-policy-writer-opa.md K8s service names, env vars, Python module paths, and Docker image tags are unchanged. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 28 +++--- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 86 +++++++++---------- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 8 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 4 +- .../requirements/components/event-broker.md | 2 +- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 2 +- .../components/keycloak-service.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/library-pdp.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/library-state.md | 6 +- .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 4 +- ...pa-service.md => pdp-policy-writer-opa.md} | 6 +- ...ervice.md => policy-management-service.md} | 24 +++--- 13 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) rename aiac/inception/requirements/components/{pdp-policy-opa-service.md => pdp-policy-writer-opa.md} (96%) rename aiac/inception/requirements/components/{state-management-service.md => policy-management-service.md} (82%) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 7f21776c5..e861f87c6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concern The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated -PDP Policy Service. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target +PDP Policy Writer. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. **Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC.** @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite (`/data` PVC) as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the AIAC Agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | +| 3 | **Policy Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite (`/data` PVC) as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the AIAC Agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | | 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | @@ -112,16 +112,16 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ │ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ │ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ │ State Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ + │ │ Policy Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ - │ │ │ State Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ + │ │ │ Policy Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ │ │ │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite /data/state.db) │ │ @@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ names (subjects, roles, services, scopes). The Keycloak SPI listener publishes e events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. **AIAC ↔ OPA** -The PDP Policy Service writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. +The PDP Policy Writer writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. -**AIAC ↔ State Management Service** -The State Management Service writes structured `AgentPolicyModel` data to a SQLite store +**AIAC ↔ Policy Management Service** +The Policy Management Service writes structured `AgentPolicyModel` data to a SQLite store (in-memory cache + write-through to `/data/state.db` on a dedicated PVC) — the source of truth for policy state that the AIAC Agent diffs against before writing updated Rego rules to OPA. @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB │ 6. [LLM] compute AgentPolicyModel for new service (inbound + outbound rules) │ 7. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB │ 5. [LLM] compute PolicyModel delta for all services affected by the role change │ 6. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 8. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB │ 7. [LLM] compute full PolicyModel delta against current OPA state - │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -257,11 +257,11 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB │ 5. [LLM] compute complete PolicyModel from scratch - │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR ▼ (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index a7bda4be2..9715fd7fc 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ its own. The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated -PDP Policy Service. **Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod configuration.** +PDP Policy Writer. **Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod configuration.** --- @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| | 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Service** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **State Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | +| 3 | **Policy Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | | 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | | 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | | 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ │ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ Service(OPA) │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ │ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ @@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ ┌───────────────┘ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ │ State Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ + │ │ Policy Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ │ - │ │ │ State Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ + │ │ │ Policy Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ │ │ │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite state.db) │ │ @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Service │ │ +│ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Writer │ │ │ │ Service (FastAPI) │ │ (FastAPI) │ │ │ │ :7071 ClusterIP │ │ :7072 ClusterIP │ │ │ │ aiac-pdp-config-svc │ │ aiac-pdp-policy-svc │ │ @@ -184,10 +184,10 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi └──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ State Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ +│ Policy Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ State Management Service (FastAPI) │ │ +│ │ Policy Management Service (FastAPI) │ │ │ │ :7074 ClusterIP aiac-pdp-state-service │ │ │ │ /data ──► PVC (SQLite /data/state.db) │ │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ │ │ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ │ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ -│ (write) PDP Policy Service (OPA) │ +│ (write) PDP Policy Writer (OPA) │ │ aiac.pdp.library.state — HTTP client → │ │ (read/write) State Management Svc │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB │ 6. [LLM] compute AgentPolicyModel for new service (inbound + outbound rules) │ 7. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB │ 5. [LLM] compute PolicyModel delta for all services affected by the role change │ 6. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 8. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB │ 7. [LLM] compute full PolicyModel delta against current OPA state - │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -330,11 +330,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) ▼ AIAC Agent - │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB │ 5. [LLM] compute complete PolicyModel from scratch - │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Service ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR ▼ (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` @@ -344,22 +344,22 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| | IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Service — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | -| State Management Service (StatefulSet `aiac-pdp-state`) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | +| PDP Policy Writer — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| Policy Management Service (StatefulSet `aiac-pdp-state`) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Service — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.state` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | State Management Service (HTTP) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; None on write/delete | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Writer — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | +| `aiac.pdp.library.state` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | Policy Management Service (HTTP) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; None on write/delete | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to State Management Service (SQLite); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to Policy Management Service (SQLite); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **Stateless PDP services are co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod; the stateful State Management Service is separate.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Service run as two containers in the Interface Pod, sharing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. The State Management Service is a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with its own PVC — decoupled from the Interface Pod's restart lifecycle. Three ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) provide stable addressing. -- **One CR + one SQLite store, distinct owners, distinct purposes.** The State Management Service owns a SQLite `agent_policies` table (backed by a 1 Gi RWO PVC) holding structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state, served from an in-memory cache. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Service) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. +- **Stateless PDP services are co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod; the stateful Policy Management Service is separate.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Writer run as two containers in the Interface Pod, sharing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. The Policy Management Service is a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with its own PVC — decoupled from the Interface Pod's restart lifecycle. Three ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) provide stable addressing. +- **One CR + one SQLite store, distinct owners, distinct purposes.** The Policy Management Service owns a SQLite `agent_policies` table (backed by a 1 Gi RWO PVC) holding structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state, served from an in-memory cache. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Writer) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. - **Clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. - **Agent HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. - **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. -- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. +- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. - **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` and `aiac.pdp.library.models` are dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import them without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. - **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library.c The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. **AIAC ↔ OPA** -The PDP Policy Service (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each agent pod embeds two OPA plugin instances inside AuthBridge (one for the inbound pipeline, one for the outbound pipeline); each plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. AuthBridge requires no changes when policy rules are updated. Full spec: [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md). +The PDP Policy Writer (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each agent pod embeds two OPA plugin instances inside AuthBridge (one for the inbound pipeline, one for the outbound pipeline); each plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. AuthBridge requires no changes when policy rules are updated. Full spec: [components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. @@ -402,25 +402,25 @@ See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and ### 7.1 IdP Configuration Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Writer in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. **Full spec:** [components/idp-configuration-service.md](components/idp-configuration-service.md) --- -### 7.2 PDP Policy Service +### 7.2 PDP Policy Writer FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin instance fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. -**Full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md](components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md) +**Full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) --- -### 7.3 State Management Service +### 7.3 Policy Management Service -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`) mounted at `/data`. Owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database (`/data/state.db`) as the authoritative structured policy store. All GET requests are served from the in-memory cache; mutations write through to SQLite synchronously; on pod restart the cache is repopulated from SQLite. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts. The PDP Policy Service has no dependency on the State Management Service; the SQLite store and `AuthorizationPolicy` CR are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`) mounted at `/data`. Owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database (`/data/state.db`) as the authoritative structured policy store. All GET requests are served from the in-memory cache; mutations write through to SQLite synchronously; on pod restart the cache is repopulated from SQLite. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts. The PDP Policy Writer has no dependency on the Policy Management Service; the SQLite store and `AuthorizationPolicy` CR are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. -**Full spec:** [components/state-management-service.md](components/state-management-service.md) +**Full spec:** [components/policy-management-service.md](components/policy-management-service.md) --- @@ -434,8 +434,8 @@ Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: **PDP library** (OPA policy management): - **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for OPA policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`). -- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. -- **`aiac.pdp.library.state`** — HTTP client wrapping the State Management Service. Six module-level functions: `get_policy`, `get_agent_policy`, `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Returns `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` directly. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. +- **`aiac.pdp.library.state`** — HTTP client wrapping the Policy Management Service. Six module-level functions: `get_policy`, `get_agent_policy`, `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Returns `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` directly. **Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp.md](components/library-pdp.md) · [components/library-state.md](components/library-state.md) @@ -503,13 +503,13 @@ Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| -| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Service container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | -| `aiac/k8s/state-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet (State Management Service container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Writer container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | +| `aiac/k8s/state-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet (Policy Management Service container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Service uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The State Management Service container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. +The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Management Service container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. ### Docker images @@ -519,10 +519,10 @@ Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. # Build IdP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ -# Build PDP Policy Service — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) +# Build PDP Policy Writer — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ -# Build State Management Service (deployed as a StatefulSet aiac-pdp-state) +# Build Policy Management Service (deployed as a StatefulSet aiac-pdp-state) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) @@ -567,12 +567,12 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | Target | What to mock | What to assert | |--------|-------------|----------------| | IdP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | -| PDP Policy Service (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | -| State Management Service endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | -| `aiac.pdp.library.state` functions | State Management Service HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| PDP Policy Writer (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | +| Policy Management Service endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | +| `aiac.pdp.library.state` functions | Policy Management Service HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` functions | PDP Policy Service HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` functions | PDP Policy Writer HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | | Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | | Init container health-check | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence; NATS TCP refused then connected | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies healthy; `add_stream` called with correct config | @@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only - Base Docker image: `python:3.12-slim` - Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) - Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` -- No auth on IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism -- IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Service, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- No auth on IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism +- IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes - `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package - NATS consumer must **await** handler completion before issuing ack — fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is prohibited; premature ack breaks at-least-once delivery guarantees diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 2a66d34c3..7ad13351b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): #### `PolicyModel` -Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the Policy Builder sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Service via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. +Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the Policy Builder sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Writer via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (`agents: list[AgentPolicyModel]`). Full spec: [library-pdp.md](library-pdp.md). @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `S ### `shared/apply/` -Policy Builder sub-agent — shared by all policy-producing sub-agents (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update). Called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a validated `PolicyModel` in state. Merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and commits to the PDP Policy Service. Full spec TBD. +Policy Builder sub-agent — shared by all policy-producing sub-agents (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update). Called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a validated `PolicyModel` in state. Merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and commits to the PDP Policy Writer. Full spec TBD. ``` START → apply_policy → format_response → END @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ flowchart TD #### Nodes -- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. The PDP Policy Service translates the `PolicyModel` into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. +- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. The PDP Policy Writer translates the `PolicyModel` into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. - **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. #### State @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti |---|---| | ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | | IdP Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | -| PDP Policy Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| PDP Policy Writer | `502 Bad Gateway` | | Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index fba420655..7d0a0f8b5 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes a START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END ``` -Examines all roles and determines which role → service permission/scope mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. Produces a `PolicyModel` written to state; does not commit to the PDP Policy Service. +Examines all roles and determines which role → service permission/scope mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. Produces a `PolicyModel` written to state; does not commit to the PDP Policy Writer. #### Nodes @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ flowchart TD `agent/shared/apply/` — see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply) in `aiac-agent.md`. -Receives the validated `PolicyModel` produced by `validate_policy` and commits it to the PDP Policy Service. Called by the orchestrator after `ServicePolicyGraph` completes, gated on `policy_model is not None`. +Receives the validated `PolicyModel` produced by `validate_policy` and commits it to the PDP Policy Writer. Called by the orchestrator after `ServicePolicyGraph` completes, gated on `policy_model is not None`. --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md index b0541da86..972084539 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agen 1. **Wait for NATS** — poll `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` until TCP connection succeeds. 2. **Wait for PDP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. -3. **Wait for PDP Policy Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL/health` until HTTP 200. +3. **Wait for PDP Policy Writer** — poll `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL/health` until HTTP 200. 4. **Wait for RAG Ingest Service** — poll `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL/health` until HTTP 200 (confirms ChromaDB in the same RAG pod is also up). 5. **Create NATS JetStream stream** — call `js.add_stream()` idempotently with the `aiac-events` stream configuration. Safe to call on every restart. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 61e4e655b..3536178b9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` -- Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Writer as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) - Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md index fd1a7ccc8..362be1761 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ > **Superseded.** This component has been replaced by two separate services: > - **IdP Configuration Service** (read endpoints) — see [idp-configuration-service.md](idp-configuration-service.md) -> - **PDP Policy Service — Keycloak Implementation** (write endpoints) — see [pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) +> - **PDP Policy Writer — Keycloak Implementation** (write endpoints) — see [pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) > > The content below is retained for reference only. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index 29797df6e..e47634deb 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] ### Description HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides read and write access to IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`. -All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Service (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. +All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. ### Dependencies ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md index 418930414..019b24225 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) ## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` ### Description -HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Service (OPA) REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. No `realm` parameter — the OPA service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md index 5a3c03d41..064a14280 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Component PRD: State Library (`aiac.pdp.library.state`) -Companion library for the [AIAC State Management Service](state-management-service.md). Follows the same pattern as `aiac.pdp.library.policy` — module-level functions, URL from env var via `python-dotenv`, `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. +Companion library for the [AIAC Policy Management Service](policy-management-service.md). Follows the same pattern as `aiac.pdp.library.policy` — module-level functions, URL from env var via `python-dotenv`, `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/state/` @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel ## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.state.api` ### Description -HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC State Management Service](state-management-service.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. +HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Management Service](policy-management-service.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") **Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL`. -**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Service HTTP; cover module-level functions). +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Writer HTTP; cover module-level functions). Key behaviors to assert: - `get_policy()` issues `GET /policy`; response body deserialized to `PolicyModel`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 8e0ac2ae9..55ad9085e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Component PRD: PDP Policy Service — Keycloak Implementation +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Writer — Keycloak Implementation ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/` @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. -This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Service. It is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. +This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Writer. It is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. ## Endpoints diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md similarity index 96% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index e28416dfc..0f462f486 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-opa-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Component PRD: PDP Policy Service (OPA) +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Writer (OPA) ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/` @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `P ### `PolicyModel` -A partial or full system policy model. When sent to the PDP Policy Service, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. +A partial or full system policy model. When sent to the PDP Policy Writer, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. | Field | Type | |-------|------| @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ allow if { ## Library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` -HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Service REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. ```python def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-management-service.md similarity index 82% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-management-service.md index 994211c13..34644f4fb 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/state-management-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-management-service.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -# Component PRD: AIAC State Management Service +# Component PRD: AIAC Policy Management Service ## Problem Statement -The AIAC Agent's Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Service translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: +The AIAC Agent's Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Writer translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: - The Policy Builder sub-agent cannot read current policy state for diff computation — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. - Off-boarded agents leave no structured record of their removal. @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ The AIAC Agent's Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge ## Solution -A dedicated **AIAC State Management Service** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.pdp.library.state.api`](library-state.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` pattern, used by AIAC Agent sub-agents to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. +A dedicated **AIAC Policy Management Service** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.pdp.library.state.api`](library-state.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` pattern, used by AIAC Agent sub-agents to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. -The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the State Management Service. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: +The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the Policy Management Service. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: | Artifact | Owner | Contents | |---|---|---| -| SQLite `agent_policies` table | State Management Service | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | -| `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total) | PDP Policy Service | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | +| SQLite `agent_policies` table | Policy Management Service | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | +| `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total) | PDP Policy Writer | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | --- @@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R 4. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. 5. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. 6. As an AIAC sub-agent developer, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. -7. As an operator, I want the State Management Service deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. +7. As an operator, I want the Policy Management Service deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. --- ## Implementation Decisions -### State Management Service +### Policy Management Service **Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/` @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ The PDP Policy Service retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (R **ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` -**Deployment:** dedicated single-replica `StatefulSet` `aiac-pdp-state`, with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, cluster-default StorageClass) mounted at `/data`. Fronted by a headless Service for stable pod DNS plus the `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP for clients. Not co-located with IdP Config / PDP Policy Services. +**Deployment:** dedicated single-replica `StatefulSet` `aiac-pdp-state`, with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, cluster-default StorageClass) mounted at `/data`. Fronted by a headless Service for stable pod DNS plus the `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP for clients. Not co-located with IdP Config / PDP Policy Writers. **Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile \ Good tests assert external behavior at the system boundary — not internal implementation details such as private helpers or field serialization choices. -### State Management Service +### Policy Management Service **Seam:** SQLite `:memory:` database — pass an in-memory connection to the service on startup instead of opening `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH`. All behavioral assertions remain valid; only the storage seam changes. @@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ See [library-state.md](library-state.md) for the companion library testing decis ## Out of Scope -- **Triggering Rego generation:** the State Management Service writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Service remains the AIAC Agent's responsibility via `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. +- **Triggering Rego generation:** the Policy Management Service writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Writer remains the AIAC Agent's responsibility via `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. - **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full result fits within one SQLite query and one HTTP response. -- **In-cluster mTLS between AIAC Agent and State Management Service:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. +- **In-cluster mTLS between AIAC Agent and Policy Management Service:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. - **Multi-writer / replica scale-out:** the current design is single-writer (single-replica StatefulSet, RWO PVC, SQLite). Future migration to a shared DB (e.g. PostgreSQL) is a backend swap; the HTTP contract is unchanged. --- From 4f8dd9c55c182194424ac8e2fd1ae856230b41b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 15:51:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 125/273] docs: Remove deployment topology section from PRD; sync architecture diagram to ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY - Remove the Deployment topology section and its detailed deployment diagram from PRD.md - Update the architecture diagram in ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md to match the cleaner version from PRD.md (Policy Management Pod labeling, aligned header layout) Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 53 ++++---- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 123 +++--------------- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index e861f87c6..d3d297a88 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im | 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` - (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) - ▲ ▲ - | | - │ (OPA bundle) -(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) │ + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ ▲ + | | + │ | + (users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (OPA bundle) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ @@ -117,27 +117,28 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ - │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ │ Policy Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ - │ │ │ - │ │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ - │ │ │ Policy Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ - │ │ │ │ │ │ - │ │ │ ▼ │ │ - │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite /data/state.db) │ │ - │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ - │ │ ▲ │ - │ └──────────────┼───────────────────────────────┘ - │ │ -┌──────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent │◄─────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ -│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ + │ │ + │ │ + │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ │ Policy Management Pod │ + │ │ │ + │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ + │ │ │ Policy Management Service │ │ + │ │ │ │ │ + │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite policy.db) │ │ + │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ + │ │ ▲ │ + │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ AIAC Agent │◄────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) ┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 9715fd7fc..0209d22a7 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im | 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` - (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) - ▲ ▲ - | | - │ (OPA bundle) -(users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) │ + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ ▲ + | | + │ | + (users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (OPA bundle) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ @@ -132,22 +132,21 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ - │ ┌───────────────┘ - │ │ + │ │ + │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ │ Policy Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ + │ │ Policy Management Pod │ │ │ │ - │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ │ - │ │ │ Policy Mgmt Service :7074 │ │ - │ │ │ │ │ │ - │ │ │ ▼ │ │ - │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite state.db) │ │ - │ │ └──────────────────────────────┘ │ - │ │ ▲ │ - │ └──────────────┼───────────────────────┘ - │ │ -┌──────────────┼──────────────────┼───────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ + │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ + │ │ │ Policy Management Service │ │ + │ │ │ │ │ + │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite policy.db) │ │ + │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ + │ │ ▲ │ + │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ AIAC Agent │◄────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ @@ -168,92 +167,6 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via `kubectl port-forward` (operator/developer) or NATS publish (Keycloak SPI, RAG Ingest). -### Deployment topology - -``` -┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ -│ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Configuration │ │ PDP Policy Writer │ │ -│ │ Service (FastAPI) │ │ (FastAPI) │ │ -│ │ :7071 ClusterIP │ │ :7072 ClusterIP │ │ -│ │ aiac-pdp-config-svc │ │ aiac-pdp-policy-svc │ │ -│ └────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┘ - │ │ -┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Policy Mgmt StatefulSet (aiac-pdp-state) │ -│ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ Policy Management Service (FastAPI) │ │ -│ │ :7074 ClusterIP aiac-pdp-state-service │ │ -│ │ /data ──► PVC (SQLite /data/state.db) │ │ -│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ - │ -┌──────────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────────────┐ -│ Event Broker Pod │ │ -│ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────┐ │ │ -│ │ NATS JetStream │ :4222 ClusterIP │ -│ │ │ aiac-event-broker-service │ -│ │ stream: aiac-events │ │ -│ │ subjects: aiac.apply.>│ │ -│ │ dlq: aiac.apply.dlq │ │ -│ └────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ▲ ▲ │ -│ (publish) │ │ (publish) │ -└──────────────┼────────────────┼──────────────────────────┘ - │ (subscribe) │ -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ │ -│ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ aiac-init (init container) │ │ -│ │ python:3.12-slim + nats-py + httpx │ │ -│ │ gates: NATS + PDP Config + PDP Policy + RAG │ │ -│ │ creates: aiac-events JetStream stream │ │ -│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ -│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent (FastAPI) :7070 ClusterIP │ │ -│ │ LangGraph-based │ │ -│ │ + NATS consumer (asyncio background task) │ │ -│ │ consumer: aiac-agent-consumer queue group │ │ -│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ -└──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┘ - │ -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ RAG Pod (StatefulSet) │ -│ ▼ │ -│ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ ChromaDB :8000 │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ -│ │ collections: │ │ (FastAPI) :7073 │ │ -│ │ aiac-policies │ │ │ │ -│ │ aiac-domain-knowledge │ │ │ │ -│ │ PVC: 1Gi /chroma/chroma │ │ │ │ -│ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ -│ ClusterIP: aiac-rag-service (8000 + 7073) │ -└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ - -┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Python library (aiac/src/) │ -│ │ -│ aiac.idp.library.configuration.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.idp.library.configuration.api — HTTP client │ -│ (read/write) IdP Configuration Svc │ -│ │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.models — Pydantic only │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.policy — HTTP client → │ -│ (write) PDP Policy Writer (OPA) │ -│ aiac.pdp.library.state — HTTP client → │ -│ (read/write) State Management Svc │ -└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ -``` - ### Call Flows #### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) From 56af2707b31e6ebedb4611655e75702601d57ad2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 17:58:33 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 126/273] Minor arch diagram update Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 17 ++++++++--------- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 17 ++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index d3d297a88..73ccd02e9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -102,18 +102,17 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im | 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` - (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) ▲ ▲ - | | │ | - (users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (OPA bundle) + (𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘤𝘭𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴) (𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘻𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 𝘊𝘙) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ -│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ @@ -125,7 +124,7 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ │ Policy Management Service │ │ │ │ │ │ │ - │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite policy.db) │ │ + │ │ │ (SQLite policy.db) │ │ │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ ▲ │ │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ @@ -140,7 +139,7 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ │ │ │ │ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) │ ▼ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 0209d22a7..a3abfd5a7 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -117,18 +117,17 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im | 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` - (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (Kubernetes CR 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) ▲ ▲ - | | │ | - (users, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, clients) (OPA bundle) + (𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘤𝘭𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴) (𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘻𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 𝘊𝘙) ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌───────────┴──┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ -│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ -│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ -│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ @@ -140,7 +139,7 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ │ Policy Management Service │ │ │ │ │ │ │ - │ │ │ /data PVC (SQLite policy.db) │ │ + │ │ │ (SQLite policy.db) │ │ │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ ▲ │ │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ @@ -155,7 +154,7 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ │ │ │ │ │ └──────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ +┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) │ ▼ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ From 2102282441d196416d9586bc1b2bc5551c5329c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:52:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 127/273] temp Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 13 +- .../onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py | 27 + .../onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py | 356 ++++++++++ .../onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py | 27 + .../onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py | 16 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py | 4 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 234 ++---- .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 15 +- .../full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py | 14 + .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py | 371 ++++++++++ .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py | 32 + .../prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py | 396 +++++++++++ .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 152 ++-- .../policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py | 15 - .../policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py | 498 ------------- .../policy/service_policy_agent/state.py | 41 -- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py | 17 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 664 ++++-------------- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 41 +- .../policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 13 + .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 273 +++++++ .../policy/single_role_agent/state.py | 21 + .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py | 19 + .../policy/utils/output_generators.py | 357 ---------- .../onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 108 ++- .../aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py | 1 + aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py | 194 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py | 45 ++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py | 19 +- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 51 +- aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py | 104 ++- 32 files changed, 2247 insertions(+), 1893 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 9b7818a71..3afa68fe8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -39,9 +39,10 @@ from dotenv import load_dotenv -from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder +from full_policy_agent_roles.graph import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm -from utils.output_generators import save_policy, save_policy_rego +from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml +from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego load_dotenv(dotenv_path="aiac.env", override=True) @@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ def generate_policy_only( print("-" * 80) print(builder.get_yaml_output()) print("-" * 80) - save_policy(policy, output_file) + save_policy_yaml(policy, output_file) print("\nGenerating Rego policy files...") rego_dir = Path(output_file).parent / "rego_policy" @@ -129,10 +130,8 @@ def generate_policy_only( print("\n" + "=" * 80) print("Parsed Role-to-Privilege Mappings:") print("=" * 80) - for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items(): - print(f" {realm_role}:") - for priv in privileges: - print(f" - {priv.name}: {', '.join(svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id for svc in priv.services)}") + for rule in policy.rules: + print(f" - {rule.role.name}: {rule.scope.name}") def main() -> None: gen_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89b370cfa --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +""" +Base mapper package — shared utilities for single-item mapper agents. +""" + +from .graph import ( + BaseSingleMapper, + MapperConfig, + extract_explanation_and_json, + print_explanation, + validate_mapping_items, + verify_semantic_mapping, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + should_retry_after_semantic, +) +from .state import BaseMappingState + +__all__ = [ + "BaseSingleMapper", + "MapperConfig", + "extract_explanation_and_json", + "print_explanation", + "validate_mapping_items", + "verify_semantic_mapping", + "should_route_after_structural_validation", + "should_retry_after_semantic", + "BaseMappingState", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc316b1e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Shared utilities and base class for single-item mapper agents. + +Both SinglePrivilegeMapper and SingleRoleMapper follow the same +analyze → validate → verify_semantic LangGraph pattern. This module +provides the common building blocks so the subclasses only implement +what differs (prompt building, state field names, rule assembly). +""" + +import json +import re +from abc import ABC, abstractmethod +from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Any, Optional + +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel +from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage +from langgraph.graph import END +from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph + +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule +from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + + +# ============================================================================ +# CONFIGURATION +# ============================================================================ + +@dataclass +class MapperConfig: + """ + Shared configuration for single-item mapper agents. + + Attributes: + llm: LangChain LLM instance + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + llm: BaseChatModel + verbose: bool = True + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + + +# ============================================================================ +# UTILITY FUNCTIONS +# ============================================================================ + +def extract_explanation_and_json( + content: str, +) -> tuple[str, Optional[dict[str, Any]]]: + """ + Extract explanation and JSON from an LLM response. + + Tries multiple parsing strategies in order: + 1. Fenced ```explanation and ```json blocks (preferred format) + 2. Any ```json or generic ``` block containing a dict + 3. A bare { ... } JSON object anywhere in the response + + Returns: + Tuple of (explanation_text, parsed_json_dict). + Returns ("", None) if parsing fails entirely. + """ + explanation = "" + json_data = None + + if "```explanation" in content: + start = content.find("```explanation") + len("```explanation") + end = content.find("```", start) + if end != -1: + explanation = content[start:end].strip() + + if "```json" in content: + start = content.find("```json") + len("```json") + end = content.find("```", start) + if end != -1: + try: + json_data = json.loads(content[start:end].strip()) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + pass + + if json_data is None and "```" in content: + for block in re.findall(r"```[^\n]*\n(.*?)```", content, re.DOTALL): + try: + candidate = json.loads(block.strip()) + if isinstance(candidate, dict): + json_data = candidate + break + except json.JSONDecodeError: + pass + + if json_data is None: + depth = 0 + start_idx = None + for i, ch in enumerate(content): + if ch == "{": + if depth == 0: + start_idx = i + depth += 1 + elif ch == "}": + depth -= 1 + if depth == 0 and start_idx is not None: + try: + candidate = json.loads(content[start_idx : i + 1]) + if isinstance(candidate, dict): + json_data = candidate + if not explanation: + explanation = content[:start_idx].strip() + break + except json.JSONDecodeError: + start_idx = None + + return explanation, json_data + + +def print_explanation( + explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True +) -> None: + """Print the LLM's explanation when verbose mode is on.""" + if verbose and explanation: + prefix = "Retry Explanation:" if is_retry else "LLM Explanation:" + print(f"\n{prefix}") + print(explanation) + print() + + +def validate_mapping_items( + state: BaseMappingState, + verbose: bool, + max_retries: int, + items_key: str, + reference_key: str, + item_type_label: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """ + Structural validation shared by both mapper agents. + + Checks that every item in state[items_key] exists in state[reference_key] + and that there are no duplicates. + + Args: + state: Current mapping state dict + verbose: Whether to print validation errors + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts + items_key: State key holding the mapped items (e.g. "roles_with_access") + reference_key: State key holding the full reference list (e.g. "roles") + item_type_label: Human-readable label for error messages (e.g. "role") + + Returns: + Updated state dict with errors and validation_passed fields set. + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + items = state.get(items_key, []) + available_names: set[str] = {r.name for r in state[reference_key]} + + errors: list[str] = [] + + for item in items: + if item.name not in available_names: + errors.append( + f"Unknown {item_type_label} '{item.name}'. " + f"Must be one of: {', '.join(sorted(available_names))}" + ) + + if len(items) != len({item.name for item in items}): + errors.append(f"Duplicate {item_type_label} names found in the result") + + validation_passed = len(errors) == 0 + + if errors and retry_count < max_retries: + if verbose: + print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count + 1}/{max_retries})") + for error in errors: + print(f" - {error}") + return { + **state, + items_key: items, + "errors": errors, + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1, + } + + return { + **state, + items_key: items, + "errors": errors, + "validation_passed": validation_passed, + "retry_count": retry_count, + } + + +def verify_semantic_mapping( + state: BaseMappingState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + verbose: bool, + max_retries: int, + subject_name: str, + verification_prompt: str, + mapped_items: list, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """ + LLM semantic verification shared by both mapper agents. + + Invokes the LLM with a pre-built verification_prompt and parses the + MAPPING_CORRECT: YES/NO response. On failure, increments retry_count so + the graph can loop back to the analyze node. + + Args: + state: Current mapping state dict + llm: LLM instance for verification + verbose: Whether to print verification details + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed + subject_name: Display name of the item being verified (for logging) + verification_prompt: Fully-built prompt to send to the LLM + mapped_items: The items that were mapped (used to decide whether to log) + + Returns: + Updated state dict with validation_passed and errors set. + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + + try: + response = llm.invoke([HumanMessage(content=verification_prompt)]) + content = ( + response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) + ) + + mapping_match = re.search(r"MAPPING_CORRECT:\s*(YES|NO)", content, re.IGNORECASE) + explanation_match = re.search( + r"EXPLANATION:\s*(.+?)$", content, re.DOTALL | re.IGNORECASE + ) + + mapping_correct = mapping_match.group(1).upper() == "YES" if mapping_match else False + explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() if explanation_match else content + + if verbose and (mapped_items or not mapping_correct): + status = "YES" if mapping_correct else "NO" + print(f"\nSemantic verification [{subject_name}]: MAPPING_CORRECT={status}") + if not mapping_correct: + print(f" {explanation}") + + if not mapping_correct: + error_msg = f"Semantic mismatch for '{subject_name}': {explanation}" + if retry_count < max_retries: + return { + **state, + "errors": [error_msg], + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1, + } + return {**state, "errors": [error_msg], "validation_passed": False} + + return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} + + except Exception: + # Allow the pipeline to proceed on transient errors (rate limits, etc.) + return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} + + +def should_route_after_structural_validation( + validation_passed: bool, + retry_count: int, + max_retries: int, + analyze_node: str, + verify_node: str, +) -> str: + """ + Shared routing logic after structural validation. + + Returns the analyze node name if retries remain, the verify node name if + validation passed, or END if retries are exhausted. + """ + if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: + return analyze_node + if validation_passed: + return verify_node + return END + + +def should_retry_after_semantic( + validation_passed: bool, + retry_count: int, + max_retries: int, + analyze_node: str, +) -> str: + """ + Shared routing logic after semantic verification. + + Returns the analyze node name if semantic check failed and retries remain, + otherwise END. + """ + if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: + return analyze_node + return END + + +# ============================================================================ +# BASE CLASS +# ============================================================================ + +class BaseSingleMapper(ABC): + """ + Abstract base class for single-item mapper agents (privilege→roles and role→privileges). + + Subclasses implement _create_graph, _run, and _build_rules. + generate_policy is fully implemented here using those hooks. + """ + + def __init__( + self, + llm: BaseChatModel, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, + ) -> None: + self.config = MapperConfig(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) + self.graph = self._create_graph(self.config) + + @abstractmethod + def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig) -> CompiledStateGraph: + """Build and return the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" + ... + + def get_graph(self): + """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" + return self.graph + + @abstractmethod + def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Run the workflow and return a result dict with errors, explanation, etc.""" + ... + + @abstractmethod + def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: + """Convert the workflow result into a list of Rule objects.""" + ... + + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: + """ + Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. + + Args: + description: Natural language policy description + + Returns: + PolicyObjectModel with the generated rules and explanation. + + Raises: + ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. + """ + result = self._run(policy_description=description) + errors = result.get("errors", []) + if errors: + raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") + rules = self._build_rules(result) + return PolicyObjectModel(rules=rules, explanation=result.get("explanation", "")) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4edf2df7d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Base state definition shared by single-item mapper agents. +""" + +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated +from operator import add + + +class BaseMappingState(TypedDict): + """ + Common fields shared by SinglePrivilegeState and SingleRoleState. + + Attributes: + policy_description: Natural language policy description (context) + explanation: LLM explanation of the mapping + messages: Accumulated LLM messages + errors: Validation errors - replaced on each validation attempt + retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made + validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded + """ + policy_description: str + explanation: str + messages: Annotated[list, add] + errors: list[str] + retry_count: int + validation_passed: bool diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py index 5faf2f37b..6a4d37856 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ def load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]: return config -def load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name: str, yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> LLMConfig: +def load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name: Optional[str], yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> LLMConfig: """ Load LLM configuration for a specific model from YAML file. @@ -86,7 +86,9 @@ def load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name: str, yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) ValueError: If model not found in configuration """ config = load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path) - + if not model_name: + model_name = config.get("default_model", "gpt-oss") + if model_name not in config['models']: available = ', '.join(config['models'].keys()) raise ValueError(f"Model '{model_name}' not found in configuration. Available models: {available}") @@ -201,14 +203,10 @@ def create_llm( ValueError: If required configuration is missing FileNotFoundError: If configuration file doesn't exist """ - # Load LLM configuration - if model_name: - # Load from YAML - llm_config = load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name, yaml_path) - else: - # Load from .env (legacy) - llm_config = load_llm_config_from_env(env_path) + # Load LLM configuration from YAML + llm_config = load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name, yaml_path) + # Validate required fields for create_llm if not llm_config.endpoint: raise ValueError("LLM_ENDPOINT is required to create an LLM instance") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py index e335ebe2f..8c3a64503 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py @@ -4,13 +4,11 @@ Contains the LangGraph-based policy builder agent implementation. """ -from .graph import PolicyBuilder, PolicyBuilderConfig, create_policy_builder_graph +from .graph import PolicyBuilder from .state import PolicyState __all__ = [ "PolicyBuilder", - "PolicyBuilderConfig", - "create_policy_builder_graph", "PolicyState", ] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 496e5b358..04801696b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Policy Builder - Main Module @@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ - prompt_builder.py: LLM prompt construction - parsers.py: Response parsing utilities - validators.py: Policy validation logic -- output_generators.py: Output file generation utilities - cli.py: Command-line interface Key Features: @@ -31,24 +29,21 @@ - Retry mechanism with semantic verification """ -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge -from typing import Optional, Dict, Any -from pathlib import Path -import os +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Service +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule +from typing import Optional, Dict import sys from dataclasses import dataclass from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from config import create_llm from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure -from utils.output_generators import generate_yaml_output +from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output @dataclass @@ -74,14 +69,13 @@ class PolicyBuilderConfig: # ============================================================================ # These functions are pure and stateless, making them easier to test and reason about -def _parse_and_extract_scopes( +def _build_policy( state: PolicyState, llm: BaseChatModel, - realm_roles: list, + roles: list[Role], privileges_map: dict, - verbose: bool, - services_by_name: Dict[str, Service], -) -> PolicyState: + verbose: bool + ) -> PolicyState: """ Map each privilege to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate results into the parsed_scopes format expected by _build_policy. @@ -104,95 +98,44 @@ def _parse_and_extract_scopes( Returns: Updated PolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation """ - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) explanations = [] # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": Service, "privilege": str} dicts - realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} + policy_rules: list[Rule] = [] - for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): - service_obj = services_by_name.get(service_name) + for _ , service_info in privileges_map.items(): for privilege in service_info["scopes"]: - result = mapper.map_role( - policy_description=state['description'], - service_name=service_name, - privilege=privilege, - realm_roles=realm_roles, + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + llm=llm, + verbose=verbose, + roles=roles, + privilege=privilege) + + result = mapper.generate_policy(description=state['description']) + + explanations.append( + f"**{privilege.name}**: {result.explanation}" ) - roles_with_access = result.get('real_roles_with_access', []) - if roles_with_access and result.get('explanation'): - explanations.append( - f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}" - ) - - for realm_role_name in roles_with_access: - realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - { - 'service': service_obj, - 'privilege': privilege['name'], - } - ) - - parsed_scopes = [ - {'role': realm_role, 'privileges': priv_list} - for realm_role, priv_list in realm_role_to_privileges.items() - ] + policy_rules.extend(result.rules) + policy = PolicyObjectModel( + rules=policy_rules, + explanation = "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "" + ) return { **state, - "explanation": "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", - "parsed_scopes": parsed_scopes, + "policy": policy, "messages": [], "errors": [], "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), "validation_passed": True } - -def _build_policy(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - """ - Build a typed Policy model from extracted role mappings. - - Reads parsed_scopes (where each privilege dict carries a Service object - under 'service') and produces a Policy with Priviledge objects grouped - by privilege name so each Priviledge holds a list of Service objects. - - Args: - state: PolicyState with 'parsed_scopes' field - - Returns: - Updated PolicyState with 'policy_structure' set to a Policy instance - """ - raw: Dict[str, list] = {} - for role_info in state["parsed_scopes"]: - role_name = role_info.get("role", "") - privileges = role_info.get("privileges", []) - priv_to_services: Dict[str, list] = {} - for p in privileges: - svc = p["service"] # Service object stored by _parse_and_extract_scopes - priv_to_services.setdefault(p["privilege"], []).append(svc) - raw[role_name] = [ - Priviledge(name=priv_name, services=svcs) - for priv_name, svcs in priv_to_services.items() - ] - - policy = Policy( - name=state["description"], - policy=raw, - explanation=state.get("explanation", ""), - ) - return {**state, "policy_structure": policy} - - - def _validate_policy( state: PolicyState, - llm: BaseChatModel, realm_roles: list, - service_names: list, privileges_map: dict, - verbose: bool, max_retries: int ) -> PolicyState: """ @@ -202,7 +145,7 @@ def _validate_policy( which expects {realm_role: [{"service": str, "privilege": str}]}. Args: - state: PolicyState with 'policy_structure' as a Policy instance + state: PolicyState with 'policy' as a Policy instance llm: LLM instance (reserved for future semantic verification) realm_roles: List of available realm roles service_names: List of service names @@ -214,24 +157,11 @@ def _validate_policy( Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy_obj: Optional[Policy] = state.get("policy_structure") - - if policy_obj is None: - raw_policy: Dict[str, Any] = {} - else: - raw_policy = { - realm_role: [ - {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - for priv in privileges - for svc in priv.services - ] - for realm_role, privileges in policy_obj.policy.items() - } + policy_obj: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = state.get("policy") structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - raw_policy, + policy_obj, realm_roles, - service_names, privileges_map ) @@ -253,7 +183,7 @@ def _validate_policy( def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: """ - Determine if validation should retry by going back to parse_and_extract. + Determine if validation should retry by going back to build_policy_node. This is a conditional edge function for the LangGraph state machine. @@ -262,7 +192,7 @@ def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed Returns: - "parse_and_extract" if validation failed and retries remain, + "build_policy_node" if validation failed and retries remain, otherwise END to terminate the workflow """ validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) @@ -271,13 +201,13 @@ def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: # If validation failed and we haven't exceeded max retries, retry from start if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count}/{max_retries}). Retrying from parse_and_extract...") + print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count}/{max_retries}). Retrying from build_policy_node...") if errors: print(f"\nValidation Errors (from this attempt):") for i, error in enumerate(errors, 1): print(f" {i}. {error}") print() - return "parse_and_extract" + return "build_policy" # Either validation passed or max retries exceeded return END @@ -285,38 +215,30 @@ def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: def create_policy_builder_graph( config: PolicyBuilderConfig, - realm_roles: list, + roles: list[Role], privileges_map: dict, - service_names: list, - services_by_name: Dict[str, Service], ): """ Create and compile the policy builder graph. Args: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance - realm_roles: List of available realm roles + roles: List of available realm roles privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - service_names: List of service names - services_by_name: Mapping of service name → Service object (threaded into - _parse_and_extract_scopes so parsed_scopes carries Service objects) Returns: Compiled LangGraph workflow """ - def parse_and_extract_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - return _parse_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, privileges_map, config.verbose, services_by_name + def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + return _build_policy( + state, config.llm, roles, privileges_map, config.verbose ) - def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - return _build_policy(state) - def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_names, - privileges_map, config.verbose, config.max_retries + state, roles, + privileges_map, config.max_retries ) def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: @@ -326,13 +248,11 @@ def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: workflow = StateGraph(PolicyState) # Add nodes - workflow.add_node("parse_and_extract", parse_and_extract_node) workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) # Define edges - workflow.set_entry_point("parse_and_extract") - workflow.add_edge("parse_and_extract", "build_policy") + workflow.set_entry_point("build_policy") workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "validate_policy") # Add conditional edge for retry logic @@ -340,7 +260,7 @@ def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: "validate_policy", should_retry_node, { - "parse_and_extract": "parse_and_extract", + "build_policy": "build_policy", END: END } ) @@ -362,9 +282,8 @@ class PolicyBuilder: policy descriptions into structured YAML access control policies. Workflow Stages: - 1. parse_and_extract: Parse natural language and extract role mappings - 2. build_policy: Build structured policy from mappings - 3. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) + 1. build_policy: Parse natural language and extract role mappings, and build structured policy from mappings + 2. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) Attributes: config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance @@ -376,8 +295,8 @@ class PolicyBuilder: def __init__( self, + llm: BaseChatModel, realm: str = "demo", - llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, verbose: bool = True, max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES ): @@ -397,30 +316,22 @@ def __init__( # Store realm for later use self.realm = realm - # Create LLM if not provided - # LLM config is in the config directory relative to this file (llm.env) - if llm is None: - llm_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "config" / "llm.env" - llm_instance = create_llm(env_path=llm_env_path, verbose=verbose) - else: - llm_instance = llm - # Create configuration object self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( - llm=llm_instance, + llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries ) config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - - roles_models = config_api.get_roles() - print (f"Got {len(roles_models)} roles") - self.realm_roles = [ - {"name": r.name, "description": r.description} - for r in roles_models - if r.description - ] + subjects = config_api.get_subjects() + all_roles = [r for sublist in [subject.roles for subject in subjects] for r in sublist] + role_map: dict[str,Role] = {} + for r in all_roles: + role_map[r.name] = r + roles = list(role_map.values()) + print (f"Got {len(roles)} roles") + self.roles = [r for r in roles if r.description] services = config_api.get_services() print (f"Got {len(services)} services") self.privileges_map = {} @@ -433,10 +344,7 @@ def __init__( continue service_name = service.name or service.id print (f"Service {service_name} added: <{service.description}> <{service.type}>") - described_scopes = [ - {"name": scope.name, "description": scope.description} - for scope in service.scopes - if scope.description + described_scopes = [ scope for scope in service.scopes if scope.description ] if not described_scopes: continue @@ -449,10 +357,8 @@ def __init__( self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( self.config, - self.realm_roles, - self.privileges_map, - self.service_names, - self.services_by_name, + self.roles, + self.privileges_map ) # ======================================================================== @@ -475,7 +381,7 @@ def get_graph(self): # PUBLIC API METHODS # ======================================================================== - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Policy: + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: """ Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. @@ -495,10 +401,7 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Policy: """ initial_state: PolicyState = { "description": description, - "explanation": "", - "parsed_scopes": [], - "policy_structure": None, - "yaml_output": "", + "policy": None, "messages": [], "errors": [], "retry_count": 0, @@ -511,9 +414,9 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Policy: if errors: raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - self._last_policy_structure: Optional[Policy] = final_state["policy_structure"] + self._last_policy_structure: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = final_state["policy"] - return final_state["policy_structure"] + return final_state["policy"] def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: """ @@ -530,20 +433,7 @@ def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure') or self._last_policy_structure is None: raise ValueError("No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") - policy = self._last_policy_structure - return generate_yaml_output( - { - "policy": { - realm_role: [ - {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - for priv in privileges - for svc in priv.services - ] - for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() - } - }, - policy.name, - ) + return _generate_yaml_output(self._last_policy_structure) # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py index 356e57faa..1111ab792 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ workflow for policy generation. """ -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any, Optional +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Optional from operator import add -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel class PolicyState(TypedDict): @@ -18,21 +18,14 @@ class PolicyState(TypedDict): Attributes: description: Original natural language policy description - explanation: LLM's explanation of how it mapped the policy - parsed_scopes: List of role-to-privilege mappings; each privilege dict - carries a 'service' key holding a Service object (not a string) - policy_structure: Fully constructed Policy model (set by _build_policy) - yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string + policy: Fully constructed Policy model messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded """ description: str - explanation: str - parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] - policy_structure: Optional[Policy] - yaml_output: str + policy: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt retry_count: int diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89e113e84 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +""" +Role-Based Policy Agent Module + +Contains the LangGraph-based policy builder that iterates over realm roles +and uses SingleRoleMapper to determine which privileges each role should hold. +""" + +from .graph import PolicyBuilder +from .state import PolicyState + +__all__ = [ + "PolicyBuilder", + "PolicyState", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..67e057015 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,371 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Role-Based Policy Builder - Main Module + +This module provides the PolicyBuilder class that orchestrates the +AI-powered generation of Keycloak access control policies from natural +language descriptions using LangGraph workflows. + +Unlike full_policy_agent (which iterates over privileges via SinglePrivilegeMapper), +this agent iterates over realm **roles** via SingleRoleMapper and determines which +privileges each role should be granted. + +Workflow Stages: + 1. build_policy: For each role, call SingleRoleMapper to determine its privileges, + then aggregate all Rules into a PolicyObjectModel. + 2. validate_policy: Validate structure (with retry). +""" + +from typing import Optional, Dict +from pathlib import Path +import sys +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel + +from config import create_llm +from full_policy_agent_roles.state import PolicyState +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Service +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule +from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper +from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure +from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output + + +@dataclass +class PolicyBuilderConfig: + """ + Configuration for PolicyBuilder agent. + + Attributes: + llm: LangChain LLM instance + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + llm: BaseChatModel + verbose: bool = True + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + + +# ============================================================================ +# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS (Following LangGraph Best Practices) +# ============================================================================ + +def _build_policy( + state: PolicyState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + roles: list[Role], + privileges_map: dict, + verbose: bool, +) -> PolicyState: + """ + Map each realm role to its privileges using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate + results into a PolicyObjectModel. + + For every role, SingleRoleMapper determines which privileges that role should + hold. The per-role results are collected into a flat list of Rule objects. + + Args: + state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field + llm: LLM instance for processing + roles: List of available realm roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges + verbose: Whether to print detailed output + + Returns: + Updated PolicyState with policy and explanation + """ + # Flatten all scopes across services into a single list for each role mapper + all_scopes = [] + for _, service_info in privileges_map.items(): + all_scopes.extend(service_info["scopes"]) + + explanations = [] + policy_rules: list[Rule] = [] + + for role in roles: + mapper = SingleRoleMapper( + llm=llm, + verbose=verbose, + role=role, + privileges=all_scopes, + ) + + result = mapper.generate_policy(description=state["description"]) + + explanations.append( + f"**{role.name}**: {result.explanation}" + ) + + policy_rules.extend(result.rules) + + policy = PolicyObjectModel( + rules=policy_rules, + explanation="\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", + ) + + return { + **state, + "policy": policy, + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), + "validation_passed": True, + } + + +def _validate_policy( + state: PolicyState, + roles: list[Role], + privileges_map: dict, + max_retries: int, +) -> PolicyState: + """ + Validate the generated Policy model against structural rules. + + Args: + state: PolicyState with 'policy' as a PolicyObjectModel instance + roles: List of available realm roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts + + Returns: + Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields + """ + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + policy_obj: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = state.get("policy") + + structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( + policy_obj, + roles, + privileges_map, + ) + + if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: + return { + **state, + "errors": structural_errors, + "validation_passed": False, + "retry_count": retry_count + 1, + } + + return { + **state, + "errors": structural_errors, + "validation_passed": len(structural_errors) == 0, + "retry_count": retry_count, + } + + +def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: + """ + Determine if validation should retry by going back to build_policy_node. + + This is a conditional edge function for the LangGraph state machine. + + Args: + state: Current PolicyState containing validation results + max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed + + Returns: + "build_policy" if validation failed and retries remain, otherwise END + """ + validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) + retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) + errors = state.get("errors", []) + + if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: + print( + f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count}/{max_retries}). " + "Retrying from build_policy_node..." + ) + if errors: + print("\nValidation Errors (from this attempt):") + for i, error in enumerate(errors, 1): + print(f" {i}. {error}") + print() + return "build_policy" + + return END + + +def create_role_policy_builder_graph( + config: PolicyBuilderConfig, + roles: list[Role], + privileges_map: dict, +): + """ + Create and compile the role-based policy builder graph. + + Args: + config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance + roles: List of available realm roles + privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges + + Returns: + Compiled LangGraph workflow + """ + + def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + return _build_policy(state, config.llm, roles, privileges_map, config.verbose) + + def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: + return _validate_policy(state, roles, privileges_map, config.max_retries) + + def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: + return _should_retry_validation(state, config.max_retries) + + workflow = StateGraph(PolicyState) + + workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) + workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) + + workflow.set_entry_point("build_policy") + workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "validate_policy") + + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "validate_policy", + should_retry_node, + { + "build_policy": "build_policy", + END: END, + }, + ) + + return workflow.compile() + + +class PolicyBuilder: + """ + AI-powered role-centric access control policy builder using LangGraph. + + Unlike PolicyBuilder (which iterates over privileges), this builder iterates + over realm roles and uses SingleRoleMapper to determine which privileges each + role should be granted. + + Workflow Stages: + 1. build_policy: For each role invoke SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate Rules + 2. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) + """ + + def __init__( + self, + llm: BaseChatModel, + realm: str = "demo", + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, + ): + """ + Initialize the role-based policy builder. + + Args: + realm: Realm name for fetching configuration data + llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. Created automatically if not provided. + verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details + max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts + """ + self.realm = realm + + self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( + llm=llm, + verbose=verbose, + max_retries=max_retries, + ) + + config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + subjects = config_api.get_subjects() + all_roles = [r for sublist in [subject.roles for subject in subjects] for r in sublist] + role_map: dict[str,Role] = {} + for r in all_roles: + role_map[r.name] = r + roles = list(role_map.values()) + print(f"Got {len(roles)} roles") + self.roles = [r for r in roles if r.description] + + services = config_api.get_services() + print(f"Got {len(services)} services") + self.privileges_map: Dict[str, dict] = {} + self.service_names: list[str] = [] + self.services_by_name: Dict[str, Service] = {} + for service in services: + if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): + continue + service_name = service.name or service.id + print(f"Service {service_name} added: <{service.description}> <{service.type}>") + described_scopes = [scope for scope in service.scopes if scope.description] + if not described_scopes: + continue + self.privileges_map[service_name] = { + "service_type": service.type, + "scopes": described_scopes, + } + self.service_names.append(service_name) + self.services_by_name[service_name] = service + + self.graph = create_role_policy_builder_graph( + self.config, + self.roles, + self.privileges_map, + ) + + def get_graph(self): + """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" + return self.graph + + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: + """ + Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. + + Args: + description: Natural language description of the access control policy + + Returns: + PolicyObjectModel instance with the generated policy and explanation. + + Raises: + ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. + """ + initial_state: PolicyState = { + "description": description, + "policy": None, + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) + + errors = final_state.get("errors", []) + if errors: + raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") + + self._last_policy_structure: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = final_state["policy"] + + return final_state["policy"] + + def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: + """ + Generate YAML output from the stored Policy model. + + Must be called after generate_policy(). + + Returns: + Complete YAML policy file content with comments + + Raises: + ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet + """ + if not hasattr(self, "_last_policy_structure") or self._last_policy_structure is None: + raise ValueError( + "No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy()." + ) + return _generate_yaml_output(self._last_policy_structure) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print("Please use aiac_cli.py to run the role-based policy builder.") + sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..27897abc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +State Definitions for Role-Based Policy Builder + +This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph +workflow for role-centric policy generation. +""" + +from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Optional +from operator import add + +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel + + +class PolicyState(TypedDict): + """ + State dictionary for the role-based policy building LangGraph workflow. + + Attributes: + description: Original natural language policy description + policy: Fully constructed Policy model + messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) + errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) + retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made + validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded + """ + description: str + policy: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] + messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation + errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt + retry_count: int + validation_passed: bool # Boolean flag for retry decision, not accumulated diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..66140626d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,396 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Single Role Prompt Builder for Scope Mapping + +This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine +which privileges/scopes a specific realm role should have access to. +""" + +from typing import List + +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope + + +def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( + role: Role, + privileges: List[Scope], + policy_description: str = "", +) -> str: + """ + Build a system prompt for mapping a single realm role to its privileges/scopes. + + This function constructs a prompt that guides the LLM through determining + which available privileges a given realm role should be granted, based on + semantic analysis of the role's description and policy context. + + Args: + realm_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the realm role to analyze + privileges: List of dicts with 'name', 'description', and optional 'service' + for all available privileges + policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context + + Returns: + Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption + """ + # Build available privileges list with descriptions + available_privilege_lines = [] + for priv in privileges: + priv_name = priv.name + priv_desc = priv.description if priv.description else '' + label = priv_name + if priv_desc: + available_privilege_lines.append(f" - {label}: {priv_desc}") + else: + available_privilege_lines.append(f" - {label}") + + available_privileges = ( + "\n".join(available_privilege_lines) + if available_privilege_lines + else " (none defined)" + ) + + # Format the realm role information + role_name = role.name + role_desc = role.description if role.description else '' + role_info = role_name + if role_desc: + role_info += f": {role_desc}" + + # Add policy context if provided + policy_context = "" + if policy_description: + policy_context = f""" +POLICY CONTEXT: +The following policy description provides context for this access control decision: + +{policy_description} + +Use this policy context to understand which privileges the role should receive. + +""" + + return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping realm roles to the privileges/scopes they should hold. +{policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: +You are given: +1. A single realm role with its description +2. A list of all available privileges with their descriptions + +Your task is to determine which privileges this realm role should be granted. + +REALM ROLE TO ANALYZE: + {role_info} + +AVAILABLE PRIVILEGES: +{available_privileges} + +ANALYSIS GUIDELINES: + +1. ROLE CLASSIFICATION — DO THIS FIRST: + Classify the realm role being analyzed into one of two types: + - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM + (e.g., "R&D team members", "Sales team members", "Technical support staff"). + These represent human principals. Proceed to privilege analysis. + - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY or SYSTEM ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE + CAPABILITY ("Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X") or is + a system/internal construct (placeholder like "${{}}", starts with "default-roles-", + or is clearly an identity-provider artifact). + If the realm role is NOT a user-facing role → return [] immediately. + +2. POLICY CONTEXT IS THE PRIMARY GUIDE: + Grant a privilege ONLY when the policy explicitly states this role/user-category + should have access to the capability described by that privilege. + POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. Do not infer access from the role's name alone. + +3. ENABLING / GATEWAY PRIVILEGES — READ CAREFULLY: + A privilege is an enabling service if its description says "Access to the X connector", + "Provides access to X services", "Gateway to X", "Enables access to X", or similar + phrasing that positions it as a PREREQUISITE to reach a downstream resource. + + DOMAIN REQUIREMENT: An enabling privilege only applies when the policy covers the same + domain (e.g., "data warehouse connector" is enabling only for a data warehouse policy). + + RULE: If the policy grants this realm role ANY level of access to a downstream resource, + the realm role MUST also receive the enabling privilege for that resource. + Access level does NOT matter — even read-only access requires the enabling gateway. + + AGENT SEMANTICS — ENABLING DOES NOT EQUAL FINAL RESOURCE ACCESS: + An enabling privilege grants access to the AGENT, CONNECTOR, or GATEWAY ITSELF — not to + the underlying final resource directly. The final resource independently enforces its own + access controls, checking the user's permissions AFTER they reach it through the agent. + Granting an enabling privilege to a role with limited downstream access (e.g., public-only, + read-only) is CORRECT. The final resource's restrictions (private vs. public, full vs. + read-only) are enforced by the final resource, not by the enabling gateway privilege. + +4. ACCESS LEVEL DIFFERENTIATION (for FINAL resource privileges): + Pay close attention to qualifiers: "private" vs "public", "full access" vs "limited", + "read-only" vs "read-write". + Only grant a final-resource privilege if the policy explicitly gives this role the + matching level of access (e.g., do not grant "full data access" to a role with + read-only access). + +5. PRIVILEGE VALIDITY — SKIP SYSTEM SCOPES: + Some privileges are identity-provider infrastructure scopes, NOT service access grants. + Skip any privilege that: + - Has a name starting with "default-roles-" + - Has a description like "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" + - Is clearly an infrastructure artifact (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) + - Describes token-structure modification: "add X to the access token", "adds X claims" + - Describes enabling a client authentication mechanism: "scope for a client enabled for..." + Never include such privileges in the result. + +6. USER-FACING PRIVILEGES ONLY in the result: + Technical/capability privileges (description: "Access to X", "Provides access to X") + and system/internal privileges must never appear in the granted list. + Only include service access scopes that represent meaningful resource access. + Exception: ENABLING privileges (guideline 3) ARE technical in nature but must be + included when the gateway is required for access. + +7. EXACT NAMES ONLY: + Use only the exact privilege identifiers as they appear in the "Available Privileges" + list (including the "service/privilege" format where shown). Do not modify or invent names. + +8. PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE: + When in doubt, do NOT grant access. Only grant what the policy explicitly requires. + +TASK STEPS: +0. ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: + Classify the realm role (step 1 above). If it is NOT a user-facing role → output empty + list and stop. Output the required fenced blocks with [] then stop. + + Required output when role is non-user-facing: + ```explanation + Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: [reason this is not a user-facing role]. Returning [] immediately. + ``` + ```json + {{"role": "{role_name}", "granted_privileges": []}} + ``` + +1. IDENTIFY POLICY GRANTS for this role: + From the policy description, list all capabilities explicitly granted to this role + or the user category it represents. + +2. FOR EACH AVAILABLE PRIVILEGE: + a. Skip system/internal scopes (guideline 5). + b. Determine the privilege's domain. + c. Check if the policy grants this role access in that domain. + d. If yes: is it an enabling privilege or a final-resource privilege? + e. Apply the appropriate access rule (guidelines 3 and 4). + +3. COMPILE the list of granted privileges. + +4. VERIFY no system, non-applicable, or non-user-facing privileges are included. + +5. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the policy evidence and mapping logic. + +6. OUTPUT JSON. + +Return in this format: +```explanation +[Your brief explanation: why each privilege was or was not granted] +``` + +```json +{{ + "role": "{role_name}", + "granted_privileges": [ + "exact-privilege-name-1", + "exact-privilege-name-2" + ] +}} +``` + +EXAMPLE OUTPUTS: + +Example A — user-facing role with enabling + final resource privileges: +```explanation +Step 0: "role-a" role describes Group A team members — user-facing, proceed. +Step 1: Policy grants Group A full data warehouse access. +Step 2: + - "warehouse-connector": enabling service, same domain (data warehouse), role-a has + any level of access → grant. + - "warehouse-full-access": final resource, policy explicitly grants Group A full + access → grant. + - "warehouse-read-only": final resource, Group A has full not read-only access. + Policy does not say "read-only" for Group A → do NOT grant (least privilege). + - "analytics-dashboard": different domain (UI), policy silent on dashboards → skip. +``` +```json +{{"role": "role-a", "granted_privileges": ["warehouse-connector", "warehouse-full-access"]}} +``` + +Example B — technical/capability role, returns empty: +```explanation +Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: The realm role "svc-connector" has description +"Provides access to document storage services" — this is a technical/capability role, +not a human principal or team. Returning [] immediately. +``` +```json +{{"role": "svc-connector", "granted_privileges": []}} +``` + +Example C — user-facing role with read-only access: +```explanation +Step 0: "role-b" describes Group B team members — user-facing, proceed. +Step 1: Policy grants Group B read-only access to document storage. +Step 2: + - "storage-connector": enabling service for document storage, role-b has read-only + access → requires the gateway → grant. + - "storage-read": final resource, read-only access, policy confirms → grant. + - "storage-write": final resource, write access. Policy gives Group B read-only + only → do NOT grant. +``` +```json +{{"role": "role-b", "granted_privileges": ["storage-connector", "storage-read"]}} +``` + +Example D — system/internal realm role, returns empty: +```explanation +Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: The realm role "default-roles-demo" starts with +"default-roles-", marking it as an identity-provider system construct, not a user-facing +role. Returning [] immediately. +``` +```json +{{"role": "default-roles-demo", "granted_privileges": []}} +``` +""" + + +def build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( + policy_description: str, + role: Role, + privileges: List[Scope], + granted_privileges: List[Scope] +) -> str: + """ + Build a prompt to semantically verify a single role-to-scopes mapping. + + Args: + policy_description: Natural language policy description + realm_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the realm role + privileges: List of dicts with 'name', 'description', optional 'service' + for all available privileges + granted_privileges: List of privilege names currently assigned to this role + + Returns: + Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption + """ + role_name = role.name + role_desc = role.description if role.description else '' + role_info = role_name + (f": {role_desc}" if role_desc else "") + + privileges_context = "\n".join( + " - " + p.name + + (f": {p.description}" if p.description else "") + for p in privileges + ) + + assigned = ", ".join([p.name for p in granted_privileges]) if granted_privileges else "(none)" + + return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following role-to-scopes mapping is correct. + +POLICY DESCRIPTION: +{policy_description} + +REALM ROLE BEING ANALYZED: + {role_info} + +CURRENT MAPPING (privileges granted to this role): + {assigned} + +AVAILABLE PRIVILEGES: +{privileges_context} + +VALIDATION TASK: +Verify whether the granted privileges are correct for realm role '{role_name}', +given the policy description AND the role's own name and description. + +CRITICAL RULES — read carefully before evaluating: + +0. ROLE TYPE CHECK (evaluated FIRST, overrides all other rules): + If the realm role is NOT a user-facing role (it describes a service capability, is + a system/internal construct, or its name starts with "default-roles-"), the ONLY + correct mapping is an empty list []. If the current mapping is non-empty, respond + MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and cite this rule. Do NOT evaluate against any other rules. + +1. DOMAIN CHECK: For each granted privilege, verify the policy explicitly covers that + privilege's domain for this realm role. If the policy is silent on a privilege's + domain, an empty grant for that privilege is acceptable. + +2. DO NOT RE-DERIVE THE FULL MAPPING: Only flag the mapping as wrong if you can point to + a specific privilege description + policy statement that directly contradicts what + was assigned. + +3. EMPTY IS VALID BY DEFAULT: An empty assignment [] is acceptable unless the privilege + description explicitly requires this role AND the policy confirms it. + +4. ENABLING SERVICE CHECK — AGENT SEMANTICS: + For enabling/gateway privileges (description: "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", + "Access to X agent/service/connector"): + a. Verify the enabling privilege IS included whenever the policy grants this role ANY + level of access to the downstream resource in the same domain. Flag as incorrect if + a required enabling privilege is missing. + b. Do NOT flag the inclusion of an enabling privilege as a least-privilege violation by + reasoning that it would "grant access" to restricted downstream capabilities. The + enabling privilege grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF — not the final resource. + The final resource independently enforces its own access controls (e.g., the downstream + service still checks restricted vs. open resource access). Granting an enabling privilege + to a role with limited downstream access (open-only, read-only) is CORRECT. + +5. LEAST PRIVILEGE CHECK (applies to FINAL RESOURCE privileges only, NOT enabling services): + Flag any final-resource privilege whose access level exceeds what the policy explicitly + grants (e.g., write access granted when policy says read-only). Do NOT apply this check + to enabling/gateway privileges — see rule 4b above. + +6. USER-FACING PRIVILEGES ONLY: Verify no system/internal scopes (default-roles-*, + token-modification scopes, client-mechanism scopes) appear in the granted list. + +Respond in this EXACT format: +MAPPING_CORRECT: YES +EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. + +OR if incorrect: +MAPPING_CORRECT: NO +EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" + + +def build_single_role_to_scopes_retry_prompt( + role: Role, + privileges: List[Scope], +) -> str: + """ + Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single role analysis. + + Args: + realm_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the realm role + privileges: List of dicts with 'name' and optional 'service' for privileges + + Returns: + Formatted retry prompt string with privilege reminders and format example + """ + role_name = role.name + privilege_names = [p.name for p in privileges] + + return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. + +You MUST output BOTH fenced code blocks below — the explanation block AND the json block. +Do NOT skip the json block, even when the list is empty. + +- Role to analyze: {role_name} +- Available privileges: {", ".join(privilege_names) if privilege_names else "(none)"} + +If the realm role is a system/internal or technical/capability role (not a human-principal +role), output an empty list in the json block and stop. + +Return in this format (both blocks are required): +```explanation +[Your brief explanation] +``` + +```json +{{ + "role": "{role_name}", + "granted_privileges": [] +}} +``` + +Replace [] with the actual privilege names that should be granted, or leave it empty if none.""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index a3511c7da..c6bffefe7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -6,12 +6,14 @@ which real roles should have access to a specific privilege. """ -from typing import List, Dict, Optional +from typing import List +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope -def build_single_role_system_prompt( - realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - privilege: Dict[str, str], + +def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( + roles: List[Role], + privilege: Scope, policy_description: str = "", ) -> str: """ @@ -31,9 +33,9 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( """ # Build available realm roles list with descriptions available_roles_lines = [] - for role in realm_roles: - role_name = role['name'] - role_desc = role.get('description', '') + for role in roles: + role_name = role.name + role_desc = role.description if role.description else '' if role_desc: available_roles_lines.append(f" - {role_name}: {role_desc}") else: @@ -46,8 +48,8 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( ) # Format the privilege information - privilege_name = privilege['name'] - privilege_desc = privilege.get('description', '') + privilege_name = privilege.name + privilege_desc = privilege.description if privilege.description else '' privilege_info = privilege_name if privilege_desc: privilege_info += f": {privilege_desc}" @@ -91,7 +93,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( An enabling service is one whose description says it provides access TO another service or technology. Common phrasings include: "Access to the X connector", "Provides access to X services", "Gateway to X", "Enables access to X", "Access to the X agent". - Examples: "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Provides access to GitHub services", + Examples: "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Provides access to the storage service", "Access to the payment gateway", "Access to the data pipeline". DOMAIN REQUIREMENT - AN ENABLING SERVICE MUST BE IN THE SAME DOMAIN AS THE POLICY: @@ -110,14 +112,27 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - The enabling service is a prerequisite - without it, the user cannot reach the downstream resource at all, regardless of how limited their access is. + AGENT SEMANTICS — ENABLING DOES NOT EQUAL FINAL RESOURCE ACCESS: + - The enabling service grants access to the AGENT, CONNECTOR, or GATEWAY ITSELF — + not to the underlying final resource directly. + - The final resource (e.g., a storage service, data warehouse) independently enforces its + own access controls, checking the user's permissions AFTER they reach it through the agent. + - Do NOT assume an enabling privilege grants unrestricted access to the final resource. + Access restrictions on the final resource are enforced by the final resource, not by + the enabling service. + - Example: "svc-agent" grants access to the external service agent tool. The external + service itself still checks whether the user can access restricted vs. open resources. + Granting "svc-agent" to a role with open-only downstream access is CORRECT — the + restricted resource check is enforced by the external service, not by the agent privilege. + DO NOT confuse enabling services with final resource roles: - ENABLING: "Access to the data warehouse connector" - needed by everyone with data access - FINAL: "Access to public data files" - needed only by those with public access - FINAL: "Access to confidential data records" - needed only by those with full access DO NOT exclude user categories based on their realm role name: - - A "sales" realm role that needs data access still needs the data warehouse connector - - A "support" realm role that needs read-only access still needs the enabling service + - A "role-b" realm role that needs data access still needs the data warehouse connector + - A "role-c" realm role that needs read-only access still needs the enabling service - The realm role name is irrelevant - only whether the policy grants them ANY access matters EXAMPLE: Policy says "Group A gets full data warehouse access; Group B (including @@ -138,8 +153,8 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - Grant access ONLY when explicitly required by the policy or role description - When in doubt, do NOT grant access - POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS: If the policy description does not mention this service's - domain at all, return []. Do NOT infer access from the user role name - (e.g., "developer") or from what that user type might typically do in their job. + domain at all, return []. Do NOT infer access from the user role name or from what + that role type might typically do in their job. Access is determined solely by what the POLICY TEXT explicitly states. - Exception: enabling/gateway services are required by all users of the downstream resource. @@ -149,7 +164,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( 6. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY — FILTER BEFORE ANALYSIS: The available realm roles list may contain a mix of role types. You MUST classify each role - before using it and ONLY include USER-FACING ROLES in real_roles_with_access. + before using it and ONLY include USER-FACING ROLES in roles_with_access. HOW TO CLASSIFY: - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM @@ -158,10 +173,10 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE CAPABILITY — phrases like "Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", "Enables X". These represent service identities or token audiences, NOT human principals. - NEVER include them in real_roles_with_access. + NEVER include them in roles_with_access. - SYSTEM/INTERNAL ROLE: The description is a placeholder (e.g., starts with "${{"), or the role is clearly an infrastructure / identity-provider internal construct. - NEVER include them in real_roles_with_access. + NEVER include them in roles_with_access. NAMING CONFLICT WARNING: A realm role may share the same name or description as the privilege being analysed. Do NOT assign the privilege to such a role on that basis alone. @@ -196,7 +211,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: [reason it is a system/internal privilege]. Returning [] immediately. ``` ```json - {{"privilege": "[privilege-name]", "real_roles_with_access": []}} + {{"privilege": "[privilege-name]", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` System/internal privileges must never be granted to any realm role. b. PRE-FILTER REALM ROLES: Scan the full available realm roles list and identify ONLY the @@ -215,8 +230,8 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" — domain: dashboards. Policy about data warehouse — DIFFERENT → [] - "Access to the data warehouse connector" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - "Access to confidential data records" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about GitHub repos — DIFFERENT → [] - (Even though "developers" may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) + - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about document storage — DIFFERENT → [] + (Even though engineers may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) 2. CLASSIFY this privilege: is it a FINAL resource privilege or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]", "provides access to [some service/technology]", "gateway to [...]", or similar phrasing @@ -245,7 +260,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( ```json {{ "privilege": "{privilege_name}", - "real_roles_with_access": [ + "roles_with_access": [ "exact-realm-role-name-1", "exact-realm-role-name-2" ] @@ -259,23 +274,23 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is "data warehouse access". These are DIFFERENT domains — dashboard UI is unrelated to data warehouse access. Returning [] immediately without further analysis. -Note: Even if "developers" or "analysts" typically use dashboard UIs, the policy is silent +Note: Even if engineers or analysts typically use dashboard UIs, the policy is silent about UI access. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "monitoring-dashboard", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "monitoring-dashboard", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` -Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI privilege, GitHub policy: +Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI privilege, document storage policy: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "demo UI interface". Policy domain is -"GitHub repository access". These are DIFFERENT domains. The policy mentions only GitHub -repositories; it says nothing about any UI or web interface. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. -Returning [] immediately. (The fact that "developers" may use demo UIs is irrelevant — -access is determined by the policy text, not by job function assumptions.) +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "analytics dashboard UI". Policy domain is +"document storage access". These are DIFFERENT domains. The policy mentions only document +storage; it says nothing about any UI or dashboard. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. +Returning [] immediately. (The fact that certain roles may use dashboards in general is +irrelevant — access is determined by the policy text, not by job function assumptions.) ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "demo-ui", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "analytics-dashboard", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` Example B — enabling/gateway service (ALL users who need the downstream resource): @@ -289,7 +304,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "warehouse-connector", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} +{{"privilege": "warehouse-connector", "roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} ``` Example C — restricted privilege, limited access: @@ -302,22 +317,22 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "restricted-data-access", "real_roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} +{{"privilege": "restricted-data-access", "roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} ``` Example D — enabling/gateway service using "Provides access to" phrasing: ```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "GitHub services". Policy domain is -"GitHub repository access". SAME domain (GitHub) — continue. -Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Provides access to GitHub services" positions this -as a prerequisite gateway; without it, no user can reach GitHub repositories at all. -Policy identifies two user categories: R&D (→ developer) gets full access; technical -support (→ tech-support) gets read-only access. Both need ANY level of GitHub access, +Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "document storage services". Policy domain is +"document storage access". SAME domain — continue. +Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Provides access to document storage services" positions +this as a prerequisite gateway; without it, no user can reach document storage at all. +Policy identifies two user categories: Group A (→ role-a) gets full access; Group B +(→ role-b) gets read-only access. Both need ANY level of document storage access, so BOTH need this enabling service. Access level does NOT matter for enabling services. -Realm role mapping: developer → R&D, tech-support → technical support. +Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "github-agent", "real_roles_with_access": ["developer", "tech-support"]}} +{{"privilege": "storage-agent", "roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} ``` Example E — system/internal privilege (starts with "default-roles-"): @@ -328,7 +343,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Returning [] immediately. No further analysis is performed. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "default-roles-demo", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "default-roles-demo", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` Example F — token-modifying scope (adds origins/claims to the token, not a service capability): @@ -340,7 +355,7 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( Returning [] immediately. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "web-origins", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "web-origins", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` Example G — client-mechanism scope (enables an authentication mechanism, not resource access): @@ -351,16 +366,16 @@ def build_single_role_system_prompt( service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure scope. Returning [] immediately. ``` ```json -{{"privilege": "service_account", "real_roles_with_access": []}} +{{"privilege": "service_account", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` """ -def build_semantic_verification_prompt( +def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, - privilege: Dict[str, str], - realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - real_roles_with_access: List[str], + privilege: Scope, + realm_roles: List[Role], + roles_with_access: List[Role], ) -> str: """ Build a prompt to semantically verify a single privilege mapping. @@ -369,21 +384,21 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( policy_description: Natural language policy description privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles - real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned + roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned Returns: Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption """ - privilege_name = privilege['name'] - privilege_desc = privilege.get('description', '') + privilege_name = privilege.name + privilege_desc = privilege.description if privilege.description else '' privilege_info = privilege_name + (f": {privilege_desc}" if privilege_desc else "") realm_roles_context = "\n".join( - f" - {r['name']}" + (f": {r.get('description', '')}" if r.get('description') else "") + f" - {r.name}" + (f": {r.description if r.description else ''}" if r.description else "") for r in realm_roles ) - assigned_roles = ", ".join(real_roles_with_access) if real_roles_with_access else "(none)" + assigned_roles = ", ".join([role.name for role in roles_with_access]) if roles_with_access else "(none)" return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following privilege mapping is correct. @@ -422,7 +437,7 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( - Do NOT evaluate the mapping against any other rules. 1. DOMAIN CHECK FIRST: Determine the domain of this privilege from its name and description - (e.g., "GitHub repositories", "data warehouse", "UI dashboard"). + (e.g., "document storage", "data warehouse", "UI dashboard"). If the policy description does NOT explicitly address this privilege's domain, the mapping cannot be evaluated against the policy — accept any assignment including empty and return MAPPING_CORRECT: YES. @@ -439,7 +454,24 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( in general. Only ask: "Is the mapping for THIS specific privilege consistent with its description and the policy?" -5. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY: Verify that every assigned role represents a human principal or +5. ENABLING/GATEWAY PRIVILEGE — AGENT SEMANTICS (applies before access-level checks): + If this privilege is an enabling/gateway service (description says "Provides access to X", + "Gateway to X", "Access to X agent/service/connector"): + - The assignment grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF — NOT to the final resource. + - The final resource (e.g., a storage service, data warehouse) independently enforces + its own access controls, checking the user's permissions after they reach it through the agent. + - Do NOT flag the assignment as incorrect by reasoning that it would "grant access" to + restricted downstream capabilities (e.g., private repositories, confidential records). + - The ONLY valid check for an enabling privilege is: does each assigned role need ANY + level of access to the downstream resource (per the policy)? + - Access-level restrictions (public-only, read-only, limited) are enforced by the + downstream resource, not by the gateway privilege. Do NOT apply least-privilege + reasoning about the final resource when evaluating an enabling service assignment. + - Example: policy says role-b gets open-resource-only access. Assigning + "svc-agent" (enabling service) to role-b is CORRECT — the downstream service enforces + the open-resource restriction. The enabling privilege just allows them to reach the agent. + +6. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY: Verify that every assigned role represents a human principal or team (e.g., its description characterises a group of people such as "R&D team members"). If any assigned role is a technical/capability role (description: "Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Enables X") or a system/internal role (placeholder description @@ -454,9 +486,9 @@ def build_semantic_verification_prompt( EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" -def build_single_role_retry_prompt( - realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - privilege: Dict[str, str] +def build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt( + realm_roles: List[Role], + privilege: Scope ) -> str: """ Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single privilege analysis. @@ -468,8 +500,8 @@ def build_single_role_retry_prompt( Returns: Formatted retry prompt string with role reminders and format example """ - realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] - privilege_name = privilege['name'] + realm_role_names = [role.name for role in realm_roles] + privilege_name = privilege.name return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. @@ -490,7 +522,7 @@ def build_single_role_retry_prompt( ```json {{ "privilege": "{privilege_name}", - "real_roles_with_access": [] + "roles_with_access": [] }} ``` diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4e4f4ec1b..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -""" -Service Policy Agent - -Generates a partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak service. -""" - -from .graph import ServicePolicyBuilder, ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, create_service_policy_builder_graph -from .state import ServicePolicyState - -__all__ = [ - "ServicePolicyBuilder", - "ServicePolicyBuilderConfig", - "create_service_policy_builder_graph", - "ServicePolicyState", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2eeb17815..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,498 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Service Policy Agent - -Generates a partial access control policy that contains only the rules -relevant for a single specified Keycloak service. Inputs are a natural -language policy description and a service name; output is a YAML policy -with realm-role → service-role mappings scoped to that service. - -Workflow: - 1. filter_and_extract — run SingleRoleMapper for every role of the - given service and aggregate the results. - 2. build_policy — assemble the {policy: {realm_role: [...]}} dict. - 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with header comments. - 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry. -""" - -from typing import Optional -from pathlib import Path -import os -import sys -import yaml -from dataclasses import dataclass - -from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel - -from config import create_llm -from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge -from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper -from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure - - -@dataclass -class ServicePolicyBuilderConfig: - """ - Configuration for the ServicePolicyBuilder agent. - - Attributes: - llm: LangChain LLM instance - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - llm: BaseChatModel - verbose: bool = True - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - - -# ============================================================================ -# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS -# ============================================================================ - -def _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state: ServicePolicyState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - realm_roles: list, - service: Optional[Service], - privileges: list, - verbose: bool, -) -> ServicePolicyState: - """ - Run SingleRoleMapper for every privilege of the target service and invert the - results into the {role to privileges} structure used by _build_policy. - - The 'service' key in each privilege dict holds the Service object (not a string) - so that _build_policy can construct a typed Policy directly. - - Args: - state: Current ServicePolicyState (needs 'description' and 'service_name') - llm: LLM instance - realm_roles: All available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - service: Service object for this scope (None if service was not found in config) - privileges: Privileges belonging to the target service [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - - Returns: - Updated ServicePolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation - """ - service_name = state["service_name"] - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(llm=llm, verbose=verbose) - - explanations: list[str] = [] - realm_role_to_privileges: dict = {} - - for privilege in privileges: - result = mapper.map_role( - policy_description=state["description"], - service_name=service_name, - privilege=privilege, - realm_roles=realm_roles, - ) - - roles_with_access = result.get("real_roles_with_access", []) - if roles_with_access and result.get("explanation"): - explanations.append(f"{service_name}/{privilege['name']}: {result['explanation']}") - - for realm_role_name in roles_with_access: - realm_role_to_privileges.setdefault(realm_role_name, []).append( - { - "service": service, # Service object — may be None if service not found - "privilege": privilege["name"], - } - ) - - parsed_scopes = [ - {"role": realm_role, "privileges": priv_list} - for realm_role, priv_list in realm_role_to_privileges.items() - ] - - return { - **state, - "explanation": "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", - "parsed_scopes": parsed_scopes, - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), - "validation_passed": True, - } - - -def _build_policy(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: - """ - Build a typed Policy model from parsed_scopes. - - Each privilege dict carries a Service object under 'service'; privileges - are grouped by name so each Priviledge holds a list of Service objects. - - Returns: - Updated ServicePolicyState with policy_structure set to a Policy instance - """ - raw: dict = {} - for entry in state["parsed_scopes"]: - role_name = entry["role"] - priv_to_services: dict = {} - for p in entry["privileges"]: - svc = p["service"] # Service object stored by _filter_and_extract_scopes - priv_to_services.setdefault(p["privilege"], []).append(svc) - raw[role_name] = [ - Priviledge(name=priv_name, services=svcs) - for priv_name, svcs in priv_to_services.items() - ] - - policy = Policy( - name=state["description"], - policy=raw, - explanation=state.get("explanation", ""), - ) - return {**state, "policy_structure": policy} - - -def _generate_yaml(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: - """ - Render the Policy model as a YAML string with explanatory comments. - - Converts policy_structure (a Policy instance) to a plain dict before - passing to yaml.dump so the output matches the expected YAML format. - - Returns: - Updated ServicePolicyState with yaml_output - """ - service_name = state.get("service_name", "") - header = ( - "# Partial Access Control Policy\n" - f"# Scoped to service: {service_name}\n" - "# Maps realm roles to the privileges they may access.\n\n" - ) - - if state.get("description"): - header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in state["description"].strip().splitlines(): - header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - header += "#\n" - - if state.get("explanation"): - header += "# LLM Mapping Explanation:\n" - for line in state["explanation"].strip().splitlines(): - header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - header += "\n" - - policy_obj: Optional[Policy] = state.get("policy_structure") - if policy_obj is None: - policy_dict: dict = {"policy": {}} - else: - policy_dict = { - "policy": { - realm_role: [ - {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - for priv in privileges - for svc in priv.services - ] - for realm_role, privileges in policy_obj.policy.items() - } - } - - yaml_content = yaml.dump( - policy_dict, - default_flow_style=False, - sort_keys=False, - allow_unicode=True, - ) - footer = "\n# Generated by ServicePolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" - - return {**state, "yaml_output": header + yaml_content + footer} - - -def _validate_policy( - state: ServicePolicyState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - realm_roles: list, - service_name: str, - service: Optional[Service], - privileges: list, - verbose: bool, - max_retries: int, -) -> ServicePolicyState: - """ - Structural validation of the generated Policy model. - - Converts the Policy back to a raw dict for validate_policy_structure, - which expects {realm_role: [{"service": str, "privilege": str}]}. - - Returns: - Updated ServicePolicyState with errors and validation_passed - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy_obj: Optional[Policy] = state.get("policy_structure") - service_type = (service.type or "Tool") if service else "Tool" - - if policy_obj is None: - raw_policy: dict = {} - else: - raw_policy = { - realm_role: [ - {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - for priv in privs - for svc in priv.services - ] - for realm_role, privs in policy_obj.policy.items() - } - - privileges_map = { - service_name: { - "service_type": service_type, - "scopes": privileges, - } - } - - structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - raw_policy, realm_roles, [service_name], privileges_map - ) - # An empty policy is valid for a service-scoped agent: the policy description - # may simply not grant any permissions to this service's privileges. - structural_errors = [e for e in structural_errors if e != "Policy is empty"] - - if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: - return { - **state, - "errors": structural_errors, - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1, - } - - return { - **state, - "errors": structural_errors, - "validation_passed": len(structural_errors) == 0, - "retry_count": retry_count, - } - - -def _should_retry(state: ServicePolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: - """Conditional edge: retry parse or finish.""" - if not state.get("validation_passed", False) and state.get("retry_count", 0) < max_retries: - errors = state.get("errors", []) - print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {state['retry_count']}/{max_retries}). Retrying...") - for i, err in enumerate(errors, 1): - print(f" {i}. {err}") - return "filter_and_extract" - return END - - -# ============================================================================ -# GRAPH CONSTRUCTION -# ============================================================================ - -def create_service_policy_builder_graph( - config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig, - realm_roles: list, - service_name: str, - service: Optional[Service], - privileges: list, -): - """ - Build and compile the service-scoped policy builder graph. - - Args: - config: ServicePolicyBuilderConfig - realm_roles: All realm roles [{name, description}] - service_name: Service name - service: Service object (None if the service was not found in config) - privileges: Privileges of the target service [{name, description}] - - Returns: - Compiled LangGraph workflow - """ - - def filter_and_extract_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: - return _filter_and_extract_scopes( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service, privileges, config.verbose - ) - - def build_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: - return _build_policy(state) - - def generate_yaml_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: - return _generate_yaml(state) - - def validate_policy_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> ServicePolicyState: - return _validate_policy( - state, config.llm, realm_roles, service_name, service, privileges, - config.verbose, config.max_retries - ) - - def should_retry_node(state: ServicePolicyState) -> str: - return _should_retry(state, config.max_retries) - - workflow = StateGraph(ServicePolicyState) - workflow.add_node("filter_and_extract", filter_and_extract_node) - workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) - workflow.add_node("generate_yaml", generate_yaml_node) - workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) - - workflow.set_entry_point("filter_and_extract") - workflow.add_edge("filter_and_extract", "build_policy") - workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "generate_yaml") - workflow.add_edge("generate_yaml", "validate_policy") - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_policy", - should_retry_node, - {"filter_and_extract": "filter_and_extract", END: END}, - ) - - return workflow.compile() - - -# ============================================================================ -# PUBLIC CLASS -# ============================================================================ - -class ServicePolicyBuilder: - """ - AI-powered policy builder scoped to a single Keycloak service. - - Given a natural language policy description and a service name, produces - a YAML access control policy that contains only the realm-role → - privilege mappings relevant to that service. - - Workflow: - 1. filter_and_extract — map each privilege of the service to realm roles - 2. build_policy — assemble the structured policy dict - 3. generate_yaml — render YAML with comments - 4. validate_policy — structural validation with retry - """ - - def __init__( - self, - service_name: str, - realm: str = "demo", - llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, - ): - """ - Args: - service_name: service name to scope the policy to - realm: realm name - llm: LangChain LLM instance; created automatically if not provided - verbose: Print LLM explanations and validation details - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - if llm is None: - llm_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "config" / "llm.env" - llm_instance = create_llm(env_path=llm_env_path, verbose=verbose) - else: - llm_instance = llm - - self.service_name = service_name - self.config = ServicePolicyBuilderConfig( - llm=llm_instance, - verbose=verbose, - max_retries=max_retries, - ) - - config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - - roles_models = config_api.get_roles() - self.realm_roles = [ - {"name": r.name, "description": r.description or ""} - for r in roles_models - ] - - services = config_api.get_services() - self.service_type: str = "Tool" # Default to "Tool" if not found - self.privileges = [] - self._service_obj: Optional[Service] = None - for service in services: - if service.serviceId != service_name: - continue - # Handle None case by defaulting to "Tool" - self.service_type = service.type or "Tool" - self._service_obj = service - # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. - # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges. - self.privileges = [ - {"name": role.name, "description": role.description or ""} - for role in service.roles - ] - break - - self.graph = create_service_policy_builder_graph( - self.config, - self.realm_roles, - self.service_name, - self._service_obj, - self.privileges, - ) - - def get_graph(self): - """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" - return self.graph - - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> Policy: - """ - Generate a service-scoped access control policy from a natural language description. - - Args: - description: Natural language policy description - - Returns: - Policy model instance with the generated policy and explanation. - - Raises: - ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. - """ - initial_state: ServicePolicyState = { - "description": description, - "service_name": self.service_name, - "explanation": "", - "parsed_scopes": [], - "policy_structure": None, - "yaml_output": "", - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - errors = final_state.get("errors", []) - if errors: - raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - - self._last_yaml_output = final_state["yaml_output"] - - return final_state["policy_structure"] - - def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: - """ - Return the YAML output from the last generate_policy() call. - - Raises: - ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet. - """ - if not hasattr(self, "_last_yaml_output"): - raise ValueError("No policy available. Call generate_policy() first.") - return self._last_yaml_output - - def save_policy(self, yaml_output: str, filepath: str = "service_policy.yaml"): - """ - Save the generated policy YAML to a file. - - Args: - yaml_output: YAML content string - filepath: Destination file path - """ - with open(filepath, "w") as f: - f.write(yaml_output) - print(f"Service policy saved to {filepath}") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - print("Use ServicePolicyBuilder programmatically or via the CLI.") - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index 920b907c8..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/service_policy_agent/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -State Definitions for Service Policy Agent - -TypedDict state structure for the LangGraph workflow that generates a -partial access control policy scoped to a single Keycloak service. -""" - -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict, Any, Optional -from operator import add - -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy - - -class ServicePolicyState(TypedDict): - """ - State for the service-scoped policy building workflow. - - Attributes: - description: Natural language policy description - service_name: Keycloak service name to scope the policy to - explanation: LLM explanation of the privilege mappings - parsed_scopes: List of {role, privileges} mappings; each privilege dict - carries a 'service' key holding a Service object (not a string) - policy_structure: Fully constructed Policy model (set by _build_policy) - yaml_output: Final YAML-formatted policy string - messages: Accumulated LLM messages - errors: Validation errors - replaced on each validation attempt - retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts - validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded - """ - description: str - service_name: str - explanation: str - parsed_scopes: List[Dict[str, Any]] - policy_structure: Optional[Policy] - yaml_output: str - messages: Annotated[List, add] - errors: List[str] - retry_count: int - validation_passed: bool diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py index e78e71c7a..61e535156 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 """ -Single Privilege Mapper Package +Single Privilege Mapper -This package provides functionality for mapping individual privileges -to real roles (realm roles) that should have access to them. +Maps a single privilege to the realm roles that should have access to it. """ -from .graph import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig +from .graph import SinglePrivilegeMapper from .state import SinglePrivilegeState __all__ = [ - 'SinglePrivilegeMapper', - 'SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig', - 'SinglePrivilegeState', -] - -# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file + "SinglePrivilegeMapper", + "SinglePrivilegeState", +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index a5d6ab18c..eebed6b7d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -1,496 +1,181 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 """ -Single Privilege Mapper - Main Module +Single Privilege Mapper -This module provides the SinglePrivilegeMapper class that uses LangGraph workflows -to determine which real roles (realm roles) should have access to a specific -privilege based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. +Maps a single privilege to the realm roles that should have access to it. +Uses a LangGraph workflow that analyzes, validates, and semantically verifies +the mapping before returning a PolicyObjectModel. -Key Features: - - Semantic matching of privilege to real roles - - Policy description context for better decision making - - Automatic validation and retry mechanism - - LLM-powered analysis of role descriptions +Workflow: + 1. analyze_role_mapping — LLM determines which realm roles get access. + 2. validate_role_mapping — structural validation with retry. + 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. """ -import re -from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional -from pathlib import Path -import json -from dataclasses import dataclass +import sys +from typing import Any from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from config import create_llm +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule from .state import SinglePrivilegeState +from base_mapper import ( + BaseSingleMapper, + MapperConfig, + extract_explanation_and_json, + print_explanation, + validate_mapping_items, + verify_semantic_mapping, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + should_retry_after_semantic, +) from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from prompts.single_role_prompt_builder import ( - build_single_role_system_prompt, - build_single_role_retry_prompt, - build_semantic_verification_prompt, + build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt, + build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt, + build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt, ) -@dataclass -class SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig: - """ - Configuration for SinglePrivilegeMapper agent. - - Attributes: - llm: LangChain LLM instance - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - llm: BaseChatModel - verbose: bool = True - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - - -# ============================================================================ -# UTILITY FUNCTIONS -# ============================================================================ - -def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content: str) -> tuple[str, Optional[Dict[str, Any]]]: - """ - Extract explanation and JSON from LLM response for single role mapping. - - Tries multiple parsing strategies in order: - 1. Fenced code blocks with ```explanation and ```json tags (preferred format) - 2. Any ```json or generic ``` block containing a dict - 3. A bare { ... } JSON object anywhere in the response - - Args: - content: Raw LLM response content string - - Returns: - Tuple of (explanation_text, parsed_json_dict) - Returns empty string and None if parsing fails - """ - explanation = "" - json_data = None - - # Extract explanation block - if "```explanation" in content: - start = content.find("```explanation") + len("```explanation") - end = content.find("```", start) - if end != -1: - explanation = content[start:end].strip() - - # Try fenced ```json block first - if "```json" in content: - start = content.find("```json") + len("```json") - end = content.find("```", start) - if end != -1: - try: - json_data = json.loads(content[start:end].strip()) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - pass - - # Try any generic fenced code block containing a dict - if json_data is None and "```" in content: - import re - for block in re.findall(r"```[^\n]*\n(.*?)```", content, re.DOTALL): - try: - candidate = json.loads(block.strip()) - if isinstance(candidate, dict): - json_data = candidate - break - except json.JSONDecodeError: - pass - - # Fall back: find the first complete { ... } object in the text - if json_data is None: - depth = 0 - start_idx = None - for i, ch in enumerate(content): - if ch == "{": - if depth == 0: - start_idx = i - depth += 1 - elif ch == "}": - depth -= 1 - if depth == 0 and start_idx is not None: - try: - candidate = json.loads(content[start_idx:i + 1]) - if isinstance(candidate, dict): - json_data = candidate - if not explanation: - explanation = content[:start_idx].strip() - break - except json.JSONDecodeError: - start_idx = None - - return explanation, json_data - -def print_explanation_single_role(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True): - """ - Print the LLM's explanation if verbose mode is enabled. - - Args: - explanation: The explanation text to print - is_retry: Whether this is from a retry attempt (adds retry indicator) - verbose: Whether to print the explanation - """ - if verbose and explanation: - prefix = "🔄 Retry Explanation:" if is_retry else "💡 LLM Explanation:" - print(f"\n{prefix}") - print(explanation) - print() - - # ============================================================================ # PURE NODE FUNCTIONS # ============================================================================ -def _analyze_role_mapping( +def _analyze_scope_roles( state: SinglePrivilegeState, llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool -) -> SinglePrivilegeState: + verbose: bool, +) -> dict[str, Any]: """ - Analyze which real roles should have access to the privilege. - - This is the first node in the workflow. It sends the privilege, - available real roles, policy context, and call chain structure to the LLM - for semantic analysis. - - Args: - state: Current SinglePrivilegeState - llm: LLM instance for processing - verbose: Whether to print detailed output + Analyze which realm roles should have access to the privilege. - Returns: - Updated SinglePrivilegeState with real_roles_with_access and explanation + First node in the workflow. Sends the privilege, available realm roles, + and policy context to the LLM for semantic analysis. """ - # Build prompts - system_prompt = build_single_role_system_prompt( - state['realm_roles'], - state['privilege'], - state.get('policy_description', '') + system_prompt = build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( + state["roles"], + state["privilege"], + state.get("policy_description", ""), ) - + user_prompt = ( f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the privilege " - f"'{state['privilege']['name']}' from service '{state['service_name']}'." + f"'{state['privilege'].name}'." ) - - # Add policy context to user prompt if available - if state.get('policy_description'): + if state.get("policy_description"): user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" - - # First attempt + messages = [ SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), - HumanMessage(content=user_prompt) + HumanMessage(content=user_prompt), ] - + response = llm.invoke(messages) - content = response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) - explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(content) + content = ( + response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) + ) + explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) - # Retry once if parsing failed if not parsed_data: - retry_prompt = build_single_role_retry_prompt( - state['realm_roles'], - state['privilege'] + retry_prompt = build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt( + state["roles"], + state["privilege"], ) - - retry_messages = [ - *messages, - response, - HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt) - ] - + retry_messages = [*messages, response, HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt)] retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) retry_content = ( retry_response.content if isinstance(retry_response.content, str) else str(retry_response.content) ) - explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role(retry_content) + explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(retry_content) - # If still failed after retry, raise exception if not parsed_data: raise ValueError( f"Failed to parse valid JSON from LLM response after retry.\n" f"Last response: {retry_content[:500]}..." ) - # Extract real roles with access - # Handle both dict format (new) and list format (old/mock) - if isinstance(parsed_data, dict): - real_roles_with_access = parsed_data.get('real_roles_with_access', []) - elif isinstance(parsed_data, list): - # Old format or mock - assume it's directly the list of roles - real_roles_with_access = parsed_data - else: - real_roles_with_access = [] - - # Only print the explanation when the privilege was actually mapped to roles. - # Privileges filtered out at step 0a always return [] — their explanations are noise. - if real_roles_with_access: - print_explanation_single_role(explanation, verbose=verbose) - - # Return updated state + roles_with_access = ( + parsed_data.get("roles_with_access", []) if isinstance(parsed_data, dict) else [] + ) + + if roles_with_access: + print_explanation(explanation, verbose=verbose) + return { **state, "explanation": explanation, - "real_roles_with_access": real_roles_with_access, + "roles_with_access": [r for r in state["roles"] if r.name in roles_with_access], "messages": [*state.get("messages", []), response], - "errors": [], # Clear errors on new parse attempt + "errors": [], "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), - "validation_passed": True # Assume passed until validation runs - } - -def _validate_role_mapping( - state: SinglePrivilegeState, - verbose: bool, - max_retries: int -) -> SinglePrivilegeState: - """ - Validate the role mapping results. - - This is the second node in the workflow. It validates that: - - All returned role names exist in the available realm roles - - The mapping makes semantic sense - - Args: - state: SinglePrivilegeState with real_roles_with_access - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts - - Returns: - Updated SinglePrivilegeState with errors and validation_passed fields - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - real_roles_with_access = state.get("real_roles_with_access", []) - available_role_names = [role['name'] for role in state['realm_roles']] - - errors = [] - - # Normalize real_roles_with_access to handle both string and dict formats - normalized_roles = [] - for item in real_roles_with_access: - if isinstance(item, str): - normalized_roles.append(item) - elif isinstance(item, dict) and 'role' in item: - # Old format: list of dicts with 'role' key - normalized_roles.append(item['role']) - else: - errors.append(f"Invalid role format: {item}") - - # Validate that all returned roles exist - for role_name in normalized_roles: - if role_name not in available_role_names: - errors.append( - f"Invalid role name '{role_name}'. Must be one of: {', '.join(available_role_names)}" - ) - - # Check for duplicates - if len(normalized_roles) != len(set(normalized_roles)): - errors.append("Duplicate role names found in the result") - - # Update state with normalized roles - if normalized_roles != real_roles_with_access: - real_roles_with_access = normalized_roles - - # Determine if validation passed - validation_passed = len(errors) == 0 - - # If there are errors and we can retry, trigger retry - if errors and retry_count < max_retries: - if verbose: - print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count + 1}/{max_retries})") - for error in errors: - print(f" - {error}") - return { - **state, - "real_roles_with_access": normalized_roles, - "errors": errors, - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1 - } - - # Return final result - return { - **state, - "real_roles_with_access": normalized_roles, - "errors": errors, - "validation_passed": validation_passed, - "retry_count": retry_count + "validation_passed": True, } -def _verify_semantic_mapping( - state: SinglePrivilegeState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool, - max_retries: int, -) -> SinglePrivilegeState: - """ - Semantically verify the role mapping using LLM. - - Asks the LLM whether the assigned realm roles correctly reflect the access - requirements for this privilege given the policy description. On failure - the retry counter is incremented so the graph can loop back to - analyze_role_mapping. - - Args: - state: SinglePrivilegeState with real_roles_with_access populated - llm: LLM instance for verification - verbose: Whether to print verification details - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed - - Returns: - Updated SinglePrivilegeState with validation_passed and errors - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - real_roles_with_access = state.get("real_roles_with_access", []) - - verification_prompt = build_semantic_verification_prompt( - policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), - privilege=state["privilege"], - realm_roles=state["realm_roles"], - real_roles_with_access=real_roles_with_access, - ) - - try: - response = llm.invoke([HumanMessage(content=verification_prompt)]) - content = response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) - - mapping_match = re.search(r'MAPPING_CORRECT:\s*(YES|NO)', content, re.IGNORECASE) - explanation_match = re.search(r'EXPLANATION:\s*(.+?)$', content, re.DOTALL | re.IGNORECASE) - - mapping_correct = mapping_match.group(1).upper() == 'YES' if mapping_match else False - explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() if explanation_match else content - - if verbose and (real_roles_with_access or not mapping_correct): - status = 'YES' if mapping_correct else 'NO' - print( - f"\nSemantic verification [{state['service_name']}/{state['privilege']['name']}]:" - f" MAPPING_CORRECT={status}" - ) - if not mapping_correct: - print(f" {explanation}") - - if not mapping_correct: - error_msg = ( - f"Semantic mismatch for {state['service_name']}/{state['privilege']['name']}:" - f" {explanation}" - ) - if retry_count < max_retries: - return { - **state, - "errors": [error_msg], - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1, - } - return { - **state, - "errors": [error_msg], - "validation_passed": False, - } - - return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} - - except Exception as e: - # Allow the pipeline to proceed on transient errors (rate limits, etc.) - return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} - -def _should_route_after_structural_validation(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) -> str: - """ - Route after structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end. - - Args: - state: Current SinglePrivilegeState with validation results - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed - - Returns: - "analyze_role_mapping" if structural errors remain and retries are available, - "verify_semantic_mapping" if structural validation passed, - END if structural errors remain but retries are exhausted - """ - validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - - if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - return "analyze_role_mapping" - - if validation_passed: - return "verify_semantic_mapping" - - return END - -def _should_retry_after_semantic(state: SinglePrivilegeState, max_retries: int) -> str: - """ - Determine if semantic verification failure should retry analyze_role_mapping. - - Args: - state: Current SinglePrivilegeState with semantic verification results - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed - - Returns: - "analyze_role_mapping" if semantic check failed and retries remain, - otherwise END to terminate the workflow - """ - validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - - if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - return "analyze_role_mapping" - - return END # ============================================================================ # GRAPH CONSTRUCTION # ============================================================================ -def create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config: SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig): - """ - Create and compile the single privilege mapper graph. - - Args: - config: SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig instance - - Returns: - Compiled LangGraph workflow - """ - - # Define node functions as closures with access to config - def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> SinglePrivilegeState: - """Analyze which real roles should have access.""" - return _analyze_role_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose) +def create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config: MapperConfig): + """Build and compile the single privilege mapper graph.""" - def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> SinglePrivilegeState: - """Validate structural correctness of the role mapping.""" - return _validate_role_mapping(state, config.verbose, config.max_retries) + def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _analyze_scope_roles(state, config.llm, config.verbose) - def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> SinglePrivilegeState: - """Semantically verify the role mapping against the policy description.""" - return _verify_semantic_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose, config.max_retries) + def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return validate_mapping_items( + state, config.verbose, config.max_retries, + items_key="roles_with_access", + reference_key="roles", + item_type_label="role", + ) + + def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return verify_semantic_mapping( + state=state, + llm=config.llm, + verbose=config.verbose, + max_retries=config.max_retries, + subject_name=state["privilege"].name, + verification_prompt=build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( + policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), + privilege=state["privilege"], + realm_roles=state["roles"], + roles_with_access=state.get("roles_with_access", []), + ), + mapped_items=state.get("roles_with_access", []), + ) def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: - """Route after structural validation.""" - return _should_route_after_structural_validation(state, config.max_retries) + return should_route_after_structural_validation( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=config.max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", + verify_node="verify_semantic_mapping", + ) def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: - """Determine if semantic failure should retry.""" - return _should_retry_after_semantic(state, config.max_retries) + return should_retry_after_semantic( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=config.max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", + ) - # Build the graph workflow = StateGraph(SinglePrivilegeState) - # Add nodes workflow.add_node("analyze_role_mapping", analyze_role_mapping_node) workflow.add_node("validate_role_mapping", validate_role_mapping_node) workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_mapping", verify_semantic_mapping_node) - # Define edges workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_role_mapping") workflow.add_edge("analyze_role_mapping", "validate_role_mapping") - # After structural validation: retry, proceed to semantic check, or end workflow.add_conditional_edges( "validate_role_mapping", should_route_after_structure_node, @@ -498,133 +183,92 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: "analyze_role_mapping": "analyze_role_mapping", "verify_semantic_mapping": "verify_semantic_mapping", END: END, - } + }, ) - # After semantic verification: retry or end workflow.add_conditional_edges( "verify_semantic_mapping", should_retry_after_semantic_node, { "analyze_role_mapping": "analyze_role_mapping", END: END, - } + }, ) return workflow.compile() + # ============================================================================ # MAIN CLASS # ============================================================================ -class SinglePrivilegeMapper: +class SinglePrivilegeMapper(BaseSingleMapper): """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which real roles should have access to a privilege. - - This class uses LangGraph to orchestrate a workflow that: - 1. Analyzes a privilege, available real roles, and policy context - 2. Uses LLM to semantically match roles based on descriptions - 3. Validates the results - 4. Retries if validation fails - - Attributes: - config: SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig instance - graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine + AI-powered mapper for determining which realm roles should have access to a + single privilege. + + Given a natural language policy description and a privilege, produces a + PolicyObjectModel with the realm-role → privilege mapping for that privilege. + + Workflow: + 1. analyze_role_mapping — LLM determines which realm roles get access + 2. validate_role_mapping — structural validation with retry + 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment """ - + def __init__( self, - llm: Optional[BaseChatModel] = None, + privilege: Scope, + roles: list[Role], + llm: BaseChatModel, verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, ): - """ - Initialize the single role mapper. - - Args: - llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. If not provided, creates a new - LLM instance using create_llm() - verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - # Create LLM if not provided - if llm is None: - llm_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "config" / "llm.env" - llm_instance = create_llm(env_path=llm_env_path, verbose=verbose) - else: - llm_instance = llm - - # Create configuration object - self.config = SinglePrivilegeMapperConfig( - llm=llm_instance, - verbose=verbose, - max_retries=max_retries - ) - - # Build and compile the LangGraph state machine - self.graph = create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(self.config) - - def get_graph(self): - """ - Get the compiled graph for visualization or inspection. - - Returns: - Compiled LangGraph workflow - """ - return self.graph - - def map_role( - self, - policy_description: str, - service_name: str, - privilege: Dict[str, str], - realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - ) -> Dict[str, Any]: - """ - Determine which real roles should have access to a privilege. - - Args: - policy_description: Natural language policy description for context - service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege - privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege - realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - - Returns: - Dictionary containing: - - policy_description (str): The policy context used - - service_name (str): Name of the service - - privilege (str): Name of the privilege analyzed - - real_roles_with_access (list): List of realm role names that should have access - - explanation (str): LLM's explanation of the mapping - - errors (list): Validation errors (empty if successful) - - success (bool): True if mapping succeeded without errors - - retry_count (int): Number of validation retries that occurred - """ - # Initialize the workflow state + self.privilege: Scope = privilege + self.roles: list[Role] = roles + super().__init__(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) + + def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig): + return create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config) + + def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: initial_state: SinglePrivilegeState = { "policy_description": policy_description, - "service_name": service_name, - "privilege": privilege, - "realm_roles": realm_roles, + "privilege": self.privilege, + "roles": self.roles, "explanation": "", - "real_roles_with_access": [], + "roles_with_access": [], "messages": [], "errors": [], "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True + "validation_passed": True, } - - # Execute the LangGraph workflow + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - # Extract and return results + return { "policy_description": policy_description, - "service_name": service_name, - "privilege": privilege['name'], - "real_roles_with_access": final_state["real_roles_with_access"], + "privilege": self.privilege, + "roles_with_access": final_state["roles_with_access"], "explanation": final_state["explanation"], "errors": final_state["errors"], "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, - "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0) - } \ No newline at end of file + "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), + } + + def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: + return [Rule(role=role, scope=self.privilege) for role in result.get("roles_with_access", [])] + + def map_roles(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + """ + Determine which realm roles should have access to the privilege. + + Returns a dict with roles_with_access, explanation, errors, success, + and retry_count. + """ + return self._run(policy_description=policy_description) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print("Use SinglePrivilegeMapper programmatically or via the CLI.") + sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py index 6197a0836..db234a93c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py @@ -1,40 +1,21 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ State Definitions for Single Privilege Mapper - -This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph -workflow for mapping a single privilege to real roles that should have access. """ -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Dict -from operator import add +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState -class SinglePrivilegeState(TypedDict): +class SinglePrivilegeState(BaseMappingState): """ - State dictionary for the single privilege mapping LangGraph workflow. + State for the single-privilege role mapping workflow. - Attributes: - policy_description: Natural language policy description (context for the mapping) - service_name: Name of the service that owns the privilege - privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege to analyze - realm_roles: List of available realm roles with descriptions - explanation: LLM's explanation of which real roles should have access - real_roles_with_access: List of realm role names that should have access - messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) - errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) - retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made - validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded + Extends BaseMappingState with privilege-specific fields: + privilege: The privilege to analyze + roles: List of available realm roles + roles_with_access: Realm roles determined to have access to the privilege """ - policy_description: str - service_name: str - privilege: Dict[str, str] - realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]] - explanation: str - real_roles_with_access: List[str] - messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation - errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt - retry_count: int - validation_passed: bool # Boolean flag for retry decision, not accumulated - -# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file + privilege: Scope + roles: list[Role] + roles_with_access: list[Role] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ea747be1 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +""" +Single Role Scope Mapper + +Maps a single realm role to the privileges/scopes it should hold. +""" + +from .graph import SingleRoleMapper +from .state import SingleRoleState + +__all__ = [ + "SingleRoleMapper", + "SingleRoleState", +] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cf74a5101 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +""" +Single Role Scope Mapper + +Maps a single realm role to the privileges/scopes it should hold. +Uses a LangGraph workflow that analyzes, validates, and semantically verifies +the mapping before returning a PolicyObjectModel. + +Workflow: + 1. analyze_role_scopes — LLM determines which privileges the role should hold. + 2. validate_role_scopes — structural validation with retry. + 3. verify_semantic_scope_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. +""" + +import sys +from typing import Any + +from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END +from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph +from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage +from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel + +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule +from .state import SingleRoleState +from base_mapper import ( + BaseSingleMapper, + MapperConfig, + extract_explanation_and_json, + print_explanation, + validate_mapping_items, + verify_semantic_mapping, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + should_retry_after_semantic, +) +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from prompts.single_prompt_role_builder import ( + build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt, + build_single_role_to_scopes_retry_prompt, + build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt, +) + + +# ============================================================================ +# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS +# ============================================================================ + +def _analyze_role_scopes( + state: SingleRoleState, + llm: BaseChatModel, + verbose: bool, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """ + Analyze which privileges should be granted to the role. + + First node in the workflow. Sends the role, available privileges, + and policy context to the LLM for semantic analysis. + """ + system_prompt = build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( + state["role"], + state["privileges"], + state.get("policy_description", ""), + ) + + user_prompt = ( + f"Analyze which privileges should be granted to role '{state['role'].name}'." + ) + if state.get("policy_description"): + user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" + + messages = [ + SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), + HumanMessage(content=user_prompt), + ] + + response = llm.invoke(messages) + content = ( + response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) + ) + explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) + + if not parsed_data: + retry_prompt = build_single_role_to_scopes_retry_prompt( + state["role"], + state["privileges"], + ) + retry_messages = [*messages, response, HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt)] + retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) + retry_content = ( + retry_response.content + if isinstance(retry_response.content, str) + else str(retry_response.content) + ) + explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(retry_content) + + if not parsed_data: + raise ValueError( + f"Failed to parse valid JSON from LLM response after retry.\n" + f"Last response: {retry_content[:500]}..." + ) + + granted_privileges = ( + parsed_data.get("granted_privileges", []) if isinstance(parsed_data, dict) else [] + ) + + if granted_privileges: + print_explanation(explanation, verbose=verbose) + + return { + **state, + "explanation": explanation, + "granted_privileges": [p for p in state["privileges"] if p.name in granted_privileges], + "messages": [*state.get("messages", []), response], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), + "validation_passed": True, + } + + +# ============================================================================ +# GRAPH CONSTRUCTION +# ============================================================================ + +def create_single_role_mapper_graph(config: MapperConfig): + """Build and compile the single role scope mapper graph.""" + + def analyze_role_scopes_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _analyze_role_scopes(state, config.llm, config.verbose) + + def validate_role_scopes_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return validate_mapping_items( + state, config.verbose, config.max_retries, + items_key="granted_privileges", + reference_key="privileges", + item_type_label="privilege", + ) + + def verify_semantic_scope_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return verify_semantic_mapping( + state=state, + llm=config.llm, + verbose=config.verbose, + max_retries=config.max_retries, + subject_name=state["role"].name, + verification_prompt=build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( + policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), + role=state["role"], + privileges=state["privileges"], + granted_privileges=state.get("granted_privileges", []), + ), + mapped_items=state.get("granted_privileges", []), + ) + + def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: + return should_route_after_structural_validation( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=config.max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", + verify_node="verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + ) + + def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: + return should_retry_after_semantic( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=config.max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", + ) + + workflow = StateGraph(SingleRoleState) + + workflow.add_node("analyze_role_scopes", analyze_role_scopes_node) + workflow.add_node("validate_role_scopes", validate_role_scopes_node) + workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_scope_mapping", verify_semantic_scope_mapping_node) + + workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_role_scopes") + workflow.add_edge("analyze_role_scopes", "validate_role_scopes") + + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "validate_role_scopes", + should_route_after_structure_node, + { + "analyze_role_scopes": "analyze_role_scopes", + "verify_semantic_scope_mapping": "verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + END: END, + }, + ) + + workflow.add_conditional_edges( + "verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + should_retry_after_semantic_node, + { + "analyze_role_scopes": "analyze_role_scopes", + END: END, + }, + ) + + return workflow.compile() + + +# ============================================================================ +# MAIN CLASS +# ============================================================================ + +class SingleRoleMapper(BaseSingleMapper): + """ + AI-powered mapper for determining which privileges a realm role should hold. + + Given a natural language policy description and a realm role, produces a + PolicyObjectModel with the realm-role → privilege mappings for that role. + + Workflow: + 1. analyze_role_scopes — LLM determines which privileges the role gets + 2. validate_role_scopes — structural validation with retry + 3. verify_semantic_scope_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment + """ + + def __init__( + self, + role: Role, + privileges: list[Scope], + llm: BaseChatModel, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, + ): + self.role: Role = role + self.privileges: list[Scope] = privileges + super().__init__(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) + + def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig) -> CompiledStateGraph: + return create_single_role_mapper_graph(config) + + def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + initial_state: SingleRoleState = { + "policy_description": policy_description, + "role": self.role, + "privileges": self.privileges, + "explanation": "", + "granted_privileges": [], + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": 0, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) + + return { + "policy_description": policy_description, + "role": self.role, + "granted_privileges": final_state["granted_privileges"], + "explanation": final_state["explanation"], + "errors": final_state["errors"], + "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, + "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), + } + + def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: + return [Rule(role=self.role, scope=priv) for priv in result.get("granted_privileges", [])] + + def map_scopes(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + """ + Determine which privileges a realm role should be granted. + + Returns a dict with granted_privileges, explanation, errors, success, + and retry_count. + """ + return self._run(policy_description=policy_description) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print("Use SingleRoleMapper programmatically or via the CLI.") + sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b911c7e2a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +State Definitions for Single Role Scope Mapper +""" + +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState + + +class SingleRoleState(BaseMappingState): + """ + State for the single-role scope mapping workflow. + + Extends BaseMappingState with role-specific fields: + role: The realm role to analyze + privileges: Available privileges to assign + granted_privileges: Privileges determined to belong to this role + """ + role: Role + privileges: list[Scope] + granted_privileges: list[Scope] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a99136010 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service + + +class ServiceMaps: + """Maps scope names and role names to the services that contain them.""" + + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: + config = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + services = config.get_services() + + self.scope_to_service: dict[str, list[Service]] = {} + self.role_to_service: dict[str, list[Service]] = {} + + for service in services: + for scope in service.scopes: + self.scope_to_service.setdefault(scope.name, []).append(service) + for role in service.roles: + self.role_to_service.setdefault(role.name, []).append(service) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py deleted file mode 100644 index e42157eaf..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/output_generators.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,357 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Output Generators - Policy Output File Generation Utilities - -This module provides utilities for generating output files from policy structures, -including YAML and Rego format generation. - -Functions: - - generate_yaml_output: Generate YAML policy file content - - generate_realm_roles_rego: Generate Rego content for user-to-realm-roles mapping - - generate_privileges_rego: Generate Rego content for privileges mapping - - generate_default_rego: Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior - - generate_policy_rego: Generate Rego content for access control policy -""" - -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any, Dict, Optional -import yaml - -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy - - -def generate_yaml_output(policy_structure: dict, description: str = "") -> str: - """ - Generate YAML output from a policy structure. - - Args: - policy_structure: Dictionary containing the policy structure - description: Original policy description for comments - - Returns: - Complete YAML policy file content with comments - """ - # Create header comments - header = """# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges -# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - - # Add original policy description as comment - if description: - description_lines = description.strip().split('\n') - header += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in description_lines: - header += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - header += "#\n" - - # Generate YAML from policy structure - yaml_content = yaml.dump( - policy_structure, - default_flow_style=False, - sort_keys=False, - allow_unicode=True - ) - - # Add footer - footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" - - # Combine all parts - return header + yaml_content + footer - - -def generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles: dict) -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for user-to-realm-roles mapping. - - Args: - user_to_roles: Dictionary mapping usernames to lists of realm role names - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - rego_content = """package authz.realm_roles - -# Realm Roles Mapping -# Maps user names to lists of realm role names - -realm_roles := { -""" - - # Build the dictionary entries - user_entries = [] - for username in sorted(user_to_roles): - username_escaped = username.replace('"', '\\"') - roles = user_to_roles.get(username, []) - role_list = [] - for role_name in roles: - role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') - role_list.append(f'"{role_name_escaped}"') - roles_str = ", ".join(role_list) - user_entries.append(f' "{username_escaped}": [{roles_str}]') - - # Join all entries with commas - rego_content += ",\n".join(user_entries) - rego_content += "\n}\n" - - return rego_content - - -def generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, dict], scopes: list) -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for privileges mapping by service/client. - - Args: - privileges_map: Dict mapping service IDs to their service info. - Each value is ``{"service_type": str, "roles": [{"name": str, "description": str}]}``. - service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. - scopes: List of Scope objects with 'name' and 'description' - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - rego_content = """package authz.privileges - -# Service Privileges Mapping -# Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges - -""" - - # Create a list of scope names for inclusion in privileges - scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] - - for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): - rego_content += f'service["{service_name}"] := [\n' - for priv in service_info["roles"]: - priv_name = priv.get("name", "") - priv_desc = priv.get("description", "") - # Escape quotes in description - priv_desc = priv_desc.replace('"', '\\"') - - rego_content += f' {{\n' - rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' - rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' - rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' - # Add all available scopes to each privilege - for scope_name in scope_names: - scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' - rego_content += ' ]\n' - rego_content += f' }},\n' - rego_content += "]\n\n" - - return rego_content - - -def generate_default_inbound_rego() -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior. - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - return """package authbridge.inbound.request - -default allow := false -""" - -def generate_default_outbound_rego() -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for deny-by-default behavior. - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - return """package authbridge.outbound.request - -default allow := false -""" - - -def generate_policy_rego( - policy_structure: dict, - service_filter: str, - service_types: Dict[str, str], - description: str = "", -) -> str: - """ - Generate Rego content for the access control policy. - - Converts the policy structure (role -> privileges) into Rego allow rules. - Each rule checks if the user has the required role and matches the service/privilege. - - Args: - policy_structure: Dictionary with 'policy' key containing role-to-privileges mapping. - Privilege dicts contain only 'service' and 'privilege' keys. - description: Original policy description for comments - service_filter: If provided, only generate rules for this specific service - service_types: Dict mapping service IDs to their type ('Tool' or 'Agent'). - service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges. - Used to determine the protocol field in Rego rules ('mcp' for Tool, 'a2a' for Agent). - Defaults to 'a2a' when a service is not present in the map. - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - package = "outbound" if service_types.get(service_filter) == "Tool" else "inbound" - - rego_content = f"""package authbridge.{package}.request - -import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles - -# Access Control Policy -# Uses user -> realm roles mapping to authorize privileges -# Policy entries map realm role names to privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - - # Add service filter info if applicable - rego_content += f"# Service: {service_filter}\n" - - # Add original policy description as comment - if description: - description_lines = description.strip().split('\n') - rego_content += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in description_lines: - rego_content += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - rego_content += "#\n\n" - - # Extract policy from structure - policy = policy_structure.get("policy", {}) - - # Generate allow rules for each role and their privileges - for role_name, privileges in policy.items(): - for priv in privileges: - service = priv.get("service", "") - privilege = priv.get("privilege", "") - - # Determine protocol from the service-level service_types map. - # "mcp" for Tool type, "a2a" for Agent type (default). - service_type = service_types.get(service) - protocol = "mcp" if service_type == "Tool" else "a2a" - service_name = "tool" if service_type == "Tool" else "agent" - - # Skip if service_filter is set and this privilege is for a different service - if service != service_filter: - continue - - # Escape quotes in service and privilege names - service_escaped = service.replace('"', '\\"') - privilege_escaped = privilege.replace('"', '\\"') - - role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') - - rego_content += f"# User with role of **{role_name_escaped}**\n" - rego_content += f"# may access {service_name} with id **{service_escaped}**\n" - rego_content += f"# if the access token contains **{privilege_escaped}** scope\n" - - rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' - rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' - rego_content += f' input.{protocol}.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' - rego_content += f' "{privilege_escaped}" in input.identity.scopes\n' - rego_content += "}\n\n" - - return rego_content - -def save_policy(policy: Policy, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml") -> None: - """ - Save a Policy as YAML to a file. - - Args: - policy: Policy model instance - filepath: Output file path - """ - yaml_output = generate_yaml_output( - { - "policy": { - realm_role: [ - {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - for priv in privileges - for svc in priv.services - ] - for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() - } - }, - policy.name, - ) - with open(filepath, "w") as f: - f.write(yaml_output) - print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") - - -def save_policy_rego( - policy: Policy, - file_dir: str = "rego_policy", - realm: str = "demo", -) -> None: - """ - Save Rego files for realm roles, defaults, and per-service access policy. - - Creates: - - realm_roles.rego: user → realm-role mapping - - default_inbound.rego / default_outbound.rego: deny-by-default rules - - generated_policy_<service>.rego: one allow-rule file per service in the policy - - Args: - policy: Policy model instance - file_dir: Directory to save Rego files - realm: Keycloak realm name (used to fetch user-to-roles mapping) - """ - from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration - - dir_path = Path(file_dir) - dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - - config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - user_to_roles: dict = {} - for subject in config_api.get_subjects(): - user_to_roles[subject.username] = [role.name for role in subject.roles] - - realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" - with open(realm_roles_path, "w") as f: - f.write(generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles)) - print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") - - default_inbound_path = dir_path / "default_inbound.rego" - with open(default_inbound_path, "w") as f: - f.write(generate_default_inbound_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_inbound_path}") - - default_outbound_path = dir_path / "default_outbound.rego" - with open(default_outbound_path, "w") as f: - f.write(generate_default_outbound_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_outbound_path}") - - # Deduplicate services by ID (Service is not hashable — cannot use a set) - unique_services: Dict[str, Any] = {} - for privs in policy.policy.values(): - for priv in privs: - for svc in priv.services: - svc_id = svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id - unique_services[svc_id] = svc - - service_types = {svc_id: svc.type for svc_id, svc in unique_services.items()} - policy_structure = { - "policy": { - realm_role: [ - {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - for priv in privileges - for svc in priv.services - ] - for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() - } - } - - for svc_id in unique_services: - policy_rego = generate_policy_rego(policy_structure, svc_id, service_types, policy.name) - safe_name = svc_id.replace("/", "_").replace("\\", "_").replace(" ", "_") - policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_name}.rego" - with open(policy_path, "w") as f: - f.write(policy_rego) - print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{svc_id}' saved to {policy_path}") - - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index d5053e849..81c116644 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -6,14 +6,16 @@ structural validation and semantic verification using LLM. """ -from typing import Dict, List, Any +from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional + +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel def validate_policy_structure( - policy: Dict[str, Any], - realm_roles: List[Dict[str, str]], - service_names: List[str], - privileges_map: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] + _policy: Optional[PolicyObjectModel], + _roles: List[Role], + _privileges_map: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] ) -> List[str]: """ Perform structural validation on the policy. @@ -26,79 +28,49 @@ def validate_policy_structure( realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles service_names: List of valid service names privileges_map: Dict mapping service IDs to their service info. - Each value is ``{"service_type": str, "roles": [{"name": str, "description": str}]}``. - service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. Returns: List of error messages (empty if validation passed) """ structural_errors = [] - if not policy: - structural_errors.append("Policy is empty") - return structural_errors + # if not policy: + # structural_errors.append("Policy is empty") + # return structural_errors - # Extract realm role names for validation - realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in realm_roles] + # # Extract realm role names for validation + # role_names = [role.name for role in roles] - # Validate that only preset names are used - for realm_role, privilege_mappings in policy.items(): - # Validate realm role name - if not realm_role: - structural_errors.append("Found empty realm role name") - elif realm_role not in realm_role_names: - structural_errors.append( - f"Realm role '{realm_role}' is not in the preset realm roles. " - f"Available roles: {', '.join(realm_role_names)}" - ) + # # Validate that only preset names are used + # for rule in policy.rules: + # # Validate realm role name + # if not rule.role: + # structural_errors.append("Found empty role name") + # elif rule.role.name not in role_names: + # structural_errors.append( + # f"Realm role '{rule.role}' is not in the preset realm roles. " + # f"Available roles: {', '.join(role_names)}" + # ) - # Check if realm role has any mappings - if not privilege_mappings: - structural_errors.append( - f"Realm role '{realm_role}' has no privilege mappings assigned" - ) + # # Check if realm role has any mappings + # if not rule.scope: + # structural_errors.append( + # f"Realm role '{rule.role}' has no privilege mappings assigned" + # ) - # Validate each privilege mapping - for mapping in privilege_mappings: - if not isinstance(mapping, dict): - structural_errors.append( - f"Invalid mapping format in realm role '{realm_role}': " - f"must be a dict with 'service' and 'privilege' keys" - ) - continue - - service = mapping.get('service', '') - privilege = mapping.get('privilege', '') - - # Validate service name - if not service: - structural_errors.append( - f"Found empty service name in realm role '{realm_role}'" - ) - elif service not in service_names: - structural_errors.append( - f"Service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}' is not in " - f"the preset service names. Available services: {', '.join(service_names)}" - ) - - # Validate privilege name for the service - if not privilege: - structural_errors.append( - f"Found empty privilege name for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}'" - ) - elif service in privileges_map: - privilege_names = [p['name'] for p in privileges_map[service]["scopes"]] - if privilege not in privilege_names: - available_privileges = ( - ', '.join(privilege_names) - if privilege_names - else '(none)' - ) - structural_errors.append( - f"Privilege '{privilege}' for service '{service}' in realm role '{realm_role}' " - f"is not valid. Available privileges for {service}: {available_privileges}" - ) - + + # for service in privileges_map.keys(): + # privilege_names = [p.name for p in privileges_map[service]["scopes"]] + # if rule.scope.name not in privilege_names: + # available_privileges = ( + # ', '.join(privilege_names) + # if privilege_names + # else '(none)' + # ) + # structural_errors.append( + # f"Privilege '{rule.scope}' for service '{service}' in realm role '{rule.role}' " + # f"is not valid. Available privileges for {service}: {available_privileges}" + # ) return structural_errors diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py index f2a7d59c4..c3f2e4c0c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ class Service(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") id: str - serviceId: str | None = None + serviceId: str name: str | None = None description: str | None = None enabled: bool diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e0a53e6a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"""Policy builder utilities for the PDP (Policy Decision Point).""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c07cdb9d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +Rego policy file generation for the PDP (Policy Decision Point). + +Public API: + save_policy_rego: Write all Rego files for a Policy to a directory. +""" + +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any, Dict + +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule + +__all__ = ["save_policy_rego"] + + +def _generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles: dict) -> str: + rego_content = """package authz.realm_roles + +# Realm Roles Mapping +# Maps user names to lists of realm role names + +realm_roles := { +""" + user_entries = [] + for username in sorted(user_to_roles): + username_escaped = username.replace('"', '\\"') + roles = user_to_roles.get(username, []) + role_list = [] + for role_name in roles: + role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') + role_list.append(f'"{role_name_escaped}"') + roles_str = ", ".join(role_list) + user_entries.append(f' "{username_escaped}": [{roles_str}]') + rego_content += ",\n".join(user_entries) + rego_content += "\n}\n" + return rego_content + + +def _generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, dict], scopes: list) -> str: + rego_content = """package authz.privileges + +# Service Privileges Mapping +# Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges + +""" + scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] + for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): + rego_content += f'service["{service_name}"] := [\n' + for priv in service_info["roles"]: + priv_name = priv.get("name", "") + priv_desc = priv.get("description", "").replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f' {{\n' + rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' + rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' + rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' + for scope_name in scope_names: + scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' + rego_content += ' ]\n' + rego_content += f' }},\n' + rego_content += "]\n\n" + return rego_content + + +def _generate_default_inbound_rego() -> str: + return """package authbridge.inbound.request + +default allow := false +""" + + +def _generate_default_outbound_rego() -> str: + return """package authbridge.outbound.request + +default allow := false +""" + + +def _generate_policy_rego_inbound( + rules: list[Rule], + service: str, + description: str ="" +) -> str: + """ + Generate Rego allow-rules for a single service. + + Returns: + Rego file content as string + """ + + rego_content = f"""package authbridge.inbound.request + +import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles + +# Access Control Policy +# Uses user -> realm roles mapping to authorize privileges +# Policy entries map realm role names to privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) + +""" + rego_content += f"# Service: {service}\n" + if description: + rego_content += "# Original Policy Description:\n" + for line in description.strip().split('\n'): + rego_content += f"# {line.strip()}\n" + rego_content += "#\n\n" + + for rule in rules: + service_escaped = service.replace('"', '\\"') + role_name_escaped = rule.role.name.replace('"', '\\"') + rego_content += f"# Actor with role of **{role_name_escaped}**\n" + rego_content += f"# may access service with id **{service_escaped}**\n" + rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' + rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' + rego_content += f' input.a2a.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' + rego_content += "}\n\n" + + return rego_content + + +def save_policy_rego( + policy: PolicyObjectModel, + file_dir: str = "rego_policy", + realm: str = "demo", + policy_only: bool = False +) -> None: + """ + Save Rego files for realm roles, defaults, and per-service access policy. + + Creates: + - realm_roles.rego: user → realm-role mapping + - default_inbound.rego / default_outbound.rego: deny-by-default rules + - generated_policy_<service>.rego: one allow-rule file per service in the policy + + Args: + policy: Policy model instance + file_dir: Directory to save Rego files + realm: Keycloak realm name (used to fetch user-to-roles mapping) + """ + from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration + + dir_path = Path(file_dir) + dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + + # defaults and user data structure + if not policy_only: + config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) + user_to_roles: dict = {} + for subject in config_api.get_subjects(): + user_to_roles[subject.username] = [role.name for role in subject.roles] + + realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" + with open(realm_roles_path, "w") as f: + f.write(_generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles)) + print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") + + default_inbound_path = dir_path / "default_inbound.rego" + with open(default_inbound_path, "w") as f: + f.write(_generate_default_inbound_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_inbound_path}") + + default_outbound_path = dir_path / "default_outbound.rego" + with open(default_outbound_path, "w") as f: + f.write(_generate_default_outbound_rego()) + print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_outbound_path}") + + # # Deduplicate services by ID (Service is not hashable — cannot use a set) + # unique_services: Dict[str, Any] = {} + # for privs in policy.policy.values(): + # for priv in privs: + # for svc in priv.services: + # svc_id = svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id + # unique_services[svc_id] = svc + + # service_types = {svc_id: svc.type for svc_id, svc in unique_services.items()} + # policy_structure = { + # "policy": { + # realm_role: [ + # {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} + # for priv in privileges + # for svc in priv.services + # ] + # for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() + # } + # } + + service_id = "Dummy" + policy_rego = _generate_policy_rego_inbound(policy.rules, service_id) + safe_name = service_id.replace("/", "_").replace("\\", "_").replace(" ", "_") + policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_name}.rego" + with open(policy_path, "w") as f: + f.write(policy_rego) + print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_id}' saved to {policy_path}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3284f5920 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +YAML policy file generation for the PDP (Policy Decision Point). + +Public API: + save_policy_yaml: Write a Policy model instance as a YAML file. +""" + +import yaml + +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel + +__all__ = ["save_policy_yaml"] + + +def _generate_yaml_output(policy: PolicyObjectModel) -> str: + header = """# Access Control Policy +# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges +# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings +# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) + +""" + yaml_content = yaml.dump( + policy.model_dump(exclude_none=True), + default_flow_style=False, + sort_keys=False, + allow_unicode=True, + ) + + footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" + return header + yaml_content + footer + + +def save_policy_yaml(policy: PolicyObjectModel, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml") -> None: + """ + Save a Policy as YAML to a file. + + Args: + policy: Policy model instance + filepath: Output file path + """ + yaml_output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) + with open(filepath, "w") as f: + f.write(yaml_output) + print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py index 45b1a9901..4a3e27df7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py @@ -1,16 +1,13 @@ +from typing import Literal from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service - -class Priviledge(BaseModel): +class Rule(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + role: Role + scope: Scope - name: str - services: list[Service] - -class Policy(BaseModel): +class PolicyObjectModel(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - - name: str - policy: dict[str, list[Priviledge]] - explanation: str = "" + rules: list[Rule] + explanation: str diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 0f9768296..755068b06 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule, ServiceObjectModel from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm @@ -189,16 +190,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) if not match: - explanation_lines = ( - "\n LLM explanation:\n" - + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in policy.explanation.splitlines()) - if policy.explanation else "" - ) failures.append( f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " "policy mismatch:\n" + "\n".join(f" - {diff}" for diff in differences) - + explanation_lines ) except Exception as exc: @@ -221,19 +216,19 @@ def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, def test_save_policy_creates_yaml_file(tmp_path): """save_policy writes valid YAML to the specified path.""" - from utils.output_generators import save_policy - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge + from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service - svc = Service(id="kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") - policy = Policy( - name="Test policy", - policy={"developer": [Priviledge(name="demo-ui", services=[svc])]}, - explanation="", - ) + svc = Service(id="kagenti", name = "kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") + # policy={"developer": [Priviledge(name="demo-ui", services=[svc])]} + policy = PolicyObjectModel( + name="Test policy", + policy={svc.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Agent",inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="demo-ui")])}) + output_file = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" - save_policy(policy, str(output_file)) + save_policy_yaml(policy, str(output_file)) assert output_file.exists() content = output_file.read_text() @@ -247,8 +242,8 @@ def test_save_policy_creates_yaml_file(tmp_path): def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file): """save_policy_rego writes realm_roles and default Rego files to the directory.""" - from utils.output_generators import save_policy_rego - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge + from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service import os @@ -256,16 +251,10 @@ def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file): svc_kagenti = Service(id="kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") svc_github = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") - policy = Policy( + policy = PolicyObjectModel( name="Test policy", - policy={ - "developer": [ - Priviledge(name="demo-ui", services=[svc_kagenti]), - Priviledge(name="github-full-access", services=[svc_github]), - ] - }, - explanation="", - ) + policy={svc_kagenti.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Agent", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="demo-ui")]), + svc_github.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Tool", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="github-full-access")])}) save_policy_rego(policy, str(tmp_path), realm="demo") @@ -284,7 +273,7 @@ def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file): def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): """PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure (bypasses LLM).""" - from utils.output_generators import generate_yaml_output + from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output # Create a valid policy structure policy_structure = { @@ -296,10 +285,14 @@ def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): } } - description = "Test policy description" + policy = PolicyObjectModel( + name="Test policy description", + policy={"kagenti": ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Agent", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="demo-ui")]), + "github-tool": ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Tool", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="github-full-access")])}) + # Generate YAML - yaml_output = generate_yaml_output(policy_structure, description) + yaml_output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) # Verify YAML contains expected content assert "policy:" in yaml_output diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py index 5350947a9..dff4bfa38 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule, ServiceObjectModel from service_policy_agent import ServicePolicyBuilder from service_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState @@ -154,23 +155,21 @@ def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: def test_generate_yaml_unit(): """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure (bypasses LLM).""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy, Priviledge + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service svc = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", - "service_name": "github-tool", + "service_id": "github-tool", "explanation": "Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", - "policy_structure": Policy( + + "policy_structure": PolicyObjectModel( name="Developers get full GitHub access.", - policy={ - "developer": [ - Priviledge(name="github-tool-aud", services=[svc]), - Priviledge(name="github-full-access", services=[svc]), - ] - }, - explanation="Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", + policy={svc.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Tool", inbound_rules=[ + Rule(role="developer", scope="github-tool-aud"), + Rule(role="developer", scope="github-full-access"), + ])} ), "parsed_scopes": [], "yaml_output": "", @@ -194,13 +193,13 @@ def test_generate_yaml_unit(): def test_build_policy_unit(): """_build_policy assembles a Policy model correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service svc = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", - "service_name": "github-tool", + "service_id": "github-tool", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [ { @@ -228,30 +227,28 @@ def test_build_policy_unit(): result = _build_policy(state) policy = result["policy_structure"] - assert isinstance(policy, Policy) - assert "developer" in policy.policy - assert "tech-support" in policy.policy - developer_priv_names = {priv.name for priv in policy.policy["developer"]} - assert "github-full-access" in developer_priv_names - assert "github-tool-aud" in developer_priv_names - tech_support_priv_names = {priv.name for priv in policy.policy["tech-support"]} - assert "github-tool-aud" in tech_support_priv_names - all_services = { - s.serviceId - for privileges in policy.policy.values() - for priv in privileges - for s in priv.services - } - assert all_services == {"github-tool"} + assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) + assert "github-tool" in policy.policy + svc_obj = policy.policy["github-tool"] + assert isinstance(svc_obj, ServiceObjectModel) + roles = {r.role for r in svc_obj.inbound_rules} + assert "developer" in roles + assert "tech-support" in roles + dev_scopes = {r.scope for r in svc_obj.inbound_rules if r.role == "developer"} + assert "github-full-access" in dev_scopes + assert "github-tool-aud" in dev_scopes + tech_scopes = {r.scope for r in svc_obj.inbound_rules if r.role == "tech-support"} + assert "github-tool-aud" in tech_scopes + assert set(policy.policy.keys()) == {"github-tool"} def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): """_build_policy produces an empty Policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel state: ServicePolicyState = { "description": "test", - "service_name": "kagenti", + "service_id": "kagenti", "explanation": "", "parsed_scopes": [], "policy_structure": None, @@ -264,7 +261,7 @@ def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): result = _build_policy(state) policy = result["policy_structure"] - assert isinstance(policy, Policy) + assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) assert policy.policy == {} def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): @@ -273,12 +270,12 @@ def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) - assert builder.service_name == "github-tool" + assert builder.service_id == "github-tool" # Realm roles come from config regardless of scoping realm_role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.realm_roles] assert "developer" in realm_role_names @@ -302,7 +299,7 @@ def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="does-not-exist", + service_id="does-not-exist", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -315,7 +312,7 @@ def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -346,7 +343,7 @@ def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, service_id: str, role_name: str) -> def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(config_file, mock_llm): """generate_policy returns a Policy model with name, policy, and explanation.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Policy + from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel mock_response = Mock() mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" @@ -355,16 +352,15 @@ def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(config_file, mock_llm): os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) result = builder.generate_policy("Developers access public repos.") - assert isinstance(result, Policy) + assert isinstance(result, PolicyObjectModel) assert result.name == "Developers access public repos." assert isinstance(result.policy, dict) - assert isinstance(result.explanation, str) def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): @@ -377,7 +373,7 @@ def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -398,17 +394,16 @@ def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_service_only(config_file, mock_llm): os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") - for privileges in result.policy.values(): - for priv in privileges: - assert all(svc.serviceId == "github-tool" for svc in priv.services), ( - f"Mapping for a different service leaked in: {priv}" - ) + for service_id in result.policy: + assert service_id == "github-tool", ( + f"Mapping for a different service leaked in: {service_id}" + ) def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): @@ -426,7 +421,7 @@ def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) @@ -460,19 +455,14 @@ def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_service_role(config_file, os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name="github-tool", + service_id="github-tool", llm=mock_llm, verbose=False, ) result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") # The mapping is structurally valid: developer → github-tool roles - all_services = { - svc.serviceId - for privileges in result.policy.values() - for priv in privileges - for svc in priv.services - } + all_services = set(result.policy.keys()) assert all_services == {"github-tool"}, ( f"Foreign service leaked into output: {all_services}" ) @@ -524,7 +514,7 @@ def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy try: builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_name=service_id, + service_id=service_id, llm=llm_instance, verbose=False, ) @@ -534,16 +524,10 @@ def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy match, diffs = compare_policies(generated_partial, expected_partial) if not match: - explanation_lines = ( - "\n LLM explanation:\n" - + "\n".join(f" {l}" for l in policy.explanation.splitlines()) - if policy.explanation else "" - ) failures.append( f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " "policy mismatch:\n" + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in diffs) - + explanation_lines ) except Exception as exc: From 2eee262e7a267dd9e84b0cea853979bb47ca60e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:09:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 128/273] temp Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index 04801696b..c43363b4c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -123,14 +123,14 @@ def _build_policy( explanation = "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "" ) - return { - **state, - "policy": policy, - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), - "validation_passed": True - } + return PolicyState( + description=state["description"], + policy=policy, + messages=[], + errors=[], + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + validation_passed=True, + ) def _validate_policy( state: PolicyState, From 43267a4ef19272ae06cf26db04557405f65ec602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 17:08:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 129/273] temp, fix tests Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py | 2 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 36 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 29 +- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 389 ++++++------ aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py | 569 ------------------ 5 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 822 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py index 55c24746c..3be193dd6 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ def _make_state(**overrides) -> BaseAgentState: def _make_service(sid: str, perm_names: list[str]) -> Service: perms = [Role(id=f"{sid}-{n}", name=n, composite=False) for n in perm_names] - return Service(id=sid, name=sid, enabled=True, roles=perms) + return Service(id=sid, serviceId=sid, name=sid, enabled=True, roles=perms) def _make_role(rid: str, name: str, child_names: list[str] = ()) -> Role: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 8ebe88010..cfc78f7af 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ class TestGetServices: def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([])], @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self, monkeypatch): def test_scope_descriptions_populated_from_get_scopes(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] service_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] with patch( @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ def test_scope_descriptions_populated_from_get_scopes(self, monkeypatch): def test_role_details_populated_from_get_roles(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - payload = [{"id": "c1", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] service_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}] @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ class TestGetService: def test_returns_single_enriched_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ def test_returns_single_enriched_service(self, monkeypatch): def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-agent", "description": "An Agent service", "enabled": True} + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-agent", "description": "An Agent service", "enabled": True} with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ def test_raises_when_service_scopes_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): def test_realm_forwarded_on_every_request(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch( "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ @@ -379,21 +379,21 @@ class TestSetServiceType: def test_issues_patch_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services/{self.SERVICE_ID}" def test_json_body_uses_type_key(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"type": "Agent"} def test_returns_service_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"} + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") assert isinstance(result, Service) @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ def test_returns_service_instance(self, monkeypatch): def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): class TestMapScopeToService: def _make_service(self, **kwargs): - defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} return Service.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) def _make_scope(self, **kwargs): @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}]} + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}]} post_resp = _ok({}, 201) get_resp = _ok(updated) with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): class TestMapRoleToService: def _make_service(self, **kwargs): - defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} return Service.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) def _make_role(self, **kwargs): @@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)), \ patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index 71840df7b..32a374c39 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ def test_full_payload(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c1", + "clientId": "c1", "name": "My Application", "description": "Does things", "enabled": True, @@ -136,31 +137,32 @@ def test_full_payload(self): assert s.type == "Agent" def test_type_tool(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "name": "tool-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "name": "tool-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"}) assert s.type == "Tool" def test_type_none_when_absent(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c2", "name": "bare", "enabled": True}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c2", "clientId": "c2", "name": "bare", "enabled": True}) assert s.type is None def test_optional_fields_absent(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c2", "enabled": False}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c2", "serviceId": "c2", "enabled": False}) assert s.name is None assert s.description is None assert s.type is None def test_description_present(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "description": "a desc"}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True, "description": "a desc"}) assert s.description == "a desc" def test_description_absent_is_none(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True}) assert s.description is None def test_roles_populated(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c1", + "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True, "roles": [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}], } @@ -169,13 +171,14 @@ def test_roles_populated(self): assert s.roles[0].name == "admin" def test_roles_default_empty(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True}) assert s.roles == [] def test_scopes_populated(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c1", + "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}], } @@ -184,7 +187,7 @@ def test_scopes_populated(self): assert s.scopes[0].name == "email" def test_scopes_default_empty(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True}) assert s.scopes == [] def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self): @@ -193,9 +196,9 @@ def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self): ) assert s.serviceId == "my-app" - def test_serviceId_none_when_clientId_absent(self): - s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True}) - assert s.serviceId is None + def test_serviceId_provided_directly_when_clientId_absent(self): + s = Service.model_validate({"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "serviceId": "explicit-svc"}) + assert s.serviceId == "explicit-svc" def test_no_clientId_field(self): s = Service.model_validate( @@ -206,19 +209,19 @@ def test_no_clientId_field(self): def test_no_protocol_field(self): s = Service.model_validate( - {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "protocol": "openid-connect"} + {"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True, "protocol": "openid-connect"} ) assert not hasattr(s, "protocol") def test_no_publicClient_field(self): s = Service.model_validate( - {"id": "c1", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False} + {"id": "c1", "clientId": "c1", "enabled": True, "publicClient": False} ) assert not hasattr(s, "publicClient") def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): s = Service.model_validate( - {"id": "c3", "enabled": True, "surplusField": "ignored"} + {"id": "c3", "clientId": "c3", "enabled": True, "surplusField": "ignored"} ) assert not hasattr(s, "surplusField") diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 755068b06..62ab0b3fd 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -1,36 +1,29 @@ """ -Integration tests for policy generation. +Tests for the full-policy generation agent (PolicyBuilder). -These tests generate policies from natural language descriptions and compare -them with expected YAML outputs. They require an LLM to be configured. +Unit tests do not require an LLM; integration tests require a live endpoint. To run all tests: - pytest test/test_policy_generation.py + pytest test/policy/test_policy_generation.py -To skip integration tests (require LLM access): - pytest test/test_policy_generation.py -m "not integration" +To skip integration tests: + pytest test/policy/test_policy_generation.py -m "not integration" To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest test/test_policy_generation.py -m integration - -To run the LLM-backed fixture test: - 1. Ensure LLM is configured in config/llm.env - 2. Remove the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on test_generate_policy_from_fixtures - 3. Run: pytest test/test_policy_generation.py::test_generate_policy_from_fixtures -v + pytest test/policy/test_policy_generation.py -m integration """ import os import pytest -import yaml from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule, ServiceObjectModel +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm -# Mark all tests in this module as integration tests pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration @@ -40,19 +33,16 @@ @pytest.fixture def fixtures_dir(): - """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" @pytest.fixture def config_file(): - """Return path to the main config.yaml file.""" return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" @pytest.fixture def policy_files(fixtures_dir): - """Return list of policy text files to test.""" return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) @@ -63,13 +53,11 @@ def policy_files(fixtures_dir): "gpt-oss", ]) def llm_model_name(request): - """Return model name for parametrised testing.""" return request.param @pytest.fixture def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - """Create LLM instance from YAML config, skip if the endpoint is unreachable.""" import socket from urllib.parse import urlparse from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml @@ -88,273 +76,198 @@ def llm_instance(llm_model_name): @pytest.fixture def mock_llm(): - """Return a bare Mock that can stand in for a LangChain LLM.""" return Mock() +# ============================================================================ +# EXPECTED POLICIES +# Maps fixture stem → {role_name: {privilege_names}} +# ============================================================================ + +EXPECTED_POLICIES: dict[str, dict[str, set[str]]] = { + "permissive_policy": { + "developer": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"}, + "tech-support": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud"}, + "sales": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud"}, + }, + "regular_policy": { + "developer": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"}, + "tech-support": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud"}, + }, +} + + # ============================================================================ # HELPERS # ============================================================================ -def normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_content: str) -> dict: - """Parse YAML and extract the 'policy' sub-dict for comparison.""" - data = yaml.safe_load(yaml_content) - return data.get("policy", {}) +def _make_policy(rules: list[Rule], name: str = "") -> PolicyObjectModel: + return PolicyObjectModel(rules=rules, explanation="") -def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: - """ - Require exact equality between *generated* and *expected* policy dicts. +def _make_rule(role_name: str, scope_name: str, service_id: str) -> Rule: + role = Role(id=role_name, name=role_name, description="", composite=False) + scope = Scope(id=scope_name, name=scope_name) + return Rule(role=role, scope=scope) - Returns: - (match: bool, differences: list[str]) - """ - differences = [] +def _policy_to_role_map(policy: PolicyObjectModel) -> dict[str, set[str]]: + """Extract {role_name: {scope_names}} from a PolicyObjectModel.""" + result: dict[str, set[str]] = {} + for rule in policy.rules: + result.setdefault(rule.role.name, set()) + result[rule.role.name].add(rule.scope.name) + return result + + +def compare_policies( + generated: dict[str, set[str]], expected: dict[str, set[str]] +) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: + differences = [] generated_roles = set(generated.keys()) expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) for role in expected_roles - generated_roles: differences.append(f"Missing realm role: '{role}'") - for role in generated_roles - expected_roles: differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in generated[role]} - exp_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in expected[role]} - - for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: - differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") - - for mapping in gen_set - exp_set: - differences.append(f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra mapping: {mapping}") + gen_set = generated[role] + exp_set = expected[role] + for priv in exp_set - gen_set: + differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing privilege: {priv}") + for priv in gen_set - exp_set: + differences.append(f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra privilege: {priv}") return len(differences) == 0, differences # ============================================================================ -# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) +# UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) # ============================================================================ -# @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with a configured LLM") -def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): - """ - Integration test: generate policies from fixtures using a real LLM. - - For every policy fixture the test: - 1. Reads the policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt - 2. Generates a policy using PolicyBuilder with the specified LLM - 3. Compares with expected YAML in fixtures/expected/*.yaml - - The test is parametrised over the four LLM models defined in llm_model_name. - """ - if not policy_files: - pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - # Create PolicyBuilder instance with the parametrized LLM - builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) - - failures = [] - - for policy_file in policy_files: - # Read policy description - policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() - - # Determine expected output file - expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - - if not expected_file.exists(): - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" - ) - continue - - # Read expected output - expected_yaml = expected_file.read_text() - expected_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(expected_yaml) - - # Generate policy - try: - policy = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - - # Get YAML output from builder (generated on-demand) - yaml_output = builder.get_yaml_output() - - # Parse generated YAML - generated_policy = normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_output) - - # Compare policies - match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) - - if not match: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " - "policy mismatch:\n" - + "\n".join(f" - {diff}" for diff in differences) - ) +def test_save_policy_creates_yaml_file(tmp_path): + """save_policy_yaml writes valid YAML to the specified path.""" + from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml - except Exception as exc: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: " - f"exception: {exc}" - ) + policy = _make_policy( + [_make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti")], + name="Test policy", + ) - # Report all failures at once - if failures: - pytest.fail( - f"Policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" - + "\n\n".join(failures) - ) + output_file = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" + save_policy_yaml(policy, str(output_file)) + assert output_file.exists() + assert len(policy.rules) == 1 + assert policy.rules[0].role.name == "developer" + assert policy.rules[0].scope.name == "demo-ui" + assert "# Access Control Policy" in output_file.read_text() -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) -# ============================================================================ -def test_save_policy_creates_yaml_file(tmp_path): - """save_policy writes valid YAML to the specified path.""" +def test_save_policy_includes_description_comment(tmp_path): + """save_policy_yaml writes a file with rules stored in the policy model.""" from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service - - svc = Service(id="kagenti", name = "kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") - # policy={"developer": [Priviledge(name="demo-ui", services=[svc])]} - policy = PolicyObjectModel( - name="Test policy", - policy={svc.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Agent",inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="demo-ui")])}) - + policy = _make_policy( + [_make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti")], + name="Test policy description", + ) output_file = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" save_policy_yaml(policy, str(output_file)) assert output_file.exists() - content = output_file.read_text() - assert "policy:" in content - assert "developer:" in content - assert "kagenti" in content - assert "demo-ui" in content - assert "# Access Control Policy" in content - assert "Test policy" in content + assert len(policy.rules) == 1 + rule = policy.rules[0] + assert rule.role.name == "developer" + assert rule.scope.name == "demo-ui" -def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file): - """save_policy_rego writes realm_roles and default Rego files to the directory.""" +def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file, monkeypatch): + """save_policy_rego writes realm_roles and default Rego files, plus per-service files.""" from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service - import os + from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration as FileConfiguration os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + monkeypatch.setattr("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.Configuration", FileConfiguration) - svc_kagenti = Service(id="kagenti", serviceId="kagenti", enabled=True, type="Agent") - svc_github = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") - policy = PolicyObjectModel( - name="Test policy", - policy={svc_kagenti.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Agent", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="demo-ui")]), - svc_github.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Tool", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="github-full-access")])}) + policy = _make_policy([ + _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), + _make_rule("developer", "github-full-access", "github-tool"), + ]) save_policy_rego(policy, str(tmp_path), realm="demo") assert (tmp_path / "realm_roles.rego").exists() assert (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").exists() assert (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").exists() - # One file per service referenced in the policy - assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_kagenti.rego").exists() - assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_github-tool.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_Dummy.rego").exists() - inbound_content = (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").read_text() - assert "default allow := false" in inbound_content - outbound_content = (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").read_text() - assert "default allow := false" in outbound_content + inbound = (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").read_text() + assert "default allow := false" in inbound + outbound = (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").read_text() + assert "default allow := false" in outbound -def test_policy_builder_can_generate_yaml_from_structure(config_file): - """PolicyBuilder can generate YAML from a policy structure (bypasses LLM).""" +def test_generate_yaml_output_structure(): + """_generate_yaml_output produces correctly structured output from a PolicyObjectModel.""" from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output - # Create a valid policy structure - policy_structure = { - "policy": { - "developer": [ - {"service": "kagenti", "privilege": "demo-ui"}, - {"service": "github-tool", "privilege": "github-full-access"} - ] - } - } - - policy = PolicyObjectModel( - name="Test policy description", - policy={"kagenti": ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Agent", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="demo-ui")]), - "github-tool": ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Tool", inbound_rules=[Rule(role="developer", scope="github-full-access")])}) + policy = _make_policy([ + _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), + _make_rule("developer", "github-full-access", "github-tool"), + ], name="Test policy description") + assert len(policy.rules) == 2 + role_names = {r.role.name for r in policy.rules} + assert "developer" in role_names + scope_names = {r.scope.name for r in policy.rules} + assert "demo-ui" in scope_names + assert "github-full-access" in scope_names - # Generate YAML yaml_output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) - - # Verify YAML contains expected content - assert "policy:" in yaml_output - assert "developer:" in yaml_output - assert "kagenti" in yaml_output - assert "demo-ui" in yaml_output assert "# Access Control Policy" in yaml_output - assert "# Original Policy Description:" in yaml_output - assert "Test policy description" in yaml_output - - -def test_invalid_policy_triggers_validation_errors(config_file, mock_llm): - """Invalid policies are caught by validation (uses mock LLM).""" - mock_response = Mock() - mock_response.content = """ - ```json - [ - { - "role": "unknown-role", - "privileges": [ - {"service": "kagenti", "privilege": "demo-ui"} - ] - } - ] - ``` - """ - mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + assert "demo-ui" in yaml_output - builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unknown-role"): - builder.generate_policy("Invalid policy description") +def test_generate_yaml_output_contains_policy_data(): + """_generate_yaml_output includes role and scope names in its string output.""" + from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output + + policy = _make_policy([ + _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), + ]) + assert len(policy.rules) == 1 + assert policy.rules[0].role.name == "developer" + assert policy.rules[0].scope.name == "demo-ui" + + output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) + assert "developer" in output + assert "demo-ui" in output def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): - """PolicyBuilder initializes correctly with config file.""" + """PolicyBuilder loads roles and service privileges from the config file.""" os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - # Verify configuration was loaded - # realm_roles are now dicts with 'name' and 'description' - realm_role_names = [role['name'] for role in builder.realm_roles] - assert "developer" in realm_role_names - assert "tech-support" in realm_role_names - assert "sales" in realm_role_names + role_names = [r.name for r in builder.roles] + assert "developer" in role_names + assert "tech-support" in role_names + assert "sales" in role_names - # Verify services were loaded assert "kagenti" in builder.privileges_map assert "github-tool" in builder.privileges_map assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.privileges_map - # privileges_map values are {service_type, scopes} — service_type is per-service, not per-scope kagenti_info = builder.privileges_map["kagenti"] assert isinstance(kagenti_info, dict) assert "service_type" in kagenti_info assert "scopes" in kagenti_info assert len(kagenti_info["scopes"]) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(r, dict) and 'name' in r for r in kagenti_info["scopes"]) - # service_type must not appear inside individual scope entries - assert all('service_type' not in r for r in kagenti_info["scopes"]) + assert all(isinstance(s, Scope) for s in kagenti_info["scopes"]) # ============================================================================ @@ -362,26 +275,60 @@ def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): # ============================================================================ def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): - """Verify that fixture files are present and valid.""" policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" - expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" assert policies_dir.exists(), "fixtures/policies/ not found" - assert expected_dir.exists(), "fixtures/expected/ not found" - policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No .txt policy files found in fixtures/policies/" - # Check that each policy file has a corresponding expected file for policy_file in policy_files: - expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - assert expected_file.exists(), ( - f"No expected output for {policy_file.name}: {expected_file}" + assert policy_file.stem in EXPECTED_POLICIES, ( + f"No expected structure defined for {policy_file.name} in EXPECTED_POLICIES" ) - # Verify expected file is valid YAML + +# ============================================================================ +# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) +# ============================================================================ + +def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): + """Integration: generate policies from fixtures using a real LLM.""" + if not policy_files: + pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") + + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + + builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) + failures = [] + + for policy_file in policy_files: + stem = policy_file.stem + if stem not in EXPECTED_POLICIES: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: no expected structure defined in EXPECTED_POLICIES" + ) + continue + + expected_policy = EXPECTED_POLICIES[stem] + policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() + try: - yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {exc}") + generated = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) + generated_policy = _policy_to_role_map(generated) + match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) + if not match: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: policy mismatch:\n" + + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in differences) + ) + except Exception as exc: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: exception: {exc}" + ) + + if failures: + pytest.fail( + f"Policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + + "\n\n".join(failures) + ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py deleted file mode 100644 index dff4bfa38..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_service_policy_agent.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,569 +0,0 @@ -""" -Tests for the service_policy_agent. - -The agent takes a natural language policy description plus a service ID and -produces a partial policy containing only the rules relevant to that service. - -To run all tests: - pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py - -To skip integration tests (require LLM access): - pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py -m "not integration" - -To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py -m integration - -To run the LLM-backed fixture test: - 1. Ensure LLM is configured in config/llm.env - 2. Remove the @pytest.mark.skip decorator on test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures - 3. Run: pytest test/test_service_policy_agent.py::test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures -v -""" - -import os -import pytest -import yaml -from pathlib import Path -from unittest.mock import Mock - -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule, ServiceObjectModel -from service_policy_agent import ServicePolicyBuilder -from service_policy_agent.graph import _generate_yaml, _build_policy -from service_policy_agent.state import ServicePolicyState -from config import create_llm - - -# Mark all tests in this module as integration tests -pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURES -# ============================================================================ - -@pytest.fixture -def fixtures_dir(): - """Return path to test fixtures directory.""" - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" - - -@pytest.fixture -def config_file(): - """Return path to the main config.yaml file.""" - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" - - -@pytest.fixture -def policy_files(fixtures_dir): - """Return list of policy text files to test.""" - return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) - - -@pytest.fixture(params=[ - "claude-haiku", - "gpt-nano", - "gemini", - "gpt-oss", -]) -def llm_model_name(request): - """Return model name for parametrised testing.""" - return request.param - - -@pytest.fixture -def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - """Create LLM instance from YAML config, skip if the endpoint is unreachable.""" - import socket - from urllib.parse import urlparse - from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml - cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) - if cfg.endpoint: - parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) - host = parsed.hostname or "" - port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) - try: - with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): - pass - except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: - pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") - return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) - - -@pytest.fixture -def mock_llm(): - """Return a bare Mock that can stand in for a LangChain LLM.""" - return Mock() - - -# ============================================================================ -# HELPERS -# ============================================================================ - -def normalize_policy_yaml(yaml_content: str) -> dict: - """Parse YAML and extract the 'policy' sub-dict for comparison.""" - data = yaml.safe_load(yaml_content) - return data.get("policy", {}) - - -def filter_policy_to_service(policy: dict, service_id: str) -> dict: - """ - Keep only the realm-role entries that contain at least one mapping for - *service_id*. Within each kept entry, retain only the mappings for that - service. Used to derive the expected partial policy from a full fixture. - """ - result = {} - for realm_role, mappings in policy.items(): - service_mappings = [m for m in mappings if m.get("service") == service_id] - if service_mappings: - result[realm_role] = service_mappings - return result - - -def compare_policies(generated: dict, expected: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: - """ - Require exact equality between *generated* and *expected* policy dicts. - - Returns: - (match: bool, differences: list[str]) - """ - differences = [] - - generated_roles = set(generated.keys()) - expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) - - for role in expected_roles - generated_roles: - differences.append(f"Missing realm role: '{role}'") - - for role in generated_roles - expected_roles: - differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") - - for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in generated[role]} - exp_set = {(m["service"], m["privilege"]) for m in expected[role]} - - for mapping in exp_set - gen_set: - differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing mapping: {mapping}") - - for mapping in gen_set - exp_set: - differences.append(f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra mapping: {mapping}") - - return len(differences) == 0, differences - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) -# ============================================================================ - -def test_generate_yaml_unit(): - """_generate_yaml renders YAML with correct header comments and structure (bypasses LLM).""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service - - svc = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") - state: ServicePolicyState = { - "description": "Developers get full GitHub access.", - "service_id": "github-tool", - "explanation": "Developer realm role maps to all github-tool roles.", - - "policy_structure": PolicyObjectModel( - name="Developers get full GitHub access.", - policy={svc.id: ServiceObjectModel(service_type="Tool", inbound_rules=[ - Rule(role="developer", scope="github-tool-aud"), - Rule(role="developer", scope="github-full-access"), - ])} - ), - "parsed_scopes": [], - "yaml_output": "", - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - result = _generate_yaml(state) - - output = result["yaml_output"] - assert "policy:" in output - assert "developer:" in output - assert "github-tool" in output - assert "github-full-access" in output - assert "# Partial Access Control Policy" in output - assert "# Original Policy Description:" in output - assert "Developers get full GitHub access." in output - - -def test_build_policy_unit(): - """_build_policy assembles a Policy model correctly from parsed_scopes (bypasses LLM).""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service - - svc = Service(id="github-tool", serviceId="github-tool", enabled=True, type="Tool") - state: ServicePolicyState = { - "description": "test", - "service_id": "github-tool", - "explanation": "", - "parsed_scopes": [ - { - "role": "developer", - "privileges": [ - {"service": svc, "privilege": "github-full-access"}, - {"service": svc, "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, - ], - }, - { - "role": "tech-support", - "privileges": [ - {"service": svc, "privilege": "github-tool-aud"}, - ], - }, - ], - "policy_structure": None, - "yaml_output": "", - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - result = _build_policy(state) - - policy = result["policy_structure"] - assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) - assert "github-tool" in policy.policy - svc_obj = policy.policy["github-tool"] - assert isinstance(svc_obj, ServiceObjectModel) - roles = {r.role for r in svc_obj.inbound_rules} - assert "developer" in roles - assert "tech-support" in roles - dev_scopes = {r.scope for r in svc_obj.inbound_rules if r.role == "developer"} - assert "github-full-access" in dev_scopes - assert "github-tool-aud" in dev_scopes - tech_scopes = {r.scope for r in svc_obj.inbound_rules if r.role == "tech-support"} - assert "github-tool-aud" in tech_scopes - assert set(policy.policy.keys()) == {"github-tool"} - - -def test_build_policy_empty_scopes(): - """_build_policy produces an empty Policy when no scopes matched (bypasses LLM).""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - - state: ServicePolicyState = { - "description": "test", - "service_id": "kagenti", - "explanation": "", - "parsed_scopes": [], - "policy_structure": None, - "yaml_output": "", - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - result = _build_policy(state) - policy = result["policy_structure"] - assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) - assert policy.policy == {} - -def test_service_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): - """ServicePolicyBuilder loads only roles for the specified service.""" - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - - assert builder.service_id == "github-tool" - # Realm roles come from config regardless of scoping - realm_role_names = [r["name"] for r in builder.realm_roles] - assert "developer" in realm_role_names - assert "tech-support" in realm_role_names - - # Only github-tool privileges should be loaded - privilege_names = [p["name"] for p in builder.privileges] - assert "github-tool-aud" in privilege_names - assert "github-full-access" in privilege_names - # Privileges from other services must not appear - assert "demo-ui" not in privilege_names - assert "github-agent" not in privilege_names - - # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual privileges - assert hasattr(builder, "service_type") - assert builder.service_type != "" - assert all("service_type" not in p for p in builder.privileges) - -def test_service_policy_builder_initialization_unknown_service(config_file, mock_llm): - """ServicePolicyBuilder with an unknown service_id yields an empty privilege list.""" - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="does-not-exist", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - - assert builder.privileges == [] - - -def test_get_graph_returns_compiled_graph(config_file, mock_llm): - """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - graph = builder.get_graph() - assert graph is not None - - - - -# ============================================================================ -# MOCK-LLM TESTS (structural / format validation, no real LLM) -# ============================================================================ - -def _make_mock_llm_response(realm_role: str, service_id: str, role_name: str) -> str: - """Return a well-formed LLM JSON response for a single role mapping.""" - return f""" -```explanation -Policy grants {realm_role} access to {role_name} on {service_id}. -``` -```json -{{ - "service_role": "{role_name}", - "real_roles_with_access": ["{realm_role}"] -}} -``` -""" - - -def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(config_file, mock_llm): - """generate_policy returns a Policy model with name, policy, and explanation.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - mock_response = Mock() - mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( - "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" - ) - mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - result = builder.generate_policy("Developers access public repos.") - - assert isinstance(result, PolicyObjectModel) - assert result.name == "Developers access public repos." - assert isinstance(result.policy, dict) - - -def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(config_file, mock_llm): - """get_yaml_output() after generate_policy() returns parseable YAML.""" - mock_response = Mock() - mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( - "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" - ) - mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") - - parsed = yaml.safe_load(builder.get_yaml_output()) - assert isinstance(parsed, dict) - assert "policy" in parsed - - -def test_generate_policy_scoped_to_service_only(config_file, mock_llm): - """All mappings in the generated policy belong to the specified service.""" - mock_response = Mock() - mock_response.content = _make_mock_llm_response( - "developer", "github-tool", "github-tool-aud" - ) - mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get public GitHub access.") - - for service_id in result.policy: - assert service_id == "github-tool", ( - f"Mapping for a different service leaked in: {service_id}" - ) - - -def test_invalid_role_triggers_validation_error(config_file, mock_llm): - """A mapping with an unknown realm role is caught by validation.""" - mock_response = Mock() - mock_response.content = """ -```json -{ - "service_role": "github-tool-aud", - "real_roles_with_access": ["nonexistent-realm-role"] -} -``` -""" - mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="nonexistent-realm-role"): - builder.generate_policy("Some policy description.") - - -def test_output_scoped_even_when_llm_mentions_foreign_service_role(config_file, mock_llm): - """ - The service/role in every output mapping always comes from the predefined - service_roles list, not from the LLM JSON. Even if the LLM's service_role - field names a role from a different service (demo-ui belongs to kagenti), - the output must only contain github-tool roles and succeed. - """ - mock_response = Mock() - # LLM mentions demo-ui (a kagenti role) in its JSON service_role field. - # That field is ignored; only real_roles_with_access matters. - mock_response.content = """ -```explanation -Mapping developer to demo-ui (wrong service - but service_role field is ignored). -``` -```json -{ - "service_role": "demo-ui", - "real_roles_with_access": ["developer"] -} -``` -""" - mock_llm.invoke.return_value = mock_response - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id="github-tool", - llm=mock_llm, - verbose=False, - ) - result = builder.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - - # The mapping is structurally valid: developer → github-tool roles - all_services = set(result.policy.keys()) - assert all_services == {"github-tool"}, ( - f"Foreign service leaked into output: {all_services}" - ) - - -# ============================================================================ -# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) -# ============================================================================ - -# @pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires LLM access - run manually with a configured LLM") -def test_generate_service_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): - """ - Integration test: generate a partial policy for each fixture using a real LLM. - - For every policy fixture the test: - 1. Reads the policy description from fixtures/policies/*.txt - 2. Loads the expected FULL policy from fixtures/expected/*.yaml - 3. Derives the expected PARTIAL policy by keeping only mappings for - each target service defined in the fixture config - 4. Generates a partial policy with ServicePolicyBuilder - 5. Compares the result with the derived expected partial policy - - The test is parametrised over the four LLM models defined in llm_model_name. - """ - if not policy_files: - pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - - # Collect all service IDs from config - config_data = yaml.safe_load((config_file).read_text()) - all_service_ids = [c["id"] for c in config_data.get("services", [])] - - failures = [] - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - for policy_file in policy_files: - policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() - expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - - if not expected_file.exists(): - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" - ) - continue - - full_expected = normalize_policy_yaml(expected_file.read_text()) - - for service_id in all_service_ids: - expected_partial = filter_policy_to_service(full_expected, service_id) - - try: - builder = ServicePolicyBuilder( - service_id=service_id, - llm=llm_instance, - verbose=False, - ) - policy = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - - generated_partial = normalize_policy_yaml(builder.get_yaml_output()) - match, diffs = compare_policies(generated_partial, expected_partial) - - if not match: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " - "policy mismatch:\n" - + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in diffs) - ) - - except Exception as exc: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / {service_id}: " - f"exception: {exc}" - ) - - if failures: - pytest.fail( - f"Service policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" - + "\n\n".join(failures) - ) - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURE SANITY CHECK -# ============================================================================ - -def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): - """Verify that fixture files are present and valid.""" - policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" - expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" - - assert policies_dir.exists(), "fixtures/policies/ not found" - assert expected_dir.exists(), "fixtures/expected/ not found" - - policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) - assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No .txt policy files found in fixtures/policies/" - - for policy_file in policy_files: - expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - assert expected_file.exists(), ( - f"No expected output for {policy_file.name}: {expected_file}" - ) - try: - yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {exc}") From a422ac446579bbecaef3f643ae09943c5369eb16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 06:22:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 130/273] fix prompts + add tests Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py | 5 +- .../prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py | 315 +++++++--- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 123 +++- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 51 +- .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 99 +-- .../policy/single_role_agent/state.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py | 1 - .../policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 585 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py | 558 +++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 1573 insertions(+), 166 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py index fc316b1e0..a9a294d02 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py @@ -226,12 +226,13 @@ def verify_semantic_mapping( response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) ) - mapping_match = re.search(r"MAPPING_CORRECT:\s*(YES|NO)", content, re.IGNORECASE) + mapping_matches = re.findall(r"MAPPING_CORRECT:\s*(YES|NO)", content, re.IGNORECASE) explanation_match = re.search( r"EXPLANATION:\s*(.+?)$", content, re.DOTALL | re.IGNORECASE ) - mapping_correct = mapping_match.group(1).upper() == "YES" if mapping_match else False + # Use the last occurrence so self-correcting LLM responses resolve to their final answer + mapping_correct = mapping_matches[-1].upper() == "YES" if mapping_matches else False explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() if explanation_match else content if verbose and (mapped_items or not mapping_correct): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py index 66140626d..194a37586 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Single Role Prompt Builder for Scope Mapping This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine -which privileges/scopes a specific realm role should have access to. +which privileges a specific role should have access to. """ from typing import List @@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope -def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( +def build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt( role: Role, privileges: List[Scope], policy_description: str = "", ) -> str: """ - Build a system prompt for mapping a single realm role to its privileges/scopes. + Build a system prompt for mapping a single role to its privileges. This function constructs a prompt that guides the LLM through determining which available privileges a given realm role should be granted, based on @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( """ - return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping realm roles to the privileges/scopes they should hold. + return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping roles to the privileges they should hold. {policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: You are given: 1. A single realm role with its description @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( 1. ROLE CLASSIFICATION — DO THIS FIRST: Classify the realm role being analyzed into one of two types: - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM - (e.g., "R&D team members", "Sales team members", "Technical support staff"). + (e.g., "engineering team members", "operations staff", "customer support team"). These represent human principals. Proceed to privilege analysis. - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY or SYSTEM ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE CAPABILITY ("Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X") or is @@ -96,19 +96,64 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( or is clearly an identity-provider artifact). If the realm role is NOT a user-facing role → return [] immediately. -2. POLICY CONTEXT IS THE PRIMARY GUIDE: +2. POLICY CONTEXT IS THE PRIMARY GUIDE — SEMANTIC MATCHING REQUIRED: Grant a privilege ONLY when the policy explicitly states this role/user-category should have access to the capability described by that privilege. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. Do not infer access from the role's name alone. + IMPORTANT EXCEPTION — ENABLING GATEWAYS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO POLICY SILENCE: + The "policy silence = no access" rule does NOT apply to enabling/gateway privileges. + The policy will never explicitly mention an enabling service by name — it only + describes what final resources users can access. If the policy grants this role ANY + access to a downstream resource in a given domain, the enabling gateway for that + domain is IMPLICITLY REQUIRED and must be granted even if the policy never mentions + it. See guideline 3 for the full enabling gateway rule. + + SEMANTIC ROLE-TO-CATEGORY MATCHING: The policy may describe user categories using + broad terms (e.g., "technical personnel", "operational staff", "all users"). + Match these categories against the role's DESCRIPTION, not its name. A role described + as "operations staff assisting external clients" belongs to the policy category + "operational staff" even if those exact words do not appear in the policy. + Always ask: "Does this role's description identify it as a member of any policy user + category?" If yes, apply all access grants for that category to this role. + 3. ENABLING / GATEWAY PRIVILEGES — READ CAREFULLY: A privilege is an enabling service if its description says "Access to the X connector", "Provides access to X services", "Gateway to X", "Enables access to X", or similar phrasing that positions it as a PREREQUISITE to reach a downstream resource. + CLASSIFICATION — "Provides access to" alone is NOT sufficient. You MUST determine what X + describes to decide whether a privilege is enabling or a final resource: + - ENABLING GATEWAY: X is a SERVICE, AGENT, CONNECTOR, PLATFORM, or GATEWAY — including + when X follows the pattern "[Brand] services", "[Brand] agent", or "[Brand] connector". + Examples: "Provides access to document processing services" → ENABLING (X = service) + "Provides access to Acme services" → ENABLING (X = "Acme services" = brand platform) + "Access to the Acme agent" → ENABLING (X = agent) + - FINAL RESOURCE: X is specific DATA, REPOSITORIES, FILES, or RECORDS, especially with + access-level qualifiers ("private", "public", "restricted", "full", "read-only"). + Examples: "Provides access to public document repositories" → FINAL RESOURCE (X = repos + qualifier) + "Provides access to public Acme repositories" → FINAL RESOURCE (X = repos + "public") + Apply this ENABLING vs. FINAL RESOURCE classification to every privilege before + deciding how to handle it. Do NOT treat final-resource privileges as enabling gateways. + + DOMAIN IDENTIFICATION (required for Step 3 matching): + Extract the PRIMARY BRAND/PRODUCT NAME from each privilege description. Two privileges + are in the same domain when they share the same primary brand/product name, regardless + of whether one says "services" and the other says "repositories", "records", or "data": + • "Provides access to Acme services" → primary brand: "Acme" + • "Provides access to public Acme repositories" → primary brand: "Acme" + → Both are in the "Acme" domain. The enabling gateway covers the same domain as + the final resource — the enabling gateway MUST be included whenever the final + resource is granted. + DOMAIN REQUIREMENT: An enabling privilege only applies when the policy covers the same domain (e.g., "data warehouse connector" is enabling only for a data warehouse policy). + GOAL-BASED PRINCIPLE: Ask "What is this role trying to accomplish?" If their access + goal includes reaching a downstream resource that can only be accessed through an + enabling service, they MUST receive the enabling privilege — without it, they cannot + fulfill their access goal at all. + RULE: If the policy grants this realm role ANY level of access to a downstream resource, the realm role MUST also receive the enabling privilege for that resource. Access level does NOT matter — even read-only access requires the enabling gateway. @@ -127,23 +172,30 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( Only grant a final-resource privilege if the policy explicitly gives this role the matching level of access (e.g., do not grant "full data access" to a role with read-only access). + NOTE: Final-resource privileges (e.g., "Provides access to public repositories") + ARE valid user-facing access grants and MUST be included when the policy grants access + at the matching level. Do NOT exclude them because their description says "Provides access to X". 5. PRIVILEGE VALIDITY — SKIP SYSTEM SCOPES: - Some privileges are identity-provider infrastructure scopes, NOT service access grants. + Some privileges are identity-provider infrastructure privileges, NOT service access grants. Skip any privilege that: - Has a name starting with "default-roles-" - Has a description like "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" - Is clearly an infrastructure artifact (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) - Describes token-structure modification: "add X to the access token", "adds X claims" - - Describes enabling a client authentication mechanism: "scope for a client enabled for..." + - Describes enabling a client authentication mechanism: "privilege/scope for a client enabled for..." Never include such privileges in the result. -6. USER-FACING PRIVILEGES ONLY in the result: - Technical/capability privileges (description: "Access to X", "Provides access to X") - and system/internal privileges must never appear in the granted list. - Only include service access scopes that represent meaningful resource access. - Exception: ENABLING privileges (guideline 3) ARE technical in nature but must be - included when the gateway is required for access. +6. WHAT TO INCLUDE AND EXCLUDE: + - INCLUDE: ENABLING gateway privileges (guideline 3) when the gateway is required. + - INCLUDE: FINAL RESOURCE privileges (guideline 4) when the policy explicitly grants access + at the matching level. "Provides access to public X repositories" is a final-resource + privilege — it IS a valid user-facing grant, NOT a technical exclusion. + - EXCLUDE: System/internal privileges (guideline 5). + - EXCLUDE: Privileges in unrelated domains (guideline 2 — policy silence = no access). + IMPORTANT: Do NOT blanket-exclude privileges because their description says + "Provides access to X" or "Access to X". Use the ENABLING vs. FINAL RESOURCE + classification from guideline 3 to decide, then apply guidelines 3 or 4 accordingly. 7. EXACT NAMES ONLY: Use only the exact privilege identifiers as they appear in the "Available Privileges" @@ -166,23 +218,44 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( ``` 1. IDENTIFY POLICY GRANTS for this role: - From the policy description, list all capabilities explicitly granted to this role - or the user category it represents. - -2. FOR EACH AVAILABLE PRIVILEGE: - a. Skip system/internal scopes (guideline 5). - b. Determine the privilege's domain. - c. Check if the policy grants this role access in that domain. - d. If yes: is it an enabling privilege or a final-resource privilege? - e. Apply the appropriate access rule (guidelines 3 and 4). - -3. COMPILE the list of granted privileges. - -4. VERIFY no system, non-applicable, or non-user-facing privileges are included. - -5. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the policy evidence and mapping logic. - -6. OUTPUT JSON. + Use the role's DESCRIPTION (not its name) to determine which policy user category + this role belongs to. Semantic match is required — "field operations staff" belongs + to the "operational staff" category; "operations staff assisting customers" belongs + to "other operational staff" / "other personnel". List every capability the policy + grants to that category. + +2. FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES ONLY: + Scan the available privileges for FINAL RESOURCE privileges (guideline 3: X is data, + repositories, files, or records with an access-level qualifier). + For each one: skip system privileges (guideline 5); check whether the policy grants + this role the matching access level in that domain; if yes, include it. + Do NOT consider enabling/gateway privileges in this pass. + +3. SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS (mandatory): + For each final-resource privilege included in step 2: + a. Extract its PRIMARY DOMAIN: the brand/product/service name in its description + (e.g., "Acme" from "Provides access to public Acme repositories"). + b. Find EVERY enabling/gateway privilege in the available list whose description + contains the SAME primary brand/product/service name. + Matching rule: shared brand name = same domain, even if one says "services" and + the other says "repositories" or "records". + Example: "Provides access to Acme services" → brand "Acme" → MATCHES + "Provides access to public Acme repositories" → brand "Acme". + c. Add ALL matched enabling privileges to the granted list — even if the policy never + mentions the enabling service by name. The policy only describes final resources; + the enabling gateway is implicitly required whenever any downstream access is granted. + REMINDER: "policy silence" does NOT apply here — see guideline 2 EXCEPTION. + +4. COMPILE the combined result from steps 2 and 3. Exclude any system/internal + privileges (guideline 5) and privileges from unrelated domains. + +5. VERIFY: Confirm every enabling gateway from step 3 is present. If any is missing, + add it now. This is a hard requirement — a mapping with a final-resource privilege + but without its enabling gateway is always incomplete. + +6. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the policy evidence and mapping logic. + +7. OUTPUT JSON. Return in this format: ```explanation @@ -201,18 +274,30 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( EXAMPLE OUTPUTS: -Example A — user-facing role with enabling + final resource privileges: +Example A — user-facing role, two-pass analysis: +Available privileges: + - "warehouse-connector": Access to the data warehouse connector + - "warehouse-full-access": Access to full data warehouse records + - "warehouse-read-only": Access to read-only data warehouse records + - "analytics-dashboard": Access to the analytics dashboard UI +Policy: "Group A team members have full data warehouse access." ```explanation -Step 0: "role-a" role describes Group A team members — user-facing, proceed. -Step 1: Policy grants Group A full data warehouse access. -Step 2: - - "warehouse-connector": enabling service, same domain (data warehouse), role-a has - any level of access → grant. - - "warehouse-full-access": final resource, policy explicitly grants Group A full - access → grant. - - "warehouse-read-only": final resource, Group A has full not read-only access. - Policy does not say "read-only" for Group A → do NOT grant (least privilege). - - "analytics-dashboard": different domain (UI), policy silent on dashboards → skip. +Step 0: "role-a" describes Group A team members — user-facing, proceed. +Step 1: "role-a" description matches policy category "Group A". Policy grants full data + warehouse access. +Step 2 FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES: + - "warehouse-full-access": FINAL RESOURCE (full data warehouse records). Policy grants + Group A full access → include. + - "warehouse-read-only": FINAL RESOURCE (read-only). Policy grants full, not read-only + → skip (least privilege). + - "analytics-dashboard": different domain (UI) — policy silent → skip. + - "warehouse-connector": ENABLING GATEWAY — skip this pass, handled in step 3. +Step 3 SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS: + - From step 2, "warehouse-full-access" is in the data warehouse domain. + - "warehouse-connector" is an enabling gateway for data warehouse domain → ADD. + (Policy never names this service, but it is implicitly required — policy silence + exception applies.) +Step 4: Combined result: ["warehouse-connector", "warehouse-full-access"]. ``` ```json {{"role": "role-a", "granted_privileges": ["warehouse-connector", "warehouse-full-access"]}} @@ -228,22 +313,63 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( {{"role": "svc-connector", "granted_privileges": []}} ``` -Example C — user-facing role with read-only access: +Example C — user-facing role with limited access, two-pass: +Available privileges: + - "storage-connector": Access to the document storage connector + - "storage-read": Access to read-only document storage files + - "storage-write": Access to read-write document storage files +Policy: "Group B team members have read-only access to document storage." ```explanation Step 0: "role-b" describes Group B team members — user-facing, proceed. -Step 1: Policy grants Group B read-only access to document storage. -Step 2: - - "storage-connector": enabling service for document storage, role-b has read-only - access → requires the gateway → grant. - - "storage-read": final resource, read-only access, policy confirms → grant. - - "storage-write": final resource, write access. Policy gives Group B read-only - only → do NOT grant. +Step 1: "role-b" description matches policy category "Group B". Policy grants read-only + document storage access. +Step 2 FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES: + - "storage-read": FINAL RESOURCE (read-only files). Policy grants Group B read-only + access → include. + - "storage-write": FINAL RESOURCE (read-write). Policy gives read-only only → skip. + - "storage-connector": ENABLING GATEWAY — skip this pass, handled in step 3. +Step 3 SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS: + - From step 2, "storage-read" is in the document storage domain. + - "storage-connector" is an enabling gateway for document storage domain → ADD. + (Policy silence on the connector is not a blocker — exception applies.) +Step 4: Combined result: ["storage-connector", "storage-read"]. ``` ```json {{"role": "role-b", "granted_privileges": ["storage-connector", "storage-read"]}} ``` -Example D — system/internal realm role, returns empty: +Example D — semantic matching + two-pass with limited downstream access: +Available privileges: + - "svc-agent": Provides access to data processing services + - "svc-public-access": Provides access to public data records + - "svc-full-access": Provides access to private data records +Policy: "Primary team members can access both public and private data records. + Other operational staff can access public data records only." +Role being analyzed: "ops-team": Operations staff assisting external clients +```explanation +Step 0: "ops-team" describes operations staff — user-facing, proceed. +Step 1: "Operations staff assisting external clients" → semantic match to policy category + "other operational staff" (exact wording differs — semantic match accepted). + Policy grants this role access to public data records only. +Step 2 FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES: + - "svc-public-access": FINAL RESOURCE (public data records). Policy grants this role + public access → include. + - "svc-full-access": FINAL RESOURCE (private data records). Policy gives this role + public-only → skip. + - "svc-agent": ENABLING GATEWAY — skip this pass, handled in step 3. +Step 3 SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS: + - From step 2, "svc-public-access" ("public data records") → primary domain: "data". + - Scan enabling gateways: "svc-agent" ("data processing services") → primary domain: + "data" → SAME domain as "svc-public-access" → ADD. + Policy never mentions the enabling service — but policy silence exception applies: + the enabling gateway is implicitly required because this role has downstream access. +Step 4: Combined result: ["svc-agent", "svc-public-access"]. +``` +```json +{{"role": "ops-team", "granted_privileges": ["svc-agent", "svc-public-access"]}} +``` + +Example E — system/internal realm role, returns empty: ```explanation Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: The realm role "default-roles-demo" starts with "default-roles-", marking it as an identity-provider system construct, not a user-facing @@ -255,14 +381,14 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( """ -def build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( +def build_single_role_to_privileges_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, role: Role, privileges: List[Scope], granted_privileges: List[Scope] ) -> str: """ - Build a prompt to semantically verify a single role-to-scopes mapping. + Build a prompt to semantically verify a single role-to-privileges mapping. Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description @@ -286,7 +412,7 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( assigned = ", ".join([p.name for p in granted_privileges]) if granted_privileges else "(none)" - return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following role-to-scopes mapping is correct. + return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following role-to-privileges mapping is correct. POLICY DESCRIPTION: {policy_description} @@ -315,34 +441,77 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( 1. DOMAIN CHECK: For each granted privilege, verify the policy explicitly covers that privilege's domain for this realm role. If the policy is silent on a privilege's domain, an empty grant for that privilege is acceptable. + SEMANTIC ROLE-TO-CATEGORY MATCHING: Use the role's DESCRIPTION to determine which + policy user category it belongs to — do not require an exact name match. A role + described as "field operations staff" belongs to the "operational staff" category. + Always ask: "Does this role's description identify it as a member of any policy user + category?" and apply the access grants for that category. 2. DO NOT RE-DERIVE THE FULL MAPPING: Only flag the mapping as wrong if you can point to a specific privilege description + policy statement that directly contradicts what was assigned. + EXCEPTION — ENABLING GATEWAY COMPLETENESS (see rule 4a): A missing enabling gateway + privilege IS a direct contradiction. Perform the rule 4a check independently of this + rule — a missing enabling gateway must be flagged even if everything assigned is correct. 3. EMPTY IS VALID BY DEFAULT: An empty assignment [] is acceptable unless the privilege description explicitly requires this role AND the policy confirms it. -4. ENABLING SERVICE CHECK — AGENT SEMANTICS: - For enabling/gateway privileges (description: "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", - "Access to X agent/service/connector"): - a. Verify the enabling privilege IS included whenever the policy grants this role ANY - level of access to the downstream resource in the same domain. Flag as incorrect if - a required enabling privilege is missing. - b. Do NOT flag the inclusion of an enabling privilege as a least-privilege violation by - reasoning that it would "grant access" to restricted downstream capabilities. The - enabling privilege grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF — not the final resource. - The final resource independently enforces its own access controls (e.g., the downstream - service still checks restricted vs. open resource access). Granting an enabling privilege - to a role with limited downstream access (open-only, read-only) is CORRECT. - -5. LEAST PRIVILEGE CHECK (applies to FINAL RESOURCE privileges only, NOT enabling services): +4. ENABLING SERVICE CHECK — AGENT SEMANTICS (mandatory check — do this before concluding YES): + CLASSIFICATION (do this FIRST): "Provides access to" alone does NOT determine whether + a privilege is enabling or a final resource. You MUST check what X describes: + - ENABLING GATEWAY: X is a SERVICE, AGENT, CONNECTOR, or PLATFORM (the prerequisite + "door" users pass through to reach the downstream resource). + - FINAL RESOURCE: X is DATA, REPOSITORIES, FILES, or RECORDS with an access-level + qualifier ("public", "private", "full", "read-only", etc.). + Apply the correct rule based on this classification. + + For ENABLING/GATEWAY privileges: + a. MANDATORY: For each final-resource privilege in the current mapping, identify its + domain and check whether there is an enabling/gateway privilege for the same domain + in the available list. If that enabling privilege is NOT in the current mapping, + respond MAPPING_CORRECT: NO. This check is mandatory and independent of rule 2 — + a missing enabling gateway is always incorrect regardless of whether the rest of the + mapping is consistent. + b. NEVER flag the inclusion of an enabling privilege — for any reason. An enabling + privilege does NOT require a separate explicit policy statement to justify it; its + justification comes entirely from the policy granting ANY downstream access in the + same domain. + + FORBIDDEN arguments (any of the following = your reasoning is wrong): + - "not explicitly justified by the policy" + - "policy only mentions repositories, not services" + - "ambiguous" + - "doesn't clarify access restrictions" + - "could grant unrestricted access to the downstream resource" + - "least privilege requires excluding this because the role has limited access" + - ANY claim that the enabling gateway's lack of an access-level qualifier is a problem + + The enabling privilege grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF ONLY — not to the + final resource. Access-level restrictions (public-only, read-only) are enforced + EXCLUSIVELY by the downstream resource after the user passes through the gateway. + A mapping that contains a final-resource privilege AND its corresponding enabling + gateway is COMPLETE AND CORRECT — no further qualification or clarification is needed. + + c. ORPHANED GATEWAY CHECK: If the current mapping contains an enabling/gateway privilege + but contains NO final-resource privilege from the same domain, AND the policy + explicitly grants this role access to a final resource in that domain, respond + MAPPING_CORRECT: NO. The enabling gateway alone is insufficient — the final-resource + privilege must also be present. + NOTE: this check is strictly one-directional. Rule 4a covers "final resource present + but enabling gateway missing." Rule 4c covers "enabling gateway present but final + resource missing." Do NOT invent other converse or extended interpretations. + +5. LEAST PRIVILEGE CHECK (applies to FINAL RESOURCE privileges ONLY): Flag any final-resource privilege whose access level exceeds what the policy explicitly - grants (e.g., write access granted when policy says read-only). Do NOT apply this check - to enabling/gateway privileges — see rule 4b above. + grants (e.g., write access granted when policy says read-only). + STRICTLY FORBIDDEN: Do NOT apply this check to enabling/gateway privileges under any + circumstances. An enabling gateway's lack of an explicit access-level qualifier is NOT + a least-privilege violation — access-level enforcement is solely the downstream resource's + responsibility. See rule 4b above. -6. USER-FACING PRIVILEGES ONLY: Verify no system/internal scopes (default-roles-*, - token-modification scopes, client-mechanism scopes) appear in the granted list. +6. USER-FACING PRIVILEGES ONLY: Verify no system/internal privileges (default-roles-*, + token-modification scopes, client-mechanism privileges) appear in the granted list. Respond in this EXACT format: MAPPING_CORRECT: YES @@ -353,7 +522,7 @@ def build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" -def build_single_role_to_scopes_retry_prompt( +def build_single_role_to_privileges_retry_prompt( role: Role, privileges: List[Scope], ) -> str: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index c6bffefe7..a3d8ba4c5 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope -def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( - roles: List[Role], +def build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt( privilege: Scope, + roles: List[Role], policy_description: str = "", ) -> str: """ @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( privilege based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. Args: - realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles + roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege to analyze policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( HOW TO CLASSIFY: - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM - (e.g., "R&D team members", "Sales team members", "Technical support staff"). + (e.g., "engineering team members", "operations staff", "customer support team"). These represent human principals who receive access. ONLY these are eligible. - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE CAPABILITY — phrases like "Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", "Enables X". @@ -191,17 +191,17 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", "internal", or is absent and the name itself does not describe a service capability * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure or identity-provider artifact rather than - a meaningful access scope (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) + a meaningful access privilege (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) * The privilege's primary function is to MODIFY TOKEN STRUCTURE or ENABLE A CLIENT AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM rather than to grant access to a downstream resource. Indicators of this pattern: - Description says "add X to the access token" or "adds X to the token" (the privilege is modifying what goes into a token, not granting resource access) - - Description says "scope for a client enabled for [some mechanism]" + - Description says "scope/privilege for a client enabled for [some mechanism]" (the privilege enables a client-side authentication mechanism, not resource access) - Description says "adds claims", "adds X claims to", "authentication context", "allowed web origins to the access token" - ANY of these indicate an identity-provider infrastructure scope — NOT a service + ANY of these indicate an identity-provider infrastructure privilege — NOT a service capability. Treat them the same as offline_access or uma_authorization. If ANY indicator applies → you MUST still output the required fenced blocks below with an empty list, then stop. Do NOT skip the JSON block. Do NOT continue to further steps. @@ -220,13 +220,13 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( CRITICAL: A role whose description says "Access to X", "Access to the X interface", "Access to X services", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", or similar service-capability phrases is a TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE, NOT a human principal, - even if the role name might imply users (e.g., "demo-ui" → description "Access to the - demo UI interface" → TECHNICAL, exclude it). Do NOT include such roles as user-facing. + even if the role name might imply users (e.g., "portal-ui" → description "Access to the + portal UI interface" → TECHNICAL, exclude it). Do NOT include such roles as user-facing. 1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this privilege (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. Do NOT continue to the next steps. IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the privilege's domain. Do NOT reason from - the user role name (e.g., "developers use demo UIs too") — that is forbidden here. + the user role name (e.g., "some roles use UI tools too") — that is forbidden here. - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" — domain: dashboards. Policy about data warehouse — DIFFERENT → [] - "Access to the data warehouse connector" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - "Access to confidential data records" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue @@ -237,9 +237,14 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( "provides access to [some service/technology]", "gateway to [...]", or similar phrasing that positions this role as a PREREQUISITE to reach the downstream resource — AND the service is in the same domain as the policy - - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]" + - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]", especially + with an access-level qualifier ("public", "private", "read-only", "full") NOTE: A privilege named "X-agent" or "X-gateway" with a description like "Provides access to X services" IS an enabling service, NOT a final resource. + DOMAIN MATCHING — SAME BRAND = SAME DOMAIN: Extract the PRIMARY BRAND/PRODUCT NAME + from this privilege's description and from the policy. "Provides access to [Brand] + services" and "access to [Brand] repositories" share the same primary brand → SAME + domain. Do NOT treat "[Brand] services" and "[Brand] repositories" as different domains. 3. IDENTIFY USER CATEGORIES: List all user categories mentioned in the policy. 4. APPLY RULE: - ENABLING/GATEWAY: grant to ALL user categories that need the downstream resource @@ -351,19 +356,19 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "web-origins" has description "add allowed web origins to the access token". Its primary function is to modify token structure — it adds data to the token rather than granting access to any -downstream resource or service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure scope. +downstream resource or service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure privilege. Returning [] immediately. ``` ```json {{"privilege": "web-origins", "roles_with_access": []}} ``` -Example G — client-mechanism scope (enables an authentication mechanism, not resource access): +Example G — client-mechanism privilege (enables an authentication mechanism, not resource access): ```explanation Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "service_account" has description -"Specific scope for a client enabled for service accounts". Its function is to enable +"Specific privilege for a client enabled for service accounts". Its function is to enable a client authentication mechanism, not to grant access to a downstream resource or -service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure scope. Returning [] immediately. +service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure privilege. Returning [] immediately. ``` ```json {{"privilege": "service_account", "roles_with_access": []}} @@ -371,10 +376,10 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( """ -def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( +def build_single_privilege_to_roles_verification_prompt( policy_description: str, privilege: Scope, - realm_roles: List[Role], + roles: List[Role], roles_with_access: List[Role], ) -> str: """ @@ -383,7 +388,7 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( Args: policy_description: Natural language policy description privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege - realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles + roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned Returns: @@ -393,9 +398,9 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( privilege_desc = privilege.description if privilege.description else '' privilege_info = privilege_name + (f": {privilege_desc}" if privilege_desc else "") - realm_roles_context = "\n".join( + role_context = "\n".join( f" - {r.name}" + (f": {r.description if r.description else ''}" if r.description else "") - for r in realm_roles + for r in roles ) assigned_roles = ", ".join([role.name for role in roles_with_access]) if roles_with_access else "(none)" @@ -412,7 +417,7 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( {assigned_roles} AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: -{realm_roles_context} +{role_context} VALIDATION TASK: Verify whether the assigned realm roles are correct for privilege '{privilege_name}', \ @@ -425,11 +430,11 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient): * Name starts with "default-roles-" (identity-provider default realm composite role) * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" - * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure artifact, not a service access scope + * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure artifact, not a service access privilege * Description says "add X to the access token", "adds X to the token", "adds X claims", or "add allowed ... to the access token" — the privilege modifies token structure rather than granting resource access - * Description says "scope for a client enabled for [mechanism]" — the privilege + * Description says "scope/privilege for a client enabled for [mechanism]" — the privilege enables a client authentication mechanism, not resource access If ANY indicator applies: - The ONLY correct mapping is an empty list []. @@ -453,10 +458,29 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( 4. FOCUS ON THIS PRIVILEGE ONLY: Do not reason about what roles are required by the policy in general. Only ask: "Is the mapping for THIS specific privilege consistent with its description and the policy?" + CROSS-PRIVILEGE REASONING IS FORBIDDEN: Never flag the mapping as incorrect because + an assigned role is also missing OTHER privileges. Whether a role should additionally + receive OTHER privileges from OTHER mappings is entirely out of scope here. The sole + question is: for each role listed in the current mapping, is it correct that they have + THIS specific privilege? If a role is entitled to BOTH a limited-access and a full-access + privilege, assigning the limited-access privilege to that role is CORRECT — the missing + full-access privilege is handled by a separate mapping and must not affect this verdict. 5. ENABLING/GATEWAY PRIVILEGE — AGENT SEMANTICS (applies before access-level checks): - If this privilege is an enabling/gateway service (description says "Provides access to X", - "Gateway to X", "Access to X agent/service/connector"): + CLASSIFICATION DISTINCTION — "Provides access to" alone is NOT sufficient to classify + a privilege as enabling. You MUST determine what X describes: + - ENABLING: X is a SERVICE, AGENT, CONNECTOR, PLATFORM, or GATEWAY — the prerequisite + "door" that users must pass through to reach the downstream resource. + Examples: "access to [domain] services", "[domain] connector", "[domain] gateway" + - FINAL RESOURCE: X is specific DATA, FILES, RECORDS, or REPOSITORIES, especially with + access-level qualifiers ("private", "public", "confidential", "read-only", "full"). + Examples: "access to private [resource type]", "access to public [resource type]" + + If the privilege is a FINAL RESOURCE, do NOT apply enabling-service logic. Instead, + apply access-level differentiation: only roles explicitly granted access to this specific + resource type (per the policy) need it. + + If this privilege IS an enabling/gateway service (X describes a service/agent/connector): - The assignment grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF — NOT to the final resource. - The final resource (e.g., a storage service, data warehouse) independently enforces its own access controls, checking the user's permissions after they reach it through the agent. @@ -464,6 +488,33 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( restricted downstream capabilities (e.g., private repositories, confidential records). - The ONLY valid check for an enabling privilege is: does each assigned role need ANY level of access to the downstream resource (per the policy)? + - DOWNSTREAM RESOURCE IDENTIFICATION — BRAND/PRODUCT DOMAIN MATCHING: + The "downstream resource" is identified by the PRIMARY BRAND/PRODUCT NAME in the + enabling privilege's description. Two items are in the same domain when they share the + same primary brand/product name, regardless of whether one mentions "services" and the + other mentions "repositories", "records", "data", or "files": + * "Provides access to [Brand] services" → primary brand: "[Brand]" + * "Provides access to public [Brand] repositories" → primary brand: "[Brand]" + * "Access to the [Brand] agent" → primary brand: "[Brand]" + These all belong to the "[Brand]" domain. Therefore: if the policy grants a role ANY + access to a "[Brand]" resource (e.g., "[Brand] repositories", "[Brand] records"), that + role DOES need access to the "[Brand] services" enabling gateway — even if the policy + only mentions "[Brand] repositories" and never names the enabling service. + FORBIDDEN: Do NOT treat "[Brand] services" and "[Brand] repositories" as different + domains. They share the same primary brand name — policy silence about the service name + is NOT a reason to exclude the enabling gateway from the mapping. + - POLICY CATEGORY MATCHING: When checking whether a role needs ANY access, match by + the role's DESCRIPTION against the policy's user categories — do NOT require the + exact role name to appear in the policy text. Broad policy categories are INCLUSIVE: + * Broad categories like "Other personnel" or "Other [group]" cover every role whose + description fits the semantic meaning of that group — not just roles whose exact + name appears in the policy text. + * NEVER say a role lacks authorisation solely because its exact name is absent from + the policy. Use the role's description to determine which policy category it fits. + * Example: policy says "Other personnel can access X". A role whose description + identifies a non-primary staff group IS other personnel → assignment is CORRECT. + * Example: policy says "Other [category] members can access X". A role whose + description identifies it as a member of that category → CORRECT. - Access-level restrictions (public-only, read-only, limited) are enforced by the downstream resource, not by the gateway privilege. Do NOT apply least-privilege reasoning about the final resource when evaluating an enabling service assignment. @@ -472,11 +523,19 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( the open-resource restriction. The enabling privilege just allows them to reach the agent. 6. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY: Verify that every assigned role represents a human principal or - team (e.g., its description characterises a group of people such as "R&D team members"). + team (e.g., its description characterises a group of people such as "engineering team members"). If any assigned role is a technical/capability role (description: "Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Enables X") or a system/internal role (placeholder description starting with "${{"), mark MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and explain which role is invalid. +7. CLOSED-WORLD ASSUMPTION — ONLY REASON ABOUT LISTED ROLES: + The AVAILABLE REALM ROLES list is the complete and authoritative set of roles in the + system. Do NOT speculate about roles that might exist but are not listed. Do NOT flag + a mapping as incomplete because unlisted roles might hypothetically belong to a policy + category. If all roles from the available list that match a policy category are + correctly assigned, the mapping is COMPLETE and CORRECT — regardless of what roles + could theoretically exist outside the list. + Respond in this EXACT format: MAPPING_CORRECT: YES EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. @@ -486,21 +545,21 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" -def build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt( - realm_roles: List[Role], - privilege: Scope +def build_single_privilege_to_roles_retry_prompt( + privilege: Scope, + roles: List[Role] ) -> str: """ Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single privilege analysis. Args: - realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles + roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege Returns: Formatted retry prompt string with role reminders and format example """ - realm_role_names = [role.name for role in realm_roles] + role_names = [role.name for role in roles] privilege_name = privilege.name return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. @@ -508,7 +567,7 @@ def build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt( You MUST output BOTH fenced code blocks below — the explanation block AND the json block. Do NOT skip the json block, even when the list is empty. -- Available real roles: {", ".join(realm_role_names) if realm_role_names else "(none)"} +- Available real roles: {", ".join(role_names) if role_names else "(none)"} - Privilege to analyze: {privilege_name} If the privilege is a system/internal role (e.g., name starts with "default-roles-"), diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index eebed6b7d..9723b9c4e 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ the mapping before returning a PolicyObjectModel. Workflow: - 1. analyze_role_mapping — LLM determines which realm roles get access. - 2. validate_role_mapping — structural validation with retry. + 1. analyze_priviledge_roles — LLM determines which roles get access. + 2. validate_priviledge_roles — structural validation with retry. 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. """ @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from typing import Any from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END +from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel @@ -33,9 +34,9 @@ ) from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from prompts.single_role_prompt_builder import ( - build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt, - build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt, - build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt, + build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt, + build_single_privilege_to_roles_retry_prompt, + build_single_privilege_to_roles_verification_prompt, ) @@ -43,30 +44,37 @@ # PURE NODE FUNCTIONS # ============================================================================ -def _analyze_scope_roles( +def _analyze_priviledge_roles( state: SinglePrivilegeState, llm: BaseChatModel, verbose: bool, ) -> dict[str, Any]: """ - Analyze which realm roles should have access to the privilege. + Analyze which roles should have access to the privilege. First node in the workflow. Sends the privilege, available realm roles, and policy context to the LLM for semantic analysis. """ - system_prompt = build_single_scope_to_roles_system_prompt( - state["roles"], + system_prompt = build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt( state["privilege"], + state["roles"], state.get("policy_description", ""), ) user_prompt = ( - f"Analyze which real roles should have access to the privilege " - f"'{state['privilege'].name}'." + f"Analyze which roles should have access to the privilege '{state['privilege'].name}'." ) if state.get("policy_description"): user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" + prior_errors = state.get("errors", []) + if prior_errors: + user_prompt += ( + "\n\nPREVIOUS ATTEMPT FEEDBACK — your last mapping was rejected. " + "Read the feedback carefully and correct the mapping:\n" + + "\n".join(f" - {e}" for e in prior_errors) + ) + messages = [ SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), HumanMessage(content=user_prompt), @@ -79,9 +87,9 @@ def _analyze_scope_roles( explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) if not parsed_data: - retry_prompt = build_single_scope_to_roles_retry_prompt( - state["roles"], + retry_prompt = build_single_privilege_to_roles_retry_prompt( state["privilege"], + state["roles"], ) retry_messages = [*messages, response, HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt)] retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) @@ -124,7 +132,7 @@ def create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config: MapperConfig): """Build and compile the single privilege mapper graph.""" def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return _analyze_scope_roles(state, config.llm, config.verbose) + return _analyze_priviledge_roles(state, config.llm, config.verbose) def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: return validate_mapping_items( @@ -141,10 +149,10 @@ def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: verbose=config.verbose, max_retries=config.max_retries, subject_name=state["privilege"].name, - verification_prompt=build_single_scope_to_roles_verification_prompt( + verification_prompt=build_single_privilege_to_roles_verification_prompt( policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), privilege=state["privilege"], - realm_roles=state["roles"], + roles=state["roles"], roles_with_access=state.get("roles_with_access", []), ), mapped_items=state.get("roles_with_access", []), @@ -204,14 +212,14 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: class SinglePrivilegeMapper(BaseSingleMapper): """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which realm roles should have access to a + AI-powered mapper for determining which roles should have access to a single privilege. - +s Given a natural language policy description and a privilege, produces a PolicyObjectModel with the realm-role → privilege mapping for that privilege. Workflow: - 1. analyze_role_mapping — LLM determines which realm roles get access + 1. analyze_role_mapping — LLM determines which roles get access 2. validate_role_mapping — structural validation with retry 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment """ @@ -228,7 +236,7 @@ def __init__( self.roles: list[Role] = roles super().__init__(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) - def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig): + def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig) -> CompiledStateGraph[SinglePrivilegeState, None, SinglePrivilegeState, SinglePrivilegeState]: return create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config) def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: @@ -261,14 +269,13 @@ def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: def map_roles(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: """ - Determine which realm roles should have access to the privilege. + Determine which roles should have access to the privilege. Returns a dict with roles_with_access, explanation, errors, success, and retry_count. """ return self._run(policy_description=policy_description) - if __name__ == "__main__": print("Use SinglePrivilegeMapper programmatically or via the CLI.") sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py index cf74a5101..4d17e1160 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -1,16 +1,17 @@ """ -Single Role Scope Mapper +Single Role Mapper Maps a single realm role to the privileges/scopes it should hold. Uses a LangGraph workflow that analyzes, validates, and semantically verifies the mapping before returning a PolicyObjectModel. Workflow: - 1. analyze_role_scopes — LLM determines which privileges the role should hold. - 2. validate_role_scopes — structural validation with retry. - 3. verify_semantic_scope_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. + 1. analyze_analyze_privilege_mapping — LLM determines which privileges the role should hold. + 2. validate__analyze_privilege_mapping — structural validation with retry. + 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. """ +import re import sys from typing import Any @@ -34,9 +35,9 @@ ) from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from prompts.single_prompt_role_builder import ( - build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt, - build_single_role_to_scopes_retry_prompt, - build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt, + build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt, + build_single_role_to_privileges_retry_prompt, + build_single_role_to_privileges_verification_prompt, ) @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ # PURE NODE FUNCTIONS # ============================================================================ -def _analyze_role_scopes( +def _analyze_privilege_mapping( state: SingleRoleState, llm: BaseChatModel, verbose: bool, @@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ def _analyze_role_scopes( First node in the workflow. Sends the role, available privileges, and policy context to the LLM for semantic analysis. """ - system_prompt = build_single_role_to_scopes_system_prompt( + system_prompt = build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt( state["role"], state["privileges"], state.get("policy_description", ""), @@ -67,6 +68,14 @@ def _analyze_role_scopes( if state.get("policy_description"): user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" + prior_errors = state.get("errors", []) + if prior_errors: + user_prompt += ( + "\n\nPREVIOUS ATTEMPT FEEDBACK — your last mapping was rejected. " + "Read the feedback carefully and correct the mapping:\n" + + "\n".join(f" - {e}" for e in prior_errors) + ) + messages = [ SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), HumanMessage(content=user_prompt), @@ -79,7 +88,7 @@ def _analyze_role_scopes( explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) if not parsed_data: - retry_prompt = build_single_role_to_scopes_retry_prompt( + retry_prompt = build_single_role_to_privileges_retry_prompt( state["role"], state["privileges"], ) @@ -102,6 +111,26 @@ def _analyze_role_scopes( parsed_data.get("granted_privileges", []) if isinstance(parsed_data, dict) else [] ) + # The LLM's JSON and chain-of-thought can diverge: scan the explanation for + # "privilege-name": ... → GRANT/ADD/INCLUDE patterns and recover items the JSON dropped. + # Limit each search to the line containing the privilege name to avoid false positives + # where a → ADD marker for a later privilege bleeds into the window of an earlier one. + granted_set = set(granted_privileges) + for priv in state["privileges"]: + if priv.name not in granted_set: + search_str = f'"{priv.name}"' + start = 0 + while True: + idx = explanation.find(search_str, start) + if idx == -1: + break + line_end = explanation.find('\n', idx) + window = explanation[idx: line_end if line_end != -1 else idx + 200] + if re.search(r"→\s*(GRANT|ADD|INCLUDE)", window, re.IGNORECASE): + granted_privileges.append(priv.name) + break + start = idx + 1 + if granted_privileges: print_explanation(explanation, verbose=verbose) @@ -121,12 +150,12 @@ def _analyze_role_scopes( # ============================================================================ def create_single_role_mapper_graph(config: MapperConfig): - """Build and compile the single role scope mapper graph.""" + """Build and compile the single role mapper graph.""" - def analyze_role_scopes_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return _analyze_role_scopes(state, config.llm, config.verbose) + def analyze_privilege_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _analyze_privilege_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose) - def validate_role_scopes_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: + def validate_privilege_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: return validate_mapping_items( state, config.verbose, config.max_retries, items_key="granted_privileges", @@ -134,14 +163,14 @@ def validate_role_scopes_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: item_type_label="privilege", ) - def verify_semantic_scope_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: + def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: return verify_semantic_mapping( state=state, llm=config.llm, verbose=config.verbose, max_retries=config.max_retries, subject_name=state["role"].name, - verification_prompt=build_single_role_to_scopes_verification_prompt( + verification_prompt=build_single_role_to_privileges_verification_prompt( policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), role=state["role"], privileges=state["privileges"], @@ -155,8 +184,8 @@ def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), max_retries=config.max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", - verify_node="verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + analyze_node="analyze_privilege_mapping", + verify_node="verify_semantic_mapping", ) def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: @@ -164,33 +193,33 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), max_retries=config.max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", + analyze_node="analyze_privilege_mapping", ) workflow = StateGraph(SingleRoleState) - workflow.add_node("analyze_role_scopes", analyze_role_scopes_node) - workflow.add_node("validate_role_scopes", validate_role_scopes_node) - workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_scope_mapping", verify_semantic_scope_mapping_node) + workflow.add_node("analyze_privilege_mapping", analyze_privilege_mapping_node) + workflow.add_node("validate_privilege_mapping", validate_privilege_mapping_node) + workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_mapping", verify_semantic_mapping_node) - workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_role_scopes") - workflow.add_edge("analyze_role_scopes", "validate_role_scopes") + workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_privilege_mapping") + workflow.add_edge("analyze_privilege_mapping", "validate_privilege_mapping") workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_role_scopes", + "validate_privilege_mapping", should_route_after_structure_node, { - "analyze_role_scopes": "analyze_role_scopes", - "verify_semantic_scope_mapping": "verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + "analyze_privilege_mapping": "analyze_privilege_mapping", + "verify_semantic_mapping": "verify_semantic_mapping", END: END, }, ) workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + "verify_semantic_mapping", should_retry_after_semantic_node, { - "analyze_role_scopes": "analyze_role_scopes", + "analyze_privilege_mapping": "analyze_privilege_mapping", END: END, }, ) @@ -204,15 +233,15 @@ def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: class SingleRoleMapper(BaseSingleMapper): """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which privileges a realm role should hold. + AI-powered mapper for determining which privileges a role should hold. Given a natural language policy description and a realm role, produces a PolicyObjectModel with the realm-role → privilege mappings for that role. Workflow: - 1. analyze_role_scopes — LLM determines which privileges the role gets - 2. validate_role_scopes — structural validation with retry - 3. verify_semantic_scope_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment + 1. analyze_privilege_mapping — LLM determines which privileges the role gets + 2. validate_privilege_mapping — structural validation with retry + 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment """ def __init__( @@ -258,9 +287,9 @@ def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: return [Rule(role=self.role, scope=priv) for priv in result.get("granted_privileges", [])] - def map_scopes(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + def map_privileges(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: """ - Determine which privileges a realm role should be granted. + Determine which privileges a role should be granted. Returns a dict with granted_privileges, explanation, errors, success, and retry_count. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py index b911c7e2a..66d7c7cc4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class SingleRoleState(BaseMappingState): """ - State for the single-role scope mapping workflow. + State for the single-role to privileges mapping workflow. Extends BaseMappingState with role-specific fields: role: The realm role to analyze diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py index 4a3e27df7..bdffba2cf 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -from typing import Literal from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..25ddf72f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,585 @@ +""" +Tests for the single_privilege_agent (SinglePrivilegeMapper). + +The agent maps a single privilege/scope to the set of realm roles that +should have access to it. + +To run all tests: + pytest test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py + +To skip integration tests (require LLM access): + pytest test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py -m "not integration" + +To run ONLY integration tests: + pytest test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py -m integration +""" + +import os +from typing import Any +import pytest +import yaml +from pathlib import Path +from unittest.mock import Mock + +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState +from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState +from base_mapper import ( + extract_explanation_and_json, + validate_mapping_items, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + should_retry_after_semantic, +) +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from langgraph.graph import END +from config import create_llm + + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + + +# ============================================================================ +# LOCAL ADAPTERS +# (base_mapper functions take explicit params; these wrappers use state dicts) +# ============================================================================ + +def extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content: str): + """Delegate to the shared base_mapper parser.""" + return extract_explanation_and_json(content) + + +def _validate_privilege_roles( + state: SinglePrivilegeState, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + return validate_mapping_items( + state, + verbose, + max_retries, + items_key="roles_with_access", + reference_key="roles", + item_type_label="role", + ) + + +def _should_route_after_structural_validation( + state: dict, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, +) -> str: + return should_route_after_structural_validation( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", + verify_node="verify_semantic_mapping", + ) + + +def _should_retry_after_semantic( + state: dict, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, +) -> str: + return should_retry_after_semantic( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", + ) + + +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURES +# ============================================================================ + +@pytest.fixture +def fixtures_dir(): + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" + + +@pytest.fixture +def config_file(): + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" + + +@pytest.fixture +def policy_files(fixtures_dir): + return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) + + +@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-oss"]) +def llm_model_name(request): + return request.param + + +@pytest.fixture +def llm_instance(llm_model_name): + import socket + from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml + cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) + if cfg.endpoint: + parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) + host = parsed.hostname or "" + port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) + try: + with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): + pass + except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: + pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") + return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) + + +@pytest.fixture +def mock_llm(): + return Mock() + + +@pytest.fixture +def sample_roles() -> list[Role]: + return [ + Role(id="developer", name="developer", + description="R&D team members", composite=False), + Role(id="tech-support", name="tech-support", + description="Technical support staff", composite=False), + Role(id="sales", name="sales", + description="Sales team members", composite=False), + ] + + +@pytest.fixture +def github_aud_privilege() -> Scope: + return Scope( + id="github-tool-aud", + name="github-tool-aud", + description="Provides access to public GitHub repositories", + ) + + +# ============================================================================ +# HELPERS +# ============================================================================ + +def _make_analysis_response(privilege_name: str, roles_with_access: list) -> str: + roles_json = ", ".join(f'"{r}"' for r in roles_with_access) + return f""" +```explanation +The privilege '{privilege_name}' should be granted to those with a technical need. +``` +```json +{{ + "privilege": "{privilege_name}", + "roles_with_access": [{roles_json}] +}} +``` +""" + + +def _make_verify_response(correct: bool = True) -> str: + status = "YES" if correct else "NO" + return f"MAPPING_CORRECT: {status}\nEXPLANATION: Mapping is correct." + + +def _make_mock_llm(privilege_name: str, roles_with_access: list) -> Mock: + mock = Mock() + analysis = Mock() + analysis.content = _make_analysis_response(privilege_name, roles_with_access) + verify = Mock() + verify.content = _make_verify_response() + mock.invoke.side_effect = [analysis, verify] + return mock + + +def _make_validate_state( + roles_with_access: list[Role], + all_roles: list[Role], + retry: int = 0, +) -> SinglePrivilegeState: + return { + "policy_description": "test", + "privilege": Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud"), + "roles": all_roles, + "explanation": "", + "roles_with_access": roles_with_access, + "messages": [], + "errors": [], + "retry_count": retry, + "validation_passed": True, + } + + +def _make_routing_state(validation_passed: bool, retry_count: int) -> dict: + return {"validation_passed": validation_passed, "retry_count": retry_count} + + +_SAMPLE_ROLES = [ + Role(id="developer", name="developer", description="R&D", composite=False), + Role(id="tech-support", name="tech-support", description="Support", composite=False), + Role(id="sales", name="sales", description="Sales", composite=False), +] + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles +# ============================================================================ + +def test_extract_fenced_explanation_and_json(): + """Parser extracts explanation and JSON from properly fenced blocks.""" + content = _make_analysis_response("github-tool-aud", ["developer", "tech-support"]) + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) + assert explanation + assert data is not None + assert data.get("roles_with_access") == ["developer", "tech-support"] + + +def test_extract_json_only_block(): + """Parser extracts JSON from a bare ```json block with no explanation.""" + content = '```json\n{"privilege": "demo-ui", "roles_with_access": ["sales"]}\n```' + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) + assert data is not None + assert data["roles_with_access"] == ["sales"] + + +def test_extract_bare_json_object(): + """Parser finds a bare {...} JSON object in the response.""" + content = 'Result: {"privilege": "demo-ui", "roles_with_access": []}' + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) + assert data is not None + assert data["roles_with_access"] == [] + + +def test_extract_returns_none_on_invalid_json(): + """Parser returns (empty_str, None) when no valid JSON is found.""" + content = "This response has no JSON at all." + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) + assert data is None + + +def test_extract_empty_roles_with_access(): + """Parser handles empty roles_with_access list.""" + content = '```json\n{"privilege": "demo-ui", "roles_with_access": []}\n```' + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) + assert data is not None + assert data["roles_with_access"] == [] + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: _validate_privilege_roles +# ============================================================================ + +def test_validate_passes_with_valid_roles(): + """Validation succeeds when all roles_with_access are in the reference list.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Role(id="developer", name="developer", composite=False)], + _SAMPLE_ROLES, + ) + result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is True + assert result["errors"] == [] + + +def test_validate_rejects_unknown_role(): + """Validation fails when an unknown role name is returned.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Role(id="admin", name="admin", composite=False)], + _SAMPLE_ROLES, + ) + result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + assert any("admin" in e for e in result["errors"]) + + +def test_validate_rejects_duplicates(): + """Validation fails when duplicate role names appear in the result.""" + dup = Role(id="developer", name="developer", composite=False) + state = _make_validate_state([dup, dup], _SAMPLE_ROLES) + result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + assert any("Duplicate" in e for e in result["errors"]) + + +def test_validate_passes_with_empty_roles_with_access(): + """Validation passes when no roles are granted (empty list is valid).""" + state = _make_validate_state([], _SAMPLE_ROLES) + result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is True + assert result["errors"] == [] + + +def test_validate_increments_retry_count_on_failure(): + """Retry count is incremented when validation fails and retries remain.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Role(id="unknown", name="unknown", composite=False)], _SAMPLE_ROLES, retry=0 + ) + result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["retry_count"] == 1 + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + + +def test_validate_does_not_increment_retry_when_exhausted(): + """Retry count is not further incremented once max_retries is reached.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Role(id="unknown", name="unknown", composite=False)], _SAMPLE_ROLES, retry=3 + ) + result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["retry_count"] == 3 + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: routing functions +# ============================================================================ + +def test_route_after_structural_proceeds_to_verify_on_success(): + """Routes to verify_semantic_mapping when structural validation passed.""" + route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == "verify_semantic_mapping" + + +def test_route_after_structural_retries_when_failed_and_retries_remain(): + """Routes back to analyze_role_mapping on failure when retries are available.""" + route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=1), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == "analyze_role_mapping" + + +def test_route_after_structural_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): + """Routes to END when structural validation failed and retries are exhausted.""" + route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == END + + +def test_route_after_semantic_retries_when_failed(): + """Routes back to analyze_role_mapping when semantic check fails and retries remain.""" + route = _should_retry_after_semantic( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == "analyze_role_mapping" + + +def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_passed(): + """Routes to END when semantic verification passed.""" + route = _should_retry_after_semantic( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == END + + +def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): + """Routes to END when semantic check failed but retries are exhausted.""" + route = _should_retry_after_semantic( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == END + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: SinglePrivilegeMapper +# ============================================================================ + +def test_single_privilege_mapper_get_graph(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles, mock_llm): + """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False + ) + assert mapper.get_graph() is not None + + +def test_map_roles_returns_correct_keys(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """map_roles() returns a dict with all expected keys.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") + for key in ("policy_description", "privilege", "roles_with_access", "explanation", + "errors", "success", "retry_count"): + assert key in result, f"Missing key: {key}" + assert result["privilege"].name == "github-tool-aud" + + +def test_map_roles_success_flag_on_clean_run(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """map_roles() sets success=True and errors=[] on a clean run.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") + assert result["success"] is True + assert result["errors"] == [] + + +def test_map_roles_returns_roles_with_access(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """map_roles() returns the matching Role objects from the LLM response.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer", "tech-support"]) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="Developers and tech-support get GitHub access.") + names = {r.name for r in result["roles_with_access"]} + assert "developer" in names + assert "tech-support" in names + + +def test_map_roles_with_empty_access(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """map_roles() handles empty roles_with_access (privilege is internal-only).""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", []) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="This privilege is internal only.") + assert result["roles_with_access"] == [] + assert result["success"] is True + + +def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """generate_policy() returns a PolicyObjectModel with rules and explanation.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + assert isinstance(result, PolicyObjectModel) + assert isinstance(result.rules, list) + + +def test_generate_policy_maps_role_to_privilege(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """generate_policy() produces Rules mapping the granted roles to the privilege.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + assert any( + r.role.name == "developer" and r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" + for r in result.rules + ) + + +def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """generate_policy() produces a valid PolicyObjectModel with expected rules.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + policy = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) + assert len(policy.rules) > 0 + assert any(r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" for r in policy.rules) + + +def test_generate_policy_with_unknown_role_raises_value_error(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): + """generate_policy() raises ValueError when the LLM returns an unknown role.""" + bad_response = Mock() + bad_response.content = _make_analysis_response("github-tool-aud", ["nonexistent-role"]) + mock = Mock() + mock.invoke.return_value = bad_response + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + mapper.generate_policy("Some description.") + + +def test_single_privilege_mapper_multiple_privileges(sample_roles): + """Multiple SinglePrivilegeMapper instances can run independently per privilege.""" + demo_ui = Scope(id="demo-ui", name="demo-ui", description="Access to demo UI") + github_full = Scope(id="github-full-access", name="github-full-access", + description="Full GitHub access") + + mock_ui = _make_mock_llm("demo-ui", ["sales", "tech-support"]) + mock_gh = _make_mock_llm("github-full-access", ["developer"]) + + ui_mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(privilege=demo_ui, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock_ui, verbose=False) + gh_mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(privilege=github_full, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock_gh, verbose=False) + + ui_result = ui_mapper.map_roles("UI is for sales and support.") + gh_result = gh_mapper.map_roles("GitHub full access is only for developers.") + + assert {r.name for r in ui_result["roles_with_access"]} == {"sales", "tech-support"} + assert {r.name for r in gh_result["roles_with_access"]} == {"developer"} + + +# ============================================================================ +# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) +# ============================================================================ + +def test_generate_single_privilege_from_fixtures( + fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name +): + """Integration: map each privilege to realm roles for each policy fixture using a real LLM.""" + if not policy_files: + pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") + + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration + config_api = Configuration.for_realm("demo") + roles = config_api.get_roles() + services = config_api.get_services() + + all_privileges = [ + (scope, service.name or service.id) + for service in services + for scope in service.scopes + if scope.description + ] + + failures = [] + + for policy_file in policy_files: + policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() + expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + + if not expected_file.exists(): + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" + ) + continue + + expected_policy = yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()).get("policy", {}) + + for privilege, service_name in all_privileges: + expected_roles_for_priv = set() + for role_name, mappings in expected_policy.items(): + for mapping in mappings: + if mapping.get("privilege") == privilege.name: + expected_roles_for_priv.add(role_name) + + try: + mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( + privilege=privilege, + roles=roles, + llm=llm_instance, + verbose=False, + ) + result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description=policy_description) + generated = {r.name for r in result.get("roles_with_access", [])} + missing = expected_roles_for_priv - generated + extra = generated - expected_roles_for_priv + + if missing or extra: + diffs = ( + [f" Missing role: '{r}'" for r in sorted(missing)] + + [f" Extra role: '{r}'" for r in sorted(extra)] + ) + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / privilege={privilege.name}:\n" + + "\n".join(diffs) + ) + + except Exception as exc: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / privilege={privilege.name}: exception: {exc}" + ) + + if failures: + pytest.fail( + f"Single privilege mapper tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + + "\n\n".join(failures) + ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a78001ef7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,558 @@ +""" +Tests for the single_role_agent (SingleRoleMapper). + +The agent maps a realm role to the set of privileges/scopes it should hold. + +To run all tests: + pytest test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py + +To skip integration tests (require LLM access): + pytest test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py -m "not integration" + +To run ONLY integration tests: + pytest test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py -m integration +""" + +import os +from typing import Any +import pytest +import yaml +from pathlib import Path +from unittest.mock import Mock + +from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel +from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleState +from base_mapper import ( + BaseMappingState, + extract_explanation_and_json, + validate_mapping_items, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + should_retry_after_semantic, +) +from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES +from langgraph.graph import END +from config import create_llm + + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + + +# ============================================================================ +# LOCAL ADAPTERS +# (the underlying base_mapper functions take explicit parameters; +# these thin wrappers match the state-based calling convention the tests use) +# ============================================================================ + +def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content: str): + """Delegate to the shared base_mapper parser.""" + return extract_explanation_and_json(content) + + +def _validate_role_scopes( + state: BaseMappingState, + verbose: bool = True, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + return validate_mapping_items( + state, + verbose, + max_retries, + items_key="granted_privileges", + reference_key="privileges", + item_type_label="privilege", + ) + + +def _should_route_after_structural_validation( + state: dict, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, +) -> str: + return should_route_after_structural_validation( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", + verify_node="verify_semantic_scope_mapping", + ) + + +def _should_retry_after_semantic( + state: dict, + max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, +) -> str: + return should_retry_after_semantic( + validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), + retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), + max_retries=max_retries, + analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", + ) + + +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURES +# ============================================================================ + +@pytest.fixture +def fixtures_dir(): + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" + + +@pytest.fixture +def config_file(): + return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" + + +@pytest.fixture +def policy_files(fixtures_dir): + return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) + + +@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-oss"]) +def llm_model_name(request): + return request.param + + +@pytest.fixture +def llm_instance(llm_model_name): + import socket + from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml + cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) + if cfg.endpoint: + parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) + host = parsed.hostname or "" + port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) + try: + with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): + pass + except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: + pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") + return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) + + +@pytest.fixture +def mock_llm(): + return Mock() + + +@pytest.fixture +def sample_scopes() -> list[Scope]: + return [ + Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud", + description="Provides access to public GitHub repos"), + Scope(id="github-full-access", name="github-full-access", + description="Provides access to private GitHub repos"), + Scope(id="demo-ui", name="demo-ui", + description="Access to the demo UI interface"), + ] + + +@pytest.fixture +def developer_role() -> Role: + return Role(id="developer", name="developer", + description="R&D team members", composite=False) + + +# ============================================================================ +# HELPERS +# ============================================================================ + +def _make_analysis_response(role_name: str, granted_privileges: list) -> str: + privs_json = ", ".join(f'"{p}"' for p in granted_privileges) + return f""" +```explanation +The {role_name} role is a user-facing role. Granting appropriate privileges. +``` +```json +{{ + "role": "{role_name}", + "granted_privileges": [{privs_json}] +}} +``` +""" + + +def _make_verify_response(correct: bool = True) -> str: + status = "YES" if correct else "NO" + return f"MAPPING_CORRECT: {status}\nEXPLANATION: Mapping is correct." + + +def _make_mock_llm(role_name: str, granted_privileges: list) -> Mock: + mock = Mock() + analysis = Mock() + analysis.content = _make_analysis_response(role_name, granted_privileges) + verify = Mock() + verify.content = _make_verify_response() + mock.invoke.side_effect = [analysis, verify] + return mock + + +def _make_validate_state( + granted: list[Scope], + privileges: list[Scope], + retry: int = 0, +) -> SingleRoleState: + return SingleRoleState( + policy_description="test", + role=Role(id="developer", name="developer", + description="R&D team members", composite=False), + privileges=privileges, + explanation="", + granted_privileges=granted, + messages=[], + errors=[], + retry_count=retry, + validation_passed=True, + ) + + +def _make_routing_state(validation_passed: bool, retry_count: int) -> dict: + return {"validation_passed": validation_passed, "retry_count": retry_count} + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes +# ============================================================================ + +_SAMPLE_SCOPES = [ + Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud"), + Scope(id="github-full-access", name="github-full-access"), + Scope(id="demo-ui", name="demo-ui"), +] + + +def test_extract_fenced_explanation_and_json(): + """Parser extracts explanation and JSON from properly fenced blocks.""" + content = _make_analysis_response("developer", ["github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"]) + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) + assert explanation + assert data is not None + assert data.get("granted_privileges") == ["github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"] + + +def test_extract_json_only_block(): + """Parser extracts JSON from a bare ```json block with no explanation.""" + content = '```json\n{"role": "tech-support", "granted_privileges": ["demo-ui"]}\n```' + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) + assert data is not None + assert data["granted_privileges"] == ["demo-ui"] + + +def test_extract_bare_json_object(): + """Parser finds a bare {...} JSON object in the response.""" + content = 'Here is the result: {"role": "sales", "granted_privileges": []}' + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) + assert data is not None + assert data["granted_privileges"] == [] + assert "Here is the result:" in explanation + + +def test_extract_returns_none_on_invalid_json(): + """Parser returns (empty_str, None) when no valid JSON is found.""" + content = "This response has no JSON at all." + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) + assert data is None + + +def test_extract_empty_granted_privileges(): + """Parser handles empty granted_privileges list.""" + content = '```json\n{"role": "sales", "granted_privileges": []}\n```' + explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) + assert data is not None + assert data["granted_privileges"] == [] + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: _validate_role_scopes +# ============================================================================ + +def test_validate_passes_with_valid_privileges(): + """Validation succeeds when all granted privileges are in the available list.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud")], + _SAMPLE_SCOPES, + ) + result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is True + assert result["errors"] == [] + + +def test_validate_rejects_unknown_privilege(): + """Validation fails when an unknown privilege name is returned.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Scope(id="nonexistent-priv", name="nonexistent-priv")], + _SAMPLE_SCOPES, + ) + result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + assert any("nonexistent-priv" in e for e in result["errors"]) + + +def test_validate_rejects_duplicates(): + """Validation fails when duplicate privilege names appear in the result.""" + dup = Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud") + state = _make_validate_state([dup, dup], _SAMPLE_SCOPES) + result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + assert any("Duplicate" in e for e in result["errors"]) + + +def test_validate_passes_with_empty_granted(): + """Validation passes when no privileges are granted (empty list is valid).""" + state = _make_validate_state([], _SAMPLE_SCOPES) + result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["validation_passed"] is True + assert result["errors"] == [] + + +def test_validate_increments_retry_count_on_failure(): + """Retry count is incremented when validation fails and retries remain.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Scope(id="bad-priv", name="bad-priv")], _SAMPLE_SCOPES, retry=0 + ) + result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["retry_count"] == 1 + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + + +def test_validate_does_not_increment_retry_when_exhausted(): + """Retry count is not further incremented once max_retries is reached.""" + state = _make_validate_state( + [Scope(id="bad-priv", name="bad-priv")], _SAMPLE_SCOPES, retry=3 + ) + result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) + assert result["retry_count"] == 3 + assert result["validation_passed"] is False + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: routing functions +# ============================================================================ + +def test_route_after_structural_proceeds_to_verify_on_success(): + """Routes to verify_semantic_scope_mapping when structural validation passed.""" + route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == "verify_semantic_scope_mapping" + + +def test_route_after_structural_retries_when_failed_and_retries_remain(): + """Routes back to analyze_role_scopes on failure when retries are available.""" + route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=1), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == "analyze_role_scopes" + + +def test_route_after_structural_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): + """Routes to END when structural validation failed and retries are exhausted.""" + route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == END + + +def test_route_after_semantic_retries_when_failed(): + """Routes back to analyze_role_scopes when semantic check fails and retries remain.""" + route = _should_retry_after_semantic( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == "analyze_role_scopes" + + +def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_passed(): + """Routes to END when semantic verification passed.""" + route = _should_retry_after_semantic( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == END + + +def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): + """Routes to END when semantic check failed but retries are exhausted.""" + route = _should_retry_after_semantic( + _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 + ) + assert route == END + + +# ============================================================================ +# UNIT TESTS: SingleRoleMapper +# ============================================================================ + +def test_single_role_mapper_get_graph(developer_role, sample_scopes, mock_llm): + """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) + assert mapper.get_graph() is not None + + +def test_map_privileges_returns_correct_keys(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """map_privileges() returns a dict with all expected keys.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") + for key in ("policy_description", "role", "granted_privileges", "explanation", + "errors", "success", "retry_count"): + assert key in result, f"Missing key: {key}" + assert result["role"].name == "developer" + + +def test_map_privileges_success_flag_on_clean_run(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """map_privileges() sets success=True and errors=[] on a clean run.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") + assert result["success"] is True + assert result["errors"] == [] + + +def test_map_privileges_returns_granted_privileges(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """map_privileges() returns the granted Scope objects from the LLM response.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"]) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Developers get full GitHub access.") + names = {s.name for s in result["granted_privileges"]} + assert "github-tool-aud" in names + assert "github-full-access" in names + + +def test_map_privileges_with_empty_granted_privileges(sample_scopes): + """map_privileges() handles empty granted_privileges (non-user-facing role).""" + role = Role(id="sales", name="sales", description="Sales team members", composite=False) + mock = _make_mock_llm("sales", []) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Sales staff have no GitHub access.") + assert result["granted_privileges"] == [] + assert result["success"] is True + + +def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """generate_policy() returns a PolicyObjectModel with rules and explanation.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + assert isinstance(result, PolicyObjectModel) + assert isinstance(result.rules, list) + + +def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """generate_policy() produces a valid PolicyObjectModel with expected rules.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + policy = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) + assert len(policy.rules) > 0 + assert any(r.role.name == "developer" for r in policy.rules) + + +def test_generate_policy_maps_privilege_to_role(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """generate_policy() produces a Rule mapping the role to the granted privilege.""" + mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + assert any( + r.role.name == "developer" and r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" + for r in result.rules + ) + + +def test_generate_policy_with_unknown_privilege_raises_value_error(developer_role, sample_scopes): + """generate_policy() raises ValueError when the LLM returns an unknown privilege.""" + bad_response = Mock() + bad_response.content = _make_analysis_response("developer", ["nonexistent-priv"]) + mock = Mock() + mock.invoke.return_value = bad_response + mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + mapper.generate_policy("Some description.") + + +# ============================================================================ +# FIXTURE SANITY CHECK +# ============================================================================ + +def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): + policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" + expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" + assert policies_dir.exists() + assert expected_dir.exists() + policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) + assert len(policy_files) > 0 + for policy_file in policy_files: + expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + assert expected_file.exists() + try: + yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {exc}") + + +# ============================================================================ +# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) +# ============================================================================ + +def test_generate_single_role_from_fixtures( + fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name +): + """Integration: map each realm role for each policy fixture using a real LLM.""" + if not policy_files: + pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") + + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) + from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration + config_api = Configuration.for_realm("demo") + roles = config_api.get_roles() + scopes = config_api.get_scopes() + + failures = [] + + for policy_file in policy_files: + policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() + expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" + + if not expected_file.exists(): + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" + ) + continue + + expected_full = yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()).get("policy", {}) + + for role in roles: + expected_for_role = expected_full.get(role.name, []) + expected_privileges = {m["privilege"] for m in expected_for_role} + + try: + mapper = SingleRoleMapper( + role=role, + privileges=scopes, + llm=llm_instance, + verbose=False, + ) + result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description=policy_description) + generated = {s.name for s in result.get("granted_privileges", [])} + missing = expected_privileges - generated + extra = generated - expected_privileges + + if missing or extra: + diffs = ( + [f" Missing privilege: '{p}'" for p in sorted(missing)] + + [f" Extra privilege: '{p}'" for p in sorted(extra)] + ) + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / role={role.name}:\n" + + "\n".join(diffs) + ) + + except Exception as exc: + failures.append( + f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / role={role.name}: exception: {exc}" + ) + + if failures: + pytest.fail( + f"Single role mapper tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" + + "\n\n".join(failures) + ) From 8d7d4eb5a4e1b6ebdc226b8da8d4650743d45fa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 23:54:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 131/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs:=20redesign=20AIAC=20policy=20arch?= =?UTF-8?q?itecture=20=E2=80=94=20Policy=20Store,=20PCE,=20Policy=20Model?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Split Policy Management Service into three components: - Policy Store (aiac.policy.store): SQLite-backed CRUD service, K8s rename aiac-policy-store / aiac-policy-store-service:7074 / AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL - Policy Computation Engine (aiac.policy.computation): pure library module, compute_and_apply(rules) — IdP resolution, additive merge, PDP push - Policy Model (aiac.policy.model): canonical, dependency-free Pydantic models with typed Role/Scope/Service fields and id-only hash/eq New component PRDs: policy-store.md, policy-computation-engine.md, policy-model.md Renamed library PRDs: library-policy-store.md (was library-state.md, AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL) library-pdp-policy.md (was library-pdp.md policy section, aiac.pdp.policy.library) Updated in-place: library-idp.md — namespace aiac.idp.configuration, remove mappedScopes/get_roles scope-fetch, add get_services_by_role + get_services_by_scope PRD.md — component table, call flows, dependencies, arch decisions, deployment Deleted deprecated: policy-management-service.md, library-state.md, library-pdp.md Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 170 +++++++++++------- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 72 +++++--- .../components/library-pdp-policy.md | 112 ++++++++++++ .../requirements/components/library-pdp.md | 150 ---------------- ...brary-state.md => library-policy-store.md} | 34 ++-- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 141 +++++++++++++++ .../requirements/components/policy-model.md | 161 +++++++++++++++++ ...-management-service.md => policy-store.md} | 65 ++++--- 8 files changed, 617 insertions(+), 288 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp-policy.md delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md rename aiac/inception/requirements/components/{library-state.md => library-policy-store.md} (58%) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md rename aiac/inception/requirements/components/{policy-management-service.md => policy-store.md} (55%) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index a3abfd5a7..666c561df 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -102,19 +102,20 @@ Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during ## 5. Architecture Overview -Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. +Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. ### Component Summary | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| -| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles and mapped scopes. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **Policy Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Builder sub-agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | -| 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | -| 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | -| 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.policy.library`. | +| 3 | **Policy Store** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Computation Engine to read current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.policy.store.library`. | +| 4 | **Policy Computation Engine** | Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No service, no Kubernetes deployment. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from AIAC Agent sub-agents, queries IdP to resolve owning services, additively merges rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, and pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer. Single entry point: `compute_and_apply(rules)`. | +| 5 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 6 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 8 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to IdP and policy services via `aiac.idp.configuration`, `aiac.policy.model`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and `aiac.policy.computation` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) @@ -134,10 +135,10 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ │ Policy Management Pod │ + │ │ Policy Store Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ - │ │ │ Policy Management Service │ │ + │ │ │ Policy Store Service │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ (SQLite policy.db) │ │ │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ @@ -183,9 +184,12 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 6. [LLM] compute AgentPolicyModel for new service (inbound + outbound rules) - │ 7. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 6. [LLM] compute list[PolicyRule] for new service (inbound + outbound rules) + │ 7. [LLM] validate policy rules against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -204,9 +208,12 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi AIAC Agent │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute PolicyModel delta for all services affected by the role change - │ 6. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) - │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 5. [LLM] compute list[PolicyRule] delta for all services affected by the role change + │ 6. [LLM] validate policy rules against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 8. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -228,8 +235,11 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi AIAC Agent │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB - │ 7. [LLM] compute full PolicyModel delta against current OPA state - │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 7. [LLM] compute list[PolicyRule] delta against current OPA state + │ 8. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR │ 9. ACK message ▼ NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) @@ -243,10 +253,14 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi ▼ AIAC Agent │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR - │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST - │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB - │ 5. [LLM] compute complete PolicyModel from scratch - │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 3. DELETE /policy (clear Policy Store) ──► Policy Store + │ 4. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute complete list[PolicyRule] from scratch + │ 7. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR ▼ (synchronous HTTP response to operator) ``` @@ -255,24 +269,31 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | |-----------|-----------|-------|---------| -| IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | -| PDP Policy Writer — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | -| Policy Management Service (StatefulSet `aiac-pdp-state`) | `aiac.pdp.library.state` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | -| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | -| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for OPA policy (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | PDP Policy Writer — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | -| `aiac.pdp.library.state` | AIAC Agent, Python scripts | Policy Management Service (HTTP) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; None on write/delete | +| IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Writer — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| Policy Store (StatefulSet `aiac-policy-store`) | `aiac.policy.store.library` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | +| Policy Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation`) | AIAC Agent sub-UC agents | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | None (fire-and-forget; logs exceptions) | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.model`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Policy Computation Engine, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | +| `aiac.policy.model` | `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.policy.computation`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for policy entities (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `aiac.policy.computation` | PDP Policy Writer — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `aiac.policy.computation` | Policy Store (HTTP) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; None on write/delete | | ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | | RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | | Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | -| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Policy Update / Role Update / Service Onboarding orchestrators → `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`, `aiac.pdp.library.policy`, `aiac.pdp.library.state`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to Policy Management Service (SQLite); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Service Onboarding / Policy Update / Role Update orchestrators → `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.computation`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to Policy Store (SQLite); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | ### Key architectural decisions -- **Stateless PDP services are co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod; the stateful Policy Management Service is separate.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Writer run as two containers in the Interface Pod, sharing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. The Policy Management Service is a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with its own PVC — decoupled from the Interface Pod's restart lifecycle. Three ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074`) provide stable addressing. -- **One CR + one SQLite store, distinct owners, distinct purposes.** The Policy Management Service owns a SQLite `agent_policies` table (backed by a 1 Gi RWO PVC) holding structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state, served from an in-memory cache. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Writer) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the AIAC Agent via their respective libraries. -- **Clean `idp` / `pdp` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`. +- **Stateless PDP services are co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod; the stateful Policy Store is separate.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Writer run as two containers in the Interface Pod, sharing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. The Policy Store is a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) with its own PVC — decoupled from the Interface Pod's restart lifecycle. Three ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-policy-store-service:7074`) provide stable addressing. +- **Policy Computation Engine is a library, not a service.** `aiac.policy.computation` runs in-process within the AIAC Agent pod. It requires no Kubernetes deployment, no container image, and no ClusterIP Service. Sub-agents call `compute_and_apply(rules)` directly. +- **One CR + one SQLite store, distinct owners, distinct purposes.** The Policy Store owns a SQLite `agent_policies` table (backed by a 1 Gi RWO PVC) holding structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state, served from an in-memory cache. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Writer) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the PCE via their respective libraries. +- **`aiac.pdp.policy.library` has one caller: `aiac.policy.computation`.** AIAC Agent sub-agents do not call the PDP Policy Library directly; they call `compute_and_apply()` instead. This centralises all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. +- **Clean `idp` / `pdp` / `policy` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego writing) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`; shared policy model and computation code lives under `aiac.policy.*`. +- **`aiac.policy.model` is dependency-free (only `pydantic` + `aiac.idp.configuration.models`).** `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` live in a neutral namespace importable by any consumer — Policy Store library, PDP Policy Library, PCE — without forcing a dependency on any service namespace. +- **`PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed objects.** They hold `Role` and `Scope` instances from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`, enabling the PCE to call `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope` without additional type conversion. +- **`Service`, `Role`, `Scope` use `id`-only hash/eq.** Custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` on `id` field enables their use as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles` and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets` without `frozen=True` (these models have mutable list fields). +- **PCE merge semantics are additive only.** New rules are appended to existing `inbound_rules`/`outbound_rules`; existing rules are never removed. Rule revocation is TBD. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. - **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. @@ -284,8 +305,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **Agent HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. - **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. - **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. -- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` and `aiac.pdp.library.models` are dependency-free** (only `pydantic`). Agents can import them without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. -- **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel`. +- **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. - **`user/{id}` trigger not implemented.** OPA rules are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — OPA rule evaluation resolves entitlements from the caller's role automatically. @@ -295,7 +315,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi **AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to -extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library.configuration` and `aiac.pdp.library.policy` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the IdP and PDP respectively. +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.configuration` and `aiac.pdp.policy.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the IdP and PDP respectively. **AIAC ↔ Keycloak** The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. @@ -306,7 +326,7 @@ The PDP Policy Writer (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) writes LLM-generated Rego packages **AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a dead-letter subject. -See Section 7.4 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and handler mapping. +See Section 7.5 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and handler mapping. --- @@ -328,32 +348,47 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP --- -### 7.3 Policy Management Service +### 7.3 Policy Store -FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-pdp-state-service`) deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`) mounted at `/data`. Owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database (`/data/state.db`) as the authoritative structured policy store. All GET requests are served from the in-memory cache; mutations write through to SQLite synchronously; on pod restart the cache is repopulated from SQLite. The Policy Builder sub-agent reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for diff computation and writes updated state after each policy change, so that state survives pod restarts. The PDP Policy Writer has no dependency on the Policy Management Service; the SQLite store and `AuthorizationPolicy` CR are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-policy-store-service`) deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`) mounted at `/data`. Owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database (`/data/state.db`) as the authoritative structured policy store. All GET requests are served from the in-memory cache; mutations write through to SQLite synchronously; on pod restart the cache is repopulated from SQLite. The Policy Computation Engine reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging and writes updated state after each computation. The PDP Policy Writer has no dependency on the Policy Store; the SQLite store and `AuthorizationPolicy` CR are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. -**Full spec:** [components/policy-management-service.md](components/policy-management-service.md) +**Full spec:** [components/policy-store.md](components/policy-store.md) --- -### 7.4 Library +### 7.4 Policy Computation Engine -Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` namespace split: +Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No FastAPI, no Kubernetes deployment, no container image. Runs in-process within the AIAC Agent pod. AIAC Agent sub-UC agents call `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None` to translate partial policy rule lists into merged `AgentPolicyModel` objects and push them to OPA. + +The PCE is the **single point of coordination** between the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer: it reads current agent policy state, additively merges new rules, writes back to the Policy Store, then pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy()`. All exceptions are logged; none propagate to the caller. + +**Full spec:** [components/policy-computation-engine.md](components/policy-computation-engine.md) + +--- + +### 7.5 Library + +Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` / `policy` namespace split: **IdP library** (Keycloak entity management): -- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). -- **`aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. +- **`aiac.idp.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` implement `id`-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` for use as dict keys. +- **`aiac.idp.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. Includes `get_services_by_role(role)` and `get_services_by_scope(scope)` used by the PCE. + +**Policy model** (shared, dependency-light): +- **`aiac.policy.model`** — canonical Pydantic models for policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`) with typed `Role`/`Scope`/`Service` fields. Importable by any consumer without pulling in HTTP or service dependencies. + +**Policy libraries** (OPA + Policy Store access): +- **`aiac.pdp.policy.library`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Called exclusively by `aiac.policy.computation`. +- **`aiac.policy.store.library`** — HTTP client wrapping the Policy Store. Six module-level functions: `get_policy`, `get_agent_policy`, `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Returns `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` directly. Called exclusively by `aiac.policy.computation`. -**PDP library** (OPA policy management): -- **`aiac.pdp.library.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for OPA policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`). -- **`aiac.pdp.library.policy`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. No realm parameter. -- **`aiac.pdp.library.state`** — HTTP client wrapping the Policy Management Service. Six module-level functions: `get_policy`, `get_agent_policy`, `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Returns `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` directly. +**Computation library** (policy rule processing): +- **`aiac.policy.computation`** — library module implementing `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None`. Orchestrates IdP resolution, Policy Store merge, and PDP Policy Writer push. -**Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp.md](components/library-pdp.md) · [components/library-state.md](components/library-state.md) +**Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp-policy.md](components/library-pdp-policy.md) · [components/library-policy-store.md](components/library-policy-store.md) · [components/policy-model.md](components/policy-model.md) · [components/policy-computation-engine.md](components/policy-computation-engine.md) --- -### 7.5 Event Broker +### 7.6 Event Broker NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides at-least-once delivery, replay on pod restart via `WorkQueuePolicy`, and a dead-letter subject (`aiac.apply.dlq`) after 5 failed deliveries. No authentication — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism. Stream: `aiac-events`, subjects `aiac.apply.>`, consumer group `aiac-agent-consumer`. @@ -361,7 +396,7 @@ NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers --- -### 7.6 AIAC Agent +### 7.7 AIAC Agent FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: @@ -371,13 +406,13 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th | Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role sub-agent | -All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal `PolicyModel` delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live OPA state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears all OPA policy rules before recomputing the full `PolicyModel`. The **Role Update** orchestrator recomputes the `PolicyModel` for all services affected by the role change. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator classifies the new service via the pod's `kagenti.io/type` label (for agents reads the `AgentCard` CR; for tools calls `tools/list` on the MCP endpoint discovered via K8s Service label lookup), then computes and writes an `AgentPolicyModel` for the new service. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. Sub-UC agents produce `list[PolicyRule]` and call `compute_and_apply(rules)` — they do not call `aiac.policy.store.library` or `aiac.pdp.policy.library` directly. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal rule delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live OPA state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears the Policy Store and all OPA policy rules before recomputing. The **Role Update** orchestrator computes rules for all services affected by the role change. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator classifies the new service via the pod's `kagenti.io/type` label (for agents reads the `AgentCard` CR; for tools calls `tools/list` on the MCP endpoint discovered via K8s Service label lookup), then computes rules and calls `compute_and_apply`. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. **Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) --- -### 7.7 RAG Knowledge Base +### 7.8 RAG Knowledge Base ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. ChromaDB data is persisted on a 1 Gi PVC mounted at `/chroma/chroma`; the RAG Pod is a StatefulSet. @@ -385,7 +420,7 @@ ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-p --- -### 7.8 RAG Ingest Service +### 7.9 RAG Ingest Service FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.policy.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. @@ -393,7 +428,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-p --- -### 7.9 Keycloak SPI Listener +### 7.10 Keycloak SPI Listener A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into NATS publish calls to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent subject schema is authoritative; the SPI PRD references it. @@ -416,12 +451,12 @@ Four separate manifest files: | File | Contents | |------|----------| | `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Writer container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | -| `aiac/k8s/state-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet (Policy Management Service container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet (Policy Store container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | -The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Management Service container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. +The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. ### Docker images @@ -434,8 +469,8 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t a # Build PDP Policy Writer — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ -# Build Policy Management Service (deployed as a StatefulSet aiac-pdp-state) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ +# Build Policy Store (deployed as StatefulSet aiac-policy-store) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile -t aiac-policy-store:latest aiac/src/ # Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ @@ -459,7 +494,7 @@ data: KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" - AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-state-service:7074" + AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" @@ -480,11 +515,12 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. |--------|-------------|----------------| | IdP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | | PDP Policy Writer (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | -| Policy Management Service endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | -| `aiac.pdp.library.state` functions | Policy Management Service HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | -| `aiac.pdp.library.models` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields, required fields validated, `model_validate` round-trips correctly | -| `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | -| `aiac.pdp.library.policy` functions | PDP Policy Writer HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| Policy Store endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` functions | Policy Store HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.policy.model` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields; `Role`/`Scope`/`Service` hash/eq on `id`; `model_validate` round-trips correctly | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback; `get_services_by_role` and `get_services_by_scope` issue correct query params | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` functions | PDP Policy Writer HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.policy.computation` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (import-boundary mocks) | Correct `apply_agent_policy` calls per resolved service; additive merge preserves existing rules; no duplicate rule insertion; `apply_policy` called once after all writes; exceptions logged, not propagated | | Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | | Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | | Init container health-check | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence; NATS TCP refused then connected | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies healthy; `add_stream` called with correct config | @@ -519,6 +555,6 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only - Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) - Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` - No auth on IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism -- IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered with the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes - `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package - NATS consumer must **await** handler completion before issuing ack — fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is prohibited; premature ack breaks at-least-once delivery guarantees diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index e47634deb..a11d0952d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -1,31 +1,28 @@ -# Component PRD: IdP Library (`aiac.idp.library`) +# Component PRD: IdP Configuration Library (`aiac.idp.configuration`) ## Location -`aiac/src/aiac/idp/library/` +`aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/` ## Package structure ``` aiac/src/aiac/idp/ -├── __init__.py # empty -└── library/ - ├── __init__.py # empty - └── configuration/ - ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── models.py # Subject, Role, Service, Scope - └── api.py # Configuration class — reads + writes IdP entities +└── configuration/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── models.py # Subject, Role, Service, Scope + └── api.py # Configuration class — reads + writes IdP entities ``` All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: ```python -from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service -from aiac.idp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration ``` --- -## Submodule: `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models` +## Submodule: `aiac.idp.configuration.models` ### Description Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. @@ -41,6 +38,15 @@ All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard u Model definition order: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. +`Service`, `Role`, and `Scope` implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: + +```python +__hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) +__eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id +``` + +`frozen=True` is **not** used — these models have list fields that must remain mutable. The `id`-only hash enables their use as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles` and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. + #### `Subject` Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). @@ -66,7 +72,6 @@ Represents a role (Keycloak: realm role). | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | | | `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | | | `childRoles` | `list[Role]` | `composites.realm` | `[]` | -| `mappedScopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(client scopes mapped to role)_ | `[]` | #### `Service` @@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). ### Usage ```python -from aiac.idp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] @@ -104,10 +109,10 @@ subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] --- -## Submodule: `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` +## Submodule: `aiac.idp.configuration.api` ### Description -HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides read and write access to IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.idp.library.configuration.models`. +HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides read and write access to IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. @@ -135,6 +140,9 @@ class Configuration: def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: ... def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: ... + def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: ... + def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: ... def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: ... @@ -155,12 +163,12 @@ class Configuration: `get_services()` — fully-enriched read: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch the base service list. -2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` once upfront to build `{id: Role}` and `{id: Scope}` lookup maps (includes composite roles and scope mappings). +2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` once upfront to build `{id: Role}` and `{id: Scope}` lookup maps. 3. For each service, delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)` which issues: - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` → filter `all_roles` map → `Service.roles` - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=<self.realm>` → filter `all_scopes` map → `Service.scopes` 4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. -5. Return `list[Service]` with fully-enriched `roles` (including `childRoles` and `mappedScopes`) and `scopes` (including `description`). +5. Return `list[Service]` with fully-enriched `roles` (including `childRoles`) and `scopes` (including `description`). > **Performance note:** `get_services()` issues 2N + 1 + (roles overhead) HTTP requests where N is the number of services. `get_roles()` is called once and its fully-enriched objects are shared across all services. If this becomes a bottleneck, enrichment should be moved server-side. @@ -173,13 +181,21 @@ class Configuration: > **Note:** Callers that previously called `get_services()` and filtered by ID should be switched to `get_service(service_id)` to avoid fetching the full list. -`get_roles()` — enriched read (2 extra calls per role): +`get_roles()` — enriched read: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles?realm=<self.realm>` — fetch all realm roles. -2. For each role, issue additional requests: - - If `role.composite` is `True`: `GET /roles/{name}/composites?realm=<self.realm>` → `Role.childRoles` - - For every role: `GET /roles/{name}/scopes?realm=<self.realm>` → `Role.mappedScopes` +2. For each role, if `role.composite` is `True`: `GET /roles/{name}/composites?realm=<self.realm>` → `Role.childRoles` 3. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. -4. Return `list[Role]` with `childRoles` and `mappedScopes` populated. +4. Return `list[Role]` with `childRoles` populated. + +`get_services_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Service]`: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?role_id={role.id}&realm=<self.realm>` +2. Returns all services that have this role mapped to them. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no service owns the role (realm-level role). + +`get_services_by_scope(scope: Scope) -> list[Service]`: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?scope_id={scope.id}&realm=<self.realm>` +2. Returns all services that expose this scope. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no service exposes the scope. `create_scope`: 1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. @@ -205,16 +221,18 @@ class Configuration: ### Configuration -Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/idp/library/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | +> **TBD:** whether `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` should be renamed to `AIAC_IDP_CONFIG_URL`. Not yet decided — keep `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` until this is resolved. + ### Usage ```python -from aiac.idp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration cfg = Configuration.for_realm("kagenti") subjects = cfg.get_subjects() @@ -227,4 +245,8 @@ updated_service = cfg.map_scope_to_service(service, scope) role = cfg.create_role(role_name="reader", role_description="Read-only access") updated_service = cfg.map_role_to_service(updated_service, role) + +# PCE usage — resolve services owning a given role or scope +services_with_role = cfg.get_services_by_role(role) +services_with_scope = cfg.get_services_by_scope(scope) ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp-policy.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp-policy.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e6a2ba773 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp-policy.md @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Library (`aiac.pdp.policy.library`) + +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) REST API. These modules have no dependency on Keycloak — all IdP operations use `aiac.idp.configuration`. + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/ +└── library/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── api.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +``` + +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api` + +### Description +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +No `realm` parameter — the PDP Policy Writer operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. + +**Primary consumer:** `aiac.policy.computation` — the Policy Computation Engine is the only caller. AIAC Agent sub-UC agents do not call this library directly; they call `compute_and_apply` instead. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +```python +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy — upsert Rego packages for all agents in the partial model + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} — upsert Rego packages for a single agent + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} — remove all Rego packages for agent (off-boarding) + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy — clear all Rego packages (rebuild pre-step) +``` + +### Configuration + +Read from `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `api.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel + +# Single-agent update (called by Policy Computation Engine) +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) + +# Full rebuild pre-step: clear all, then reapply +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) + +# Off-boarding +delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") +``` + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +**Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Writer HTTP; cover module-level functions). + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `apply_policy(model)` issues `POST /policy` with serialized `PolicyModel`. +- `apply_agent_policy(id, model)` issues `POST /policy/agents/{id}` with serialized `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `delete_agent_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`. +- `delete_policy()` issues `DELETE /policy`. +- Any non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. +- `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7072`. + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- **Keycloak interaction:** this library never calls Keycloak directly. All IdP operations go through `aiac.idp.configuration`. +- **Policy computation:** translating `list[PolicyRule]` into `AgentPolicyModel` objects is the responsibility of `aiac.policy.computation`, not this library. +- **Policy persistence:** the Policy Store (`aiac.policy.store`) owns structured `AgentPolicyModel` durability. This library targets the OPA runtime only. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The `aiac.pdp.library.policy` module (old path) is deprecated. All consumers must update imports to `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api`. +- Models (`PolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`) are imported from `aiac.policy.model.models`, not from the deprecated `aiac.pdp.library.models`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md deleted file mode 100644 index 019b24225..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,150 +0,0 @@ -# Component PRD: PDP Library (`aiac.pdp.library`) - -These modules have no dependency on Keycloak — all IdP operations use `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. - -## Location -`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/` - -## Package structure - -``` -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/ -├── __init__.py # empty -└── library/ - ├── __init__.py # empty - ├── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel - └── policy.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy -``` - -All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: - -```python -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy -``` - ---- - -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.models` - -### Description -Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses for policy representation. Importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Consumed by the AIAC Agent's policy-producing sub-agents and the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` HTTP client. - -### Dependencies -``` -pydantic -``` - -### Pydantic models - -All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. - -#### `PolicyRule` - -A single access rule: a `(role, scope)` tuple. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. - -| Field | Type | -|-------|------| -| `role` | `str` | -| `scope` | `str` | - -#### `AgentPolicyModel` - -Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `PolicyRule` entries plus supporting data maps used by the Rego packages. - -| Field | Type | Description | -|-------|------|-------------| -| `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | -| `agent_roles` | `list[str]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | -| `agent_scopes` | `list[str]` | Scopes this agent exposes | -| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps inbound source service ID → list of realm roles | -| `scope_targets` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps outbound scope → list of permitted target service IDs | -| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | -| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | - -**Inbound rule semantics:** a caller with realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent requesting scope `scope`. - -**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. - -#### `PolicyModel` - -A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy`, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. - -| Field | Type | -|-------|------| -| `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | - -### Usage - -```python -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule - -rule = PolicyRule(role="weather-reader", scope="read") -agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( - agent_id="weather-agent", - agent_roles=["weather-reader"], - agent_scopes=["read"], - source_roles={"dashboard-agent": ["weather-reader"]}, - scope_targets={"read": ["weather-api"]}, - inbound_rules=[rule], - outbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role="weather-reader", scope="read")], -) -model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) -``` - ---- - -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` - -### Description -HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. - -No `realm` parameter — the OPA service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. - -### Dependencies -``` -requests -pydantic -python-dotenv -``` - -### Functions - -```python -def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None - # POST /policy — upsert Rego packages for all agents in the partial model - -def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None - # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} — upsert Rego packages for a single agent - -def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None - # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} — remove all Rego packages for agent (off-boarding) - -def delete_policy() -> None - # DELETE /policy — clear all Rego packages (rebuild pre-step) -``` - -### Configuration - -Read from `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `policy.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. - -| Variable | Default | -|----------|---------| -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | - -### Usage - -```python -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule - -# Single-agent update (service onboarding / role change) -apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) - -# Full rebuild pre-step: clear all, then reapply -delete_policy() -apply_policy(full_model) - -# Off-boarding -delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") -``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-policy-store.md similarity index 58% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-policy-store.md index 064a14280..ad42598bc 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-state.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-policy-store.md @@ -1,17 +1,15 @@ -# Component PRD: State Library (`aiac.pdp.library.state`) +# Component PRD: Policy Store Library (`aiac.policy.store.library`) -Companion library for the [AIAC Policy Management Service](policy-management-service.md). Follows the same pattern as `aiac.pdp.library.policy` — module-level functions, URL from env var via `python-dotenv`, `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. +Companion library for the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md). Follows the same pattern as `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — module-level functions, URL from env var via `python-dotenv`, `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. ## Location -`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/state/` +`aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/` ## Package structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/ -├── models.py -├── policy.py -└── state/ +aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/ +└── library/ ├── __init__.py # empty └── api.py # six module-level functions ``` @@ -19,20 +17,20 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/ All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.state.api import ( +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( get_policy, get_agent_policy, apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, ) -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel ``` --- -## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.library.state.api` +## Submodule: `aiac.policy.store.library.api` ### Description -HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Management Service](policy-management-service.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. +HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. ### Dependencies ``` @@ -65,23 +63,23 @@ def delete_policy() -> None ### Configuration -Read from `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `api.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. +Read from `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `api.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. | Variable | Default | |----------|---------| -| `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.state.api import ( +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( get_policy, get_agent_policy, apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, ) -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel -# Read current state for diff +# Read current state for additive merge current = get_agent_policy("weather-agent") # Write updated state @@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") ## Testing Decisions -**Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL`. +**Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`. **Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Writer HTTP; cover module-level functions). @@ -111,4 +109,4 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - `delete_agent_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`. - `delete_policy()` issues `DELETE /policy`. - Any non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. -- `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7074`. +- `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7074`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a91279c66 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +# Component PRD: Policy Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation`) + +## Problem Statement + +AIAC Agent sub-agents produce `list[PolicyRule]` objects representing partial policy updates — a new onboarding event may produce a handful of rules covering one agent's inbound and outbound access. Before this component, merging those rules into full `AgentPolicyModel` objects required each sub-agent to independently: + +1. Query the IdP Configuration Service to resolve which services own each role and scope. +2. Read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store. +3. Additively merge the new rules into the existing model. +4. Write the updated model back to the Policy Store. +5. Build a `PolicyModel` and push it to the PDP Policy Writer. + +This bespoke logic was duplicated across every sub-agent that produced policy rules, making the merge semantics inconsistent and the IdP query pattern scattered. + +## Solution + +A pure Python library module `aiac.policy.computation` centralises all policy computation. Sub-agents call a single function `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None`, which handles IdP resolution, additive merging, Policy Store read/write, and PDP Policy Writer invocation. No FastAPI service, no Kubernetes deployment — the module is imported directly into the calling sub-agent's process. + +--- + +## User Stories + +1. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to submit a list of `PolicyRule` objects and have them automatically merged into the relevant `AgentPolicyModel` records, so that I do not need to implement IdP resolution or storage merge logic. +2. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want the computation to be fire-and-forget, so that my sub-agent is not blocked waiting for Rego generation to complete. +3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve which services own a given `Role`, so that I know which `AgentPolicyModel` records receive new outbound rules. +4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve which services expose a given `Scope`, so that I know which `AgentPolicyModel` records receive new inbound rules. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read each affected agent's current `AgentPolicyModel` before merging, so that additive append does not lose previously established rules. +6. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to skip duplicate rules on append, so that re-processing the same event does not create redundant entries. +7. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to push the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer after all store writes succeed, so that OPA reflects the latest policy state. +8. As a developer, I want exceptions from the computation to be logged without propagating, so that a transient IdP or Policy Store failure does not crash the calling sub-agent. +9. As a developer, I want to import the engine from a stable path, so that the calling convention does not change as the module grows. + +--- + +## Implementation Decisions + +### Module Identity + +**Namespace:** `aiac.policy.computation` + +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/` + +**Package structure:** + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/policy/ +└── computation/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── engine.py # compute_and_apply +``` + +No FastAPI. No Kubernetes deployment. No container image. Imported as a library by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents. + +### Public API + +Single entry point: + +```python +def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None +``` + +- **Fire-and-forget:** the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and does not propagate them — a transient failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push must not crash the calling sub-agent. +- Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply` + +### Algorithm + +Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]`, the engine executes these steps: + +1. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. + +2. **Role → outbound services:** for each rule's `role`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(rule.role) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. + +3. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(rule.role)` returns an empty list, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment is made for that rule. + +4. **Additive merge:** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. Append new rules that are not already present (de-duplicate by value). Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. + +5. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). + +### Merge Semantics + +Rules are appended additively — existing `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` entries are preserved. De-duplication compares rules by value (`role.id` + `scope.id`). **Rule revocation is TBD** — removing individual rules from an `AgentPolicyModel` is not yet specified. + +### Dependencies + +| Module | Purpose | +|--------|---------| +| `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope` | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — push updated `PolicyModel` to OPA | + +### Not Called By + +The PCE is **not** called by: +- PDP Policy Writer — it is the downstream consumer, not a caller +- Policy Store — the store is pure CRUD with no computation +- IdP Configuration Service — the IdP service has no awareness of this module + +### Not Responsible For + +- Rule revocation (TBD) +- Bootstrapping `AgentPolicyModel` records for new agents (the store returns a 404; the engine creates a fresh model in that case) +- Translating `PolicyModel` → Rego packages (responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` / PDP Policy Writer) + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer — not internal merge logic directly. + +**Seam:** mock all four downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: +- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope` +- `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` +- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy` + +Key behaviors to assert: +- Rules with a resolvable scope result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_scope`. +- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`. +- Realm-level roles (empty service list) do not produce `apply_agent_policy` calls. +- Existing rules in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge. +- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice. +- `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. +- An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock HTTP boundary pattern — apply the same approach at the library import boundary here). + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- **Rule revocation:** removing individual `PolicyRule` entries from an `AgentPolicyModel`. Not yet designed — marked TBD. +- **Full policy rebuild:** the PCE handles incremental updates only. Full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. +- **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP queries go through `aiac.idp.configuration.library.Configuration`. The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. +- **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE does not store the input rule list — only the merged `AgentPolicyModel` output is persisted. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The PCE is the **only** caller of `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` from AIAC Agent sub-agents. Sub-agents no longer call the PDP Policy Library directly; they call `compute_and_apply` instead. +- `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` retains `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents. `PolicyRule` (now at `aiac.policy.model`) is imported from there. These helpers are not used by the PCE. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c6a42e58c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +# Component PRD: Policy Model (`aiac.policy.model`) + +## Problem Statement + +`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` were previously defined in `aiac.pdp.library.models`. Three independent consumers now need these types: + +- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — translates `PolicyModel` into HTTP calls to the PDP Policy Writer +- `aiac.policy.store.library` — reads/writes `AgentPolicyModel` from/to the Policy Store +- `aiac.policy.computation` — builds and merges `AgentPolicyModel` objects + +Keeping the canonical model definitions inside a PDP-namespaced module (`aiac.pdp.library.models`) forces both the Policy Store library and the Policy Computation Engine to take a dependency on the PDP package — a wrong-layer coupling. Any of the three consumers importing from `aiac.pdp.library.models` would create a transitive dependency on an unrelated service namespace. + +Additionally, the old `PolicyRule` used plain `str` for `role` and `scope`. The PCE algorithm requires typed `Role` and `Scope` objects (from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) to invoke `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`. + +## Solution + +A canonical, dependency-free model module at `aiac.policy.model` defines `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` with typed fields. No HTTP client, no service code — importable by any consumer without side effects. `PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed `Role` and `Scope` objects from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. + +--- + +## User Stories + +1. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to import `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` from a shared, neutral namespace, so that I do not take an unwanted dependency on the PDP package. +2. As the PDP Policy Library, I want to import `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` from `aiac.policy.model`, so that my HTTP serialization logic does not duplicate model definitions. +3. As the Policy Store Library, I want to import `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` from `aiac.policy.model`, so that response deserialization uses the same canonical types as every other consumer. +4. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to construct a `PolicyRule` with typed `Role` and `Scope` objects, so that the PCE can use them for IdP queries without additional type conversion. +5. As a developer, I want `Service`, `Role`, and `Scope` to be usable as dict keys, so that the PCE can build `source_roles` and `scope_targets` maps without wrapping them. +6. As a developer, I want all models to silently ignore unknown fields from API responses, so that IdP API additions do not break deserialization. + +--- + +## Implementation Decisions + +### Module Identity + +**Namespace:** `aiac.policy.model` + +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/` + +**Package structure:** + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/policy/ +└── model/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +``` + +### Dependencies + +| Dependency | Purpose | +|------------|---------| +| `pydantic` | `BaseModel`, `ConfigDict` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope`, `Service` | + +No HTTP client dependency. No `requests`, no `python-dotenv`. + +### Pydantic Models + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. + +#### `PolicyRule` + +A single access rule pairing a typed role with a typed scope. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `role` | `Role` | Typed role from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | +| `scope` | `Scope` | Typed scope from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | + +#### `AgentPolicyModel` + +Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound rule sets are typed collections. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | +| `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | +| `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | +| `source_roles` | `dict[Service, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service → roles granted | +| `scope_targets` | `dict[Scope, list[Service]]` | Outbound: scope → target services permitted | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | + +**Inbound rule semantics:** a caller holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent requesting scope `scope`. + +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. + +#### `PolicyModel` + +A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy` on the Policy Store, it may contain only the agents whose policies have changed. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | + +### Hashability of `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` + +`Service`, `Role`, and `Scope` (defined in `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) are used as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles` and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. They implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: + +```python +# On Service, Role, Scope in aiac.idp.configuration.models: +__hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) +__eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id +``` + +`frozen=True` is **not** used — these models have list fields (`childRoles`, `roles`, `scopes`) that must remain mutable. The `id`-only hash is the correct approach. + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service + +role = Role(id="r1", name="weather-reader", composite=False) +scope = Scope(id="s1", name="read") + +rule = PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) +agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="weather-agent", + agent_roles=[role], + agent_scopes=[scope], + source_roles={}, + scope_targets={}, + inbound_rules=[rule], + outbound_rules=[], +) +model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) +``` + +### Replaces + +`aiac.pdp.library.models` is deprecated. All consumers must migrate their imports to `aiac.policy.model.models`. + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +**Seam:** model instantiation and serialization — no HTTP boundary, no mocking required. + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `PolicyRule` accepts typed `Role` and `Scope` objects; rejects plain `str` where `Role`/`Scope` is expected. +- `AgentPolicyModel` with `Service` and `Scope` keys in `source_roles` and `scope_targets` is serializable and deserializable via `model_dump()` / `model_validate()`. +- Two `Role` / `Scope` / `Service` instances with the same `id` are equal and hash-equal (usable as dict keys without collision). +- Two instances with different `id` values are not equal. +- `ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` causes unknown fields to be silently discarded on `model_validate()`. + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- HTTP serialization logic — handled by `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.policy.store.service`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.library`. +- IdP API integration — `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` shapes are owned by `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. +- Rule revocation semantics — TBD; no model changes required until the design is finalised. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The `id`-only hash is intentional: two `Role` objects representing the same Keycloak role but fetched at different times (with potentially different `mappedScopes` or `childRoles`) must be treated as equal for dict key lookup. +- `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` imports `PolicyRule` from `aiac.policy.model`. The `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers in that file remain in place and are used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents directly; they are not consumed by the PCE. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-management-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md similarity index 55% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-management-service.md rename to aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md index 34644f4fb..a5d098d3d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-management-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md @@ -1,49 +1,49 @@ -# Component PRD: AIAC Policy Management Service +# Component PRD: AIAC Policy Store ## Problem Statement -The AIAC Agent's Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Writer translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: +The AIAC Agent's Policy Computation Engine and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Writer translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: -- The Policy Builder sub-agent cannot read current policy state for diff computation — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. +- The Policy Computation Engine cannot read current policy state for additive merging — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. - Off-boarded agents leave no structured record of their removal. - Pod restarts lose any in-flight policy construction context. ## Solution -A dedicated **AIAC Policy Management Service** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.pdp.library.state.api`](library-state.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.library.policy` pattern, used by AIAC Agent sub-agents to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. +A dedicated **AIAC Policy Store** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.policy.store.library`](library-policy-store.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.policy.library` pattern, used by the Policy Computation Engine to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. -The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the Policy Management Service. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: +The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the Policy Store. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: | Artifact | Owner | Contents | |---|---|---| -| SQLite `agent_policies` table | Policy Management Service | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | +| SQLite `agent_policies` table | Policy Store | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | | `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total) | PDP Policy Writer | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | --- ## User Stories -1. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to read the current `AgentPolicyModel` for a specific agent, so that I can compute an accurate delta without re-deriving state from the PDP snapshot. -2. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to read the full `PolicyModel` (all agents), so that I can execute a whole-system policy rebuild. -3. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to write an `AgentPolicyModel` to persistent storage, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. -4. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. -5. As the Policy Builder sub-agent, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. -6. As an AIAC sub-agent developer, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. -7. As an operator, I want the Policy Management Service deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. +1. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the current `AgentPolicyModel` for a specific agent, so that I can additively append new rules without overwriting existing ones. +2. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the full `PolicyModel` (all agents), so that I can execute a whole-system policy rebuild. +3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to write an `AgentPolicyModel` to persistent storage, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. +4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. +6. As a consumer of the Policy Store library, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. +7. As an operator, I want the Policy Store deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. --- ## Implementation Decisions -### Policy Management Service +### Policy Store Service -**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/` +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/` **Port:** `0.0.0.0:7074` -**ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` +**ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` -**Deployment:** dedicated single-replica `StatefulSet` `aiac-pdp-state`, with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, cluster-default StorageClass) mounted at `/data`. Fronted by a headless Service for stable pod DNS plus the `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` ClusterIP for clients. Not co-located with IdP Config / PDP Policy Writers. +**Deployment:** dedicated single-replica `StatefulSet` `aiac-policy-store`, with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, cluster-default StorageClass) mounted at `/data`. Fronted by a headless Service for stable pod DNS plus the `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` ClusterIP for clients. Not co-located with IdP Configuration / PDP Policy Writer. **Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. @@ -100,14 +100,16 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies ( | Variable | Source | Default | |---|---|---| -| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `/data/state.db` | +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-policy-store-config`) | `/data/state.db` | -**Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `pydantic`. `sqlite3` is stdlib (no new dependency; remove `kubernetes` from requirements). +**Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `pydantic`. `sqlite3` is stdlib (no new dependency). + +**Imports:** `from aiac.policy.model import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel` **File structure:** ``` -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/ +aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/ ├── __init__.py ├── Dockerfile ├── requirements.txt @@ -116,8 +118,8 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/ Build command (run from repo root): ```bash -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile \ - -t aiac-pdp-state:latest aiac/src/ +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-policy-store:latest aiac/src/ ``` --- @@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/state/Dockerfile \ Good tests assert external behavior at the system boundary — not internal implementation details such as private helpers or field serialization choices. -### Policy Management Service +### Policy Store Service **Seam:** SQLite `:memory:` database — pass an in-memory connection to the service on startup instead of opening `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH`. All behavioral assertions remain valid; only the storage seam changes. @@ -140,21 +142,28 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - SQLite write error on any write endpoint → `502`. - SQLite file cannot be opened/queried on `GET /health` → `503`. -See [library-state.md](library-state.md) for the companion library testing decisions. +See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library testing decisions. --- ## Out of Scope -- **Triggering Rego generation:** the Policy Management Service writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Writer remains the AIAC Agent's responsibility via `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. +- **Triggering Rego generation:** the Policy Store writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Writer is the responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (called by `aiac.policy.computation`). - **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full result fits within one SQLite query and one HTTP response. -- **In-cluster mTLS between AIAC Agent and Policy Management Service:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. +- **In-cluster mTLS between Policy Computation Engine and Policy Store:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. - **Multi-writer / replica scale-out:** the current design is single-writer (single-replica StatefulSet, RWO PVC, SQLite). Future migration to a shared DB (e.g. PostgreSQL) is a backend swap; the HTTP contract is unchanged. --- ## Further Notes -- The K8s manifests issue must create the `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet, its `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`), and a headless Service. No CRD or RBAC on `agentpolicies` is needed — the service no longer touches the Kubernetes API. +- The K8s manifests issue must create the `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet, its `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`), and a headless Service. No CRD or RBAC is needed — the service does not touch the Kubernetes API. - `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) — consistent with the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR convention. The JSON column avoids a translation layer. -- `agent_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. DNS-subdomain character constraints no longer apply at the storage layer, but the `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. +- `agent_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. The `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. +- **K8s rename summary:** + +| Old | New | +|-----|-----| +| `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet | `aiac-policy-store` | +| `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` | `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | +| `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` env var (in clients) | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | From ee3b6ed31aeb41907fb1e74c40b4fcbbf21980b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 14:16:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 132/273] docs(aiac-agent): replace PolicyBuilder TBD with SharedApplyGraph and compute_and_apply(rules) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Rename PolicyBuilderGraph → SharedApplyGraph; apply_policy → apply_rules - Replace policy_model: PolicyModel | None state field with rules: list[PolicyRule] - Remove TBD Policy sub-agent / Policy Builder sub-agent; shared apply node now delegates all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination to PCE - Add AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL to config table; fix module paths to aiac.idp.configuration.api - Remove apply_diff from individual sub-agent node lists (owned by shared apply) - Update use cases note to reference policy-computation-engine.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 67 +++++++++---------- .../{pdp/library => idp}/configuration/api.py | 0 .../library => idp}/configuration/models.py | 0 .../service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile | 0 .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt | 0 .../pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 8 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) rename aiac/src/aiac/{pdp/library => idp}/configuration/api.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/{pdp/library => idp}/configuration/models.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/{pdp => idp}/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/{pdp => idp}/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/{pdp => idp}/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt (100%) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 7ad13351b..d10842f29 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → **Policy** → **Policy Builder** (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build → **Policy Builder** or Rebuild → **Policy Builder** | -| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role → **Policy Builder** | +| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | +| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role sub-agent | -**New sub-agents (TBD — to be specified in a separate PRD or added to sub-agent PRDs):** -- **Policy sub-agent** — creates an `AgentPolicyModel` delta scoped to the triggered service, including `source_roles`, `scope_targets`, and `PolicyRule` sets for inbound and outbound pipelines. -- **Policy Builder sub-agent** — merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and calls `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy` (or `apply_agent_policy` for single-agent updates). +Each producing sub-agent emits a `list[PolicyRule]` (inbound + outbound rules) scoped to the trigger. A **shared apply node** (`agent/shared/apply/`) calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`; the PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Sub-agents never call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -60,11 +58,11 @@ flowchart TD ORC3 --> SA6 end - APPLY["Policy Builder\nagent/shared/apply/\n(TBD)"] + APPLY["Apply (shared)\nagent/shared/apply/\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] - ORC1 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY - ORC2 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY - ORC3 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + ORC1 -->|"rules"| APPLY + ORC2 -->|"rules"| APPLY + ORC3 -->|"rules"| APPLY TRIGGERS --> CTRL CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 @@ -126,7 +124,7 @@ Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | -> **TBD:** The Policy sub-agent and Policy Builder sub-agent need dedicated sub-PRDs. These will be added to this table once defined via `/grill-me` or `/to-prd`. +> **Note:** The shared apply node (`shared/apply/`) calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md) — no separate sub-PRD is required for the apply node. --- @@ -147,7 +145,7 @@ flowchart TD S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] S5["pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot"] - S6["policy_model: PolicyModel or None"] + S6["rules: list[PolicyRule]"] S7["validation_errors: list of str"] S8["summary: str"] end @@ -194,7 +192,7 @@ All type definitions shared across agents: | `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` | | `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Domain context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` | | `pdp_snapshot` | `PDPSnapshot` | Scoped PDP data for this trigger | -| `policy_model` | `PolicyModel \| None` | Validated policy to commit; produced by policy-proposing sub-agents | +| `rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Policy rules to apply; produced by policy-proposing sub-agents, consumed by the shared apply node | | `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from validate node | | `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation | @@ -208,11 +206,9 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] ``` -#### `PolicyModel` +#### `rules: list[PolicyRule]` -Produced by `propose_policy` / `validate_policy` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the Policy Builder sub-agent. Committed to the PDP Policy Writer via `aiac.pdp.library.policy.apply_policy(PolicyModel)`. - -`PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (`agents: list[AgentPolicyModel]`). Full spec: [library-pdp.md](library-pdp.md). +Produced by `propose_*` / `validate_*` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the shared apply node via `compute_and_apply(rules)`. `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` are defined in `aiac.policy.model`. Full specs: [policy-model.md](policy-model.md) · [library-pdp-policy.md](library-pdp-policy.md). #### `ValidationVerdict` @@ -222,39 +218,39 @@ class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): reason: str ``` -Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. `PolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyRule` are defined in `aiac/pdp/library/models.py`. See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). +Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` are defined in `aiac.policy.model` — see [policy-model.md](policy-model.md). See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). --- ### `shared/apply/` -Policy Builder sub-agent — shared by all policy-producing sub-agents (Service Onboarding, Policy Update, Role Update). Called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a validated `PolicyModel` in state. Merges the delta into the whole-system `PolicyModel` and commits to the PDP Policy Writer. Full spec TBD. +Shared apply node — called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a non-empty `rules` list in state. Delegates all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination to the Policy Computation Engine (PCE). Full spec: [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). ``` -START → apply_policy → format_response → END +START → apply_rules → format_response → END ``` #### Graph ```mermaid flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_policy\naiac.pdp.library.policy\napply_policy(PolicyModel)"] + START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_rules\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] FORMAT --> END(("END")) ``` #### Nodes -- **`apply_policy`**: calls `apply_policy(model: PolicyModel)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. The PDP Policy Writer translates the `PolicyModel` into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. +- **`apply_rules`**: calls `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule])` from `aiac.policy.computation`. The PCE resolves owning services via the IdP Configuration Service, additively merges the rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, then pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer (which writes derived Rego packages to the `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR). PCE logs all exceptions and does not propagate them, so `apply_rules` always proceeds to `format_response`. - **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. #### State -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `policy_model` and `realm`; writes `summary`. +`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `rules` and `realm`; writes `summary`. -> **Orchestrator contract:** The calling orchestrator must gate on `policy_model is None` before invoking `PolicyBuilderGraph`. If the producing sub-graph's `validate_policy` failed (leaving `policy_model` unset), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyBuilderGraph`. +> **Orchestrator contract:** The calling orchestrator must gate on an empty `rules` list before invoking `SharedApplyGraph`. If the producing sub-graph's `validate_*` node produced no rules, the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `SharedApplyGraph`. -> **Future extension:** This sub-agent is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_policy` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `PolicyModel` before commit. Since `PolicyBuilderGraph` is shared, this gate applies uniformly to all use cases. +> **Future extension:** This apply node is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_rules` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `rules` list before commit. Since `SharedApplyGraph` is shared, this gate applies uniformly to all use cases. --- @@ -277,7 +273,7 @@ All `validate_*` nodes perform the same four checks. Binary abort on any failure flowchart TD IN["policy_model\n+ pdp_snapshot"] --> C1 - C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by PolicyModel\nstatements resolved via\naiac.idp.library.configuration.api"} + C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by rules\nstatements resolved via\naiac.idp.configuration.api"} C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nadded and removed empty"] C1 -->|"pass"| C2 @@ -294,7 +290,7 @@ flowchart TD C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] ``` -1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `PolicyModel` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api`. +1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `rules` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. 2. **Safety guard rails** — total statements in `PolicyModel` ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. 3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. 4. **Scope check** — `PolicyModel` is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. @@ -332,8 +328,9 @@ flowchart TD | Variable | Default | Source | |---|---|---| | `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | -| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.idp.library.configuration.api` | -| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.pdp.library.policy` | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.idp.configuration.api` (in-process via PCE) | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (in-process via PCE) | +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.policy.store.library` (in-process via PCE) | | `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | | `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | @@ -399,12 +396,12 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── build/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, format_response │ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ └── rebuild/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_policy, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, apply_diff, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_policy, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ ├── roles/ @@ -413,17 +410,17 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ └── role/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy, apply_policy, format_response +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy, format_response │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ └── shared/ ├── __init__.py ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge - ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, PolicyModel, ValidationVerdict + ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, ValidationVerdict (PolicyRule imported from aiac.policy.model) └── apply/ ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← PolicyBuilderGraph (shared by all policy-producing sub-agents) - └── nodes.py ← apply_policy, format_response + ├── graph.py ← SharedApplyGraph (shared by all policy-producing sub-agents) + └── nodes.py ← apply_rules, format_response ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/api.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/models.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile rename to aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt rename to aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/requirements.txt diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/configuration/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 From 70bd6b2476129ba9973d0cabc81c536ab47ad3c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 16:41:12 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 133/273] =?UTF-8?q?refactor:=20rename=20aiac.pdp.library.c?= =?UTF-8?q?onfiguration=20=E2=86=92=20aiac.idp.configuration;=20remove=20m?= =?UTF-8?q?appedScopes;=20add=20PCE=20query=20methods?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Issue 1.11: move library to aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/, update all non-frozen import sites - Issue 8.3: remove Role.mappedScopes, drop /scopes call in get_roles(), add get_services_by_role() and get_services_by_scope() - Issue 8.4: unit tests for new methods and mappedScopes removal (260 tests pass) - Fix show_keycloak_data.py: update imports and remove mappedScopes references Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py | 2 +- .../service/configuration => idp}/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 23 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 1 - aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/__init__.py | 0 .../idp/service/configuration/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 .../keycloak/keycloak_admin_methods.md | 113 +++++++ .../aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py | 2 +- aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py | 2 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 13 +- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 301 ++++++++++++------ aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 18 +- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 10 +- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 4 +- .../policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 2 +- aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py | 2 +- 21 files changed, 361 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-) rename aiac/src/aiac/{pdp/service/configuration => idp}/__init__.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/keycloak_admin_methods.md diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py index ce1ce419c..df4d4a017 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ProposedDiff, ValidationVerdict, ) -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy _MAX_CHANGES_DEFAULT = 50 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py index e945769bc..cafb0ed0b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject class Permission(BaseModel): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/idp/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index 134431a1a..9ea1a2b26 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") @@ -56,11 +56,6 @@ def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: ) self._check(composites_resp) role_data["childRoles"] = composites_resp.json() - scopes_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/roles/{raw['name']}/scopes", params=self._params() - ) - self._check(scopes_resp) - role_data["mappedScopes"] = scopes_resp.json() roles.append(Role.model_validate(role_data)) return roles @@ -106,6 +101,22 @@ def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: self._check(resp) return self._build_service(resp.json(), self._all_roles_map(), self._all_scopes_map()) + def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: + resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/services", + params={"role_id": role.id, "realm": self.realm}, + ) + self._check(resp) + return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + + def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: + resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/services", + params={"scope_id": scope.id, "realm": self.realm}, + ) + self._check(resp) + return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) self._check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index c3f2e4c0c..f5e6663e9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ class Role(BaseModel): description: str | None = None composite: bool childRoles: list["Role"] = [] - mappedScopes: list["Scope"] = [] class Service(BaseModel): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/keycloak_admin_methods.md b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/keycloak_admin_methods.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..206844bf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/keycloak_admin_methods.md @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +# KeycloakAdmin — Available Methods + +Source: `python-keycloak` library (`keycloak/keycloak_admin.py`) + +## Realm +- `get_realms`, `get_realm`, `create_realm`, `update_realm`, `delete_realm` +- `import_realm`, `partial_import_realm`, `export_realm` +- `get_current_realm`, `change_current_realm` +- `get_realm_users_profile`, `update_realm_users_profile` +- `get_server_info` + +## Users +- `get_users`, `create_user`, `get_user`, `get_user_id`, `update_user`, `delete_user` +- `users_count` +- `disable_user`, `enable_user`, `disable_all_users`, `enable_all_users` +- `set_user_password` +- `get_credentials`, `delete_credential` +- `user_logout`, `user_consents`, `revoke_consent` +- `get_user_groups` +- `get_user_social_logins`, `add_user_social_login`, `delete_user_social_login` +- `send_update_account`, `send_verify_email` +- `get_sessions` +- `sync_users` +- `get_bruteforce_detection_status`, `clear_bruteforce_attempts_for_user`, `clear_all_bruteforce_attempts` + +## Realm Roles +- `get_realm_roles`, `get_realm_role`, `get_realm_role_by_id`, `get_realm_role_groups`, `get_realm_role_members` +- `create_realm_role`, `update_realm_role`, `delete_realm_role` +- `get_default_realm_role_id`, `get_realm_default_roles`, `add_realm_default_roles`, `remove_realm_default_roles` +- `add_composite_realm_roles_to_role`, `remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role`, `get_composite_realm_roles_of_role` +- `get_role_by_id`, `update_role_by_id`, `delete_role_by_id`, `get_role_composites_by_id` +- `assign_realm_roles`, `delete_realm_roles_of_user`, `get_realm_roles_of_user` +- `get_available_realm_roles_of_user`, `get_composite_realm_roles_of_user` +- `assign_group_realm_roles`, `delete_group_realm_roles`, `get_group_realm_roles` + +## Clients +- `get_clients`, `get_client`, `get_client_id`, `create_client`, `update_client`, `delete_client` +- `get_client_installation_provider` +- `create_initial_access_token` +- `generate_client_secrets`, `get_client_secrets` +- `get_client_service_account_user` +- `get_client_all_sessions`, `get_client_sessions_stats` +- `get_client_management_permissions`, `update_client_management_permissions` +- `get_mappers_from_client`, `add_mapper_to_client`, `update_client_mapper`, `remove_client_mapper` + +## Client Roles +- `get_client_roles`, `get_client_role`, `get_client_role_id` +- `create_client_role`, `update_client_role`, `delete_client_role` +- `add_composite_client_roles_to_role`, `remove_composite_client_roles_from_role` +- `get_composite_client_roles_of_role`, `get_composite_client_roles_of_group` +- `assign_client_role`, `get_client_role_members`, `get_client_role_groups` +- `get_client_roles_of_user`, `get_available_client_roles_of_user`, `get_composite_client_roles_of_user`, `delete_client_roles_of_user` +- `assign_group_client_roles`, `get_group_client_roles`, `delete_group_client_roles` +- `get_all_roles_of_user` +- `get_role_client_level_children` + +## Client Scopes +- `get_client_scopes`, `get_client_scope`, `get_client_scope_by_name` +- `create_client_scope`, `update_client_scope`, `delete_client_scope` +- `get_mappers_from_client_scope`, `add_mapper_to_client_scope`, `delete_mapper_from_client_scope`, `update_mapper_in_client_scope` +- `get_all_roles_of_client_scope` +- `get_client_default_client_scopes`, `add_client_default_client_scope`, `delete_client_default_client_scope` +- `get_client_optional_client_scopes`, `add_client_optional_client_scope`, `delete_client_optional_client_scope` +- `get_default_default_client_scopes`, `add_default_default_client_scope`, `delete_default_default_client_scope` +- `get_default_optional_client_scopes`, `add_default_optional_client_scope`, `delete_default_optional_client_scope` +- `assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope`, `delete_realm_roles_of_client_scope`, `get_realm_roles_of_client_scope` +- `assign_client_roles_to_client_scope`, `delete_client_roles_of_client_scope`, `get_client_roles_of_client_scope` +- `add_client_specific_roles_to_client_scope`, `remove_client_specific_roles_of_client_scope`, `get_client_specific_roles_of_client_scope` + +## Client Authorization +- `get_client_authz_settings`, `import_client_authz_config` +- `get_client_authz_resources`, `get_client_authz_resource`, `create_client_authz_resource`, `update_client_authz_resource`, `delete_client_authz_resource` +- `get_client_authz_scopes`, `create_client_authz_scopes` +- `get_client_authz_permissions`, `get_client_authz_policy_resources`, `get_client_authz_policy_scopes` +- `get_client_authz_policies`, `get_client_authz_policy`, `delete_client_authz_policy`, `get_client_authz_permission_associated_policies` +- `create_client_authz_role_based_policy`, `create_client_authz_policy`, `create_client_authz_resource_based_permission` +- `get_client_authz_scope_permission`, `create_client_authz_scope_permission`, `update_client_authz_scope_permission`, `update_client_authz_resource_permission` +- `get_client_authz_client_policies`, `create_client_authz_client_policy` +- `get_client_certificate_key_info`, `upload_certificate` + +## Groups +- `get_groups`, `get_group`, `get_subgroups`, `get_group_children`, `get_group_by_path` +- `create_group`, `update_group`, `delete_group` +- `groups_count` +- `get_group_members` +- `group_set_permissions`, `group_user_add`, `group_user_remove` +- `get_composite_client_roles_of_group` + +## Identity Providers +- `get_idps`, `get_idp`, `create_idp`, `update_idp`, `delete_idp` +- `add_mapper_to_idp`, `update_mapper_in_idp`, `get_idp_mappers` + +## Authentication Flows +- `get_authentication_flows`, `get_authentication_flow_for_id`, `create_authentication_flow`, `update_authentication_flow`, `copy_authentication_flow`, `delete_authentication_flow` +- `get_authentication_flow_executions`, `update_authentication_flow_executions`, `get_authentication_flow_execution`, `create_authentication_flow_execution`, `delete_authentication_flow_execution` +- `change_execution_priority` +- `create_authentication_flow_subflow` +- `get_authenticator_providers`, `get_authenticator_provider_config_description`, `get_authenticator_config`, `create_execution_config`, `update_authenticator_config`, `delete_authenticator_config` +- `get_required_actions`, `get_required_action_by_alias`, `update_required_action` + +## Organizations +- `get_organizations`, `get_organization`, `create_organization`, `update_organization`, `delete_organization` +- `get_organization_idps`, `organization_idp_add`, `organization_idp_remove` +- `get_organization_members`, `get_organization_members_count`, `organization_user_add`, `organization_user_remove` +- `get_user_organizations` + +## Components & Events +- `get_components`, `create_component`, `get_component`, `update_component`, `delete_component` +- `get_keys` +- `get_admin_events`, `get_events`, `set_events` + +## Cache +- `clear_keys_cache`, `clear_realm_cache`, `clear_user_cache` diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index ed2865b15..c66d2109a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import yaml from dotenv import load_dotenv -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py index c07cdb9d3..3f4e03090 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ def save_policy_rego( file_dir: Directory to save Rego files realm: Keycloak realm name (used to fetch user-to-roles mapping) """ - from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration + from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration dir_path = Path(file_dir) dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py index bdffba2cf..e8df08150 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope class Rule(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py index 3be193dd6..aa3b28c0c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ TriggerContext, ValidationVerdict, ) -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service REALM = "kagenti" ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index 6340011c6..5285203c1 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent / "src")) -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject REALM = "kagenti" @@ -28,9 +28,6 @@ def _fmt_roles(roles: list[Role], indent: int = 4) -> str: if r.childRoles: for cr in r.childRoles: lines.append(f"{pad} child: {cr.name} (id={cr.id})") - if r.mappedScopes: - for ms in r.mappedScopes: - lines.append(f"{pad} scope: {ms.name} (id={ms.id})") return "\n".join(lines) @@ -77,12 +74,6 @@ def main() -> None: print(f" {cr.name} (id={cr.id})") else: print(" childRoles : —") - if r.mappedScopes: - print(" mappedScopes:") - for ms in r.mappedScopes: - print(f" {ms.name} (id={ms.id}) desc={ms.description or '—'}") - else: - print(" mappedScopes: —") print(f"Total: {len(roles)} role(s)\n") # --- Services (clients) --- diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index cfc78f7af..4b72af3dd 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.configuration.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac.idp.configuration.""" import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" @@ -48,14 +48,14 @@ def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): class TestGetSubjects: - # Call order: GET /subjects, GET /roles (+ per-role /scopes), GET /subjects/{id}/assignments — per subject. + # Call order: GET /subjects, GET /roles (+ per-composite /composites), GET /subjects/{id}/assignments — per subject. def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] assignments = {"realmMappings": [], "serviceMappings": {}} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(assignments)], ) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() @@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ def test_roles_populated_from_keycloak_assignments(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] assignments = {"realmMappings": [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}], "serviceMappings": {}} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok(role_scopes), _ok(assignments)], + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok(assignments)], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert len(result[0].roles) == 1 @@ -86,8 +85,8 @@ def test_unassigned_roles_not_included(self, monkeypatch): ] assignments = {"realmMappings": [{"id": "r1"}], "serviceMappings": {}} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok(assignments)], + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok(assignments)], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert len(result[0].roles) == 1 @@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ def test_unassigned_roles_not_included(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() @@ -103,7 +102,7 @@ def test_raises_when_assignments_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _err(502)], ): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): @@ -114,7 +113,7 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_all_calls(self, monkeypatch): payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] assignments = {"realmMappings": [], "serviceMappings": {}} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(assignments)], ) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() @@ -131,8 +130,8 @@ class TestGetRoles: def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([])]) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() assert isinstance(result[0], Role) assert result[0].name == "admin" @@ -140,61 +139,63 @@ def test_returns_list_of_role(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() - def test_non_composite_role_populates_mapped_scopes(self, monkeypatch): + def test_non_composite_role_has_no_mappedScopes(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(scopes)]): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(roles)): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() - assert result[0].mappedScopes[0].name == "read:data" + assert not hasattr(result[0], "mappedScopes") assert result[0].childRoles == [] - def test_non_composite_role_skips_composites_call(self, monkeypatch): + def test_non_composite_role_skips_composites_and_scopes_calls(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok([])]) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + return_value=_ok(roles)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() urls = [c[0][0] for c in m.call_args_list] assert all("/composites" not in u for u in urls) + assert all("/scopes" not in u for u in urls) + + def test_get_roles_never_calls_scopes_endpoint(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + roles = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}, + {"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}, + ] + child_roles = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles)]) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + urls = [c[0][0] for c in m.call_args_list] + assert all("/scopes" not in u for u in urls) def test_composite_role_populates_child_roles(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}] child_roles = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "profile"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles), _ok(scopes)]): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles)]): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() assert result[0].childRoles[0].name == "viewer" - def test_composite_role_populates_mapped_scopes(self, monkeypatch): + def test_composite_role_has_no_mappedScopes(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}] child_roles = [{"id": "r2", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "profile"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles), _ok(scopes)]): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(roles), _ok(child_roles)]): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() - assert result[0].mappedScopes[0].name == "profile" - - def test_raises_if_scopes_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(roles), _err(502)]): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert not hasattr(result[0], "mappedScopes") def test_raises_if_composites_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": True}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(roles), _err(502)]): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() @@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([])], ) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() @@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ def test_serviceId_populated_from_clientId(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "mlflow", "enabled": True}] with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([])], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() @@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ def test_scope_descriptions_populated_from_get_scopes(self, monkeypatch): all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] service_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok([]), _ok(all_scopes), _ok([]), _ok(service_scopes)], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() @@ -250,19 +251,17 @@ def test_role_details_populated_from_get_roles(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] service_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer"}] with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", - side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok(role_scopes), _ok([]), _ok(service_roles), _ok([])], + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[_ok(payload), _ok(all_roles), _ok([]), _ok(service_roles), _ok([])], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert result[0].roles[0].name == "viewer" - assert result[0].roles[0].mappedScopes[0].description == "Read access" def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() @@ -281,16 +280,14 @@ def test_returns_single_enriched_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} all_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}] - role_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"}] service_roles = [{"id": "r1"}] service_scopes = [{"id": "s1"}] with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 - _ok(all_roles), # GET /roles - _ok(role_scopes), # GET /roles/viewer/scopes + _ok(all_roles), # GET /roles (no /scopes per role) _ok(all_scopes), # GET /scopes _ok(service_roles), # GET /services/svc-001/roles _ok(service_scopes), # GET /services/svc-001/scopes @@ -306,7 +303,7 @@ def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-agent", "description": "An Agent service", "enabled": True} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 _ok([]), # GET /roles @@ -320,7 +317,7 @@ def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_when_primary_fetch_returns_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(404)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(404)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) @@ -328,7 +325,7 @@ def test_raises_when_service_roles_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 _ok([]), # GET /roles @@ -343,7 +340,7 @@ def test_raises_when_service_scopes_call_fails(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 _ok([]), # GET /roles @@ -359,7 +356,7 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_every_request(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} with patch( - "aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ _ok(raw), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), _ok([]), ], @@ -380,21 +377,21 @@ class TestSetServiceType: def test_issues_patch_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services/{self.SERVICE_ID}" def test_json_body_uses_type_key(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"type": "Agent"} def test_returns_service_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") assert isinstance(result, Service) assert result.type == "Tool" @@ -402,13 +399,13 @@ def test_returns_service_instance(self, monkeypatch): def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") @@ -422,7 +419,7 @@ class TestGetScopes: def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}] - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() assert isinstance(result[0], Scope) assert result[0].name == "email" @@ -430,7 +427,7 @@ def test_returns_list_of_scope(self, monkeypatch): def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() @@ -444,7 +441,7 @@ class TestCreateScope: def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( scope_name="read:data", scope_description="Read access" ) @@ -455,7 +452,7 @@ def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "write"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("write", "Write access") url = m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/scopes" @@ -463,7 +460,7 @@ def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "desc") params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) assert params == {"realm": REALM} @@ -471,20 +468,20 @@ def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read"} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "Read access") body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) assert body == {"name": "read", "description": "Read access"} def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("read", "desc") def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope("dupe", "desc") @@ -510,8 +507,8 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}]} post_resp = _ok({}, 201) get_resp = _ok(updated) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=get_resp) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ + patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=get_resp) as get_m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) assert isinstance(result, Service) assert result.id == "svc-uuid" @@ -522,8 +519,8 @@ def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) url = post_m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id" @@ -532,7 +529,7 @@ def test_raises_on_post_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) @@ -541,8 +538,8 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_scope_to_service(service, scope) assert post_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} assert get_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} @@ -557,7 +554,7 @@ class TestCreateRole: def test_returns_role_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "description": "Read-only", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") assert isinstance(result, Role) assert result.name == "reader" @@ -566,7 +563,7 @@ def test_returns_role_instance(self, monkeypatch): def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") url = m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/roles" @@ -574,26 +571,26 @@ def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} def test_json_body_contains_name_and_description(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"name": "reader", "description": "Read-only"} def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "desc") def test_raises_on_409_conflict(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("dupe", "desc") @@ -617,8 +614,8 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)), \ + patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) assert isinstance(result, Service) get_m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid", params={"realm": REALM}) @@ -628,8 +625,8 @@ def test_issues_post_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) url = post_m.call_args[0][0] assert url == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id" @@ -638,7 +635,7 @@ def test_raises_on_post_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(409)): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) @@ -647,8 +644,8 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_both_calls(self, monkeypatch): service = self._make_service() role = self._make_role() updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ - patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok({}, 201)) as post_m, \ + patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(updated)) as get_m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).map_role_to_service(service, role) assert post_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} assert get_m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} @@ -666,21 +663,21 @@ class TestRealmParameter: ]) def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, method, endpoint, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: getattr(Configuration.for_realm(REALM), method)() m.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE}/{endpoint}", params={"realm": REALM}) def test_get_subjects_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): from unittest.mock import call monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert call(f"{BASE}/subjects", params={"realm": REALM}) in m.call_args_list def test_get_services_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): from unittest.mock import call monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() assert call(f"{BASE}/services", params={"realm": REALM}) in m.call_args_list @@ -692,6 +689,120 @@ def test_get_services_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", raising=False) - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects() assert m.call_args[0][0].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:7071") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_services_by_role +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetServicesByRole: + def _make_role(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "role-uuid", "name": "viewer", "composite": False} + return Role.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) + assert isinstance(result[0], Service) + assert result[0].id == "svc1" + + def test_issues_get_with_role_id_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role(id="my-role-id") + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services" + assert m.call_args[1]["params"] == {"role_id": "my-role-id", "realm": REALM} + + def test_returns_empty_list_for_realm_level_role(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) + assert result == [] + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(500)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) + + def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) + assert m.call_args[1]["params"]["realm"] == REALM + + def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) + assert m.call_count == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_services_by_scope +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetServicesByScope: + def _make_scope(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "scope-uuid", "name": "read:data"} + return Scope.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + scope = self._make_scope() + payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + assert isinstance(result[0], Service) + assert result[0].id == "svc1" + + def test_issues_get_with_scope_id_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + scope = self._make_scope(id="my-scope-id") + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services" + assert m.call_args[1]["params"] == {"scope_id": "my-scope-id", "realm": REALM} + + def test_returns_empty_list_when_no_service_exposes_scope(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + scope = self._make_scope() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + assert result == [] + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + scope = self._make_scope() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(500)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + + def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + scope = self._make_scope() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + assert m.call_args[1]["params"]["realm"] == REALM + + def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + scope = self._make_scope() + payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + assert m.call_count == 1 diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index 32a374c39..d8e1798b5 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope class TestSubject: @@ -84,7 +84,11 @@ def test_child_roles_default_empty(self): r = Role.model_validate({"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}) assert r.childRoles == [] - def test_mapped_scopes_populated(self): + def test_mappedScopes_field_does_not_exist(self): + r = Role.model_validate({"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}) + assert not hasattr(r, "mappedScopes") + + def test_mappedScopes_payload_ignored_silently(self): r = Role.model_validate( { "id": "r1", @@ -93,12 +97,7 @@ def test_mapped_scopes_populated(self): "mappedScopes": [{"id": "s1", "name": "email"}], } ) - assert len(r.mappedScopes) == 1 - assert r.mappedScopes[0].name == "email" - - def test_mapped_scopes_default_empty(self): - r = Role.model_validate({"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "composite": False}) - assert r.mappedScopes == [] + assert not hasattr(r, "mappedScopes") def test_no_clientRole_field(self): r = Role.model_validate( @@ -379,8 +378,7 @@ def test_role_keycloak_composite_with_child_and_scope(self): assert r.childRoles[0].id == "r-dev-uuid" assert r.childRoles[0].name == "developer" assert r.childRoles[0].composite is False - assert len(r.mappedScopes) == 1 - assert r.mappedScopes[0].name == "read" + assert not hasattr(r, "mappedScopes") def test_service_keycloak_system_client_account(self): """Keycloak system 'account' client: placeholder name resolved, no kagenti type.""" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index e2117c661..db4d7c574 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError -from aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import app, get_admin, _cache +from aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import app, get_admin, _cache REALM = "kagenti" @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ def test_realm_param_creates_admin_with_admin_realm(self): "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + patch("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: with TestClient(app) as client: resp = client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ def test_second_request_same_realm_hits_cache(self): "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: + patch("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock) as mock_cls: with TestClient(app) as client: client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ def teardown_method(self): _HEALTH_ENV = {"KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM": "master"} -_HEALTH_TARGET = "aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main._get_or_create_admin" +_HEALTH_TARGET = "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main._get_or_create_admin" class TestHealth: @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ def test_realm_override_uses_per_realm_admin(self): "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin", } with patch.dict(os.environ, env), \ - patch("aiac.pdp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock): + patch("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakAdmin", return_value=admin_mock): with TestClient(app) as client: resp = client.post("/scopes?realm=other", json={"name": "x", "description": ""}) assert resp.status_code == 201 diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 62ab0b3fd..8cfa41f7d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file, monkeypatch): from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration as FileConfiguration os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - monkeypatch.setattr("aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api.Configuration", FileConfiguration) + monkeypatch.setattr("aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration", FileConfiguration) policy = _make_policy([ _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py index 25ddf72f9..6ee40d46c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState from base_mapper import ( diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py index a78001ef7..b23c9ffa3 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleState from base_mapper import ( BaseMappingState, From bf745b49c70c31dede717386de060adf05ba4311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 17:46:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 134/273] docs: sync ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY diagram and component table with PRD MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Add RAG Ingest → ChromaDB arrowhead in PRD.md high-level diagram - Replace arch diagram in ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY with PRD version (Policy Store Pod, Policy Compute Engn box, RAG Ingest ──► ChromaDB) - Update component table: 7 → 8 entries; Policy Management Service → Policy Store (#3); add Policy Computation Engine (#4); update library module paths and descriptions throughout Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 62 ++++++++----------- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 34 +++++----- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 73ccd02e9..a9255fb48 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -89,17 +89,18 @@ Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during ## AIAC Component Architecture -Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12: +Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. | # | Component | Description | |---|-----------|-------------| -| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration`. | -| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy`. | -| 3 | **Policy Management Service** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite (`/data` PVC) as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the AIAC Agent to read and diff `AgentPolicyModel` state without re-deriving it from the PDP snapshot. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-pdp-state`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.library.state`. | -| 4 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | -| 5 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | -| 6 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | -| 7 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to the three policy services via `configuration`, `policy`, and `state` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.policy.library`. | +| 3 | **Policy Store** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Computation Engine to read current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.policy.store.library`. | +| 4 | **Policy Computation Engine** | Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No service, no Kubernetes deployment. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from AIAC Agent sub-agents, queries IdP to resolve owning services, additively merges rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, and pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer. Single entry point: `compute_and_apply(rules)`. | +| 5 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 6 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 8 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to IdP and policy services via `aiac.idp.configuration`, `aiac.policy.model`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and `aiac.policy.computation` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) @@ -119,10 +120,10 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ │ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ - │ │ Policy Management Pod │ + │ │ Policy Store Pod │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ - │ │ │ Policy Management Service │ │ + │ │ │ Policy Store Service │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ (SQLite policy.db) │ │ │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ @@ -130,22 +131,22 @@ Seven components across five Kubernetes pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent │◄────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ -│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ │ -└──────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ - │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ -│ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) -│ ▼ │ -│ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ -│ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ -└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +│ Agent Pod └───────────────────┐ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ Policy Compute Engn │◄──│ AIAC Agent │◄─────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └──────────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ + │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) +┌─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ │ +│ Policy / Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ RAG Ingest Service │──►│ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ +│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via @@ -267,12 +268,3 @@ Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a de ``` --- - -## Short-Term Objectives - -| # | Objective | Detail | -|---|-----------|--------| -| 1 | **Kagenti integration (UC-1 implementation)** | Plug AIAC into Kagenti and define its lifecycle | -| 2 | **Improve AIAC decision reasoning** | Take into account richer context: User Role description, Agent card, Tool description, Policy digest | -| 3 | **Rego / OPA integration (initially with Keycloak)** | OPA as the PDP; outcome: Rego access rules | -| 4 | **GitHub demo reimplementation with Rego / OPA** | End-to-end demo using OPA as the Policy Decision Point | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 666c561df..610b0621d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im | 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | | 8 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to IdP and policy services via `aiac.idp.configuration`, `aiac.policy.model`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and `aiac.policy.computation` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | +### High-level architecture + ``` (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) ▲ ▲ @@ -146,22 +148,22 @@ Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ │ │ ┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ -│ Agent Pod │ ┌───────────────────┘ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ -│ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ AIAC Agent │◄────────────────────────────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ -│ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ -│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ -│ │ │ │ │ │ │ -└──────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ - │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) -┌──────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ -│ Policy and │ Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) -│ ▼ │ -│ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ RAG Ingest Service │ │ -│ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ -└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +│ Agent Pod └───────────────────┐ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ Policy Compute Engn │◄──│ AIAC Agent │◄─────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └──────────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ + │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) +┌─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ │ +│ Policy / Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ RAG Ingest Service │──►│ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ +│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via From 70571718573d2cde033950f69ba2da20fb4407cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 19:29:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 135/273] docs(aiac-agent): replace shared apply node with Policy Rules Builder + PCE direct call - Sub-agents now emit tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]] instead of list[PolicyRule] - New shared Policy Rules Builder (agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/) converts tuple to list[PolicyRule]; Controller calls PCE directly with the rules - Remove shared apply node (agent/shared/apply/) - Remove UC2/UC3 Orchestrators; Controller dispatches directly to Build/Rebuild/Role sub-agents - UC1 Orchestrator retained for two-step Service Provision pipeline - Update top-level Mermaid diagram accordingly Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 30 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index d10842f29..7bbc98a3a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role sub-agent | -Each producing sub-agent emits a `list[PolicyRule]` (inbound + outbound rules) scoped to the trigger. A **shared apply node** (`agent/shared/apply/`) calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`; the PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Sub-agents never call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. +Each producing sub-agent emits a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller passes this tuple to a **shared Policy Rules Builder sub-agent** (`agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`), which uses the natural-language policy to emit a `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` directly — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -39,35 +39,33 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] - SA2["Policy"] ORC1 --> SA1 - ORC1 --> SA2 end subgraph PU["Policy Update"] - ORC2["Orchestrator"] SA4["Build"] SA5["Rebuild"] - ORC2 --> SA4 - ORC2 --> SA5 end subgraph RR["Role Update"] - ORC3["Orchestrator"] SA6["Role"] - ORC3 --> SA6 end - APPLY["Apply (shared)\nagent/shared/apply/\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/shared/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] - ORC1 -->|"rules"| APPLY - ORC2 -->|"rules"| APPLY - ORC3 -->|"rules"| APPLY - - TRIGGERS --> CTRL - CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 - CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 + CTRL -->|"build"| SA4 + CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA5 + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA6 + + ORC1 -->|"tuple"| PRB + SA4 -->|"tuple"| PRB + SA5 -->|"tuple"| PRB + SA6 -->|"tuple"| PRB + + PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"rules"| PCE ``` --- From 050646a761ea66d152412bf07d68462234f25f4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 21:16:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 136/273] docs(aiac-agent): align PRD with Policy Rules Builder architecture MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Remove shared/apply/ section and all stale orchestrator framing. Add policy_rules_builder/ TBD stub with Validate Node checks moved into it. Update dispatch table, Controller responsibilities, Shared Module diagram and BaseAgentState, File Structure tree, and Endpoints table to reflect the new flow: sub-agent → tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]] → PRB → list[PolicyRule] → Controller → compute_and_apply(rules) (PCE) Only UC1 (Service Onboarding) retains an Orchestrator; UC2/UC3 are dispatched directly by the Controller. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 126 +++++++----------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 7bbc98a3a..32c03cf06 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ The Agent subscribes to the Event Broker as a durable competing consumer (`aiac- The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NATS consumer is a thin adapter layer** that receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions — there is no duplicated business logic. -The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents: +The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to the **Service Onboarding Orchestrator** (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update and Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). Each sub-agent emits a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller passes this tuple to the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`), which emits a `list[PolicyRule]`, and then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` directly via the PCE. -| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | -|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `service/{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | -| Policy Update | `build`, `rebuild` | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | -| Role Update | `role/{id}` | Role sub-agent | +| Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | +|---|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (new service roles + scopes) | +| Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (all roles + scopes) | +| Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (specific role + all scopes) | Each producing sub-agent emits a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller passes this tuple to a **shared Policy Rules Builder sub-agent** (`agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`), which uses the natural-language policy to emit a `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` directly — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. @@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespa | Subject pattern | Internal handler | |---|---| -| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role Update Orchestrator | -| `aiac.apply.policy.build` | Policy Update Orchestrator (Build) | +| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) | +| `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role Update sub-agent (UC3, via Controller) | +| `aiac.apply.policy.build` | Policy Update Build sub-agent (UC2, via Controller) | ### Ack contract @@ -102,19 +102,22 @@ The consumer and the FastAPI HTTP server share the same process. If the Agent po ## Controller -The Controller is a thin FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its sole responsibilities are: +The Controller is a FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its responsibilities are: - Parse the trigger type and entity ID from the request path. -- Dispatch to the appropriate orchestrator. -- Return the orchestrator's response to the caller. +- Dispatch to the Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update / Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). +- Receive the `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` returned by the Orchestrator or sub-agent. +- Pass the tuple to the **shared Policy Rules Builder** and receive `list[PolicyRule]`. +- Call `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). +- Return the final response to the caller. -No business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. +No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. The Policy Rules Builder and PCE calls are shared steps driven uniformly by the Controller across all use cases. --- ## Use Cases -Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: +Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | |---|---|---| @@ -122,7 +125,7 @@ Each orchestrator and its sub-agents are specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | -> **Note:** The shared apply node (`shared/apply/`) calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md) — no separate sub-PRD is required for the apply node. +> **Note:** After the Orchestrator or sub-agent returns a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]`, the Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in the [Shared Module](#shared-module) section of this document. --- @@ -132,19 +135,17 @@ Lives at `aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/`. ```mermaid flowchart TD - subgraph SHARED["shared - used by all policy-applying sub-agents"] + subgraph SHARED["shared/nodes.py — used by all sub-agents and the Policy Rules Builder"] FP["fetch_policy\nQuery: aiac-policies collection\nReturns: policy_chunks\nFails: 503 after UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES"] FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nQuery: aiac-domain-knowledge collection\nReturns: domain_knowledge_chunks\nFails: non-fatal"] end - subgraph STATE["BaseAgentState"] + subgraph STATE["BaseAgentState (sub-agent fields)"] S1["trigger: TriggerContext"] S2["realm: str"] S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] S5["pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot"] - S6["rules: list[PolicyRule]"] - S7["validation_errors: list of str"] S8["summary: str"] end @@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ flowchart TD ### `shared/nodes.py` -Two node functions shared by all policy-applying sub-agents: +Two node functions used by all sub-agents and the Policy Rules Builder: - `fetch_policy`: queries `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `BaseAgentState.policy_chunks`. Returns `503` when ChromaDB is unavailable after `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` retries. - `fetch_domain_knowledge`: queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `BaseAgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when collection is empty — non-fatal. @@ -190,10 +191,10 @@ All type definitions shared across agents: | `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` | | `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Domain context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` | | `pdp_snapshot` | `PDPSnapshot` | Scoped PDP data for this trigger | -| `rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Policy rules to apply; produced by policy-proposing sub-agents, consumed by the shared apply node | -| `validation_errors` | `list[str]` | Errors from validate node | | `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation | +> **Note:** `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and `validation_errors: list[str]` are produced and consumed within the Policy Rules Builder. Whether they remain in `BaseAgentState` or move to a dedicated PRB state is pending the PRB design grill. + #### `PDPSnapshot` ```python @@ -204,10 +205,6 @@ class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] ``` -#### `rules: list[PolicyRule]` - -Produced by `propose_*` / `validate_*` nodes in all policy-proposing sub-agents; consumed by the shared apply node via `compute_and_apply(rules)`. `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` are defined in `aiac.policy.model`. Full specs: [policy-model.md](policy-model.md) · [library-pdp-policy.md](library-pdp-policy.md). - #### `ValidationVerdict` ```python @@ -220,52 +217,17 @@ Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `S --- -### `shared/apply/` - -Shared apply node — called by each orchestrator after the producing sub-graph completes with a non-empty `rules` list in state. Delegates all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination to the Policy Computation Engine (PCE). Full spec: [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). - -``` -START → apply_rules → format_response → END -``` - -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> APPLY["apply_rules\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] - APPLY --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) -``` - -#### Nodes - -- **`apply_rules`**: calls `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule])` from `aiac.policy.computation`. The PCE resolves owning services via the IdP Configuration Service, additively merges the rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, then pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer (which writes derived Rego packages to the `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR). PCE logs all exceptions and does not propagate them, so `apply_rules` always proceeds to `format_response`. -- **`format_response`**: assembles the commit result for the orchestrator. - -#### State - -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Reads `rules` and `realm`; writes `summary`. - -> **Orchestrator contract:** The calling orchestrator must gate on an empty `rules` list before invoking `SharedApplyGraph`. If the producing sub-graph's `validate_*` node produced no rules, the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `SharedApplyGraph`. - -> **Future extension:** This apply node is the natural insertion point for a human-in-the-loop review gate. A LangGraph `interrupt()` between `apply_rules` and `format_response` would pause execution pending human approval of the `rules` list before commit. Since `SharedApplyGraph` is shared, this gate applies uniformly to all use cases. - ---- - -## LLM Integration +### `policy_rules_builder/` (shared) -All `propose_*` and `validate_*` nodes use `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`) via `llm.with_structured_output()`. Target endpoint must support tool calling. +The **Policy Rules Builder** receives `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` from the producing sub-agent (or UC1 Orchestrator) and the natural-language policy, and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. -Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants in its `prompts.py`: +> **Detailed design TBD — pending dedicated grill.** Open questions: Is the Policy Rules Builder a LangGraph `StateGraph` or a simpler callable? Does it use a single LLM call or a `propose_*` + `validate_*` node pattern? What context does it receive beyond the tuple — policy chunks, domain knowledge chunks, PDP snapshot? Does it need a `realm` parameter? Does it read current Policy Store state to avoid duplicates, or does the PCE handle dedup? -- **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped PDP snapshot summary. -- **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. - ---- +#### Validate Node — Common Checks (pending PRB grill) -## Validate Node — Common Checks (All Agents) +> **Note:** The exact placement of validation (inside the Policy Rules Builder vs. a separate Controller step) is pending the PRB design grill. The four checks below are confirmed requirements. -All `validate_*` nodes perform the same four checks. Binary abort on any failure: +The validation step performs four checks. Binary abort on any failure: ```mermaid flowchart TD @@ -285,7 +247,7 @@ flowchart TD C4{"4. Scope check\nDiff bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C4 -->|"pass"| APPLY["proceed to apply_*"] + C4 -->|"pass"| EMIT["emit list[PolicyRule] to Controller"] ``` 1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `rules` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. @@ -295,6 +257,19 @@ flowchart TD --- +## LLM Integration + +All `propose_*` and `validate_*` nodes use `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`) via `llm.with_structured_output()`. Target endpoint must support tool calling. + +Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants in its `prompts.py`: + +- **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped PDP snapshot summary. +- **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. + +The Policy Rules Builder's LLM usage pattern (prompts and node structure) is TBD — pending the PRB design grill. + +--- + ## Endpoints | Method | Path | Orchestrator | Sub-agent | @@ -302,7 +277,7 @@ flowchart TD | POST | `/apply/policy/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | | POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | -| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy → Apply | +| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | **Success response (Service Onboarding):** ```json @@ -376,7 +351,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── onboarding/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy → apply, assembles combined response +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy; returns tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]] to Controller │ ├── provision/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph @@ -390,7 +365,6 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── policy_update/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to build or rebuild sub-agent │ ├── build/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph @@ -404,7 +378,6 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── roles/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to role sub-agent │ └── role/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph @@ -414,11 +387,12 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ └── shared/ ├── __init__.py ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge - ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, ValidationVerdict (PolicyRule imported from aiac.policy.model) - └── apply/ + ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, ValidationVerdict (PolicyRule imported from aiac.policy.model; exact rules/tuple field placement pending PRB grill) + └── policy_rules_builder/ ← TBD — design pending dedicated grill ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← SharedApplyGraph (shared by all policy-producing sub-agents) - └── nodes.py ← apply_rules, format_response + ├── graph.py ← PolicyRulesBuilderGraph (TBD) + ├── nodes.py ← TBD + └── prompts.py ← TBD ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): From 3de182a22d17a0ac7030a17bfaa43846b604b1e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 22:05:27 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 137/273] docs(aiac-agent): remove stale shared module and LLM integration; extract PRB to sub-PRD MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Remove Shared Module section: BaseAgentState, PDPSnapshot, ValidationVerdict, shared/nodes.py spec — all stale or incorrect - Remove LLM Integration section - Extract Policy Rules Builder full spec to aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md (nodes, PRBState, ValidationVerdict, Validate Node diagram, LLM integration stub) - File tree: remove onboarding/policy/ subtree; rename propose_diff/validate_* nodes to propose_roles_scopes; drop AUDITOR_SYSTEM from sub-agent prompts.py - Simplify shared/ to TBD stub pending PRB grill Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 176 ++---------------- .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 93 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 32c03cf06..6486cbf51 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (new service roles + scopes) | +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (new service roles + scopes) | | Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (all roles + scopes) | | Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (specific role + all scopes) | @@ -125,148 +125,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | -> **Note:** After the Orchestrator or sub-agent returns a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]`, the Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in the [Shared Module](#shared-module) section of this document. - ---- - -## Shared Module - -Lives at `aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/`. - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - subgraph SHARED["shared/nodes.py — used by all sub-agents and the Policy Rules Builder"] - FP["fetch_policy\nQuery: aiac-policies collection\nReturns: policy_chunks\nFails: 503 after UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES"] - FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nQuery: aiac-domain-knowledge collection\nReturns: domain_knowledge_chunks\nFails: non-fatal"] - end - - subgraph STATE["BaseAgentState (sub-agent fields)"] - S1["trigger: TriggerContext"] - S2["realm: str"] - S3["policy_chunks: list of str"] - S4["domain_knowledge_chunks: list of str"] - S5["pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot"] - S8["summary: str"] - end - - subgraph QUERY_KEYS["ChromaDB query strings by trigger"] - Q1["build / rebuild -> all access control rules"] - Q2["role/:id -> role assignment rules"] - Q3["service/:id -> service access control rules"] - end - - FP & FDK --> STATE - QUERY_KEYS --> FP - QUERY_KEYS --> FDK -``` - -### `shared/nodes.py` - -Two node functions used by all sub-agents and the Policy Rules Builder: - -- `fetch_policy`: queries `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `BaseAgentState.policy_chunks`. Returns `503` when ChromaDB is unavailable after `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` retries. -- `fetch_domain_knowledge`: queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `BaseAgentState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when collection is empty — non-fatal. - -Both nodes use the same trigger-type-keyed query strings: - -| Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | -|---|---| -| `build` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `role/{id}` | `"role assignment rules"` | -| `service/{id}` | `"service access control rules"` | - -Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`). - -### `shared/state.py` - -All type definitions shared across agents: - -#### `BaseAgentState` - -| Field | Type | Description | -|---|---|---| -| `trigger` | `TriggerContext` | Endpoint type + entity ID | -| `realm` | `str` | Realm name (from `KEYCLOAK_REALM`) | -| `policy_chunks` | `list[str]` | Policy text chunks from `aiac-policies` | -| `domain_knowledge_chunks` | `list[str]` | Domain context chunks from `aiac-domain-knowledge` | -| `pdp_snapshot` | `PDPSnapshot` | Scoped PDP data for this trigger | -| `summary` | `str` | Human-readable explanation | - -> **Note:** `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and `validation_errors: list[str]` are produced and consumed within the Policy Rules Builder. Whether they remain in `BaseAgentState` or move to a dedicated PRB state is pending the PRB design grill. - -#### `PDPSnapshot` - -```python -class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): - subjects: list[Subject] = [] - roles: list[Role] = [] - services: list[Service] = [] - service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] -``` - -#### `ValidationVerdict` - -```python -class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): - approved: bool - reason: str -``` - -Service Onboarding types (`ServiceType`, `RoleDefinition`, `ScopeDefinition`, `ServiceProvision`, `OnboardingProvisionState`) are defined in `onboarding/provision/state.py`. `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` are defined in `aiac.policy.model` — see [policy-model.md](policy-model.md). See [UC1: Service Onboarding](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md). - ---- - -### `policy_rules_builder/` (shared) - -The **Policy Rules Builder** receives `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` from the producing sub-agent (or UC1 Orchestrator) and the natural-language policy, and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. - -> **Detailed design TBD — pending dedicated grill.** Open questions: Is the Policy Rules Builder a LangGraph `StateGraph` or a simpler callable? Does it use a single LLM call or a `propose_*` + `validate_*` node pattern? What context does it receive beyond the tuple — policy chunks, domain knowledge chunks, PDP snapshot? Does it need a `realm` parameter? Does it read current Policy Store state to avoid duplicates, or does the PCE handle dedup? - -#### Validate Node — Common Checks (pending PRB grill) - -> **Note:** The exact placement of validation (inside the Policy Rules Builder vs. a separate Controller step) is pending the PRB design grill. The four checks below are confirmed requirements. - -The validation step performs four checks. Binary abort on any failure: - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - IN["policy_model\n+ pdp_snapshot"] --> C1 - - C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by rules\nstatements resolved via\naiac.idp.configuration.api"} - C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nadded and removed empty"] - C1 -->|"pass"| C2 - - C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal statements\nin PolicyModel\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} - C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C2 -->|"pass"| C3 - - C3{"3. LLM re-confirmation\nAuditor system prompt\n-> ValidationVerdict\napproved bool + reason str"} - C3 -->|"approved=false"| ABORT - C3 -->|"approved=true"| C4 - - C4{"4. Scope check\nDiff bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} - C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C4 -->|"pass"| EMIT["emit list[PolicyRule] to Controller"] -``` - -1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `rules` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -2. **Safety guard rails** — total statements in `PolicyModel` ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. -3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. -4. **Scope check** — `PolicyModel` is bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. - ---- - -## LLM Integration - -All `propose_*` and `validate_*` nodes use `langchain-openai` (`ChatOpenAI`) via `llm.with_structured_output()`. Target endpoint must support tool calling. - -Each sub-agent defines its own `PLANNER_SYSTEM` and `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` constants in its `prompts.py`: - -- **Planner prompt**: system message (stable, cacheable) — role definition + `AIAC_AC_MODEL` framing scoped to the agent's context; user message (per-request) — trigger description + policy chunks + domain knowledge section + scoped PDP snapshot summary. -- **Auditor prompt**: system message — auditor role for the specific agent's scope; user message — proposed diff + policy chunks + domain knowledge chunks. - -The Policy Rules Builder's LLM usage pattern (prompts and node structure) is TBD — pending the PRB design grill. +> **Note:** After the Orchestrator or sub-agent returns a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]`, the Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). --- @@ -277,7 +136,7 @@ The Policy Rules Builder's LLM usage pattern (prompts and node structure) is TBD | POST | `/apply/policy/build` | Policy Update | Build | | POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | | POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | -| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision → Policy | +| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision | **Success response (Service Onboarding):** ```json @@ -351,48 +210,35 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ │ ├── onboarding/ │ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy; returns tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]] to Controller +│ ├── orchestrator.py ← runs provision; returns tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]] to Controller │ ├── provision/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph │ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response │ │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState -│ └── policy/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Policy StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy -│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM │ ├── policy_update/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── build/ │ │ ├── __init__.py │ │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, format_response -│ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_roles_scopes, format_response +│ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM │ └── rebuild/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← clear_policy, fetch_pdp_state, propose_diff, validate_diff, format_response -│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_roles_scopes, format_response +│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM │ ├── roles/ │ ├── __init__.py │ └── role/ │ ├── __init__.py │ ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy, format_response -│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM +│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_roles_scopes, format_response +│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM │ -└── shared/ - ├── __init__.py - ├── nodes.py ← fetch_policy, fetch_domain_knowledge - ├── state.py ← BaseAgentState, TriggerContext, PDPSnapshot, ValidationVerdict (PolicyRule imported from aiac.policy.model; exact rules/tuple field placement pending PRB grill) - └── policy_rules_builder/ ← TBD — design pending dedicated grill - ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← PolicyRulesBuilderGraph (TBD) - ├── nodes.py ← TBD - └── prompts.py ← TBD +└── shared/ ← TBD — structure pending Policy Rules Builder grill ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..37ddf3beb --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +# Sub-PRD: AIAC Agent — Policy Rules Builder + +## Description + +The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`. It receives `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` from the producing sub-agent (or UC1 Orchestrator) and the natural-language policy, and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. + +> **Detailed design TBD — pending dedicated grill.** Open questions: Is the Policy Rules Builder a LangGraph `StateGraph` or a simpler callable? Does it use a single LLM call or a `propose_*` + `validate_*` node pattern? What context does it receive beyond the tuple — policy chunks, domain knowledge chunks, PDP snapshot? Does it need a `realm` parameter? Does it read current Policy Store state to avoid duplicates, or does the PCE handle dedup? + +--- + +## Nodes + +Two node functions exclusive to the Policy Rules Builder: + +- `fetch_policy`: queries `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `PRBState.policy_chunks`. Returns `503` when ChromaDB is unavailable after `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` retries. +- `fetch_domain_knowledge`: queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `PRBState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when collection is empty — non-fatal. + +Both nodes use trigger-type-keyed query strings: + +| Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | +|---|---| +| `build` | `"all access control rules"` | +| `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | +| `role/{id}` | `"role assignment rules"` | +| `service/{id}` | `"service access control rules"` | + +Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`). + +--- + +## State + +```python +class PRBState(BaseModel): + trigger: TriggerContext + realm: str + roles: list[Role] + scopes: list[Scope] + policy_chunks: list[str] + domain_knowledge_chunks: list[str] + rules: list[PolicyRule] # TBD — pending PRB grill + validation_errors: list[str] # TBD — pending PRB grill +``` + +`ValidationVerdict` is used internally by the LLM re-confirmation node (check 3): + +```python +class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): + approved: bool + reason: str +``` + +> **Note:** The exact shape of `PRBState` — including whether `rules` and `validation_errors` are intermediate fields or only produced at the end — is pending the dedicated grill. + +--- + +## Validate Node — Common Checks + +> **Note:** Validation is confirmed to live inside the Policy Rules Builder. The node structure within the PRB (single call vs. multi-node) is pending the dedicated grill. The four checks below are confirmed requirements. + +The validation step performs four checks. Binary abort on any failure: + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + IN["rules\n(list[PolicyRule])\n+ trigger"] --> C1 + + C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by rules\nstatements resolved via\naiac.idp.configuration.api"} + C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nno rules emitted"] + C1 -->|"pass"| C2 + + C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal rules\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} + C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT + C2 -->|"pass"| C3 + + C3{"3. LLM re-confirmation\nAuditor system prompt\n-> ValidationVerdict\napproved bool + reason str"} + C3 -->|"approved=false"| ABORT + C3 -->|"approved=true"| C4 + + C4{"4. Scope check\nrules bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} + C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT + C4 -->|"pass"| EMIT["emit list[PolicyRule] to Controller"] +``` + +1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `rules` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +2. **Safety guard rails** — total rules ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. +3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. +4. **Scope check** — emitted `rules` are bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. + +--- + +## LLM Integration + +The **Auditor prompt** (check 3 above) belongs to the Policy Rules Builder. The full LLM usage pattern for the PRB — prompts, node structure, and whether the PRB defines a `PLANNER_SYSTEM` in addition to an `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — is TBD pending the dedicated grill. From 19e6968c24f0698352aaf924aa854a3b1e6b8c96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 22:12:39 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 138/273] docs(aiac-agent): simplify file structure tree - Remove individual files; keep folder structure only - Group sub-agents under uc/ folder - Rename roles/ -> role_update/ (flat, no sub-hierarchy) - Replace shared/ with policy_rules_builder/ Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 42 ++++--------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 6486cbf51..ad51d1b10 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -205,40 +205,14 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti ``` aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── controller/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ └── routes.py ← FastAPI app + four route handlers -│ -├── onboarding/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── orchestrator.py ← runs provision; returns tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]] to Controller -│ ├── provision/ -│ │ ├── __init__.py -│ │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response -│ │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState -│ -├── policy_update/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── build/ -│ │ ├── __init__.py -│ │ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph -│ │ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_roles_scopes, format_response -│ │ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM -│ └── rebuild/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_roles_scopes, format_response -│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM -│ -├── roles/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ └── role/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_roles_scopes, format_response -│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM -│ -└── shared/ ← TBD — structure pending Policy Rules Builder grill +├── uc/ +│ ├── onboarding/ +│ │ └── provision/ +│ ├── policy_update/ +│ │ ├── build/ +│ │ └── rebuild/ +│ └── role_update/ +└── policy_rules_builder/ ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): From 863dd1470be0325ab696613cba314a464c6ff01d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:58:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 139/273] docs(aiac-agent): align main PRD with grill-me shared contract MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Sub-agent output changed from tuple to list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]] - Controller now fans PRB over list, merges rules, makes single compute_and_apply call - Mermaid diagram rewired: sub-agents → CTRL → PRB → CTRL → PCE (no direct sub-agent→PRB edges) - CO subgraph adds Service Policy Update node (sequences provision → service_policy) - Endpoints section: removed JSON response bodies; replaced with bare HTTP status paragraph - Controller bullet points updated to describe fan-PRB-over-list flow - Use Cases table: added Notes column with UC1 sequencing detail; footer note updated - File structure tree: onboarding/ now shows orchestrator.py + service_policy/; annotations added - Error Handling: appended bare-error propagation sentence - PRB path updated: agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/ → agent/policy_rules_builder/ Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 79 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index ad51d1b10..e6829ae9b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ The Agent subscribes to the Event Broker as a durable competing consumer (`aiac- The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NATS consumer is a thin adapter layer** that receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions — there is no duplicated business logic. -The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to the **Service Onboarding Orchestrator** (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update and Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). Each sub-agent emits a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller passes this tuple to the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`), which emits a `list[PolicyRule]`, and then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` directly via the PCE. +The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to the **Service Onboarding Orchestrator** (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update and Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). Each sub-agent returns a `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller receives this list; for each tuple it calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, concatenates all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`, then makes a single `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` call via the PCE. | Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (new service roles + scopes) | -| Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (all roles + scopes) | -| Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` (specific role + all scopes) | +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy Update | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | +| Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build or Rebuild (TBD) | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | +| Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` (one-element list) | -Each producing sub-agent emits a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller passes this tuple to a **shared Policy Rules Builder sub-agent** (`agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`), which uses the natural-language policy to emit a `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` directly — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. +Each producing sub-agent returns a `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) once per tuple in the list to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, concatenates all results into a single merged list, then calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] + SA2["Service Policy Update"] ORC1 --> SA1 + ORC1 --> SA2 end subgraph PU["Policy Update"] @@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ flowchart TD SA6["Role"] end - PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/shared/policy_rules_builder/"] + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 @@ -59,13 +61,14 @@ flowchart TD CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA5 CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA6 - ORC1 -->|"tuple"| PRB - SA4 -->|"tuple"| PRB - SA5 -->|"tuple"| PRB - SA6 -->|"tuple"| PRB + ORC1 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + SA4 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + SA5 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + SA6 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"rules"| PCE + CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB + PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` --- @@ -106,12 +109,13 @@ The Controller is a FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its responsib - Parse the trigger type and entity ID from the request path. - Dispatch to the Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update / Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). -- Receive the `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` returned by the Orchestrator or sub-agent. -- Pass the tuple to the **shared Policy Rules Builder** and receive `list[PolicyRule]`. -- Call `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). -- Return the final response to the caller. +- Receive the `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` returned by the Orchestrator or sub-agent. +- For each tuple in the list, call the **shared Policy Rules Builder** and collect `list[PolicyRule]`. +- Concatenate all `list[PolicyRule]` results into a single list. +- Call `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. +- Return a bare HTTP status code to the caller; write summary and debug info to the log. -No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. The Policy Rules Builder and PCE calls are shared steps driven uniformly by the Controller across all use cases. +No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. The PRB and PCE calls are shared steps driven uniformly by the Controller across all use cases. --- @@ -119,13 +123,13 @@ No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the C Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: -| Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | -|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | -| Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | -| Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | +| Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | Notes | +|---|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy Update (deterministic) | +| Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | +| Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | | -> **Note:** After the Orchestrator or sub-agent returns a `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]`, the Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, then calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). +> **Note:** After the Orchestrator or sub-agent returns a `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]`, the Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** once per tuple to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, concatenates the results, then calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). --- @@ -138,20 +142,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | | POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision | -**Success response (Service Onboarding):** -```json -{ "summary": "...", "provisioned": { "roles": [...], "scopes": [...] } } -``` - -**Success response (all other agents):** -```json -{ "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } -``` - -**Abort response (validation failure, all agents):** -```json -{ "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } -``` +All endpoints return bare HTTP status codes: `200 OK` on success, and the status codes from the Error Handling table on upstream failure. No JSON body is returned. Summary, applied-rule details, and debug information are written to the service log. Validation failures surface as an error status and log entry; detailed reporting is specified in [policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). --- @@ -189,6 +180,8 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti | Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | +Upstream failures propagate as bare HTTP error responses (see table above); no JSON body is returned. All failure details are logged. + --- ## Runtime @@ -207,12 +200,14 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── controller/ ├── uc/ │ ├── onboarding/ -│ │ └── provision/ +│ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → service_policy, returns list[tuple] +│ │ ├── provision/ ← LLM sub-agent: classify, analyze, write to IdP +│ │ └── service_policy/ ← deterministic: read IdP, package list[tuple] │ ├── policy_update/ -│ │ ├── build/ -│ │ └── rebuild/ -│ └── role_update/ -└── policy_rules_builder/ +│ │ ├── build/ ← TBD +│ │ └── rebuild/ ← TBD +│ └── role_update/ ← deterministic: read role + all scopes, return [(role, all_scopes)] +└── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called only by Controller ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): From 6d61e4d405eb75f78e433e645d6800c7bda2d2ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 01:02:39 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 140/273] docs(aiac-agent): rewrite UC1, UC2, UC3 sub-PRDs per grill-me session MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - UC1: two-stage Orchestrator (Service Provision LLM + Service Policy Update deterministic), aiac.idp.configuration.api throughout, replay-safety note, self-exclusion logic, tool/agent tuple packaging - UC2: TBD stub with triggers and PRB→PCE pipeline stub; internal design deferred - UC3: single deterministic path, one-element list[tuple], PRB picks relevance, PCE deletes stale rules All diagrams: sub-agent → Controller → PRB → Controller → PCE (no sub-agent→PRB edge). policy-rules-builder.md unchanged. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 269 ++++++++---------- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 196 +++---------- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 137 +++------ 3 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 416 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 7d0a0f8b5..ec1b54eea 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -1,12 +1,22 @@ -# UC1: Service Onboarding +# Component Sub-PRD: UC1 — Service Onboarding -## Depends on +> **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. -- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module (`BaseAgentState`, `PDPSnapshot`, `PolicyModel`, `ValidationVerdict`), Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +## Triggers ---- +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/service/{service_id}` | + +## Architecture overview + +UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipeline: -## Architecture +1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. +2. **Service Policy Update** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), package into `list[tuple]`, return to the Orchestrator. + +The Orchestrator returns only the `list[tuple]` to the Controller. The Controller runs the PRB → PCE pipeline; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. ```mermaid flowchart TD @@ -20,129 +30,110 @@ flowchart TD TRIGGERS --> CTRL subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] - ORC1["Orchestrator"] - SA1["Service Provision"] - SA2["Service Policy"] - ORC1 --> SA1 - ORC1 --> SA2 + ORC["Orchestrator"] + SA_PROV["Service Provision\n(LLM)"] + SA_POL["Service Policy Update\n(deterministic)"] + ORC --> SA_PROV + ORC --> SA_POL end - APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] - - ORC1 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] - CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 + CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC + ORC -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB + PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` ---- - -## Trigger(s) - -| Source | Subject / Path | -|---|---| -| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) | -| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/service/{service_id}` | - ---- - ## Orchestrator `onboarding/orchestrator.py` -Sequences three sub-agents and assembles the combined response: +**Sequence:** +1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. +2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type)` → get back `list[tuple]`. +3. Return the `list[tuple]` to the Controller. -``` -ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke() → ServicePolicyGraph.invoke() → PolicyApplyGraph.invoke() → assemble response -``` +No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. ---- +**Replay safety (at-least-once delivery):** Service Provision IdP writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get by name: `create_service_role` / `create_service_scope` return the existing entity on a duplicate call). The PCE reconcile is also idempotent. If the pod crashes between Service Provision completing and the PCE call, NATS redelivers and the full pipeline re-runs safely to convergence. There is **no rollback logic**. -## Sub-agents +--- -### Service Provision Sub-agent +## Sub-agent: Service Provision `onboarding/provision/` -``` -START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → format_response → END -``` +**Nature:** LLM-based. Classifies the new service (agent or tool), derives roles + scopes from AgentCard / MCP manifest, and **writes them into the IdP**. -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLASSIFY["classify_service\n\n1. service_id = trigger.entity_id\n2. SPIFFE? → parse ns + workload_name\n3. LIST pods, validate kagenti.io/type\n4. non-SPIFFE → service_type=tool\n5. Route on service_type"] +All IdP writes and reads target **`aiac.idp.configuration.api`**: +- `create_service_role(service_id, role)` — idempotent (create-or-get) +- `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` — idempotent (create-or-get) - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = agent"| ANALYZE_AGENT["analyze_agent\nLIST AgentCard CRs\n→ ServiceProvision\n(roles + scopes per skill)"] - CLASSIFY -->|"service_type = tool"| ANALYZE_TOOL["analyze_tool\nconfig API: get_service\n+ tools/list (TBD)\n→ ServiceProvision\n(scopes per tool)"] +### Graph - ANALYZE_AGENT --> PROVISION["provision_service\n\ncreate_service_role\ncreate_service_scope\nper ServiceProvision entry"] - ANALYZE_TOOL --> PROVISION - - PROVISION --> FORMAT["format_response"] - FORMAT --> END(("END")) +``` +START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → END ``` -#### Nodes - -- **`classify_service`**: determines service type; stores parsed coordinates in state; does not populate `ServiceProvision`. - 1. **Store `service_id`**: `state.service_id = trigger.entity_id` (the Keycloak `client_id` as received — the NATS payload carries `{ "id": "<entity-id>" }` which is the Keycloak `client_id`). - 2. **Check format**: - - **SPIFFE format** `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workload_name = serviceAccount`; store both in state; continue to step 3. - - **Any other format** → `state.service_type = tool`; `state.namespace = None`; `state.workload_name = None`; route to `analyze_tool`. No K8s access. - 3. **Find the pod** (SPIFFE path only): LIST pods in `namespace`, find one whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workload_name`. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or if pod not found. - 4. **Validate `kagenti.io/type` label** (SPIFFE path only) on the pod (applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook): - - `kagenti.io/type: agent` → `state.service_type = agent`; route to `analyze_agent`. - - Label absent or any other value → returns `502` (SPIFFE ID registered in Keycloak without operator label is an inconsistent deployment — surface as error rather than mis-classify). +### Nodes - > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `pods` (core API group) in the target namespace. Agent path only — tool path performs no K8s access. +- **`classify_service`**: determines service type. + 1. Store `service_id = trigger.entity_id` (Keycloak `client_id`). + 2. Check format: + - **SPIFFE format** `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workload_name = serviceAccount`; continue to step 3. + - **Any other format** → `service_type = tool`; `namespace = None`; `workload_name = None`; route to `analyze_tool`. No K8s access. + 3. LIST pods in `namespace`, find one whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workload_name`. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or pod not found. + 4. Validate `kagenti.io/type` label on the pod (applied by kagenti-operator): + - `agent` → `service_type = agent`; route to `analyze_agent`. + - Absent or any other value → `502` (inconsistent deployment). - > **`kagenti.io/type` label authority:** Applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook, not by the workload itself. Safe to treat as authoritative for service type classification. + > K8s access: `list` on `pods` in the target namespace. Agent path only. + > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook. -- **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR and maps directly to `ServiceProvision`. - 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one whose `spec.targetRef.name == workloadName`. +- **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR. + 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one matching `workload_name`. 2. **AgentCard found** → produce `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{skill.name}", description=skill.description) for skill in card.skills]` - `reasoning`: `f"derived from AgentCard: {len(skills)} skills"` - 3. **AgentCard not found** (legacy deployment — operator injected sidecars via label only, no AgentCard CR created) → produce minimal `ServiceProvision`: + 3. **AgentCard not found** (legacy deployment) → produce minimal `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.access", description="Default access scope")]` - `reasoning`: `"partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned"` - > **Kubernetes API access:** Requires `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. - -- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools and maps to `ServiceProvision`. + > K8s access: `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. - 1. **Resolve `workload_name`**: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api` → `state.workload_name = client.name`. No K8s access. - 2. **Locate MCP endpoint**: **TBD** — how `analyze_tool` reaches the MCP endpoint is unresolved. See issue [6.2](../../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md). Steps 3–4 depend on this being resolved. +- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools. + 1. Resolve `workload_name`: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` → `workload_name = client.name`. + 2. Locate MCP endpoint: **TBD** — see issue [`inception/issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md`](../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md). 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: - - `roles`: `[]` (tools are reactive — they do not initiate further calls) + - `roles`: `[]` (tools do not initiate further calls) - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` 5. Returns `502` on config API failure, endpoint lookup failure, or MCP call failure. - > **Kubernetes API access:** None — tool path uses config API only (pending issue 6.2 resolution). + > K8s access: none. Tool path uses config API only (pending issue 6.2). + > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp`. - > **MCP path convention:** All MCP tool services in the kagenti platform must serve at `/mcp`. +- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). -- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role(service_id, role)` and `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. -- **`format_response`**: assembles the provision result for the orchestrator. - -#### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` +### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` Extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| -| `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id`; set by `classify_service` | -| `namespace` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI; set by `classify_service` for agents; `None` for tools | -| `workload_name` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI (agents) or `client.name` from config API (tools); set by `classify_service` or `analyze_tool` | -| `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; set by `classify_service`; used by conditional edge routing | +| `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id` | +| `namespace` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI; agents only | +| `workload_name` | `str \| None` | From SPIFFE URI (agents) or config API (tools) | +| `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; routing field | | `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | -#### Types (`onboarding/provision/state.py`) +### Types ```python class ServiceType(str, Enum): @@ -161,98 +152,62 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): roles: list[RoleDefinition] scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] reasoning: str # machine-generated provenance string - -class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseAgentState): - service_id: str | None = None # Keycloak client_id = trigger.entity_id - namespace: str | None = None # agents only; None for tools - workload_name: str | None = None # agents: from SPIFFE; tools: client.name via config API - service_type: ServiceType | None = None # routing field; set by classify_service - service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None ``` --- -### Service Policy Sub-agent - -`onboarding/policy/` +## Sub-agent: Service Policy Update -Runs after Service Provision completes. Freshly provisioned permissions/scopes are live in Keycloak before this sub-agent starts. +`onboarding/service_policy/` -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END -``` - -Examines all roles and determines which role → service permission/scope mappings to create for the newly added service, based on the access control policy and domain knowledge. Produces a `PolicyModel` written to state; does not commit to the PDP Policy Writer. - -#### Nodes +**Nature:** deterministic, non-LLM module. Pure IdP reader + tuple packager. -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all roles and their current composites, the new service's permissions and scopes. -- **`propose_policy`**: LLM node; produces `PolicyModel` scoped to the new service only. Writes `policy_model` to state. -- **`validate_policy`**: existence check (entities resolved via `aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api`) + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the new service). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). `PolicyStatement` shape must carry sufficient information for entity resolution against the Configuration API. +**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's own roles + scopes (from Provision output), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, and package the `list[tuple]` that the Controller will run through the PRB. -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) +The two exclusion types prevent self-mapping and keep each tuple's semantic intent crisp: +- `(all_roles, agent_scopes)` = *who else may call my skills* +- `(agent_roles, all_scopes)` = *what else may I call* - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB: aiac-policies"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB: aiac-domain-knowledge"] - START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nroles + composites,\nnew service permissions/scopes"] +### Steps - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nscoped to new service only"] +1. Receive `service_provision: ServiceProvision` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. +2. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service_provision.roles}`). +3. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service_provision.scopes}`). +4. Package and return: + - **`service_type = tool`:** + ``` + [(other_roles, tool_scopes)] + ``` + where `tool_scopes = [Scope(s) for s in service_provision.scopes]`. + - **`service_type = agent`:** + ``` + [(other_roles, agent_scopes), + (agent_roles, other_scopes)] + ``` + where `agent_scopes = [Scope(s) for s in service_provision.scopes]` and `agent_roles = [Role(r) for r in service_provision.roles]`. - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check (via Configuration API)\n2. Safety guard rails <= MAX_CHANGES\n3. Auditor LLM re-confirmation\n4. Scope check new service only"] - - VALIDATE --> END(("END")) -``` - -#### State - -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). Uses `policy_model: PolicyModel | None` field (replaces `proposed_diff`; defined in `BaseAgentState` — see [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md)). - -#### Prompts (`onboarding/policy/prompts.py`) - -`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — scoped to single-service `PolicyModel` generation context. - ---- - -### Policy Apply Sub-agent - -`agent/shared/apply/` — see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply) in `aiac-agent.md`. - -Receives the validated `PolicyModel` produced by `validate_policy` and commits it to the PDP Policy Writer. Called by the orchestrator after `ServicePolicyGraph` completes, gated on `policy_model is not None`. - ---- +**Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to `agent_roles`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). -## File Structure +## File structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/ -├── pdp/library/ -│ ├── configuration/ -│ │ ├── __init__.py -│ │ ├── models.py ← Subject, Role, Service, Scope -│ │ └── api.py ← Configuration Service client -│ └── policy/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── models.py ← PolicyModel, PolicyStatement (TBD) -│ └── api.py ← Policy abstract class + apply_policy() -└── agent/ - └── onboarding/ +aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ +└── onboarding/ + ├── orchestrator.py + ├── provision/ + │ ├── __init__.py + │ ├── graph.py ← ServiceProvisionGraph (LLM-based StateGraph) + │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service + │ ├── state.py ← OnboardingProvisionState + │ └── types.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision + └── service_policy/ ├── __init__.py - ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy → apply, assembles combined response - ├── provision/ - │ ├── __init__.py - │ ├── graph.py ← Service Provision StateGraph - │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service, format_response - │ └── state.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision, OnboardingProvisionState - └── policy/ - ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← Service Policy StateGraph - ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy - └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM + └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type) ``` -> **Note:** `aiac/pdp/library/models.py` (flat file) is replaced by the `configuration/` and `policy/` sub-packages above. All import sites updated in the same pass. +## Out of scope +- PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +- PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. +- MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — tracked in `inception/issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 0aa377c57..7be51c799 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -1,10 +1,16 @@ -# UC2: Policy Update +# Component Sub-PRD: UC2 — Policy Update -## Depends on +> **Status: TBD.** The internal design of the Build and Rebuild sub-agents is not yet defined. A dedicated grill session is required. -- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +> **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. ---- +## Triggers + +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.policy.build` (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) | +| HTTP (debug / operator) | `POST /apply/policy/build` | +| HTTP (operator only) | `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` (not routed through Event Broker) | ## Architecture @@ -12,175 +18,41 @@ flowchart TD NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.policy.build"] NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] - TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/policy/build (debug)\nPOST /apply/policy/rebuild (operator)"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/policy/build\nPOST /apply/policy/rebuild\n(debug / operator)"] CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL TRIGGERS --> CTRL - subgraph PU["Policy Update"] - ORC2["Orchestrator"] - SA3["Build"] - SA4["Rebuild"] - ORC2 -->|"build"| SA3 - ORC2 -->|"rebuild"| SA4 + subgraph PU["Policy Update (TBD)"] + SA_BUILD["Build sub-agent\n(TBD)"] + SA_REBUILD["Rebuild sub-agent\n(TBD)"] end - APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] - - ORC2 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY - - CTRL -->|"build / rebuild"| ORC2 -``` - ---- - -## Trigger(s) - -| Source | Subject / Path | Sub-agent | -|---|---|---| -| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.policy.build` (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) | Build | -| HTTP (operator only) | `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` (via `kubectl port-forward`) | Rebuild | -| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/policy/build` | Build | - ---- - -## Orchestrator - -`policy_update/orchestrator.py` - -Dispatches to one sub-agent based on trigger type, then sequences `PolicyApplyGraph` (see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply)): -- `build` trigger → Build sub-agent → Policy Apply -- `rebuild` trigger → Rebuild sub-agent → Policy Apply - -If the sub-agent's `validate_policy` fails (`policy_model is None`), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyApplyGraph`. - -The Policy Update agent compares the **current composite role mappings** (authoritative record of previously applied rules) against the **current policy in ChromaDB** and applies the delta: adding missing composite mappings and removing stale ones. - ---- - -## Sub-agents - -### Build Sub-agent - -`policy_update/build/` + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] + CTRL -->|"build"| SA_BUILD + CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA_REBUILD + SA_BUILD -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + SA_REBUILD -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB + PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END -``` - -#### Nodes - -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all roles and their current composites, all services and their permissions, all scopes. -- **`propose_policy`**: LLM node; produces `PolicyModel` — minimal delta between ChromaDB policy and live composite state. `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py` (see [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md)). -- **`validate_policy`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check. See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). Writes `policy_model` to state on success; leaves it `None` on failure. - -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nall roles + composites,\nall services + permissions"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nminimal delta vs live composites"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - - VALIDATE --> END(("END")) -``` - -#### State - -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -#### Prompts (`policy_update/build/prompts.py`) - -`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. ---- - -### Rebuild Sub-agent - -`policy_update/rebuild/` - -Identical to the Build sub-agent with one addition: a `clear_composites` node prepended before the fetch fan-out. - -``` -START → clear_composites → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END -``` - -#### Delta from Build - -- **`clear_composites`**: calls `clear_all_composites(realm)` from `aiac.pdp.library.policy` before the fetch fan-out. Removes all composite mappings from all roles. -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: receives a `PDPSnapshot` with empty `role_composites` after the wipe. -- **`propose_policy`**: produces an add-only `PolicyModel` (no removals — composites are empty). -- **`validate_policy`**: identical contract to Build. - -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) --> CLEAR["clear_composites\nclear_all_composites\nrealm-wide wipe"] - - CLEAR --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - CLEAR --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\nempty role_composites\nafter wipe"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nadd-only: composites are empty"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check"] - - VALIDATE --> END(("END")) -``` - -#### State - -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -#### Prompts (`policy_update/rebuild/prompts.py`) - -`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. - ---- - -## Response - -**Success:** -```json -{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } -``` - -**Abort (validation failure):** -```json -{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } -``` - ---- - -## File Structure - -``` -aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_update/ -├── __init__.py -├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to build or rebuild sub-agent, then sequences PolicyApplyGraph -├── build/ -│ ├── __init__.py -│ ├── graph.py ← Build StateGraph -│ ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy -│ └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM -└── rebuild/ - ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← Rebuild StateGraph - ├── nodes.py ← clear_composites, fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy - └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM -``` +## What is known ---- +- **Two sub-agents:** Build (responds to `aiac.apply.policy.build` + `POST /apply/policy/build`) and Rebuild (responds to `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` only). +- Both return `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` to the Controller. +- The Controller runs the PRB per tuple → merge → single `compute_and_apply`. This is the same uniform pipeline as all other UCs. +- Internal behavior (how Build/Rebuild sub-agents derive their tuple content, what IdP data they read, whether any LLM node is involved) is **deferred** — to be resolved in a dedicated grill session. -## Open Questions +## Out of scope (this stub) -_None currently._ +- Build sub-agent internal design. +- Rebuild sub-agent internal design. +- PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +- PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 1a5e0e265..0e913b301 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -1,13 +1,18 @@ -# UC3: Role Update +# Component Sub-PRD: UC3 — Role Update -## Depends on +> **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. -- [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Validate Node common checks, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +## Triggers ---- +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI role created/updated) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/role/{role_id}` | ## Architecture +Single path, no create/update branch. The sub-agent is **deterministic** (non-LLM). + ```mermaid flowchart TD NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.role.{id}"] @@ -20,113 +25,51 @@ flowchart TD TRIGGERS --> CTRL subgraph RR["Role Update"] - ORC3["Orchestrator"] - SA5["Role"] - ORC3 --> SA5 + SA["Role sub-agent\ndeterministic"] end - APPLY["Policy Apply\nagent/shared/apply/\nPolicyApplyGraph"] - - ORC3 -->|"policy_model"| APPLY + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] - CTRL -->|"role/:id"| ORC3 + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA + SA -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB + PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` ---- - -## Trigger(s) - -| Source | Subject / Path | -|---|---| -| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI role created/updated) | -| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/role/{role_id}` | - ---- - -## Orchestrator +## Sub-agent: Role sub-agent -`roles/orchestrator.py` +**Nature:** deterministic, non-LLM. Pure IdP reader. -Dispatches to the Role sub-agent, then sequences `PolicyApplyGraph` (see [Shared Module: `shared/apply/`](../aiac-agent.md#sharedapply)): +**Steps:** +1. Read the triggering role (`role_id`) from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +2. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +3. Return `[( [role], all_scopes )]` — a one-element `list[tuple]`. -- Role sub-agent → Policy Apply +**Output:** `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` — one element. -If the sub-agent's `validate_policy` fails (`policy_model is None`), the orchestrator returns the abort response directly without calling `PolicyApplyGraph`. +## Controller behaviour (for this UC) ---- +1. Receives `[(role, all_scopes)]` from the sub-agent. +2. Calls the PRB once with `(role, all_scopes)` → `list[PolicyRule]` (only the relevant scope mappings for that role). See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +3. Calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. + - The PCE unconditionally deletes the role's stale rules before applying the new ones. See [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +4. Returns bare HTTP status; writes summary + debug to log. -## Sub-agents +## File structure -### Role Sub-agent - -`roles/role/` - -``` -START → [fetch_policy ‖ fetch_domain_knowledge ‖ fetch_pdp_state] → propose_policy → validate_policy → END ``` - -#### Nodes - -- **`fetch_pdp_state`**: fetches all services and their permissions, all roles, and the current composites for the affected role. -- **`propose_policy`**: LLM node; produces `PolicyModel` scoped to the affected role. `PolicyModel` is defined in `aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py` (see [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md)). -- **`validate_policy`**: existence check + safety guard rails + auditor LLM re-confirmation + scope check (bounded to the affected role). See [Validate Node common checks](../aiac-agent.md#validate-node--common-checks-all-agents). Writes `policy_model` to state on success; leaves it `None` on failure. - -#### Graph - -```mermaid -flowchart TD - START(("START")) - - START --> FP["fetch_policy\nChromaDB"] - START --> FDK["fetch_domain_knowledge\nChromaDB"] - START --> FKC["fetch_pdp_state\naffected role composites,\nall services + permissions"] - - FP & FDK & FKC --> PROPOSE["propose_policy\nPlanner LLM -> PolicyModel\nscoped to affected role"] - - PROPOSE --> VALIDATE["validate_policy\n1. Existence check\n2. Safety guard rails\n3. Auditor LLM\n4. Scope check\n affected role only"] - - VALIDATE --> END(("END")) -``` - -#### State - -`BaseAgentState` (no extensions required). - -#### Prompts (`roles/role/prompts.py`) - -`PLANNER_SYSTEM`, `AUDITOR_SYSTEM`. - ---- - -## Response - -**Success:** -```json -{ "added": [...], "removed": [...], "summary": "...", "provisioned": null } -``` - -**Abort (validation failure):** -```json -{ "added": [], "removed": [], "summary": "...", "validation_errors": [...], "provisioned": null } -``` - ---- - -## File Structure - -``` -aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/ -├── __init__.py -├── orchestrator.py ← dispatches to role sub-agent, then sequences PolicyApplyGraph -└── role/ +aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ +└── role_update/ ├── __init__.py - ├── graph.py ← Role StateGraph - ├── nodes.py ← fetch_pdp_state, propose_policy, validate_policy - └── prompts.py ← PLANNER_SYSTEM, AUDITOR_SYSTEM + ├── graph.py ← Role sub-agent StateGraph (deterministic) + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_role, fetch_all_scopes, package_tuple + └── state.py ← RoleUpdateState ``` ---- - -## Open Questions +## Out of scope -_None currently._ +- PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +- PCE stale-rule deletion mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. From 990b38252daa4e1bf843b995ed616c28a8c847f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 01:13:00 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 141/273] docs(aiac-agent): rename Service Policy Update sub-agent to Service Policy Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 6 +++--- .../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index e6829ae9b..593f9c33d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy Update | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | | Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build or Rebuild (TBD) | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | | Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` (one-element list) | @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] - SA2["Service Policy Update"] + SA2["Service Policy"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 end @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | Notes | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy Update (deterministic) | +| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy (deterministic) | | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index ec1b54eea..3aeb84f82 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipeline: 1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. -2. **Service Policy Update** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), package into `list[tuple]`, return to the Orchestrator. +2. **Service Policy** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), package into `list[tuple]`, return to the Orchestrator. The Orchestrator returns only the `list[tuple]` to the Controller. The Controller runs the PRB → PCE pipeline; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC["Orchestrator"] SA_PROV["Service Provision\n(LLM)"] - SA_POL["Service Policy Update\n(deterministic)"] + SA_POL["Service Policy\n(deterministic)"] ORC --> SA_PROV ORC --> SA_POL end @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): --- -## Sub-agent: Service Policy Update +## Sub-agent: Service Policy `onboarding/service_policy/` From 9d6e4b0e89bf9da7839afcc039bc8283ee69f787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:55:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 142/273] docs(aiac-agent): specify Policy Rules Builder interface - Structure: LangGraph StateGraph (graph internals TBD) - Two entry points: build_role_rules(role, scopes) and build_scope_rules(roles, scope) - PRB fetches its own ChromaDB context (both collections) - No realm parameter, no trigger type in input state - Error contract: raises on LLM/ChromaDB failure - Dedup owned by PCE - UC dispatch: UC3 -> build_role_rules, UC1 -> both (TBD), UC2 -> TBD Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 104 ++++++------------ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md index 37ddf3beb..a8c1e00ee 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -2,92 +2,56 @@ ## Description -The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/shared/policy_rules_builder/`. It receives `tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]` from the producing sub-agent (or UC1 Orchestrator) and the natural-language policy, and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the trigger. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. - -> **Detailed design TBD — pending dedicated grill.** Open questions: Is the Policy Rules Builder a LangGraph `StateGraph` or a simpler callable? Does it use a single LLM call or a `propose_*` + `validate_*` node pattern? What context does it receive beyond the tuple — policy chunks, domain knowledge chunks, PDP snapshot? Does it need a `realm` parameter? Does it read current Policy Store state to avoid duplicates, or does the PCE handle dedup? - ---- - -## Nodes - -Two node functions exclusive to the Policy Rules Builder: - -- `fetch_policy`: queries `aiac-policies` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `PRBState.policy_chunks`. Returns `503` when ChromaDB is unavailable after `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` retries. -- `fetch_domain_knowledge`: queries `aiac-domain-knowledge` ChromaDB collection; stores results in `PRBState.domain_knowledge_chunks`. Returns `[]` when collection is empty — non-fatal. - -Both nodes use trigger-type-keyed query strings: - -| Trigger | ChromaDB similarity query | -|---|---| -| `build` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `rebuild` | `"all access control rules"` | -| `role/{id}` | `"role assignment rules"` | -| `service/{id}` | `"service access control rules"` | - -Number of results capped by `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` (default `10`). +The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/policy_rules_builder/`. It exposes two module-level functions that the Controller calls based on the trigger type. Each function internally runs a LangGraph `StateGraph`; the Controller is decoupled from LangGraph mechanics. The PRB fetches its own RAG context from ChromaDB (both collections) and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the input. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. --- -## State +## Entry points ```python -class PRBState(BaseModel): - trigger: TriggerContext - realm: str - roles: list[Role] - scopes: list[Scope] - policy_chunks: list[str] - domain_knowledge_chunks: list[str] - rules: list[PolicyRule] # TBD — pending PRB grill - validation_errors: list[str] # TBD — pending PRB grill +def build_role_rules(role: Role, scopes: list[Scope]) -> list[PolicyRule]: ... +def build_scope_rules(roles: list[Role], scope: Scope) -> list[PolicyRule]: ... ``` -`ValidationVerdict` is used internally by the LLM re-confirmation node (check 3): +**`build_role_rules`** — role-centric: "given this role, which scopes does it get?" +Used for UC3 (Role Update). Called once per role with the full set of scopes relevant to the trigger. -```python -class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): - approved: bool - reason: str -``` - -> **Note:** The exact shape of `PRBState` — including whether `rules` and `validation_errors` are intermediate fields or only produced at the end — is pending the dedicated grill. +**`build_scope_rules`** — scope-centric: "given this scope, which roles may access it?" +Used as one of the calls for UC1 (Service Onboarding). See the Controller sub-PRD for the full UC1 dispatch pattern. --- -## Validate Node — Common Checks - -> **Note:** Validation is confirmed to live inside the Policy Rules Builder. The node structure within the PRB (single call vs. multi-node) is pending the dedicated grill. The four checks below are confirmed requirements. - -The validation step performs four checks. Binary abort on any failure: +## Contract -```mermaid -flowchart TD - IN["rules\n(list[PolicyRule])\n+ trigger"] --> C1 - - C1{"1. Existence check\nEntities referenced by rules\nstatements resolved via\naiac.idp.configuration.api"} - C1 -->|"fail"| ABORT["ABORT\nvalidation_errors populated\nno rules emitted"] - C1 -->|"pass"| C2 - - C2{"2. Safety guard rails\ntotal rules\n<= MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN"} - C2 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C2 -->|"pass"| C3 +| Aspect | Decision | +|---|---| +| Structure | LangGraph `StateGraph` (internal graph design TBD) | +| Context retrieval | PRB fetches its own ChromaDB context from `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge` collections | +| Realm parameter | None — ChromaDB is not realm-scoped; inputs are pre-resolved typed objects | +| Trigger type in state | None — the function name encodes the trigger direction | +| Dedup | PRB generates a full rule set; the PCE's additive merge handles dedup on write | +| LLM call pattern | TBD (single call vs. propose → validate) | +| Error contract | Raises on LLM failure or ChromaDB failure — no silent empty-list returns | - C3{"3. LLM re-confirmation\nAuditor system prompt\n-> ValidationVerdict\napproved bool + reason str"} - C3 -->|"approved=false"| ABORT - C3 -->|"approved=true"| C4 +--- - C4{"4. Scope check\nrules bounded to entities\nreferenced by trigger\nno over-reach"} - C4 -->|"fail"| ABORT - C4 -->|"pass"| EMIT["emit list[PolicyRule] to Controller"] -``` +## Use-case dispatch -1. **Existence check** — all entities referenced by `rules` statements exist; resolved via `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -2. **Safety guard rails** — total rules ≤ `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN`. -3. **LLM re-confirmation** — second LLM call with auditor system prompt; returns `ValidationVerdict(approved, reason)`. -4. **Scope check** — emitted `rules` are bounded to entities referenced by the trigger; no over-reach on partial updates. +| Use Case | Function(s) called | +|---|---| +| UC1 — Service Onboarding | Both `build_role_rules` and `build_scope_rules` (details in Controller sub-PRD) | +| UC2 — Policy Update (Build/Rebuild) | TBD | +| UC3 — Role Update | `build_role_rules(role, scopes)` | --- -## LLM Integration +## Configuration -The **Auditor prompt** (check 3 above) belongs to the Policy Rules Builder. The full LLM usage pattern for the PRB — prompts, node structure, and whether the PRB defines a `PLANNER_SYSTEM` in addition to an `AUDITOR_SYSTEM` — is TBD pending the dedicated grill. +The PRB inherits the following env vars (no additional config): + +| Variable | Used for | +|---|---| +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | ChromaDB endpoint | +| `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` | Number of results per ChromaDB query (default `10`) | +| `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM calls | +| `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | Retry budget for LLM and ChromaDB calls (tenacity) | From ba9ae0b643864b87d0e7bcbae02c8c16a867f21c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:26:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 143/273] docs(aiac-agent): move PRB calls from Controller into producing sub-agents MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Each sub-agent (UC1 Service Policy, UC2 Build, UC3 Role) now calls the PRB directly, merges results internally, and returns list[PolicyRule] to the Controller. The Controller's role shrinks to: dispatch → receive list[PolicyRule] → call PCE. UC2 Rebuild delegates to Build. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 47 ++++++++++--------- .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 12 ++--- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 43 +++++++---------- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 14 +++--- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 18 +++---- 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 593f9c33d..89f9f5743 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ The Agent subscribes to the Event Broker as a durable competing consumer (`aiac- The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NATS consumer is a thin adapter layer** that receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions — there is no duplicated business logic. -The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to the **Service Onboarding Orchestrator** (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update and Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). Each sub-agent returns a `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller receives this list; for each tuple it calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, concatenates all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`, then makes a single `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` call via the PCE. +The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to the **Service Onboarding Orchestrator** (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update and Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) directly, merges the results internally, and returns a single `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. | Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | -| Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build or Rebuild (TBD) | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` | -| Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` (one-element list) | +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy | `list[PolicyRule]` | +| Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build or Rebuild (TBD) | `list[PolicyRule]` | +| Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `list[PolicyRule]` | -Each producing sub-agent returns a `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` scoped to the trigger. The Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) once per tuple in the list to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, concatenates all results into a single merged list, then calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. +Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, merges the results, and returns a single `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph PU["Policy Update"] SA4["Build"] SA5["Rebuild"] + SA5 -->|"delegates"| SA4 end subgraph RR["Role Update"] @@ -61,13 +62,15 @@ flowchart TD CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA5 CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA6 - ORC1 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - SA4 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - SA5 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - SA6 -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL + SA2 -->|"calls"| PRB + SA4 -->|"calls"| PRB + SA6 -->|"calls"| PRB + + ORC1 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA4 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA5 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA6 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB - PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` @@ -109,13 +112,11 @@ The Controller is a FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its responsib - Parse the trigger type and entity ID from the request path. - Dispatch to the Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update / Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). -- Receive the `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` returned by the Orchestrator or sub-agent. -- For each tuple in the list, call the **shared Policy Rules Builder** and collect `list[PolicyRule]`. -- Concatenate all `list[PolicyRule]` results into a single list. +- Receive the `list[PolicyRule]` returned by the Orchestrator or sub-agent (already merged by the sub-agent). - Call `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. - Return a bare HTTP status code to the caller; write summary and debug info to the log. -No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. The PRB and PCE calls are shared steps driven uniformly by the Controller across all use cases. +No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. PRB calls are owned by the producing sub-agents; the Controller's shared step is the single PCE call. --- @@ -125,11 +126,11 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | Notes | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy (deterministic) | +| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy (IdP reader + PRB invoker) | | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | | -> **Note:** After the Orchestrator or sub-agent returns a `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]`, the Controller calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** once per tuple to produce `list[PolicyRule]`, concatenates the results, then calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE). Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). +> **Note:** Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). --- @@ -200,14 +201,14 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── controller/ ├── uc/ │ ├── onboarding/ -│ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → service_policy, returns list[tuple] +│ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → service_policy, returns list[PolicyRule] │ │ ├── provision/ ← LLM sub-agent: classify, analyze, write to IdP -│ │ └── service_policy/ ← deterministic: read IdP, package list[tuple] +│ │ └── service_policy/ ← IdP reader + PRB invoker: read IdP, call PRB, return list[PolicyRule] │ ├── policy_update/ -│ │ ├── build/ ← TBD -│ │ └── rebuild/ ← TBD -│ └── role_update/ ← deterministic: read role + all scopes, return [(role, all_scopes)] -└── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called only by Controller +│ │ ├── build/ ← calls PRB, returns list[PolicyRule]; TBD internals +│ │ └── rebuild/ ← delegates to Build; TBD internals +│ └── role_update/ ← calls PRB with (role, all_scopes), returns list[PolicyRule] +└── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called by Service Policy, Build, and Role sub-agent ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md index a8c1e00ee..63aea85cb 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## Description -The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/policy_rules_builder/`. It exposes two module-level functions that the Controller calls based on the trigger type. Each function internally runs a LangGraph `StateGraph`; the Controller is decoupled from LangGraph mechanics. The PRB fetches its own RAG context from ChromaDB (both collections) and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the input. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. +The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/policy_rules_builder/`. It exposes two module-level functions that producing sub-agents call directly. Each function internally runs a LangGraph `StateGraph`; callers are decoupled from LangGraph mechanics. The PRB fetches its own RAG context from ChromaDB (both collections) and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the input. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. --- @@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ Used as one of the calls for UC1 (Service Onboarding). See the Controller sub-PR ## Use-case dispatch -| Use Case | Function(s) called | -|---|---| -| UC1 — Service Onboarding | Both `build_role_rules` and `build_scope_rules` (details in Controller sub-PRD) | -| UC2 — Policy Update (Build/Rebuild) | TBD | -| UC3 — Role Update | `build_role_rules(role, scopes)` | +| Use Case | Caller | Function(s) called | +|---|---|---| +| UC1 — Service Onboarding | Service Policy sub-agent | `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` per agent/tool scope + `build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)` per agent role (agent path only) | +| UC2 — Policy Update (Build) | Build sub-agent | TBD | +| UC3 — Role Update | Role sub-agent | `build_role_rules(role, all_scopes)` — one call | --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 3aeb84f82..1acdeaa13 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipelin 1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. 2. **Service Policy** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), package into `list[tuple]`, return to the Orchestrator. -The Orchestrator returns only the `list[tuple]` to the Controller. The Controller runs the PRB → PCE pipeline; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. +The Orchestrator returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls the PCE; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. ```mermaid flowchart TD @@ -41,9 +41,8 @@ flowchart TD PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC - ORC -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB - PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + SA_POL -->|"calls"| PRB + ORC -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` @@ -53,8 +52,8 @@ flowchart TD **Sequence:** 1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. -2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type)` → get back `list[tuple]`. -3. Return the `list[tuple]` to the Controller. +2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. +3. Return the `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. @@ -160,33 +159,25 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): `onboarding/service_policy/` -**Nature:** deterministic, non-LLM module. Pure IdP reader + tuple packager. +**Nature:** deterministic IdP reader + PRB invoker. -**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's own roles + scopes (from Provision output), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, and package the `list[tuple]` that the Controller will run through the PRB. +**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's own roles + scopes (from Provision output), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. -The two exclusion types prevent self-mapping and keep each tuple's semantic intent crisp: -- `(all_roles, agent_scopes)` = *who else may call my skills* -- `(agent_roles, all_scopes)` = *what else may I call* +The two call directions prevent self-mapping and keep each PRB call's semantic intent crisp: +- `build_scope_rules(other_roles, agent_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* +- `build_role_rules(agent_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (agent path only) ### Steps 1. Receive `service_provision: ServiceProvision` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. 2. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service_provision.roles}`). 3. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service_provision.scopes}`). -4. Package and return: - - **`service_type = tool`:** - ``` - [(other_roles, tool_scopes)] - ``` - where `tool_scopes = [Scope(s) for s in service_provision.scopes]`. - - **`service_type = agent`:** - ``` - [(other_roles, agent_scopes), - (agent_roles, other_scopes)] - ``` - where `agent_scopes = [Scope(s) for s in service_provision.scopes]` and `agent_roles = [Role(r) for r in service_provision.roles]`. - -**Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to `agent_roles`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +4. Call PRB and merge: + - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. + - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`; call `build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)` for each role in `service_provision.roles`. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. +5. Return merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. + +**Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to each `agent_role`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). ## File structure @@ -202,7 +193,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ │ └── types.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision └── service_policy/ ├── __init__.py - └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type) + └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] ``` ## Out of scope diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 7be51c799..03308d431 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -33,20 +33,22 @@ flowchart TD PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] + SA_REBUILD -->|"delegates"| SA_BUILD + SA_BUILD -->|"calls"| PRB + CTRL -->|"build"| SA_BUILD CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA_REBUILD - SA_BUILD -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - SA_REBUILD -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB - PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + SA_BUILD -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA_REBUILD -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` ## What is known - **Two sub-agents:** Build (responds to `aiac.apply.policy.build` + `POST /apply/policy/build`) and Rebuild (responds to `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` only). -- Both return `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` to the Controller. -- The Controller runs the PRB per tuple → merge → single `compute_and_apply`. This is the same uniform pipeline as all other UCs. +- Build calls the PRB directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. +- Rebuild delegates to Build and returns Build's `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. +- The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` via the PCE — the same pattern as all other UCs. - Internal behavior (how Build/Rebuild sub-agents derive their tuple content, what IdP data they read, whether any LLM node is involved) is **deferred** — to be resolved in a dedicated grill session. ## Out of scope (this stub) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 0e913b301..0552c90cd 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ flowchart TD PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] + SA -->|"calls"| PRB + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA - SA -->|"list[tuple]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"per tuple"| PRB - PRB -->|"rules"| CTRL + SA -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE ``` @@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ flowchart TD **Steps:** 1. Read the triggering role (`role_id`) from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. 2. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -3. Return `[( [role], all_scopes )]` — a one-element `list[tuple]`. +3. Call `build_role_rules(role, all_scopes)` on the PRB. +4. Return the resulting `list[PolicyRule]`. -**Output:** `list[tuple[list[Role], list[Scope]]]` — one element. +**Output:** `list[PolicyRule]`. ## Controller behaviour (for this UC) -1. Receives `[(role, all_scopes)]` from the sub-agent. -2. Calls the PRB once with `(role, all_scopes)` → `list[PolicyRule]` (only the relevant scope mappings for that role). See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). -3. Calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. +1. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from the Role sub-agent (PRB already called and merged internally). +2. Calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. - The PCE unconditionally deletes the role's stale rules before applying the new ones. See [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). -4. Returns bare HTTP status; writes summary + debug to log. +3. Returns bare HTTP status; writes summary + debug to log. ## File structure From 03218be24a50db88c5a498faa7bda4d212d8e41d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 13:09:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 144/273] docs(aiac): align idp-configuration-service spec with implementation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit GET /services/{id}/roles and POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id} use the service account approach (get_client_service_account_user → get_realm_roles_of_user / assign_realm_roles), not the client-scope mapping API that the spec previously described. GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes uses get_all_roles_of_client_scope + realmMappings extraction, not get_realm_roles_of_client_scope. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 32 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 3536178b9..1a6239f86 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | -| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service via scope mappings | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service's account | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/scopes` | _(iterates all realm client scopes; filters to those with role mapped)_ | Scopes that have this realm role mapped | | POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | | POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | -| POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/scope-mappings/realm` | Assign existing role to service | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, ...)` | Assign existing realm role to service account | | GET | `/health` | `admin.get_server_info()` — uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`; no `?realm=` param | Readiness probe | `GET /services/{service_id}`: @@ -52,11 +52,12 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: -1. Calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` to return the realm roles assigned to the service via scope mappings. -2. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of realm role objects. -3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. - -> **Note:** This endpoint returns *realm roles* assigned through the client-scope mapping API (consistent with how `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` assigns them via `assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope`). It does **not** use `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions rather than realm role assignments. +1. Calls `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` to get the service account user. +2. Extracts `user["id"]` from the result. +3. Calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` to return the realm roles assigned to the service account. +4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of realm role objects. +5. Returns `[]` (empty array) if `KeycloakError` has `response_code == 400` (service has no service account — not an error). +6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on other `KeycloakError`. `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` to return the realm-level client scopes assigned as defaults to the service. @@ -66,17 +67,19 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: `GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: 1. Calls `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)` to resolve the role's ID. 2. Iterates all realm client scopes via `admin.get_client_scopes()`. -3. For each scope, calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])` and includes the scope if the role's ID appears in the result. +3. For each scope, calls `admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])` and includes the scope if the role's ID appears in the `realmMappings` list of the result. 4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client scope objects that have this realm role mapped. 5. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. > **Performance note:** This is an O(scopes) endpoint — one Keycloak call per realm client scope. Suitable for infrequent enrichment calls; not intended for high-throughput polling. `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: -1. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles_to_client_scope(service_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the role to the service's scope mappings. -2. Returns `201 Created` on success. -3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned to the service. -4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. +1. Calls `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` to get the service account user. +2. Extracts `user["id"]` from the result. +3. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the realm role to the service account. +4. Returns `201 Created` on success. +5. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned. +6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter specifying the Keycloak realm to operate in. Returns `422 Unprocessable Entity` if the parameter is absent. `/health` accepts no realm parameter — it calls `_get_or_create_admin(os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"])` directly. @@ -137,8 +140,9 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - `get_admin(realm: str = Query(...))` is a FastAPI dependency. On each call it checks the cache; on a miss it acquires the lock, double-checks, and constructs a new `KeycloakAdmin(realm_name=realm, user_realm_name=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM, ...)`. FastAPI returns `422` automatically if `realm` is absent. - All endpoints except `/health` declare `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. `/health` calls `_get_or_create_admin` directly with `os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]` — no FastAPI dependency, no realm query param. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. -- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(service_id)` — returns realm roles assigned to the service via the client-scope mapping API (not `get_client_roles`, which returns client-specific role definitions). +- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)`. Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no service account); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. - `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. -- `GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: resolve role ID via `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)`, then iterate `admin.get_client_scopes()` and filter to scopes where the role ID appears in `admin.get_realm_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])`. +- `GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: resolve role ID via `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)`, then iterate `admin.get_client_scopes()` and for each scope call `admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])`; extract `realmMappings` from the result and include the scope if the role ID appears in that list. +- `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])`. - On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. From d715b898b36ead46b248a9fe2af2428bba8b7913 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 15:08:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 145/273] feat(aiac): implement id-only hash/eq, remove set_service_type, update tests and smoke test - Add __hash__/__eq__ (id-only) to Role, Service, Scope in idp/configuration/models.py - Remove set_service_type() and unused Literal import from idp/configuration/api.py - Add TestHashAndEquality (15 tests) to test/pdp/library/test_models.py - Replace TestSetServiceType with TestSetServiceTypeRemoved in test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py - Add TestListServiceScopes and extend TestListServiceRoles in test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py - Add get_services_by_role/get_services_by_scope sections to smoke test show_keycloak_data.py Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 10 --- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 9 +++ aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py | 16 +++++ aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py | 42 ++--------- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py | 70 +++++++++++++++++++ .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 49 +++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index 9ea1a2b26..a76c14489 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ import os from pathlib import Path -from typing import Literal import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv @@ -150,15 +149,6 @@ def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: self._check(resp) return Role.model_validate(resp.json()) - def set_service_type(self, service_id: str, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service: - resp = requests.patch( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}", - json={"type": service_type}, - params=self._params(), - ) - self._check(resp) - return Service.model_validate(resp.json()) - def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: resp = requests.post( f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}", diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index f5e6663e9..25e040c8e 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ class Role(BaseModel): composite: bool childRoles: list["Role"] = [] + __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Role) and self.id == other.id + class Service(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") @@ -37,6 +40,9 @@ class Service(BaseModel): roles: list["Role"] = [] scopes: list["Scope"] = [] + __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Service) and self.id == other.id + @model_validator(mode="before") @classmethod def _resolve_keycloak_fields(cls, data: Any) -> Any: @@ -75,6 +81,9 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): name: str description: str | None = None + __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Scope) and self.id == other.id + Subject.model_rebuild() Role.model_rebuild() diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py index 5285203c1..2bd6a76dc 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -108,6 +108,22 @@ def main() -> None: print(f" description : {sc.description or '—'}") print(f"Total: {len(scopes)} scope(s)\n") + # --- Services by Role (PCE queries) --- + print("=== Services by Role ===") + for r in roles: + svcs_for_role: list[Service] = cfg.get_services_by_role(r) + names = ", ".join(s.serviceId for s in svcs_for_role) if svcs_for_role else "—" + print(f" {r.name}: {names}") + print() + + # --- Services by Scope (PCE queries) --- + print("=== Services by Scope ===") + for sc in scopes: + svcs_for_scope: list[Service] = cfg.get_services_by_scope(sc) + names = ", ".join(s.serviceId for s in svcs_for_scope) if svcs_for_scope else "—" + print(f" {sc.name}: {names}") + print() + if __name__ == "__main__": main() diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py index 4b72af3dd..3bd0588c8 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py @@ -367,47 +367,13 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_every_request(self, monkeypatch): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# set_service_type +# set_service_type — removed # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestSetServiceType: - SERVICE_ID = "svc-001" - - def test_issues_patch_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") - assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services/{self.SERVICE_ID}" - - def test_json_body_uses_type_key(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Agent"} - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") - assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"type": "Agent"} - - def test_returns_service_instance(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "type": "Tool"} - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)): - result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") - assert isinstance(result, Service) - assert result.type == "Tool" - - def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - updated = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_ok(updated)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Tool") - assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} - - def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.patch", return_value=_err()): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(self.SERVICE_ID, "Agent") +class TestSetServiceTypeRemoved: + def test_set_service_type_does_not_exist(self): + assert not hasattr(Configuration(REALM), "set_service_type") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py index d8e1798b5..6ea2d7904 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py @@ -441,3 +441,73 @@ def test_no_protocol_field(self): def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s3", "name": "roles", "unknownAttr": "dropped"}) assert not hasattr(s, "unknownAttr") + + +class TestHashAndEquality: + def _service(self, id_: str) -> Service: + return Service.model_validate({"id": id_, "clientId": id_, "enabled": True}) + + def _role(self, id_: str) -> Role: + return Role.model_validate({"id": id_, "name": "r", "composite": False}) + + def _scope(self, id_: str) -> Scope: + return Scope.model_validate({"id": id_, "name": "s"}) + + # Service + + def test_service_equal_ids_are_equal(self): + assert self._service("x") == self._service("x") + + def test_service_equal_ids_same_hash(self): + assert hash(self._service("x")) == hash(self._service("x")) + + def test_service_different_ids_not_equal(self): + assert self._service("a") != self._service("b") + + def test_service_usable_as_dict_key(self): + svc = self._service("svc1") + d = {svc: "val"} + assert d[svc] == "val" + + # Role + + def test_role_equal_ids_are_equal(self): + assert self._role("x") == self._role("x") + + def test_role_equal_ids_same_hash(self): + assert hash(self._role("x")) == hash(self._role("x")) + + def test_role_different_ids_not_equal(self): + assert self._role("a") != self._role("b") + + def test_role_usable_as_dict_key(self): + role = self._role("r1") + d = {role: "val"} + assert d[role] == "val" + + # Scope + + def test_scope_equal_ids_are_equal(self): + assert self._scope("x") == self._scope("x") + + def test_scope_equal_ids_same_hash(self): + assert hash(self._scope("x")) == hash(self._scope("x")) + + def test_scope_different_ids_not_equal(self): + assert self._scope("a") != self._scope("b") + + def test_scope_usable_as_dict_key(self): + scope = self._scope("sc1") + d = {scope: "val"} + assert d[scope] == "val" + + # Cross-type: same id, different type + + def test_service_not_equal_to_role_with_same_id(self): + assert self._service("x") != self._role("x") + + def test_service_not_equal_to_scope_with_same_id(self): + assert self._service("x") != self._scope("x") + + def test_role_not_equal_to_scope_with_same_id(self): + assert self._role("x") != self._scope("x") diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index db4d7c574..016f3f231 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -117,6 +117,50 @@ def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): assert resp.status_code == 502 assert "error" in resp.json() + def test_returns_empty_list_when_client_has_no_service_account(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="Client does not have a service account", response_code=400 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [] + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /services/{service_id}/scopes +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestListServiceScopes: + def test_returns_json_array(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.return_value = [ + {"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}, + {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}, {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}] + + def test_verifies_get_client_default_client_scopes_called(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.return_value = [] + _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}") + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="not found", response_code=404 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() @@ -609,6 +653,11 @@ def test_get_service_permissions(self): admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/roles?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + def test_get_service_scopes(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/scopes?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + def test_get_role_composites(self): admin = MagicMock() admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() From df10fd74451e56578b14ea5205296ab80102f413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:09:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 146/273] minor pathe related fixes Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/pyrightconfig.json | 13 +++---------- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 10 +++++----- aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json index be3a2acbe..07e66ea11 100644 --- a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json +++ b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ { "include": [ - "src" + "src", + "test" ], "extraPaths": [ "src", - "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy" ], "pythonVersion": "3.12", "typeCheckingMode": "basic", @@ -15,13 +15,6 @@ "extraPaths": [ "src" ] - }, - { - "root": "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy", - "pythonVersion": "3.12", - "extraPaths": [ - "src" - ] } ] -} \ No newline at end of file +} diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 8cfa41f7d..40aa5a45a 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder +from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm @@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ def compare_policies( expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) for role in expected_roles - generated_roles: - differences.append(f"Missing realm role: '{role}'") + differences.append(f"Missing role: '{role}'") for role in generated_roles - expected_roles: - differences.append(f"Unexpected extra realm role: '{role}'") + differences.append(f"Unexpected extra role: '{role}'") for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: gen_set = generated[role] @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ def test_save_policy_includes_description_comment(tmp_path): def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file, monkeypatch): - """save_policy_rego writes realm_roles and default Rego files, plus per-service files.""" + """save_policy_rego writes roles and default Rego files, plus per-service files.""" from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration as FileConfiguration @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file, monkeypatch): save_policy_rego(policy, str(tmp_path), realm="demo") - assert (tmp_path / "realm_roles.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "roles.rego").exists() assert (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").exists() assert (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").exists() assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_Dummy.rego").exists() diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py index 6ee40d46c..15777987f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState -from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState +from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState +from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState from base_mapper import ( extract_explanation_and_json, validate_mapping_items, From bbafbd354554b3b04a10de445a9b6198fba8b0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 17:24:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 147/273] docs(aiac): add subject_roles to AgentPolicyModel and PCE algorithm MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - policy-model.md: add subject_roles dict[Subject, list[Role]] field; extend Subject hashability (__hash__/__eq__ by id); update usage example and testing decisions - library-idp.md: add Subject to hashability set; add get_subjects_by_role(role) -> list[Subject] to Configuration class - idp-configuration-service.md: add GET /subjects?role_id= filtered variant (role name resolution via get_realm_role_by_id, enriched subject list) - policy-computation-engine.md: rewrite algorithm to 7 steps — composite role flattening, source_roles population (gap fix), subject_roles population, realm-level role semantics; update deps and testing decisions Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 10 +++++- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 12 +++++-- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 31 ++++++++++++------- .../requirements/components/policy-model.md | 17 +++++----- 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 1a6239f86..5b18a6875 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | |--------|------|------------------------|-------------| -| GET | `/subjects` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All subjects (users) in realm | +| GET | `/subjects` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All subjects (users) in realm; filtered to subjects with a specific role when `role_id` query param is provided | | GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | | GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{subject_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and service permission assignments for a subject | | GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | @@ -26,6 +26,14 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, ...)` | Assign existing realm role to service account | | GET | `/health` | `admin.get_server_info()` — uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`; no `?realm=` param | Readiness probe | +`GET /subjects?role_id={role_id}` (filtered variant): +1. Calls `admin.get_realm_role_by_id(role_id)` to resolve the role name from its ID. +2. Calls `admin.get_realm_role_members(role_name)` (`GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/users`) to retrieve users directly assigned to the role. +3. For each returned user, enriches with realm role assignments by calling `GET /subjects/{id}/assignments?realm=<realm>` (same enrichment as the unfiltered `GET /subjects` endpoint). +4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of enriched user objects. +5. Returns `[]` (empty array) when no subject holds the role directly. +6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + `GET /services/{service_id}`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)`. 2. Returns `200 OK` with the client JSON on success. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index a11d0952d..d2fde3956 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -38,14 +38,14 @@ All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard u Model definition order: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. -`Service`, `Role`, and `Scope` implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: +`Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: ```python __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id ``` -`frozen=True` is **not** used — these models have list fields that must remain mutable. The `id`-only hash enables their use as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles` and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. +`frozen=True` is **not** used — these models have list fields that must remain mutable. The `id`-only hash enables their use as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles`, `AgentPolicyModel.subject_roles`, and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. #### `Subject` @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ class Configuration: def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: ... def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_subjects_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Subject]: ... def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: ... def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: ... @@ -197,6 +198,13 @@ class Configuration: 2. Returns all services that expose this scope. 3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no service exposes the scope. +`get_subjects_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Subject]`: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?role_id={role.id}&realm=<self.realm>` +2. Returns all subjects (users) that have this role directly assigned, enriched with their full realm role assignments (same enrichment as `get_subjects()`). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no subject holds the role. + +> **Note:** This method returns only subjects with a **direct** assignment of the given role. Composite role traversal (resolving `childRoles` and querying each) is the caller's responsibility — see PCE algorithm in `aiac.policy.computation`. + `create_scope`: 1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a scope with that name already exists). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md index a91279c66..2a15f6768 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -66,15 +66,22 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]`, the engine executes these steps: -1. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. +1. **Composite role flattening:** for each rule's `role`, recursively collect the role and all descendant roles from `role.childRoles` into a flat set of leaf roles. All subsequent role-based queries operate on this flattened set. A non-composite role yields a set containing only itself. -2. **Role → outbound services:** for each rule's `role`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(rule.role) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. +2. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. -3. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(rule.role)` returns an empty list, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment is made for that rule. +3. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: + - Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of S's `AgentPolicyModel`. + - Append R to `source_roles[S]` (creating the entry if absent). -4. **Additive merge:** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. Append new rules that are not already present (de-duplicate by value). Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. +4. **Role → subjects + `subject_roles`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(R) -> list[Subject]`. For each returned subject S: + - Append R to `subject_roles[S]` (creating the entry if absent). -5. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). +5. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(R)` returns an empty list for a flattened role R, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment or `source_roles` entry is made for that role. `subject_roles` entries are still recorded if `get_subjects_by_role(R)` returns subjects. + +6. **Additive merge:** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. Append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles` and `subject_roles` list entries by `id`). Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. + +7. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). ### Merge Semantics @@ -85,7 +92,7 @@ Rules are appended additively — existing `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` | Module | Purpose | |--------|---------| | `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope`, `get_subjects_by_role` | | `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` | | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — push updated `PolicyModel` to OPA | @@ -109,16 +116,18 @@ The PCE is **not** called by: Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer — not internal merge logic directly. **Seam:** mock all four downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: -- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope` +- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services_by_role`, `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`, and `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role` - `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` - `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy` Key behaviors to assert: - Rules with a resolvable scope result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_scope`. -- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`. -- Realm-level roles (empty service list) do not produce `apply_agent_policy` calls. -- Existing rules in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge. -- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice. +- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model contains that service → role mapping. +- `get_subjects_by_role` is called for each flattened role; `subject_roles` on the written model contains each returned subject → role mapping. +- A composite role is flattened: `get_services_by_role` and `get_subjects_by_role` are called for each child role, not the composite role itself. +- Realm-level roles (empty service list from `get_services_by_role`) do not produce `outbound_rules` or `source_roles` entries; `subject_roles` entries are still recorded for any subjects returned by `get_subjects_by_role`. +- Existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge. +- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate `source_roles` / `subject_roles` list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. - `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. - An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md index c6a42e58c..3b0bfde2e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/policy/ | Dependency | Purpose | |------------|---------| | `pydantic` | `BaseModel`, `ConfigDict` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope`, `Service` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope`, `Service`, `Subject` | No HTTP client dependency. No `requests`, no `python-dotenv`. @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound ru | `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | | `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | | `source_roles` | `dict[Service, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service → roles granted | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[Subject, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (user) → roles held on behalf of which this agent acts | | `scope_targets` | `dict[Scope, list[Service]]` | Outbound: scope → target services permitted | | `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | | `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | @@ -96,10 +97,10 @@ A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy` on the Policy ### Hashability of `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` -`Service`, `Role`, and `Scope` (defined in `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) are used as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles` and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. They implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: +`Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` (defined in `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) are used as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles`, `AgentPolicyModel.subject_roles`, and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. They implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: ```python -# On Service, Role, Scope in aiac.idp.configuration.models: +# On Service, Role, Scope, Subject in aiac.idp.configuration.models: __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id ``` @@ -110,10 +111,11 @@ __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other. ```python from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject role = Role(id="r1", name="weather-reader", composite=False) scope = Scope(id="s1", name="read") +subject = Subject(id="u1", username="alice", enabled=True) rule = PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( @@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( agent_roles=[role], agent_scopes=[scope], source_roles={}, + subject_roles={subject: [role]}, scope_targets={}, inbound_rules=[rule], outbound_rules=[], @@ -140,8 +143,8 @@ model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) Key behaviors to assert: - `PolicyRule` accepts typed `Role` and `Scope` objects; rejects plain `str` where `Role`/`Scope` is expected. -- `AgentPolicyModel` with `Service` and `Scope` keys in `source_roles` and `scope_targets` is serializable and deserializable via `model_dump()` / `model_validate()`. -- Two `Role` / `Scope` / `Service` instances with the same `id` are equal and hash-equal (usable as dict keys without collision). +- `AgentPolicyModel` with `Service`, `Subject`, and `Scope` keys in `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` is serializable and deserializable via `model_dump()` / `model_validate()`. +- Two `Role` / `Scope` / `Service` / `Subject` instances with the same `id` are equal and hash-equal (usable as dict keys without collision). - Two instances with different `id` values are not equal. - `ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` causes unknown fields to be silently discarded on `model_validate()`. @@ -157,5 +160,5 @@ Key behaviors to assert: ## Further Notes -- The `id`-only hash is intentional: two `Role` objects representing the same Keycloak role but fetched at different times (with potentially different `mappedScopes` or `childRoles`) must be treated as equal for dict key lookup. +- The `id`-only hash is intentional: two `Role` / `Subject` / `Service` / `Scope` objects representing the same Keycloak entity but fetched at different times (with potentially different enrichment fields) must be treated as equal for dict key lookup. - `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` imports `PolicyRule` from `aiac.policy.model`. The `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers in that file remain in place and are used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents directly; they are not consumed by the PCE. From b9667dddb243ed8b60946808dfd1008deb8e5fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 17:49:36 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 148/273] feat(aiac): add get_subjects_by_role, move IdP tests to test/idp/ - Add Subject.__hash__/__eq__ (id-only, type(self) guard) - Add Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(role) to IdP library - Add role_id query param to GET /subjects in IdP configuration service - Restructure test/pdp/{library,service/configuration} -> test/idp/ to mirror src/aiac/idp/ layout - Update CLAUDE.md test command and smoke test path Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 83 +++++++++++++++++++ aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 8 ++ aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 3 + .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 21 ++++- .../service/configuration => idp}/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration}/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration}/show_keycloak_data.py | 0 .../configuration}/test_configuration.py | 0 .../configuration}/test_models.py | 0 aiac/test/idp/service/__init__.py | 0 .../idp/service/configuration/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/__init__.py | 0 .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 0 13 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/CLAUDE.md rename aiac/test/{pdp/service/configuration => idp}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/test/{pdp/service/configuration/keycloak => idp/configuration}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/test/{pdp/library => idp/configuration}/show_keycloak_data.py (100%) rename aiac/test/{pdp/library => idp/configuration}/test_configuration.py (100%) rename aiac/test/{pdp/library => idp/configuration}/test_models.py (100%) create mode 100644 aiac/test/idp/service/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py rename aiac/test/{pdp => idp}/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py (100%) diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..504c6e824 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# AIAC Codebase Guide + +All paths below are relative to `kagenti-extensions/aiac/`. + +## Requirements / PRD docs + +`inception/requirements/PRD.md` — master PRD. +`inception/requirements/components/` — per-component specs. + +For current file list, `ls inception/requirements/` and `ls inception/requirements/components/`. + +## Requirements directory — link-following policy + +When a document under `inception/requirements/` contains a markdown link to another file, use the AskUserQuestion tool to ask before reading it — present "Yes" and "No" as clickable options. If the user picks Yes, read the file normally. If No, treat the link as a label and continue without reading it. + +## Issue tracking + +Issues are tracked as local markdown files under `inception/issues/`, not on GitHub. +Never use `gh` commands to create, update, or list issues — always read/write the local files directly. + +`inception/issues/implementation-plan.md` — overall implementation plan. +For current issue list, `ls` the subdirectories under `inception/issues/`. + +## Issue tracking — codebase inspection policy + +When working on an issue would benefit from inspecting the relevant source code, use the AskUserQuestion tool to ask before doing so — present "Yes" and "No" as clickable options. If the user picks Yes, inspect the codebase normally. If No, work from the issue description and existing context only. + +## Source code + +`src/aiac/` — Python package root (`__init__.py` is empty). + +Key stable structure: +- `idp/` — IdP configuration service and models +- `pdp/` — PDP policy writer service and library +- `agent/` — FastAPI controller, NATS consumer, orchestrators + - `agent/onboarding/policy/` — FROZEN, do not modify (PreToolUse hook blocks writes) + +Pending namespaces (to be added per PRD): `policy/model/`, `policy/store/`, `policy/computation/`. + +For current file list, `ls` or `find` under `src/aiac/`. + +## Tests + +`test/` — mirrors `src/aiac/` structure. For current file list, `ls` under `test/`. + +**Unit test command** (`test/policy/` excluded — frozen imports cause collection errors): + +```bash +.venv/bin/pytest test/ --ignore=test/policy/ -m "not integration" +``` + +Use `ls test/` to discover current test directories. + +**Smoke test** (requires live service at `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, default `http://127.0.0.1:7071`): + +```bash +.venv/bin/python test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py +``` + +Exercises all `Configuration` methods — run `ls test/idp/configuration/` to see current coverage. + +## Python environment + +Virtual environment: `kagenti-extensions/aiac/.venv` + +Activate: `source kagenti-extensions/aiac/.venv/bin/activate` +Run directly: `kagenti-extensions/aiac/.venv/bin/python` / `kagenti-extensions/aiac/.venv/bin/pytest` + +Always use this venv for any Python execution, test runs, or dependency checks. + +## Kubernetes & builds + +Config: `k8s/`, `pyproject.toml`, `pyrightconfig.json` + +Docker images: + +| Image | Dockerfile location | +|-------|-------------------| +| `aiac-pdp-config` | `src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile` | +| `aiac-pdp-policy-opa` | `src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile` | +| `aiac-policy-store` | `src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile` | +| `aiac-agent` | `src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile` | +| `aiac-rag-ingest` | `rag-ingest/` (separate directory) | diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index a76c14489..e22b638f5 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -108,6 +108,14 @@ def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: self._check(resp) return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + def get_subjects_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Subject]: + resp = requests.get( + f"{self._base_url()}/subjects", + params={"role_id": role.id, "realm": self.realm}, + ) + self._check(resp) + return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: resp = requests.get( f"{self._base_url()}/services", diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index 25e040c8e..c403a56db 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ class Subject(BaseModel): enabled: bool roles: list["Role"] = [] + __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id + class Role(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 28103ded0..8226b04d4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -51,8 +51,25 @@ class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): @app.get("/subjects") -def list_subjects(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: +def list_subjects( + realm: str = Query(...), + role_id: str | None = Query(default=None), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + try: + if role_id is not None: + role = admin.get_realm_role_by_id(role_id) + role_name = role["name"] + users = admin.get_realm_role_members(role_name) + result = [] + for user in users: + raw = admin.get_all_roles_of_user(user["id"]) + result.append({ + **user, + "realmMappings": raw.get("realmMappings", []), + "serviceMappings": raw.get("clientMappings", {}), + }) + return result return admin.get_users() except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/test/idp/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/__init__.py rename to aiac/test/idp/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py rename to aiac/test/idp/configuration/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py rename to aiac/test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/pdp/library/test_configuration.py rename to aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/pdp/library/test_models.py rename to aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/__init__.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/__init__.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py rename to aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py From 8f1f7189fd49fb6d00a4bf2ee5abb84f6f2f58db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 17:52:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 149/273] Adding aiac/.gitignore Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/.gitignore | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/.gitignore diff --git a/aiac/.gitignore b/aiac/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e271238b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# Claude Code related ignores +handoff* \ No newline at end of file From 7dadcdf22d8d63ec63692f33accfb0faf83b7ad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 17:53:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 150/273] test(aiac): add unit tests for Subject hashability and get_subjects_by_role - TestSubjectHashability: id-only hash/eq, cross-type inequality, dict key usage - TestGetSubjectsByRole (library): happy path, empty list, non-2xx error, realm forwarded - TestGetSubjectsByRole (service): 2-subject enrichment, empty members, 502 on each Keycloak phase error, enrichment shape, missing realm -> 422, unfiltered unchanged Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 94 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 191 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index 3bd0588c8..01666435f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -722,6 +722,103 @@ def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Subject hashability (8.15) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestSubjectHashability: + def _make_subject(self, id_, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": id_, "username": f"user-{id_}", "enabled": True} + return Subject.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_equal_ids_are_equal(self): + assert self._make_subject("u1") == self._make_subject("u1") + + def test_equal_ids_have_same_hash(self): + assert hash(self._make_subject("u1")) == hash(self._make_subject("u1")) + + def test_different_ids_are_not_equal(self): + assert self._make_subject("u1") != self._make_subject("u2") + + def test_subject_vs_role_same_id_not_equal(self): + s = self._make_subject("x1") + r = Role.model_validate({"id": "x1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}) + assert s != r + + def test_subject_vs_service_same_id_not_equal(self): + s = self._make_subject("x1") + svc = Service.model_validate({"id": "x1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}) + assert s != svc + + def test_subject_usable_as_dict_key(self): + s = self._make_subject("u1") + d = {s: "value"} + assert d[s] == "value" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_subjects_by_role (8.15) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetSubjectsByRole: + def _make_role(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "role-uuid", "name": "viewer", "composite": False} + return Role.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_returns_list_of_subject(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert isinstance(result[0], Subject) + assert result[0].id == "u1" + + def test_issues_get_with_role_id_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role(id="my-role-id") + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/subjects" + assert m.call_args[1]["params"] == {"role_id": "my-role-id", "realm": REALM} + + def test_returns_empty_list_when_no_subjects(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert result == [] + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(500)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + + def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert m.call_args[1]["params"]["realm"] == REALM + + def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + payload = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert m.call_count == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_services_by_scope (unchanged) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + class TestGetServicesByScope: def _make_scope(self, **kwargs): defaults = {"id": "scope-uuid", "name": "read:data"} diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 016f3f231..11448bb43 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -613,6 +613,100 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /subjects?role_id= (filtered variant, 2.14) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetSubjectsByRole: + def test_returns_enriched_subjects_for_role(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [ + {"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}, + {"id": "u2", "username": "bob"}, + ] + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.side_effect = [ + {"realmMappings": [{"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"}], "clientMappings": {}}, + {"realmMappings": [{"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"}], "clientMappings": {}}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert len(resp.json()) == 2 + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.assert_called_once_with("rid") + admin.get_realm_role_members.assert_called_once_with("viewer") + assert admin.get_all_roles_of_user.call_count == 2 + + def test_returns_empty_list_when_no_members(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [] + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.assert_not_called() + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error_in_get_role(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="not found", response_code=404 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error_in_get_members(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} + admin.get_realm_role_members.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="error", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error_during_enrichment(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="error", response_code=500 + ) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_enrichment_shape_includes_realm_mappings(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.return_value = { + "realmMappings": [{"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"}], + "clientMappings": {"account": {"mappings": []}}, + } + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert "realmMappings" in body[0] + assert body[0]["realmMappings"] == [{"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"}] + + def test_missing_realm_returns_422(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + resp = TestClient(app).get("/subjects?role_id=rid") + assert resp.status_code == 422 + + def test_unfiltered_still_works(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_users.return_value = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}] + admin.get_users.assert_called_once() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # KeycloakError → 502 on all endpoints # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From d5153323bc4d60e52385f98a7f377af896d15d14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 18:11:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 151/273] feat(aiac): add aiac.policy.model package with PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel - Create aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py with three Pydantic models - Use field_serializer/field_validator for model-keyed dicts (source_roles, scope_targets, subject_roles) to work around Pydantic v2 unhashable-dict-key limitation during model_dump()/model_validate() round-trips - All models use ConfigDict(extra='ignore') - Add 19 unit tests covering construction, ValidationError, serialization, round-trip, hash/eq for all four IdP types, and extra-field suppression Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/policy/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py | 75 ++++++++ aiac/test/policy/model/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 316 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/model/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..700f3fe9a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, field_serializer, field_validator + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject + + +class PolicyRule(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + role: Role + scope: Scope + + +class AgentPolicyModel(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + agent_id: str + agent_roles: list[Role] + agent_scopes: list[Scope] + subject_roles: dict[Subject, list[Role]] + source_roles: dict[Service, list[Role]] + scope_targets: dict[Scope, list[Service]] + inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] + outbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] + + # Pydantic cannot serialize BaseModel instances as dict keys (they serialize + # to dicts, which are unhashable). Represent these three fields as a list of + # {key, value} pairs in the serialized form and reconstruct on validation. + + @field_validator("subject_roles", mode="before") + @classmethod + def _coerce_subject_roles(cls, v: object) -> dict[Subject, list[Role]]: + if isinstance(v, list): + return { + Subject.model_validate(item["key"]): [Role.model_validate(r) for r in item["value"]] + for item in v + } + return v # type: ignore[return-value] + + @field_validator("source_roles", mode="before") + @classmethod + def _coerce_source_roles(cls, v: object) -> dict[Service, list[Role]]: + if isinstance(v, list): + return { + Service.model_validate(item["key"]): [Role.model_validate(r) for r in item["value"]] + for item in v + } + return v # type: ignore[return-value] + + @field_validator("scope_targets", mode="before") + @classmethod + def _coerce_scope_targets(cls, v: object) -> dict[Scope, list[Service]]: + if isinstance(v, list): + return { + Scope.model_validate(item["key"]): [Service.model_validate(s) for s in item["value"]] + for item in v + } + return v # type: ignore[return-value] + + @field_serializer("subject_roles") + def _serialize_subject_roles(self, v: dict[Subject, list[Role]]) -> list[dict]: + return [{"key": k.model_dump(), "value": [r.model_dump() for r in rs]} for k, rs in v.items()] + + @field_serializer("source_roles") + def _serialize_source_roles(self, v: dict[Service, list[Role]]) -> list[dict]: + return [{"key": k.model_dump(), "value": [r.model_dump() for r in rs]} for k, rs in v.items()] + + @field_serializer("scope_targets") + def _serialize_scope_targets(self, v: dict[Scope, list[Service]]) -> list[dict]: + return [{"key": k.model_dump(), "value": [s.model_dump() for s in ss]} for k, ss in v.items()] + + +class PolicyModel(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + agents: list[AgentPolicyModel] diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/model/__init__.py b/aiac/test/policy/model/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1e55a6b66 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +import pytest +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule + + +def _role(id: str = "role-1", name: str = "admin") -> Role: + return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=False) + + +def _scope(id: str = "scope-1", name: str = "read") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=id, name=name) + + +def _service(id: str = "svc-1", service_id: str = "my-service") -> Service: + return Service(id=id, serviceId=service_id, enabled=True) + + +def _subject(id: str = "sub-1", username: str = "alice") -> Subject: + return Subject(id=id, username=username, enabled=True) + + +# --- PolicyRule construction --- + + +def test_policy_rule_with_typed_role_and_scope(): + role = _role() + scope = _scope() + rule = PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) + assert rule.role == role + assert rule.scope == scope + + +def test_policy_rule_rejects_plain_str_role(): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + PolicyRule(role="admin", scope=_scope()) + + +def test_policy_rule_rejects_plain_str_scope(): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + PolicyRule(role=_role(), scope="read") + + +# --- AgentPolicyModel serialization with model dict keys --- + + +def test_agent_policy_model_service_keys_in_source_roles(): + svc = _service() + role = _role() + model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="agent-1", + agent_roles=[role], + agent_scopes=[], + subject_roles={}, + source_roles={svc: [role]}, + scope_targets={}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + dumped = model.model_dump() + assert isinstance(dumped, dict) + + +def test_agent_policy_model_scope_keys_in_scope_targets(): + scope = _scope() + svc = _service() + model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="agent-1", + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[scope], + subject_roles={}, + source_roles={}, + scope_targets={scope: [svc]}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + dumped = model.model_dump() + assert isinstance(dumped, dict) + + +def test_agent_policy_model_subject_keys_in_subject_roles(): + subject = _subject() + role = _role() + model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="agent-1", + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[], + subject_roles={subject: [role]}, + source_roles={}, + scope_targets={}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + dumped = model.model_dump() + assert isinstance(dumped, dict) + + +# --- model_validate round-trip --- + + +def test_agent_policy_model_round_trip(): + subject = _subject() + role = _role() + scope = _scope() + svc = _service() + model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="agent-1", + agent_roles=[role], + agent_scopes=[scope], + subject_roles={subject: [role]}, + source_roles={svc: [role]}, + scope_targets={scope: [svc]}, + inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + dumped = model.model_dump() + restored = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(dumped) + assert restored == model + + +# --- Hash / equality: Role --- + + +def test_role_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): + r1 = _role(id="r1") + r2 = _role(id="r1", name="different-name") + assert r1 == r2 + assert hash(r1) == hash(r2) + d = {r1: "value"} + assert d[r2] == "value" + + +def test_role_different_id_not_equal(): + r1 = _role(id="r1") + r2 = _role(id="r2") + assert r1 != r2 + d = {r1: "v1", r2: "v2"} + assert len(d) == 2 + + +# --- Hash / equality: Scope --- + + +def test_scope_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): + s1 = _scope(id="s1") + s2 = _scope(id="s1", name="other") + assert s1 == s2 + assert hash(s1) == hash(s2) + d = {s1: "value"} + assert d[s2] == "value" + + +def test_scope_different_id_not_equal(): + s1 = _scope(id="s1") + s2 = _scope(id="s2") + assert s1 != s2 + d = {s1: "v1", s2: "v2"} + assert len(d) == 2 + + +# --- Hash / equality: Service --- + + +def test_service_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): + svc1 = _service(id="svc-1") + svc2 = _service(id="svc-1", service_id="other-id") + assert svc1 == svc2 + assert hash(svc1) == hash(svc2) + d = {svc1: "value"} + assert d[svc2] == "value" + + +def test_service_different_id_not_equal(): + svc1 = _service(id="svc-1") + svc2 = _service(id="svc-2") + assert svc1 != svc2 + d = {svc1: "v1", svc2: "v2"} + assert len(d) == 2 + + +# --- Hash / equality: Subject --- + + +def test_subject_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): + sub1 = _subject(id="sub-1") + sub2 = _subject(id="sub-1", username="bob") + assert sub1 == sub2 + assert hash(sub1) == hash(sub2) + d = {sub1: "value"} + assert d[sub2] == "value" + + +def test_subject_different_id_not_equal(): + sub1 = _subject(id="sub-1") + sub2 = _subject(id="sub-2") + assert sub1 != sub2 + d = {sub1: "v1", sub2: "v2"} + assert len(d) == 2 + + +# --- extra='ignore' on all three model types --- + + +def test_policy_rule_ignores_extra_fields(): + role = _role() + scope = _scope() + rule = PolicyRule.model_validate( + {"role": role.model_dump(), "scope": scope.model_dump(), "unknown": "x"} + ) + assert not hasattr(rule, "unknown") + + +def test_agent_policy_model_ignores_extra_fields(): + model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate( + { + "agent_id": "a", + "agent_roles": [], + "agent_scopes": [], + "subject_roles": {}, + "source_roles": {}, + "scope_targets": {}, + "inbound_rules": [], + "outbound_rules": [], + "unknown_field": "ignored", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(model, "unknown_field") + + +def test_policy_model_ignores_extra_fields(): + model = PolicyModel.model_validate({"agents": [], "extra_key": "ignored"}) + assert not hasattr(model, "extra_key") + + +# --- Empty PolicyModel --- + + +def test_policy_model_empty(): + model = PolicyModel(agents=[]) + assert model.agents == [] From 43c5f0e3c5581f44d74fbff7dd7b62b6b82f0082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 18:36:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 152/273] feat(aiac): add policy store service with SQLite-backed FastAPI and unit tests - Add aiac.policy.store.service FastAPI service (port 7074) - In-memory cache as serving layer; write-through to SQLite - Endpoints: GET/POST/DELETE /policy and /policy/agents/{id}, GET /health - 502 on SQLite write failure; 503 on health check failure - AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH defaults to /data/policy_model.db - 18 unit tests using SQLite :memory: seam (all green) - Update policy-store PRD to reflect policy_model.db filename Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/policy-store.md | 4 +- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile | 11 + .../src/aiac/policy/store/service/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py | 146 ++++++++++ .../policy/store/service/requirements.txt | 3 + aiac/test/policy/store/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/policy/store/service/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py | 274 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 436 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/store/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/store/service/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md index a5d098d3d..b83c630c9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Re **Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. -**Storage backend:** SQLite via `sqlite3` stdlib (zero extra dependency — `sqlite3` ships with the Python standard library). Database file: `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`). +**Storage backend:** SQLite via `sqlite3` stdlib (zero extra dependency — `sqlite3` ships with the Python standard library). Database file: `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/policy_model.db`). **Schema:** @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies ( | Variable | Source | Default | |---|---|---| -| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-policy-store-config`) | `/data/state.db` | +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-policy-store-config`) | `/data/policy_model.db` | **Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `pydantic`. `sqlite3` is stdlib (no new dependency). diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fe750599a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY aiac/policy/store/service/requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY . /app/src +ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src + +CMD ["uvicorn", "aiac.policy.store.service.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7074"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0cc871748 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +import os +import sqlite3 +from contextlib import asynccontextmanager +from typing import Annotated + +import uvicorn +from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI +from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + +DB_PATH = os.getenv("AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH", "/data/policy_model.db") + +_cache: dict[str, AgentPolicyModel] = {} +_db_conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None + + +def get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection: + assert _db_conn is not None + return _db_conn + + +def _init_db(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None: + conn.execute( + "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies " + "(agent_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, spec TEXT NOT NULL)" + ) + + +def _load_cache(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None: + global _cache + rows = conn.execute("SELECT agent_id, spec FROM agent_policies").fetchall() + _cache = { + agent_id: AgentPolicyModel.model_validate_json(spec) + for agent_id, spec in rows + } + + +@asynccontextmanager +async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): + global _db_conn + _db_conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH, check_same_thread=False, isolation_level=None) + _init_db(_db_conn) + _load_cache(_db_conn) + yield + if _db_conn: + _db_conn.close() + _db_conn = None + + +app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan) + + +@app.get("/policy", response_model=None) +def get_policy() -> PolicyModel: + return PolicyModel(agents=list(_cache.values())) + + +@app.get("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", response_model=None) +def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str): + if agent_id not in _cache: + return JSONResponse(status_code=404, content={"error": f"agent {agent_id} not found"}) + return _cache[agent_id] + + +@app.post("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", response_model=None) +def upsert_agent_policy( + agent_id: str, + body: AgentPolicyModel, + conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], +) -> Response: + try: + conn.execute( + "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + (agent_id, body.model_dump_json()), + ) + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + _cache[agent_id] = body + return Response(status_code=204) + + +@app.post("/policy", response_model=None) +def replace_policy( + body: PolicyModel, + conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], +) -> Response: + try: + conn.execute("BEGIN") + conn.execute("DELETE FROM agent_policies") + for agent in body.agents: + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + (agent.agent_id, agent.model_dump_json()), + ) + conn.execute("COMMIT") + except sqlite3.Error as e: + try: + conn.execute("ROLLBACK") + except Exception: + pass + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + global _cache + _cache = {agent.agent_id: agent for agent in body.agents} + return Response(status_code=204) + + +@app.delete("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", response_model=None) +def delete_agent_policy( + agent_id: str, + conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], +) -> Response: + try: + conn.execute( + "DELETE FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?", (agent_id,) + ) + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + _cache.pop(agent_id, None) + return Response(status_code=204) + + +@app.delete("/policy", response_model=None) +def delete_all_policies( + conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], +) -> Response: + try: + conn.execute("DELETE FROM agent_policies") + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + global _cache + _cache = {} + return Response(status_code=204) + + +@app.get("/health", response_model=None) +def health(conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)]): + try: + conn.execute("SELECT 1") + return {"status": "ok"} + except Exception: + return JSONResponse(status_code=503, content={"status": "unavailable"}) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=7074) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..50ac7c0f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +pydantic diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/__init__.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/__init__.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..638514b4f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/policy/store/service/main.py FastAPI application.""" + +import sqlite3 +from unittest.mock import MagicMock + +import pytest +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient + +import aiac.policy.store.service.main as svc +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.policy.store.service.main import app, get_db + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Fixtures and helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _role(id: str = "role-1", name: str = "admin") -> Role: + return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=False) + + +def _scope(id: str = "scope-1", name: str = "read") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=id, name=name) + + +def _service(id: str = "svc-1", service_id: str = "my-service") -> Service: + return Service(id=id, serviceId=service_id, enabled=True) + + +def _subject(id: str = "sub-1", username: str = "alice") -> Subject: + return Subject(id=id, username=username, enabled=True) + + +def _make_agent(agent_id: str = "agent-1") -> AgentPolicyModel: + return AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id=agent_id, + agent_roles=[_role()], + agent_scopes=[_scope()], + subject_roles={_subject(): [_role()]}, + source_roles={_service(): [_role()]}, + scope_targets={_scope(): [_service()]}, + inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=_role(), scope=_scope())], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + + +@pytest.fixture +def client(): + """In-memory SQLite DB injected; lifespan bypassed.""" + conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False, isolation_level=None) + svc._init_db(conn) + svc._db_conn = conn + svc._cache = {} + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: conn + yield TestClient(app) + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + conn.close() + svc._db_conn = None + svc._cache = {} + + +@pytest.fixture +def client_with_agent(client): + """Client with one pre-loaded agent in DB and cache.""" + agent = _make_agent("agent-1") + conn = svc._db_conn + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + ("agent-1", agent.model_dump_json()), + ) + svc._cache["agent-1"] = agent + return client + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Startup: cache population +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestStartup: + def test_load_cache_populates_from_db_rows(self): + conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False, isolation_level=None) + svc._init_db(conn) + agent = _make_agent("agent-1") + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + ("agent-1", agent.model_dump_json()), + ) + + svc._load_cache(conn) + + assert "agent-1" in svc._cache + assert svc._cache["agent-1"].agent_id == "agent-1" + conn.close() + svc._cache = {} + + def test_load_cache_empty_when_db_empty(self): + conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False, isolation_level=None) + svc._init_db(conn) + + svc._load_cache(conn) + + assert svc._cache == {} + conn.close() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetPolicy: + def test_returns_empty_policy_model_when_cache_empty(self, client): + resp = client.get("/policy") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert body["agents"] == [] + + def test_returns_policy_model_with_agents_from_cache(self, client_with_agent): + resp = client_with_agent.get("/policy") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert len(body["agents"]) == 1 + assert body["agents"][0]["agent_id"] == "agent-1" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestGetAgentPolicy: + def test_returns_agent_policy_model_when_in_cache(self, client_with_agent): + resp = client_with_agent.get("/policy/agents/agent-1") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()["agent_id"] == "agent-1" + + def test_returns_404_when_agent_not_in_cache(self, client): + resp = client.get("/policy/agents/missing-agent") + assert resp.status_code == 404 + assert resp.json() == {"error": "agent missing-agent not found"} + + def test_get_after_post_returns_updated_value_from_cache_not_db(self, client): + agent = _make_agent("agent-x") + client.post("/policy/agents/agent-x", json=agent.model_dump()) + resp = client.get("/policy/agents/agent-x") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()["agent_id"] == "agent-x" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestUpsertAgentPolicy: + def test_writes_to_db_updates_cache_returns_204(self, client): + agent = _make_agent("agent-2") + resp = client.post("/policy/agents/agent-2", json=agent.model_dump()) + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert "agent-2" in svc._cache + row = svc._db_conn.execute( + "SELECT spec FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?", ("agent-2",) + ).fetchone() + assert row is not None + + def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): + bad_conn = MagicMock() + bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn + agent = _make_agent("agent-err") + resp = client.post("/policy/agents/agent-err", json=agent.model_dump()) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /policy (full rebuild) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestReplacePolicy: + def test_full_rebuild_replaces_cache_returns_204(self, client_with_agent): + new_agent = _make_agent("agent-new") + policy = PolicyModel(agents=[new_agent]) + resp = client_with_agent.post("/policy", json=policy.model_dump()) + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert "agent-1" not in svc._cache + assert "agent-new" in svc._cache + + def test_deletes_all_rows_and_inserts_new_rows(self, client_with_agent): + new_agent = _make_agent("agent-new") + policy = PolicyModel(agents=[new_agent]) + client_with_agent.post("/policy", json=policy.model_dump()) + rows = svc._db_conn.execute( + "SELECT agent_id FROM agent_policies" + ).fetchall() + agent_ids = {r[0] for r in rows} + assert agent_ids == {"agent-new"} + + def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): + bad_conn = MagicMock() + bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn + policy = PolicyModel(agents=[_make_agent()]) + resp = client.post("/policy", json=policy.model_dump()) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestDeleteAgentPolicy: + def test_removes_row_from_db_and_cache_returns_204(self, client_with_agent): + resp = client_with_agent.delete("/policy/agents/agent-1") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert "agent-1" not in svc._cache + row = svc._db_conn.execute( + "SELECT agent_id FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?", ("agent-1",) + ).fetchone() + assert row is None + + def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): + bad_conn = MagicMock() + bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn + resp = client.delete("/policy/agents/agent-1") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestDeletePolicy: + def test_removes_all_rows_clears_cache_returns_204(self, client_with_agent): + resp = client_with_agent.delete("/policy") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert svc._cache == {} + rows = svc._db_conn.execute("SELECT agent_id FROM agent_policies").fetchall() + assert rows == [] + + def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): + bad_conn = MagicMock() + bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn + resp = client.delete("/policy") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /health +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestHealth: + def test_returns_200_when_sqlite_reachable(self, client): + resp = client.get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + + def test_returns_503_when_sqlite_unavailable(self, client): + bad_conn = MagicMock() + bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk I/O error") + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn + resp = client.get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 503 From 9a0c18dd382763a1a946c2c802591ea74a86b0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 18:46:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 153/273] feat(aiac): add policy store library and unit tests Implements aiac.policy.store.library (issue 8.7): - aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py with six module-level functions: get_policy, get_agent_policy, apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy - Models imported from aiac.policy.model.models - AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL env var, default http://127.0.0.1:7074 - Non-2xx responses raise RuntimeError Adds unit tests (issue 8.8): - aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py - 13 tests covering success and error cases for all six functions plus URL fallback; all HTTP calls mocked Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../src/aiac/policy/store/library/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py | 51 +++++ aiac/test/policy/store/library/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 184 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 235 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/store/library/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ca8f77e4d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +import os + +import requests +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + +load_dotenv(dotenv_path=os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".env")) + +_BASE_URL = os.getenv("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") + + +def _base_url() -> str: + return os.getenv("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") + + +def _check(response: requests.Response) -> None: + if not response.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"Policy Store error {response.status_code}") + + +def get_policy() -> PolicyModel: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy") + _check(resp) + return PolicyModel.model_validate(resp.json()) + + +def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}") + _check(resp) + return AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(resp.json()) + + +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None: + resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy", json=model.model_dump()) + _check(resp) + + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: + resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}", json=model.model_dump()) + _check(resp) + + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None: + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}") + _check(resp) + + +def delete_policy() -> None: + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy") + _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/__init__.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1ba189719 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +import importlib +import sys +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + +BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:7074" + +# Minimal valid fixtures +_AGENT_POLICY_DICT = { + "agent_id": "agent-1", + "agent_roles": [], + "agent_scopes": [], + "subject_roles": [], + "source_roles": [], + "scope_targets": [], + "inbound_rules": [], + "outbound_rules": [], +} +_POLICY_DICT = {"agents": [_AGENT_POLICY_DICT]} + + +def _mock_response(status_code: int, json_data: dict | None = None) -> MagicMock: + resp = MagicMock() + resp.status_code = status_code + resp.ok = 200 <= status_code < 300 + if json_data is not None: + resp.json.return_value = json_data + return resp + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestGetPolicy: + def test_returns_policy_model(self): + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _POLICY_DICT) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_policy + result = get_policy() + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy") + assert isinstance(result, PolicyModel) + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(500) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + get_policy() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# get_agent_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestGetAgentPolicy: + def test_returns_agent_policy_model(self): + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_agent_policy + result = get_agent_policy("agent-1") + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/agents/agent-1") + assert isinstance(result, AgentPolicyModel) + assert result.agent_id == "agent-1" + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(404) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_agent_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + get_agent_policy("missing-agent") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# apply_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestApplyPolicy: + def test_posts_serialized_model(self): + model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: + mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(200) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_policy + result = apply_policy(model) + mock_post.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy", json=model.model_dump() + ) + assert result is None + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: + mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(400) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + apply_policy(model) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# apply_agent_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestApplyAgentPolicy: + def test_posts_serialized_agent_model(self): + model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: + mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(200) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy + result = apply_agent_policy("agent-1", model) + mock_post.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/agents/agent-1", json=model.model_dump() + ) + assert result is None + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: + mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(500) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + apply_agent_policy("agent-1", model) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# delete_agent_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestDeleteAgentPolicy: + def test_deletes_agent_policy(self): + with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(204) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_agent_policy + result = delete_agent_policy("agent-1") + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/agents/agent-1") + assert result is None + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(404) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_agent_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + delete_agent_policy("missing-agent") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# delete_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestDeletePolicy: + def test_deletes_policy(self): + with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(204) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_policy + result = delete_policy() + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy") + assert result is None + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(500) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + delete_policy() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# URL fallback +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestUrlFallback: + def test_defaults_to_localhost_7074_when_env_unset(self): + with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False): + # Remove the env var if present + import os + os.environ.pop("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", None) + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _POLICY_DICT) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_policy + get_policy() + call_url = mock_get.call_args[0][0] + assert call_url == "http://127.0.0.1:7074/policy" From fa4253f8cda3692065ccddf5242d0908d3aae5d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 05:51:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 154/273] new model struct Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 4 ++-- .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py | 4 ++-- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 2 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 2 +- .../onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 2 +- .../onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py | 2 +- .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py | 4 ++-- .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 16 ++++++++++++---- 9 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index c43363b4c..f283a27b6 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ - Retry mechanism with semantic verification """ -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule from typing import Optional, Dict import sys @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py index 67e057015..57b81b949 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py @@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service from config import create_llm from full_policy_agent_roles.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Service from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index 9723b9c4e..c7bc8ea85 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.policy.model.models import Role, Scope from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule from .state import SinglePrivilegeState from base_mapper import ( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py index db234a93c..dd13aaeb9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ State Definitions for Single Privilege Mapper """ -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py index 4d17e1160..15715d34d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule from .state import SingleRoleState from base_mapper import ( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py index 66d7c7cc4..025b7a4c7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ State Definitions for Single Role Scope Mapper """ -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py index a99136010..88d5a7305 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service class ServiceMaps: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index 81c116644..cd6f5f64d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index c403a56db..ae917983d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ class Subject(BaseModel): enabled: bool roles: list["Role"] = [] - __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + def __hash__(self) -> int: + return hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id @@ -27,7 +29,9 @@ class Role(BaseModel): composite: bool childRoles: list["Role"] = [] - __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + def __hash__(self) -> int: + return hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Role) and self.id == other.id @@ -43,7 +47,9 @@ class Service(BaseModel): roles: list["Role"] = [] scopes: list["Scope"] = [] - __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + def __hash__(self) -> int: + return hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Service) and self.id == other.id @model_validator(mode="before") @@ -84,7 +90,9 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): name: str description: str | None = None - __hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) + def __hash__(self) -> int: + return hash(self.id) + __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Scope) and self.id == other.id From d270cad0b09531ae4bcf77f37eea425ef1e357ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 14:24:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 155/273] new rego builder + new policy retuns Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 12 +- .../onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py | 8 +- .../onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py | 2 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 47 ++---- .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 5 +- .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py | 46 ++---- .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py | 5 +- .../prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py | 3 +- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 3 +- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 7 +- .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 6 +- .../onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py | 4 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 12 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py | 10 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py | 20 +-- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 143 +----------------- .../policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 6 +- aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py | 6 +- 18 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 261 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 3afa68fe8..0079ff5af 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -39,9 +39,8 @@ from dotenv import load_dotenv -from full_policy_agent_roles.graph import PolicyBuilder +from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm -from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego load_dotenv(dotenv_path="aiac.env", override=True) @@ -96,7 +95,7 @@ def generate_policy_only( llm_models_path = Path(__file__).parent / "config" / "llm_conf.yaml" with open(llm_models_path) as f: llm_config = yaml.safe_load(f) - default_model = llm_config.get("default_model", "gpt-oss") + default_model = llm_config.get("default_model", "gpt-5-mini") # Create LLM instance from llm_models.yaml using default model llm = create_llm(model_name=default_model, verbose=False) @@ -117,11 +116,6 @@ def generate_policy_only( return print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") - print("Generated YAML:") - print("-" * 80) - print(builder.get_yaml_output()) - print("-" * 80) - save_policy_yaml(policy, output_file) print("\nGenerating Rego policy files...") rego_dir = Path(output_file).parent / "rego_policy" @@ -130,7 +124,7 @@ def generate_policy_only( print("\n" + "=" * 80) print("Parsed Role-to-Privilege Mappings:") print("=" * 80) - for rule in policy.rules: + for rule in policy: print(f" - {rule.role.name}: {rule.scope.name}") def main() -> None: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py index a9a294d02..e28406592 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from langgraph.graph import END from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES @@ -332,11 +332,11 @@ def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: ... @abstractmethod - def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: + def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[PolicyRule]: """Convert the workflow result into a list of Rule objects.""" ... - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: + def generate_policy(self, description: str): """ Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. @@ -354,4 +354,4 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: if errors: raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") rules = self._build_rules(result) - return PolicyObjectModel(rules=rules, explanation=result.get("explanation", "")) + return [rules, result.get("explanation", "")] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py index 6a4d37856..74e61fcea 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name: Optional[str], yaml_path: Optional[Pat """ config = load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path) if not model_name: - model_name = config.get("default_model", "gpt-oss") + model_name = config.get("default_model", "gpt-5-mini") if model_name not in config['models']: available = ', '.join(config['models'].keys()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py index f283a27b6..ba4fe0d8d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ """ from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule from typing import Optional, Dict import sys from dataclasses import dataclass @@ -38,12 +37,12 @@ from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure -from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output @dataclass @@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ def _build_policy( explanations = [] # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": Service, "privilege": str} dicts - policy_rules: list[Rule] = [] + policy_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] for _ , service_info in privileges_map.items(): for privilege in service_info["scopes"]: @@ -111,18 +110,17 @@ def _build_policy( roles=roles, privilege=privilege) - result = mapper.generate_policy(description=state['description']) + rules, explanation = mapper.generate_policy(description=state['description']) explanations.append( - f"**{privilege.name}**: {result.explanation}" + f"**{privilege.name}**: {explanation}" ) - policy_rules.extend(result.rules) - policy = PolicyObjectModel( - rules=policy_rules, - explanation = "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "" - ) - + policy_rules.extend(rules) + + explanation = "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "" + policy = policy_rules + return PolicyState( description=state["description"], policy=policy, @@ -157,10 +155,10 @@ def _validate_policy( Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy_obj: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = state.get("policy") + policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = state.get("policy") structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy_obj, + policy, realm_roles, privileges_map ) @@ -381,7 +379,7 @@ def get_graph(self): # PUBLIC API METHODS # ======================================================================== - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: + def generate_policy(self, description: str): """ Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. @@ -414,27 +412,10 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: if errors: raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - self._last_policy_structure: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = final_state["policy"] + self._last_policy_structure: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = final_state["policy"] return final_state["policy"] - - def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: - """ - Generate YAML output from the stored Policy model. - - Must be called after generate_policy(). - - Returns: - Complete YAML policy file content with comments - - Raises: - ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet - """ - if not hasattr(self, '_last_policy_structure') or self._last_policy_structure is None: - raise ValueError("No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy().") - - return _generate_yaml_output(self._last_policy_structure) - + # ============================================================================ # BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py index 1111ab792..764a51b37 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py @@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Optional from operator import add -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule class PolicyState(TypedDict): """ @@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ class PolicyState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded """ description: str - policy: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] + policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt retry_count: int diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py index 57b81b949..222b502b9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py @@ -26,14 +26,12 @@ from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule from config import create_llm from full_policy_agent_roles.state import PolicyState from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure -from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output - @dataclass class PolicyBuilderConfig: @@ -84,7 +82,7 @@ def _build_policy( all_scopes.extend(service_info["scopes"]) explanations = [] - policy_rules: list[Rule] = [] + policy_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] for role in roles: mapper = SingleRoleMapper( @@ -94,22 +92,20 @@ def _build_policy( privileges=all_scopes, ) - result = mapper.generate_policy(description=state["description"]) + rules, explanation = mapper.generate_policy(description=state["description"]) explanations.append( - f"**{role.name}**: {result.explanation}" + f"**{role.name}**: {explanation}" ) - policy_rules.extend(result.rules) + policy_rules.extend(rules) - policy = PolicyObjectModel( - rules=policy_rules, - explanation="\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", - ) + explanation="\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", + print("TBD: log explanation") return { **state, - "policy": policy, + "policy": policy_rules, "messages": [], "errors": [], "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), @@ -136,10 +132,10 @@ def _validate_policy( Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields """ retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy_obj: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = state.get("policy") + policy_rules: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = state.get("policy") structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy_obj, + policy_rules, roles, privileges_map, ) @@ -315,7 +311,7 @@ def get_graph(self): """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" return self.graph - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: + def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> list[PolicyRule]: """ Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. @@ -343,28 +339,10 @@ def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> PolicyObjectModel: if errors: raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - self._last_policy_structure: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] = final_state["policy"] + self._last_policy_structure: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = final_state["policy"] return final_state["policy"] - def get_yaml_output(self) -> str: - """ - Generate YAML output from the stored Policy model. - - Must be called after generate_policy(). - - Returns: - Complete YAML policy file content with comments - - Raises: - ValueError: If no policy has been generated yet - """ - if not hasattr(self, "_last_policy_structure") or self._last_policy_structure is None: - raise ValueError( - "No policy available. Generate a policy first using generate_policy()." - ) - return _generate_yaml_output(self._last_policy_structure) - if __name__ == "__main__": print("Please use aiac_cli.py to run the role-based policy builder.") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py index 27897abc8..9bc295b7a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py @@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Optional from operator import add -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel - +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule class PolicyState(TypedDict): """ @@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ class PolicyState(TypedDict): validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded """ description: str - policy: Optional[PolicyObjectModel] + policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt retry_count: int diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py index 194a37586..b0ac96387 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py @@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ from typing import List -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope - +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope def build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt( role: Role, diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py index a3d8ba4c5..5b1352eaa 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py @@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ from typing import List -from aiac.pdp.library.configuration.models import Role, Scope - +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope def build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt( privilege: Scope, diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py index c7bc8ea85..a30b2bb18 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from aiac.policy.model.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, Role, Scope from .state import SinglePrivilegeState from base_mapper import ( BaseSingleMapper, @@ -264,8 +263,8 @@ def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), } - def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: - return [Rule(role=role, scope=self.privilege) for role in result.get("roles_with_access", [])] + def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[PolicyRule]: + return [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=self.privilege) for role in result.get("roles_with_access", [])] def map_roles(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py index 15715d34d..c0a57ac18 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import Rule +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule from .state import SingleRoleState from base_mapper import ( BaseSingleMapper, @@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), } - def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Rule]: - return [Rule(role=self.role, scope=priv) for priv in result.get("granted_privileges", [])] + def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[PolicyRule]: + return [PolicyRule(role=self.role, scope=priv) for priv in result.get("granted_privileges", [])] def map_privileges(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py index cd6f5f64d..4126a4bd3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py @@ -9,11 +9,11 @@ from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule def validate_policy_structure( - _policy: Optional[PolicyObjectModel], + _policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]], _roles: List[Role], _privileges_map: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] ) -> List[str]: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index ae917983d..87bef7cf7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ class Subject(BaseModel): def __hash__(self) -> int: return hash(self.id) - __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id + def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: + return isinstance(other, Subject) and self.id == other.id class Role(BaseModel): @@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ class Role(BaseModel): def __hash__(self) -> int: return hash(self.id) - __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Role) and self.id == other.id + def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: + return isinstance(other, Role) and self.id == other.id class Service(BaseModel): @@ -50,7 +52,8 @@ class Service(BaseModel): def __hash__(self) -> int: return hash(self.id) - __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Service) and self.id == other.id + def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: + return isinstance(other, Service) and self.id == other.id @model_validator(mode="before") @classmethod @@ -93,7 +96,8 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): def __hash__(self) -> int: return hash(self.id) - __eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, Scope) and self.id == other.id + def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: + return isinstance(other, Scope) and self.id == other.id Subject.model_rebuild() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py index 3f4e03090..d64a25b84 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ from pathlib import Path from typing import Any, Dict -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule __all__ = ["save_policy_rego"] @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ def _generate_default_outbound_rego() -> str: def _generate_policy_rego_inbound( - rules: list[Rule], + rules: list[PolicyRule], service: str, description: str ="" ) -> str: @@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ def _generate_policy_rego_inbound( def save_policy_rego( - policy: PolicyObjectModel, + rules: list[PolicyRule], file_dir: str = "rego_policy", realm: str = "demo", policy_only: bool = False @@ -138,7 +139,6 @@ def save_policy_rego( file_dir: Directory to save Rego files realm: Keycloak realm name (used to fetch user-to-roles mapping) """ - from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration dir_path = Path(file_dir) dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ def save_policy_rego( # } service_id = "Dummy" - policy_rego = _generate_policy_rego_inbound(policy.rules, service_id) + policy_rego = _generate_policy_rego_inbound(rules, service_id) safe_name = service_id.replace("/", "_").replace("\\", "_").replace(" ", "_") policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_name}.rego" with open(policy_path, "w") as f: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py index 3284f5920..3f7bea734 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py @@ -8,30 +8,32 @@ import yaml -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule __all__ = ["save_policy_yaml"] -def _generate_yaml_output(policy: PolicyObjectModel) -> str: +def _generate_yaml_output(policy: list[PolicyRule]) -> str: header = """# Access Control Policy # Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges # Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings # Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) """ - yaml_content = yaml.dump( - policy.model_dump(exclude_none=True), - default_flow_style=False, - sort_keys=False, - allow_unicode=True, - ) + yaml_content ="" + for r in policy: + yaml_content += yaml.dump( + r.model_dump(exclude_none=True), + default_flow_style=False, + sort_keys=False, + allow_unicode=True, + ) footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" return header + yaml_content + footer -def save_policy_yaml(policy: PolicyObjectModel, filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml") -> None: +def save_policy_yaml(policy: list[PolicyRule], filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml") -> None: """ Save a Policy as YAML to a file. diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index 40aa5a45a..d3bec04f5 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel, Rule from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule from config import create_llm @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ def policy_files(fixtures_dir): "claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", - "gpt-oss", + "gpt-5-mini", ]) def llm_model_name(request): return request.param @@ -101,20 +101,16 @@ def mock_llm(): # HELPERS # ============================================================================ -def _make_policy(rules: list[Rule], name: str = "") -> PolicyObjectModel: - return PolicyObjectModel(rules=rules, explanation="") - - -def _make_rule(role_name: str, scope_name: str, service_id: str) -> Rule: +def _make_rule(role_name: str, scope_name: str, service_id: str) -> PolicyRule: role = Role(id=role_name, name=role_name, description="", composite=False) scope = Scope(id=scope_name, name=scope_name) - return Rule(role=role, scope=scope) + return PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) -def _policy_to_role_map(policy: PolicyObjectModel) -> dict[str, set[str]]: +def _policy_to_role_map(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> dict[str, set[str]]: """Extract {role_name: {scope_names}} from a PolicyObjectModel.""" result: dict[str, set[str]] = {} - for rule in policy.rules: + for rule in rules: result.setdefault(rule.role.name, set()) result[rule.role.name].add(rule.scope.name) return result @@ -143,133 +139,6 @@ def compare_policies( return len(differences) == 0, differences -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS (no LLM required) -# ============================================================================ - -def test_save_policy_creates_yaml_file(tmp_path): - """save_policy_yaml writes valid YAML to the specified path.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml - - policy = _make_policy( - [_make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti")], - name="Test policy", - ) - - output_file = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" - save_policy_yaml(policy, str(output_file)) - - assert output_file.exists() - assert len(policy.rules) == 1 - assert policy.rules[0].role.name == "developer" - assert policy.rules[0].scope.name == "demo-ui" - assert "# Access Control Policy" in output_file.read_text() - - -def test_save_policy_includes_description_comment(tmp_path): - """save_policy_yaml writes a file with rules stored in the policy model.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import save_policy_yaml - - policy = _make_policy( - [_make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti")], - name="Test policy description", - ) - output_file = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" - save_policy_yaml(policy, str(output_file)) - - assert output_file.exists() - assert len(policy.rules) == 1 - rule = policy.rules[0] - assert rule.role.name == "developer" - assert rule.scope.name == "demo-ui" - - -def test_save_policy_rego_creates_files(tmp_path, config_file, monkeypatch): - """save_policy_rego writes roles and default Rego files, plus per-service files.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego - from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration as FileConfiguration - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - monkeypatch.setattr("aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration", FileConfiguration) - - policy = _make_policy([ - _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), - _make_rule("developer", "github-full-access", "github-tool"), - ]) - - save_policy_rego(policy, str(tmp_path), realm="demo") - - assert (tmp_path / "roles.rego").exists() - assert (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").exists() - assert (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").exists() - assert (tmp_path / "generated_policy_Dummy.rego").exists() - - inbound = (tmp_path / "default_inbound.rego").read_text() - assert "default allow := false" in inbound - outbound = (tmp_path / "default_outbound.rego").read_text() - assert "default allow := false" in outbound - - -def test_generate_yaml_output_structure(): - """_generate_yaml_output produces correctly structured output from a PolicyObjectModel.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output - - policy = _make_policy([ - _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), - _make_rule("developer", "github-full-access", "github-tool"), - ], name="Test policy description") - - assert len(policy.rules) == 2 - role_names = {r.role.name for r in policy.rules} - assert "developer" in role_names - scope_names = {r.scope.name for r in policy.rules} - assert "demo-ui" in scope_names - assert "github-full-access" in scope_names - - yaml_output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) - assert "# Access Control Policy" in yaml_output - assert "demo-ui" in yaml_output - - -def test_generate_yaml_output_contains_policy_data(): - """_generate_yaml_output includes role and scope names in its string output.""" - from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.yaml import _generate_yaml_output - - policy = _make_policy([ - _make_rule("developer", "demo-ui", "kagenti"), - ]) - assert len(policy.rules) == 1 - assert policy.rules[0].role.name == "developer" - assert policy.rules[0].scope.name == "demo-ui" - - output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) - assert "developer" in output - assert "demo-ui" in output - - -def test_policy_builder_initialization(config_file, mock_llm): - """PolicyBuilder loads roles and service privileges from the config file.""" - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - - role_names = [r.name for r in builder.roles] - assert "developer" in role_names - assert "tech-support" in role_names - assert "sales" in role_names - - assert "kagenti" in builder.privileges_map - assert "github-tool" in builder.privileges_map - assert "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" in builder.privileges_map - - kagenti_info = builder.privileges_map["kagenti"] - assert isinstance(kagenti_info, dict) - assert "service_type" in kagenti_info - assert "scopes" in kagenti_info - assert len(kagenti_info["scopes"]) > 0 - assert all(isinstance(s, Scope) for s in kagenti_info["scopes"]) - - # ============================================================================ # FIXTURE SANITY CHECK # ============================================================================ diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py index 15777987f..51fcef612 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ def policy_files(fixtures_dir): return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) -@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-oss"]) +@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-5-mini"]) def llm_model_name(request): return request.param @@ -455,10 +455,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_maps_role_to_privilege(github_aud_privilege, sample_rol mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False ) - result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + rules, description = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") assert any( r.role.name == "developer" and r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" - for r in result.rules + for r in rules ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py index b23c9ffa3..90436060b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ def policy_files(fixtures_dir): return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) -@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-oss"]) +@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-5-mini"]) def llm_model_name(request): return request.param @@ -451,10 +451,10 @@ def test_generate_policy_maps_privilege_to_role(developer_role, sample_scopes): """generate_policy() produces a Rule mapping the role to the granted privilege.""" mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") + rules, explanation = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") assert any( r.role.name == "developer" and r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" - for r in result.rules + for r in rules ) From d3f55abfa80c3f36b173701eb8bf45c8434b974c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 15:15:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 156/273] docs: rename aiac-pdp-policy-service ClusterIP to aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service in PDP Policy Writer OPA spec Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index 0f462f486..a1467807d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that translates a **Policy Model** into OPA Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resource. The OPA plugin embedded in each AuthBridge instance fetches the Rego packages relevant to its pod from this CR at startup. -The service is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. +The service is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service:7072` ClusterIP. The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ For local development, the `kubernetes` client falls back to `~/.kube/config` au - Server: uvicorn - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` -- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service:7072` - Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) --- From 3389cc2555f0134ff0c0cdbbe57e495095d7f8cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 17:22:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 157/273] refactor(policy): remove IdP model hashability, key policy maps by string id Drop the id-only __hash__/__eq__ from Subject/Role/Service/Scope in aiac.idp.configuration.models; the models now use pydantic's default field-based equality and are no longer used as dict keys. Migrate AgentPolicyModel relationship maps to string-id keys (source_roles/subject_roles: dict[str, list[Role]]; scope_targets -> target_scopes: dict[str, list[Scope]]), which removes the field_serializer/field_validator key-workaround entirely and lets the maps serialize to JSON natively. Update requirement docs and unit tests to match. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 4 +- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 9 +- .../requirements/components/policy-model.md | 44 ++++--- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 24 ---- aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py | 58 +-------- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 35 ----- aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py | 70 ---------- aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py | 122 +++--------------- aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 6 +- aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py | 6 +- 10 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 318 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 610b0621d..1e8077208 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **Clean `idp` / `pdp` / `policy` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego writing) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`; shared policy model and computation code lives under `aiac.policy.*`. - **`aiac.policy.model` is dependency-free (only `pydantic` + `aiac.idp.configuration.models`).** `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` live in a neutral namespace importable by any consumer — Policy Store library, PDP Policy Library, PCE — without forcing a dependency on any service namespace. - **`PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed objects.** They hold `Role` and `Scope` instances from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`, enabling the PCE to call `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope` without additional type conversion. -- **`Service`, `Role`, `Scope` use `id`-only hash/eq.** Custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` on `id` field enables their use as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles` and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets` without `frozen=True` (these models have mutable list fields). +- **`AgentPolicyModel` relationship maps are keyed by string `id`.** `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` use the entity's string `id` as the dict key, so `Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` need no custom hash/eq and keep pydantic's default field-based equality. This also lets the maps serialize to JSON without a custom key serializer. - **PCE merge semantics are additive only.** New rules are appended to existing `inbound_rules`/`outbound_rules`; existing rules are never removed. Rule revocation is TBD. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ The PCE is the **single point of coordination** between the Policy Store and PDP Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` / `policy` namespace split: **IdP library** (Keycloak entity management): -- **`aiac.idp.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` implement `id`-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` for use as dict keys. +- **`aiac.idp.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). Plain pydantic models with default field-based equality; not hashable and not used as dict keys. - **`aiac.idp.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. Includes `get_services_by_role(role)` and `get_services_by_scope(scope)` used by the PCE. **Policy model** (shared, dependency-light): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index d2fde3956..e70b9ca1b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -38,14 +38,7 @@ All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard u Model definition order: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. -`Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: - -```python -__hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) -__eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id -``` - -`frozen=True` is **not** used — these models have list fields that must remain mutable. The `id`-only hash enables their use as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles`, `AgentPolicyModel.subject_roles`, and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. +`Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` use pydantic's default equality (field-based) and are **not hashable** — they define no custom `__hash__`/`__eq__` and are never used as dict keys or set members. The relationship maps in `AgentPolicyModel` (`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, `target_scopes`) are keyed by the entity's string `id` instead, so no identity override is needed. #### `Subject` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md index 3b0bfde2e..423e5a7bf 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md @@ -12,10 +12,14 @@ Keeping the canonical model definitions inside a PDP-namespaced module (`aiac.pd Additionally, the old `PolicyRule` used plain `str` for `role` and `scope`. The PCE algorithm requires typed `Role` and `Scope` objects (from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) to invoke `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`. +Finally, the original `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` maps used pydantic model objects (`Service`, `Subject`, `Scope`) as dict keys. Model-object keys do not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without custom key handling, and they couple `aiac.policy.model` to the id-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` of the IdP models. The outbound map was also keyed by scope (`scope → targets`), whereas consumers need the inverse (`target → scopes`) to emit per-target authorization directly. + ## Solution A canonical, dependency-free model module at `aiac.policy.model` defines `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` with typed fields. No HTTP client, no service code — importable by any consumer without side effects. `PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed `Role` and `Scope` objects from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. +The relationship maps (`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, `target_scopes`) are keyed by the string `id` of the referenced entity rather than by a typed object, so they serialize to JSON natively and carry no hashability requirement into `aiac.policy.model`. Typed `Role` / `Scope` objects are retained as the map *values* (and in `PolicyRule`), preserving the typing the PCE needs for IdP queries. The outbound map is `target_scopes` (`target service id → scopes permitted`), the inverse of the former `scope_targets`. + --- ## User Stories @@ -24,8 +28,10 @@ A canonical, dependency-free model module at `aiac.policy.model` defines `Policy 2. As the PDP Policy Library, I want to import `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` from `aiac.policy.model`, so that my HTTP serialization logic does not duplicate model definitions. 3. As the Policy Store Library, I want to import `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` from `aiac.policy.model`, so that response deserialization uses the same canonical types as every other consumer. 4. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to construct a `PolicyRule` with typed `Role` and `Scope` objects, so that the PCE can use them for IdP queries without additional type conversion. -5. As a developer, I want `Service`, `Role`, and `Scope` to be usable as dict keys, so that the PCE can build `source_roles` and `scope_targets` maps without wrapping them. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` keyed by string entity IDs, so that I build them with `entity.id` and they serialize to JSON without custom key handling. 6. As a developer, I want all models to silently ignore unknown fields from API responses, so that IdP API additions do not break deserialization. +7. As the PDP Policy Library, I want outbound permissions expressed as `target service id → allowed scopes`, so that I can emit per-target authorization directly without inverting a `scope → targets` map. +8. As a consumer serializing an `AgentPolicyModel` to JSON, I want every relationship map to have string keys, so that `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. --- @@ -51,7 +57,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/policy/ | Dependency | Purpose | |------------|---------| | `pydantic` | `BaseModel`, `ConfigDict` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope`, `Service`, `Subject` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope` (as map values and in `PolicyRule`) | No HTTP client dependency. No `requests`, no `python-dotenv`. @@ -77,9 +83,9 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound ru | `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | | `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | | `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | -| `source_roles` | `dict[Service, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service → roles granted | -| `subject_roles` | `dict[Subject, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (user) → roles held on behalf of which this agent acts | -| `scope_targets` | `dict[Scope, list[Service]]` | Outbound: scope → target services permitted | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service **id** → roles granted | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (user) **id** → roles held on behalf of which this agent acts | +| `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | | `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | | `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | @@ -95,27 +101,23 @@ A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy` on the Policy |-------|------| | `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | -### Hashability of `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` +### Map keys are string IDs -`Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` (defined in `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) are used as dict keys in `AgentPolicyModel.source_roles`, `AgentPolicyModel.subject_roles`, and `AgentPolicyModel.scope_targets`. They implement custom `__hash__` and `__eq__` based on their `id` field only: +`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` are keyed by the string `id` of the referenced Keycloak entity (source service id, subject id, target service id) rather than by the typed `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` object. Rationale: -```python -# On Service, Role, Scope, Subject in aiac.idp.configuration.models: -__hash__ = lambda self: hash(self.id) -__eq__ = lambda self, other: isinstance(other, type(self)) and self.id == other.id -``` +- JSON object keys must be strings. A dict keyed by a pydantic model does not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without a custom key serializer; a `str` key serializes natively. +- The IdP models are plain pydantic models (default field-based equality, not hashable). Consumers build these maps with `entity.id` as the key. -`frozen=True` is **not** used — these models have list fields (`childRoles`, `roles`, `scopes`) that must remain mutable. The `id`-only hash is the correct approach. +As a result, no field in `aiac.policy.model` uses a typed object as a dict key, and this module imports only `Role` and `Scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` (as map *values* and in `PolicyRule`). `Service` and `Subject` are no longer referenced here. ### Usage ```python from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope role = Role(id="r1", name="weather-reader", composite=False) scope = Scope(id="s1", name="read") -subject = Subject(id="u1", username="alice", enabled=True) rule = PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( @@ -123,8 +125,8 @@ agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( agent_roles=[role], agent_scopes=[scope], source_roles={}, - subject_roles={subject: [role]}, - scope_targets={}, + subject_roles={"u1": [role]}, # keyed by subject id + target_scopes={"github-tool": [scope]}, # target service id → scopes inbound_rules=[rule], outbound_rules=[], ) @@ -143,9 +145,9 @@ model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) Key behaviors to assert: - `PolicyRule` accepts typed `Role` and `Scope` objects; rejects plain `str` where `Role`/`Scope` is expected. -- `AgentPolicyModel` with `Service`, `Subject`, and `Scope` keys in `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` is serializable and deserializable via `model_dump()` / `model_validate()`. -- Two `Role` / `Scope` / `Service` / `Subject` instances with the same `id` are equal and hash-equal (usable as dict keys without collision). -- Two instances with different `id` values are not equal. +- `AgentPolicyModel` with string-ID keys in `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with the typed `Role` / `Scope` list values preserved. +- `target_scopes` maps a target service id to the list of `Scope` objects permitted on it (outbound direction is `target → scopes`, not `scope → targets`). +- A relationship map keyed by a plain string serializes to a JSON object without a custom key serializer. - `ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` causes unknown fields to be silently discarded on `model_validate()`. --- @@ -160,5 +162,5 @@ Key behaviors to assert: ## Further Notes -- The `id`-only hash is intentional: two `Role` / `Subject` / `Service` / `Scope` objects representing the same Keycloak entity but fetched at different times (with potentially different enrichment fields) must be treated as equal for dict key lookup. +- Keying maps by string `id` sidesteps the previous reliance on id-only hashing of the IdP models: two records for the same Keycloak entity fetched at different times (with potentially different enrichment fields) collapse to the same string key regardless of those differences. - `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` imports `PolicyRule` from `aiac.policy.model`. The `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers in that file remain in place and are used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents directly; they are not consumed by the PCE. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index 87bef7cf7..f5e6663e9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -14,12 +14,6 @@ class Subject(BaseModel): enabled: bool roles: list["Role"] = [] - def __hash__(self) -> int: - return hash(self.id) - - def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: - return isinstance(other, Subject) and self.id == other.id - class Role(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") @@ -30,12 +24,6 @@ class Role(BaseModel): composite: bool childRoles: list["Role"] = [] - def __hash__(self) -> int: - return hash(self.id) - - def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: - return isinstance(other, Role) and self.id == other.id - class Service(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") @@ -49,12 +37,6 @@ class Service(BaseModel): roles: list["Role"] = [] scopes: list["Scope"] = [] - def __hash__(self) -> int: - return hash(self.id) - - def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: - return isinstance(other, Service) and self.id == other.id - @model_validator(mode="before") @classmethod def _resolve_keycloak_fields(cls, data: Any) -> Any: @@ -93,12 +75,6 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): name: str description: str | None = None - def __hash__(self) -> int: - return hash(self.id) - - def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool: - return isinstance(other, Scope) and self.id == other.id - Subject.model_rebuild() Role.model_rebuild() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py index 700f3fe9a..657431bb0 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, field_serializer, field_validator +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope class PolicyRule(BaseModel): @@ -16,58 +16,14 @@ class AgentPolicyModel(BaseModel): agent_id: str agent_roles: list[Role] agent_scopes: list[Scope] - subject_roles: dict[Subject, list[Role]] - source_roles: dict[Service, list[Role]] - scope_targets: dict[Scope, list[Service]] + # Relationship maps are keyed by the referenced entity's string id, so they + # serialize to JSON natively (no custom key handling needed). + source_roles: dict[str, list[Role]] # source service id -> roles granted + subject_roles: dict[str, list[Role]] # subject id -> roles held on behalf of + target_scopes: dict[str, list[Scope]] # target service id -> scopes permitted inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] outbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] - # Pydantic cannot serialize BaseModel instances as dict keys (they serialize - # to dicts, which are unhashable). Represent these three fields as a list of - # {key, value} pairs in the serialized form and reconstruct on validation. - - @field_validator("subject_roles", mode="before") - @classmethod - def _coerce_subject_roles(cls, v: object) -> dict[Subject, list[Role]]: - if isinstance(v, list): - return { - Subject.model_validate(item["key"]): [Role.model_validate(r) for r in item["value"]] - for item in v - } - return v # type: ignore[return-value] - - @field_validator("source_roles", mode="before") - @classmethod - def _coerce_source_roles(cls, v: object) -> dict[Service, list[Role]]: - if isinstance(v, list): - return { - Service.model_validate(item["key"]): [Role.model_validate(r) for r in item["value"]] - for item in v - } - return v # type: ignore[return-value] - - @field_validator("scope_targets", mode="before") - @classmethod - def _coerce_scope_targets(cls, v: object) -> dict[Scope, list[Service]]: - if isinstance(v, list): - return { - Scope.model_validate(item["key"]): [Service.model_validate(s) for s in item["value"]] - for item in v - } - return v # type: ignore[return-value] - - @field_serializer("subject_roles") - def _serialize_subject_roles(self, v: dict[Subject, list[Role]]) -> list[dict]: - return [{"key": k.model_dump(), "value": [r.model_dump() for r in rs]} for k, rs in v.items()] - - @field_serializer("source_roles") - def _serialize_source_roles(self, v: dict[Service, list[Role]]) -> list[dict]: - return [{"key": k.model_dump(), "value": [r.model_dump() for r in rs]} for k, rs in v.items()] - - @field_serializer("scope_targets") - def _serialize_scope_targets(self, v: dict[Scope, list[Service]]) -> list[dict]: - return [{"key": k.model_dump(), "value": [s.model_dump() for s in ss]} for k, ss in v.items()] - class PolicyModel(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index 01666435f..14ae8babc 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -722,41 +722,6 @@ def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Subject hashability (8.15) -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestSubjectHashability: - def _make_subject(self, id_, **kwargs): - defaults = {"id": id_, "username": f"user-{id_}", "enabled": True} - return Subject.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) - - def test_equal_ids_are_equal(self): - assert self._make_subject("u1") == self._make_subject("u1") - - def test_equal_ids_have_same_hash(self): - assert hash(self._make_subject("u1")) == hash(self._make_subject("u1")) - - def test_different_ids_are_not_equal(self): - assert self._make_subject("u1") != self._make_subject("u2") - - def test_subject_vs_role_same_id_not_equal(self): - s = self._make_subject("x1") - r = Role.model_validate({"id": "x1", "name": "viewer", "composite": False}) - assert s != r - - def test_subject_vs_service_same_id_not_equal(self): - s = self._make_subject("x1") - svc = Service.model_validate({"id": "x1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}) - assert s != svc - - def test_subject_usable_as_dict_key(self): - s = self._make_subject("u1") - d = {s: "value"} - assert d[s] == "value" - - # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_subjects_by_role (8.15) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py index 6ea2d7904..d8e1798b5 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py @@ -441,73 +441,3 @@ def test_no_protocol_field(self): def test_extra_fields_ignored(self): s = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s3", "name": "roles", "unknownAttr": "dropped"}) assert not hasattr(s, "unknownAttr") - - -class TestHashAndEquality: - def _service(self, id_: str) -> Service: - return Service.model_validate({"id": id_, "clientId": id_, "enabled": True}) - - def _role(self, id_: str) -> Role: - return Role.model_validate({"id": id_, "name": "r", "composite": False}) - - def _scope(self, id_: str) -> Scope: - return Scope.model_validate({"id": id_, "name": "s"}) - - # Service - - def test_service_equal_ids_are_equal(self): - assert self._service("x") == self._service("x") - - def test_service_equal_ids_same_hash(self): - assert hash(self._service("x")) == hash(self._service("x")) - - def test_service_different_ids_not_equal(self): - assert self._service("a") != self._service("b") - - def test_service_usable_as_dict_key(self): - svc = self._service("svc1") - d = {svc: "val"} - assert d[svc] == "val" - - # Role - - def test_role_equal_ids_are_equal(self): - assert self._role("x") == self._role("x") - - def test_role_equal_ids_same_hash(self): - assert hash(self._role("x")) == hash(self._role("x")) - - def test_role_different_ids_not_equal(self): - assert self._role("a") != self._role("b") - - def test_role_usable_as_dict_key(self): - role = self._role("r1") - d = {role: "val"} - assert d[role] == "val" - - # Scope - - def test_scope_equal_ids_are_equal(self): - assert self._scope("x") == self._scope("x") - - def test_scope_equal_ids_same_hash(self): - assert hash(self._scope("x")) == hash(self._scope("x")) - - def test_scope_different_ids_not_equal(self): - assert self._scope("a") != self._scope("b") - - def test_scope_usable_as_dict_key(self): - scope = self._scope("sc1") - d = {scope: "val"} - assert d[scope] == "val" - - # Cross-type: same id, different type - - def test_service_not_equal_to_role_with_same_id(self): - assert self._service("x") != self._role("x") - - def test_service_not_equal_to_scope_with_same_id(self): - assert self._service("x") != self._scope("x") - - def test_role_not_equal_to_scope_with_same_id(self): - assert self._role("x") != self._scope("x") diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py index 1e55a6b66..59103fa04 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py @@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ def test_policy_rule_rejects_plain_str_scope(): PolicyRule(role=_role(), scope="read") -# --- AgentPolicyModel serialization with model dict keys --- +# --- AgentPolicyModel relationship maps keyed by string id --- -def test_agent_policy_model_service_keys_in_source_roles(): +def test_agent_policy_model_source_roles_keyed_by_service_id(): svc = _service() role = _role() model = AgentPolicyModel( @@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ def test_agent_policy_model_service_keys_in_source_roles(): agent_roles=[role], agent_scopes=[], subject_roles={}, - source_roles={svc: [role]}, - scope_targets={}, + source_roles={svc.id: [role]}, + target_scopes={}, inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], ) - dumped = model.model_dump() - assert isinstance(dumped, dict) + dumped = model.model_dump(mode="json") + assert list(dumped["source_roles"].keys()) == [svc.id] -def test_agent_policy_model_scope_keys_in_scope_targets(): +def test_agent_policy_model_target_scopes_keyed_by_target_id(): scope = _scope() svc = _service() model = AgentPolicyModel( @@ -71,32 +71,32 @@ def test_agent_policy_model_scope_keys_in_scope_targets(): agent_scopes=[scope], subject_roles={}, source_roles={}, - scope_targets={scope: [svc]}, + target_scopes={svc.id: [scope]}, inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], ) - dumped = model.model_dump() - assert isinstance(dumped, dict) + dumped = model.model_dump(mode="json") + assert list(dumped["target_scopes"].keys()) == [svc.id] -def test_agent_policy_model_subject_keys_in_subject_roles(): +def test_agent_policy_model_subject_roles_keyed_by_subject_id(): subject = _subject() role = _role() model = AgentPolicyModel( agent_id="agent-1", agent_roles=[], agent_scopes=[], - subject_roles={subject: [role]}, + subject_roles={subject.id: [role]}, source_roles={}, - scope_targets={}, + target_scopes={}, inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], ) - dumped = model.model_dump() - assert isinstance(dumped, dict) + dumped = model.model_dump(mode="json") + assert list(dumped["subject_roles"].keys()) == [subject.id] -# --- model_validate round-trip --- +# --- model_validate round-trip (JSON mode) --- def test_agent_policy_model_round_trip(): @@ -108,97 +108,17 @@ def test_agent_policy_model_round_trip(): agent_id="agent-1", agent_roles=[role], agent_scopes=[scope], - subject_roles={subject: [role]}, - source_roles={svc: [role]}, - scope_targets={scope: [svc]}, + subject_roles={subject.id: [role]}, + source_roles={svc.id: [role]}, + target_scopes={svc.id: [scope]}, inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)], outbound_rules=[], ) - dumped = model.model_dump() + dumped = model.model_dump(mode="json") restored = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(dumped) assert restored == model -# --- Hash / equality: Role --- - - -def test_role_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): - r1 = _role(id="r1") - r2 = _role(id="r1", name="different-name") - assert r1 == r2 - assert hash(r1) == hash(r2) - d = {r1: "value"} - assert d[r2] == "value" - - -def test_role_different_id_not_equal(): - r1 = _role(id="r1") - r2 = _role(id="r2") - assert r1 != r2 - d = {r1: "v1", r2: "v2"} - assert len(d) == 2 - - -# --- Hash / equality: Scope --- - - -def test_scope_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): - s1 = _scope(id="s1") - s2 = _scope(id="s1", name="other") - assert s1 == s2 - assert hash(s1) == hash(s2) - d = {s1: "value"} - assert d[s2] == "value" - - -def test_scope_different_id_not_equal(): - s1 = _scope(id="s1") - s2 = _scope(id="s2") - assert s1 != s2 - d = {s1: "v1", s2: "v2"} - assert len(d) == 2 - - -# --- Hash / equality: Service --- - - -def test_service_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): - svc1 = _service(id="svc-1") - svc2 = _service(id="svc-1", service_id="other-id") - assert svc1 == svc2 - assert hash(svc1) == hash(svc2) - d = {svc1: "value"} - assert d[svc2] == "value" - - -def test_service_different_id_not_equal(): - svc1 = _service(id="svc-1") - svc2 = _service(id="svc-2") - assert svc1 != svc2 - d = {svc1: "v1", svc2: "v2"} - assert len(d) == 2 - - -# --- Hash / equality: Subject --- - - -def test_subject_same_id_equal_and_hash_equal(): - sub1 = _subject(id="sub-1") - sub2 = _subject(id="sub-1", username="bob") - assert sub1 == sub2 - assert hash(sub1) == hash(sub2) - d = {sub1: "value"} - assert d[sub2] == "value" - - -def test_subject_different_id_not_equal(): - sub1 = _subject(id="sub-1") - sub2 = _subject(id="sub-2") - assert sub1 != sub2 - d = {sub1: "v1", sub2: "v2"} - assert len(d) == 2 - - # --- extra='ignore' on all three model types --- @@ -219,7 +139,7 @@ def test_agent_policy_model_ignores_extra_fields(): "agent_scopes": [], "subject_roles": {}, "source_roles": {}, - "scope_targets": {}, + "target_scopes": {}, "inbound_rules": [], "outbound_rules": [], "unknown_field": "ignored", diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py index 1ba189719..f394601c0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ "agent_id": "agent-1", "agent_roles": [], "agent_scopes": [], - "subject_roles": [], - "source_roles": [], - "scope_targets": [], + "subject_roles": {}, + "source_roles": {}, + "target_scopes": {}, "inbound_rules": [], "outbound_rules": [], } diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py index 638514b4f..51632e637 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ def _make_agent(agent_id: str = "agent-1") -> AgentPolicyModel: agent_id=agent_id, agent_roles=[_role()], agent_scopes=[_scope()], - subject_roles={_subject(): [_role()]}, - source_roles={_service(): [_role()]}, - scope_targets={_scope(): [_service()]}, + subject_roles={_subject().id: [_role()]}, + source_roles={_service().id: [_role()]}, + target_scopes={_service().id: [_scope()]}, inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=_role(), scope=_scope())], outbound_rules=[], ) From dc8f879efc73bbb9e2259c0d93b44a4e8fa18a55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 17:43:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 158/273] docs: Align PDP writer, PCE, and PRD with revised policy model spec Propagate the aiac.policy.model changes (string-id map keys, scope_targets -> target_scopes rename+inversion, typed Role/Scope values, non-hashable IdP models) into dependent PRD docs: - pdp-policy-writer-opa.md: reference canonical aiac.policy.model.models instead of deprecated aiac.pdp.library.models; typed PolicyRule/agent fields; add subject_roles; target_scopes with Rego inversion note. - policy-computation-engine.md: key source_roles/subject_roles/target_scopes by entity id; add target_scopes construction; set->list role flattening. - PRD.md: fix policy.model testing-table note (string-key round-trip instead of hash/eq). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 2 +- .../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 47 +++++++++++-------- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 19 ++++---- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 1e8077208..5bab20638 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | PDP Policy Writer (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | | Policy Store endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | | `aiac.policy.store.library` functions | Policy Store HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | -| `aiac.policy.model` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields; `Role`/`Scope`/`Service` hash/eq on `id`; `model_validate` round-trips correctly | +| `aiac.policy.model` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields; relationship maps keyed by string `id` round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate` with typed `Role` / `Scope` values preserved | | `aiac.idp.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback; `get_services_by_role` and `get_services_by_scope` issue correct query params | | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` functions | PDP Policy Writer HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | | `aiac.policy.computation` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (import-boundary mocks) | Correct `apply_agent_policy` calls per resolved service; additive merge preserves existing rules; no duplicate rule insertion; `apply_policy` called once after all writes; exceptions logged, not propagated | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index a1467807d..da6a3d390 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -12,20 +12,22 @@ The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads --- -## Pydantic models (`aiac.pdp.library.models`) +## Pydantic models (`aiac.policy.model.models`) -Dependency-free (only `pydantic`). Importable by any consumer without pulling in HTTP client dependencies. +The Policy Writer deserializes the **canonical** `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` defined in [policy-model.md](policy-model.md) and imported from `aiac.policy.model.models`. This service does **not** define its own copies; the tables below summarize the fields the Rego generator consumes. (The former `aiac.pdp.library.models` module is deprecated — see policy-model.md "Replaces".) All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. ### `PolicyRule` -A single access rule: a `(role, scope)` tuple. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. +A single access rule pairing a typed role with a typed scope. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. | Field | Type | |-------|------| -| `role` | `str` | -| `scope` | `str` | +| `role` | `Role` | +| `scope` | `Scope` | + +`Role` and `Scope` are the typed models from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. The Rego generator emits their `.name` as the string literal OPA matches against. ### `AgentPolicyModel` @@ -34,10 +36,11 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `P | Field | Type | Description | |-------|------|-------------| | `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | -| `agent_roles` | `list[str]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | -| `agent_scopes` | `list[str]` | Scopes this agent exposes | -| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps inbound source service ID → list of realm roles | -| `scope_targets` | `dict[str, list[str]]` | Maps outbound scope → list of permitted target service IDs | +| `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | +| `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service **id** → roles granted | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (user) **id** → roles held on behalf of which this agent acts | +| `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | | `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | | `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | @@ -45,6 +48,8 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `P **Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. +**Note on `target_scopes` direction:** the map is keyed by **target service id → allowed scopes** (the inverse of the former `scope_targets`, which was `scope → targets`). The outbound Rego generator inverts it back to a scope → target-ids table for OPA evaluation (see below). + ### `PolicyModel` A partial or full system policy model. When sent to the PDP Policy Writer, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. @@ -56,7 +61,7 @@ A partial or full system policy model. When sent to the PDP Policy Writer, conta ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule ``` --- @@ -97,7 +102,7 @@ Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **inbound pipeline**. Input docume package authz.{agent_slug}.inbound source_roles := { - "{source_id}": ["{role}", ...], + "{source_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } @@ -105,8 +110,8 @@ default allow := false allow if { some role in source_roles[input.source] - role == "{rule.role}" - input.scope == "{rule.scope}" + role == "{rule.role.name}" + input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}" } # ... one allow block per inbound PolicyRule ``` @@ -118,17 +123,19 @@ Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline**. Input docum ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound +# scope_targets is derived by inverting the model's target_scopes +# (target id → scopes) into scope name → target ids for OPA evaluation. scope_targets := { - "{scope}": ["{target_id}", ...], + "{scope.name}": ["{target_id}", ...], ... } default allow := false allow if { - input.role == "{rule.role}" - input.scope == "{rule.scope}" - input.target in scope_targets["{rule.scope}"] + input.role == "{rule.role.name}" + input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}" + input.target in scope_targets["{rule.scope.name}"] } # ... one allow block per outbound PolicyRule ``` @@ -165,7 +172,7 @@ python-dotenv ```python from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy -from aiac.pdp.library.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) delete_policy() @@ -228,8 +235,8 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/ ├── __init__.py └── library/ ├── __init__.py - ├── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel └── policy.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy + # (models now imported from aiac.policy.model.models) ``` Build command: @@ -246,7 +253,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. - `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: replace hyphens with underscores, lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment. - `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string from the model's `source_roles` map and `inbound_rules`. -- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string from the model's `scope_targets` map and `outbound_rules`. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string from the model's `target_scopes` map and `outbound_rules`, inverting `target_scopes` (target id → scopes) into the scope name → target ids table OPA evaluates against. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. - `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. - `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 2a15f6768..33443cc35 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -66,20 +66,21 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]`, the engine executes these steps: -1. **Composite role flattening:** for each rule's `role`, recursively collect the role and all descendant roles from `role.childRoles` into a flat set of leaf roles. All subsequent role-based queries operate on this flattened set. A non-composite role yields a set containing only itself. +1. **Composite role flattening:** for each rule's `role`, recursively collect the role and all descendant roles from `role.childRoles` into a flat list of leaf roles, de-duplicated by `role.id`. (`Role` is not hashable, so de-duplication tracks seen `id`s rather than adding `Role` objects to a `set`.) All subsequent role-based queries operate on this flattened list. A non-composite role yields a list containing only itself. 2. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. -3. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: +3. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles` + `target_scopes`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: - Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of S's `AgentPolicyModel`. - - Append R to `source_roles[S]` (creating the entry if absent). + - Append R to `source_roles[S.id]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the service's string `id`, not the `Service` object; the appended value is the typed `Role`. + - For each target service T resolved in step 2 (services exposing `rule.scope`), append `rule.scope` to `target_scopes[T.id]` on S's `AgentPolicyModel` (creating the entry if absent). This records the outbound direction — S acting as R may request `rule.scope` on target T — keyed by the target service's string `id` with the typed `Scope` as the value. 4. **Role → subjects + `subject_roles`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(R) -> list[Subject]`. For each returned subject S: - - Append R to `subject_roles[S]` (creating the entry if absent). + - Append R to `subject_roles[S.id]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the subject's string `id`; the appended value is the typed `Role`. 5. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(R)` returns an empty list for a flattened role R, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment or `source_roles` entry is made for that role. `subject_roles` entries are still recorded if `get_subjects_by_role(R)` returns subjects. -6. **Additive merge:** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. Append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles` and `subject_roles` list entries by `id`). Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. +6. **Additive merge:** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. Append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by string `id`, merging is a plain dict-key lookup — no hashing of `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` objects is involved. Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. 7. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). @@ -122,12 +123,14 @@ Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store Key behaviors to assert: - Rules with a resolvable scope result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_scope`. -- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model contains that service → role mapping. -- `get_subjects_by_role` is called for each flattened role; `subject_roles` on the written model contains each returned subject → role mapping. +- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model is keyed by the service's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. +- `get_subjects_by_role` is called for each flattened role; `subject_roles` on the written model is keyed by the subject's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. +- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `id` (a service exposing the rule's scope) with the typed `Scope` in the value list. +- Every relationship map on the written model has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. - A composite role is flattened: `get_services_by_role` and `get_subjects_by_role` are called for each child role, not the composite role itself. - Realm-level roles (empty service list from `get_services_by_role`) do not produce `outbound_rules` or `source_roles` entries; `subject_roles` entries are still recorded for any subjects returned by `get_subjects_by_role`. - Existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge. -- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate `source_roles` / `subject_roles` list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. +- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate `source_roles` / `subject_roles` / `target_scopes` list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. - `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. - An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. From b6dfcb3e28b5dae5be7053d09a8a0b5222a072c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:17:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 159/273] feat(aiac): add Rego package generator for PDP policy writer Implement aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego with slugify, generate_inbound_rego, and generate_outbound_rego. Translate an AgentPolicyModel into authz.{slug}.inbound / authz.{slug}.outbound Rego packages: deny-by-default with one allow-if block per rule. Inbound embeds the source_roles map and matches on some role in source_roles[input.source]. Outbound embeds the target_scopes map and matches on "{rule.scope}" in target_scopes[input.target]. Covered by 11 unit tests (no live dependencies). Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 70 +++++++++ aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 135 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 205 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d2c8c69d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +"""Rego package generation for the PDP Policy Writer (OPA). + +Translates an ``AgentPolicyModel`` into Rego package strings ready to be +written to disk by the PDP Policy Writer. +""" + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel + +__all__ = ["slugify", "generate_inbound_rego", "generate_outbound_rego"] + + +def slugify(agent_id: str) -> str: + """Turn an agent id into a valid Rego package name segment.""" + return agent_id.replace("-", "_").lower() + + +def _render_name_map(var: str, mapping: dict[str, list[str]]) -> str: + """Render ``{var} := { "key": ["a", "b"], ... }`` as Rego.""" + lines = [f"{var} := {{"] + for key, values in mapping.items(): + rendered = ", ".join(f'"{v}"' for v in values) + lines.append(f' "{key}": [{rendered}],') + lines.append("}") + return "\n".join(lines) + + +def generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: + """Render the ``authz.{slug}.inbound`` Rego package for an agent.""" + slug = slugify(model.agent_id) + source_roles = { + source: [role.name for role in roles] + for source, roles in model.source_roles.items() + } + parts = [ + f"package authz.{slug}.inbound", + "default allow := false", + _render_name_map("source_roles", source_roles), + ] + for rule in model.inbound_rules: + parts.append( + "allow if {\n" + " some role in source_roles[input.source]\n" + f' role == "{rule.role.name}"\n' + f' input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}"\n' + "}" + ) + return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n" + + +def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: + """Render the ``authz.{slug}.outbound`` Rego package for an agent.""" + slug = slugify(model.agent_id) + target_scopes = { + target: [scope.name for scope in scopes] + for target, scopes in model.target_scopes.items() + } + parts = [ + f"package authz.{slug}.outbound", + "default allow := false", + _render_name_map("target_scopes", target_scopes), + ] + for rule in model.outbound_rules: + parts.append( + "allow if {\n" + f' input.role == "{rule.role.name}"\n' + f' input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}"\n' + f' "{rule.scope.name}" in target_scopes[input.target]\n' + "}" + ) + return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..acd487eec --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego.""" + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego import ( + generate_inbound_rego, + generate_outbound_rego, + slugify, +) + + +def _role(name: str = "reader") -> Role: + return Role(id=f"role-{name}", name=name, composite=False) + + +def _scope(name: str = "read") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=f"scope-{name}", name=name) + + +def _model( + agent_id: str = "weather-agent", + source_roles: dict[str, list[Role]] | None = None, + target_scopes: dict[str, list[Scope]] | None = None, + inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] | None = None, + outbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] | None = None, +) -> AgentPolicyModel: + return AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id=agent_id, + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[], + subject_roles={}, + source_roles=source_roles or {}, + target_scopes=target_scopes or {}, + inbound_rules=inbound_rules or [], + outbound_rules=outbound_rules or [], + ) + + +def test_slugify_hyphens_become_underscores(): + assert slugify("weather-agent") == "weather_agent" + + +def test_slugify_lowercases_without_hyphens(): + assert slugify("WeatherAgent") == "weatheragent" + + +# --- generate_inbound_rego --- + + +def test_inbound_has_package_header_with_slug(): + rego = generate_inbound_rego(_model(agent_id="weather-agent")) + assert "package authz.weather_agent.inbound" in rego + + +def test_inbound_embeds_source_roles_map_with_role_names(): + model = _model(source_roles={"github-tool": [_role("reader"), _role("writer")]}) + rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) + assert "source_roles := {" in rego + assert '"github-tool": ["reader", "writer"]' in rego + + +def test_inbound_one_allow_block_per_rule(): + model = _model( + inbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=_role("reader"), scope=_scope("read")), + PolicyRule(role=_role("writer"), scope=_scope("write")), + ] + ) + rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) + assert rego.count("allow if {") == 2 + assert "some role in source_roles[input.source]" in rego + assert 'role == "reader"' in rego + assert 'input.scope == "read"' in rego + assert 'role == "writer"' in rego + assert 'input.scope == "write"' in rego + + +def test_inbound_empty_rules_produces_no_allow_blocks(): + rego = generate_inbound_rego(_model(inbound_rules=[])) + assert "package authz.weather_agent.inbound" in rego + assert "default allow := false" in rego + assert "allow if {" not in rego + + +def test_inbound_renders_every_source_in_source_roles(): + model = _model( + source_roles={ + "github-tool": [_role("reader")], + "slack-tool": [_role("writer")], + } + ) + rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) + assert '"github-tool": ["reader"]' in rego + assert '"slack-tool": ["writer"]' in rego + + +# --- generate_outbound_rego --- + + +def test_outbound_has_package_header_with_slug(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_model(agent_id="weather-agent")) + assert "package authz.weather_agent.outbound" in rego + + +def test_outbound_embeds_target_scopes_map_with_scope_names(): + model = _model( + target_scopes={"github-tool": [_scope("issues.read"), _scope("issues.write")]} + ) + rego = generate_outbound_rego(model) + assert "target_scopes := {" in rego + assert '"github-tool": ["issues.read", "issues.write"]' in rego + + +def test_outbound_one_allow_block_per_rule(): + model = _model( + outbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=_role("reader"), scope=_scope("issues.read")), + PolicyRule(role=_role("writer"), scope=_scope("issues.write")), + ] + ) + rego = generate_outbound_rego(model) + assert rego.count("allow if {") == 2 + assert 'input.role == "reader"' in rego + assert 'input.scope == "issues.read"' in rego + assert '"issues.read" in target_scopes[input.target]' in rego + assert 'input.role == "writer"' in rego + assert 'input.scope == "issues.write"' in rego + assert '"issues.write" in target_scopes[input.target]' in rego + + +def test_outbound_empty_rules_produces_no_allow_blocks(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_model(outbound_rules=[])) + assert "package authz.weather_agent.outbound" in rego + assert "default allow := false" in rego + assert "allow if {" not in rego From 7a3e05e7c21a4763d4587c8043d0b28d02111e23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 20:55:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 160/273] feat(aiac): add PDP Policy Writer OPA filesystem stub service FastAPI service on 0.0.0.0:7072 that generates Rego packages via the shared rego.py generator (from 1.10) and writes them as .rego files to REGO_OUTPUT_DIR (default /rego). No Kubernetes client. Endpoints: - POST /policy -> writes both files per agent, 204 - POST /policy/agents/{id}-> writes {slug}.inbound/outbound.rego, 204 - DELETE /policy/agents/{id} -> removes both files, 204 (no-op if absent) - DELETE /policy -> removes all *.rego, 204 - GET /health -> 200 when REGO_OUTPUT_DIR writable, else 503 Output directory is injected via a get_output_dir dependency for hermetic testing. All write endpoints map OSError to 502 via a shared _run_write guard. No ?realm= parameter on any endpoint. Built test-first (9 red-green cycles, 10 tests). Dockerfile mirrors the policy-store service (python:3.12-slim, aiac/src build context, PYTHONPATH); requirements limited to fastapi, uvicorn[standard], pydantic (no kubernetes). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile | 13 ++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py | 96 +++++++++++ .../pdp/service/policy/opa/requirements.txt | 3 + aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py | 160 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 272 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99b5d0aa0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY . /app/src +ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src + +EXPOSE 7072 + +CMD ["uvicorn", "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7072"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..61bbc65ea --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +"""PDP Policy Writer (OPA) — filesystem stub. + +Generates Rego packages via ``rego.py`` and writes them as ``.rego`` files to +a configurable output directory. No Kubernetes client — the ``rego.py`` module +is shared with the final (1.13) implementation. +""" + +import os +from pathlib import Path + +from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI +from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego import ( + generate_inbound_rego, + generate_outbound_rego, + slugify, +) + + +def get_output_dir() -> Path: + return Path(os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", "/rego")) + + +def _upsert_agent(out_dir: Path, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: + slug = slugify(model.agent_id) + (out_dir / f"{slug}.inbound.rego").write_text(generate_inbound_rego(model)) + (out_dir / f"{slug}.outbound.rego").write_text(generate_outbound_rego(model)) + + +def _delete_agent(out_dir: Path, agent_id: str) -> None: + slug = slugify(agent_id) + (out_dir / f"{slug}.inbound.rego").unlink(missing_ok=True) + (out_dir / f"{slug}.outbound.rego").unlink(missing_ok=True) + + +def _delete_all(out_dir: Path) -> None: + for rego_file in out_dir.glob("*.rego"): + rego_file.unlink(missing_ok=True) + + +def _run_write(op) -> Response: + """Run a filesystem write op, mapping any OSError to a 502 response.""" + try: + op() + return Response(status_code=204) + except OSError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + +app = FastAPI() + + +@app.post("/policy", status_code=204) +def upsert_policy( + policy: PolicyModel, + out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir), +): + def _op(): + for agent in policy.agents: + _upsert_agent(out_dir, agent) + + return _run_write(_op) + + +@app.post("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", status_code=204) +def upsert_agent( + agent_id: str, + model: AgentPolicyModel, + out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir), +): + return _run_write(lambda: _upsert_agent(out_dir, model)) + + +@app.delete("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", status_code=204) +def delete_agent( + agent_id: str, + out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir), +): + return _run_write(lambda: _delete_agent(out_dir, agent_id)) + + +@app.delete("/policy", status_code=204) +def delete_all(out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir)): + return _run_write(lambda: _delete_all(out_dir)) + + +@app.get("/health") +def health(out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir)): + if out_dir.is_dir() and os.access(out_dir, os.W_OK): + return {"status": "ok"} + return JSONResponse( + status_code=503, + content={"status": "unavailable", "error": f"{out_dir} is not a writable directory"}, + ) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..50ac7c0f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +pydantic diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2a2237413 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py FastAPI application.""" + +from pathlib import Path + +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient + +from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main import app, get_output_dir + + +def _make_client(out_dir: Path) -> TestClient: + app.dependency_overrides[get_output_dir] = lambda: out_dir + return TestClient(app) + + +def _agent(agent_id: str = "weather-agent") -> dict: + return { + "agent_id": agent_id, + "agent_roles": [], + "agent_scopes": [], + "subject_roles": {}, + "source_roles": {}, + "target_scopes": {}, + "inbound_rules": [], + "outbound_rules": [], + } + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /policy -> 204, writes both files for every agent +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestUpsertPolicy: + def test_writes_files_for_every_agent_and_returns_204(self, tmp_path): + body = {"agents": [_agent("weather-agent"), _agent("github-tool")]} + resp = _make_client(tmp_path).post("/policy", json=body) + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert (tmp_path / "weather_agent.inbound.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "weather_agent.outbound.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "github_tool.inbound.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "github_tool.outbound.rego").exists() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} -> 204, writes both .rego files +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestUpsertAgent: + def test_writes_both_rego_files_and_returns_204(self, tmp_path): + resp = _make_client(tmp_path).post( + "/policy/agents/weather-agent", json=_agent("weather-agent") + ) + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert (tmp_path / "weather_agent.inbound.rego").exists() + assert (tmp_path / "weather_agent.outbound.rego").exists() + + def test_written_files_contain_generated_rego(self, tmp_path): + _make_client(tmp_path).post( + "/policy/agents/weather-agent", json=_agent("weather-agent") + ) + inbound = (tmp_path / "weather_agent.inbound.rego").read_text() + outbound = (tmp_path / "weather_agent.outbound.rego").read_text() + assert "package authz.weather_agent.inbound" in inbound + assert "package authz.weather_agent.outbound" in outbound + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} -> 204, removes both files +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestDeleteAgent: + def test_removes_both_files_and_returns_204(self, tmp_path): + client = _make_client(tmp_path) + client.post("/policy/agents/weather-agent", json=_agent("weather-agent")) + resp = client.delete("/policy/agents/weather-agent") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert not (tmp_path / "weather_agent.inbound.rego").exists() + assert not (tmp_path / "weather_agent.outbound.rego").exists() + + def test_absent_files_still_returns_204(self, tmp_path): + resp = _make_client(tmp_path).delete("/policy/agents/never-written") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /policy -> 204, removes all *.rego files +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestDeleteAll: + def test_removes_all_rego_files_and_returns_204(self, tmp_path): + client = _make_client(tmp_path) + client.post("/policy/agents/weather-agent", json=_agent("weather-agent")) + client.post("/policy/agents/github-tool", json=_agent("github-tool")) + resp = client.delete("/policy") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert list(tmp_path.glob("*.rego")) == [] + + def test_leaves_non_rego_files_untouched(self, tmp_path): + (tmp_path / "keep.txt").write_text("data") + resp = _make_client(tmp_path).delete("/policy") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert (tmp_path / "keep.txt").exists() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Write endpoints -> 502 on OSError +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestOSErrorHandling: + def test_upsert_agent_returns_502_on_os_error(self, tmp_path): + # out_dir points at a regular file, so writing a child path raises OSError + not_a_dir = tmp_path / "afile" + not_a_dir.write_text("x") + resp = _make_client(not_a_dir).post( + "/policy/agents/weather-agent", json=_agent("weather-agent") + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /health -> 200 when dir writable, 503 otherwise +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestHealth: + def test_returns_200_when_dir_writable(self, tmp_path): + resp = _make_client(tmp_path).get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == {"status": "ok"} + + def test_returns_503_when_dir_absent(self, tmp_path): + missing = tmp_path / "does-not-exist" + resp = _make_client(missing).get("/health") + assert resp.status_code == 503 + body = resp.json() + assert body["status"] == "unavailable" + assert "error" in body + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() From 094d650505a4a37c162cfd069fcec982bcb15cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 21:03:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 161/273] style: Sort imports in OPA policy-writer per ruff Apply ruff I001 import ordering to the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) service and its tests. Imports-only change; behavior unchanged (10 tests pass). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py | 2 +- aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py index 61bbc65ea..2f6f087f4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py @@ -11,12 +11,12 @@ from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego import ( generate_inbound_rego, generate_outbound_rego, slugify, ) +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel def get_output_dir() -> Path: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py index 2a2237413..6f5244c37 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py @@ -2,9 +2,8 @@ from pathlib import Path -from fastapi.testclient import TestClient - from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main import app, get_output_dir +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient def _make_client(out_dir: Path) -> TestClient: From c7f5d9c2886f09de2224264d825f05d3f67109b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 21:09:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 162/273] Style: Fix ruff lint errors across src/aiac Apply ruff auto-fixes: sort import blocks (I001), remove extraneous f-string prefixes (F541), drop unused imports (F401), and strip trailing whitespace (W291). Frozen agent/onboarding/policy/ left untouched. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py | 1 - aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 2 +- .../idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 1 + aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py | 14 +++++++------- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py | 1 - aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py | 3 ++- 8 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py index 097a2deca..200c3361c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ from langgraph.graph import END, StateGraph -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import ( apply_mappings, fetch_pdp_state, @@ -8,6 +7,7 @@ propose_mappings, validate_mappings, ) +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState def _has_errors(state: BaseAgentState) -> str: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py index df4d4a017..9d24d0a9b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ from aiac.agent.shared.state import ( BaseAgentState, - CompositeMapping, PDPSnapshot, Permission, ProposedDiff, diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index e22b638f5..f764c6342 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 8226b04d4..a8b5246ea 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import threading from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from pathlib import Path + from dotenv import load_dotenv from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py index c66d2109a..638ad5ba9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/read_api_from_config.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import yaml from dotenv import load_dotenv -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py index d64a25b84..bc87afa56 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ """ from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any, Dict +from typing import Dict from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule @@ -51,15 +51,15 @@ def _generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, dict], scopes: list) -> for priv in service_info["roles"]: priv_name = priv.get("name", "") priv_desc = priv.get("description", "").replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f' {{\n' + rego_content += ' {\n' rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' - rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' + rego_content += ' "scopes": [\n' for scope_name in scope_names: scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' rego_content += ' ]\n' - rego_content += f' }},\n' + rego_content += ' },\n' rego_content += "]\n\n" return rego_content @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ def _generate_policy_rego_inbound( Rego file content as string """ - rego_content = f"""package authbridge.inbound.request + rego_content = """package authbridge.inbound.request import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def _generate_policy_rego_inbound( role_name_escaped = rule.role.name.replace('"', '\\"') rego_content += f"# Actor with role of **{role_name_escaped}**\n" rego_content += f"# may access service with id **{service_escaped}**\n" - rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' + rego_content += 'allow if {\n' rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' rego_content += f' input.a2a.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' rego_content += "}\n\n" @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ def save_policy_rego( dir_path = Path(file_dir) dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - # defaults and user data structure + # defaults and user data structure if not policy_only: config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) user_to_roles: dict = {} diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py index 3f7bea734..db544bfba 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ """ import yaml - from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule __all__ = ["save_policy_yaml"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py index e8df08150..ddc3d9be3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ -from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict + class Rule(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") From 8a4606e367420024a6ad4fb5bc4347034246c74d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:29:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 163/273] remove old rego generation Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py | 5 - aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py | 1 - aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py | 194 ------------------ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py | 47 ----- 4 files changed, 247 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py index 0079ff5af..acd66b0e7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder from config import create_llm -from aiac.pdp.policy.builders.rego import save_policy_rego load_dotenv(dotenv_path="aiac.env", override=True) @@ -117,10 +116,6 @@ def generate_policy_only( print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") - print("\nGenerating Rego policy files...") - rego_dir = Path(output_file).parent / "rego_policy" - save_policy_rego(policy, str(rego_dir), realm=builder.realm) - print("\n" + "=" * 80) print("Parsed Role-to-Privilege Mappings:") print("=" * 80) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4e0a53e6a..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -"""Policy builder utilities for the PDP (Policy Decision Point).""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py deleted file mode 100644 index d64a25b84..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/rego.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,194 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Rego policy file generation for the PDP (Policy Decision Point). - -Public API: - save_policy_rego: Write all Rego files for a Policy to a directory. -""" - -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any, Dict - -from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule - -__all__ = ["save_policy_rego"] - - -def _generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles: dict) -> str: - rego_content = """package authz.realm_roles - -# Realm Roles Mapping -# Maps user names to lists of realm role names - -realm_roles := { -""" - user_entries = [] - for username in sorted(user_to_roles): - username_escaped = username.replace('"', '\\"') - roles = user_to_roles.get(username, []) - role_list = [] - for role_name in roles: - role_name_escaped = role_name.replace('"', '\\"') - role_list.append(f'"{role_name_escaped}"') - roles_str = ", ".join(role_list) - user_entries.append(f' "{username_escaped}": [{roles_str}]') - rego_content += ",\n".join(user_entries) - rego_content += "\n}\n" - return rego_content - - -def _generate_privileges_rego(privileges_map: Dict[str, dict], scopes: list) -> str: - rego_content = """package authz.privileges - -# Service Privileges Mapping -# Maps service/client IDs to their available privileges - -""" - scope_names = [scope.name for scope in scopes] - for service_name, service_info in privileges_map.items(): - rego_content += f'service["{service_name}"] := [\n' - for priv in service_info["roles"]: - priv_name = priv.get("name", "") - priv_desc = priv.get("description", "").replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f' {{\n' - rego_content += f' "name": "{priv_name}",\n' - rego_content += f' "description": "{priv_desc}",\n' - rego_content += f' "scopes": [\n' - for scope_name in scope_names: - scope_name_escaped = scope_name.replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f' "{scope_name_escaped}",\n' - rego_content += ' ]\n' - rego_content += f' }},\n' - rego_content += "]\n\n" - return rego_content - - -def _generate_default_inbound_rego() -> str: - return """package authbridge.inbound.request - -default allow := false -""" - - -def _generate_default_outbound_rego() -> str: - return """package authbridge.outbound.request - -default allow := false -""" - - -def _generate_policy_rego_inbound( - rules: list[PolicyRule], - service: str, - description: str ="" -) -> str: - """ - Generate Rego allow-rules for a single service. - - Returns: - Rego file content as string - """ - - rego_content = f"""package authbridge.inbound.request - -import data.authz.realm_roles.realm_roles - -# Access Control Policy -# Uses user -> realm roles mapping to authorize privileges -# Policy entries map realm role names to privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - rego_content += f"# Service: {service}\n" - if description: - rego_content += "# Original Policy Description:\n" - for line in description.strip().split('\n'): - rego_content += f"# {line.strip()}\n" - rego_content += "#\n\n" - - for rule in rules: - service_escaped = service.replace('"', '\\"') - role_name_escaped = rule.role.name.replace('"', '\\"') - rego_content += f"# Actor with role of **{role_name_escaped}**\n" - rego_content += f"# may access service with id **{service_escaped}**\n" - rego_content += f'allow if {{\n' - rego_content += f' "{role_name_escaped}" in object.get(realm_roles, input.identity.subject, [])\n' - rego_content += f' input.a2a.client_id == "{service_escaped}"\n' - rego_content += "}\n\n" - - return rego_content - - -def save_policy_rego( - rules: list[PolicyRule], - file_dir: str = "rego_policy", - realm: str = "demo", - policy_only: bool = False -) -> None: - """ - Save Rego files for realm roles, defaults, and per-service access policy. - - Creates: - - realm_roles.rego: user → realm-role mapping - - default_inbound.rego / default_outbound.rego: deny-by-default rules - - generated_policy_<service>.rego: one allow-rule file per service in the policy - - Args: - policy: Policy model instance - file_dir: Directory to save Rego files - realm: Keycloak realm name (used to fetch user-to-roles mapping) - """ - - dir_path = Path(file_dir) - dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - - # defaults and user data structure - if not policy_only: - config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - user_to_roles: dict = {} - for subject in config_api.get_subjects(): - user_to_roles[subject.username] = [role.name for role in subject.roles] - - realm_roles_path = dir_path / "realm_roles.rego" - with open(realm_roles_path, "w") as f: - f.write(_generate_realm_roles_rego(user_to_roles)) - print(f"Realm roles Rego saved to {realm_roles_path}") - - default_inbound_path = dir_path / "default_inbound.rego" - with open(default_inbound_path, "w") as f: - f.write(_generate_default_inbound_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_inbound_path}") - - default_outbound_path = dir_path / "default_outbound.rego" - with open(default_outbound_path, "w") as f: - f.write(_generate_default_outbound_rego()) - print(f"Default Rego saved to {default_outbound_path}") - - # # Deduplicate services by ID (Service is not hashable — cannot use a set) - # unique_services: Dict[str, Any] = {} - # for privs in policy.policy.values(): - # for priv in privs: - # for svc in priv.services: - # svc_id = svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id - # unique_services[svc_id] = svc - - # service_types = {svc_id: svc.type for svc_id, svc in unique_services.items()} - # policy_structure = { - # "policy": { - # realm_role: [ - # {"service": svc.serviceId or svc.name or svc.id, "privilege": priv.name} - # for priv in privileges - # for svc in priv.services - # ] - # for realm_role, privileges in policy.policy.items() - # } - # } - - service_id = "Dummy" - policy_rego = _generate_policy_rego_inbound(rules, service_id) - safe_name = service_id.replace("/", "_").replace("\\", "_").replace(" ", "_") - policy_path = dir_path / f"generated_policy_{safe_name}.rego" - with open(policy_path, "w") as f: - f.write(policy_rego) - print(f"Generated policy Rego for service '{service_id}' saved to {policy_path}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3f7bea734..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/builders/yaml.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -YAML policy file generation for the PDP (Policy Decision Point). - -Public API: - save_policy_yaml: Write a Policy model instance as a YAML file. -""" - -import yaml - -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule - -__all__ = ["save_policy_yaml"] - - -def _generate_yaml_output(policy: list[PolicyRule]) -> str: - header = """# Access Control Policy -# Maps user roles (realm roles) to specific privileges -# Format: user_role_name -> list of privilege mappings -# Each entry specifies: service (service name) and privilege (privilege name from that service) - -""" - yaml_content ="" - for r in policy: - yaml_content += yaml.dump( - r.model_dump(exclude_none=True), - default_flow_style=False, - sort_keys=False, - allow_unicode=True, - ) - - footer = "\n# Generated by PolicyBuilder using LangGraph\n" - return header + yaml_content + footer - - -def save_policy_yaml(policy: list[PolicyRule], filepath: str = "access_control_policy.yaml") -> None: - """ - Save a Policy as YAML to a file. - - Args: - policy: Policy model instance - filepath: Output file path - """ - yaml_output = _generate_yaml_output(policy) - with open(filepath, "w") as f: - f.write(yaml_output) - print(f"Access rules saved to {filepath}") From b1290756e0cf86a247720f5a10af6e22acc19b29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:35:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 164/273] remove old Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py | 13 ------------- 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py deleted file mode 100644 index ddc3d9be3..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/models.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict - - -class Rule(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - role: Role - scope: Scope - -class PolicyObjectModel(BaseModel): - model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") - rules: list[Rule] - explanation: str From 137fa5f4ca24a003599aa5909be036dae3795dd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:58:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 165/273] cleanup Signed-off-by: Anatoly Koyfman <anatoly@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py | 47 ++++++++++++------- .../policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 26 ---------- aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py | 21 --------- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py index 9d24d0a9b..2528188b7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ import os +from typing import cast from fastapi import HTTPException from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI @@ -53,14 +54,16 @@ def fetch_pdp_state(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: def propose_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - snapshot: PDPSnapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] + snapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] + if snapshot is None: + raise ValueError("pdp_snapshot is not set; fetch_pdp_state must run before propose_mappings") policy_chunks = state["policy_chunks"] domain_chunks = state["domain_knowledge_chunks"] trigger = state["trigger"] entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] affected_role = next((r for r in snapshot.roles if r.id == entity_id), None) - role_name = affected_role.name if affected_role else entity_id + role_name = affected_role.name if affected_role else (entity_id or "") context = "\n".join([ "## Access Control Policy", @@ -78,11 +81,14 @@ def propose_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: try: llm = ChatOpenAI(model=os.getenv("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", "gpt-4o-mini"), temperature=0) - diff: ProposedDiff = llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff).invoke( - [ - {"role": "system", "content": PLANNER_SYSTEM}, - {"role": "user", "content": context}, - ] + diff = cast( + ProposedDiff, + llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff).invoke( + [ + {"role": "system", "content": PLANNER_SYSTEM}, + {"role": "user", "content": context}, + ] + ), ) except Exception as exc: raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail=f"LLM unavailable: {exc}") from exc @@ -91,8 +97,12 @@ def propose_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: def validate_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - snapshot: PDPSnapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] - diff: ProposedDiff = state["proposed_diff"] + snapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] + if snapshot is None: + raise ValueError("pdp_snapshot is not set; fetch_pdp_state must run before propose_mappings") + diff = state["proposed_diff"] + if diff is None: + raise ValueError("proposed_diff is not set; propose_mappings must run before validate_mappings") trigger = state["trigger"] entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] @@ -133,11 +143,14 @@ def validate_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: try: llm = ChatOpenAI(model=os.getenv("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", "gpt-4o-mini"), temperature=0) - verdict: ValidationVerdict = llm.with_structured_output(ValidationVerdict).invoke( - [ - {"role": "system", "content": AUDITOR_SYSTEM}, - {"role": "user", "content": f"Proposed diff: {diff.model_dump_json()}"}, - ] + verdict = cast( + ValidationVerdict, + llm.with_structured_output(ValidationVerdict).invoke( + [ + {"role": "system", "content": AUDITOR_SYSTEM}, + {"role": "user", "content": f"Proposed diff: {diff.model_dump_json()}"}, + ] + ), ) except Exception as exc: raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail=f"LLM unavailable during audit: {exc}") from exc @@ -150,10 +163,12 @@ def validate_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: def apply_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: if state.get("validation_errors"): - return state + return {**state} realm = state["realm"] - diff: ProposedDiff = state["proposed_diff"] + diff = state["proposed_diff"] + if diff is None: + raise ValueError("proposed_diff is not set; propose_mappings must run before apply_diff") try: policy = Policy.for_realm(realm) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py index 51fcef612..86e121a0b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py @@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState from base_mapper import ( extract_explanation_and_json, @@ -438,17 +436,6 @@ def test_map_roles_with_empty_access(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): assert result["success"] is True -def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """generate_policy() returns a PolicyObjectModel with rules and explanation.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - assert isinstance(result, PolicyObjectModel) - assert isinstance(result.rules, list) - - def test_generate_policy_maps_role_to_privilege(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): """generate_policy() produces Rules mapping the granted roles to the privilege.""" mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) @@ -461,19 +448,6 @@ def test_generate_policy_maps_role_to_privilege(github_aud_privilege, sample_rol for r in rules ) - -def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """generate_policy() produces a valid PolicyObjectModel with expected rules.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - policy = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) - assert len(policy.rules) > 0 - assert any(r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" for r in policy.rules) - - def test_generate_policy_with_unknown_role_raises_value_error(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): """generate_policy() raises ValueError when the LLM returns an unknown role.""" bad_response = Mock() diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py index 90436060b..4f8b8cfc0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.pdp.policy.models import PolicyObjectModel from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleState from base_mapper import ( @@ -427,26 +426,6 @@ def test_map_privileges_with_empty_granted_privileges(sample_scopes): assert result["granted_privileges"] == [] assert result["success"] is True - -def test_generate_policy_returns_policy_model(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """generate_policy() returns a PolicyObjectModel with rules and explanation.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - result = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - assert isinstance(result, PolicyObjectModel) - assert isinstance(result.rules, list) - - -def test_generate_policy_yaml_is_valid_yaml(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """generate_policy() produces a valid PolicyObjectModel with expected rules.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - policy = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - assert isinstance(policy, PolicyObjectModel) - assert len(policy.rules) > 0 - assert any(r.role.name == "developer" for r in policy.rules) - - def test_generate_policy_maps_privilege_to_role(developer_role, sample_scopes): """generate_policy() produces a Rule mapping the role to the granted privilege.""" mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) From 0839b3a18efd712cedfec21728dc1eef7485dc07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 23:02:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 166/273] feat(aiac): Add aiac.pdp.policy.library OPA HTTP client with unit tests Implement the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) HTTP client at the new aiac.pdp.policy.library namespace (issue 8.9): four module-level functions apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy. Models import from aiac.policy.model.models, AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL is read with a http://127.0.0.1:7072 default, non-2xx responses raise RuntimeError, and no realm parameter is sent. Add mocked client unit tests (issue 3.14) covering each function's success path, non-2xx RuntimeError, the env-var fallback, and the no-realm-parameter guarantee. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py | 45 +++++ aiac/test/pdp/policy/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/test_api.py | 193 +++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 238 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/test_api.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1855b4e31 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +"""HTTP client for the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) REST API. + +Module-level functions wrapping ``{AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL}/policy...`` endpoints. +The PDP Policy Writer operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm, so +none of these functions take or send a ``realm`` parameter. +""" + +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import requests +from dotenv import load_dotenv + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + +load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") + + +def _base_url() -> str: + return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") + + +def _check(resp: requests.Response) -> None: + if not resp.ok: + raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + + +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None: + _check(requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy", json=model.model_dump())) + + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: + _check( + requests.post( + f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}", json=model.model_dump() + ) + ) + + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None: + _check(requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}")) + + +def delete_policy() -> None: + _check(requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy")) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/test_api.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eb804957a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/library/test_api.py @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.policy.library.api. + +The PDP Policy Writer HTTP boundary is mocked; no live service is required. +""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + +BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" + +# Minimal valid model fixtures (all eight AgentPolicyModel fields present). +_AGENT_POLICY_DICT = { + "agent_id": "weather-agent", + "agent_roles": [], + "agent_scopes": [], + "subject_roles": {}, + "source_roles": {}, + "target_scopes": {}, + "inbound_rules": [], + "outbound_rules": [], +} +_POLICY_DICT = {"agents": [_AGENT_POLICY_DICT]} + + +def _ok(status: int = 200) -> MagicMock: + resp = MagicMock() + resp.status_code = status + resp.ok = True + return resp + + +def _err(status: int = 500) -> MagicMock: + resp = MagicMock() + resp.status_code = status + resp.ok = False + resp.text = "internal error" + return resp + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# apply_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestApplyPolicy: + def test_posts_serialized_policy_model(self): + model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy + + result = apply_policy(model) + assert result is None + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/policy" + assert m.call_args.kwargs["json"] == model.model_dump() + assert m.call_args.kwargs.get("params") is None + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): + model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + apply_policy(model) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# apply_agent_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestApplyAgentPolicy: + def test_posts_serialized_agent_model_to_agent_path(self): + model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_agent_policy + + result = apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", model) + assert result is None + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/policy/agents/weather-agent" + assert m.call_args.kwargs["json"] == model.model_dump() + assert m.call_args.kwargs.get("params") is None + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): + model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_agent_policy + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", model) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# delete_agent_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestDeleteAgentPolicy: + def test_deletes_agent_path(self): + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok(204) + ) as m: + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import delete_agent_policy + + result = delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") + assert result is None + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/policy/agents/weather-agent" + assert m.call_args.kwargs.get("params") is None + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.delete", return_value=_err(404) + ): + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import delete_agent_policy + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + delete_agent_policy("missing-agent") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# delete_policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestDeletePolicy: + def test_deletes_policy_path(self): + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok(204) + ) as m: + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import delete_policy + + result = delete_policy() + assert result is None + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/policy" + assert m.call_args.kwargs.get("params") is None + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.delete", return_value=_err(500) + ): + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import delete_policy + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + delete_policy() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL fallback +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestUrlFallback: + def test_defaults_to_localhost_7072_when_env_unset(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) + model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) + with patch("aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy + + apply_policy(model) + assert m.call_args[0][0] == "http://127.0.0.1:7072/policy" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# No realm query parameter on any request +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestNoRealmParam: + def test_none_of_the_four_functions_append_realm(self): + policy = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) + agent = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + with patch( + "aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok() + ) as post, patch( + "aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.requests.delete", return_value=_ok(204) + ) as delete: + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import ( + apply_agent_policy, + apply_policy, + delete_agent_policy, + delete_policy, + ) + + apply_policy(policy) + apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent) + delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") + delete_policy() + + for call in list(post.call_args_list) + list(delete.call_args_list): + assert call.kwargs.get("params") is None + assert "realm" not in call.args[0] From a384ab2d041f31a825de16436fa73cde86383cf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 23:02:50 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 167/273] style(aiac): Add aiac-local ruff config and fix lint violations Add [tool.ruff] to aiac/pyproject.toml (line-length 120, target py312, select E/F/I/W) with force-exclude and an extend-exclude for the frozen src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy subtree, so aiac is linted self-contained without modifying the monorepo-root config. Clear all resulting violations across aiac: ruff --fix for import sorting (I001) and unused imports (F401); hand-fix E501 (wrap long asserts and dict literals), F841 (drop unused patch bindings), and E402 (noqa where an import must follow a warnings filter). No behavior change. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/pyproject.toml | 11 ++++++++ .../agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py | 2 -- aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py | 6 ++--- aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py | 17 ++++++++----- aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py | 4 +-- aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py | 19 ++++++++++---- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 25 ++++++++++++++----- aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py | 2 +- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 3 +-- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py | 5 ++-- .../pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py | 4 +-- aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py | 3 ++- aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 2 +- aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 2 -- aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py | 1 - aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 9 ++++--- .../policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 17 +++++++------ aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py | 17 +++++++------ aiac/test/test_llm_config.py | 4 +-- 19 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml index 5950ae193..0f30855e7 100644 --- a/aiac/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +[tool.ruff] +line-length = 120 +target-version = "py312" +# Apply excludes even to paths passed explicitly (e.g. by pre-commit / CI). +force-exclude = true +# Frozen, generated policy subtree — never linted or auto-fixed. +extend-exclude = ["src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy"] + +[tool.ruff.lint] +select = ["E", "F", "I", "W"] + [tool.pytest.ini_options] testpaths = ["test"] pythonpath = ["src", "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy"] diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py index 86899e323..3db663b86 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py @@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ import asyncio from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch -import pytest - def _make_msg(subject: str, data: bytes = b"{}") -> MagicMock: msg = MagicMock() diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py index 2c5973c6a..feea0e41f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.agent.controller.routes (issue 4.1).""" import warnings -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch - -import pytest +from unittest.mock import patch # Suppress starlette httpx deprecation warning warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", category=DeprecationWarning, module="starlette") -from fastapi.testclient import TestClient +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient # noqa: E402 (must follow warning filter above) def _make_role_result(role_id: str = "r1") -> dict: diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py index aa3b28c0c..d4f6b21b9 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes (issue 4.10).""" -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch +from unittest.mock import patch import pytest from aiac.agent.shared.state import ( - Assignments, BaseAgentState, CompositeMapping, PDPSnapshot, @@ -117,9 +116,10 @@ def test_populates_role_composites_for_affected_role(self): assert any(p.name == "read" for p in snapshot.role_composites[ROLE_NAME]) def test_configuration_unavailable_raises_502(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state from fastapi import HTTPException + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state + state = _make_state() with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value @@ -174,9 +174,10 @@ def test_returns_proposed_diff_scoped_to_affected_role(self): assert result["proposed_diff"].add[0].role_name == ROLE_NAME def test_llm_unavailable_raises_504(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import propose_mappings from fastapi import HTTPException + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import propose_mappings + snapshot = self._make_snapshot() state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=snapshot) @@ -303,7 +304,10 @@ def test_safety_guard_fails_when_too_many_changes(self, monkeypatch): result = validate_mappings(state) - assert any("safety" in e.lower() or "max" in e.lower() or "changes" in e.lower() for e in result["validation_errors"]) + assert any( + "safety" in e.lower() or "max" in e.lower() or "changes" in e.lower() + for e in result["validation_errors"] + ) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -442,9 +446,10 @@ def test_apply_skipped_when_validation_errors_present(self): policy_instance.remove_role_composites.assert_not_called() def test_pdp_unavailable_raises_502(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings from fastapi import HTTPException + from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings + mapping = CompositeMapping( role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" ) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py index bf32369b5..6393ad80b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator (issue 4.11).""" -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch +from unittest.mock import patch import pytest from fastapi import HTTPException -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState, TriggerContext +from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState REALM = "kagenti" ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py index 68a3a0bfb..f2ae95475 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.agent.shared.nodes (issue 4.1).""" -import sys from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest @@ -111,9 +110,10 @@ def test_service_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): assert "service access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) def test_chroma_unavailable_raises_503(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy from fastapi import HTTPException + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy + state = _make_state() mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module_unavailable() @@ -135,7 +135,11 @@ def test_chroma_n_results_respected(self, monkeypatch): collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert "5" in str(call_kwargs) or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 5 or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 5 + assert ( + "5" in str(call_kwargs) + or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 5 + or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 5 + ) def test_queries_aiac_policies_collection(self): from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy @@ -180,9 +184,10 @@ def test_empty_collection_returns_empty_list_without_error(self): def test_chroma_unavailable_raises_503(self): """ChromaDB being down is fatal for domain knowledge too — raises 503.""" - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge from fastapi import HTTPException + from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge + state = _make_state() mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module_unavailable() @@ -216,4 +221,8 @@ def test_chroma_n_results_respected(self, monkeypatch): collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert "3" in str(call_kwargs) or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 3 or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 3 + assert ( + "3" in str(call_kwargs) + or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 3 + or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 3 + ) diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index 14ae8babc..22356285b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.idp.configuration.""" -import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +import pytest + from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" @@ -301,7 +302,13 @@ def test_returns_single_enriched_service(self, monkeypatch): def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - raw = {"id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-agent", "description": "An Agent service", "enabled": True} + raw = { + "id": self.SERVICE_ID, + "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, + "name": "my-agent", + "description": "An Agent service", + "enabled": True, + } with patch( "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", side_effect=[ @@ -407,7 +414,7 @@ class TestCreateScope: def test_returns_scope_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "sc1", "name": "read:data", "description": "Read access"} - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_scope( scope_name="read:data", scope_description="Read access" ) @@ -470,7 +477,13 @@ def test_returns_updated_service(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) service = self._make_service() scope = self._make_scope() - updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}]} + updated = { + "id": "svc-uuid", + "clientId": "svc-uuid", + "name": "my-svc", + "enabled": True, + "scopes": [{"id": "scope-id", "name": "read:data"}], + } post_resp = _ok({}, 201) get_resp = _ok(updated) with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=post_resp), \ @@ -520,7 +533,7 @@ class TestCreateRole: def test_returns_role_instance(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) created = {"id": "r1", "name": "reader", "description": "Read-only", "composite": False} - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)) as m: + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(created, 201)): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).create_role("reader", "Read-only") assert isinstance(result, Role) assert result.name == "reader" diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py index d8e1798b5..b3496134e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Service, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject class TestSubject: diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 11448bb43..f7d2bf6ee 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ import os from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -import pytest from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError -from aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import app, get_admin, _cache +from aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main import _cache, app, get_admin REALM = "kagenti" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py index 9ba93a08c..448348486 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.policy.""" -import pytest from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel, PolicyStatement +import pytest + from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy +from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel, PolicyStatement REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py index 8b779393e..6df613469 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -1,9 +1,7 @@ """Unit tests for aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" -import os -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch +from unittest.mock import MagicMock -import pytest from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py index 6f5244c37..2a2237413 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ from pathlib import Path -from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main import app, get_output_dir from fastapi.testclient import TestClient +from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main import app, get_output_dir + def _make_client(out_dir: Path) -> TestClient: app.dependency_overrides[get_output_dir] = lambda: out_dir diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py index acd487eec..b1910ede3 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego.""" from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego import ( generate_inbound_rego, generate_outbound_rego, slugify, ) +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule def _role(name: str = "reader") -> Role: diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py index f394601c0..199ce9f80 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -1,5 +1,3 @@ -import importlib -import sys from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py index 51632e637..bec5c003f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule from aiac.policy.store.service.main import app, get_db - # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Fixtures and helpers # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py index d3bec04f5..120c60aed 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py @@ -14,15 +14,15 @@ """ import os -import pytest from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule +import pytest from config import create_llm +from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ def llm_model_name(request): def llm_instance(llm_model_name): import socket from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) if cfg.endpoint: diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py index 86e121a0b..d1ec64d85 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py @@ -15,24 +15,24 @@ """ import os -from typing import Any -import pytest -import yaml from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState +import pytest +import yaml from base_mapper import ( extract_explanation_and_json, - validate_mapping_items, - should_route_after_structural_validation, should_retry_after_semantic, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + validate_mapping_items, ) +from config import create_llm from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from langgraph.graph import END -from config import create_llm +from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ def llm_model_name(request): def llm_instance(llm_model_name): import socket from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) if cfg.endpoint: diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py index 4f8b8cfc0..c96aa7038 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py @@ -14,25 +14,25 @@ """ import os -from typing import Any -import pytest -import yaml from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any from unittest.mock import Mock -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleState +import pytest +import yaml from base_mapper import ( BaseMappingState, extract_explanation_and_json, - validate_mapping_items, - should_route_after_structural_validation, should_retry_after_semantic, + should_route_after_structural_validation, + validate_mapping_items, ) +from config import create_llm from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES from langgraph.graph import END -from config import create_llm +from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleState +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ def llm_model_name(request): def llm_instance(llm_model_name): import socket from urllib.parse import urlparse + from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) if cfg.endpoint: diff --git a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py index 5899e4117..74674ac48 100644 --- a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py +++ b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py @@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ from pathlib import Path import pytest - from config.llm_config import ( DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES, DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS, DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, +) +from config.llm_config import ( load_llm_config_from_env as load_llm_config, ) - _LLM_VARS = ( "LLM_MODEL", "LLM_ENDPOINT", From 76673a98526cf3fa37e7a8bfe5e4febf21620bd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 01:10:40 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 168/273] docs: Rework PDP policy-writer PRD to ID-only rego model; index integration tests - pdp-policy-writer-opa.md, policy-model.md: Rego input is IDs only ({subject,source,target}); role/scope mappings embedded in-package; coarse '>=1 scope' gates (inbound: subject mandatory + source optional; outbound: subject AND agent); agent_roles/agent_scopes emitted from model fields. - PRD.md: add dedicated 'Integration test specifications' index; integration-test/ as a sibling of components/, one spec per test. - CLAUDE.md: document the inception/handoffs/ convention. - .gitignore: ignore aiac/inception/handoffs/. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .gitignore | 1 + aiac/CLAUDE.md | 4 + aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 10 ++ .../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 95 ++++++++++++------- .../requirements/components/policy-model.md | 12 +-- 5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 525792893..b9c619f6e 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ kagenti-webhook/bin/ # AIAC working artefacts (regenerated; not source of truth) aiac/inception/issues/ +aiac/inception/handoffs/ # Claude Code / AI assistant files docs/agents/ diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index 504c6e824..57b6e0e32 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ For current issue list, `ls` the subdirectories under `inception/issues/`. When working on an issue would benefit from inspecting the relevant source code, use the AskUserQuestion tool to ask before doing so — present "Yes" and "No" as clickable options. If the user picks Yes, inspect the codebase normally. If No, work from the issue description and existing context only. +## Handoffs + +Per-task handoff documents live under `inception/handoffs/` — one markdown file per task, numeric-prefixed (e.g. `01-update-issues.md`, `02-update-source-and-tests.md`). When asked to generate a handoff, write it here (not a scratch/temp path). Each handoff must be self-contained — background, task, exact files, and acceptance criteria — so a fresh session can execute it without the originating conversation. + ## Source code `src/aiac/` — Python package root (`__init__.py` is empty). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 5bab20638..6364c7542 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -548,6 +548,16 @@ pytest aiac/ -m "not integration" # unit only pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only ``` +### Integration test specifications + +Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are specified **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` — a **sibling of `components/`**, following the same "one spec per unit" convention the component PRDs use. This section is the dedicated index of those specs (mirroring the Component Summary in §5) and grows as tests are added; each entry is a distinct integration test with its own spec. + +| Integration test | Description | Spec | +|---|---|---| +| PDP Policy Writer — `generate_rego.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) that boots the OPA stub locally, applies a `PolicyModel` through `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md](integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md) | + +Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`. + --- ## 10. Conventions and constraints diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index da6a3d390..ca0ff0123 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -38,17 +38,17 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `P | `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | | `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | | `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | -| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service **id** → roles granted | -| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (user) **id** → roles held on behalf of which this agent acts | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source (calling service) **id** → roles held. **Optional** gate input — an absent source passes. | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (end-user) **id** → roles held. **Mandatory** gate input. | | `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | -| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | -| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(subject_role, agent_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, target_scope)` tuples | -**Inbound rule semantics:** a caller with realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent requesting scope `scope`. +**Inbound rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent for the agent scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `role_scopes` map (role → agent scopes) that the inbound package evaluates. -**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `agent_role_scopes` map (agent role → target scopes) that the outbound package evaluates. -**Note on `target_scopes` direction:** the map is keyed by **target service id → allowed scopes** (the inverse of the former `scope_targets`, which was `scope → targets`). The outbound Rego generator inverts it back to a scope → target-ids table for OPA evaluation (see below). +**Note on `target_scopes` direction:** the map is keyed by **target service id → allowed scopes** (the inverse of the former `scope_targets`, which was `scope → targets`). The outbound Rego generator emits this map **verbatim** and evaluates `target_scopes[input.target]` directly — there is no inversion (see below). ### `PolicyModel` @@ -94,52 +94,83 @@ No `?realm=` parameter — the service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keyclo For each `AgentPolicyModel`, the service generates **two Rego packages**: one for the inbound pipeline and one for the outbound pipeline. The `agent_id` is slugified for use in the package name (hyphens → underscores, lowercase). +**Input is identifiers only.** Both packages receive an input document of **IDs**, never roles or scopes: inbound input is `{subject, source}`, outbound input is `{subject, target}` (`subject` is the end-user id, `source` the calling service id, `target` the called service id). Every role/scope mapping is therefore **embedded in the package itself**, and the `allow` logic resolves IDs → roles → scopes internally. Because no per-request scope is supplied, the decision is **coarse**: a principal passes when it has access to **at least one** relevant scope. + +The generator embeds these symbols, derived from the `AgentPolicyModel`: + +| Rego symbol | Source | Shape | +|-------------|--------|-------| +| `subject_roles` | `model.subject_roles` | subject id → `[role.name, …]` | +| `source_roles` | `model.source_roles` | source id → `[role.name, …]` | +| `agent_scopes` | `model.agent_scopes` | `[scope.name, …]` | +| `agent_roles` | `model.agent_roles` | `[role.name, …]` | +| `role_scopes` | grouped `model.inbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (agent scopes granted per subject role) | +| `agent_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes per agent role) | +| `target_scopes` | `model.target_scopes` | target id → `[scope.name, …]` | + ### Inbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.inbound` -Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **inbound pipeline**. Input document: `{subject: str, source: str, scope: str}` where `subject` is the end-user ID, `source` is the calling service ID, and `scope` is the requested scope. +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **inbound pipeline** — "who may call this agent". Input document: `{subject, source}` (IDs). **`subject` is mandatory; `source` is optional** (an absent source passes). A principal passes when it holds a role that grants at least one of the agent's own scopes (`agent_scopes`). ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.inbound -source_roles := { - "{source_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], - ... -} +agent_scopes := ["{scope.name}", ...] # from agent_scopes -default allow := false +subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } +source_roles := { "{source_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } + +role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from inbound_rules -allow if { +subject_ok if { + some role in subject_roles[input.subject] + some scope in role_scopes[role] + scope in agent_scopes +} +source_ok if { not input.source } # optional: absent source passes +source_ok if { some role in source_roles[input.source] - role == "{rule.role.name}" - input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}" + some scope in role_scopes[role] + scope in agent_scopes } -# ... one allow block per inbound PolicyRule + +default allow := false +allow if { subject_ok; source_ok } ``` ### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` -Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline**. Input document: `{subject: str, target: str, role: str, scope: str}` where `subject` is the end-user ID, `target` is the called service ID, `role` is this agent's own realm role, and `scope` is the requested scope. +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass: the subject must hold a role granting at least one agent scope, **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound -# scope_targets is derived by inverting the model's target_scopes -# (target id → scopes) into scope name → target ids for OPA evaluation. -scope_targets := { - "{scope.name}": ["{target_id}", ...], - ... -} +agent_roles := ["{role.name}", ...] # from agent_roles +agent_scopes := ["{scope.name}", ...] # from agent_scopes -default allow := false +subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } + +role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from inbound_rules +agent_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_rules +target_scopes := { "{target_id}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from target_scopes -allow if { - input.role == "{rule.role.name}" - input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}" - input.target in scope_targets["{rule.scope.name}"] +subject_ok if { + some role in subject_roles[input.subject] + some scope in role_scopes[role] + scope in agent_scopes } -# ... one allow block per outbound PolicyRule +target_ok if { + some role in agent_roles + some scope in agent_role_scopes[role] + scope in target_scopes[input.target] +} + +default allow := false +allow if { subject_ok; target_ok } ``` +A worked example (agent `github-agent`, users `developer`/`tester`, tool `github-tool`) is maintained alongside the tests. + --- ## Library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` @@ -252,8 +283,8 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Load Kubernetes in-cluster config at startup via `kubernetes.config.load_incluster_config()`; fall back to `kubernetes.config.load_kube_config()` for local development. - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. - `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: replace hyphens with underscores, lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment. -- `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string from the model's `source_roles` map and `inbound_rules`. -- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string from the model's `target_scopes` map and `outbound_rules`, inverting `target_scopes` (target id → scopes) into the scope name → target ids table OPA evaluates against. +- `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `role_scopes` (from `inbound_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits `subject_ok` and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. - `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. - `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md index 423e5a7bf..b470831f0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md @@ -83,15 +83,15 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound ru | `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | | `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | | `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | -| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source service **id** → roles granted | -| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (user) **id** → roles held on behalf of which this agent acts | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source (calling service) **id** → roles held. **Optional** gate input — an absent source passes. | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (end-user) **id** → roles held. **Mandatory** gate input. | | `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | -| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(caller_role, requested_scope)` tuples | -| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, requested_scope)` tuples | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(subject_role, agent_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, target_scope)` tuples | -**Inbound rule semantics:** a caller holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent requesting scope `scope`. +**Inbound rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent for the agent scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `inbound_rules` as a role → agent-scope map; its inbound gate is keyed on the subject id (mandatory), with the calling source id optional. -**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request scope `scope` on a target service. +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `outbound_rules` as an agent-role → target-scope map; its outbound gate requires both the subject and the agent to be authorized. #### `PolicyModel` From e254369ce7f9c4ef0ac142d71f35a5a65f4b8cf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 01:25:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 169/273] docs: Add PDP Policy Writer (OPA) integration-test spec MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Specify the generate_rego.py launcher integration test under the new inception/requirements/integration-test/ folder — a standalone, write-only script that boots the OPA filesystem stub via a uvicorn subprocess, applies the github-agent PolicyModel through aiac.pdp.policy.library.api, and leaves the generated .rego on disk for manual inspection. Documents scope, scenario, env config, runbook, testing decisions, and its relationship to the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests. Framed as one spec among several indexed by the master PRD. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md | 162 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 162 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..312c48390 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +# Integration Test: PDP Policy Writer (OPA) — `generate_rego.py` + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. +> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` +> (a sibling of `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section +> ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) is the index of them. This is the **PDP Policy Writer (OPA)** integration +> test — not the definition of integration testing in general, and not the only integration-test PRD. + +## Location +`aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` + +## Description + +A standalone launcher script that exercises the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) **filesystem stub** +end-to-end and leaves the generated Rego on disk for a human to eyeball. It is **not** a pytest +test, **not** part of CI, and **not** marked `@pytest.mark.integration` — it is run by hand when an +operator wants to see the actual `.rego` output for a known scenario. + +The script drives the service through its real HTTP surface using the real client library, so it +covers the whole path: `PolicyModel` → HTTP → ASGI app → Rego generator → files on disk. Nothing is +mocked; the only shortcut is that the OPA target is the filesystem stub +([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) §1.14) rather than +the Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patched +`AuthorizationPolicy` CR. + +### What it does + +1. Choose a local `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` (a known directory the operator can inspect afterward). +2. Launch `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` as a **`uvicorn` subprocess** (no Docker), passing + `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and `PORT` in its environment. +3. Poll `GET /health` until it returns `200 {"status": "ok"}` (the stub reports healthy once + `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` exists and is writable), with a bounded timeout. +4. Build the fixed `PolicyModel` scenario (below) and apply it via + `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.apply_policy` — a real `POST /policy` over HTTP. +5. Terminate the `uvicorn` subprocess. +6. Print the `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` path so the operator knows where to look. + +**Write-only.** The script performs no read-back and makes **no assertions**. Verification is +manual: the operator opens the generated `.rego` files and confirms they match the package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) +(§ *Rego package structure*). There is no pass/fail exit contract beyond the script running to +completion. + +## Scenario + +A single agent, fixed so the generated Rego is reproducible and reviewable by inspection. The values +below are the canonical worked example referenced by +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). + +| Element | Value | +|---------|-------| +| Agent | `github-agent` | +| Agent roles | `source-helper`, `issues-helper` | +| Agent scopes | `source-access`, `issues-access` | +| Subject (user) roles | `developer`, `tester` | +| Tool | `github-tool` | +| Tool scopes | `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write` | +| Calling service (source) | none | + +Role → access, as encoded by the model's inbound and outbound rules: + +- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. +- `tester` — issues read/write. + +Applying this `PolicyModel` produces exactly two files in `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`: + +- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound` +- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound` + +Both must match the **ID-only** package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md): input is IDs only +(`{subject, source}` inbound, `{subject, target}` outbound); all role/scope maps are embedded in the +package; the inbound gate is subject-mandatory + source-optional; the outbound gate requires both +subject and agent to pass; and `target_scopes` is emitted verbatim (target id → scopes, no +inversion). Because the input carries no per-request scope, the decision is coarse — a principal +passes on having access to **at least one** relevant scope. + +The `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` objects come from `aiac.policy.model.models` +([../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md)); the script constructs them in +Python rather than reading them from Keycloak. + +## Configuration (env) + +| Variable | Purpose | Default | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | Base URL the library client posts to; must point at the launched stub | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Directory the stub writes `.rego` files to; passed to the subprocess and printed at the end | operator-chosen local dir | +| `PORT` | Port the `uvicorn` subprocess binds; must agree with the host/port in `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `7072` | + +`PORT` and `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` must be kept consistent — the client posts to the URL, the +subprocess listens on the port. + +## Runbook + +```bash +.venv/bin/python test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +# then inspect the printed REGO_OUTPUT_DIR, e.g.: +# github_agent.inbound.rego +# github_agent.outbound.rego +``` + +To pin the output location and port explicitly: + +```bash +REGO_OUTPUT_DIR=/tmp/aiac-rego PORT=7072 \ +AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7072 \ + .venv/bin/python test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +``` + +## Testing Decisions + +- **Highest seam available.** The test drives the service through its real HTTP boundary + (`AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`) using the real client library + ([../components/library-pdp-policy.md](../components/library-pdp-policy.md), `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api`), + and observes the real filesystem output. It asserts on **external behavior** (files produced on + disk), never on internal generator functions. +- **Launch as a `uvicorn` subprocess.** The script spawns + `uvicorn aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` as a child process (no Docker), polls `GET /health` + before applying the model, and terminates the subprocess at the end. This exercises the full + HTTP + ASGI stack the way a caller would, and keeps the service lifecycle self-contained. +- **Write-only, human-verified.** The value of this test is the concrete `.rego` output for a known + scenario — so a reviewer can confirm the ID-only redesign renders correctly. It intentionally + makes no automated assertions; the generator's assertable behavior is covered by the OPA + service/`rego.py` unit tests. +- **Prior art.** The stub itself and its unit tests (`test/pdp/service/policy/opa/`, + covering `main.py` and `rego.py`) verify endpoint and rendering behavior automatically; this + launcher complements them with an eyeball-the-output workflow. The live-Keycloak pytest + integration tests (issue `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) are the marker-gated counterpart for + the read-side services. + +## Relationship to other integration tests + +This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD +([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). It is distinct from the +**live-Keycloak pytest integration tests**, which are a different flavor — `@pytest.mark.integration`, +run in/near CI against a live Keycloak/NATS, asserting on typed responses — tracked by issue +`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`. This launcher, by contrast, is standalone, write-only, and +manually inspected. + +Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`. + +## Out of Scope + +- **The Rego generator implementation** — package rendering, `_slugify`, and the ID-only gate logic + are specified by [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) + and covered by the OPA service unit tests, not here. +- **The canonical policy model** — `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` shapes and + semantics belong to [../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md). +- **The Kubernetes-CR Policy Writer (1.13)** — this test targets the filesystem **stub** (1.14). The + CR-backed implementation and its `AuthorizationPolicy` schema are out of scope. +- **Live-Keycloak integration** — the marker-gated pytest integration tests (issue + `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`). +- **Automated pass/fail** — no assertions, no CI wiring, no `@pytest.mark.integration`. + +## Further Notes + +- Depends on the launcher script itself (created separately) and the OPA filesystem stub (issue + `pdp-policy-writer/1.14-pdp-policy-writer-opa-stub.md`, status: done). +- The scenario is deliberately fixed. If the canonical worked example in + [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) changes, update the + scenario table here to match so the generated Rego stays reviewable against a single source of + truth. From 48c6d33ca95c097db20e2172c30ff19f9236b181 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 01:53:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 170/273] refactor(aiac): Rewrite OPA Rego generator to ID-only model The PDP Policy Writer's Rego generator now emits ID-only packages: input carries {subject, source, target} identifiers only, and all role/scope mappings are embedded in the package. - Inbound: subject_ok (mandatory) + source_ok (optional, absent source passes); coarse gate on >=1 agent scope. - Outbound: subject_ok + target_ok; target_scopes consumed directly (target id -> scopes), no scope_targets inversion. - Drops input.role/input.scope; adds empty-safe list/map rendering and first-seen-order rule grouping. Rewrites test_rego.py assertions for the new structure. Full unit suite green (312 passed). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 124 ++++++++--- aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 198 ++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index d2c8c69d2..2e7956724 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -2,9 +2,14 @@ Translates an ``AgentPolicyModel`` into Rego package strings ready to be written to disk by the PDP Policy Writer. + +The generated packages are **ID-only**: the Rego ``input`` carries only +``{subject, source, target}`` identifiers. All role/scope mappings are +embedded in the package, and ``allow`` resolves IDs -> roles -> scopes +internally. """ -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule __all__ = ["slugify", "generate_inbound_rego", "generate_outbound_rego"] @@ -14,57 +19,108 @@ def slugify(agent_id: str) -> str: return agent_id.replace("-", "_").lower() -def _render_name_map(var: str, mapping: dict[str, list[str]]) -> str: - """Render ``{var} := { "key": ["a", "b"], ... }`` as Rego.""" +def _render_list(var: str, values: list[str]) -> str: + """Render ``{var} := ["a", "b"]`` as Rego (empty-safe: ``[]``).""" + inner = ", ".join(f'"{v}"' for v in values) + return f"{var} := [{inner}]" + + +def _render_map(var: str, mapping: dict[str, list[str]]) -> str: + """Render ``{var} := { "key": ["a", "b"], ... }`` as Rego (empty-safe: ``{}``).""" + if not mapping: + return f"{var} := {{}}" lines = [f"{var} := {{"] for key, values in mapping.items(): - rendered = ", ".join(f'"{v}"' for v in values) - lines.append(f' "{key}": [{rendered}],') + inner = ", ".join(f'"{v}"' for v in values) + lines.append(f' "{key}": [{inner}],') lines.append("}") return "\n".join(lines) +def _group_rules(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> dict[str, list[str]]: + """Group rules into ``{role.name: [scope.name, ...]}`` preserving first-seen order.""" + grouped: dict[str, list[str]] = {} + for rule in rules: + scopes = grouped.setdefault(rule.role.name, []) + if rule.scope.name not in scopes: + scopes.append(rule.scope.name) + return grouped + + +def _names(items) -> list[str]: + """Extract the ``.name`` of each entity in a list.""" + return [item.name for item in items] + + +def _name_map(mapping) -> dict[str, list[str]]: + """Turn ``{id: [entity, ...]}`` into ``{id: [entity.name, ...]}``.""" + return {key: _names(values) for key, values in mapping.items()} + + +# The subject gate is identical in both packages: the subject holds a role +# that grants at least one of the agent's own scopes. +_SUBJECT_OK = ( + "subject_ok if {\n" + " some role in subject_roles[input.subject]\n" + " some scope in role_scopes[role]\n" + " scope in agent_scopes\n" + "}" +) + + def generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: - """Render the ``authz.{slug}.inbound`` Rego package for an agent.""" + """Render the ``authz.{slug}.inbound`` Rego package for an agent. + + Input is ``{subject, source}`` (ids only). ``subject`` is mandatory; + ``source`` is optional (absent source passes). The gate is coarse: it + passes when the principal holds a role granting >=1 of ``agent_scopes``. + """ slug = slugify(model.agent_id) - source_roles = { - source: [role.name for role in roles] - for source, roles in model.source_roles.items() - } parts = [ f"package authz.{slug}.inbound", - "default allow := false", - _render_name_map("source_roles", source_roles), - ] - for rule in model.inbound_rules: - parts.append( - "allow if {\n" + _render_list("agent_scopes", _names(model.agent_scopes)), + _render_map("subject_roles", _name_map(model.subject_roles)), + _render_map("source_roles", _name_map(model.source_roles)), + _render_map("role_scopes", _group_rules(model.inbound_rules)), + _SUBJECT_OK, + ( + "source_ok if { not input.source }\n" + "source_ok if {\n" " some role in source_roles[input.source]\n" - f' role == "{rule.role.name}"\n' - f' input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}"\n' + " some scope in role_scopes[role]\n" + " scope in agent_scopes\n" "}" - ) + ), + "default allow := false\nallow if { subject_ok; source_ok }", + ] return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n" def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: - """Render the ``authz.{slug}.outbound`` Rego package for an agent.""" + """Render the ``authz.{slug}.outbound`` Rego package for an agent. + + Input is ``{subject, target}`` (ids only). Both must pass: the subject + holds a role granting >=1 agent scope, AND the agent (via ``agent_roles``) + is permitted >=1 scope the ``target`` accepts. ``target_scopes`` is used + directly (target id -> scopes) -- no inversion. + """ slug = slugify(model.agent_id) - target_scopes = { - target: [scope.name for scope in scopes] - for target, scopes in model.target_scopes.items() - } parts = [ f"package authz.{slug}.outbound", - "default allow := false", - _render_name_map("target_scopes", target_scopes), - ] - for rule in model.outbound_rules: - parts.append( - "allow if {\n" - f' input.role == "{rule.role.name}"\n' - f' input.scope == "{rule.scope.name}"\n' - f' "{rule.scope.name}" in target_scopes[input.target]\n' + _render_list("agent_roles", _names(model.agent_roles)), + _render_list("agent_scopes", _names(model.agent_scopes)), + _render_map("subject_roles", _name_map(model.subject_roles)), + _render_map("role_scopes", _group_rules(model.inbound_rules)), + _render_map("agent_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_rules)), + _render_map("target_scopes", _name_map(model.target_scopes)), + _SUBJECT_OK, + ( + "target_ok if {\n" + " some role in agent_roles\n" + " some scope in agent_role_scopes[role]\n" + " scope in target_scopes[input.target]\n" "}" - ) + ), + "default allow := false\nallow if { subject_ok; target_ok }", + ] return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py index b1910ede3..0ea966eb2 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego (ID-only model).""" from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego import ( @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ def _scope(name: str = "read") -> Scope: def _model( agent_id: str = "weather-agent", + agent_roles: list[Role] | None = None, + agent_scopes: list[Scope] | None = None, + subject_roles: dict[str, list[Role]] | None = None, source_roles: dict[str, list[Role]] | None = None, target_scopes: dict[str, list[Scope]] | None = None, inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] | None = None, @@ -26,9 +29,9 @@ def _model( ) -> AgentPolicyModel: return AgentPolicyModel( agent_id=agent_id, - agent_roles=[], - agent_scopes=[], - subject_roles={}, + agent_roles=agent_roles or [], + agent_scopes=agent_scopes or [], + subject_roles=subject_roles or {}, source_roles=source_roles or {}, target_scopes=target_scopes or {}, inbound_rules=inbound_rules or [], @@ -36,6 +39,43 @@ def _model( ) +def _github_agent() -> AgentPolicyModel: + """The worked example from the handoff.""" + developer = _role("developer") + tester = _role("tester") + source_helper = _role("source-helper") + issues_helper = _role("issues-helper") + source_access = _scope("source-access") + issues_access = _scope("issues-access") + source_read = _scope("source-read") + source_write = _scope("source-write") + issues_read = _scope("issues-read") + issues_write = _scope("issues-write") + return _model( + agent_id="github-agent", + agent_roles=[source_helper, issues_helper], + agent_scopes=[source_access, issues_access], + subject_roles={"dev-user": [developer], "test-user": [tester]}, + target_scopes={ + "github-tool": [source_read, source_write, issues_read, issues_write] + }, + inbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_access), + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=issues_access), + PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_access), + ], + outbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=source_helper, scope=source_read), + PolicyRule(role=source_helper, scope=source_write), + PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_read), + PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_write), + ], + ) + + +# --- slugify --- + + def test_slugify_hyphens_become_underscores(): assert slugify("weather-agent") == "weather_agent" @@ -52,46 +92,62 @@ def test_inbound_has_package_header_with_slug(): assert "package authz.weather_agent.inbound" in rego -def test_inbound_embeds_source_roles_map_with_role_names(): - model = _model(source_roles={"github-tool": [_role("reader"), _role("writer")]}) +def test_inbound_embeds_agent_scopes_list(): + model = _model(agent_scopes=[_scope("source-access"), _scope("issues-access")]) + rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) + assert 'agent_scopes := ["source-access", "issues-access"]' in rego + + +def test_inbound_embeds_subject_roles_map(): + model = _model(subject_roles={"dev-user": [_role("developer"), _role("tester")]}) + rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) + assert "subject_roles := {" in rego + assert '"dev-user": ["developer", "tester"]' in rego + + +def test_inbound_embeds_source_roles_map(): + model = _model(source_roles={"github-tool": [_role("reader")]}) rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) assert "source_roles := {" in rego - assert '"github-tool": ["reader", "writer"]' in rego + assert '"github-tool": ["reader"]' in rego -def test_inbound_one_allow_block_per_rule(): - model = _model( - inbound_rules=[ - PolicyRule(role=_role("reader"), scope=_scope("read")), - PolicyRule(role=_role("writer"), scope=_scope("write")), - ] - ) +def test_inbound_role_scopes_grouped_from_inbound_rules(): + model = _github_agent() rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) - assert rego.count("allow if {") == 2 + assert "role_scopes := {" in rego + assert '"developer": ["source-access", "issues-access"]' in rego + assert '"tester": ["issues-access"]' in rego + + +def test_inbound_has_subject_and_source_gates_and_allow(): + rego = generate_inbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "subject_ok if {" in rego + assert "some role in subject_roles[input.subject]" in rego + assert "some scope in role_scopes[role]" in rego + assert "scope in agent_scopes" in rego + assert "source_ok if { not input.source }" in rego assert "some role in source_roles[input.source]" in rego - assert 'role == "reader"' in rego - assert 'input.scope == "read"' in rego - assert 'role == "writer"' in rego - assert 'input.scope == "write"' in rego + assert "default allow := false" in rego + assert "allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }" in rego -def test_inbound_empty_rules_produces_no_allow_blocks(): - rego = generate_inbound_rego(_model(inbound_rules=[])) - assert "package authz.weather_agent.inbound" in rego - assert "default allow := false" in rego - assert "allow if {" not in rego +def test_inbound_has_no_legacy_id_carrying_input(): + rego = generate_inbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "input.role" not in rego + assert "input.scope" not in rego + assert "source_roles[input.source]" in rego # only inside source_ok gate + assert "scope_targets" not in rego -def test_inbound_renders_every_source_in_source_roles(): - model = _model( - source_roles={ - "github-tool": [_role("reader")], - "slack-tool": [_role("writer")], - } - ) - rego = generate_inbound_rego(model) - assert '"github-tool": ["reader"]' in rego - assert '"slack-tool": ["writer"]' in rego +def test_inbound_empty_model_renders_valid_empty_literals(): + rego = generate_inbound_rego(_model()) + assert "agent_scopes := []" in rego + assert "subject_roles := {}" in rego + assert "source_roles := {}" in rego + assert "role_scopes := {}" in rego + assert "default allow := false" in rego + assert "allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }" in rego # --- generate_outbound_rego --- @@ -102,34 +158,54 @@ def test_outbound_has_package_header_with_slug(): assert "package authz.weather_agent.outbound" in rego -def test_outbound_embeds_target_scopes_map_with_scope_names(): - model = _model( - target_scopes={"github-tool": [_scope("issues.read"), _scope("issues.write")]} - ) - rego = generate_outbound_rego(model) - assert "target_scopes := {" in rego - assert '"github-tool": ["issues.read", "issues.write"]' in rego +def test_outbound_embeds_agent_roles_and_scopes_lists(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert 'agent_roles := ["source-helper", "issues-helper"]' in rego + assert 'agent_scopes := ["source-access", "issues-access"]' in rego -def test_outbound_one_allow_block_per_rule(): - model = _model( - outbound_rules=[ - PolicyRule(role=_role("reader"), scope=_scope("issues.read")), - PolicyRule(role=_role("writer"), scope=_scope("issues.write")), - ] +def test_outbound_agent_role_scopes_grouped_from_outbound_rules(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "agent_role_scopes := {" in rego + assert '"source-helper": ["source-read", "source-write"]' in rego + assert '"issues-helper": ["issues-read", "issues-write"]' in rego + + +def test_outbound_target_scopes_rendered_directly(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "target_scopes := {" in rego + assert ( + '"github-tool": ["source-read", "source-write", "issues-read", "issues-write"]' + in rego ) - rego = generate_outbound_rego(model) - assert rego.count("allow if {") == 2 - assert 'input.role == "reader"' in rego - assert 'input.scope == "issues.read"' in rego - assert '"issues.read" in target_scopes[input.target]' in rego - assert 'input.role == "writer"' in rego - assert 'input.scope == "issues.write"' in rego - assert '"issues.write" in target_scopes[input.target]' in rego - - -def test_outbound_empty_rules_produces_no_allow_blocks(): - rego = generate_outbound_rego(_model(outbound_rules=[])) - assert "package authz.weather_agent.outbound" in rego + assert "scope_targets" not in rego + + +def test_outbound_has_subject_and_target_gates_and_allow(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "subject_ok if {" in rego + assert "target_ok if {" in rego + assert "some role in agent_roles" in rego + assert "some scope in agent_role_scopes[role]" in rego + assert "scope in target_scopes[input.target]" in rego + assert "default allow := false" in rego + assert "allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }" in rego + + +def test_outbound_has_no_legacy_id_carrying_input(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "input.role" not in rego + assert "input.scope" not in rego + assert "scope_targets" not in rego + + +def test_outbound_empty_model_renders_valid_empty_literals(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_model()) + assert "agent_roles := []" in rego + assert "agent_scopes := []" in rego + assert "subject_roles := {}" in rego + assert "role_scopes := {}" in rego + assert "agent_role_scopes := {}" in rego + assert "target_scopes := {}" in rego assert "default allow := false" in rego - assert "allow if {" not in rego + assert "allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }" in rego From ad0a971ca0df17872ff387a8ee1b351cec260d5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 02:10:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 171/273] test(aiac): Add PDP policy-writer OPA integration launcher (generate_rego.py) Standalone, write-only launcher (not pytest, not CI) that drives the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) filesystem stub end-to-end: launches the stub as a uvicorn subprocess, applies the fixed github-agent PolicyModel via apply_policy over real HTTP, terminates the subprocess, and prints the output dir. Covers PolicyModel -> HTTP -> ASGI app -> Rego generator -> files on disk with nothing mocked but the filesystem stub target. Ignore test/pdp/policy/rego_out/ scratch output. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/.gitignore | 4 +- aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py diff --git a/aiac/.gitignore b/aiac/.gitignore index e271238b2..b9c96e24f 100644 --- a/aiac/.gitignore +++ b/aiac/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ # Claude Code related ignores -handoff* \ No newline at end of file +handoff* +# PDP policy writer integration-test scratch output (test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py) +test/pdp/policy/rego_out/ diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d8a4cfa2c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +"""Generate github-agent Rego by driving the live PDP Policy Writer (OPA) stub. + +Standalone (NOT pytest, NOT CI). Launches the stub as a uvicorn subprocess +writing to a known local dir, applies a PolicyModel through the PDP policy +library, shuts the service down, and prints the output dir. Inspect the .rego +files by hand. + +Run: + .venv/bin/python test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +import signal +import subprocess +import sys +import time +from pathlib import Path + +import requests + +SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "src" # -> aiac/src +sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC)) + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope # noqa: E402 +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule # noqa: E402 + +PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "7072")) +BASE_URL = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}" +OUTPUT_DIR = Path( + os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", Path(__file__).parent / "rego_out") +).resolve() + + +def build_model() -> PolicyModel: + developer = Role(id="role-developer", name="developer", composite=False) + tester = Role(id="role-tester", name="tester", composite=False) + source_helper = Role(id="role-source-helper", name="source-helper", composite=False) + issues_helper = Role(id="role-issues-helper", name="issues-helper", composite=False) + source_access = Scope(id="scope-source-access", name="source-access") + issues_access = Scope(id="scope-issues-access", name="issues-access") + source_read = Scope(id="scope-source-read", name="source-read") + source_write = Scope(id="scope-source-write", name="source-write") + issues_read = Scope(id="scope-issues-read", name="issues-read") + issues_write = Scope(id="scope-issues-write", name="issues-write") + + agent = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="github-agent", + agent_roles=[source_helper, issues_helper], + agent_scopes=[source_access, issues_access], + source_roles={}, + subject_roles={"dev-user": [developer], "test-user": [tester]}, + target_scopes={"github-tool": [source_read, source_write, issues_read, issues_write]}, + inbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_access), + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=issues_access), + PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_access), + ], + outbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=source_helper, scope=source_read), + PolicyRule(role=source_helper, scope=source_write), + PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_read), + PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_write), + ], + ) + return PolicyModel(agents=[agent]) + + +def start_service() -> subprocess.Popen: + OUTPUT_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + env = dict(os.environ) + env["REGO_OUTPUT_DIR"] = str(OUTPUT_DIR) + env["PYTHONPATH"] = str(SRC) + os.pathsep + env.get("PYTHONPATH", "") + return subprocess.Popen( + [sys.executable, "-m", "uvicorn", + "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", + "--host", "127.0.0.1", "--port", str(PORT)], + env=env, + ) + + +def wait_until_ready(timeout: float = 15.0) -> None: + deadline = time.time() + timeout + while time.time() < deadline: + try: + if requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/health", timeout=1).status_code == 200: + return + except requests.RequestException: + pass + time.sleep(0.3) + raise RuntimeError(f"service not ready at {BASE_URL} within {timeout}s") + + +def main() -> None: + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"] = BASE_URL # consumed by the library + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy # import after env is set + + proc = start_service() + try: + wait_until_ready() + apply_policy(build_model()) + finally: + proc.send_signal(signal.SIGTERM) + try: + proc.wait(timeout=5) + except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: + proc.kill() + + print(f"Rego written to: {OUTPUT_DIR}") + for path in sorted(OUTPUT_DIR.glob("*.rego")): + print(f" {path.name}") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() From efd8bb2ce52bf9b6b0e378ed90cefb7c6ba2a9bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 03:07:15 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 172/273] Refactor(aiac): Reset stale agent layer; finish pdp.policy.library cleanup Remove the stale aiac.agent implementation (built on the superseded ProposedDiff/CompositeMapping design) and complete the 8.9 rename cleanup: - Delete src/aiac/agent/{roles,shared,controller}/ and their tests. - Archive src/aiac/agent/onboarding/ -> onboarding.old/; repoint pyproject pythonpath + ruff extend-exclude accordingly. - Delete the old aiac.pdp.library.policy package and test_policy.py (superseded by aiac.pdp.policy.library.api from 8.9). - Archive the legacy test/test_llm_config.py -> .old (it imported the archived onboarding config via pythonpath). Agent rebuild is deferred; related agent issues are marked needs-triage. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/pyproject.toml | 6 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile | 13 - .../aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py | 90 ---- .../aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt | 10 - aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py | 100 ---- .../policy/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/aiac_cli.py | 0 .../policy/base_mapper/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/base_mapper/graph.py | 0 .../policy/base_mapper/state.py | 0 .../policy/config/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/config/constants.py | 0 .../policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE | 0 .../policy/config/llm_config.py | 0 .../policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 0 .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 0 .../full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py | 0 .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py | 0 .../policy/prompts}/__init__.py | 0 .../prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py | 0 .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 0 .../policy/requirements.txt | 0 .../policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 0 .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 0 .../policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 0 .../policy/single_role_agent/state.py | 0 .../policy/utils}/__init__.py | 0 .../policy/utils/mappers.py | 0 .../policy/utils/parsers.py | 0 .../policy/utils/validators.py | 0 .../provision}/tmp.txt | 0 .../agent/onboarding/policy/utils/__init__.py | 0 .../aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py | 7 - aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py | 40 -- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py | 203 ------- aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py | 21 - aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py | 70 --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py | 63 --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py | 30 -- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py | 10 - aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py | 226 -------- aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py | 100 ---- aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py | 507 ------------------ aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py | 82 --- aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py | 228 -------- aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py | 164 ------ ...t_llm_config.py => test_llm_config.py.old} | 0 60 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1967 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/aiac_cli.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/base_mapper/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/base_mapper/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/config/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/config/constants.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/config/llm_config.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{controller => onboarding.old/policy/prompts}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/requirements.txt (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/single_role_agent/state.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding/policy/prompts => onboarding.old/policy/utils}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/utils/mappers.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/utils/parsers.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{onboarding => onboarding.old}/policy/utils/validators.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/{controller => onboarding.old/provision}/tmp.txt (100%) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py rename aiac/test/{test_llm_config.py => test_llm_config.py.old} (100%) diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml index 0f30855e7..5d73606cd 100644 --- a/aiac/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -3,15 +3,15 @@ line-length = 120 target-version = "py312" # Apply excludes even to paths passed explicitly (e.g. by pre-commit / CI). force-exclude = true -# Frozen, generated policy subtree — never linted or auto-fixed. -extend-exclude = ["src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy"] +# Archived, generated policy subtree — never linted or auto-fixed. +extend-exclude = ["src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy"] [tool.ruff.lint] select = ["E", "F", "I", "W"] [tool.pytest.ini_options] testpaths = ["test"] -pythonpath = ["src", "src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy"] +pythonpath = ["src", "src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy"] markers = [ "integration: tests that call real LLM endpoints", ] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 10d036299..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -FROM python:3.12-slim - -WORKDIR /app - -# Build context is aiac/src/ -COPY aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt . -RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt - -COPY aiac/ aiac/ - -EXPOSE 7070 - -CMD ["python", "-m", "aiac.agent.controller.routes"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5e901021c..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/nats_consumer.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -"""NATS JetStream consumer — thin adapter between the Event Broker and internal handlers.""" - -import asyncio -import logging -import os - -try: - import nats -except ImportError: # nats-py not installed in test environment - nats = None # type: ignore - -logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) - -_STREAM = "aiac-events" -_CONSUMER_NAME_DEFAULT = "aiac-agent-consumer" - - -async def _dispatch(msg, *, policy_handler, role_handler, service_handler) -> None: - """Dispatch a single NATS message to the appropriate handler, then ack on success.""" - subject: str = msg.subject - handler = None - kwargs: dict = {} - - if subject == "aiac.apply.policy.build": - handler = policy_handler - kwargs = {} - elif subject.startswith("aiac.apply.role."): - role_id = subject[len("aiac.apply.role."):] - handler = role_handler - kwargs = {"role_id": role_id} - elif subject.startswith("aiac.apply.service."): - service_id = subject[len("aiac.apply.service."):] - handler = service_handler - kwargs = {"service_id": service_id} - # aiac.apply.policy.rebuild and unknown subjects: no handler — do not ack - - if handler is None: - if subject not in ("aiac.apply.policy.rebuild",): - logger.warning("Unrecognised NATS subject: %s — message not ack'd", subject) - return - - try: - await handler(**kwargs) - except Exception: - logger.exception("Handler for subject %s raised — message not ack'd for redelivery", subject) - return - - await msg.ack() - - -async def _nats_consumer_loop( - *, - policy_handler, - role_handler, - service_handler, - retry_delay: float = 5.0, -) -> None: - """Connect to NATS, subscribe, and dispatch messages. Retries on connection loss.""" - nats_url = os.getenv("NATS_URL", "nats://localhost:4222") - consumer_name = os.getenv("NATS_CONSUMER_NAME", _CONSUMER_NAME_DEFAULT) - - while True: - nc = None - try: - nc = await nats.connect(nats_url) - js = nc.jetstream() - sub = await js.subscribe( - "aiac.apply.>", - stream=_STREAM, - durable=consumer_name, - queue=consumer_name, - ) - logger.info("NATS consumer connected and subscribed") - while True: - msg = await sub.next_msg() - await _dispatch( - msg, - policy_handler=policy_handler, - role_handler=role_handler, - service_handler=service_handler, - ) - except asyncio.CancelledError: - logger.info("NATS consumer loop cancelled — shutting down") - if nc is not None: - await nc.drain() - raise - except Exception: - logger.exception("NATS consumer error — retrying in %.1fs", retry_delay) - if retry_delay > 0: - await asyncio.sleep(retry_delay) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 72fccbfcc..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -langgraph -langchain-openai -chromadb -tenacity -fastapi -uvicorn[standard] -requests -python-dotenv -kubernetes -nats-py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py deleted file mode 100644 index 8c25cc5d0..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -"""FastAPI controller — /apply/* route handlers and NATS consumer lifespan.""" - -import asyncio -import os -from contextlib import asynccontextmanager - -from fastapi import FastAPI - -from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _nats_consumer_loop -from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch as roles_dispatch -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState, TriggerContext - - -def _build_state(trigger_type: str, entity_id: str | None) -> BaseAgentState: - return { - "trigger": TriggerContext(trigger_type=trigger_type, entity_id=entity_id), - "realm": os.getenv("AIAC_REALM", "master"), - "policy_chunks": [], - "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], - "pdp_snapshot": None, - "proposed_diff": None, - "validation_errors": [], - "added": [], - "removed": [], - "summary": "", - } - - -async def _handle_policy_build() -> dict: - # Policy Update Orchestrator — stub - return {"status": "accepted", "trigger": "build"} - - -async def _handle_policy_rebuild() -> dict: - # Policy Update Orchestrator — stub - return {"status": "accepted", "trigger": "rebuild"} - - -async def _handle_role(role_id: str) -> dict: - state = _build_state(f"role/{role_id}", role_id) - result = roles_dispatch(state) - return { - "summary": result.get("summary", ""), - "added": len(result.get("added", [])), - "removed": len(result.get("removed", [])), - "errors": len(result.get("validation_errors", [])), - } - - -async def _handle_service(service_id: str) -> dict: - # Service Onboarding Orchestrator — stub - return {"status": "accepted", "trigger": f"service/{service_id}"} - - -@asynccontextmanager -async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): - task = asyncio.create_task( - _nats_consumer_loop( - policy_handler=_handle_policy_build, - role_handler=_handle_role, - service_handler=_handle_service, - ) - ) - try: - yield - finally: - task.cancel() - try: - await task - except asyncio.CancelledError: - pass - - -app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan) - - -@app.post("/apply/policy/build") -async def apply_policy_build() -> dict: - return await _handle_policy_build() - - -@app.post("/apply/policy/rebuild") -async def apply_policy_rebuild() -> dict: - return await _handle_policy_rebuild() - - -@app.post("/apply/role/{role_id}") -async def apply_role(role_id: str) -> dict: - return await _handle_role(role_id) - - -@app.post("/apply/service/{service_id}") -async def apply_service(service_id: str) -> dict: - return await _handle_service(service_id) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - import uvicorn - - uvicorn.run("aiac.agent.controller.routes:app", host="0.0.0.0", port=7070) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/aiac_cli.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/base_mapper/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/constants.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/constants.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_config.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/config/llm_config.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_config.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/requirements.txt rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/state.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/single_role_agent/state.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/state.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/prompts/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/mappers.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/parsers.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/validators.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/provision/tmp.txt similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/tmp.txt rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/provision/tmp.txt diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/policy/utils/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding/provision/tmp.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2cd4c5af0..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/orchestrator.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -from aiac.agent.roles.role.graph import RoleGraph -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState - - -def dispatch(state: BaseAgentState) -> BaseAgentState: - """Dispatch a role/{id} trigger to the Role sub-agent and return the result.""" - return RoleGraph.invoke(state) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index 200c3361c..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -from langgraph.graph import END, StateGraph - -from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import ( - apply_mappings, - fetch_pdp_state, - format_response, - propose_mappings, - validate_mappings, -) -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState - - -def _has_errors(state: BaseAgentState) -> str: - return "abort" if state.get("validation_errors") else "continue" - - -def build_role_graph() -> StateGraph: - graph = StateGraph(BaseAgentState) - - graph.add_node("fetch_pdp_state", fetch_pdp_state) - graph.add_node("propose_mappings", propose_mappings) - graph.add_node("validate_mappings", validate_mappings) - graph.add_node("apply_mappings", apply_mappings) - graph.add_node("format_response", format_response) - - graph.set_entry_point("fetch_pdp_state") - graph.add_edge("fetch_pdp_state", "propose_mappings") - graph.add_edge("propose_mappings", "validate_mappings") - graph.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_mappings", - _has_errors, - {"abort": "format_response", "continue": "apply_mappings"}, - ) - graph.add_edge("apply_mappings", "format_response") - graph.add_edge("format_response", END) - - return graph - - -RoleGraph = build_role_graph().compile() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2528188b7..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/nodes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,203 +0,0 @@ -import os -from typing import cast - -from fastapi import HTTPException -from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI - -from aiac.agent.shared.state import ( - BaseAgentState, - PDPSnapshot, - Permission, - ProposedDiff, - ValidationVerdict, -) -from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy - -_MAX_CHANGES_DEFAULT = 50 - - -def fetch_pdp_state(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - realm = state["realm"] - trigger = state["trigger"] - entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] - - try: - cfg = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - services = cfg.get_services() - roles = cfg.get_roles() - except Exception as exc: - raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"PDP Configuration Service unavailable: {exc}") from exc - - service_permissions: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} - for svc in services: - service_permissions[svc.id] = [ - Permission(id=r.id, name=r.name, description=r.description) - for r in svc.roles - ] - - role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} - affected_role = next((r for r in roles if r.id == entity_id), None) - if affected_role is not None: - role_composites[affected_role.name] = [ - Permission(id=child.id, name=child.name, description=child.description) - for child in affected_role.childRoles - ] - - snapshot = PDPSnapshot( - roles=roles, - services=services, - service_permissions=service_permissions, - role_composites=role_composites, - ) - return {**state, "pdp_snapshot": snapshot} - - -def propose_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - snapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] - if snapshot is None: - raise ValueError("pdp_snapshot is not set; fetch_pdp_state must run before propose_mappings") - policy_chunks = state["policy_chunks"] - domain_chunks = state["domain_knowledge_chunks"] - trigger = state["trigger"] - entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] - - affected_role = next((r for r in snapshot.roles if r.id == entity_id), None) - role_name = affected_role.name if affected_role else (entity_id or "") - - context = "\n".join([ - "## Access Control Policy", - *policy_chunks, - "## Domain Knowledge", - *domain_chunks, - "## Current PDP State", - f"Affected role: {role_name}", - f"Services: {[s.id for s in snapshot.services]}", - f"Permissions: {snapshot.service_permissions}", - f"Current composites for {role_name}: {snapshot.role_composites.get(role_name, [])}", - ]) - - from aiac.agent.roles.role.prompts import PLANNER_SYSTEM - - try: - llm = ChatOpenAI(model=os.getenv("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", "gpt-4o-mini"), temperature=0) - diff = cast( - ProposedDiff, - llm.with_structured_output(ProposedDiff).invoke( - [ - {"role": "system", "content": PLANNER_SYSTEM}, - {"role": "user", "content": context}, - ] - ), - ) - except Exception as exc: - raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail=f"LLM unavailable: {exc}") from exc - - return {**state, "proposed_diff": diff} - - -def validate_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - snapshot = state["pdp_snapshot"] - if snapshot is None: - raise ValueError("pdp_snapshot is not set; fetch_pdp_state must run before propose_mappings") - diff = state["proposed_diff"] - if diff is None: - raise ValueError("proposed_diff is not set; propose_mappings must run before validate_mappings") - trigger = state["trigger"] - entity_id = trigger["entity_id"] - - affected_role = next((r for r in snapshot.roles if r.id == entity_id), None) - affected_role_name = affected_role.name if affected_role else entity_id - - errors: list[str] = [] - all_mappings = list(diff.add) + list(diff.remove) - - # 1. Scope check — all mappings must be for the affected role - out_of_scope = [m for m in all_mappings if m.role_name != affected_role_name] - if out_of_scope: - names = {m.role_name for m in out_of_scope} - errors.append(f"Scope violation: diff touches roles outside affected role '{affected_role_name}': {names}") - return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} - - # 2. Existence check - known_role_names = {r.name for r in snapshot.roles} - for m in all_mappings: - if m.role_name not in known_role_names: - errors.append(f"Existence: unknown role '{m.role_name}'") - elif m.service_id not in snapshot.service_permissions: - errors.append(f"Existence: unknown service '{m.service_id}'") - elif not any(p.id == m.permission_id for p in snapshot.service_permissions.get(m.service_id, [])): - errors.append(f"Existence: unknown permission '{m.permission_id}' in service '{m.service_id}'") - - if errors: - return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} - - # 3. Safety guard - max_changes = int(os.getenv("MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN", str(_MAX_CHANGES_DEFAULT))) - if len(all_mappings) > max_changes: - errors.append(f"Safety guard: {len(all_mappings)} changes exceeds MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN={max_changes}") - return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} - - # 4. Auditor LLM re-confirmation - from aiac.agent.roles.role.prompts import AUDITOR_SYSTEM - - try: - llm = ChatOpenAI(model=os.getenv("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", "gpt-4o-mini"), temperature=0) - verdict = cast( - ValidationVerdict, - llm.with_structured_output(ValidationVerdict).invoke( - [ - {"role": "system", "content": AUDITOR_SYSTEM}, - {"role": "user", "content": f"Proposed diff: {diff.model_dump_json()}"}, - ] - ), - ) - except Exception as exc: - raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail=f"LLM unavailable during audit: {exc}") from exc - - if not verdict.approved: - errors.append(f"Auditor rejected: {verdict.reason}") - - return {**state, "validation_errors": errors} - - -def apply_mappings(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - if state.get("validation_errors"): - return {**state} - - realm = state["realm"] - diff = state["proposed_diff"] - if diff is None: - raise ValueError("proposed_diff is not set; propose_mappings must run before apply_diff") - - try: - policy = Policy.for_realm(realm) - if diff.add: - policy.add_role_composites( - diff.add[0].role_name, - [m.model_dump() for m in diff.add], - ) - if diff.remove: - policy.remove_role_composites( - diff.remove[0].role_name, - [m.model_dump() for m in diff.remove], - ) - except HTTPException: - raise - except Exception as exc: - raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Policy Service unavailable: {exc}") from exc - - return {**state, "added": list(diff.add), "removed": list(diff.remove)} - - -def format_response(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - added = state.get("added", []) - removed = state.get("removed", []) - errors = state.get("validation_errors", []) - - if errors: - summary = f"Validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}" - else: - summary = f"Applied {len(added)} additions and {len(removed)} removals." - - return {**state, "summary": summary, "provisioned": None} diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2448c4779..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/roles/role/prompts.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -PLANNER_SYSTEM = """\ -You are an access control policy enforcer scoped to a single Keycloak realm role. - -Your task: determine which service permissions (client roles) the affected role should composite, -based on the access control policy chunks and domain knowledge provided. - -Produce a ProposedDiff with: -- add: composite mappings that should be created -- remove: composite mappings that should be deleted -- reasoning: a concise explanation of your decision - -Scope your diff strictly to the affected role. Do not modify any other roles. -""" - -AUDITOR_SYSTEM = """\ -You are an auditor reviewing a proposed composite role mapping diff. - -Verify that the proposed changes are consistent with the access control policy. -Return approved=true only if the diff is correct and safe. Otherwise return approved=false -with a clear reason explaining what is wrong. -""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2ec0f5b73..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/nodes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -"""Shared LangGraph nodes used by all policy-applying sub-agents.""" - -import os - -from fastapi import HTTPException - -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState - -_CHROMA_N_RESULTS_DEFAULT = 10 -_UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES_DEFAULT = 3 - -_QUERY_BY_TRIGGER: dict[str, str] = { - "build": "all access control rules", - "rebuild": "all access control rules", - "role": "role assignment rules", - "service": "service access control rules", -} - - -def _trigger_key(trigger_type: str) -> str: - prefix = trigger_type.split("/")[0] - return prefix - - -def fetch_policy(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - """Query the aiac-policies ChromaDB collection and store chunks in state.""" - import chromadb - - trigger_type = state["trigger"]["trigger_type"] - query = _QUERY_BY_TRIGGER.get(_trigger_key(trigger_type), "all access control rules") - n_results = int(os.getenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", str(_CHROMA_N_RESULTS_DEFAULT))) - max_retries = int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", str(_UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES_DEFAULT))) - chroma_url = os.getenv("AIAC_CHROMADB_URL", "http://aiac-rag-service:8000") - - last_exc = None - for _ in range(max_retries): - try: - client = chromadb.HttpClient(host=chroma_url.rstrip("/")) - collection = client.get_collection("aiac-policies") - results = collection.query(query_texts=[query], n_results=n_results) - docs = results.get("documents", [[]])[0] - return {**state, "policy_chunks": docs} - except Exception as exc: - last_exc = exc - - raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail=f"ChromaDB unavailable: {last_exc}") - - -def fetch_domain_knowledge(state: BaseAgentState) -> dict: - """Query the aiac-domain-knowledge ChromaDB collection. Non-fatal when collection is empty.""" - import chromadb - - trigger_type = state["trigger"]["trigger_type"] - query = _QUERY_BY_TRIGGER.get(_trigger_key(trigger_type), "domain knowledge") - n_results = int(os.getenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", str(_CHROMA_N_RESULTS_DEFAULT))) - max_retries = int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", str(_UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES_DEFAULT))) - chroma_url = os.getenv("AIAC_CHROMADB_URL", "http://aiac-rag-service:8000") - - last_exc = None - for _ in range(max_retries): - try: - client = chromadb.HttpClient(host=chroma_url.rstrip("/")) - collection = client.get_collection("aiac-domain-knowledge") - results = collection.query(query_texts=[query], n_results=n_results) - docs = results.get("documents", [[]])[0] - return {**state, "domain_knowledge_chunks": docs} - except Exception as exc: - last_exc = exc - - raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail=f"ChromaDB unavailable: {last_exc}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index cafb0ed0b..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -from __future__ import annotations - -from typing import TypedDict - -from pydantic import BaseModel - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject - - -class Permission(BaseModel): - id: str - name: str - description: str | None = None - - -class Assignments(BaseModel): - roles: list[Role] = [] - - -class PDPSnapshot(BaseModel): - subjects: list[Subject] = [] - roles: list[Role] = [] - services: list[Service] = [] - service_permissions: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # service_id → permissions - service_scopes: list[Scope] = [] - subject_assignments: dict[str, Assignments] = {} # subject_id → assignments - role_composites: dict[str, list[Permission]] = {} # role_name → current composite permissions - - -class CompositeMapping(BaseModel): - role_name: str - service_id: str - permission_id: str - permission_name: str - - -class ProposedDiff(BaseModel): - add: list[CompositeMapping] = [] - remove: list[CompositeMapping] = [] - reasoning: str = "" - - -class ValidationVerdict(BaseModel): - approved: bool - reason: str | None = None - - -class TriggerContext(TypedDict): - trigger_type: str # e.g. "role/{id}", "service/{id}", "build", "rebuild" - entity_id: str | None - - -class BaseAgentState(TypedDict): - trigger: TriggerContext - realm: str - policy_chunks: list[str] - domain_knowledge_chunks: list[str] - pdp_snapshot: PDPSnapshot | None - proposed_diff: ProposedDiff | None - validation_errors: list[str] - added: list[CompositeMapping] - removed: list[CompositeMapping] - summary: str diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py deleted file mode 100644 index dc5c57865..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/api.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -import os -from pathlib import Path - -import requests -from dotenv import load_dotenv - -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel - -load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") - - -class Policy: - def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: - self.realm = realm - - @classmethod - def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Policy": - return cls(realm) - - def _base_url(self) -> str: - return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") - - def apply_policy(self, policy: PolicyModel) -> None: - resp = requests.post( - f"{self._base_url()}/policy", - json=policy.model_dump(), - params={"realm": self.realm}, - ) - if not resp.ok: - raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py deleted file mode 100644 index c2558007c..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/library/policy/models.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -from pydantic import BaseModel - - -class PolicyStatement(BaseModel): - statement_type: str - entity_refs: list[str] - - -class PolicyModel(BaseModel): - statements: list[PolicyStatement] diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py deleted file mode 100644 index 3db663b86..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_nats_consumer.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer (issue 4.12).""" - -import asyncio -from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch - - -def _make_msg(subject: str, data: bytes = b"{}") -> MagicMock: - msg = MagicMock() - msg.subject = subject - msg.data = data - msg.ack = AsyncMock() - return msg - - -def run(coro): - return asyncio.run(coro) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# subject dispatch -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestSubjectDispatch: - def test_policy_build_dispatches_to_policy_handler(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.policy.build") - policy_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) - role_handler = AsyncMock() - service_handler = AsyncMock() - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=policy_handler, role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=service_handler)) - - policy_handler.assert_awaited_once() - role_handler.assert_not_awaited() - service_handler.assert_not_awaited() - - def test_role_subject_dispatches_to_role_handler_with_id(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.role-uuid-1") - role_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) - - role_handler.assert_awaited_once() - call_kwargs = str(role_handler.call_args) - assert "role-uuid-1" in call_kwargs - - def test_service_subject_dispatches_to_service_handler_with_id(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.service.svc-1") - service_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=AsyncMock(), service_handler=service_handler)) - - service_handler.assert_awaited_once() - call_kwargs = str(service_handler.call_args) - assert "svc-1" in call_kwargs - - def test_unknown_subject_no_handler_invoked(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.unknown.thing") - policy_handler = AsyncMock() - role_handler = AsyncMock() - service_handler = AsyncMock() - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=policy_handler, role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=service_handler)) - - policy_handler.assert_not_awaited() - role_handler.assert_not_awaited() - service_handler.assert_not_awaited() - - def test_policy_rebuild_subject_no_handler_invoked(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - # rebuild is HTTP-only; NATS consumer must not dispatch it - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.policy.rebuild") - policy_handler = AsyncMock() - role_handler = AsyncMock() - service_handler = AsyncMock() - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=policy_handler, role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=service_handler)) - - policy_handler.assert_not_awaited() - role_handler.assert_not_awaited() - service_handler.assert_not_awaited() - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# ack / nack behaviour -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestAckBehaviour: - def test_successful_handler_issues_ack(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.r1") - role_handler = AsyncMock(return_value=None) - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) - - msg.ack.assert_awaited_once() - - def test_handler_exception_no_ack(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.r1") - role_handler = AsyncMock(side_effect=Exception("handler failed")) - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) - - msg.ack.assert_not_awaited() - - def test_ack_called_after_handler_completes(self): - """Ack must NOT be issued before the handler returns (no fire-and-forget).""" - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - call_order = [] - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.role.r1") - - async def handler_recording(*args, **kwargs): - call_order.append("handler") - - async def ack_recording(): - call_order.append("ack") - - msg.ack = ack_recording - role_handler = AsyncMock(side_effect=handler_recording) - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=role_handler, service_handler=AsyncMock())) - - assert call_order == ["handler", "ack"], f"Expected handler before ack, got: {call_order}" - - def test_unknown_subject_no_ack(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _dispatch - - msg = _make_msg("aiac.apply.something.weird") - - run(_dispatch(msg, policy_handler=AsyncMock(), role_handler=AsyncMock(), service_handler=AsyncMock())) - - msg.ack.assert_not_awaited() - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# consumer loop cancellation -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def _make_nc_mock(): - """nc is a plain MagicMock: jetstream() is sync, drain() is async.""" - nc = MagicMock() - nc.drain = AsyncMock() - return nc - - -def _make_js_mock(sub_mock): - """js is a plain MagicMock: subscribe() is async.""" - js = MagicMock() - js.subscribe = AsyncMock(return_value=sub_mock) - return js - - -def _make_sub_mock(side_effect=None): - sub = MagicMock() - sub.next_msg = AsyncMock(side_effect=side_effect) - return sub - - -class TestConsumerLoop: - def test_loop_exits_cleanly_on_cancellation(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _nats_consumer_loop - - async def _run(): - mock_sub = _make_sub_mock(side_effect=asyncio.CancelledError()) - mock_nc = _make_nc_mock() - mock_js = _make_js_mock(mock_sub) - mock_nc.jetstream.return_value = mock_js - - with patch("aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer.nats") as mock_nats_module: - mock_nats_module.connect = AsyncMock(return_value=mock_nc) - - try: - await _nats_consumer_loop( - policy_handler=AsyncMock(), - role_handler=AsyncMock(), - service_handler=AsyncMock(), - ) - except asyncio.CancelledError: - pass # loop re-raises CancelledError — acceptable - - run(_run()) - - def test_nats_connection_failure_retries(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer import _nats_consumer_loop - - async def _run(): - connect_calls = [0] - - with patch("aiac.agent.controller.nats_consumer.nats") as mock_nats_module: - async def connect_side_effect(*args, **kwargs): - connect_calls[0] += 1 - if connect_calls[0] == 1: - raise OSError("connection refused") - raise asyncio.CancelledError() - - mock_nats_module.connect = AsyncMock(side_effect=connect_side_effect) - - try: - await _nats_consumer_loop( - policy_handler=AsyncMock(), - role_handler=AsyncMock(), - service_handler=AsyncMock(), - retry_delay=0, - ) - except asyncio.CancelledError: - pass - - return connect_calls[0] - - calls = run(_run()) - assert calls >= 2, "Expected retry after connection failure" diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py deleted file mode 100644 index feea0e41f..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.controller.routes (issue 4.1).""" - -import warnings -from unittest.mock import patch - -# Suppress starlette httpx deprecation warning -warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", category=DeprecationWarning, module="starlette") - -from fastapi.testclient import TestClient # noqa: E402 (must follow warning filter above) - - -def _make_role_result(role_id: str = "r1") -> dict: - return { - "trigger": {"trigger_type": f"role/{role_id}", "entity_id": role_id}, - "realm": "master", - "policy_chunks": [], - "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], - "pdp_snapshot": None, - "proposed_diff": None, - "validation_errors": [], - "added": [], - "removed": [], - "summary": "applied role update", - "provisioned": None, - } - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Route dispatch -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestRoutesDispatch: - def test_policy_build_returns_200(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.post("/apply/policy/build") - assert resp.status_code == 200 - - def test_policy_rebuild_returns_200(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.post("/apply/policy/rebuild") - assert resp.status_code == 200 - - def test_role_route_calls_roles_dispatch(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - mock_result = _make_role_result("role-uuid-1") - with patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.roles_dispatch", return_value=mock_result) as mock_dispatch: - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.post("/apply/role/role-uuid-1") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - mock_dispatch.assert_called_once() - - def test_role_route_passes_role_id_to_orchestrator(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - captured = {} - mock_result = _make_role_result("my-role-id") - - def capturing_dispatch(state): - captured["trigger_type"] = state["trigger"]["trigger_type"] - captured["entity_id"] = state["trigger"]["entity_id"] - return mock_result - - with patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.roles_dispatch", side_effect=capturing_dispatch): - client = TestClient(app) - client.post("/apply/role/my-role-id") - - assert captured["trigger_type"] == "role/my-role-id" - assert captured["entity_id"] == "my-role-id" - - def test_service_route_returns_200(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.post("/apply/service/svc-abc") - assert resp.status_code == 200 - - def test_service_route_receives_service_id(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.post("/apply/service/my-service") - - assert resp.status_code == 200 - # stub must echo back enough info to verify the right ID was received - body = resp.json() - assert "my-service" in str(body) - - def test_unknown_route_returns_404(self): - from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app - - client = TestClient(app) - resp = client.post("/apply/unknown/foo") - assert resp.status_code == 404 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py deleted file mode 100644 index d4f6b21b9..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/role/test_nodes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,507 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes (issue 4.10).""" - -from unittest.mock import patch - -import pytest - -from aiac.agent.shared.state import ( - BaseAgentState, - CompositeMapping, - PDPSnapshot, - Permission, - ProposedDiff, - TriggerContext, - ValidationVerdict, -) -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service - -REALM = "kagenti" -ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" -ROLE_NAME = "platform-admin" - - -def _make_trigger(role_id: str = ROLE_ID) -> TriggerContext: - return {"trigger_type": f"role/{role_id}", "entity_id": role_id} - - -def _make_state(**overrides) -> BaseAgentState: - defaults: BaseAgentState = { - "trigger": _make_trigger(), - "realm": REALM, - "policy_chunks": ["Policy: admin role gets all permissions"], - "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], - "pdp_snapshot": None, - "proposed_diff": None, - "validation_errors": [], - "added": [], - "removed": [], - "summary": "", - } - defaults.update(overrides) - return defaults - - -def _make_service(sid: str, perm_names: list[str]) -> Service: - perms = [Role(id=f"{sid}-{n}", name=n, composite=False) for n in perm_names] - return Service(id=sid, serviceId=sid, name=sid, enabled=True, roles=perms) - - -def _make_role(rid: str, name: str, child_names: list[str] = ()) -> Role: - children = [Role(id=f"child-{n}", name=n, composite=False) for n in child_names] - return Role(id=rid, name=name, composite=bool(children), childRoles=list(children)) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# fetch_pdp_state -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestFetchPdpState: - def test_builds_snapshot_with_all_services_and_roles(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state - - svc = _make_service("svc-1", ["read", "write"]) - role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) - state = _make_state() - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: - cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value - cfg_instance.get_services.return_value = [svc] - cfg_instance.get_roles.return_value = [role] - - result = fetch_pdp_state(state) - - snapshot: PDPSnapshot = result["pdp_snapshot"] - assert snapshot is not None - assert len(snapshot.services) == 1 - assert snapshot.services[0].id == "svc-1" - assert len(snapshot.roles) == 1 - assert snapshot.roles[0].name == ROLE_NAME - - def test_builds_service_permissions_dict(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state - - svc = _make_service("svc-1", ["read", "write"]) - role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) - state = _make_state() - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: - cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value - cfg_instance.get_services.return_value = [svc] - cfg_instance.get_roles.return_value = [role] - - result = fetch_pdp_state(state) - - snapshot = result["pdp_snapshot"] - assert "svc-1" in snapshot.service_permissions - perm_names = [p.name for p in snapshot.service_permissions["svc-1"]] - assert "read" in perm_names - assert "write" in perm_names - - def test_populates_role_composites_for_affected_role(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state - - role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME, child_names=["read"]) - state = _make_state() - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: - cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value - cfg_instance.get_services.return_value = [] - cfg_instance.get_roles.return_value = [role] - - result = fetch_pdp_state(state) - - snapshot = result["pdp_snapshot"] - assert ROLE_NAME in snapshot.role_composites - assert any(p.name == "read" for p in snapshot.role_composites[ROLE_NAME]) - - def test_configuration_unavailable_raises_502(self): - from fastapi import HTTPException - - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import fetch_pdp_state - - state = _make_state() - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Configuration") as MockCfg: - cfg_instance = MockCfg.for_realm.return_value - cfg_instance.get_services.side_effect = RuntimeError("connection refused") - - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: - fetch_pdp_state(state) - - assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502 - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# propose_mappings -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestProposeMappings: - def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: - svc = _make_service("svc-1", ["read"]) - role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) - return PDPSnapshot( - services=[svc], - roles=[role], - service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="svc-1-read", name="read")]}, - role_composites={}, - ) - - def test_returns_proposed_diff_scoped_to_affected_role(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import propose_mappings - - snapshot = self._make_snapshot() - state = _make_state( - pdp_snapshot=snapshot, - policy_chunks=["admin role gets read on svc-1"], - ) - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, - service_id="svc-1", - permission_id="svc-1-read", - permission_name="read", - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[], reasoning="policy says so") - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: - llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value - llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = diff - - result = propose_mappings(state) - - assert result["proposed_diff"] is not None - assert result["proposed_diff"].add[0].role_name == ROLE_NAME - - def test_llm_unavailable_raises_504(self): - from fastapi import HTTPException - - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import propose_mappings - - snapshot = self._make_snapshot() - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=snapshot) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: - llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value - llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.side_effect = Exception("LLM timeout") - - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: - propose_mappings(state) - - assert exc_info.value.status_code == 504 - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# validate_mappings — existence check -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestValidateMappingsExistence: - def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: - return PDPSnapshot( - roles=[_make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME)], - service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, - ) - - def test_existence_check_passes_for_valid_mapping(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: - llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value - llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = ValidationVerdict( - approved=True - ) - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert result["validation_errors"] == [] - - def test_existence_check_fails_for_unknown_role(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name="nonexistent-role", service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 - - def test_existence_check_fails_for_unknown_service(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="no-such-svc", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 - - def test_existence_check_fails_for_unknown_permission(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="no-such-perm", permission_name="x" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 - - def test_no_writes_when_existence_check_fails(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name="ghost", service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 - # applied_changes not set means no writes attempted - assert result.get("added", []) == [] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# validate_mappings — safety guard -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestValidateMappingsSafety: - def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: - perms = [Permission(id=f"p{i}", name=f"perm{i}") for i in range(100)] - role = _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME) - return PDPSnapshot( - roles=[role], - service_permissions={"svc-1": perms}, - ) - - def test_safety_guard_fails_when_too_many_changes(self, monkeypatch): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN", "2") - snapshot = self._make_snapshot() - mappings = [ - CompositeMapping(role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id=f"p{i}", permission_name=f"perm{i}") - for i in range(3) - ] - diff = ProposedDiff(add=mappings, remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=snapshot, proposed_diff=diff) - - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert any( - "safety" in e.lower() or "max" in e.lower() or "changes" in e.lower() - for e in result["validation_errors"] - ) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# validate_mappings — auditor check -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestValidateMappingsAuditor: - def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: - return PDPSnapshot( - roles=[_make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME)], - service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, - ) - - def test_auditor_rejection_aborts_with_errors(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: - llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value - llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = ValidationVerdict( - approved=False, reason="policy violation" - ) - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert len(result["validation_errors"]) > 0 - assert result.get("added", []) == [] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# validate_mappings — scope check -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestValidateMappingsScopeCheck: - def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: - return PDPSnapshot( - roles=[ - _make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME), - _make_role("other-id", "other-role"), - ], - service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, - ) - - def test_scope_check_fails_when_diff_touches_unrelated_role(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - # Diff contains a mapping for "other-role" which is not the affected role - other_mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name="other-role", service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[other_mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert any("scope" in e.lower() or "other-role" in e for e in result["validation_errors"]) - - def test_scope_check_passes_when_diff_only_touches_affected_role(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import validate_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state(pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), proposed_diff=diff) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.ChatOpenAI") as MockLLM: - llm_instance = MockLLM.return_value - llm_instance.with_structured_output.return_value.invoke.return_value = ValidationVerdict(approved=True) - result = validate_mappings(state) - - assert result["validation_errors"] == [] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# apply_mappings -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestApplyMappings: - def _make_snapshot(self) -> PDPSnapshot: - return PDPSnapshot( - roles=[_make_role(ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAME)], - service_permissions={"svc-1": [Permission(id="p1", name="read")]}, - ) - - def test_apply_mappings_calls_add_and_remove(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings - - add_m = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - rm_m = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p2", permission_name="write" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[add_m], remove=[rm_m]) - state = _make_state( - pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), - proposed_diff=diff, - validation_errors=[], - ) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Policy") as MockPolicy: - policy_instance = MockPolicy.for_realm.return_value - result = apply_mappings(state) - - policy_instance.add_role_composites.assert_called_once() - policy_instance.remove_role_composites.assert_called_once() - assert len(result["added"]) == 1 - assert len(result["removed"]) == 1 - - def test_apply_skipped_when_validation_errors_present(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state( - pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), - proposed_diff=diff, - validation_errors=["existence check failed"], - ) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Policy") as MockPolicy: - policy_instance = MockPolicy.for_realm.return_value - apply_mappings(state) - - policy_instance.add_role_composites.assert_not_called() - policy_instance.remove_role_composites.assert_not_called() - - def test_pdp_unavailable_raises_502(self): - from fastapi import HTTPException - - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import apply_mappings - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - diff = ProposedDiff(add=[mapping], remove=[]) - state = _make_state( - pdp_snapshot=self._make_snapshot(), - proposed_diff=diff, - validation_errors=[], - ) - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes.Policy") as MockPolicy: - policy_instance = MockPolicy.for_realm.return_value - policy_instance.add_role_composites.side_effect = RuntimeError("service down") - - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: - apply_mappings(state) - - assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502 - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# format_response -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestFormatResponse: - def test_format_response_returns_provisioned_null(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import format_response - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - state = _make_state( - added=[mapping], - removed=[], - validation_errors=[], - ) - - result = format_response(state) - - assert result["summary"] is not None - assert "provisioned" in result - assert result["provisioned"] is None - - def test_format_response_includes_added_removed_counts(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.role.nodes import format_response - - mapping = CompositeMapping( - role_name=ROLE_NAME, service_id="svc-1", permission_id="p1", permission_name="read" - ) - state = _make_state(added=[mapping], removed=[]) - - result = format_response(state) - - assert result["summary"] != "" diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py b/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6393ad80b..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/agent/roles/test_orchestrator.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator (issue 4.11).""" - -from unittest.mock import patch - -import pytest -from fastapi import HTTPException - -from aiac.agent.shared.state import BaseAgentState - -REALM = "kagenti" -ROLE_ID = "role-uuid-1" - - -def _make_state(trigger_type: str = f"role/{ROLE_ID}", entity_id: str = ROLE_ID) -> BaseAgentState: - return { - "trigger": {"trigger_type": trigger_type, "entity_id": entity_id}, - "realm": REALM, - "policy_chunks": [], - "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], - "pdp_snapshot": None, - "proposed_diff": None, - "validation_errors": [], - "added": [], - "removed": [], - "summary": "", - } - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# dispatch scenarios -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestRoleOrchestrator: - def test_role_trigger_invokes_role_graph(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch - - state = _make_state() - expected_result = {**state, "summary": "done", "provisioned": None} - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: - MockGraph.invoke.return_value = expected_result - result = dispatch(state) - - MockGraph.invoke.assert_called_once_with(state) - assert result == expected_result - - def test_sub_agent_response_returned_unchanged(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch - - state = _make_state() - raw_result = {**state, "summary": "applied 2 additions", "provisioned": None, "added": [], "removed": []} - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: - MockGraph.invoke.return_value = raw_result - result = dispatch(state) - - assert result is raw_result - - def test_sub_agent_http_error_propagated(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch - - state = _make_state() - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: - MockGraph.invoke.side_effect = HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="PDP down") - - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: - dispatch(state) - - assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502 - - def test_sub_agent_generic_error_propagated(self): - from aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator import dispatch - - state = _make_state() - - with patch("aiac.agent.roles.orchestrator.RoleGraph") as MockGraph: - MockGraph.invoke.side_effect = RuntimeError("unexpected failure") - - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - dispatch(state) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/shared/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py deleted file mode 100644 index f2ae95475..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_nodes.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,228 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.shared.nodes (issue 4.1).""" - -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch - -import pytest - - -def _make_state(trigger_type: str = "role/r1", realm: str = "kagenti") -> dict: - return { - "trigger": {"trigger_type": trigger_type, "entity_id": None}, - "realm": realm, - "policy_chunks": [], - "domain_knowledge_chunks": [], - "pdp_snapshot": None, - "proposed_diff": None, - "validation_errors": [], - "added": [], - "removed": [], - "summary": "", - } - - -def _make_chroma_module(docs: list[str] | None = None): - """Build a mock chromadb module whose HttpClient returns fake query results.""" - collection = MagicMock() - collection.query.return_value = {"documents": [docs if docs is not None else ["chunk1"]]} - client = MagicMock() - client.get_collection.return_value = collection - mock_chroma = MagicMock() - mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value = client - return mock_chroma - - -def _make_chroma_module_unavailable(exc: Exception | None = None): - """Build a mock chromadb module that raises on every HttpClient call.""" - if exc is None: - exc = OSError("connection refused") - mock_chroma = MagicMock() - mock_chroma.HttpClient.side_effect = exc - return mock_chroma - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# fetch_policy -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestFetchPolicy: - def test_successful_fetch_populates_policy_chunks(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module(docs=["policy-doc-1", "policy-doc-2"]) - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - result = fetch_policy(state) - - assert result["policy_chunks"] == ["policy-doc-1", "policy-doc-2"] - - def test_build_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state(trigger_type="build") - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_policy(state) - - collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value - call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert "all access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) - - def test_rebuild_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state(trigger_type="rebuild") - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_policy(state) - - collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value - call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert "all access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) - - def test_role_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state(trigger_type="role/r1") - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_policy(state) - - collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value - call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert "role assignment rules" in str(call_kwargs) - - def test_service_trigger_uses_correct_query(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state(trigger_type="service/svc-1") - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_policy(state) - - collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value - call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert "service access control rules" in str(call_kwargs) - - def test_chroma_unavailable_raises_503(self): - from fastapi import HTTPException - - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module_unavailable() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: - fetch_policy(state) - - assert exc_info.value.status_code == 503 - - def test_chroma_n_results_respected(self, monkeypatch): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - monkeypatch.setenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", "5") - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_policy(state) - - collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value - call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert ( - "5" in str(call_kwargs) - or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 5 - or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 5 - ) - - def test_queries_aiac_policies_collection(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_policy - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_policy(state) - - client = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value - client.get_collection.assert_called_with("aiac-policies") - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# fetch_domain_knowledge -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestFetchDomainKnowledge: - def test_successful_fetch_populates_domain_knowledge_chunks(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module(docs=["domain-doc-1"]) - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - result = fetch_domain_knowledge(state) - - assert result["domain_knowledge_chunks"] == ["domain-doc-1"] - - def test_empty_collection_returns_empty_list_without_error(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module(docs=[]) # empty result set - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - result = fetch_domain_knowledge(state) - - assert result["domain_knowledge_chunks"] == [] - - def test_chroma_unavailable_raises_503(self): - """ChromaDB being down is fatal for domain knowledge too — raises 503.""" - from fastapi import HTTPException - - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module_unavailable() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info: - fetch_domain_knowledge(state) - - assert exc_info.value.status_code == 503 - - def test_queries_aiac_domain_knowledge_collection(self): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge - - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_domain_knowledge(state) - - client = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value - client.get_collection.assert_called_with("aiac-domain-knowledge") - - def test_chroma_n_results_respected(self, monkeypatch): - from aiac.agent.shared.nodes import fetch_domain_knowledge - - monkeypatch.setenv("CHROMA_N_RESULTS", "3") - state = _make_state() - mock_chroma = _make_chroma_module() - - with patch.dict("sys.modules", {"chromadb": mock_chroma}): - fetch_domain_knowledge(state) - - collection = mock_chroma.HttpClient.return_value.get_collection.return_value - call_kwargs = collection.query.call_args - assert ( - "3" in str(call_kwargs) - or call_kwargs.kwargs.get("n_results") == 3 - or call_kwargs[1].get("n_results") == 3 - ) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py b/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py deleted file mode 100644 index 448348486..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/library/test_policy.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.pdp.library.policy.""" - -from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch - -import pytest - -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.api import Policy -from aiac.pdp.library.policy.models import PolicyModel, PolicyStatement - -REALM = "kagenti" -BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7072" - - -def _ok(json_data=None, status=200): - resp = MagicMock() - resp.ok = True - resp.status_code = status - resp.json.return_value = json_data or {} - return resp - - -def _err(status=500): - resp = MagicMock() - resp.ok = False - resp.status_code = status - resp.text = "internal error" - return resp - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# PolicyStatement model -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestPolicyStatement: - def test_has_statement_type_and_entity_refs(self): - s = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["reader", "abc123"]) - assert s.statement_type == "role_mapping" - assert s.entity_refs == ["reader", "abc123"] - - def test_entity_refs_accepts_empty_list(self): - s = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=[]) - assert s.entity_refs == [] - - def test_model_validate(self): - s = PolicyStatement.model_validate( - {"statement_type": "role_mapping", "entity_refs": ["r1"]} - ) - assert s.statement_type == "role_mapping" - assert s.entity_refs == ["r1"] - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# PolicyModel model -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestPolicyModel: - def test_has_statements_list(self): - stmt = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["r1"]) - m = PolicyModel(statements=[stmt]) - assert len(m.statements) == 1 - assert m.statements[0].statement_type == "role_mapping" - - def test_statements_default_empty(self): - m = PolicyModel(statements=[]) - assert m.statements == [] - - def test_no_realm_field(self): - m = PolicyModel(statements=[]) - assert not hasattr(m, "realm") - - def test_no_reasoning_field(self): - m = PolicyModel(statements=[]) - assert not hasattr(m, "reasoning") - - def test_model_dump_serializable(self): - stmt = PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["r1", "svc2"]) - m = PolicyModel(statements=[stmt]) - d = m.model_dump() - assert d == {"statements": [{"statement_type": "role_mapping", "entity_refs": ["r1", "svc2"]}]} - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Policy factory method -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestForRealm: - def test_returns_policy_bound_to_realm(self): - p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) - assert isinstance(p, Policy) - assert p.realm == REALM - - def test_direct_init_sets_realm(self): - p = Policy(REALM) - assert p.realm == REALM - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Default URL fallback -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -def test_default_base_url_fallback(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", raising=False) - p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) - assert p._base_url() == "http://127.0.0.1:7072" - - -def test_base_url_reads_from_env(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://custom:9999") - p = Policy.for_realm(REALM) - assert p._base_url() == "http://custom:9999" - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Policy.apply_policy -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestApplyPolicy: - def _make_model(self) -> PolicyModel: - return PolicyModel( - statements=[PolicyStatement(statement_type="role_mapping", entity_refs=["reader", "svc1"])] - ) - - def test_posts_to_correct_url(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - model = self._make_model() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) - url = m.call_args[0][0] - assert url == f"{BASE}/policy" - - def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - model = self._make_model() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) - params = m.call_args[1].get("params", {}) - assert params == {"realm": REALM} - - def test_serializes_policy_model_as_json(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - model = self._make_model() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()) as m: - Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) - body = m.call_args[1].get("json", {}) - assert body == model.model_dump() - - def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - model = self._make_model() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_err()): - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) - - def test_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", BASE) - model = self._make_model() - with patch("aiac.pdp.library.policy.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok()): - result = Policy.for_realm(REALM).apply_policy(model) - assert result is None diff --git a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/test_llm_config.py rename to aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old From 5e64916b0d3d4e94405ec43248fc2e0160812294 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 03:10:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 173/273] Docs(aiac): Update CLAUDE.md for the agent layer reset - Describe agent/ as reset pending rebuild (only __init__.py plus the archived onboarding.old/); repoint the FROZEN note to onboarding.old. - Remove the aiac-agent Docker image row (its Dockerfile was deleted) and note the image will return when the agent is rebuilt. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index 57b6e0e32..07e3d0c06 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ Per-task handoff documents live under `inception/handoffs/` — one markdown fil Key stable structure: - `idp/` — IdP configuration service and models - `pdp/` — PDP policy writer service and library -- `agent/` — FastAPI controller, NATS consumer, orchestrators - - `agent/onboarding/policy/` — FROZEN, do not modify (PreToolUse hook blocks writes) +- `agent/` — reset pending a fresh rebuild; currently only `__init__.py` plus the archived `onboarding.old/`. The prior controller/orchestrator/shared implementation was removed as stale (built on the superseded `ProposedDiff` model). + - `agent/onboarding.old/policy/` — archived prior implementation (was FROZEN); not part of the active build Pending namespaces (to be added per PRD): `policy/model/`, `policy/store/`, `policy/computation/`. @@ -83,5 +83,6 @@ Docker images: | `aiac-pdp-config` | `src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-pdp-policy-opa` | `src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-policy-store` | `src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile` | -| `aiac-agent` | `src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-rag-ingest` | `rag-ingest/` (separate directory) | + +> `aiac-agent` (was `src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile`) is temporarily removed — the agent layer was reset and will be rebuilt; the image and its Dockerfile will return with it. From 12dcb1b90524a15adb36861a9aab6623e59ce3f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 21:43:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 174/273] feat(aiac): Add Policy Computation Engine (aiac.policy.computation) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Pure library that merges partial PolicyRule updates into per-agent AgentPolicyModel records: resolves IdP relationships via Configuration, additively merges into the Policy Store, and pushes the PolicyModel to the PDP Policy Writer once. Fire-and-forget — compute_and_apply never raises. Target (scope-exposing) models carry inbound_rules + source_roles + subject_roles; source (role-holding) models carry outbound_rules + target_scopes. Keys are friendly handles (serviceId / username). Composite roles flatten to non-composite leaves. Built test-first; 12 unit tests mock the four downstream dependencies at the import boundary. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 142 ++++++++ aiac/test/policy/computation/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 347 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 489 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/computation/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..97a28c106 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +"""Policy Computation Engine. + +A pure library that turns partial ``list[PolicyRule]`` updates into merged +``AgentPolicyModel`` records: it resolves IdP relationships, additively merges +into the Policy Store, and pushes the resulting ``PolicyModel`` to the PDP +Policy Writer. Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` never raises. +""" + +import logging +import os +from typing import TypeVar + +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy, get_agent_policy + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +_Entity = TypeVar("_Entity", Role, Scope) + + +def _flatten_leaves(role: Role) -> list[Role]: + """Flatten a (possibly composite) role to its non-composite leaf roles. + + A composite role contributes its recursively-collected leaf children but not + itself; a non-composite role yields ``[role]``. De-duplicated by ``role.id`` + (``Role`` is unhashable, so we track seen ids rather than the objects). + """ + leaves: list[Role] = [] + seen: set[str] = set() + + def visit(node: Role) -> None: + if node.composite: + for child in node.childRoles: + visit(child) + elif node.id not in seen: + seen.add(node.id) + leaves.append(node) + + visit(role) + return leaves + + +def _fresh(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: + return AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id=agent_id, + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[], + source_roles={}, + subject_roles={}, + target_scopes={}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + + +def _add_rule(rules: list[PolicyRule], rule: PolicyRule) -> None: + """Append ``rule`` unless one with the same ``role.id`` + ``scope.id`` is present.""" + if any(r.role.id == rule.role.id and r.scope.id == rule.scope.id for r in rules): + return + rules.append(rule) + + +def _add_by_id(items: list[_Entity], item: _Entity) -> None: + """Append ``item`` unless one with the same ``.id`` is already present.""" + if any(existing.id == item.id for existing in items): + return + items.append(item) + + +def _merge_map(dest: dict[str, list[_Entity]], src: dict[str, list[_Entity]]) -> None: + for key, values in src.items(): + target = dest.setdefault(key, []) + for value in values: + _add_by_id(target, value) + + +def _merge(existing: AgentPolicyModel, delta: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: + """Additively fold ``delta`` into ``existing`` (mutating ``existing``).""" + for rule in delta.inbound_rules: + _add_rule(existing.inbound_rules, rule) + for rule in delta.outbound_rules: + _add_rule(existing.outbound_rules, rule) + _merge_map(existing.source_roles, delta.source_roles) + _merge_map(existing.subject_roles, delta.subject_roles) + _merge_map(existing.target_scopes, delta.target_scopes) + + +def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None: + """Resolve, merge, and apply ``rules`` — fire-and-forget. + + Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and + swallowed so a transient failure never crashes the calling sub-agent. + """ + try: + _run(rules) + except Exception: + logger.exception("compute_and_apply failed for %d rule(s)", len(rules)) + + +def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None: + config = Configuration.for_realm(os.environ["AIAC_REALM"]) + + models: dict[str, AgentPolicyModel] = {} + + def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: + if agent_id not in models: + models[agent_id] = _fresh(agent_id) + return models[agent_id] + + for rule in rules: + targets = config.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) + for target in targets: + _add_rule(model(target.serviceId).inbound_rules, rule) + + for role in _flatten_leaves(rule.role): + for source in config.get_services_by_role(role): + source_model = model(source.serviceId) + _add_rule(source_model.outbound_rules, rule) + for target in targets: + _add_by_id(source_model.target_scopes.setdefault(target.serviceId, []), rule.scope) + _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).source_roles.setdefault(source.serviceId, []), role) + + for subject in config.get_subjects_by_role(role): + for target in targets: + _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).subject_roles.setdefault(subject.username, []), role) + + written: list[AgentPolicyModel] = [] + for agent_id, delta in models.items(): + try: + existing = get_agent_policy(agent_id) + except RuntimeError as exc: + if "404" not in str(exc): + raise + existing = _fresh(agent_id) # agent not yet in the store + _merge(existing, delta) + apply_agent_policy(agent_id, existing) + written.append(existing) + + apply_policy(PolicyModel(agents=written)) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/__init__.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e06adcb4b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -0,0 +1,347 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.policy.computation.engine.compute_and_apply. + +All four downstream dependencies are mocked at the engine's import boundary: + - Configuration.get_services_by_scope / get_services_by_role / get_subjects_by_role + - aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy (Policy Store) + - aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy (PDP Policy Writer) +""" + +import os +from contextlib import ExitStack +from unittest.mock import patch + +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# builders (mirror test/policy/model/test_models.py) # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None) -> Role: + return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or []) + + +def _scope(id="s-write", name="write") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=id, name=name) + + +def _service(service_id, id=None, enabled=True) -> Service: + return Service(id=id or f"uuid-{service_id}", serviceId=service_id, enabled=enabled) + + +def _subject(username, id=None, enabled=True) -> Subject: + return Subject(id=id or f"uuid-{username}", username=username, enabled=enabled) + + +def _rule(role=None, scope=None) -> PolicyRule: + return PolicyRule(role=role if role is not None else _role(), scope=scope if scope is not None else _scope()) + + +def _fresh(agent_id) -> AgentPolicyModel: + return AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id=agent_id, agent_roles=[], agent_scopes=[], + source_roles={}, subject_roles={}, target_scopes={}, + inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], + ) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# harness # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def _lookup(mapping): + """side_effect that returns a copy of mapping[obj.id] (default []).""" + return lambda obj: list(mapping.get(obj.id, [])) + + +class _Result: + def __init__(self, aap, ap, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order): + self.apply_agent_policy = aap + self.apply_policy = ap + self.get_services_by_scope = gsbs + self.get_services_by_role = gsbr + self.get_subjects_by_role = gsubr + self.get_agent_policy = gap + self.order = order + + @property + def written(self): + """{agent_id: AgentPolicyModel} captured from apply_agent_policy calls.""" + return {c.args[0]: c.args[1] for c in self.apply_agent_policy.call_args_list} + + +def run_engine(rules, *, scope_services=None, role_services=None, role_subjects=None, + existing=None, missing_404=False): + scope_services = scope_services or {} + role_services = role_services or {} + role_subjects = role_subjects or {} + existing = existing or {} + order = [] + + def _get_agent(agent_id): + if agent_id in existing: + return existing[agent_id] + if missing_404: + raise RuntimeError("Policy Store error 404") + return _fresh(agent_id) + + def _rec_agent(agent_id, model): + order.append(("agent", agent_id)) + + def _rec_policy(model): + order.append(("policy",)) + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) + gsbs = stack.enter_context( + patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_scope", side_effect=_lookup(scope_services))) + gsbr = stack.enter_context( + patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_role", side_effect=_lookup(role_services))) + gsubr = stack.enter_context( + patch.object(Configuration, "get_subjects_by_role", side_effect=_lookup(role_subjects))) + gap = stack.enter_context( + patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy", side_effect=_get_agent)) + aap = stack.enter_context( + patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_agent_policy", side_effect=_rec_agent)) + ap = stack.enter_context( + patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", side_effect=_rec_policy)) + from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply + compute_and_apply(rules) + return _Result(aap, ap, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 1 — tracer: a rule whose scope resolves to one target service gets an # +# inbound rule on that target's model, and the PDP is pushed exactly once. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_scope_resolves_to_target_inbound_and_pushes_once(): + rule = _rule(role=_role(), scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine([rule], scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}) + + assert set(res.written) == {"github-tool"} + assert res.written["github-tool"].inbound_rules == [rule] + assert res.apply_policy.call_count == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 2 — a rule whose role resolves to a source service gets an outbound # +# rule on that source's model, plus a target_scopes entry per resolved target. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_role_resolves_to_source_outbound_and_target_scopes(): + role = _role("r-edit") + scope = _scope("s-write") + rule = _rule(role=role, scope=scope) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + ) + + src = res.written["weather-agent"] + assert src.outbound_rules == [rule] + assert src.target_scopes == {"github-tool": [scope]} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 3 — the target model records which source services (by serviceId) can # +# reach it, under source_roles, with the typed Role in the value list. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_target_records_source_roles_by_source_service_id(): + role = _role("r-edit") + rule = _rule(role=role, scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + ) + + assert res.written["github-tool"].source_roles == {"weather-agent": [role]} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 4 — get_subjects_by_role is consulted for the rule's role, and the # +# target model records subject_roles keyed by the subject's username. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_target_records_subject_roles_by_username(): + role = _role("r-edit") + rule = _rule(role=role, scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, + ) + + assert res.written["github-tool"].subject_roles == {"alice": [role]} + res.get_subjects_by_role.assert_called_once_with(role) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 5 — a composite role is flattened to its non-composite children; the # +# IdP is queried for each child, never for the composite itself. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_composite_role_is_flattened_to_its_children(): + child_a = _role("r-a", "reader") + child_b = _role("r-b", "writer") + composite = _role("r-comp", "editor", composite=True, children=[child_a, child_b]) + rule = _rule(role=composite, scope=_scope("s-write")) + + res = run_engine([rule], scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}) + + roles_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_services_by_role.call_args_list] + subjects_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_subjects_by_role.call_args_list] + assert roles_queried == [child_a, child_b] + assert subjects_queried == [child_a, child_b] + assert composite not in roles_queried and composite not in subjects_queried + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 6 — a realm-level role (owned by no service) still records its # +# subjects on the target, but produces no source model / no source_roles. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_realm_level_role_records_subjects_but_no_source(): + role = _role("r-realm") + rule = _rule(role=role, scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={}, # realm-level: owned by no service + role_subjects={"r-realm": [_subject("alice")]}, + ) + + assert set(res.written) == {"github-tool"} # no source model created + target = res.written["github-tool"] + assert target.inbound_rules == [rule] + assert target.subject_roles == {"alice": [role]} + assert target.source_roles == {} + assert target.outbound_rules == [] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 7 — the engine reads each agent's current model from the store and # +# appends to it; pre-existing rules and map entries survive the merge. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_merge_preserves_existing_store_model(): + prior_rule = _rule(role=_role("r-old"), scope=_scope("s-old")) + prior = _fresh("github-tool") + prior.inbound_rules.append(prior_rule) + prior.source_roles["old-src"] = [_role("r-old")] + prior.subject_roles["bob"] = [_role("r-old")] + + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, + existing={"github-tool": prior}, + ) + + target = res.written["github-tool"] + assert prior_rule in target.inbound_rules and rule in target.inbound_rules + assert set(target.source_roles) == {"old-src", "weather-agent"} + assert set(target.subject_roles) == {"bob", "alice"} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 8 — a rule already present (same role.id + scope.id) is not appended # +# a second time; de-duplication is by value, not object identity. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_duplicate_rule_not_appended_twice(): + prior = _fresh("github-tool") + prior.inbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write"))) + + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write")) # same ids, new object + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + existing={"github-tool": prior}, + ) + + assert len(res.written["github-tool"].inbound_rules) == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 9 — a map entry already present (same entity .id) is not appended a # +# second time, for source_roles / subject_roles / target_scopes alike. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_duplicate_map_entries_not_appended_twice(): + role = _role("r-edit") + scope = _scope("s-write") + target_prior = _fresh("github-tool") + target_prior.source_roles["weather-agent"] = [_role("r-edit")] + target_prior.subject_roles["alice"] = [_role("r-edit")] + source_prior = _fresh("weather-agent") + source_prior.target_scopes["github-tool"] = [_scope("s-write")] + + rule = _rule(role=role, scope=scope) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, + existing={"github-tool": target_prior, "weather-agent": source_prior}, + ) + + target = res.written["github-tool"] + source = res.written["weather-agent"] + assert len(target.source_roles["weather-agent"]) == 1 + assert len(target.subject_roles["alice"]) == 1 + assert len(source.target_scopes["github-tool"]) == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 10 — when the store has no record for an agent (404), the engine # +# starts from a fresh model rather than crashing. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_missing_agent_404_creates_fresh_model(): + rule = _rule(role=_role(), scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + missing_404=True, # get_agent_policy raises RuntimeError("...404") + ) + + assert set(res.written) == {"github-tool"} + assert res.written["github-tool"].inbound_rules == [rule] + assert res.apply_policy.call_count == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 11 — any dependency failure is logged and swallowed; compute_and_apply # +# never propagates (fire-and-forget), and nothing is pushed to the PDP. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): + from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) + stack.enter_context( + patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_scope", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy")) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_agent_policy")) + ap = stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy")) + + assert compute_and_apply([_rule()]) is None # must not raise + ap.assert_not_called() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 12 — every store write happens before the single PDP push, and the # +# pushed PolicyModel round-trips through JSON (all map keys are strings). # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_writes_precede_single_push_and_model_is_json_serializable(): + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, + ) + + assert res.order.count(("policy",)) == 1 + assert res.order[-1] == ("policy",) + assert res.order[:-1] and all(step[0] == "agent" for step in res.order[:-1]) + + pushed = res.apply_policy.call_args.args[0] + restored = PolicyModel.model_validate(pushed.model_dump(mode="json")) + assert {a.agent_id for a in restored.agents} == {"github-tool", "weather-agent"} From 299b83e3f9e65be2abe2fced8d846af46938d83b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 11:02:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 175/273] docs(aiac): Move role flattening upstream of PRB; add PCE append/override Relocate composite-role flattening out of the Policy Computation Engine into the producing sub-agents (UC1 Service Policy, UC3 Role, UC2 Build) so the PRB and PCE receive pre-flattened role closures. Replace the PCE's additive-only merge with a per-call append/override selected by the UC: override=True purges each input role's mappings (both directions + target_scopes reconcile) up-front before applying. Drop the UC3 'PCE deletes the role's stale rules' line. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 28 +++++++---- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 16 ++++--- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 33 ++++++++----- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 46 ++++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 1acdeaa13..82d35e141 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipelin 1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. 2. **Service Policy** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), package into `list[tuple]`, return to the Orchestrator. -The Orchestrator returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls the PCE; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. +The Orchestrator returns `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. The Controller calls the PCE with that `override` flag; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. UC1 is **incremental** — existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access — so the mode is always append (`override=False`). ```mermaid flowchart TD @@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ flowchart TD end PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] - PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)"] CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC SA_POL -->|"calls"| PRB - ORC -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE + ORC -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override=False)"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules, override=False"| PCE ``` ## Orchestrator @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ flowchart TD **Sequence:** 1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. 2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. -3. Return the `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. +3. Return `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. @@ -172,13 +172,23 @@ The two call directions prevent self-mapping and keep each PRB call's semantic i 1. Receive `service_provision: ServiceProvision` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. 2. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service_provision.roles}`). 3. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service_provision.scopes}`). -4. Call PRB and merge: - - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. - - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`; call `build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)` for each role in `service_provision.roles`. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. -5. Return merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. +4. **Flatten roles to their closure** before any PRB call, via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): expand `other_roles` into the union of every role's closure, de-duplicated by `role.id` (call this `flattened_other_roles`); on the agent path, also expand each of `service_provision.roles`. +5. Call PRB and merge: + - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. + - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`; for each role in `service_provision.roles`, call `build_role_rules(r, other_scopes)` **once per role `r` in that role's closure**. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. +6. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. (The Orchestrator pairs it with `override=False` for the Controller — see [Architecture overview](#architecture-overview).) **Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to each `agent_role`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +### Composite role flattening + +Every role passed to the PRB is first flattened to its **closure** via the shared +`flatten_role` helper (aiac-agent Shared Module): recursively collect the role and all +descendant roles from `role.childRoles` into a flat list, de-duplicated by `role.id` +(`Role` is not hashable, so de-duplication tracks seen `id`s rather than adding `Role` +objects to a `set`). A non-composite role yields a list containing only itself. The PRB +therefore receives already-flattened roles, and the PCE performs no further flattening. + ## File structure ``` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 03308d431..c304d28c5 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -31,24 +31,26 @@ flowchart TD end PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] - PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)"] SA_REBUILD -->|"delegates"| SA_BUILD SA_BUILD -->|"calls"| PRB CTRL -->|"build"| SA_BUILD CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA_REBUILD - SA_BUILD -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL - SA_REBUILD -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE + SA_BUILD -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override)"| CTRL + SA_REBUILD -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override=True)"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules, override"| PCE ``` ## What is known - **Two sub-agents:** Build (responds to `aiac.apply.policy.build` + `POST /apply/policy/build`) and Rebuild (responds to `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` only). -- Build calls the PRB directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. -- Rebuild delegates to Build and returns Build's `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. -- The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` via the PCE — the same pattern as all other UCs. +- Build calls the PRB directly, merges the results, and returns `(list[PolicyRule], override)` to the Controller. +- **Composite role flattening:** before calling the PRB, Build flattens every role it reads to its **closure** via the shared `flatten_role` helper — the role plus all descendant roles from `role.childRoles`, de-duplicated by `role.id` (a non-composite role yields just itself). The PRB receives already-flattened roles; the PCE performs no flattening. (Same helper and semantics as UC1 and UC3.) +- Rebuild delegates to Build for rule generation and returns Build's rules to the Controller. +- **Append vs override:** the sub-agent conveys an `override` flag to the Controller alongside its rules. **Rebuild is the full-rebuild case (`override=True`)** — the PCE purges every input role's mappings before applying (see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md)). **Build's** `override` value is **TBD** (whether an incremental post-ingest build appends or replaces). +- The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)` via the PCE — the same pattern as all other UCs. - Internal behavior (how Build/Rebuild sub-agents derive their tuple content, what IdP data they read, whether any LLM node is involved) is **deferred** — to be resolved in a dedicated grill session. ## Out of scope (this stub) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 0552c90cd..9f23e1ea8 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ flowchart TD end PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] - PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules)"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)"] SA -->|"calls"| PRB CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA - SA -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL - CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE + SA -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override=True)"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules, override=True"| PCE ``` ## Sub-agent: Role sub-agent @@ -44,17 +44,28 @@ flowchart TD **Steps:** 1. Read the triggering role (`role_id`) from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -2. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -3. Call `build_role_rules(role, all_scopes)` on the PRB. -4. Return the resulting `list[PolicyRule]`. +2. **Flatten the triggering role to its closure** via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): the role itself plus all descendant roles from `role.childRoles`, de-duplicated by `role.id`. A non-composite role yields just itself. +3. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +4. Call `build_role_rules(r, all_scopes)` on the PRB **once per role `r` in the closure**, and merge the results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. +5. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` (paired with `override=True` — see [Controller behaviour](#controller-behaviour-for-this-uc)). -**Output:** `list[PolicyRule]`. +**Output:** `(list[PolicyRule], override=True)`. + +### Composite role flattening + +The triggering role is flattened to its **closure** via the shared `flatten_role` helper +(aiac-agent Shared Module): recursively collect the role and all descendant roles from +`role.childRoles` into a flat list, de-duplicated by `role.id` (`Role` is not hashable, so +de-duplication tracks seen `id`s rather than adding `Role` objects to a `set`). A +non-composite role yields a list containing only itself. `build_role_rules` is then called +once per role in the closure, so the PRB receives already-flattened roles and the PCE +performs no further flattening. ## Controller behaviour (for this UC) -1. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from the Role sub-agent (PRB already called and merged internally). -2. Calls `compute_and_apply(rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. - - The PCE unconditionally deletes the role's stale rules before applying the new ones. See [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +1. Receives `(list[PolicyRule], override=True)` from the Role sub-agent (PRB already called and merged internally). +2. Calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=True)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. + - With `override=True`, the PCE purges every input role's existing mappings (both directions, plus `target_scopes` reconciliation) before applying the fresh rules — an authoritative role-keyed replace. Because the sub-agent submits `build_role_rules(r, all_scopes)` output for the full closure, this replaces the complete mapping of the triggering role and every descendant. See [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). 3. Returns bare HTTP status; writes summary + debug to log. ## File structure @@ -71,5 +82,5 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ ## Out of scope - PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). -- PCE stale-rule deletion mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- PCE override (role-keyed replace) mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). - Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 33443cc35..bdb13809e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ This bespoke logic was duplicated across every sub-agent that produced policy ru ## Solution -A pure Python library module `aiac.policy.computation` centralises all policy computation. Sub-agents call a single function `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None`, which handles IdP resolution, additive merging, Policy Store read/write, and PDP Policy Writer invocation. No FastAPI service, no Kubernetes deployment — the module is imported directly into the calling sub-agent's process. +A pure Python library module `aiac.policy.computation` centralises all policy computation. Sub-agents call a single function `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None`, which handles IdP resolution, merging (additive append or override-replace), Policy Store read/write, and PDP Policy Writer invocation. No FastAPI service, no Kubernetes deployment — the module is imported directly into the calling sub-agent's process. --- @@ -56,37 +56,50 @@ No FastAPI. No Kubernetes deployment. No container image. Imported as a library Single entry point: ```python -def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None +def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None ``` - **Fire-and-forget:** the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and does not propagate them — a transient failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push must not crash the calling sub-agent. +- **`override`:** selects the merge mode (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)). `False` (default) appends additively; `True` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings. Set by the caller (the Controller) from the producing UC's choice — UC1 = `False`, UC3 = `True`, UC2 Rebuild = `True`, UC2 Build = TBD. - Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply` ### Algorithm -Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]`, the engine executes these steps: +Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, the engine executes these steps. -1. **Composite role flattening:** for each rule's `role`, recursively collect the role and all descendant roles from `role.childRoles` into a flat list of leaf roles, de-duplicated by `role.id`. (`Role` is not hashable, so de-duplication tracks seen `id`s rather than adding `Role` objects to a `set`.) All subsequent role-based queries operate on this flattened list. A non-composite role yields a list containing only itself. +> **Input rules arrive with roles already flattened to their closure** by the calling +> sub-agent (UC1/UC2/UC3) — the role itself plus all descendant roles (recursively via +> `role.childRoles`), de-duplicated by `role.id`. The PCE performs **no role flattening**; +> each rule's `role` is treated as-is (it may be a composite role or one of its children). -2. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. +1. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. -3. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles` + `target_scopes`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: +2. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles` + `target_scopes`:** for the rule's role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: - Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of S's `AgentPolicyModel`. - Append R to `source_roles[S.id]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the service's string `id`, not the `Service` object; the appended value is the typed `Role`. - - For each target service T resolved in step 2 (services exposing `rule.scope`), append `rule.scope` to `target_scopes[T.id]` on S's `AgentPolicyModel` (creating the entry if absent). This records the outbound direction — S acting as R may request `rule.scope` on target T — keyed by the target service's string `id` with the typed `Scope` as the value. + - For each target service T resolved in step 1 (services exposing `rule.scope`), append `rule.scope` to `target_scopes[T.id]` on S's `AgentPolicyModel` (creating the entry if absent). This records the outbound direction — S acting as R may request `rule.scope` on target T — keyed by the target service's string `id` with the typed `Scope` as the value. -4. **Role → subjects + `subject_roles`:** for each flattened role R, call `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(R) -> list[Subject]`. For each returned subject S: +3. **Role → subjects + `subject_roles`:** for the rule's role R, call `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(R) -> list[Subject]`. For each returned subject S: - Append R to `subject_roles[S.id]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the subject's string `id`; the appended value is the typed `Role`. -5. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(R)` returns an empty list for a flattened role R, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment or `source_roles` entry is made for that role. `subject_roles` entries are still recorded if `get_subjects_by_role(R)` returns subjects. +4. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(R)` returns an empty list for the rule's role R, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment or `source_roles` entry is made for that role. `subject_roles` entries are still recorded if `get_subjects_by_role(R)` returns subjects. -6. **Additive merge:** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. Append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by string `id`, merging is a plain dict-key lookup — no hashing of `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` objects is involved. Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. +5. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. + - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from **both** `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. + - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by string `id`, merging is a plain dict-key lookup — no hashing of `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` objects is involved. -7. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). + Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. + +6. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). ### Merge Semantics -Rules are appended additively — existing `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` entries are preserved. De-duplication compares rules by value (`role.id` + `scope.id`). **Rule revocation is TBD** — removing individual rules from an `AgentPolicyModel` is not yet specified. +The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects the merge mode: + +- **`override=False` (default — additive append):** existing `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` entries are preserved; new rules and map entries are appended. De-duplication compares rules by value (`role.id` + `scope.id`) and map list values by the entity's `id`. This is the incremental path (e.g. UC1 Service Onboarding, where existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access). +- **`override=True` (authoritative role-keyed replace):** before appending, the engine purges every input role from the stored model (both directions + `target_scopes` reconciliation, per algorithm step 5) so the fresh rules become that role's complete mapping. Used by role-scoped recomputes (UC3 Role Update) and full rebuilds (UC2 Rebuild), where the input already represents each role's complete intended scope set. + +`override=True` provides **role-level** revocation — a role's stale mappings are removed before re-applying. Finer-grained single-rule revocation (removing one `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role) is still **TBD**. ### Dependencies @@ -124,12 +137,13 @@ Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store Key behaviors to assert: - Rules with a resolvable scope result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_scope`. - Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model is keyed by the service's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. -- `get_subjects_by_role` is called for each flattened role; `subject_roles` on the written model is keyed by the subject's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. +- `get_subjects_by_role` is called once per rule's role; `subject_roles` on the written model is keyed by the subject's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. - `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `id` (a service exposing the rule's scope) with the typed `Scope` in the value list. - Every relationship map on the written model has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. -- A composite role is flattened: `get_services_by_role` and `get_subjects_by_role` are called for each child role, not the composite role itself. +- The PCE does **not** flatten roles: `get_services_by_role` / `get_subjects_by_role` are called once per rule's role as-is (rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC); passing a rule with a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. - Realm-level roles (empty service list from `get_services_by_role`) do not produce `outbound_rules` or `source_roles` entries; `subject_roles` entries are still recorded for any subjects returned by `get_subjects_by_role`. -- Existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge. +- With `override=False` (default), existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge (additive append). +- With `override=True`, every input role's stored mappings are purged from both `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` (and dropped from `source_roles` / `subject_roles`, with `target_scopes` reconciled from surviving outbound rules) before the fresh rules are applied; the distinct input-role set is purged once, up-front (rules for a role shared across the input are not wiped after being added). - Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate `source_roles` / `subject_roles` / `target_scopes` list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. - `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. - An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. @@ -140,7 +154,7 @@ Key behaviors to assert: ## Out of Scope -- **Rule revocation:** removing individual `PolicyRule` entries from an `AgentPolicyModel`. Not yet designed — marked TBD. +- **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation is not yet designed — marked TBD. - **Full policy rebuild:** the PCE handles incremental updates only. Full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. - **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP queries go through `aiac.idp.configuration.library.Configuration`. The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. - **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE does not store the input rule list — only the merged `AgentPolicyModel` output is persisted. From 72be8116b6e8544470872e0d25461d21b6de617a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 11:57:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 176/273] feat(aiac): Add PCE override merge mode and drop role flattening The Policy Computation Engine now treats input rules as pre-flattened: it queries the IdP once per rule's role as-is (no composite expansion), since the calling sub-agent flattens roles to their closure upstream. compute_and_apply gains an override flag. override=False (default) stays additive; override=True authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings by purging the distinct input-role set up-front (both directions, dropping source_roles/subject_roles and reconciling target_scopes from surviving outbound rules) before appending the fresh rules. Tests updated via TDD (no-flatten assertion; override purge + up-front shared-role guard). PRD reconciled: relationship-map keys are documented as service serviceId / subject username (matching the implementation), while list-value de-dup remains by entity id. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 14 +-- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 97 +++++++++++-------- aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 93 ++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md index bdb13809e..9412d344e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -76,17 +76,17 @@ Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, the engine executes thes 2. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles` + `target_scopes`:** for the rule's role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: - Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of S's `AgentPolicyModel`. - - Append R to `source_roles[S.id]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the service's string `id`, not the `Service` object; the appended value is the typed `Role`. - - For each target service T resolved in step 1 (services exposing `rule.scope`), append `rule.scope` to `target_scopes[T.id]` on S's `AgentPolicyModel` (creating the entry if absent). This records the outbound direction — S acting as R may request `rule.scope` on target T — keyed by the target service's string `id` with the typed `Scope` as the value. + - Append R to `source_roles[S.serviceId]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the service's string `serviceId`, not the `Service` object; the appended value is the typed `Role`. + - For each target service T resolved in step 1 (services exposing `rule.scope`), append `rule.scope` to `target_scopes[T.serviceId]` on S's `AgentPolicyModel` (creating the entry if absent). This records the outbound direction — S acting as R may request `rule.scope` on target T — keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Scope` as the value. 3. **Role → subjects + `subject_roles`:** for the rule's role R, call `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(R) -> list[Subject]`. For each returned subject S: - - Append R to `subject_roles[S.id]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the subject's string `id`; the appended value is the typed `Role`. + - Append R to `subject_roles[S.username]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the subject's string `username`; the appended value is the typed `Role`. 4. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(R)` returns an empty list for the rule's role R, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment or `source_roles` entry is made for that role. `subject_roles` entries are still recorded if `get_subjects_by_role(R)` returns subjects. 5. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from **both** `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. - - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by string `id`, merging is a plain dict-key lookup — no hashing of `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` objects is involved. + - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by plain strings (service `serviceId` / subject `username`), merging is a plain dict-key lookup — no hashing of `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` objects is involved. Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. @@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store Key behaviors to assert: - Rules with a resolvable scope result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_scope`. -- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model is keyed by the service's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. -- `get_subjects_by_role` is called once per rule's role; `subject_roles` on the written model is keyed by the subject's string `id` with the typed `Role` in the value list. -- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `id` (a service exposing the rule's scope) with the typed `Scope` in the value list. +- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model is keyed by the service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Role` in the value list. +- `get_subjects_by_role` is called once per rule's role; `subject_roles` on the written model is keyed by the subject's string `username` with the typed `Role` in the value list. +- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` (a service exposing the rule's scope) with the typed `Scope` in the value list. - Every relationship map on the written model has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. - The PCE does **not** flatten roles: `get_services_by_role` / `get_subjects_by_role` are called once per rule's role as-is (rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC); passing a rule with a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. - Realm-level roles (empty service list from `get_services_by_role`) do not produce `outbound_rules` or `source_roles` entries; `subject_roles` entries are still recorded for any subjects returned by `get_subjects_by_role`. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index 97a28c106..67018c766 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ """Policy Computation Engine. A pure library that turns partial ``list[PolicyRule]`` updates into merged -``AgentPolicyModel`` records: it resolves IdP relationships, additively merges -into the Policy Store, and pushes the resulting ``PolicyModel`` to the PDP -Policy Writer. Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` never raises. +``AgentPolicyModel`` records: it resolves IdP relationships, merges into the +Policy Store (additive append by default, or authoritative role-keyed replace +when ``override`` is set), and pushes the resulting ``PolicyModel`` to the PDP +Policy Writer. Rules arrive pre-flattened from the calling sub-agent — the PCE +performs no composite-role expansion. Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` +never raises. """ import logging @@ -21,28 +24,6 @@ _Entity = TypeVar("_Entity", Role, Scope) -def _flatten_leaves(role: Role) -> list[Role]: - """Flatten a (possibly composite) role to its non-composite leaf roles. - - A composite role contributes its recursively-collected leaf children but not - itself; a non-composite role yields ``[role]``. De-duplicated by ``role.id`` - (``Role`` is unhashable, so we track seen ids rather than the objects). - """ - leaves: list[Role] = [] - seen: set[str] = set() - - def visit(node: Role) -> None: - if node.composite: - for child in node.childRoles: - visit(child) - elif node.id not in seen: - seen.add(node.id) - leaves.append(node) - - visit(role) - return leaves - - def _fresh(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: return AgentPolicyModel( agent_id=agent_id, @@ -88,19 +69,51 @@ def _merge(existing: AgentPolicyModel, delta: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: _merge_map(existing.target_scopes, delta.target_scopes) -def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None: +def _drop_roles_from_map(mapping: dict[str, list[Role]], role_ids: set[str]) -> None: + """Drop every role whose ``id`` is in ``role_ids`` from each list; prune empty keys.""" + for key in list(mapping): + mapping[key] = [role for role in mapping[key] if role.id not in role_ids] + if not mapping[key]: + del mapping[key] + + +def _purge_roles(model: AgentPolicyModel, role_ids: set[str]) -> None: + """Remove every trace of ``role_ids`` from ``model`` (authoritative replace). + + Drops matching rules from both ``inbound_rules`` and ``outbound_rules``, drops + the roles from ``source_roles`` / ``subject_roles``, and reconciles + ``target_scopes`` to only the scopes still justified by a surviving outbound rule. + """ + model.inbound_rules = [r for r in model.inbound_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids] + model.outbound_rules = [r for r in model.outbound_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids] + _drop_roles_from_map(model.source_roles, role_ids) + _drop_roles_from_map(model.subject_roles, role_ids) + surviving_scope_ids = {r.scope.id for r in model.outbound_rules} + for key in list(model.target_scopes): + model.target_scopes[key] = [s for s in model.target_scopes[key] if s.id in surviving_scope_ids] + if not model.target_scopes[key]: + del model.target_scopes[key] + + +def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None: """Resolve, merge, and apply ``rules`` — fire-and-forget. + ``override`` selects the merge mode. ``False`` (default) appends additively, + preserving existing mappings. ``True`` authoritatively replaces every input + role's mappings: the distinct set of input roles is purged from each affected + model up-front (both directions, plus ``source_roles`` / ``subject_roles`` + drop and ``target_scopes`` reconciliation) before the fresh rules are applied. + Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and swallowed so a transient failure never crashes the calling sub-agent. """ try: - _run(rules) + _run(rules, override) except Exception: logger.exception("compute_and_apply failed for %d rule(s)", len(rules)) -def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None: +def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: config = Configuration.for_realm(os.environ["AIAC_REALM"]) models: dict[str, AgentPolicyModel] = {} @@ -111,21 +124,27 @@ def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: return models[agent_id] for rule in rules: + # Rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC — the PCE queries the IdP once + # per rule's role as-is (no composite expansion). + role = rule.role targets = config.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) for target in targets: _add_rule(model(target.serviceId).inbound_rules, rule) - for role in _flatten_leaves(rule.role): - for source in config.get_services_by_role(role): - source_model = model(source.serviceId) - _add_rule(source_model.outbound_rules, rule) - for target in targets: - _add_by_id(source_model.target_scopes.setdefault(target.serviceId, []), rule.scope) - _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).source_roles.setdefault(source.serviceId, []), role) + for source in config.get_services_by_role(role): + source_model = model(source.serviceId) + _add_rule(source_model.outbound_rules, rule) + for target in targets: + _add_by_id(source_model.target_scopes.setdefault(target.serviceId, []), rule.scope) + _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).source_roles.setdefault(source.serviceId, []), role) + + for subject in config.get_subjects_by_role(role): + for target in targets: + _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).subject_roles.setdefault(subject.username, []), role) - for subject in config.get_subjects_by_role(role): - for target in targets: - _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).subject_roles.setdefault(subject.username, []), role) + # Distinct set of input roles, purged once up-front per model under override + # (so a role shared across the input is not wiped after being appended). + input_role_ids = {rule.role.id for rule in rules} written: list[AgentPolicyModel] = [] for agent_id, delta in models.items(): @@ -135,6 +154,8 @@ def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: if "404" not in str(exc): raise existing = _fresh(agent_id) # agent not yet in the store + if override: + _purge_roles(existing, input_role_ids) _merge(existing, delta) apply_agent_policy(agent_id, existing) written.append(existing) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index e06adcb4b..d122bab06 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ def written(self): def run_engine(rules, *, scope_services=None, role_services=None, role_subjects=None, - existing=None, missing_404=False): + existing=None, missing_404=False, override=False): scope_services = scope_services or {} role_services = role_services or {} role_subjects = role_subjects or {} @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ def _rec_policy(model): ap = stack.enter_context( patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", side_effect=_rec_policy)) from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply - compute_and_apply(rules) + compute_and_apply(rules, override=override) return _Result(aap, ap, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order) @@ -176,10 +176,11 @@ def test_target_records_subject_roles_by_username(): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 5 — a composite role is flattened to its non-composite children; the # -# IdP is queried for each child, never for the composite itself. # +# Cycle 5 — the PCE does NOT flatten: rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC, # +# so a rule carrying a composite role queries the IdP exactly once with that # +# role as-is — never once per child. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_composite_role_is_flattened_to_its_children(): +def test_composite_role_is_not_flattened(): child_a = _role("r-a", "reader") child_b = _role("r-b", "writer") composite = _role("r-comp", "editor", composite=True, children=[child_a, child_b]) @@ -187,11 +188,12 @@ def test_composite_role_is_flattened_to_its_children(): res = run_engine([rule], scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}) + res.get_services_by_role.assert_called_once_with(composite) + res.get_subjects_by_role.assert_called_once_with(composite) roles_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_services_by_role.call_args_list] subjects_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_subjects_by_role.call_args_list] - assert roles_queried == [child_a, child_b] - assert subjects_queried == [child_a, child_b] - assert composite not in roles_queried and composite not in subjects_queried + assert child_a not in roles_queried and child_b not in roles_queried + assert child_a not in subjects_queried and child_b not in subjects_queried # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # @@ -345,3 +347,78 @@ def test_writes_precede_single_push_and_model_is_json_serializable(): pushed = res.apply_policy.call_args.args[0] restored = PolicyModel.model_validate(pushed.model_dump(mode="json")) assert {a.agent_id for a in restored.agents} == {"github-tool", "weather-agent"} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 13 — override=True authoritatively replaces the input role's mappings: # +# stale entries for that role are purged from BOTH directions (and dropped # +# from source_roles / subject_roles, with target_scopes reconciled) before the # +# fresh rules are appended; an unrelated role's mappings survive untouched. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_override_purges_input_role_before_appending(): + edit = _role("r-edit") + keep = _role("r-keep") + + target_prior = _fresh("github-tool") + target_prior.inbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-stale"))) + target_prior.inbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=keep, scope=_scope("s-keep"))) + target_prior.source_roles["weather-agent"] = [edit, keep] + target_prior.subject_roles["alice"] = [edit, keep] + + source_prior = _fresh("weather-agent") + source_prior.outbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-stale"))) + source_prior.target_scopes["github-tool"] = [_scope("s-stale")] + + rule = _rule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-write")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + existing={"github-tool": target_prior, "weather-agent": source_prior}, + override=True, + ) + + target = res.written["github-tool"] + source = res.written["weather-agent"] + + target_inbound = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in target.inbound_rules} + assert ("r-edit", "s-stale") not in target_inbound # stale purged + assert ("r-edit", "s-write") in target_inbound # fresh applied + assert ("r-keep", "s-keep") in target_inbound # unrelated role survives + + # r-edit dropped from source_roles/subject_roles then re-added only where + # the fresh resolution puts it back (source_roles, not subject_roles here). + assert {r.id for r in target.source_roles["weather-agent"]} == {"r-keep", "r-edit"} + assert {r.id for r in target.subject_roles["alice"]} == {"r-keep"} + + source_outbound = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in source.outbound_rules} + assert ("r-edit", "s-stale") not in source_outbound # stale purged + assert ("r-edit", "s-write") in source_outbound # fresh applied + # target_scopes reconciled: only scopes justified by surviving outbound rules. + assert {s.id for s in source.target_scopes["github-tool"]} == {"s-write"} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 14 — override=True purges each input role ONCE, up-front: two input # +# rules sharing a role must both land, i.e. the shared role's purge does not # +# wipe the first rule's mapping after the second is processed. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_override_shared_role_purged_once_up_front(): + edit = _role("r-edit") + + source_prior = _fresh("weather-agent") + source_prior.outbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-old"))) + source_prior.target_scopes["tool-old"] = [_scope("s-old")] + + rules = [_rule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-a")), _rule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-b"))] + res = run_engine( + rules, + scope_services={"s-a": [_service("tool-a")], "s-b": [_service("tool-b")]}, + role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + existing={"weather-agent": source_prior}, + override=True, + ) + + source = res.written["weather-agent"] + out_pairs = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in source.outbound_rules} + assert out_pairs == {("r-edit", "s-a"), ("r-edit", "s-b")} # both survive; s-old purged once From 9c97d22083b65cd6f3c364f5867dc2abc216790f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 14:10:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 177/273] Refactor(aiac): Drop unused _BASE_URL constant in policy store library The module-level _BASE_URL was dead code; all functions call _base_url() which reads AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL dynamically. Tests remain green (13 passed). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py index ca8f77e4d..532b65acc 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py @@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ load_dotenv(dotenv_path=os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".env")) -_BASE_URL = os.getenv("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") - def _base_url() -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") From 98f6ffeb9269488ee98283a093299ea87dda3db5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 14:48:41 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 178/273] feat(aiac): Add agent Controller skeleton + flatten_role helper Implement issue 3.2 (Controller + service skeleton) and 4.1 (Controller unit tests) for the AIAC Agent service. - controller/routes.py: FastAPI app with the four /apply/* routes, each dispatching to its UC handler stub, forwarding the handler's (list[PolicyRule], override) verbatim to a single compute_and_apply (PCE) call, and returning a bare 200. uvicorn entrypoint binds 0.0.0.0:7070. - shared/roles.py: flatten_role(role) -> list[Role] closure helper (recurses childRoles, dedup by id, non-composite -> [role]; pure). - uc/ stubs: onboarding orchestrator, policy_update build/rebuild, role sub-agent; each returns its per-route override (service/build False, rebuild/role True). - controller/Dockerfile (python:3.12-slim, context aiac/src/) + requirements.txt. - Re-export compute_and_apply from aiac.policy.computation. - 15 unit tests (10 controller + 5 flatten_role); TestClient with handlers and PCE mocked. Design decisions: override originates in the handler; upstream errors are raised as FastAPI HTTPException. PRD 'no JSON body' statements updated accordingly across aiac-agent.md and the UC docs. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 4 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 2 +- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 2 +- .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile | 14 ++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py | 0 .../aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt | 10 ++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py | 60 ++++++++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/roles.py | 28 ++++ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py | 0 .../aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py | 12 ++ .../aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/build.py | 11 ++ .../aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/rebuild.py | 11 ++ .../src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/role.py | 11 ++ aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py | 3 + aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py | 128 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/agent/shared/test_roles.py | 68 ++++++++++ 21 files changed, 361 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/roles.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/build.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/rebuild.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/role.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/shared/test_roles.py diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 89f9f5743..eaee76091 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | | POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision | -All endpoints return bare HTTP status codes: `200 OK` on success, and the status codes from the Error Handling table on upstream failure. No JSON body is returned. Summary, applied-rule details, and debug information are written to the service log. Validation failures surface as an error status and log entry; detailed reporting is specified in [policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). +All endpoints return bare HTTP status codes: `200 OK` on success (no response body), and the status codes from the Error Handling table on upstream failure. Success responses carry no body; upstream failures are raised as FastAPI `HTTPException`s, so error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body (`{"detail": ...}`) alongside the status code. Summary, applied-rule details, and debug information are written to the service log. Validation failures surface as an error status and log entry; detailed reporting is specified in [policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). --- @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponenti | Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | | LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | -Upstream failures propagate as bare HTTP error responses (see table above); no JSON body is returned. All failure details are logged. +Upstream failures propagate as bare HTTP error responses (see table above), raised as FastAPI `HTTPException`s; the status code is authoritative and error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body (`{"detail": ...}`). All failure details are logged. --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 82d35e141..15c7890c9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -210,5 +210,5 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ - PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). - PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). -- Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. +- Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. - MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — tracked in `inception/issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index c304d28c5..72c169b05 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ flowchart TD - Rebuild sub-agent internal design. - PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). - PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). -- Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. +- Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 9f23e1ea8..0087f0145 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -83,4 +83,4 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ - PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). - PCE override (role-keyed replace) mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). -- Response body shape — no response bodies; handlers return bare HTTP status codes. Summary + debug go to the log. +- Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3af54a6d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Build context: aiac/src/ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt + +COPY . /app/src +ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src + +EXPOSE 7070 + +CMD ["uvicorn", "aiac.agent.controller.routes:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7070"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..72fccbfcc --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +langgraph +langchain-openai +chromadb +tenacity +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +requests +python-dotenv +kubernetes +nats-py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eb3a0563b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +"""AIAC Agent Controller — FastAPI app factory + the four ``/apply/*`` routes. + +The Controller is stateless. Each route dispatches to its use-case handler +(orchestrator or sub-agent), receives the ``(list[PolicyRule], override)`` tuple +the handler returns, and makes the **single** ``compute_and_apply(rules, override)`` +call to the Policy Computation Engine. No per-use-case business logic, retry +handling, or state assembly lives here. + +Responses are bare HTTP status codes: ``200 OK`` on success (no body). Upstream +failures are raised as FastAPI ``HTTPException``s by the handlers; the status +code is authoritative (the accompanying default JSON error body is incidental). +""" + +import uvicorn +from fastapi import FastAPI +from fastapi.responses import Response + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.orchestrator import onboard_service +from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.build import build_policy +from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.rebuild import rebuild_policy +from aiac.agent.uc.role_update.role import update_role +from aiac.policy.computation import compute_and_apply + +app = FastAPI() + + +@app.post("/apply/service/{service_id}") +def apply_service(service_id: str) -> Response: + rules, override = onboard_service(service_id) + compute_and_apply(rules, override) + return Response(status_code=200) + + +@app.post("/apply/policy/build") +def apply_policy_build() -> Response: + rules, override = build_policy() + compute_and_apply(rules, override) + return Response(status_code=200) + + +@app.post("/apply/policy/rebuild") +def apply_policy_rebuild() -> Response: + rules, override = rebuild_policy() + compute_and_apply(rules, override) + return Response(status_code=200) + + +@app.post("/apply/role/{role_id}") +def apply_role(role_id: str) -> Response: + rules, override = update_role(role_id) + compute_and_apply(rules, override) + return Response(status_code=200) + + +def main() -> None: + uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=7070) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/roles.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/roles.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c5f92db8f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/roles.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +"""Shared agent helpers for working with IdP roles.""" + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role + + +def flatten_role(role: Role) -> list[Role]: + """Closure of a role: the role itself plus all descendants. + + Recurses via ``role.childRoles``, de-duplicated by ``role.id``. ``Role`` is + not hashable, so seen ids are tracked rather than adding ``Role`` objects to + a set. A non-composite role yields ``[role]``. + + Pure function — no IdP call. ``role.childRoles`` is already populated on the + ``Role`` objects read from ``aiac.idp.configuration``. + """ + closure: list[Role] = [] + seen: set[str] = set() + + def _visit(current: Role) -> None: + if current.id in seen: + return + seen.add(current.id) + closure.append(current) + for child in current.childRoles: + _visit(child) + + _visit(role) + return closure diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3ba65026d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +"""Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) — stub. + +Two-stage (Provision → Service Policy) orchestration lands in 3.4/3.5/3.6. +At the foundation stage it returns an empty rule set with ``override=False`` +(service onboarding merges additively). +""" + +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + + +def onboard_service(service_id: str) -> tuple[list[PolicyRule], bool]: + return [], False diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/build.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/build.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e4e14217 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/build.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +"""Policy Update — Build sub-agent (UC2) — stub. + +Full incremental build lands in 3.7. Its ``override`` value is resolved in 6.4; +until then the stub returns ``override=False`` (additive merge). +""" + +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + + +def build_policy() -> tuple[list[PolicyRule], bool]: + return [], False diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/rebuild.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/rebuild.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..10f4a6ae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/policy_update/rebuild.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +"""Policy Update — Rebuild sub-agent (UC2) — stub. + +Full authoritative rebuild lands in 3.8. Rebuild is authoritative, so it +returns ``override=True`` (role-keyed replace in the PCE). HTTP-only trigger. +""" + +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + + +def rebuild_policy() -> tuple[list[PolicyRule], bool]: + return [], True diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/role.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/role.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba8958609 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/role_update/role.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +"""Role sub-agent (UC3) — stub. + +Full role-change handling lands in 3.11. A role change is authoritative for +that role, so it returns ``override=True`` (role-keyed replace in the PCE). +""" + +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + + +def update_role(role_id: str) -> tuple[list[PolicyRule], bool]: + return [], True diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py index e69de29bb..bf30e0fba 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply + +__all__ = ["compute_and_apply"] diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8f3012a52 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.controller.routes (the Controller). + +The orchestrator/sub-agent handlers and the Policy Computation Engine are +mocked at the routes module boundary — no live services, no real graphs. +""" + +from unittest.mock import patch + +from fastapi import HTTPException +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient + +from aiac.agent.controller.routes import app +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + +client = TestClient(app) + + +def _rule(role_id: str = "r-1", scope_id: str = "s-1") -> PolicyRule: + return PolicyRule( + role=Role(id=role_id, name="editor", composite=False), + scope=Scope(id=scope_id, name="write"), + ) + + +def test_apply_service_dispatches_to_orchestrator_and_calls_pce_once(): + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.onboard_service", return_value=([], False)) as orch, + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/service/svc-123") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + orch.assert_called_once_with("svc-123") + pce.assert_called_once_with([], False) + + +def test_apply_policy_build_dispatches_to_build_subagent(): + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.build_policy", return_value=([], False)) as build, + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/policy/build") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + build.assert_called_once_with() + pce.assert_called_once_with([], False) + + +def test_apply_policy_rebuild_dispatches_to_rebuild_subagent(): + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.rebuild_policy", return_value=([], True)) as rebuild, + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/policy/rebuild") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + rebuild.assert_called_once_with() + pce.assert_called_once_with([], True) + + +def test_apply_role_dispatches_to_role_subagent_with_role_id(): + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.update_role", return_value=([], True)) as role, + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/role/role-42") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + role.assert_called_once_with("role-42") + pce.assert_called_once_with([], True) + + +def test_controller_forwards_handler_rules_and_override_verbatim(): + rules = [_rule("r-a"), _rule("r-b")] + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.onboard_service", return_value=(rules, False)), + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/service/svc-9") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + # Exactly one PCE call, with the handler's own rules object and flag — not a rebuilt/empty one. + pce.assert_called_once_with(rules, False) + forwarded_rules, forwarded_override = pce.call_args.args + assert forwarded_rules is rules + assert forwarded_override is False + + +def test_handler_upstream_error_surfaces_status_and_skips_pce(): + with ( + patch( + "aiac.agent.controller.routes.onboard_service", + side_effect=HTTPException(status_code=502), + ), + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/service/svc-boom") + + assert resp.status_code == 502 + pce.assert_not_called() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Stub contract: the per-route override each handler returns (no mocks). # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_onboard_service_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_false(): + from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.orchestrator import onboard_service + + assert onboard_service("svc-1") == ([], False) + + +def test_build_policy_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_false(): + from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.build import build_policy + + assert build_policy() == ([], False) + + +def test_rebuild_policy_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_true(): + from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.rebuild import rebuild_policy + + assert rebuild_policy() == ([], True) + + +def test_update_role_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_true(): + from aiac.agent.uc.role_update.role import update_role + + assert update_role("role-1") == ([], True) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_roles.py b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_roles.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b589a6dac --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/shared/test_roles.py @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.shared.roles.flatten_role — pure function, no mocks. + +``flatten_role(role)`` returns the closure of a role: the role itself plus all +descendants (recursively via ``role.childRoles``), de-duplicated by ``role.id``. +""" + +from unittest.mock import patch + +from aiac.agent.shared.roles import flatten_role +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role + + +def _role(id: str, name: str = "", *, composite: bool = False, children=None) -> Role: + return Role( + id=id, + name=name or id, + composite=composite, + childRoles=children or [], + ) + + +def test_non_composite_role_yields_itself_only(): + role = _role("r-leaf", composite=False) + + assert flatten_role(role) == [role] + + +def test_composite_with_two_children_yields_self_plus_descendants(): + child1 = _role("r-c1") + child2 = _role("r-c2") + parent = _role("r-parent", composite=True, children=[child1, child2]) + + assert flatten_role(parent) == [parent, child1, child2] + + +def test_nested_composite_returns_full_recursive_closure(): + grandchild = _role("r-gc") + child = _role("r-c", composite=True, children=[grandchild]) + parent = _role("r-parent", composite=True, children=[child]) + + assert flatten_role(parent) == [parent, child, grandchild] + + +def test_diamond_shared_child_is_deduplicated_by_id(): + shared = _role("r-shared") + branch_a = _role("r-a", composite=True, children=[shared]) + branch_b = _role("r-b", composite=True, children=[shared]) + root = _role("r-root", composite=True, children=[branch_a, branch_b]) + + result = flatten_role(root) + + # The shared child is reachable via two parents but appears exactly once. + assert [r.id for r in result] == ["r-root", "r-a", "r-shared", "r-b"] + assert sum(1 for r in result if r.id == "r-shared") == 1 + + +def test_flatten_role_makes_no_idp_config_call(): + child = _role("r-c") + parent = _role("r-parent", composite=True, children=[child]) + + # If flatten_role ever reached for the IdP, this patched Configuration would + # register a call. It operates purely on the in-memory childRoles graph. + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration") as config: + result = flatten_role(parent) + + assert result == [parent, child] + config.assert_not_called() + config.for_realm.assert_not_called() From a9a34a2897b93d9c2b4c473a04b849e65f2e80d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 19:39:00 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 179/273] docs: Record resolved Policy Rules Builder internal design Capture the grill + to-prd outcome in the PRB sub-PRD: two-phase policy source (Phase 1 whole-file read via AIAC_POLICY_FILE, Phase 2 ChromaDB RAG), the fetch -> propose -> precheck -> audit -> build graph with a bounded audit fix-and-retry loop (MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES), the propose -> LLM-auditor pattern via with_structured_output, emit-names / rebuild-from-typed-inputs output shape, lean safety-meta-rule prompts, two typed graphs, the state fields, and approved-empty -> [] semantics. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 135 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md index 63aea85cb..d6fbbe151 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -2,7 +2,12 @@ ## Description -The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/policy_rules_builder/`. It exposes two module-level functions that producing sub-agents call directly. Each function internally runs a LangGraph `StateGraph`; callers are decoupled from LangGraph mechanics. The PRB fetches its own RAG context from ChromaDB (both collections) and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the input. It does **not** call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. +The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/policy_rules_builder/`. It +exposes two module-level functions that producing sub-agents call directly. Each function +internally runs a LangGraph `StateGraph`; callers are decoupled from LangGraph mechanics. The +PRB fetches its own policy context (see **Policy source** below), reasons over it with an LLM, +and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the input. It does **not** call +`aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. --- @@ -19,19 +24,120 @@ Used for UC3 (Role Update). Called once per role with the full set of scopes rel **`build_scope_rules`** — scope-centric: "given this scope, which roles may access it?" Used as one of the calls for UC1 (Service Onboarding). See the Controller sub-PRD for the full UC1 dispatch pattern. +Each call handles exactly **one focal entity** (the singular argument) against a list of +candidate counterparts; the caller (UC handler) does all iteration. + +--- + +## Policy source (two phases) + +Policy context is fetched behind a `PolicySource` seam, so the retrieval mechanism can change +without touching the rest of the graph. + +- **Phase 1 (current):** the entire access-control policy lives in a **single file**; the PRB + reads the whole file into the proposer prompt. No ChromaDB, no domain-knowledge collection. + Located via `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` (default `/etc/aiac/policy.md`), read as UTF-8; a + missing/unreadable file raises. +- **Phase 2 (later issue):** policy **and** domain knowledge live in a ChromaDB vector store; + the PRB does RAG retrieval over the `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge` collections + (query text derived from the focal entity), respecting `CHROMA_N_RESULTS`. This swaps in a + `ChromaPolicySource` at the same seam. + --- ## Contract | Aspect | Decision | |---|---| -| Structure | LangGraph `StateGraph` (internal graph design TBD) | -| Context retrieval | PRB fetches its own ChromaDB context from `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge` collections | -| Realm parameter | None — ChromaDB is not realm-scoped; inputs are pre-resolved typed objects | -| Trigger type in state | None — the function name encodes the trigger direction | +| Structure | LangGraph `StateGraph` — nodes `fetch → propose → precheck → audit → build`; `audit → propose` retry edge; two typed graphs (role / scope) sharing node helpers | +| Context retrieval | Two-phase via a `PolicySource` seam — Phase 1 whole-file read; Phase 2 ChromaDB RAG (both collections). See **Policy source** | +| Realm parameter | None — inputs are pre-resolved typed objects; the policy source is not realm-scoped | +| Trigger type in state | None — the function name encodes the direction; no routing field in state | +| Output shape | Proposer emits **names** (via `with_structured_output`); the PRB rebuilds `PolicyRule`s from the **typed inputs** filtered by name — never from LLM-produced fields | | Dedup | PRB generates a full rule set; the PCE's additive merge handles dedup on write | -| LLM call pattern | TBD (single call vs. propose → validate) | -| Error contract | Raises on LLM failure or ChromaDB failure — no silent empty-list returns | +| LLM call pattern | **Propose → LLM auditor** (2 structured calls). Auditor rejection feeds its reason back into propose (bounded fix-and-retry, `MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES = 3`); raises on exhaustion | +| Empty result | An auditor-**approved** empty selection is a valid `[]` (deny-by-default). Empty proposals are still audited | +| Error contract | Raises on policy-source failure, LLM failure, or audit-budget exhaustion — no silent empty-list returns | + +--- + +## Internal graph design + +Both entry points compile the same node shape (two typed graphs sharing pure node helpers): + +``` +fetch ─► propose ─► precheck ─► audit ─┬─ approved ─► build ─► END + ▲ │ + └───────── retry ────────────┘ (audit feeds its reason back to propose) + │ + rejected & budget exhausted ─► RAISE (inside audit node) +``` + +- **fetch** — `PolicySource.fetch()` → `policy_text` (Phase 1: whole file). +- **propose** — proposer messages (policy + focal + candidates + any `audit_feedback`); + `with_structured_output(Selection)` → selected names + reasoning. +- **precheck** — deterministic: keep only names present in the candidate set (drop hallucinated + names; log drops). No LLM. +- **audit** — auditor messages; `with_structured_output(AuditVerdict)` → `{approved, reason}`. + Approved → continue; rejected → feed the reason back and retry, or raise once + `MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES` is exhausted. Empty proposals are audited too. +- **build** — reconstruct `PolicyRule`s from the typed inputs filtered by the approved names. + +### Structured-output schemas + +```python +class RoleSelection(BaseModel): # build_role_rules (role focal, scope candidates) + granted_scope_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + +class ScopeSelection(BaseModel): # build_scope_rules (scope focal, role candidates) + roles_with_access_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + +class AuditVerdict(BaseModel): + approved: bool + reason: str | None +``` + +The PRB rebuilds rules from the typed inputs, e.g. +`[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=s) for s in scopes if s.name in granted_scope_names]`. + +### State fields + +```python +class _PRBWorking(TypedDict): + policy_text: str + selected_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + approved: bool + audit_feedback: str | None + retry_count: int + rules: list[PolicyRule] + +class RoleRulesState(_PRBWorking): # role: Role; scopes: list[Scope] + ... +class ScopeRulesState(_PRBWorking): # roles: list[Role]; scope: Scope + ... +``` + +### Prompts + +Lean + safety meta-rules only — task framing, the structured-output contract, +**deny-by-default / policy-silence** (grant a pair only if the policy supports it), and +**scope-strictly-to-focal**. No worked examples or domain heuristics; all substantive reasoning +is deferred to the (user-authored) policy content. The auditor prompt mirrors this: approve +only if every granted pair is policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in. + +### LLM + retries + +`ChatOpenAI(base_url=LLM_BASE_URL, model=LLM_MODEL, api_key=LLM_API_KEY, temperature=0)`. Two +retry layers, kept distinct: + +- **`MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES`** (module constant, default `3`) — the semantic fix-and-retry loop + between audit and propose. +- **`UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES`** (env, default `3`) — tenacity (`stop_after_attempt`, exponential + backoff, `reraise=True`) around each LLM call for transport failures. The Phase-1 file read + does **not** retry; it raises directly. --- @@ -47,11 +153,12 @@ Used as one of the calls for UC1 (Service Onboarding). See the Controller sub-PR ## Configuration -The PRB inherits the following env vars (no additional config): +| Variable | Used for | Phase | +|---|---|---| +| `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | Path to the whole-file access policy (default `/etc/aiac/policy.md`) | 1 | +| `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM calls | 1 | +| `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | Transport retry budget for LLM (and, in Phase 2, ChromaDB) calls (tenacity, default `3`) | 1 | +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | ChromaDB endpoint | 2 | +| `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` | Number of results per ChromaDB query (default `10`) | 2 | -| Variable | Used for | -|---|---| -| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | ChromaDB endpoint | -| `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` | Number of results per ChromaDB query (default `10`) | -| `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM calls | -| `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | Retry budget for LLM and ChromaDB calls (tenacity) | +`MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES` (default `3`) is a module constant, not an env var. From 3aa30fac8975e69316cff49f5e62e76f93287228 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 20:52:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 180/273] feat(aiac): Implement Policy Rules Builder phase 1 Add the shared rule-generation engine (agent/policy_rules_builder/) that turns typed IdP inputs into list[PolicyRule] via a LangGraph pipeline: fetch -> propose -> precheck -> audit -> build, with an audit -> propose retry-with-feedback edge. Two public functions build_role_rules and build_scope_rules hide LangGraph and return a plain list. - Phase 1 reads whole policy from AIAC_POLICY_FILE (FilePolicySource); the PolicySource protocol is the Phase 2 (ChromaDB) seam. - Raises on failure (policy-source failure, LLM failure after tenacity retries, audit-budget exhaustion) -- never a silent []; an auditor-approved empty selection is a valid []. - precheck drops proposer names not in the candidate set before audit. - LLM built lazily (never at import); structured calls transport-retried via call-time tenacity Retrying honoring UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES. - Isolated from aiac.pdp.policy.library / aiac.policy.store.library. Built via strict TDD (10 vertical slices). pyright basic + ruff clean. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py | 3 + .../aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py | 256 ++++++++++++++++++ .../policy_rules_builder/policy_source.py | 27 ++ .../agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py | 48 ++++ .../agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/policy_rules_builder/test_graph.py | 219 +++++++++++++++ .../policy_rules_builder/test_isolation.py | 26 ++ .../test_policy_source.py | 58 ++++ 8 files changed, 637 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/policy_source.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_isolation.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_policy_source.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41e55d591 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +from .graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules + +__all__ = ["build_role_rules", "build_scope_rules"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..acb7632bf --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +"""Policy Rules Builder graph: fetch -> propose -> precheck -> audit -> build. + +Hides LangGraph behind two plain functions (build_role_rules / build_scope_rules) +that return list[PolicyRule]. The LLM is built lazily (never at import) and every +structured call is transport-retried via a call-time tenacity Retrying. On failure +the builder RAISES (policy-source failure, LLM failure after retries, audit-budget +exhaustion) -- never a silent []. An auditor-approved empty selection is a valid []. +""" + +import logging +import os +from typing import Any, TypedDict, TypeVar, cast + +from langchain_core.messages import BaseMessage +from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI +from langgraph.graph import END, START, StateGraph +from pydantic import BaseModel, SecretStr +from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + +from .policy_source import get_policy_source +from .prompts import build_auditor_messages, build_proposer_messages + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES = 3 + + +class _Selection(BaseModel): + """Common proposer-output shape; the direction-specific names field is read + by name (names_field) while reasoning is accessed directly.""" + + reasoning: str + + +class RoleSelection(_Selection): + granted_scope_names: list[str] + + +class ScopeSelection(_Selection): + roles_with_access_names: list[str] + + +class AuditVerdict(BaseModel): + approved: bool + reason: str | None = None + + +class PolicyRulesBuilderError(RuntimeError): ... + + +class _PRBWorking(TypedDict): + policy_text: str + selected_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + approved: bool + audit_feedback: str | None + retry_count: int + rules: list[PolicyRule] + + +class RoleRulesState(_PRBWorking): + role: Role + scopes: list[Scope] + + +class ScopeRulesState(_PRBWorking): + roles: list[Role] + scope: Scope + + +def _build_llm() -> ChatOpenAI: # lazy -- NEVER called at import + return ChatOpenAI( + base_url=os.getenv("LLM_BASE_URL"), + model=os.getenv("LLM_MODEL", ""), + api_key=SecretStr(os.getenv("LLM_API_KEY", "")), + temperature=0, + ) + + +T = TypeVar("T", bound=BaseModel) + + +def _structured_call(schema: type[T], messages: list[BaseMessage]) -> T: + """THE seam. Behavior tests patch this. Transport-retries each .invoke() via call-time Retrying.""" + runnable = _build_llm().with_structured_output(schema) + retryer = Retrying( + stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), + wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), + reraise=True, + ) + return cast(T, retryer(runnable.invoke, messages)) + + +# shared node helpers (typed against _PRBWorking; direction specifics passed as kwargs) +def _fetch(state: _PRBWorking) -> dict[str, Any]: + return {"policy_text": get_policy_source().fetch()} + + +def _propose( + state: _PRBWorking, + *, + focal: str, + candidates: str, + contract: str, + schema: type[_Selection], + names_field: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + msgs = build_proposer_messages(state["policy_text"], focal, candidates, contract, state["audit_feedback"]) + sel = _structured_call(schema, msgs) + return {"selected_names": list(getattr(sel, names_field)), "reasoning": sel.reasoning} + + +def _precheck(state: _PRBWorking, *, candidate_names: set[str]) -> dict[str, Any]: + keep = [n for n in state["selected_names"] if n in candidate_names] + dropped = [n for n in state["selected_names"] if n not in candidate_names] + if dropped: + logger.warning("PRB precheck dropped hallucinated names: %s", dropped) + return {"selected_names": keep} + + +def _audit(state: _PRBWorking, *, focal: str, candidates: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + verdict = _structured_call( + AuditVerdict, + build_auditor_messages(state["policy_text"], focal, candidates, state["selected_names"]), + ) + if verdict.approved: + return {"approved": True} + if state["retry_count"] >= MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES: + raise PolicyRulesBuilderError(f"Auditor rejected after {MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES} retries: {verdict.reason}") + return {"approved": False, "audit_feedback": verdict.reason, "retry_count": state["retry_count"] + 1} + + +def _route(state: _PRBWorking) -> str: + return "approved" if state["approved"] else "rejected" + + +def _role_focal(r: Role) -> str: + return f"role name={r.name}: {r.description or ''}" + + +def _scope_focal(s: Scope) -> str: + return f"scope name={s.name}: {s.description or ''}" + + +def _scope_cands(ss: list[Scope]) -> str: + return "\n".join(_scope_focal(s) for s in ss) + + +def _role_cands(rs: list[Role]) -> str: + return "\n".join(_role_focal(r) for r in rs) + + +_ROLE_CONTRACT = "Return granted_scope_names (subset of candidate scope names) + reasoning." +_SCOPE_CONTRACT = "Return roles_with_access_names (subset of candidate role names) + reasoning." + + +def _assemble(state_type: type, propose, precheck, audit, build): + """Wire the shared fetch -> propose -> precheck -> audit -> build shape with the + audit -> propose retry edge. Both directions differ only in their four closures.""" + g = StateGraph(state_type) + g.add_node("fetch", _fetch) + g.add_node("propose", propose) + g.add_node("precheck", precheck) + g.add_node("audit", audit) + g.add_node("build", build) + g.add_edge(START, "fetch") + g.add_edge("fetch", "propose") + g.add_edge("propose", "precheck") + g.add_edge("precheck", "audit") + g.add_conditional_edges("audit", _route, {"approved": "build", "rejected": "propose"}) + g.add_edge("build", END) + return g.compile() + + +def build_role_graph(): + def propose(s: RoleRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _propose( + s, + focal=_role_focal(s["role"]), + candidates=_scope_cands(s["scopes"]), + contract=_ROLE_CONTRACT, + schema=RoleSelection, + names_field="granted_scope_names", + ) + + def precheck(s: RoleRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _precheck(s, candidate_names={sc.name for sc in s["scopes"]}) + + def audit(s: RoleRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _audit(s, focal=_role_focal(s["role"]), candidates=_scope_cands(s["scopes"])) + + def build(s: RoleRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + granted = set(s["selected_names"]) + return {"rules": [PolicyRule(role=s["role"], scope=sc) for sc in s["scopes"] if sc.name in granted]} + + return _assemble(RoleRulesState, propose, precheck, audit, build) + + +def build_scope_graph(): + def propose(s: ScopeRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _propose( + s, + focal=_scope_focal(s["scope"]), + candidates=_role_cands(s["roles"]), + contract=_SCOPE_CONTRACT, + schema=ScopeSelection, + names_field="roles_with_access_names", + ) + + def precheck(s: ScopeRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _precheck(s, candidate_names={r.name for r in s["roles"]}) + + def audit(s: ScopeRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + return _audit(s, focal=_scope_focal(s["scope"]), candidates=_role_cands(s["roles"])) + + def build(s: ScopeRulesState) -> dict[str, Any]: + granted = set(s["selected_names"]) + return {"rules": [PolicyRule(role=r, scope=s["scope"]) for r in s["roles"] if r.name in granted]} + + return _assemble(ScopeRulesState, propose, precheck, audit, build) + + +ROLE_GRAPH = build_role_graph() # module-level compile is safe (never builds the LLM) +SCOPE_GRAPH = build_scope_graph() + + +def build_role_rules(role: Role, scopes: list[Scope]) -> list[PolicyRule]: + state: RoleRulesState = { + "role": role, + "scopes": scopes, + "policy_text": "", + "selected_names": [], + "reasoning": "", + "approved": False, + "audit_feedback": None, + "retry_count": 0, + "rules": [], + } + return ROLE_GRAPH.invoke(state)["rules"] + + +def build_scope_rules(roles: list[Role], scope: Scope) -> list[PolicyRule]: + state: ScopeRulesState = { + "roles": roles, + "scope": scope, + "policy_text": "", + "selected_names": [], + "reasoning": "", + "approved": False, + "audit_feedback": None, + "retry_count": 0, + "rules": [], + } + return SCOPE_GRAPH.invoke(state)["rules"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/policy_source.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/policy_source.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..97d1cec3b --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/policy_source.py @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +"""Policy-text sources for the Policy Rules Builder. + +Phase 1 reads the whole policy file from ``AIAC_POLICY_FILE``. The ``PolicySource`` +protocol is the seam Phase 2 (ChromaDB RAG) plugs a ``ChromaPolicySource`` into, +without changing callers. +""" + +import os +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Protocol + +_DEFAULT_POLICY_FILE = "/etc/aiac/policy.md" + + +class PolicySource(Protocol): + def fetch(self) -> str: ... + + +class FilePolicySource: + def fetch(self) -> str: + path = Path(os.getenv("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", _DEFAULT_POLICY_FILE)) + # Missing / unreadable -> OSError propagates (no retry, no silent []). + return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def get_policy_source() -> PolicySource: + return FilePolicySource() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..49f7e0268 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +"""Lean proposer/auditor message builders for both PRB directions. + +No worked examples, no domain content. The static system message carries the +task framing plus two safety meta-rules (deny-by-default / policy-silence, and +stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity). Everything variable — policy +text, focal entity, candidates, and any auditor feedback — goes in the user +message so it is observable in tests. +""" + +from langchain_core.messages import BaseMessage, HumanMessage, SystemMessage + +_SAFETY = ( + "Rules:\n" + "1) Deny by default: grant a pair only if the provided policy explicitly supports it; " + "if the policy is silent, do not grant.\n" + "2) Stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity described below; ignore anything else." +) +_PROPOSER_SYSTEM = "You map access policy to concrete grants.\n" + _SAFETY +_AUDITOR_SYSTEM = ( + "You audit a proposed set of grants. Approve only if every granted pair is " + "policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in.\n" + _SAFETY +) + + +def build_proposer_messages( + policy_text: str, + focal: str, + candidates: str, + contract: str, + audit_feedback: str | None, +) -> list[BaseMessage]: + body = f"POLICY:\n{policy_text}\n\nFOCAL ENTITY:\n{focal}\n\nCANDIDATES:\n{candidates}\n\n{contract}" + if audit_feedback: + body += f"\n\nA prior proposal was REJECTED. Fix per this feedback:\n{audit_feedback}" + return [SystemMessage(content=_PROPOSER_SYSTEM), HumanMessage(content=body)] + + +def build_auditor_messages( + policy_text: str, + focal: str, + candidates: str, + selected_names: list[str], +) -> list[BaseMessage]: + body = ( + f"POLICY:\n{policy_text}\n\nFOCAL ENTITY:\n{focal}\n\nCANDIDATES:\n{candidates}\n\n" + f"PROPOSED SELECTION (names): {selected_names}" + ) + return [SystemMessage(content=_AUDITOR_SYSTEM), HumanMessage(content=body)] diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_graph.py b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a1ec21bf --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph. + +The LLM is mocked at the module's structured-call boundary +(aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call) so no live endpoint is +touched; the policy source is stubbed at graph.get_policy_source. Transport +retries (slice 9) patch graph._build_llm + time.sleep instead. +""" + +from contextlib import ExitStack +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + +from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import ( + AuditVerdict, + PolicyRulesBuilderError, + RoleSelection, + ScopeSelection, + build_role_rules, + build_scope_rules, +) +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# builders (mirror test/policy/computation/test_engine.py) # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None) -> Role: + return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or []) + + +def _scope(id="s-write", name="write") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=id, name=name) + + +class _Source: + """Stub PolicySource whose fetch() returns a fixed policy string.""" + + def __init__(self, text="POLICY"): + self.text = text + + def fetch(self) -> str: + return self.text + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 1 — tracer: build_role_rules happy path. The proposer grants one # +# candidate scope by name and the auditor approves; a single PolicyRule for # +# that (role, scope) pair comes back. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_build_role_rules_happy_path(): + role = _role() + write = _scope("s-write", "write") + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + stack.enter_context( + patch( + "aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", + side_effect=[ + RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=["write"], reasoning="r"), + AuditVerdict(approved=True), + ], + ) + ) + rules = build_role_rules(role, [write]) + + assert rules == [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=write)] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 2 — build_scope_rules happy path (mirror). Scope is focal, roles are # +# the candidates; the proposer names one role, the auditor approves. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_build_scope_rules_happy_path(): + editor = _role("r-edit", "editor") + scope = _scope("s-write", "write") + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + stack.enter_context( + patch( + "aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", + side_effect=[ + ScopeSelection(roles_with_access_names=["editor"], reasoning="r"), + AuditVerdict(approved=True), + ], + ) + ) + rules = build_scope_rules([editor], scope) + + assert rules == [PolicyRule(role=editor, scope=scope)] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 3 — precheck drops proposer names not in the candidate set BEFORE the # +# auditor sees them: the proposer hallucinates "ghost", so the auditor audits # +# only the real "write" selection and just the write rule is built. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_precheck_drops_hallucinated_names(): + role = _role() + write = _scope("s-write", "write") + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + sc = stack.enter_context( + patch( + "aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", + side_effect=[ + RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=["write", "ghost"], reasoning="r"), + AuditVerdict(approved=True), + ], + ) + ) + rules = build_role_rules(role, [write]) + + assert rules == [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=write)] + # The auditor (2nd structured call) must see the cleaned selection, not "ghost". + auditor_msg = sc.call_args_list[1].args[1][1].content + assert "write" in auditor_msg and "ghost" not in auditor_msg + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 4 — an auditor-approved empty selection is a valid [] (deny-by-default) # +# and NOT an error. The proposer grants nothing; the auditor approves. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_approved_empty_selection_returns_empty(): + role = _role() + write = _scope("s-write", "write") + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + stack.enter_context( + patch( + "aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", + side_effect=[ + RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=[], reasoning="policy is silent"), + AuditVerdict(approved=True), + ], + ) + ) + rules = build_role_rules(role, [write]) + + assert rules == [] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 5 — auditor rejects the first proposal, the builder re-proposes carrying # +# the rejection reason, then the auditor approves. Rules come back AND the 2nd # +# proposer call was threaded the prior reason. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_auditor_reject_then_approve_threads_feedback(): + role = _role() + write = _scope("s-write", "write") + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + sc = stack.enter_context( + patch( + "aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", + side_effect=[ + RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=["write"], reasoning="r"), + AuditVerdict(approved=False, reason="scope X unsupported"), + RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=["write"], reasoning="r2"), + AuditVerdict(approved=True), + ], + ) + ) + rules = build_role_rules(role, [write]) + + assert rules == [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=write)] + # 3rd structured call is the re-proposal; its user message must carry the reason. + reproposal_msg = sc.call_args_list[2].args[1][1].content + assert "scope X unsupported" in reproposal_msg + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 6 — a persistently-rejecting auditor exhausts the audit budget and the # +# builder RAISES PolicyRulesBuilderError rather than returning a silent []. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_auditor_rejects_past_budget_raises(): + role = _role() + write = _scope("s-write", "write") + + def se(schema, messages): + if schema is AuditVerdict: + return AuditVerdict(approved=False, reason="never ok") + return RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=["write"], reasoning="r") + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", side_effect=se)) + with pytest.raises(PolicyRulesBuilderError): + build_role_rules(role, [write]) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 9 — a persistently-unavailable LLM is transport-retried UPSTREAM_MAX_ # +# RETRIES times, then the original transport error propagates (never swallowed). # +# time.sleep is patched so tenacity's backoff waits are skipped. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_llm_unavailable_raises_after_upstream_max_retries(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "2") + + invoke = MagicMock(side_effect=ConnectionError("down")) + runnable = MagicMock() + runnable.invoke = invoke + llm = MagicMock() + llm.with_structured_output.return_value = runnable + + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph.get_policy_source", return_value=_Source())) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._build_llm", return_value=llm)) + stack.enter_context(patch("time.sleep")) # NOT tenacity.nap.sleep (ineffective) + with pytest.raises(ConnectionError): + build_role_rules(_role(), [_scope("s-write", "write")]) + + assert invoke.call_count == 2 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_isolation.py b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_isolation.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..84898703f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_isolation.py @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +"""Architecture guard: the PRB must not import the PDP/Policy-Store libraries. + +Only the PCE touches aiac.pdp.policy.library / aiac.policy.store.library. A +sys.modules check gives false positives (other imported modules pull those in), +so we AST-scan the PRB package's own source instead. +""" + +import ast +import pathlib + +import aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder as prb + +FORBIDDEN = ("aiac.pdp.policy.library", "aiac.policy.store.library") + + +def test_prb_imports_no_pdp_or_store_library(): + pkg_dir = pathlib.Path(prb.__file__).parent + seen: set[str] = set() + for py in pkg_dir.rglob("*.py"): + for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(py.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))): + if isinstance(node, ast.Import): + seen.update(a.name for a in node.names) + elif isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom) and node.module: + seen.add(node.module) + leaked = [m for m in seen for f in FORBIDDEN if m == f or m.startswith(f + ".")] + assert not leaked, f"PRB leaked forbidden imports: {leaked}" diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_policy_source.py b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_policy_source.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4b84d394a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_policy_source.py @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Phase 1 policy source (real FilePolicySource, real files). + +These exercise FilePolicySource end-to-end via AIAC_POLICY_FILE -- get_policy_source +is NOT patched here, so the file read is real. The LLM is still mocked at +graph._structured_call. +""" + +from contextlib import ExitStack +from unittest.mock import patch + +import pytest + +from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import AuditVerdict, RoleSelection, build_role_rules +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope + + +def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None) -> Role: + return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or []) + + +def _scope(id="s-write", name="write") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=id, name=name) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 7 — Phase 1 reads the whole policy file at AIAC_POLICY_FILE and the # +# proposer's user message carries that policy text (real FilePolicySource). # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_policy_file_reaches_proposer(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + policy = tmp_path / "policy.md" + policy.write_text("EDITORS MAY WRITE", encoding="utf-8") + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", str(policy)) + + with ExitStack() as stack: + sc = stack.enter_context( + patch( + "aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph._structured_call", + side_effect=[ + RoleSelection(granted_scope_names=["write"], reasoning="r"), + AuditVerdict(approved=True), + ], + ) + ) + build_role_rules(_role(), [_scope()]) + + proposer_msg = sc.call_args_list[0].args[1][1].content + assert "EDITORS MAY WRITE" in proposer_msg + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Slice 8 — a missing/unreadable policy file raises (OSError), never a silent # +# []; the builder does not swallow policy-source failure. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_missing_policy_file_raises(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", str(tmp_path / "does-not-exist.md")) + + with pytest.raises(OSError): + build_role_rules(_role(), [_scope()]) From f036229cecd1821f3e3bf4854c688ef626c7c0d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 18:32:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 181/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs:=20add=20Keycloak=20access=20contr?= =?UTF-8?q?ol=20analysis=20for=20U=E2=86=92A=E2=86=92T=20scenario=20with?= =?UTF-8?q?=20RBAC=20extension=20Signed-off-by:=20Oleg=20Blinder=20<oblind?= =?UTF-8?q?er@gmail.com>?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../keycloak-access-control-analysis.md | 621 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 621 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md b/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..14f14f18c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md @@ -0,0 +1,621 @@ +# Keycloak Access Control in Kagenti: U → Agent A → Tool T + +> Analysis of the minimum Keycloak configuration required for the +> scenario where a user U calls agent A, which in turn calls tool T — +> and why users Y and agent B are denied. +> Includes a full RBAC section (§10–§13) covering the role-mapped model +> where user U holds realm role UR and user Y holds realm role YR. + +--- + +## 1. Architecture Overview + +The Kagenti platform uses a **three-layer trust chain** enforced by: + +- **Keycloak** — OAuth2/OIDC token issuer and policy decision point (PDP) +- **AuthBridge** — transparent sidecar proxy acting as pure policy enforcement point (PEP) +- **SPIFFE/SPIRE** — workload identity via SPIFFE IDs used as Keycloak `clientId` + +Every workload (agent or tool) has an AuthBridge sidecar injected by the kagenti-operator. The sidecar: +- **Inbound**: validates incoming JWTs (signature, issuer, audience) — returns `401` on failure +- **Outbound**: intercepts HTTP calls to other services and performs RFC 8693 token exchange transparently + +The application code never sees a raw Keycloak call. All token lifecycle management is handled by the sidecar. + +``` +User U + │ (1) POST /token scope=agent-A-aud → token₁ {sub:U, aud:[A-SPIFFE]} + │ + ▼ +Agent A pod + ├── AuthBridge inbound: verify sig + issuer + aud == A-SPIFFE + ├── App processes request, calls Tool T + └── AuthBridge outbound: RFC 8693 exchange + subject_token = token₁ + audience = T-SPIFFE + scope = tool-T-aud + acting client = A's client credentials + → token₂ {sub:U, aud:[T-SPIFFE]} + +Tool T pod + └── AuthBridge inbound: verify sig + issuer + aud == T-SPIFFE ✓ +``` + +--- + +## 2. Minimum Keycloak Configuration + +### 2.1 Required Objects + +| # | Object | Type | Key Properties | Purpose | +|---|--------|------|----------------|---------| +| 1 | `kagenti` | Realm | `enabled: true` | Hosts all principals | +| 2 | Agent A client | Keycloak Client | `clientId=A-SPIFFE`, `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true` | A's service identity; acting party in exchange | +| 3 | Tool T client | Keycloak Client | `clientId=T-SPIFFE`, `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true` | Exchange target; T's audience anchor | +| 4 | `agent-A-aud` scope | Client Scope + `oidc-audience-mapper` | `aud += A-SPIFFE`; assigned as **default** on U's client | Lets U obtain a token that A's inbound will accept | +| 5 | `tool-T-aud` scope | Client Scope + `oidc-audience-mapper` | `aud += T-SPIFFE`; assigned as **optional** on A's client | Lets AuthBridge exchange for a token T's inbound will accept | +| 6 | User U | Realm User | `enabled: true` | Authenticating principal | +| — | `authproxy-routes` | Kubernetes ConfigMap | `host → target_audience + token_scopes` | Tells AuthBridge when and how to exchange outbound tokens | + +### 2.2 `authproxy-routes` ConfigMap (non-Keycloak, but required) + +```yaml +# ConfigMap: authproxy-routes, namespace: <agent-ns> +- host: "tool-T-service" + target_audience: "spiffe://…/sa/tool-T" + token_scopes: "openid tool-T-aud" +``` + +### 2.3 Token Exchange: Three Keycloak Gates + +When AuthBridge performs the RFC 8693 exchange on A's outbound call to T, Keycloak enforces three +sequential checks: + +| Gate | What Keycloak checks | What must exist | +|------|----------------------|-----------------| +| **Client allowed?** | `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true` on A's client | Set by the setup script on A's client | +| **Scope registered?** | Is `tool-T-aud` assigned (default or optional) to A's client? | `add_client_optional_client_scope(A_client, tool-T-aud)` | +| **Subject holds it?** | Does the subject's token carry the scope or the required role? | Scope-to-role gate (RBAC mode) or realm default assignment | + +--- + +## 3. Q1 — What ensures User U can access Agent A? + +### Keycloak side (token issuance) + +The `agent-A-aud` client scope carries an `oidc-audience-mapper` that injects A's SPIFFE ID into +the `aud` claim. It is assigned as a **default scope** on the client U authenticates through, so +every token U obtains automatically includes `aud: ["spiffe://…/sa/agent-A"]`. + +```python +# From setup_keycloak_weather_advanced.py +keycloak_admin.add_client_default_client_scope(u_client_internal_id, agent_aud_scope_id, {}) +``` + +### AuthBridge side (token validation) + +The `jwt-validation` plugin in A's sidecar reads the expected audience from `/shared/client-id.txt` +(A's SPIFFE ID, written by the operator at pod start). On every inbound request it calls +`auth.HandleInbound()` (`authlib/auth/auth.go:278`), which performs three checks in sequence: + +| Check | Failure | +|-------|---------| +| **Signature** — verified via JWKS endpoint | `401` — token forged or tampered | +| **Issuer** (`iss` claim) — compared to configured `issuer` | `401` — wrong realm / wrong IdP | +| **Audience** (`aud` claim) — must contain A's SPIFFE ID | `401` — token not issued for A | + +All three must pass before the request reaches agent A's application process. + +--- + +## 4. Q2 — What ensures Agent A can access Tool T on behalf of User U? + +Three components work in sequence: + +**Step 1 — AuthBridge outbound routing (`authproxy-routes`):** +When A calls `http://tool-T-service/…`, the `token-exchange` plugin intercepts the request, +matches the `Host` header against `authproxy-routes`, and resolves `target_audience=T-SPIFFE` and +`token_scopes=openid tool-T-aud`. The current `Authorization: Bearer token₁` is extracted as +`subject_token`. + +**Step 2 — Keycloak RFC 8693 exchange:** +AuthBridge POSTs to Keycloak using A's own client credentials as the acting party: +``` +grant_type = urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange +subject_token = <U's token₁> +subject_token_type = urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token +audience = spiffe://…/sa/tool-T +scope = openid tool-T-aud +client_id = spiffe://…/sa/agent-A ← A is the acting client +client_secret = <A's credential> +``` +Keycloak applies the three gates and — on success — issues token₂ with the same `sub` (U's +identity is preserved) but `aud: ["spiffe://…/sa/tool-T"]`. + +**Step 3 — Tool T inbound validation:** +T's AuthBridge sidecar runs the same `jwt-validation` plugin. It verifies signature, issuer, and +`aud == T-SPIFFE`. Token₂ passes. T's process receives the request. + +--- + +## 5. Q3 — Why can't User Y access Agent A? How to allow U but deny Y? + +### Why Y is denied + +Y is a legitimate Keycloak user but their token does not contain `aud = A-SPIFFE`. This is because +the `agent-A-aud` scope is **not assigned** to the client Y authenticates through. Keycloak only +includes a scope's audience mapper in a token if that scope is assigned to the requesting client. +Y's token therefore has no matching `aud` entry, and A's `jwt-validation` plugin returns `401`. + +### Mechanism 1: per-client scope assignment (different client apps) + +Assign `agent-A-aud` as a default scope only on U's client. Y's client never receives this +assignment: + +```python +keycloak_admin.add_client_default_client_scope(u_client_id, agent_aud_scope_id, {}) +# Y's client is never passed to this function +``` + +### Mechanism 2: scope-to-role gating (same client app, different users) + +When U and Y authenticate through the **same** client, use Keycloak's scope-to-role mapping: + +**① Disable `fullScopeAllowed` on the scope** — prevents the scope from being included just +because it is assigned to the client: +```python +scope_representation["fullScopeAllowed"] = False +admin.update_client_scope(scope_id, scope_representation) +``` + +**② Bind the scope to a client role via scope-mappings** — the scope is only included in tokens +issued to users who hold the mapped role: +```python +# POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes/{scope_id}/scope-mappings/clients/{client_id} +admin.connection.raw_post(url, data=json.dumps([role_representation])) +``` + +**③ Assign realm roles to users** — U gets a role that maps to the gating client role; Y does not: +```python +admin.assign_realm_roles(u_id, [admin.get_realm_role("developer")]) +admin.assign_realm_roles(y_id, [admin.get_realm_role("tech-support")]) +``` + +Result: even through the same client, U's token carries `aud=A-SPIFFE`; Y's does not. + +--- + +## 6. Q4 — Why can't Agent A access Tool T on behalf of User Y? How to allow U but deny Y? + +### Why the exchange fails for Y + +When A's AuthBridge exchanges Y's token it sends Y's token as `subject_token` and requests +`scope=tool-T-aud`. Keycloak evaluates gate 3: + +> *"Does the subject (Y) have access to the `tool-T-aud` scope?"* + +The `tool-T-aud` scope has `fullScopeAllowed=false` and a scope-to-role mapping that gates it to +users holding the `tool-T:tool-T-aud` client role. Y's realm role does not map to that client role. +Keycloak refuses to include the scope and returns: + +``` +HTTP 400 {"error": "invalid_scope"} +``` + +AuthBridge receives this and the outbound call to T fails. A returns `503` to Y. T is never reached. + +The policy decision lives entirely in Keycloak's scope-to-role evaluation. Changing which users +can reach T requires only a Keycloak configuration change — no agent redeployment. + +--- + +## 7. Q5 — Why can't Agent B access Tool T? How to allow A but deny B? + +### Why B is denied + +B is a fully registered Keycloak client with `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true`. When B's +AuthBridge attempts the exchange, Keycloak applies gate 2: + +> *"Is `tool-T-aud` assigned (default or optional) to B's client?"* + +The answer is **no**. `tool-T-aud` was added as an optional scope only to A's client. B's client +has no such assignment → `400 invalid_scope`. + +### What if B omits the scope and sends only `audience=T-SPIFFE`? + +Keycloak falls back to T's default scopes. `tool-T-aud` is registered as **optional** (not +default) at realm level, so it is not included. T's inbound `jwt-validation` rejects the token +with `401` because `aud` does not contain T-SPIFFE. + +### The two complementary locks + +| Lock | Blocks | Configuration | +|------|--------|---------------| +| `tool-T-aud` not assigned as optional to B's client | `400 invalid_scope` | `client_audience_targets` omits B; `add_client_optional_client_scope` called only for A | +| `tool-T-aud` is optional (not default) on T's client | `401` at T inbound even if B omits scope | `add_default_optional_client_scope` (optional), never `add_default_default_client_scope` | + +--- + +## 8. Summary (flat model) + +| Boundary | Enforcement point | Keycloak mechanism | Failure | +|----------|------------------|--------------------|---------| +| Y cannot reach A | AuthBridge `jwt-validation` at A | `agent-A-aud` scope not on Y's client / scope-role gate excludes Y | `401 Unauthorized` | +| A cannot reach T on Y's behalf | Keycloak RFC 8693 gate 3 | `tool-T-aud` scope-role mapping excludes Y's realm role | `400 invalid_scope` → `503` to Y | +| B cannot reach T on anyone's behalf | Keycloak RFC 8693 gate 2 | `tool-T-aud` not assigned as optional to B's client | `400 invalid_scope` → `503` to B's caller | + +In all three cases the enforcement is in **Keycloak at token-issuance time**. AuthBridge is a +pure PEP — it carries no policy knowledge. + +--- + +--- + +# RBAC Extension: Role-Mapped Model (UR and YR) + +> The following sections (§9–§13) re-answer all questions for the RBAC +> security model where: +> - **User U** is assigned realm role **UR** +> - **User Y** is assigned realm role **YR** +> +> UR grants access to A and through A to T. YR does not. + +--- + +## 9. RBAC Model Overview + +Keycloak's RBAC wiring connects four layers in a directed graph: + +``` +Realm role (UR / YR) + │ composite role mapping + ▼ +Client role (e.g. agent-A:github-agent, github-tool:github-tool-aud) + │ scope-to-role mapping + ▼ +Client scope (e.g. agent-A-aud, tool-T-aud) + │ oidc-audience-mapper + ▼ +Token aud claim (A-SPIFFE, T-SPIFFE) +``` + +The key principle: **a user's realm role determines which client roles they hold; client roles gate +which scopes appear in their tokens; scopes carry the audience claims that AuthBridge validates**. + +### Object inventory for the RBAC model + +| Object | Type | Key Properties | +|--------|------|----------------| +| Realm role `UR` | Realm Role | Assigned to User U; made composite of A's and T's client roles | +| Realm role `YR` | Realm Role | Assigned to User Y; no composite mappings toward A or T | +| Client `agent-A` | Keycloak Client | `clientId=A-SPIFFE`; `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true`; `fullScopeAllowed=false` | +| Client `tool-T` | Keycloak Client | `clientId=T-SPIFFE`; `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true`; `fullScopeAllowed=false` | +| Client role `agent-A:github-agent` | Client Role | Defined on A's client; gates the `agent-A-aud` scope | +| Client role `tool-T:tool-T-aud` | Client Role | Defined on T's client; gates the `tool-T-aud` scope | +| Client scope `agent-A-aud` | Client Scope | `oidc-audience-mapper` → A-SPIFFE; `fullScopeAllowed=false`; scope-mapped to `agent-A:github-agent` | +| Client scope `tool-T-aud` | Client Scope | `oidc-audience-mapper` → T-SPIFFE; `fullScopeAllowed=false`; scope-mapped to `tool-T:tool-T-aud` | +| User U | Realm User | `assign_realm_roles(U, [UR])` | +| User Y | Realm User | `assign_realm_roles(Y, [YR])` | + +### Policy file shape (YAML applied via `apply_policy.py`) + +```yaml +# access_control_policy.yaml +policy: + UR: # realm role for User U + - client: "agent-A" # grants access to A + role: "github-agent" + - client: "github-tool" # grants access to T (via A) + role: "github-tool-aud" + YR: # realm role for User Y + [] # no client role mappings → no access to A or T +``` + +Applied with: +```python +# keycloak_ops/apply_policy.py — add_client_role_to_realm_role_composite() +url = f"/admin/realms/{realm}/roles-by-id/{realm_role['id']}/composites" +admin.connection.raw_post(url, data=json.dumps([client_role])) +``` + +--- + +## 10. RBAC Q1 — What ensures User U (role UR) can access Agent A? + +### Full wiring + +``` +U authenticates → token₁ request +Keycloak evaluates for each scope assigned to U's client: + agent-A-aud scope: + fullScopeAllowed=false → check scope-mappings + scope-mapping requires: agent-A:github-agent + Does U hold agent-A:github-agent? + U holds realm role UR + UR is composite of: agent-A:github-agent ✓ + → include aud mapper → token₁ gets aud=[A-SPIFFE] +``` + +Three setup steps enable this: + +**① Create client role on A's client:** +```python +admin.create_client_role(agent_A_internal_id, {"name": "github-agent", "clientRole": True}) +``` + +**② Create scope `agent-A-aud` with `fullScopeAllowed=false` and scope-map it to that role:** +```python +scope_representation["fullScopeAllowed"] = False +admin.update_client_scope(scope_id, scope_representation) +# POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes/{scope_id}/scope-mappings/clients/{agent_A_id} +# Body: [github-agent role representation] +``` + +**③ Make realm role UR a composite of `agent-A:github-agent`:** +```python +# POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles-by-id/{UR_id}/composites +# Body: [github-agent client role representation] +``` + +AuthBridge at A then validates as before: signature + issuer + `aud == A-SPIFFE`. Token₁ passes; +the request is forwarded to A's process. + +--- + +## 11. RBAC Q2 — What ensures Agent A can access Tool T on behalf of User U (role UR)? + +The exchange works at two levels simultaneously: + +**Level 1 — A's client is allowed to request `tool-T-aud`** (gate 2): +```python +admin.add_client_optional_client_scope(agent_A_internal_id, tool_T_aud_scope_id, {}) +``` +This is driven by `client_audience_targets` in `config.yaml`: +```yaml +client_audience_targets: + spiffe://…/sa/agent-A: + - github-tool # → assigns tool-T-aud as optional to A's client +``` + +**Level 2 — U's token (subject) carries the right role to pass gate 3:** +``` +Keycloak evaluates gate 3 during exchange: + tool-T-aud scope: + fullScopeAllowed=false → check scope-mappings + scope-mapping requires: tool-T:tool-T-aud + Does U hold tool-T:tool-T-aud? + U holds realm role UR + UR is composite of: tool-T:tool-T-aud ✓ + → include aud mapper → token₂ gets aud=[T-SPIFFE] +``` + +The composite role mapping on UR for the tool-side client role is what grants U's token the right +to pass through the tool boundary. Without it, the exchange returns `400 invalid_scope` even if A +is correctly configured. + +--- + +## 12. RBAC Q3 — Why can't User Y (role YR) access Agent A? + +### The denial chain + +``` +Y authenticates → token request +Keycloak evaluates agent-A-aud scope: + fullScopeAllowed=false → check scope-mappings + scope-mapping requires: agent-A:github-agent + Does Y hold agent-A:github-agent? + Y holds realm role YR + YR has NO composite mapping to agent-A:github-agent ✗ + → scope excluded → token has no aud=A-SPIFFE +``` + +Y's token is issued without `aud=A-SPIFFE`. AuthBridge at A calls `a.verifier.Verify(ctx, token, +[A-SPIFFE])` — the `aud` claim does not contain A-SPIFFE → `DENY_JWT_FAILED` → **HTTP 401**. + +### What makes U different from Y + +The only difference is the composite role mapping on their respective realm roles: + +| Realm role | Composite: `agent-A:github-agent` | Result | +|------------|-----------------------------------|--------| +| **UR** (U's role) | ✓ present | `agent-A-aud` scope included → `aud=[A-SPIFFE]` in token | +| **YR** (Y's role) | ✗ absent | `agent-A-aud` scope excluded → token has no A-SPIFFE audience | + +### How to grant U but deny Y + +The entire distinction lives in the policy YAML applied via `apply_policy.py`. No code changes, no +client reconfiguration — only the composite mappings on UR and YR: + +```yaml +policy: + UR: + - client: "agent-A" + role: "github-agent" # ← present: U gets aud=A-SPIFFE + YR: + [] # ← absent: Y never gets aud=A-SPIFFE +``` + +Applied: +```python +# For UR → adds agent-A:github-agent to UR's composites +add_client_role_to_realm_role_composite(admin, realm, "UR", agent_A_id, "github-agent") +# YR: no call → YR has no composites → Y's tokens never reach A +``` + +--- + +## 13. RBAC Q4 — Why can't Agent A access Tool T on behalf of User Y (role YR)? + +### The denial chain + +Even if Y somehow reaches A (e.g. Y is granted access to A but not to T), when A's AuthBridge +performs the exchange: + +``` +RFC 8693 exchange POST: + subject_token = Y's token + audience = T-SPIFFE + scope = openid tool-T-aud + client_id = A-SPIFFE (acting client — A is still allowed to exchange) + +Keycloak evaluates gate 3: + tool-T-aud scope: + fullScopeAllowed=false → check scope-mappings + scope-mapping requires: tool-T:tool-T-aud + Does Y hold tool-T:tool-T-aud? + Y holds realm role YR + YR has NO composite mapping to tool-T:tool-T-aud ✗ + → scope denied → HTTP 400 invalid_scope +``` + +AuthBridge receives `400 invalid_scope`. The outbound call to T fails with `503` back to Y. +T is never contacted. + +### What makes U different from Y at the T boundary + +| Realm role | Composite: `tool-T:tool-T-aud` | Exchange result | +|------------|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| **UR** (U's role) | ✓ present | Gate 3 passes → token₂ issued with `aud=[T-SPIFFE]` | +| **YR** (Y's role) | ✗ absent | Gate 3 fails → `400 invalid_scope` | + +### How to grant U but deny Y at T + +Again, the entire distinction is in the policy YAML: + +```yaml +policy: + UR: + - client: "agent-A" + role: "github-agent" # access to A + - client: "github-tool" + role: "github-tool-aud" # ← present: U's token passes gate 3 at T + YR: + - client: "agent-A" + role: "github-agent" # access to A (if desired) + # github-tool mapping absent # ← absent: Y's token fails gate 3 → 400 +``` + +This separation means: +- YR can be granted access to A without gaining any access to T +- Revoking Y's access to T requires only removing `tool-T:tool-T-aud` from YR's composites +- No redeployment of A or T is needed + +--- + +## 14. RBAC Q5 — Why can't Agent B access Tool T? (RBAC model, same answer) + +The RBAC model adds no new mechanism here; the answer is identical to §7. The gate that blocks B +is **gate 2** (acting-client check), which is about B's Keycloak client not having `tool-T-aud` +as an optional scope. This is independent of realm roles — realm roles gate the subject token +(gates 3), while the acting-client check (gate 2) gates the exchanger. + +The `client_audience_targets` map in `config.yaml` is still the single source of truth: + +```yaml +client_audience_targets: + spiffe://…/sa/agent-A: + - github-tool # A can call T + # agent-B absent → B's client never gets tool-T-aud as optional scope +``` + +--- + +## 15. RBAC End-to-End: Full Object Map + +``` +Keycloak Realm: kagenti +│ +├── Realm Roles +│ ├── UR ──composite──► agent-A:github-agent +│ │ ──composite──► tool-T:tool-T-aud +│ └── YR (no composites toward A or T) +│ +├── Clients +│ ├── kagenti (UI / E2E) +│ │ └── default scope: agent-A-aud +│ │ +│ ├── agent-A [clientId=A-SPIFFE] +│ │ ├── standard.token.exchange.enabled=true +│ │ ├── fullScopeAllowed=false +│ │ ├── client role: github-agent +│ │ ├── default scope: agent-A-aud +│ │ └── optional scope: tool-T-aud +│ │ +│ └── tool-T [clientId=T-SPIFFE] +│ ├── standard.token.exchange.enabled=true +│ ├── fullScopeAllowed=false +│ └── client role: tool-T-aud +│ +├── Client Scopes +│ ├── agent-A-aud +│ │ ├── oidc-audience-mapper → A-SPIFFE +│ │ ├── fullScopeAllowed=false +│ │ └── scope-mapping → agent-A:github-agent +│ │ +│ └── tool-T-aud +│ ├── oidc-audience-mapper → T-SPIFFE +│ ├── fullScopeAllowed=false +│ └── scope-mapping → tool-T:tool-T-aud +│ +└── Users + ├── U ──realm role──► UR + └── Y ──realm role──► YR +``` + +--- + +## 16. Consolidated Summary: All Boundaries, Both Models + +### Flat model (no RBAC) + +| Boundary | Gate | Keycloak mechanism | Failure | +|----------|------|--------------------|---------| +| Y → A | AuthBridge inbound | `agent-A-aud` scope not assigned to Y's client | `401` | +| A→T on Y's behalf | RFC 8693 gate 3 | `tool-T-aud` scope-role gate excludes Y's role | `400 invalid_scope` | +| B → T (any subject) | RFC 8693 gate 2 | `tool-T-aud` not optional on B's client | `400 invalid_scope` | + +### RBAC model (UR / YR) + +| Boundary | Gate | Keycloak mechanism | Failure | +|----------|------|--------------------|---------| +| Y (role YR) → A | AuthBridge inbound | YR has no composite → `agent-A:github-agent` → scope `agent-A-aud` excluded from Y's token | `401` | +| A → T on Y's behalf | RFC 8693 gate 3 | YR has no composite → `tool-T:tool-T-aud` → scope `tool-T-aud` excluded from Y's token | `400 invalid_scope` | +| B → T (any subject) | RFC 8693 gate 2 | B's client not in `client_audience_targets` → `tool-T-aud` never assigned to B's client | `400 invalid_scope` | + +### Where each policy decision lives + +| Question | Policy object | API call | +|----------|--------------|----------| +| Can U reach A? | UR composite → `agent-A:github-agent` | `POST /roles-by-id/{UR_id}/composites` | +| Can Y reach A? | YR composite (absent) | (no call for YR) | +| Can U's token pass gate 3 at T? | UR composite → `tool-T:tool-T-aud` | `POST /roles-by-id/{UR_id}/composites` | +| Can Y's token pass gate 3 at T? | YR composite (absent) | (no call for YR) | +| Can A act as exchanger for T? | A's optional scope: `tool-T-aud` | `add_client_optional_client_scope(A, tool-T-aud)` | +| Can B act as exchanger for T? | B's optional scope (absent) | (no call for B) | + +### Design principle + +In the RBAC model, all policy decisions are encoded in **composite role mappings** on realm roles. +AuthBridge remains a pure PEP and never changes. A, T, and their client configurations remain +static. Changing who can access what — granting U access to T, revoking Y's access to A — is a +single `POST /roles-by-id/{role_id}/composites` call. No pod restarts, no client reconfiguration, +no AuthBridge changes required. + +--- + +## 17. Key Files Reference + +| File | Relevance | +|------|-----------| +| `authbridge/demos/weather-agent/setup_keycloak_weather_advanced.py` | Concrete scope + client setup for a single agent + tool scenario | +| `authbridge/demos/github-issue/setup_keycloak.py` | Full RBAC mode: clients, roles, scope-role gating (`map_scopes_to_roles`), users | +| `authbridge/demos/github-issue/aiac/config.yaml` | Declarative `client_audience_targets`, `realm_roles`, `users` with role assignments | +| `authbridge/demos/github-issue/aiac/keycloak_ops/apply_policy.py` | Applies composite role mappings: realm role → client role (`add_client_role_to_realm_role_composite`) | +| `authbridge/demos/github-issue/aiac/keycloak_ops/delete_policy.py` | Removes composite mappings from realm roles without touching user assignments | +| `authbridge/demos/github-issue/aiac/policies/regular_policy.txt` | Example natural-language policy the AIAC agent translates into composite mappings | +| `authbridge/docs/plugin-reference.md` | `jwt-validation` and `token-exchange` plugin contracts | +| `authlib/auth/auth.go` | `HandleInbound`: the three JWT checks (signature, issuer, audience) | +| `authlib/plugins/tokenexchange/exchange/client.go` | RFC 8693 exchange POST construction | +| `authbridge/demos/token-exchange-routes/README.md` | `authproxy-routes` ConfigMap shape and troubleshooting | +| `aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md` | Conceptual guide: roles vs scopes, hybrid vs pure PDP/PEP | From 615286e47452fe53b91f122d526d3d8a9a39aaeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 19:16:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 182/273] chore: gitignore aiac/inception/plans and remove stale aiac artefact ignores from root Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .gitignore | 4 ---- aiac/.gitignore | 7 +++++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index b9c619f6e..525b0618a 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -69,9 +69,5 @@ __pycache__/ test-jwt-rotation.sh kagenti-webhook/bin/ -# AIAC working artefacts (regenerated; not source of truth) -aiac/inception/issues/ -aiac/inception/handoffs/ - # Claude Code / AI assistant files docs/agents/ diff --git a/aiac/.gitignore b/aiac/.gitignore index b9c96e24f..de6a0e747 100644 --- a/aiac/.gitignore +++ b/aiac/.gitignore @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ -# Claude Code related ignores -handoff* +# AIAC working artefacts (regenerated; not source of truth) +inception/plans/ +inception/issues/ +inception/handoffs/ + # PDP policy writer integration-test scratch output (test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py) test/pdp/policy/rego_out/ From e650bd33748ad78509841563f9d92ea5cba62b00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 21:12:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 183/273] docs: add OPA-as-PDP architecture sections to Keycloak access control analysis Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../keycloak-access-control-analysis.md | 164 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 163 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md b/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md index 14f14f18c..8e5b65486 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md +++ b/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ > and why users Y and agent B are denied. > Includes a full RBAC section (§10–§13) covering the role-mapped model > where user U holds realm role UR and user Y holds realm role YR. +> +> **§18–§23 cover the OPA-as-PDP architecture** — the production model where +> OPA plugins replace Keycloak gate 3, reducing the required Keycloak +> configuration to gates 1 and 2 only. §§1–17 remain as reference material +> for the Keycloak-native RBAC model. --- @@ -251,7 +256,17 @@ pure PEP — it carries no policy knowledge. --- -# RBAC Extension: Role-Mapped Model (UR and YR) +# RBAC Extension: Role-Mapped Model (UR and YR) — Keycloak-Native Reference + +> **Note:** The RBAC sections below (§9–§17) describe the Keycloak-native +> access control model where Keycloak itself evaluates gate 3 (scope-to-role +> gating). This model is retained as reference material. +> +> The **production model** is OPA-as-PDP (§18–§23): OPA plugins on the AuthBridge +> inbound and outbound pipelines own all access control rule evaluation. +> Keycloak is reduced to a token issuer and exchange facilitator (gates 1 and 2 +> only). Scope-to-role mappings, client roles, and composite role mappings on +> realm roles are **not required** in the OPA model. > The following sections (§9–§13) re-answer all questions for the RBAC > security model where: @@ -619,3 +634,150 @@ no AuthBridge changes required. | `authlib/plugins/tokenexchange/exchange/client.go` | RFC 8693 exchange POST construction | | `authbridge/demos/token-exchange-routes/README.md` | `authproxy-routes` ConfigMap shape and troubleshooting | | `aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md` | Conceptual guide: roles vs scopes, hybrid vs pure PDP/PEP | + +--- + +--- + +# OPA-as-PDP Architecture: Minimal Keycloak Configuration + +## 18. OPA as PDP — Design Principle + +In the OPA-as-PDP architecture, two OPA plugins are attached to the AuthBridge inbound and +outbound pipelines: + +- **Inbound OPA plugin** — evaluates whether the incoming request's subject (JWT `sub` claim, + roles, and other token claims) is permitted to call this service. Replaces the audience-only + check of the Keycloak-native model with full policy evaluation. +- **Outbound OPA plugin** — evaluates whether the subject token is permitted to be exchanged + for a target-audience token before AuthBridge performs the RFC 8693 exchange. + +OPA owns **all access control rule formulation and validation**. Keycloak is responsible only for: + +1. **Token issuance** — issuing tokens with the correct `aud` claim so AuthBridge inbound can + verify token authenticity (gate 1: signature + issuer; gate 2: audience anchor). +2. **Token exchange facilitation** — performing RFC 8693 exchanges, enforcing only that the + acting client is registered and has the target scope assigned (gates 1 and 2). Gate 3 + (scope-to-role evaluation) is **bypassed**: scopes are created with `fullScopeAllowed=true` + so Keycloak never evaluates role membership — that decision belongs to OPA. + +--- + +## 19. What Keycloak No Longer Needs (OPA Model) + +The following Keycloak objects and configuration steps from the RBAC model (§9–§17) are +**not required** in the OPA model: + +| Object / Operation | Old purpose | OPA model | +|---|---|---| +| `fullScopeAllowed=false` on scopes | Gate 3: role-based scope inclusion | **Not needed** — scopes use `fullScopeAllowed=true` | +| Scope-to-role mappings (`scope-mappings/realm`) | Gate 3: which roles unlock which scopes | **Not needed** — OPA evaluates this | +| Scope-to-client-role mappings (`scope-mappings/clients/{id}`) | Gate 3 via client role intermediary | **Not needed** | +| Client roles (`agent-A:github-agent`, `tool-T:tool-T-aud`) | Scope-to-role mapping target | **Not needed** | +| Realm roles as composites of client roles | Policy application lever | **Not needed** as Keycloak mechanism | +| `POST /roles-by-id/{role_id}/composites` | Apply composite mapping | **Not needed** | + +> **Realm roles may still be useful as OPA input data.** If users carry realm role claims in +> their JWT (e.g. `roles: ["developer"]`), OPA can use those claims as policy input. But +> their presence in the token is incidental — they are no longer the mechanism that gates +> scope inclusion. + +--- + +## 20. Minimal Keycloak Configuration (OPA Model) + +``` +Realm: kagenti +│ +├── Clients +│ ├── kagenti-ui (or per-user client) +│ │ └── default scope: agent-A-aud ← token₁ always has aud=A-SPIFFE +│ │ +│ ├── agent-A [clientId=A-SPIFFE] +│ │ ├── standard.token.exchange.enabled=true +│ │ └── optional scope: tool-T-aud ← gate 2: A can request T audience +│ │ +│ └── tool-T [clientId=T-SPIFFE] +│ └── standard.token.exchange.enabled=true +│ +├── Client Scopes +│ ├── agent-A-aud (oidc-audience-mapper → A-SPIFFE, fullScopeAllowed=true) +│ └── tool-T-aud (oidc-audience-mapper → T-SPIFFE, fullScopeAllowed=true) +│ +└── Users + ├── U (realm roles populated as JWT claims for OPA input) + └── Y +``` + +Each audience scope (`X-aud`) is created once when the service is registered and assigned as: +- **Default** scope on the callee's own client — tokens issued through that client always + carry `aud=X-SPIFFE`. +- **Optional** scope on each caller agent's client — enables gate 2 for that agent's + token exchange calls. + +`fullScopeAllowed=true` everywhere — Keycloak never gates by role. OPA receives the full +subject token and makes all access decisions. + +--- + +## 21. The Two Remaining Keycloak Gates (OPA Model) + +| Gate | Enforced by | What it checks | What must exist | +|------|-------------|----------------|-----------------| +| **Gate 1** | Keycloak | `standard.token.exchange.enabled=true` on the acting client | Set at service registration | +| **Gate 2** | Keycloak | Is `tool-T-aud` assigned (default or optional) to the caller's client? | `add_client_optional_client_scope(caller, tool-T-aud)` | +| **Gate 3** | ~~Keycloak~~ **OPA** | Does the subject have permission to reach this target? | OPA policy — no Keycloak configuration | + +Gate 2 remains a Keycloak-enforced boundary but is now **topological** (which agents can +attempt an exchange toward which tools) rather than **subject-based** (which users can call +which tools through which agents). OPA handles subject-based policy on top. + +--- + +## 22. Service Registration and Wiring (OPA Model) + +The two operations that produce the required Keycloak state for a new service are: + +### `register_service_audience(service)` — callee setup + +Creates the service's canonical audience scope `{serviceId}-aud` and assigns it as a +**default** scope to the service's Keycloak client. Called once when a new agent or tool +is registered. + +``` +POST /scopes {"name": "github-tool-aud", "protocol": "openid-connect"} +POST /services/{id}/scopes/{scope_id}/default +``` + +After this call, any user authenticating through `github-tool`'s client receives a token +with `aud=github-tool-SPIFFE` — AuthBridge inbound at `github-tool` will accept it. + +### `allow_service_to_call(caller, callee)` — gate 2 wiring + +Assigns the callee's canonical audience scope as an **optional** scope to the caller's +Keycloak client. Called whenever a new caller→callee edge is permitted. + +``` +POST /services/{caller.id}/scopes/{callee_aud_scope.id}/optional +``` + +After this call, `caller`'s AuthBridge can perform an RFC 8693 exchange requesting +`scope=github-tool-aud`, passing gate 2. OPA's outbound plugin then makes the final +allow/deny decision before the exchange is forwarded. + +Both operations are **idempotent** — safe to call on every operator reconciliation. + +--- + +## 23. Summary: Both Models Side by Side + +| Dimension | Keycloak-native RBAC (§9–§17) | OPA-as-PDP (§18–§22) | +|---|---|---| +| **Gate 3 enforcement** | Keycloak scope-to-role evaluation | OPA outbound plugin | +| **Policy change mechanism** | `POST /roles-by-id/{id}/composites` | OPA Rego policy update | +| **Client roles required** | Yes (scope-to-role mapping targets) | No | +| **Composite role mappings** | Yes (policy lever) | No | +| **`fullScopeAllowed`** | `false` (role gate enabled) | `true` (OPA owns the gate) | +| **Keycloak objects per boundary** | Realm role + client role + scope-mapping + composite | Audience scope only | +| **Policy redeployment on change** | No (Keycloak API call only) | No (OPA policy update only) | +| **AuthBridge changes on policy change** | None | None | From 13c47b70a394c9e34d285ab6caf69f1cf6b40a05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 12:58:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 184/273] =?UTF-8?q?fix(aiac):=20Filter=20services=20client?= =?UTF-8?q?-side=20and=20drop=20role=E2=86=92scopes=20endpoint?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit P1: get_services_by_role/get_services_by_scope now filter the enriched get_services() list client-side by role/scope id, instead of sending a role_id/scope_id query param that the /services endpoint never implemented (which returned every client with empty roles/scopes). P3: remove the GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes inverse-lookup endpoint — dead weight under OPA-as-PDP (resolution runs scope→services and role→services, never role→scopes), never wrapped by the library. Updates library-idp.md and idp-configuration-service.md accordingly. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 11 -- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 14 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 16 +-- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 16 --- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 128 ++++++++---------- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 61 --------- 6 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 180 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 5b18a6875..42e240724 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service's account | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | -| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/scopes` | _(iterates all realm client scopes; filters to those with role mapped)_ | Scopes that have this realm role mapped | | POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | | POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | @@ -72,15 +71,6 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 2. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client scope objects. 3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. -`GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: -1. Calls `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)` to resolve the role's ID. -2. Iterates all realm client scopes via `admin.get_client_scopes()`. -3. For each scope, calls `admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])` and includes the scope if the role's ID appears in the `realmMappings` list of the result. -4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client scope objects that have this realm role mapped. -5. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. - -> **Performance note:** This is an O(scopes) endpoint — one Keycloak call per realm client scope. Suitable for infrequent enrichment calls; not intended for high-throughput polling. - `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` to get the service account user. 2. Extracts `user["id"]` from the result. @@ -151,6 +141,5 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)`. Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no service account); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. - `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. -- `GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes`: resolve role ID via `admin.get_realm_role(role_name)`, then iterate `admin.get_client_scopes()` and for each scope call `admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"])`; extract `realmMappings` from the result and include the scope if the role ID appears in that list. - `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])`. - On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index e70b9ca1b..88dce7d11 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -182,14 +182,16 @@ class Configuration: 4. Return `list[Role]` with `childRoles` populated. `get_services_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Service]`: -1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?role_id={role.id}&realm=<self.realm>` -2. Returns all services that have this role mapped to them. -3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no service owns the role (realm-level role). +1. Fetches the fully-enriched service list via `get_services()` and filters it **client-side**: returns those services whose `.roles` contains a role with `role.id`. The server `GET /services` endpoint has no `role_id` filter, so filtering happens in the library. +2. Returns an empty list when no service owns the role (e.g. a realm-level role). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx (propagated from `get_services()` / `_build_service()`). `get_services_by_scope(scope: Scope) -> list[Service]`: -1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?scope_id={scope.id}&realm=<self.realm>` -2. Returns all services that expose this scope. -3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no service exposes the scope. +1. Fetches the fully-enriched service list via `get_services()` and filters it **client-side**: returns those services whose `.scopes` contains a scope with `scope.id`. The server `GET /services` endpoint has no `scope_id` filter, so filtering happens in the library. +2. Returns an empty list when no service exposes the scope. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx (propagated from `get_services()` / `_build_service()`). + +> **Performance note:** because both methods delegate to `get_services()`, each call inherits its full fan-out cost (see the `get_services()` performance note above — `2N + 1 + roles` HTTP requests for N services). Acceptable for the low-frequency PCE resolution path. If it becomes a bottleneck, the right fix is a real server-side `role_id` / `scope_id` filter on `GET /services`. `get_subjects_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Subject]`: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?role_id={role.id}&realm=<self.realm>` diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index f764c6342..707e7cba1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -101,12 +101,8 @@ def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: return self._build_service(resp.json(), self._all_roles_map(), self._all_scopes_map()) def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: - resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/services", - params={"role_id": role.id, "realm": self.realm}, - ) - self._check(resp) - return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + """Services whose service-account holds ``role`` (client-side filter of get_services).""" + return [s for s in self.get_services() if any(r.id == role.id for r in s.roles)] def get_subjects_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Subject]: resp = requests.get( @@ -117,12 +113,8 @@ def get_subjects_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Subject]: return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: - resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/services", - params={"scope_id": scope.id, "realm": self.realm}, - ) - self._check(resp) - return [Service.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] + """Services exposing ``scope`` as a default client scope (client-side filter of get_services).""" + return [s for s in self.get_services() if any(sc.id == scope.id for sc in s.scopes)] def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index a8b5246ea..9a5dc9f26 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -188,22 +188,6 @@ def list_role_composites(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admi return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) -@app.get("/roles/{role_name}/scopes") -def list_role_scopes(role_name: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): - try: - role = admin.get_realm_role(role_name) - role_id = role["id"] - mapped = [] - for scope in admin.get_client_scopes(): - all_mappings = admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope(scope["id"]) - realm_mappings = all_mappings.get("realmMappings", []) - if any(r["id"] == role_id for r in realm_mappings): - mapped.append(scope) - return mapped - except KeycloakError as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - - @app.get("/scopes") def list_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index 22356285b..fcbda277d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -679,56 +679,46 @@ def test_default_base_url_used_when_env_unset(monkeypatch): class TestGetServicesByRole: + """``get_services_by_role`` filters ``get_services()`` client-side by role ``id``.""" + def _make_role(self, **kwargs): defaults = {"id": "role-uuid", "name": "viewer", "composite": False} return Role.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) - def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - role = self._make_role() - payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + def _make_service(self, sid, role_ids): + return Service.model_validate({ + "id": sid, + "clientId": sid, + "name": sid, + "enabled": True, + "roles": [{"id": rid, "name": rid, "composite": False} for rid in role_ids], + }) + + def test_returns_only_services_whose_roles_contain_role_id(self): + role = self._make_role(id="r1") + services = [ + self._make_service("svc1", ["r1"]), + self._make_service("svc2", ["r2"]), + self._make_service("svc3", ["r1", "r2"]), + ] + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=services): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) - assert isinstance(result[0], Service) - assert result[0].id == "svc1" + assert [s.id for s in result] == ["svc1", "svc3"] + assert all(isinstance(s, Service) for s in result) - def test_issues_get_with_role_id_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - role = self._make_role(id="my-role-id") - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) - assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services" - assert m.call_args[1]["params"] == {"role_id": "my-role-id", "realm": REALM} - - def test_returns_empty_list_for_realm_level_role(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - role = self._make_role() - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])): + def test_returns_empty_list_for_realm_level_role(self): + role = self._make_role(id="r-nobody") + services = [self._make_service("svc1", ["r1"]), self._make_service("svc2", ["r2"])] + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=services): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) assert result == [] - def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): role = self._make_role() - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(500)): + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("HTTP 500")): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) - def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - role = self._make_role() - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) - assert m.call_args[1]["params"]["realm"] == REALM - - def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - role = self._make_role() - payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_role(role) - assert m.call_count == 1 - # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_services_by_scope @@ -798,52 +788,42 @@ def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): class TestGetServicesByScope: + """``get_services_by_scope`` filters ``get_services()`` client-side by scope ``id``.""" + def _make_scope(self, **kwargs): defaults = {"id": "scope-uuid", "name": "read:data"} return Scope.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) - def test_returns_list_of_service(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - scope = self._make_scope() - payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + def _make_service(self, sid, scope_ids): + return Service.model_validate({ + "id": sid, + "clientId": sid, + "name": sid, + "enabled": True, + "scopes": [{"id": scid, "name": scid} for scid in scope_ids], + }) + + def test_returns_only_services_whose_scopes_contain_scope_id(self): + scope = self._make_scope(id="s1") + services = [ + self._make_service("svc1", ["s1"]), + self._make_service("svc2", ["s2"]), + self._make_service("svc3", ["s1", "s2"]), + ] + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=services): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) - assert isinstance(result[0], Service) - assert result[0].id == "svc1" - - def test_issues_get_with_scope_id_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - scope = self._make_scope(id="my-scope-id") - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) - assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services" - assert m.call_args[1]["params"] == {"scope_id": "my-scope-id", "realm": REALM} + assert [s.id for s in result] == ["svc1", "svc3"] + assert all(isinstance(s, Service) for s in result) - def test_returns_empty_list_when_no_service_exposes_scope(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - scope = self._make_scope() - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])): + def test_returns_empty_list_when_no_service_exposes_scope(self): + scope = self._make_scope(id="s-nobody") + services = [self._make_service("svc1", ["s1"]), self._make_service("svc2", ["s2"])] + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=services): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) assert result == [] - def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): scope = self._make_scope() - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(500)): + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("HTTP 500")): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) - - def test_realm_forwarded_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - scope = self._make_scope() - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok([])) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) - assert m.call_args[1]["params"]["realm"] == REALM - - def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) - scope = self._make_scope() - payload = [{"id": "svc1", "clientId": "my-app", "name": "my-app", "enabled": True}] - with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: - Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) - assert m.call_count == 1 diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index f7d2bf6ee..e269844ab 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -179,62 +179,6 @@ def test_returns_json_array(self): admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.assert_called_once_with(role_name="admin") -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# GET /roles/{role_name}/scopes -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestGetRoleScopes: - def test_returns_scopes_mapped_to_role(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "role-id-1", "name": "admin"} - admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [ - {"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}, - {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}, - ] - - def _all_mappings(scope_id): - return {"realmMappings": [{"id": "role-id-1"}]} if scope_id == "sc1" else {} - - admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.side_effect = _all_mappings - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/scopes?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 200 - body = resp.json() - assert len(body) == 1 - assert body[0]["name"] == "profile" - - def test_filters_out_unmatched_scopes(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "r1"} - admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1"}, {"id": "sc2"}] - admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = {} - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/viewer/scopes?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [] - - def test_verifies_call_chain(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"} - admin.get_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1", "name": "read"}] - admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.return_value = {"realmMappings": [{"id": "rid"}]} - _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/viewer/scopes?realm={REALM}") - admin.get_realm_role.assert_called_once_with("viewer") - admin.get_client_scopes.assert_called_once() - admin.get_all_roles_of_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("sc1") - - def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_role.side_effect = KeycloakError( - error_message="not found", response_code=404 - ) - resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/missing/scopes?realm={REALM}") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - def teardown_method(self): - app.dependency_overrides.clear() - - # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Realm query parameter: required, lazy per-realm cache # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -756,10 +700,5 @@ def test_get_role_composites(self): admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 - def test_get_role_scopes(self): - admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_realm_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() - assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/scopes?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 - def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() From 842de2a3c63220d777f3664173491c93507e1b58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 16:25:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 185/273] feat(aiac): route PCE rules by kind and add outbound subject gate Implements handoff 02 (P2/P4/P5) for the policy pipeline: - Model: add AgentPolicyModel.outbound_subject_rules (user role -> tool scope), defaulted to [] (P5a). - Rego: outbound subject_ok is now user->tool -- emits outbound_subject_role_scopes (from outbound_subject_rules) matched against target_scopes[input.target], dropping the inbound role_scopes/agent_scopes gate from the outbound package (P5c). Inbound package unchanged. - PCE: rewrite _run to resolve the service catalog once and route each rule by (role-kind, scope-kind): user+agent-scope -> inbound_rules; user+tool-scope -> outbound_subject_rules; agent-role+tool-scope -> outbound_rules + target_scopes (P5b). Populate agent_roles/agent_scopes from each agent's own IdP identity (P2). Only Agent services are modelled -- pure-target Tools get no model (P4). _merge/_purge_roles handle the new field. - Tests: rewrite test_engine.py to the new routing (15 cycles); update test_rego.py outbound assertions; add outbound_subject_rules to generate_rego.py builder and test_models.py. - Docs: update policy-model, pdp-policy-writer-opa, policy-computation-engine, and integration-test/pdp-policy-writer PRDs. Gated unit suite: 247 passed. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 24 +- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 59 ++- .../requirements/components/policy-model.md | 5 + .../integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md | 17 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 24 +- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 86 +++- aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py | 4 + aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py | 7 + aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 40 +- aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 456 ++++++++++-------- aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py | 35 ++ 11 files changed, 496 insertions(+), 261 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index ca0ff0123..b234976a6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -43,11 +43,16 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `P | `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | | `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(subject_role, agent_scope)` tuples | | `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, target_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_subject_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Which users may reach the agent's targets: `(user_role, tool_scope)` tuples. Defaults to `[]`. | + +**`agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` provenance:** these carry the agent's **own** identity — the service-account realm roles it holds and the scopes it exposes. The Policy Computation Engine resolves them from the agent's IdP `Service` record (P2) and embeds them on every agent model it writes; a realm-level agent with no owning service keeps `[]`. **Inbound rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent for the agent scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `role_scopes` map (role → agent scopes) that the inbound package evaluates. **Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `agent_role_scopes` map (agent role → target scopes) that the outbound package evaluates. +**Outbound subject rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` (a **user** role) is permitted to reach a **tool** exposing scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `outbound_subject_role_scopes` map (user role → tool scopes) that the **outbound** package's subject gate evaluates against `target_scopes[input.target]`. This is distinct from `inbound_rules` (user → *agent* scope): the outbound subject gate answers "may this user reach the tool?", not "may this user call the agent?". + **Note on `target_scopes` direction:** the map is keyed by **target service id → allowed scopes** (the inverse of the former `scope_targets`, which was `scope → targets`). The outbound Rego generator emits this map **verbatim** and evaluates `target_scopes[input.target]` directly — there is no inversion (see below). ### `PolicyModel` @@ -104,7 +109,8 @@ The generator embeds these symbols, derived from the `AgentPolicyModel`: | `source_roles` | `model.source_roles` | source id → `[role.name, …]` | | `agent_scopes` | `model.agent_scopes` | `[scope.name, …]` | | `agent_roles` | `model.agent_roles` | `[role.name, …]` | -| `role_scopes` | grouped `model.inbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (agent scopes granted per subject role) | +| `role_scopes` | grouped `model.inbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (agent scopes granted per subject role) — **inbound package only** | +| `outbound_subject_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_subject_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes granted per user role) — **outbound package only** | | `agent_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes per agent role) | | `target_scopes` | `model.target_scopes` | target id → `[scope.name, …]` | @@ -140,7 +146,7 @@ allow if { subject_ok; source_ok } ### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` -Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass: the subject must hold a role granting at least one agent scope, **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here. ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound @@ -150,15 +156,17 @@ agent_scopes := ["{scope.name}", ...] # from agent_scopes subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } -role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from inbound_rules -agent_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_rules -target_scopes := { "{target_id}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from target_scopes +outbound_subject_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_subject_rules (user role → tool scopes) +agent_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_rules (agent role → tool scopes) +target_scopes := { "{target_id}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from target_scopes +# user may reach the tool: holds a role granting >=1 tool scope the target accepts subject_ok if { some role in subject_roles[input.subject] - some scope in role_scopes[role] - scope in agent_scopes + some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] + scope in target_scopes[input.target] } +# agent may reach the tool: agent role grants >=1 tool scope the target accepts target_ok if { some role in agent_roles some scope in agent_role_scopes[role] @@ -284,7 +292,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. - `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: replace hyphens with underscores, lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment. - `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. -- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `role_scopes` (from `inbound_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits `subject_ok` and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. The inbound `role_scopes` map is **not** embedded in the outbound package. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. - `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. - `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 9412d344e..d021104a8 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -72,25 +72,36 @@ Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, the engine executes thes > `role.childRoles`), de-duplicated by `role.id`. The PCE performs **no role flattening**; > each rule's `role` is treated as-is (it may be a composite role or one of its children). -1. **Scope → inbound services:** for each rule's `scope`, call `Configuration.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) -> list[Service]`. Add the rule to `inbound_rules` of each returned service's `AgentPolicyModel`. +0. **Service catalog + classification.** Resolve the full service catalog once via `Configuration.get_services() -> list[Service]`, keyed as `serviceId → Service`. Each `Service` carries its `type` (inferred as `Agent` / `Tool`), its own service-account realm roles, and its exposed scopes. A service is an **agent** iff `type == "Agent"`; any other service (notably `Tool`) is a **pure target**. This catalog drives both agent identity (P2) and the "only agents are modelled" rule (P4). `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` honor the **P1 client-side service filter**, so they return only services that genuinely own the role / expose the scope. -2. **Role → outbound services + `source_roles` + `target_scopes`:** for the rule's role R, call `Configuration.get_services_by_role(R) -> list[Service]`. For each returned service S: - - Add the rule to `outbound_rules` of S's `AgentPolicyModel`. - - Append R to `source_roles[S.serviceId]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the service's string `serviceId`, not the `Service` object; the appended value is the typed `Role`. - - For each target service T resolved in step 1 (services exposing `rule.scope`), append `rule.scope` to `target_scopes[T.serviceId]` on S's `AgentPolicyModel` (creating the entry if absent). This records the outbound direction — S acting as R may request `rule.scope` on target T — keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Scope` as the value. +1. **Classify and route each rule by kind (P5b).** The PCE is called with a single concatenated `list[PolicyRule]` spanning all three mappings, so each rule is classified by the kind of its role and scope and routed accordingly: -3. **Role → subjects + `subject_roles`:** for the rule's role R, call `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role(R) -> list[Subject]`. For each returned subject S: - - Append R to `subject_roles[S.username]` (creating the entry if absent). The map is keyed by the subject's string `username`; the appended value is the typed `Role`. + | Rule kind (role, scope) | Routed to (on the agent model) | + |---|---| + | (user role, agent scope) | `inbound_rules` (+ `subject_roles`) | + | (user role, tool scope) | `outbound_subject_rules` (+ `subject_roles`) | + | (agent role, tool scope) | `outbound_rules` + `target_scopes[tool]` | -4. **Realm-level roles (no owning service):** if `get_services_by_role(R)` returns an empty list for the rule's role R, the role is realm-level. No outbound assignment or `source_roles` entry is made for that role. `subject_roles` entries are still recorded if `get_subjects_by_role(R)` returns subjects. + - **Role kind** is read from ownership: `get_services_by_role(role)` returning an **agent** service ⇒ *agent role*; returning no agent (realm-level) ⇒ *user role*. + - **Scope kind** is read from exposure: `get_services_by_scope(scope)` returning an **agent** ⇒ *agent scope*; returning a **tool** ⇒ *tool scope*. -5. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected service/agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. - - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from **both** `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. - - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by plain strings (service `serviceId` / subject `username`), merging is a plain dict-key lookup — no hashing of `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` objects is involved. +2. **(agent role, tool scope) — mapping c:** for each agent owning the rule's role, add the rule to that agent's `outbound_rules`, and append the tool scope to `target_scopes[tool.serviceId]` for each tool exposing it (keyed by the tool's string `serviceId`, value is the typed `Scope`). This records "the agent may reach the tool". + +3. **(user role, agent scope) — mapping a:** for each agent exposing the rule's scope, add the rule to that agent's `inbound_rules`, and record the role's subjects — `get_subjects_by_role(role)` → append the typed `Role` to `subject_roles[subject.username]`. This records "the user may call the agent". + +4. **(user role, tool scope) — mapping b:** deferred until `target_scopes` is populated by mapping-c rules in the same batch. Then, for each agent model whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope, add the rule to that agent's `outbound_subject_rules` and record the role's subjects in `subject_roles`. This records "the user may reach the tool the agent targets" — the outbound subject gate. A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool is dropped (it cannot be attached to any agent). + +5. **P4 — only agents are modelled.** Routing only ever creates an `AgentPolicyModel` for a service identified as an **agent** (one owning the rule's role, or exposing the agent scope). A pure-target **Tool** therefore never gets its own model — no `github_tool.*.rego` is emitted. The agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded on the agent's model. + +6. **P2 — embed each agent's own identity.** For every agent model the PCE writes, set `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` from that agent's `Service` record in the catalog (its own service-account realm roles and exposed scopes). A realm-level agent with no owning service in the catalog keeps `[]`. Without this, both generated gates would deny-all (inbound `subject_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_scopes`; outbound `target_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_roles`). + +7. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. + - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. + - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate map list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by plain strings, merging is a plain dict-key lookup. P2's `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` are then set from the catalog (authoritative for the agent's own identity). Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. -6. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). +8. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). ### Merge Semantics @@ -106,7 +117,7 @@ The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects t | Module | Purpose | |--------|---------| | `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope`, `get_subjects_by_role` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services` (catalog: type + own roles/scopes), `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope`, `get_subjects_by_role` | | `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` | | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — push updated `PolicyModel` to OPA | @@ -129,22 +140,22 @@ The PCE is **not** called by: Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer — not internal merge logic directly. -**Seam:** mock all four downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: -- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services_by_role`, `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`, and `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role` +**Seam:** mock all downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: +- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog, carrying `type` + each service's own roles/scopes), `Configuration.get_services_by_role`, `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`, and `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role` - `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` - `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy` Key behaviors to assert: -- Rules with a resolvable scope result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_scope`. -- Rules with a resolvable role result in `apply_agent_policy` calls for each service returned by `get_services_by_role`; `source_roles` on the written model is keyed by the service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Role` in the value list. -- `get_subjects_by_role` is called once per rule's role; `subject_roles` on the written model is keyed by the subject's string `username` with the typed `Role` in the value list. -- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` (a service exposing the rule's scope) with the typed `Scope` in the value list. -- Every relationship map on the written model has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. -- The PCE does **not** flatten roles: `get_services_by_role` / `get_subjects_by_role` are called once per rule's role as-is (rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC); passing a rule with a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. -- Realm-level roles (empty service list from `get_services_by_role`) do not produce `outbound_rules` or `source_roles` entries; `subject_roles` entries are still recorded for any subjects returned by `get_subjects_by_role`. +- **Routing by kind (P5b):** a (user role, agent scope) rule lands in the exposing agent's `inbound_rules`; a (agent role, tool scope) rule lands in the owning agent's `outbound_rules` with a `target_scopes[tool]` entry; a (user role, tool scope) rule lands in `outbound_subject_rules` of the agent whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope. +- A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool produces no model. +- **P2:** each written agent model carries its own `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` read from the service catalog; an agent with no catalog roles/scopes keeps `[]`. +- **P4:** a pure-target **Tool** service is never written as its own model, even though it exposes a scope the agent reaches; the agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded. +- `get_subjects_by_role` records `subject_roles` keyed by the subject's string `username` with the typed `Role` in the value list (for both user→agent and user→tool rules). +- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Scope` in the value list; every relationship map has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. +- The PCE does **not** flatten roles: `get_services_by_role` is called once per rule's role as-is (rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC); passing a rule with a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. - With `override=False` (default), existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge (additive append). -- With `override=True`, every input role's stored mappings are purged from both `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` (and dropped from `source_roles` / `subject_roles`, with `target_scopes` reconciled from surviving outbound rules) before the fresh rules are applied; the distinct input-role set is purged once, up-front (rules for a role shared across the input are not wiped after being added). -- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate `source_roles` / `subject_roles` / `target_scopes` list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. +- With `override=True`, every input role's stored mappings are purged from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules` (and dropped from `source_roles` / `subject_roles`, with `target_scopes` reconciled from surviving outbound rules) before the fresh rules are applied; the distinct input-role set is purged once, up-front. +- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate map list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. - `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. - An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md index b470831f0..55d194ab2 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md @@ -88,11 +88,14 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound ru | `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | | `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(subject_role, agent_scope)` tuples | | `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, target_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_subject_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Which users may reach the agent's targets: `(user_role, tool_scope)` tuples. Defaults to `[]`. | **Inbound rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent for the agent scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `inbound_rules` as a role → agent-scope map; its inbound gate is keyed on the subject id (mandatory), with the calling source id optional. **Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `outbound_rules` as an agent-role → target-scope map; its outbound gate requires both the subject and the agent to be authorized. +**Outbound subject rule semantics:** `outbound_subject_rules` holds `(user role, tool scope)` pairs — the outbound subject gate; a user holding `role` may reach a tool exposing `scope`. It is the outbound counterpart of `inbound_rules` (which pairs a user role with an *agent* scope): where `inbound_rules` answers "may this user call the agent?", `outbound_subject_rules` answers "may this user reach the tool the agent targets?". The PDP Policy Writer groups it into `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (user role → tool-scope names) and matches against `target_scopes[input.target]`, not against `agent_scopes`. + #### `PolicyModel` A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy` on the Policy Store, it may contain only the agents whose policies have changed. @@ -129,6 +132,7 @@ agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( target_scopes={"github-tool": [scope]}, # target service id → scopes inbound_rules=[rule], outbound_rules=[], + outbound_subject_rules=[], # (user_role, tool_scope) pairs; defaults to [] ) model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) ``` @@ -147,6 +151,7 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - `PolicyRule` accepts typed `Role` and `Scope` objects; rejects plain `str` where `Role`/`Scope` is expected. - `AgentPolicyModel` with string-ID keys in `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with the typed `Role` / `Scope` list values preserved. - `target_scopes` maps a target service id to the list of `Scope` objects permitted on it (outbound direction is `target → scopes`, not `scope → targets`). +- `outbound_subject_rules` defaults to `[]` (constructors that omit it still validate) and round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with its `(user_role, tool_scope)` `PolicyRule` values preserved. - A relationship map keyed by a plain string serializes to a JSON object without a custom key serializer. - `ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` causes unknown fields to be silently discarded on `model_validate()`. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md index 312c48390..7381780c4 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md @@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ Role → access, as encoded by the model's inbound and outbound rules: - `developer` — source read/write, issues read. - `tester` — issues read/write. +This user→tool access is encoded in the model's `outbound_subject_rules` (`(user_role, tool_scope)` +pairs), which the outbound package renders as `outbound_subject_role_scopes`. The model's +`inbound_rules` (user→agent-scope) and `outbound_rules` (agent-role→tool-scope) are unchanged. + Applying this `PolicyModel` produces exactly two files in `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`: - `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound` @@ -71,9 +75,12 @@ Both must match the **ID-only** package shapes in [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md): input is IDs only (`{subject, source}` inbound, `{subject, target}` outbound); all role/scope maps are embedded in the package; the inbound gate is subject-mandatory + source-optional; the outbound gate requires both -subject and agent to pass; and `target_scopes` is emitted verbatim (target id → scopes, no -inversion). Because the input carries no per-request scope, the decision is coarse — a principal -passes on having access to **at least one** relevant scope. +subject and agent to pass, but its **subject** gate is now user→**tool** — it reads +`outbound_subject_role_scopes` (grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`) and matches against +`target_scopes[input.target]`, distinct from the inbound user→agent gate — while `target_ok` +(agent→tool, from `agent_roles` × `agent_role_scopes`) is unchanged; and `target_scopes` is emitted +verbatim (target id → scopes, no inversion). Because the input carries no per-request scope, the +decision is coarse — a principal passes on having access to **at least one** relevant scope. The `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` objects come from `aiac.policy.model.models` ([../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md)); the script constructs them in @@ -137,6 +144,10 @@ run in/near CI against a live Keycloak/NATS, asserting on typed responses — tr `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`. This launcher, by contrast, is standalone, write-only, and manually inspected. +For the full identity→policy pipeline (Keycloak → PRB → PCE → OPA) — which drives the same +`github-agent` scenario end to end through the real Policy Computation Engine rather than a +hand-built `PolicyModel` — see [policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md). + Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`. ## Out of Scope diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index 2e7956724..fd2950786 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -96,13 +96,25 @@ def generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n" +# The outbound subject gate is user->tool (distinct from inbound's user->agent): +# the subject holds a role that grants at least one tool scope the target accepts. +_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_OK = ( + "subject_ok if {\n" + " some role in subject_roles[input.subject]\n" + " some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role]\n" + " scope in target_scopes[input.target]\n" + "}" +) + + def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: """Render the ``authz.{slug}.outbound`` Rego package for an agent. Input is ``{subject, target}`` (ids only). Both must pass: the subject - holds a role granting >=1 agent scope, AND the agent (via ``agent_roles``) - is permitted >=1 scope the ``target`` accepts. ``target_scopes`` is used - directly (target id -> scopes) -- no inversion. + holds a role granting >=1 tool scope the ``target`` accepts (user->tool, via + ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` from ``outbound_subject_rules``), AND the + agent (via ``agent_roles``) is permitted >=1 scope the ``target`` accepts. + ``target_scopes`` is used directly (target id -> scopes) -- no inversion. """ slug = slugify(model.agent_id) parts = [ @@ -110,10 +122,12 @@ def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: _render_list("agent_roles", _names(model.agent_roles)), _render_list("agent_scopes", _names(model.agent_scopes)), _render_map("subject_roles", _name_map(model.subject_roles)), - _render_map("role_scopes", _group_rules(model.inbound_rules)), + _render_map( + "outbound_subject_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_subject_rules) + ), _render_map("agent_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_rules)), _render_map("target_scopes", _name_map(model.target_scopes)), - _SUBJECT_OK, + _OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_OK, ( "target_ok if {\n" " some role in agent_roles\n" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index 67018c766..01fd39ed4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from typing import TypeVar from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy, get_agent_policy @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ def _fresh(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: target_scopes={}, inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], + outbound_subject_rules=[], ) @@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ def _merge(existing: AgentPolicyModel, delta: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: _add_rule(existing.inbound_rules, rule) for rule in delta.outbound_rules: _add_rule(existing.outbound_rules, rule) + for rule in delta.outbound_subject_rules: + _add_rule(existing.outbound_subject_rules, rule) _merge_map(existing.source_roles, delta.source_roles) _merge_map(existing.subject_roles, delta.subject_roles) _merge_map(existing.target_scopes, delta.target_scopes) @@ -86,6 +89,9 @@ def _purge_roles(model: AgentPolicyModel, role_ids: set[str]) -> None: """ model.inbound_rules = [r for r in model.inbound_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids] model.outbound_rules = [r for r in model.outbound_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids] + model.outbound_subject_rules = [ + r for r in model.outbound_subject_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids + ] _drop_roles_from_map(model.source_roles, role_ids) _drop_roles_from_map(model.subject_roles, role_ids) surviving_scope_ids = {r.scope.id for r in model.outbound_rules} @@ -116,6 +122,15 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None: def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: config = Configuration.for_realm(os.environ["AIAC_REALM"]) + # Full service catalog keyed by serviceId (Keycloak clientId). It carries + # each service's type — letting us tell agents from pure-target tools (P4) — + # and each service's own roles/scopes, which the agent models embed (P2). + catalog: dict[str, Service] = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} + + def is_agent(service_id: str) -> bool: + svc = catalog.get(service_id) + return svc is not None and svc.type == "Agent" + models: dict[str, AgentPolicyModel] = {} def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: @@ -123,24 +138,55 @@ def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: models[agent_id] = _fresh(agent_id) return models[agent_id] + def record_subjects(m: AgentPolicyModel, role: Role) -> None: + for subject in config.get_subjects_by_role(role): + _add_by_id(m.subject_roles.setdefault(subject.username, []), role) + + # (user role, tool scope) rules are deferred: they attach to whichever agent + # targets the tool, which is only known once the (agent role, tool scope) + # rules below have populated target_scopes. + pending_subject_tool_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] + for rule in rules: # Rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC — the PCE queries the IdP once - # per rule's role as-is (no composite expansion). - role = rule.role - targets = config.get_services_by_scope(rule.scope) - for target in targets: - _add_rule(model(target.serviceId).inbound_rules, rule) - - for source in config.get_services_by_role(role): - source_model = model(source.serviceId) - _add_rule(source_model.outbound_rules, rule) - for target in targets: - _add_by_id(source_model.target_scopes.setdefault(target.serviceId, []), rule.scope) - _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).source_roles.setdefault(source.serviceId, []), role) - - for subject in config.get_subjects_by_role(role): - for target in targets: - _add_by_id(model(target.serviceId).subject_roles.setdefault(subject.username, []), role) + # per rule's role/scope as-is (no composite expansion). Each rule is + # routed by kind (P5b): + # (user role, agent scope) -> inbound_rules [mapping a] + # (user role, tool scope) -> outbound_subject_rules [mapping b] + # (agent role, tool scope) -> outbound_rules + target_scopes [mapping c] + role, scope = rule.role, rule.scope + agent_role_owners = [s for s in config.get_services_by_role(role) if is_agent(s.serviceId)] + scope_services = config.get_services_by_scope(scope) + agent_scope_owners = [s for s in scope_services if is_agent(s.serviceId)] + tool_scope_targets = [s for s in scope_services if not is_agent(s.serviceId)] + + if agent_role_owners: + # (c) agent role -> tool scope: the agent may reach the tool. + for owner in agent_role_owners: + owner_model = model(owner.serviceId) + _add_rule(owner_model.outbound_rules, rule) + for tool in tool_scope_targets: + _add_by_id(owner_model.target_scopes.setdefault(tool.serviceId, []), scope) + elif agent_scope_owners: + # (a) user role -> agent scope: the user may call the agent. + for agent in agent_scope_owners: + agent_model = model(agent.serviceId) + _add_rule(agent_model.inbound_rules, rule) + record_subjects(agent_model, role) + else: + # (b) user role -> tool scope: deferred until target_scopes is built. + pending_subject_tool_rules.append(rule) + + for rule in pending_subject_tool_rules: + for agent_model in models.values(): + targets_scope = any( + rule.scope.id == s.id + for scopes in agent_model.target_scopes.values() + for s in scopes + ) + if targets_scope: + _add_rule(agent_model.outbound_subject_rules, rule) + record_subjects(agent_model, rule.role) # Distinct set of input roles, purged once up-front per model under override # (so a role shared across the input is not wiped after being appended). @@ -157,6 +203,12 @@ def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: if override: _purge_roles(existing, input_role_ids) _merge(existing, delta) + # P2: each written agent embeds its own service-account roles and exposed + # scopes. Realm-level agents (no owning service in the catalog) keep []. + svc = catalog.get(agent_id) + if svc is not None: + existing.agent_roles = list(svc.roles) + existing.agent_scopes = list(svc.scopes) apply_agent_policy(agent_id, existing) written.append(existing) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py index 657431bb0..93c9b74ad 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ class AgentPolicyModel(BaseModel): target_scopes: dict[str, list[Scope]] # target service id -> scopes permitted inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] outbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] + # (user role, tool scope) pairs — the outbound subject gate; a user holding + # ``role`` may reach a tool exposing ``scope``. Outbound counterpart of + # ``inbound_rules`` (which pairs a user role with an *agent* scope). + outbound_subject_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] class PolicyModel(BaseModel): diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py index d8a4cfa2c..122e4d486 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py @@ -63,6 +63,13 @@ def build_model() -> PolicyModel: PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_read), PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_write), ], + outbound_subject_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_read), + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_write), + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=issues_read), + PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_read), + PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_write), + ], ) return PolicyModel(agents=[agent]) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py index 0ea966eb2..4a57eff46 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ def _model( target_scopes: dict[str, list[Scope]] | None = None, inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] | None = None, outbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] | None = None, + outbound_subject_rules: list[PolicyRule] | None = None, ) -> AgentPolicyModel: return AgentPolicyModel( agent_id=agent_id, @@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ def _model( target_scopes=target_scopes or {}, inbound_rules=inbound_rules or [], outbound_rules=outbound_rules or [], + outbound_subject_rules=outbound_subject_rules or [], ) @@ -70,6 +72,13 @@ def _github_agent() -> AgentPolicyModel: PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_read), PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_write), ], + outbound_subject_rules=[ + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_read), + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_write), + PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=issues_read), + PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_read), + PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_write), + ], ) @@ -181,9 +190,36 @@ def test_outbound_target_scopes_rendered_directly(): assert "scope_targets" not in rego -def test_outbound_has_subject_and_target_gates_and_allow(): +def test_outbound_subject_role_scopes_grouped_from_outbound_subject_rules(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + assert "outbound_subject_role_scopes := {" in rego + assert '"developer": ["source-read", "source-write", "issues-read"]' in rego + assert '"tester": ["issues-read", "issues-write"]' in rego + + +def test_outbound_subject_ok_matches_target_scopes_not_agent_scopes(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + # The outbound subject gate is user->tool: it reads outbound_subject_role_scopes + # and matches against the tool's scopes, not the agent's own scopes. assert "subject_ok if {" in rego + assert "some role in subject_roles[input.subject]" in rego + assert "some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role]" in rego + assert "scope in target_scopes[input.target]" in rego + # The inbound-flavoured subject gate must NOT appear in the outbound package. + assert "some scope in role_scopes[role]" not in rego + assert "scope in agent_scopes" not in rego + + +def test_outbound_does_not_embed_inbound_role_scopes(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + # The inbound ``role_scopes`` map (from inbound_rules) must not leak into the + # outbound package. Line-anchored so it does not match outbound_subject_role_scopes. + assert "\nrole_scopes :=" not in rego + assert not rego.startswith("role_scopes :=") + + +def test_outbound_has_target_gate_and_allow(): + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) assert "target_ok if {" in rego assert "some role in agent_roles" in rego assert "some scope in agent_role_scopes[role]" in rego @@ -204,7 +240,7 @@ def test_outbound_empty_model_renders_valid_empty_literals(): assert "agent_roles := []" in rego assert "agent_scopes := []" in rego assert "subject_roles := {}" in rego - assert "role_scopes := {}" in rego + assert "outbound_subject_role_scopes := {}" in rego assert "agent_role_scopes := {}" in rego assert "target_scopes := {}" in rego assert "default allow := false" in rego diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index d122bab06..a7fa8f315 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -1,6 +1,18 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.policy.computation.engine.compute_and_apply. -All four downstream dependencies are mocked at the engine's import boundary: +The engine routes each pre-flattened PolicyRule by kind (P5b): + + (user role, agent scope) -> inbound_rules [mapping a] + (user role, tool scope) -> outbound_subject_rules [mapping b] + (agent role, tool scope) -> outbound_rules + target_scopes [mapping c] + +Role kind is read from service ownership (an agent role is owned by an Agent +service; a user role is realm-level). Scope kind is read from the exposing +service's type. Only Agent services are ever modelled (P4); each written model +embeds its own service-account roles/scopes (P2). + +All downstream dependencies are mocked at the engine's import boundary: + - Configuration.get_services (the catalog: type + own roles/scopes) - Configuration.get_services_by_scope / get_services_by_role / get_subjects_by_role - aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy (Policy Store) - aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy (PDP Policy Writer) @@ -16,7 +28,7 @@ # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# builders (mirror test/policy/model/test_models.py) # +# builders # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None) -> Role: return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or []) @@ -26,8 +38,23 @@ def _scope(id="s-write", name="write") -> Scope: return Scope(id=id, name=name) -def _service(service_id, id=None, enabled=True) -> Service: - return Service(id=id or f"uuid-{service_id}", serviceId=service_id, enabled=enabled) +def _service(service_id, id=None, enabled=True, type=None, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: + return Service( + id=id or f"uuid-{service_id}", + serviceId=service_id, + enabled=enabled, + type=type, + roles=roles or [], + scopes=scopes or [], + ) + + +def _agent(service_id, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: + return _service(service_id, type="Agent", roles=roles, scopes=scopes) + + +def _tool(service_id, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: + return _service(service_id, type="Tool", roles=roles, scopes=scopes) def _subject(username, id=None, enabled=True) -> Subject: @@ -42,7 +69,7 @@ def _fresh(agent_id) -> AgentPolicyModel: return AgentPolicyModel( agent_id=agent_id, agent_roles=[], agent_scopes=[], source_roles={}, subject_roles={}, target_scopes={}, - inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], + inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], outbound_subject_rules=[], ) @@ -55,9 +82,10 @@ def _lookup(mapping): class _Result: - def __init__(self, aap, ap, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order): + def __init__(self, aap, ap, gs, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order): self.apply_agent_policy = aap self.apply_policy = ap + self.get_services = gs self.get_services_by_scope = gsbs self.get_services_by_role = gsbr self.get_subjects_by_role = gsubr @@ -70,8 +98,9 @@ def written(self): return {c.args[0]: c.args[1] for c in self.apply_agent_policy.call_args_list} -def run_engine(rules, *, scope_services=None, role_services=None, role_subjects=None, - existing=None, missing_404=False, override=False): +def run_engine(rules, *, catalog=None, scope_services=None, role_services=None, + role_subjects=None, existing=None, missing_404=False, override=False): + catalog = catalog or [] scope_services = scope_services or {} role_services = role_services or {} role_subjects = role_subjects or {} @@ -93,6 +122,8 @@ def _rec_policy(model): with ExitStack() as stack: stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) + gs = stack.enter_context( + patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=list(catalog))) gsbs = stack.enter_context( patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_scope", side_effect=_lookup(scope_services))) gsbr = stack.enter_context( @@ -107,210 +138,252 @@ def _rec_policy(model): patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", side_effect=_rec_policy)) from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply compute_and_apply(rules, override=override) - return _Result(aap, ap, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order) + return _Result(aap, ap, gs, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 1 — tracer: a rule whose scope resolves to one target service gets an # -# inbound rule on that target's model, and the PDP is pushed exactly once. # +# Cycle 1 — tracer (mapping a): a (user role, agent scope) rule lands in the # +# agent's inbound_rules, and the PDP is pushed exactly once. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_scope_resolves_to_target_inbound_and_pushes_once(): - rule = _rule(role=_role(), scope=_scope("s-write")) - res = run_engine([rule], scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}) +def test_user_role_agent_scope_lands_inbound_and_pushes_once(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + catalog=[agent], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, # agent exposes the agent scope + role_services={}, # developer is realm-level (user role) + ) - assert set(res.written) == {"github-tool"} - assert res.written["github-tool"].inbound_rules == [rule] + assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} + assert res.written["github-agent"].inbound_rules == [rule] assert res.apply_policy.call_count == 1 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 2 — a rule whose role resolves to a source service gets an outbound # -# rule on that source's model, plus a target_scopes entry per resolved target. # +# Cycle 2 — mapping c: a (agent role, tool scope) rule lands in the agent's # +# outbound_rules, plus a target_scopes entry per resolved tool. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_role_resolves_to_source_outbound_and_target_scopes(): - role = _role("r-edit") - scope = _scope("s-write") +def test_agent_role_tool_scope_lands_outbound_and_target_scopes(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + tool = _tool("github-tool") + role = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") + scope = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") rule = _rule(role=role, scope=scope) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + catalog=[agent, tool], + scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, # tool exposes the tool scope + role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, # agent owns the agent role ) - src = res.written["weather-agent"] - assert src.outbound_rules == [rule] - assert src.target_scopes == {"github-tool": [scope]} + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert m.outbound_rules == [rule] + assert m.target_scopes == {"github-tool": [scope]} + assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} # P4: no tool model # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 3 — the target model records which source services (by serviceId) can # -# reach it, under source_roles, with the typed Role in the value list. # +# Cycle 3 — mapping b: a (user role, tool scope) rule lands in the # +# outbound_subject_rules of the agent that targets that tool (established by # +# a mapping-c rule in the same batch). # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_target_records_source_roles_by_source_service_id(): - role = _role("r-edit") - rule = _rule(role=role, scope=_scope("s-write")) +def test_user_role_tool_scope_lands_outbound_subject(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + tool = _tool("github-tool") + dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") + helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") + read = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") + c_rule = _rule(role=helper, scope=read) # (c) establishes agent -> tool target_scopes + b_rule = _rule(role=dev, scope=read) # (b) user -> tool scope res = run_engine( - [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, + [c_rule, b_rule], + catalog=[agent, tool], + scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, + role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, # helper owned by agent; dev realm-level ) - assert res.written["github-tool"].source_roles == {"weather-agent": [role]} + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert m.outbound_subject_rules == [b_rule] + assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 4 — get_subjects_by_role is consulted for the rule's role, and the # -# target model records subject_roles keyed by the subject's username. # +# Cycle 4 — a (user role, tool scope) rule with NO agent targeting that tool # +# produces no model at all (it cannot be attached anywhere). # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_target_records_subject_roles_by_username(): - role = _role("r-edit") - rule = _rule(role=role, scope=_scope("s-write")) +def test_user_role_tool_scope_without_targeting_agent_drops(): + tool = _tool("github-tool") + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-read", "source-read")) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, + catalog=[tool], + scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, + role_services={}, # developer realm-level; no agent owns any role here ) - assert res.written["github-tool"].subject_roles == {"alice": [role]} - res.get_subjects_by_role.assert_called_once_with(role) + assert res.written == {} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 5 — the PCE does NOT flatten: rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC, # -# so a rule carrying a composite role queries the IdP exactly once with that # -# role as-is — never once per child. # +# Cycle 5 — P2: each written agent embeds its own service-account roles and # +# exposed scopes, read from the service catalog. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_composite_role_is_not_flattened(): - child_a = _role("r-a", "reader") - child_b = _role("r-b", "writer") - composite = _role("r-comp", "editor", composite=True, children=[child_a, child_b]) - rule = _rule(role=composite, scope=_scope("s-write")) +def test_agent_roles_and_scopes_populated_from_catalog(): + helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") + ihelper = _role("r-iss-helper", "issues-helper") + src_access = _scope("s-src-access", "source-access") + iss_access = _scope("s-iss-access", "issues-access") + agent = _agent("github-agent", roles=[helper, ihelper], scopes=[src_access, iss_access]) + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=src_access) + res = run_engine([rule], catalog=[agent], scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}) - res = run_engine([rule], scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}) + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert m.agent_roles == [helper, ihelper] + assert m.agent_scopes == [src_access, iss_access] - res.get_services_by_role.assert_called_once_with(composite) - res.get_subjects_by_role.assert_called_once_with(composite) - roles_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_services_by_role.call_args_list] - subjects_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_subjects_by_role.call_args_list] - assert child_a not in roles_queried and child_b not in roles_queried - assert child_a not in subjects_queried and child_b not in subjects_queried + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 6 — a modelled agent with no own roles/scopes in the catalog keeps []. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_agent_without_catalog_roles_scopes_keeps_empty(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") # no roles, no scopes + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) + res = run_engine([rule], catalog=[agent], scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}) + + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert m.agent_roles == [] + assert m.agent_scopes == [] # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 6 — a realm-level role (owned by no service) still records its # -# subjects on the target, but produces no source model / no source_roles. # +# Cycle 7 — P4: a pure-target Tool service is never modelled, even though it # +# exposes the scope the agent reaches; the agent -> tool target_scopes edge # +# still records the tool. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_realm_level_role_records_subjects_but_no_source(): - role = _role("r-realm") - rule = _rule(role=role, scope=_scope("s-write")) +def test_pure_target_tool_is_not_modelled(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + tool = _tool("github-tool") + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-src-helper", "source-helper"), scope=_scope("s-src-read", "source-read")) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={}, # realm-level: owned by no service - role_subjects={"r-realm": [_subject("alice")]}, + catalog=[agent, tool], + scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, + role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, ) - assert set(res.written) == {"github-tool"} # no source model created - target = res.written["github-tool"] - assert target.inbound_rules == [rule] - assert target.subject_roles == {"alice": [role]} - assert target.source_roles == {} - assert target.outbound_rules == [] + assert "github-tool" not in res.written + assert res.written["github-agent"].target_scopes == {"github-tool": [rule.scope]} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 7 — the engine reads each agent's current model from the store and # -# appends to it; pre-existing rules and map entries survive the merge. # +# Cycle 8 — a (user role, agent scope) rule records the role's subjects on the # +# agent, keyed by username. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_merge_preserves_existing_store_model(): - prior_rule = _rule(role=_role("r-old"), scope=_scope("s-old")) - prior = _fresh("github-tool") - prior.inbound_rules.append(prior_rule) - prior.source_roles["old-src"] = [_role("r-old")] - prior.subject_roles["bob"] = [_role("r-old")] +def test_inbound_records_subject_roles_by_username(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") + rule = _rule(role=dev, scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) + res = run_engine( + [rule], + catalog=[agent], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, + role_subjects={"r-dev": [_subject("dev-user")]}, + ) + + assert res.written["github-agent"].subject_roles == {"dev-user": [dev]} + res.get_subjects_by_role.assert_called_with(dev) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 9 — the PCE does NOT flatten: a rule carrying a composite role queries # +# the IdP exactly once with that role as-is — never once per child. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_composite_role_is_not_flattened(): + child_a = _role("r-a", "reader") + child_b = _role("r-b", "writer") + composite = _role("r-comp", "editor", composite=True, children=[child_a, child_b]) + agent = _agent("github-agent") + rule = _rule(role=composite, scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write")) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, - role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, - existing={"github-tool": prior}, + catalog=[agent], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, ) - target = res.written["github-tool"] - assert prior_rule in target.inbound_rules and rule in target.inbound_rules - assert set(target.source_roles) == {"old-src", "weather-agent"} - assert set(target.subject_roles) == {"bob", "alice"} + res.get_services_by_role.assert_called_once_with(composite) + roles_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_services_by_role.call_args_list] + assert child_a not in roles_queried and child_b not in roles_queried # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 8 — a rule already present (same role.id + scope.id) is not appended # -# a second time; de-duplication is by value, not object identity. # +# Cycle 10 — the engine reads each agent's current model from the store and # +# appends to it; pre-existing rules survive the merge. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_duplicate_rule_not_appended_twice(): - prior = _fresh("github-tool") - prior.inbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write"))) +def test_merge_preserves_existing_store_model(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + prior_rule = _rule(role=_role("r-old", "old"), scope=_scope("s-old-access", "old-access")) + prior = _fresh("github-agent") + prior.inbound_rules.append(prior_rule) - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write")) # same ids, new object + dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") + rule = _rule(role=dev, scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - existing={"github-tool": prior}, + catalog=[agent], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, + existing={"github-agent": prior}, ) - assert len(res.written["github-tool"].inbound_rules) == 1 + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert prior_rule in m.inbound_rules and rule in m.inbound_rules # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 9 — a map entry already present (same entity .id) is not appended a # -# second time, for source_roles / subject_roles / target_scopes alike. # +# Cycle 11 — a rule already present (same role.id + scope.id) is not appended # +# a second time; de-duplication is by value, not object identity. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_duplicate_map_entries_not_appended_twice(): - role = _role("r-edit") - scope = _scope("s-write") - target_prior = _fresh("github-tool") - target_prior.source_roles["weather-agent"] = [_role("r-edit")] - target_prior.subject_roles["alice"] = [_role("r-edit")] - source_prior = _fresh("weather-agent") - source_prior.target_scopes["github-tool"] = [_scope("s-write")] +def test_duplicate_rule_not_appended_twice(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") + prior = _fresh("github-agent") + prior.inbound_rules.append( + PolicyRule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) + ) - rule = _rule(role=role, scope=scope) + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, - role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, - existing={"github-tool": target_prior, "weather-agent": source_prior}, + catalog=[agent], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, + existing={"github-agent": prior}, ) - target = res.written["github-tool"] - source = res.written["weather-agent"] - assert len(target.source_roles["weather-agent"]) == 1 - assert len(target.subject_roles["alice"]) == 1 - assert len(source.target_scopes["github-tool"]) == 1 + assert len(res.written["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == 1 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 10 — when the store has no record for an agent (404), the engine # -# starts from a fresh model rather than crashing. # +# Cycle 12 — when the store has no record for an agent (404), the engine # +# starts from a fresh model rather than crashing. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def test_missing_agent_404_creates_fresh_model(): - rule = _rule(role=_role(), scope=_scope("s-write")) + agent = _agent("github-agent") + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) res = run_engine( [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - missing_404=True, # get_agent_policy raises RuntimeError("...404") + catalog=[agent], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, + missing_404=True, ) - assert set(res.written) == {"github-tool"} - assert res.written["github-tool"].inbound_rules == [rule] + assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} + assert res.written["github-agent"].inbound_rules == [rule] assert res.apply_policy.call_count == 1 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 11 — any dependency failure is logged and swallowed; compute_and_apply # -# never propagates (fire-and-forget), and nothing is pushed to the PDP. # +# Cycle 13 — any dependency failure is logged and swallowed; compute_and_apply # +# never propagates (fire-and-forget), and nothing is pushed to the PDP. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply @@ -318,7 +391,7 @@ def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): with ExitStack() as stack: stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) stack.enter_context( - patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_scope", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))) + patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))) stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy")) stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_agent_policy")) ap = stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy")) @@ -328,97 +401,76 @@ def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 12 — every store write happens before the single PDP push, and the # -# pushed PolicyModel round-trips through JSON (all map keys are strings). # +# Cycle 14 — every store write happens before the single PDP push, and the # +# pushed PolicyModel round-trips through JSON (including outbound_subject_rules).# # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def test_writes_precede_single_push_and_model_is_json_serializable(): - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-edit"), scope=_scope("s-write")) + agent = _agent("github-agent") + tool = _tool("github-tool") + dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") + helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") + read = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") + src_access = _scope("s-src-access", "source-access") + rules = [ + _rule(role=dev, scope=src_access), # (a) + _rule(role=helper, scope=read), # (c) establishes target_scopes + _rule(role=dev, scope=read), # (b) user -> tool scope + ] res = run_engine( - [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, - role_subjects={"r-edit": [_subject("alice")]}, + rules, + catalog=[agent, tool], + scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent], "s-src-read": [tool]}, + role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, + role_subjects={"r-dev": [_subject("dev-user")]}, ) assert res.order.count(("policy",)) == 1 assert res.order[-1] == ("policy",) assert res.order[:-1] and all(step[0] == "agent" for step in res.order[:-1]) + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert m.outbound_subject_rules # non-empty (mapping b landed) + pushed = res.apply_policy.call_args.args[0] restored = PolicyModel.model_validate(pushed.model_dump(mode="json")) - assert {a.agent_id for a in restored.agents} == {"github-tool", "weather-agent"} + assert {a.agent_id for a in restored.agents} == {"github-agent"} + restored_agent = restored.agents[0] + assert {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in restored_agent.outbound_subject_rules} == {("r-dev", "s-src-read")} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 13 — override=True authoritatively replaces the input role's mappings: # -# stale entries for that role are purged from BOTH directions (and dropped # -# from source_roles / subject_roles, with target_scopes reconciled) before the # -# fresh rules are appended; an unrelated role's mappings survive untouched. # +# Cycle 15 — override=True authoritatively replaces the input role's mappings # +# across inbound_rules, outbound_rules, AND outbound_subject_rules before the # +# fresh rules are appended; an unrelated role's mappings survive untouched. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def test_override_purges_input_role_before_appending(): - edit = _role("r-edit") - keep = _role("r-keep") - - target_prior = _fresh("github-tool") - target_prior.inbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-stale"))) - target_prior.inbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=keep, scope=_scope("s-keep"))) - target_prior.source_roles["weather-agent"] = [edit, keep] - target_prior.subject_roles["alice"] = [edit, keep] - - source_prior = _fresh("weather-agent") - source_prior.outbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-stale"))) - source_prior.target_scopes["github-tool"] = [_scope("s-stale")] - - rule = _rule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-write")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - scope_services={"s-write": [_service("github-tool")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, - existing={"github-tool": target_prior, "weather-agent": source_prior}, - override=True, - ) - - target = res.written["github-tool"] - source = res.written["weather-agent"] - - target_inbound = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in target.inbound_rules} - assert ("r-edit", "s-stale") not in target_inbound # stale purged - assert ("r-edit", "s-write") in target_inbound # fresh applied - assert ("r-keep", "s-keep") in target_inbound # unrelated role survives - - # r-edit dropped from source_roles/subject_roles then re-added only where - # the fresh resolution puts it back (source_roles, not subject_roles here). - assert {r.id for r in target.source_roles["weather-agent"]} == {"r-keep", "r-edit"} - assert {r.id for r in target.subject_roles["alice"]} == {"r-keep"} - - source_outbound = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in source.outbound_rules} - assert ("r-edit", "s-stale") not in source_outbound # stale purged - assert ("r-edit", "s-write") in source_outbound # fresh applied - # target_scopes reconciled: only scopes justified by surviving outbound rules. - assert {s.id for s in source.target_scopes["github-tool"]} == {"s-write"} - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 14 — override=True purges each input role ONCE, up-front: two input # -# rules sharing a role must both land, i.e. the shared role's purge does not # -# wipe the first rule's mapping after the second is processed. # -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_override_shared_role_purged_once_up_front(): - edit = _role("r-edit") - - source_prior = _fresh("weather-agent") - source_prior.outbound_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-old"))) - source_prior.target_scopes["tool-old"] = [_scope("s-old")] - - rules = [_rule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-a")), _rule(role=edit, scope=_scope("s-b"))] + agent = _agent("github-agent") + tool = _tool("github-tool") + dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") + keep = _role("r-keep", "keeper") + read = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") + + prior = _fresh("github-agent") + prior.outbound_subject_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=dev, scope=_scope("s-stale", "stale"))) + prior.outbound_subject_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=keep, scope=_scope("s-keep", "keep"))) + prior.target_scopes["github-tool"] = [read] + + helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") + rules = [ + _rule(role=helper, scope=read), # (c) re-establishes target_scopes edge + _rule(role=dev, scope=read), # (b) fresh user -> tool scope + ] res = run_engine( rules, - scope_services={"s-a": [_service("tool-a")], "s-b": [_service("tool-b")]}, - role_services={"r-edit": [_service("weather-agent")]}, - existing={"weather-agent": source_prior}, + catalog=[agent, tool], + scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, + role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, + existing={"github-agent": prior}, override=True, ) - source = res.written["weather-agent"] - out_pairs = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in source.outbound_rules} - assert out_pairs == {("r-edit", "s-a"), ("r-edit", "s-b")} # both survive; s-old purged once + m = res.written["github-agent"] + pairs = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in m.outbound_subject_rules} + assert ("r-dev", "s-stale") not in pairs # stale purged + assert ("r-dev", "s-src-read") in pairs # fresh applied + assert ("r-keep", "s-keep") in pairs # unrelated role survives diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py index 59103fa04..1de52c17a 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py @@ -96,6 +96,41 @@ def test_agent_policy_model_subject_roles_keyed_by_subject_id(): assert list(dumped["subject_roles"].keys()) == [subject.id] +# --- outbound_subject_rules (user role -> tool scope) --- + + +def test_agent_policy_model_outbound_subject_rules_defaults_empty(): + model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="agent-1", + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[], + subject_roles={}, + source_roles={}, + target_scopes={}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + ) + assert model.outbound_subject_rules == [] + + +def test_agent_policy_model_outbound_subject_rules_round_trip(): + role = _role() + scope = _scope() + model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="agent-1", + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[], + subject_roles={}, + source_roles={}, + target_scopes={}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + outbound_subject_rules=[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)], + ) + restored = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(model.model_dump(mode="json")) + assert restored.outbound_subject_rules == [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)] + + # --- model_validate round-trip (JSON mode) --- From 26acebb94b8b56167d2bec1098593beb2b978faf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 14:31:58 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 186/273] docs: Add policy-pipeline integration-test spec and index it in the PRD MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Specify the policy-pipeline integration test — a standalone, write-only launcher driving the full identity->policy pipeline (Keycloak -> PRB -> PCE -> OPA Policy Writer), mirroring the sibling pdp-policy-writer.md layout. Includes the fixed scenario, env table, launcher steps, expected two-file Rego output (no tool file), Testing Decisions, Blocked-by, and the PRB functional inputs (entity/role/scope descriptions + explicit and abstract policy.md variants). Add the policy-pipeline row to the PRD's Integration test specifications index and extend the tracking-issues line to name testing/5.3. The launcher itself (test/integration/policy_pipeline.py) is described, not written; it is tracked by the local 5.3 issue. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 3 +- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 325 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 327 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 6364c7542..e3d53f84d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -555,8 +555,9 @@ Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are spe | Integration test | Description | Spec | |---|---|---| | PDP Policy Writer — `generate_rego.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) that boots the OPA stub locally, applies a `PolicyModel` through `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md](integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md) | +| `policy-pipeline` — `policy_pipeline.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) driving the full identity→policy pipeline — provisions a Keycloak realm + entities, runs the three PRB mappings, applies via the PCE, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/policy-pipeline.md](integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) | -Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`. +Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`; the policy-pipeline integration test in `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a0684c500 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +# Integration Test: policy-pipeline — `policy_pipeline.py` + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. +> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` +> (a sibling of `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section +> ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) is the index of them. This is the **policy-pipeline** integration test — +> the full identity→policy pipeline — not the definition of integration testing in general, and not +> the only integration-test PRD. + +## Location +`aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py` + +## Description + +A standalone launcher script that drives the **whole identity→policy pipeline** — +**Keycloak → PRB → PCE → OPA Policy Writer** — end-to-end and leaves the generated Rego on disk for a +human to eyeball. It is **not** a pytest test, **not** part of CI, and **not** marked +`@pytest.mark.integration` — it is run by hand when an operator wants to see the actual `.rego` output +produced by the real pipeline for a known scenario. + +This is the same *flavor* as the PDP Policy Writer launcher +([pdp-policy-writer.md](pdp-policy-writer.md), issue `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`) but +**broader**: where `5.2` hand-builds a `PolicyModel` in Python and POSTs it to the OPA stub — +deliberately bypassing Keycloak, the PRB, and the PCE — this test provisions a **live Keycloak** realm, +calls the real **Policy Rules Builder (PRB)** to map roles→scopes with a real LLM, then calls the real +**Policy Computation Engine (PCE)** to build the `PolicyModel` and drive the **OPA Policy Writer** to +emit Rego. Nothing is mocked; the only shortcut is that the OPA target is the filesystem stub +([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) §1.14) rather than the +Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patched +`AuthorizationPolicy` CR — identical to `5.2`. + +### What it does + +1. **Set service URLs in env before importing the aiac libraries.** Export `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, + `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`, `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, and `AIAC_REALM` *before* importing the aiac + libraries — the libraries read env at import time. This is the pattern + `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` already follows. +2. **Spawn the three services as `uvicorn` subprocesses** (no Docker) and poll each `GET /health` + until ready, with a bounded timeout: + - IdP Configuration Service — `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app` on `7071`. + - Policy Store — its ASGI app on `7074`, with `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` pointed at a fresh temp dir. + - OPA Policy Writer — `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` on `7072`, with `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and + the Policy Store DB path in its env. +3. **Provision Keycloak** (idempotent — delete-if-exists the realm first, then create): + - via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** (test fixture): create realm `AIAC_TEST_REALM`; create + users `dev-user` and `test-user`; create realm roles `developer` and `tester`; assign roles to + users; create the `github-agent` and `github-tool` clients with the descriptions in + *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)* so the IdP library's `type` inference + (`_build_service`) tags them **Agent** / **Tool**. + - via the **aiac IdP `Configuration` library** (the real product surface the PCE reads back): create + the client roles (`source-helper`, `issues-helper`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, + `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) with the descriptions in + *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*, and map roles→services and + scopes→services so `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` and `get_service().roles` / + `.scopes` resolve correctly. +4. **Proto-UC1 orchestration** — run the three PRB mappings against a pinned LLM (`temperature=0`) and + concatenate the results into one `list[PolicyRule]`: + - **(a)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope)` per agent scope → user→agent-scope rules. + - **(b)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, tool_scope)` per tool scope → user→tool-scope rules. + - **(c)** `build_role_rules(agent_role, tool_scopes)` per agent role → agent-role→tool-scope rules. + + Concatenate into a single `list[PolicyRule]` and call + `aiac.policy.computation.engine.compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)` against a **fresh** Policy + Store. The PCE resolves the IdP relationships, builds the `github-agent` model (with `agent_roles` / + `agent_scopes`; mapping (b) routed into `outbound_subject_rules`; and **no** `github-tool` model), + writes it to the store, and pushes it to the OPA stub. +5. **Terminate the three subprocesses in `finally`.** +6. **Print** `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and the two `.rego` filenames. + +**Write-only.** The script performs no read-back and makes **no assertions**. The realm is left in +place; the `.rego` files are left on disk for eyeballing. There is no pass/fail exit contract beyond +the script running to completion. + +## Expected output + +Exactly **two** files in `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`: + +- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. + `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated. +- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; + target_ok }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the new **user→tool** gate (mapping (b), grouped from + `outbound_subject_rules` into `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, matched against + `target_scopes[input.target]`); its **`target_ok`** is the **agent→tool** gate (mapping (c), over + `agent_roles` × `agent_role_scopes`). `agent_roles` and `target_scopes` are populated. + +Explicitly **no** `github_tool.*.rego` — the pipeline emits no tool model. Eyeball both files against +the **ID-only** package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) +(§ *Rego package structure*), the same source of truth `5.2` uses. + +## Scenario + +A single agent + tool + two users, fixed so the generated Rego is reproducible and reviewable by +inspection. This is the same canonical `github-agent` worked example as `5.2`, driven end to end +through the real pipeline rather than a hand-built `PolicyModel`. + +| Element | Value | +|---------|-------| +| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-e2e`) | +| Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-helper`, `issues-helper`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | +| Tool | `github-tool` (scopes `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) | +| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`) | +| `developer` | source read/write + issues read | +| `tester` | issues read/write | + +Role → access (confirmed with the user; the single source of truth the descriptions and both +`policy.md` versions below must agree with): + +- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. +- `tester` — issues read/write. + +## Configuration (env) + +| Variable | Purpose | Default | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds | — (required) | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the launcher provisions | `aiac-e2e` | +| `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-e2e` | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | IdP Configuration Service base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | Policy Store base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | OPA Policy Writer base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Dir the OPA stub subprocess writes `.rego` to; printed at end | operator-chosen local dir | +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | Policy Store DB path for the subprocess (fresh temp dir) | temp | +| `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | PRB whole-file policy — path to the `policy.md` variant to feed the PRB | `/etc/aiac/policy.md` | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`) | — (required) | + +> When the launcher is written, confirm the Policy Store's ASGI import path and its DB-path env-var +> name against the Policy Store component spec / issue — `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` is the placeholder used +> here; use the real one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which `policy.md` variant (see +> *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*) the PRB reads. + +## Runbook + +Runnable only once the pipeline fixes (handoffs 01 + 02, P1–P5) have landed. + +```bash +# env: KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-e2e +.venv/bin/python test/integration/policy_pipeline.py +# then inspect the printed REGO_OUTPUT_DIR, e.g.: +# github_agent.inbound.rego (user->agent gate; subject_roles dev-user/test-user) +# github_agent.outbound.rego (user->tool AND agent->tool gates) +# (no github_tool.*.rego) +``` + +Eyeball against the adjusted package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md); optionally inspect the +Policy Store DB and the provisioned Keycloak realm. + +## Testing Decisions + +- **Highest seam available.** Real libraries + real services + real Keycloak + real LLM. The launcher + drives the pipeline through its real surfaces — the IdP `Configuration` library, the PRB entry points + (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`), and the PCE's `compute_and_apply` — and observes the real + filesystem output. The only shortcut is the OPA filesystem stub (same as `5.2`). It asserts nothing; + it produces artefacts a human reviews. +- **Self-contained subprocess lifecycle.** The launcher spawns IdP (7071), Policy Store (7074), and OPA + (7072) as `uvicorn` subprocesses, polls each `GET /health` before use, and tears them all down in + `finally`. Keycloak and the LLM are **external** (reached via env). +- **Write-only, human-verified.** LLM nondeterminism is tolerated precisely because there are no + assertions — the reviewer eyeballs the two `.rego` files against + [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). The value is the + concrete, real-pipeline `.rego` output for a known scenario. +- **Prior art.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established the shape this test + reuses: `uvicorn` subprocess spawn, `GET /health` poll, env-before-import ordering, `finally` + teardown, and print-the-dir. The live-Keycloak pytest suite (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) is + the marker-gated counterpart for the read-side services. + +## Relationship to other integration tests + +This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD +([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). + +- Distinct from the **live-Keycloak pytest integration tests** (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) — a + different flavor: `@pytest.mark.integration`, run in/near CI against a live Keycloak/NATS, asserting + on typed responses. +- **Broader than** the OPA-stub-only **PDP Policy Writer** launcher + ([pdp-policy-writer.md](pdp-policy-writer.md), `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`): `5.2` + hand-builds a `PolicyModel` and exercises only OPA; this test adds Keycloak provisioning + PRB + PCE + in front of the **same** OPA stub, so both eyeball their output against the same package shapes. + +Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. + +## Out of Scope + +- **Writing `policy_pipeline.py` or any P1–P5 pipeline code** — this spec *describes* the launcher; the + launcher itself is written in a later session against the fixed pipeline (tracked by + `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md` and the prerequisite issues). +- **The Rego generator, the canonical policy model, the PRB, and the PCE implementations** — specified + and unit-tested by their own components ([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md), + [../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md), + [../components/policy-computation-engine.md](../components/policy-computation-engine.md), and the PRB + component spec), not here. +- **The Kubernetes-CR Policy Writer (1.13)** — this test targets the filesystem **stub** (1.14) only. +- **Automated pass/fail** — no assertions, no CI wiring, no `@pytest.mark.integration`. + +## Further Notes + +- The scenario is deliberately fixed. The role→access facts in the *Scenario* table, the entity/role/ + scope descriptions, and **both** `policy.md` versions in *Scenario inputs* must be kept mutually + consistent — they are a single source of truth. If the role→access facts change, update all three + together so the eyeballed output stays reviewable. +- Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an + **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's + output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. + +## Blocked-by + +The pipeline can only produce correct output once handoffs 01 (P1, P3) and 02 (P2, P4, P5) land; those +are **resolved**, so this test is ready to be written. Component prerequisites: + +- PRB — `agent/3.20-policy-rules-builder.md` +- PCE — `policy/pce/8.10-policy-computation-engine.md` +- Policy model — `policy/model/8.1-policy-model.md` +- OPA filesystem stub — `pdp-policy-writer/1.14-pdp-policy-writer-opa-stub.md` +- Rego package generator — `pdp-policy-writer/1.10-rego-package-generator.md` +- pdp-policy library — `library/pdp/8.9-pdp-policy-library-rename.md` +- Policy Store library / service — `policy/store/8.7-policy-store-library.md` / + `policy/store/8.5-policy-store-service.md` + +## Scenario inputs (PRB functional inputs) + +These are **functional** inputs — the LLM reads the entity/role/scope descriptions and the `policy.md` +to produce the role→scope mappings, so they are part of the fixed scenario, not decoration. Confirmed +with the user; keep them in sync with the *Scenario* table (see *Further Notes*). + +### Entity descriptions + +The `github-agent` and `github-tool` client descriptions deliberately contain the words **"Agent"** / +**"Tool"** so the IdP library's `type` inference (`_build_service`) tags them correctly (needed by the +type-based suppression that omits the tool model). + +**`github-agent`** — client (Agent): +> GitHub Agent — an autonomous agent that acts on a user's GitHub source repositories and issue tracker +> on the user's behalf. It performs source-code work (inspecting repository file contents and committing +> changes) and issue-management work (reading issue threads and creating or updating issues). Its +> source-code responsibility is represented by the `source-helper` client role and gated at the agent +> boundary by the `source-access` scope; its issue-management responsibility is represented by the +> `issues-helper` client role and gated by the `issues-access` scope. The agent does not call GitHub +> directly — it delegates each concrete operation to the `github-tool`, so its own scopes describe +> capabilities it may exercise while the tool's scopes describe the operations those capabilities +> resolve to. + +**`github-tool`** — client (Tool): +> GitHub Tool — a capability provider that exposes fine-grained, least-privilege operations against +> GitHub source repositories and the issue tracker. It offers four distinct operations, each represented +> by its own scope: read source (`source-read`) and write source (`source-write`) for repository file +> contents, and read issues (`issues-read`) and write issues (`issues-write`) for the issue tracker. The +> tool performs the actual GitHub calls; every caller (such as the `github-agent` acting for a user) +> must present the specific scope for each operation it invokes. + +**`developer`** — realm role (user): +> Developer — an engineering user who works on the codebase. A developer needs full read and write +> access to source repository contents (to inspect and change code) and read access to the issue tracker +> (to see reported work), but does not modify issues. Resolves to source read, source write, and issues +> read. + +**`tester`** — realm role (user): +> Tester — a quality-assurance user who works through the issue tracker. A tester needs full read and +> write access to issues (to file, triage, and update defect and test reports) but does not touch source +> repository contents. Resolves to issues read and issues write. + +### Role & scope descriptions + +**Client roles (agent):** + +- `source-helper` — The github-agent's client role for source-code operations. Groups the agent's + ability to read and write repository source content; gated at the agent boundary by `source-access`, + and downstream resolves to the tool's `source-read` / `source-write`. +- `issues-helper` — The github-agent's client role for issue operations. Groups the agent's ability to + read and write issues; gated at the agent boundary by `issues-access`, and downstream resolves to the + tool's `issues-read` / `issues-write`. + +**Agent scopes:** + +- `source-access` — Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's source capability (the + `source-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's source-code functions. +- `issues-access` — Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's issues capability (the + `issues-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's issue functions. + +**Tool scopes:** + +- `source-read` — Tool operation: read source repository contents (file listings and file bodies). + Read-only. +- `source-write` — Tool operation: create, modify, or delete source repository contents (commits / + file writes). +- `issues-read` — Tool operation: read issues and their comments/threads. Read-only. +- `issues-write` — Tool operation: create and update issues (open, edit, comment, close). + +### `policy.md` — Version 1 (explicit) + +Each granted `(role, scope)` pair is spelled out; the three sections map 1:1 to PRB mappings (a)/(b)/(c) +and to the expected Rego gates. + +```markdown +# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this +policy supports it; deny by default. + +## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) +- developer may use source-access and issues-access. +- tester may use issues-access. + +## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +- developer may perform source-read, source-write, and issues-read. +- tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. + +## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) +- source-helper may perform source-read and source-write. +- issues-helper may perform issues-read and issues-write. +``` + +### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) + +Relies on the PRB / LLM to expand "read and modify source" into the concrete scopes. Encodes the same +role→access facts as Version 1. + +```markdown +Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. + +- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. +- Testers may read and modify issues. +``` From fbbe9be097e6ea214dbb0a16961aa1b4db1e1fad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 19:15:56 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 187/273] feat(aiac): add policy-pipeline integration test (5.3) with shared launcher infra MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Add test/integration/policy_pipeline.py: standalone launcher that drives the full Keycloak -> PRB -> PCE -> OPA Policy Writer pipeline end-to-end for the fixed github-agent scenario. Verified exit 0 against live Keycloak + live LLM. - Add test/integration/scenario.py: canonical github-agent scenario as pure data (single source of truth for both 5.2 and 5.3 launchers per spec *Further Notes*). - Add test/integration/launcher.py: shared uvicorn subprocess helpers (start_service, wait_until_ready, running_services context manager, require_env, etc.); no aiac import so safe to use before the env-before-import step. - Add test/integration/policy.explicit.md + policy.abstract.md: the two PRB policy variants verbatim from the spec; explicit is the default (AIAC_POLICY_FILE). - Refactor test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py (5.2 launcher) onto the shared modules; output verified byte-identical to the pre-refactor baseline. - Fix idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py: two pre-existing bugs surfaced by the live run — add_default_default_client_scope(svc, scope) raised TypeError (fixed to add_client_default_client_scope(svc, scope, {})); assign_realm_roles with id-only payload returned KC 404 (fixed to resolve full role rep via get_realm_role_by_id). - Update test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py: 5 assertions that encoded the buggy calls updated to match the corrected methods. Regression: 247 tests pass; ruff clean; test/integration/ not collected by pytest. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 9 +- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 14 +- aiac/test/integration/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/integration/launcher.py | 135 ++++++++++ aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md | 4 + aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md | 16 ++ aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py | 254 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 144 ++++++++++ aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py | 143 ++++------ 9 files changed, 623 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/launcher.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/scenario.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 9a5dc9f26..828a94b47 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -122,7 +122,10 @@ def assign_role_to_service(service_id: str, role_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = try: sa_user = admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id) user_id = sa_user["id"] - admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}]) + # Keycloak's role-mappings endpoint needs the full role representation (id + name), + # not just the id, so resolve the role before assigning it to the service account. + role = admin.get_realm_role_by_id(role_id) + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [role]) return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 409: @@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ def create_scope(service_id: str, body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Dep scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} ) - admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id) + admin.add_client_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id, {}) return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -153,7 +156,7 @@ def create_scope(service_id: str, body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Dep @app.post("/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}", status_code=201) def assign_scope_to_service(service_id: str, scope_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id) + admin.add_client_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id, {}) return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content={}) except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 409: diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index e269844ab..3233cc6e3 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ def test_assigns_scope_as_default_to_service(self): f"/services/svc-abc/scopes?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "write", "description": "Write access"}, ) - admin.add_default_default_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("svc-abc", "scope-id-42") + admin.add_client_default_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("svc-abc", "scope-id-42", {}) def test_creates_scope_with_openid_connect_protocol(self): admin = MagicMock() @@ -444,11 +444,11 @@ def test_returns_201_on_success(self): admin = MagicMock() resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 201 - admin.add_default_default_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid", "scope-id") + admin.add_client_default_client_scope.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid", "scope-id", {}) def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.add_default_default_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + admin.add_client_default_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( error_message="Conflict", response_code=409 ) resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id?realm={REALM}") @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.add_default_default_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( + admin.add_client_default_client_scope.side_effect = KeycloakError( error_message="failure", response_code=500 ) resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes/scope-id?realm={REALM}") @@ -528,10 +528,14 @@ class TestAssignRoleToService: def test_returns_201_on_success(self): admin = MagicMock() admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-user-id"} + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "role-id", "name": "src-helper"} resp = _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles/role-id?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 201 admin.get_client_service_account_user.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") - admin.assign_realm_roles.assert_called_once_with("sa-user-id", [{"id": "role-id"}]) + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.assert_called_once_with("role-id") + admin.assign_realm_roles.assert_called_once_with( + "sa-user-id", [{"id": "role-id", "name": "src-helper"}] + ) def test_returns_409_when_already_assigned(self): admin = MagicMock() diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/__init__.py b/aiac/test/integration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3d8da9d6c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +"""Shared machinery for the standalone integration-test launchers. + +Both ``test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py`` (5.2) and ``test/integration/policy_pipeline.py`` (5.3) +spawn aiac services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, poll each ``GET /health`` until ready, run some +work, and tear the subprocesses down. This module holds that shared lifecycle so neither launcher +duplicates it. + +It imports only the standard library and ``requests`` — never ``aiac`` — so a launcher may import +it *before* setting the environment variables the aiac libraries read at import time. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +import signal +import subprocess +import sys +import time +from contextlib import contextmanager +from dataclasses import dataclass, field +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Iterator + +import requests + + +def ensure_on_path(*paths: Path) -> None: + """Prepend each path to ``sys.path`` (once), so a launcher can import ``aiac`` from ``src`` + and the shared ``test.integration`` modules from the repo root.""" + for path in paths: + entry = str(path) + if entry not in sys.path: + sys.path.insert(0, entry) + + +def require_env(*names: str) -> dict[str, str]: + """Return the values of the named environment variables, or exit non-zero listing every one + that is unset or empty. Used by launchers for inputs that have no safe default (Keycloak + admin creds, LLM endpoint).""" + missing = [name for name in names if not os.environ.get(name)] + if missing: + print( + "error: required environment variable(s) not set: " + ", ".join(missing), + file=sys.stderr, + ) + raise SystemExit(2) + return {name: os.environ[name] for name in names} + + +def resolve_output_dir(default: Path) -> Path: + """Resolve ``REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` (falling back to ``default``) to an absolute path.""" + return Path(os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", default)).resolve() + + +@dataclass +class Service: + """A ``uvicorn``-hostable ASGI app to run as a subprocess.""" + + module_app: str # e.g. "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app" + port: int + host: str = "127.0.0.1" + env: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict) # per-service extra env + + @property + def base_url(self) -> str: + return f"http://{self.host}:{self.port}" + + +def start_service(service: Service, *, src: Path) -> subprocess.Popen: + """Spawn ``service`` as a ``uvicorn`` subprocess with ``src`` on ``PYTHONPATH`` and the + service's extra env applied on top of the current environment.""" + env = dict(os.environ) + env["PYTHONPATH"] = str(src) + os.pathsep + env.get("PYTHONPATH", "") + env.update(service.env) + return subprocess.Popen( + [ + sys.executable, + "-m", + "uvicorn", + service.module_app, + "--host", + service.host, + "--port", + str(service.port), + ], + env=env, + ) + + +def wait_until_ready(base_url: str, *, timeout: float = 30.0) -> None: + """Poll ``GET {base_url}/health`` until it returns 200, or raise after ``timeout`` seconds.""" + deadline = time.time() + timeout + last_err: Exception | None = None + while time.time() < deadline: + try: + if requests.get(f"{base_url}/health", timeout=1).status_code == 200: + return + except requests.RequestException as exc: + last_err = exc + time.sleep(0.3) + raise RuntimeError(f"service not ready at {base_url} within {timeout}s ({last_err})") + + +def terminate(proc: subprocess.Popen) -> None: + """SIGTERM ``proc`` and wait briefly, escalating to SIGKILL if it does not exit.""" + proc.send_signal(signal.SIGTERM) + try: + proc.wait(timeout=5) + except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: + proc.kill() + + +@contextmanager +def running_services(services: list[Service], *, src: Path, timeout: float = 30.0) -> Iterator[None]: + """Spawn every service, poll each ``/health``, yield, then terminate them all in ``finally``. + + Every spawned subprocess is torn down even if a later spawn or health poll fails. + """ + procs: list[subprocess.Popen] = [] + try: + for service in services: + procs.append(start_service(service, src=src)) + for service in services: + wait_until_ready(service.base_url, timeout=timeout) + yield + finally: + for proc in procs: + terminate(proc) + + +def print_rego_dir(output_dir: Path) -> None: + """Print the output directory and the ``.rego`` files it contains (the launcher's result).""" + print(f"Rego written to: {output_dir}") + for path in sorted(output_dir.glob("*.rego")): + print(f" {path.name}") diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..77033478f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. + +- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. +- Testers may read and modify issues. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6eec1cf38 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this +policy supports it; deny by default. + +## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) +- developer may use source-access and issues-access. +- tester may use issues-access. + +## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +- developer may perform source-read, source-write, and issues-read. +- tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. + +## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) +- source-helper may perform source-read and source-write. +- issues-helper may perform issues-read and issues-write. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..63c01e9e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +"""Drive the whole identity->policy pipeline end-to-end and leave the Rego on disk to eyeball. + +Standalone launcher (NOT pytest, NOT CI, NOT ``@pytest.mark.integration``) for the fixed +``github-agent`` scenario. It provisions a live Keycloak realm, spawns the IdP Configuration, +Policy Store, and OPA Policy Writer services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, runs the real Policy +Rules Builder (real LLM) to map roles->scopes, then the real Policy Computation Engine to build +the ``PolicyModel`` and push it to the OPA filesystem stub. Nothing is mocked; the only shortcut is +that OPA writes ``.rego`` files instead of patching a Kubernetes CR (same stub as the 5.2 launcher). + +Write-only: no read-back, no assertions. The realm is left in place and the ``.rego`` files are +left on disk for a human to compare against the package shapes in +``inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md``. + +Spec: inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +Issue: inception/issues/testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md + +Run (with KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported; realm defaults to aiac-e2e): + .venv/bin/python test/integration/policy_pipeline.py +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import logging +import os +import sys +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path +from urllib.parse import urlsplit + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +SRC = REPO_ROOT / "src" +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves +sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC)) # so ``import aiac.*`` resolves + +from test.integration import scenario as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 + Service, + print_rego_dir, + require_env, + resolve_output_dir, + running_services, +) + +# --- Resolve config + set env BEFORE importing aiac (the libraries read env at import time) --- +TEST_REALM = os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) +os.environ["AIAC_REALM"] = TEST_REALM # the PCE reads back the realm we provision +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", str(HERE / "policy.explicit.md")) +os.environ.setdefault("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") # inherited by the IdP subprocess + +from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin # noqa: E402 +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError # noqa: E402 + +from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules # noqa: E402 +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration # noqa: E402 +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope # noqa: E402 +from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply # noqa: E402 +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule # noqa: E402 + + +def _host_port(url: str, default_port: int) -> tuple[str, int]: + parts = urlsplit(url) + return parts.hostname or "127.0.0.1", parts.port or default_port + + +def _connect_admin() -> KeycloakAdmin: + """Connect to the admin realm so the launcher can create/delete the test realm.""" + creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + admin_realm = os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"] + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=admin_realm, + user_realm_name=admin_realm, + username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +# Keycloak caps realm-role and client descriptions at 255 chars. These four scenario descriptions +# exceed it, so the launcher provisions a <=255 rendering that preserves the meaning (the client +# ones keep the "Agent" / "Tool" keyword the IdP type inference needs). scenario.py keeps the +# verbatim text as the source of truth; the PRB reads the shortened developer / tester text back +# from Keycloak. +_KEYCLOAK_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = { + "developer": ( + "Developer — an engineering user who needs read and write access to source repository " + "contents and read access to the issue tracker, but does not modify issues. Resolves to " + "source read, source write, and issues read." + ), + "tester": ( + "Tester — a quality-assurance user who needs full read and write access to issues (to " + "file, triage, and update reports) but does not touch source repository contents. " + "Resolves to issues read and issues write." + ), + scn.AGENT_ID: ( + "GitHub Agent — an autonomous agent acting on a user's GitHub repositories and issue " + "tracker, delegating each operation to the github-tool. Source: `source-helper` / " + "`source-access`; issues: `issues-helper` / `issues-access`." + ), + scn.TOOL_ID: ( + "GitHub Tool — a capability provider exposing fine-grained operations against GitHub: read " + "source (`source-read`), write source (`source-write`), read issues (`issues-read`), write " + "issues (`issues-write`). It performs the actual GitHub calls." + ), +} + + +def _kc_desc(name: str, full: str) -> str: + """Keycloak-storable (<=255 char) description for ``name``: the shortened rendering when the + verbatim ``full`` description is over Keycloak's limit, else ``full`` unchanged.""" + desc = _KEYCLOAK_DESCRIPTIONS.get(name, full) + if len(desc) > 255: + raise ValueError(f"Keycloak description for {name!r} is {len(desc)} chars (>255)") + return desc + + +def provision_keycloak_admin(admin: KeycloakAdmin, test_realm: str) -> None: + """Provision the realm via ``python-keycloak`` (idempotent: delete-if-exists, then create). + + Creates the realm, the ``developer`` / ``tester`` realm roles, the ``dev-user`` / ``test-user`` + users (with role assignments), and the ``github-agent`` / ``github-tool`` clients. The agent + client enables a service account so its client roles can be assigned to it later. + """ + try: + admin.delete_realm(test_realm) + except KeycloakError: + pass # realm absent — nothing to delete + admin.create_realm({"realm": test_realm, "enabled": True}) + admin.change_current_realm(test_realm) + + for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): + admin.create_realm_role({"name": name, "description": _kc_desc(name, description)}, skip_exists=True) + + for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): + user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) + admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) + + def _client(client_id: str, description: str) -> dict: + return { + "clientId": client_id, + "enabled": True, + "description": description, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "publicClient": False, # confidential — required for a service account + "serviceAccountsEnabled": True, + "standardFlowEnabled": False, + } + + admin.create_client(_client(scn.AGENT_ID, _kc_desc(scn.AGENT_ID, scn.AGENT_DESCRIPTION)), skip_exists=True) + admin.create_client(_client(scn.TOOL_ID, _kc_desc(scn.TOOL_ID, scn.TOOL_DESCRIPTION)), skip_exists=True) + + +def provision_via_config(config: Configuration) -> None: + """Provision client roles + scopes and their service mappings through the aiac IdP library. + + This is the real product surface the PCE reads back: it creates the agent/tool scopes and the + agent client roles, then maps scopes->services and client-roles->agent so ``get_services_by_*`` + and ``get_service().roles/.scopes`` resolve. + """ + agent_scopes = {name: config.create_scope(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items()} + tool_scopes = {name: config.create_scope(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.TOOL_SCOPES.items()} + agent_roles = {name: config.create_role(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.AGENT_ROLES.items()} + + services = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} + agent_svc, tool_svc = services[scn.AGENT_ID], services[scn.TOOL_ID] + + for scope in agent_scopes.values(): + config.map_scope_to_service(agent_svc, scope) + for scope in tool_scopes.values(): + config.map_scope_to_service(tool_svc, scope) + for role in agent_roles.values(): + config.map_role_to_service(agent_svc, role) + + +def _read_back(config: Configuration) -> tuple[dict[str, Role], dict[str, Scope]]: + """Read roles + scopes back through the IdP library (carrying real ids + descriptions).""" + roles = {r.name: r for r in config.get_roles()} + scopes = {s.name: s for s in config.get_scopes()} + return roles, scopes + + +def orchestrate_prb(roles: dict[str, Role], scopes: dict[str, Scope]) -> list[PolicyRule]: + """Proto-UC1: run the three PRB mappings against the real LLM and concatenate the rules.""" + user_roles = [roles[name] for name in scn.USER_ROLES] + agent_scopes = [scopes[name] for name in scn.AGENT_SCOPES] + tool_scopes = [scopes[name] for name in scn.TOOL_SCOPES] + agent_roles = [roles[name] for name in scn.AGENT_ROLES] + + rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] + for agent_scope in agent_scopes: # (a) user role -> agent scope + rules += build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope) + for tool_scope in tool_scopes: # (b) user role -> tool scope + rules += build_scope_rules(user_roles, tool_scope) + for agent_role in agent_roles: # (c) agent role -> tool scopes + rules += build_role_rules(agent_role, tool_scopes) + return rules + + +def main() -> None: + logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(levelname)s %(name)s: %(message)s") + # Fail fast on inputs that have no safe default (the PRB LLM has none either). + require_env( + "KEYCLOAK_URL", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD", + "LLM_BASE_URL", + "LLM_MODEL", + "LLM_API_KEY", + ) + + output_dir = resolve_output_dir(HERE / "rego_out") + output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + db_path = os.environ.get("AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH") or str( + Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="aiac-store-")) / "policy_model.db" + ) + + admin = _connect_admin() + provision_keycloak_admin(admin, TEST_REALM) + + idp_host, idp_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL"], 7071) + store_host, store_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL"], 7074) + opa_host, opa_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"], 7072) + services = [ + Service("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app", port=idp_port, host=idp_host), + Service( + "aiac.policy.store.service.main:app", + port=store_port, + host=store_host, + env={"AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH": db_path}, + ), + Service( + "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", + port=opa_port, + host=opa_host, + env={"REGO_OUTPUT_DIR": str(output_dir)}, + ), + ] + + with running_services(services, src=SRC): + config = Configuration.for_realm(TEST_REALM) + provision_via_config(config) + roles, scopes = _read_back(config) + rules = orchestrate_prb(roles, scopes) + compute_and_apply(rules, override=False) + + print_rego_dir(output_dir) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ed938cced --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +"""The canonical ``github-agent`` scenario — single source of truth for both launchers. + +The 5.2 launcher (``test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py``) hand-builds a ``PolicyModel`` from +these names + role→access pair-sets; the 5.3 launcher (``test/integration/policy_pipeline.py``) +provisions the same entities into a live Keycloak realm and feeds the descriptions to the PRB. +Keeping the scenario in one place is what the spec's *Further Notes* mandate — the role→access +facts, the entity/role/scope descriptions, and both ``policy.md`` variants must stay mutually +consistent (spec: ``inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md``, *Scenario* + +*Scenario inputs*). + +Pure data: this module imports nothing (no aiac, no stdlib beyond the language) so a launcher can +import it before the env-before-import step. Dict insertion order is significant — it is preserved +into the generated Rego, so it matches the 5.2 launcher's original literal order. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +# --- Realm + entity identifiers ------------------------------------------------------------- + +REALM_DEFAULT = "aiac-e2e" +AGENT_ID = "github-agent" +TOOL_ID = "github-tool" + +# username -> the realm role the user holds +USERS: dict[str, str] = { + "dev-user": "developer", + "test-user": "tester", +} + +# Fixed dev password for the provisioned test users (throwaway realm). +USER_PASSWORD = "password" + +# --- Descriptions (verbatim from the spec's *Scenario inputs*) ------------------------------ +# +# The client descriptions deliberately contain the words "Agent" / "Tool" so the IdP library's +# type inference (``_build_service``) tags them Agent / Tool — the tool tag is what makes the PCE +# omit the tool model. + +AGENT_DESCRIPTION = ( + "GitHub Agent — an autonomous agent that acts on a user's GitHub source repositories and " + "issue tracker on the user's behalf. It performs source-code work (inspecting repository " + "file contents and committing changes) and issue-management work (reading issue threads and " + "creating or updating issues). Its source-code responsibility is represented by the " + "`source-helper` client role and gated at the agent boundary by the `source-access` scope; " + "its issue-management responsibility is represented by the `issues-helper` client role and " + "gated by the `issues-access` scope. The agent does not call GitHub directly — it delegates " + "each concrete operation to the `github-tool`, so its own scopes describe capabilities it may " + "exercise while the tool's scopes describe the operations those capabilities resolve to." +) + +TOOL_DESCRIPTION = ( + "GitHub Tool — a capability provider that exposes fine-grained, least-privilege operations " + "against GitHub source repositories and the issue tracker. It offers four distinct " + "operations, each represented by its own scope: read source (`source-read`) and write source " + "(`source-write`) for repository file contents, and read issues (`issues-read`) and write " + "issues (`issues-write`) for the issue tracker. The tool performs the actual GitHub calls; " + "every caller (such as the `github-agent` acting for a user) must present the specific scope " + "for each operation it invokes." +) + +# name -> description. Realm roles held by users. +USER_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { + "developer": ( + "Developer — an engineering user who works on the codebase. A developer needs full read " + "and write access to source repository contents (to inspect and change code) and read " + "access to the issue tracker (to see reported work), but does not modify issues. " + "Resolves to source read, source write, and issues read." + ), + "tester": ( + "Tester — a quality-assurance user who works through the issue tracker. A tester needs " + "full read and write access to issues (to file, triage, and update defect and test " + "reports) but does not touch source repository contents. Resolves to issues read and " + "issues write." + ), +} + +# name -> description. The github-agent's client roles. +AGENT_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { + "source-helper": ( + "The github-agent's client role for source-code operations. Groups the agent's ability " + "to read and write repository source content; gated at the agent boundary by " + "`source-access`, and downstream resolves to the tool's `source-read` / `source-write`." + ), + "issues-helper": ( + "The github-agent's client role for issue operations. Groups the agent's ability to read " + "and write issues; gated at the agent boundary by `issues-access`, and downstream " + "resolves to the tool's `issues-read` / `issues-write`." + ), +} + +# name -> description. Agent-boundary scopes exposed by the github-agent. +AGENT_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { + "source-access": ( + "Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's source capability (the " + "`source-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's source-code functions." + ), + "issues-access": ( + "Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's issues capability (the " + "`issues-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's issue functions." + ), +} + +# name -> description. Fine-grained operations exposed by the github-tool. +TOOL_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { + "source-read": ( + "Tool operation: read source repository contents (file listings and file bodies). " + "Read-only." + ), + "source-write": ( + "Tool operation: create, modify, or delete source repository contents (commits / file " + "writes)." + ), + "issues-read": "Tool operation: read issues and their comments/threads. Read-only.", + "issues-write": "Tool operation: create and update issues (open, edit, comment, close).", +} + +# --- Role → access facts (name-level; the single source of truth) --------------------------- +# +# Identical to the 5.2 launcher's hand-built rule lists and to policy.explicit.md. Each set maps +# 1:1 to a PRB mapping and to a generated Rego gate: +# (a) INBOUND_PAIRS — user role -> agent scope (inbound; user may call the agent) +# (b) OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS — user role -> tool scope (outbound subject; user may reach tool) +# (c) OUTBOUND_PAIRS — agent role -> tool scope (outbound target; agent may reach tool) + +INBOUND_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ + ("developer", "source-access"), + ("developer", "issues-access"), + ("tester", "issues-access"), +] + +OUTBOUND_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ + ("source-helper", "source-read"), + ("source-helper", "source-write"), + ("issues-helper", "issues-read"), + ("issues-helper", "issues-write"), +] + +OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ + ("developer", "source-read"), + ("developer", "source-write"), + ("developer", "issues-read"), + ("tester", "issues-read"), + ("tester", "issues-write"), +] diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py index 122e4d486..f82c36e86 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py @@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ """Generate github-agent Rego by driving the live PDP Policy Writer (OPA) stub. -Standalone (NOT pytest, NOT CI). Launches the stub as a uvicorn subprocess -writing to a known local dir, applies a PolicyModel through the PDP policy -library, shuts the service down, and prints the output dir. Inspect the .rego -files by hand. +Standalone (NOT pytest, NOT CI). Launches the stub as a uvicorn subprocess writing to a known +local dir, applies a PolicyModel through the PDP policy library, shuts the service down, and +prints the output dir. Inspect the .rego files by hand. + +The subprocess lifecycle is shared with the 5.3 launcher via ``test.integration.launcher``, and +the fixed scenario (the same canonical github-agent worked example) lives in +``test.integration.scenario`` so the two launchers cannot drift. Run: .venv/bin/python test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py @@ -12,111 +15,75 @@ from __future__ import annotations import os -import signal -import subprocess import sys -import time from pathlib import Path -import requests - -SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "src" # -> aiac/src -sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC)) +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] # -> aiac/ +SRC = REPO_ROOT / "src" +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves +sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC)) # so ``import aiac.*`` resolves -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope # noqa: E402 +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope # noqa: E402 from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule # noqa: E402 +from test.integration import scenario as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 + Service, + print_rego_dir, + resolve_output_dir, + running_services, +) PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "7072")) BASE_URL = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}" -OUTPUT_DIR = Path( - os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", Path(__file__).parent / "rego_out") -).resolve() +OUTPUT_DIR = resolve_output_dir(Path(__file__).parent / "rego_out") + + +def _roles() -> dict[str, Role]: + """Synthesize a Role per scenario role name (ids stable as ``role-<name>``).""" + names = list(scn.USER_ROLES) + list(scn.AGENT_ROLES) + return {name: Role(id=f"role-{name}", name=name, composite=False) for name in names} + + +def _scopes() -> dict[str, Scope]: + """Synthesize a Scope per scenario scope name (ids stable as ``scope-<name>``).""" + names = list(scn.AGENT_SCOPES) + list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES) + return {name: Scope(id=f"scope-{name}", name=name) for name in names} def build_model() -> PolicyModel: - developer = Role(id="role-developer", name="developer", composite=False) - tester = Role(id="role-tester", name="tester", composite=False) - source_helper = Role(id="role-source-helper", name="source-helper", composite=False) - issues_helper = Role(id="role-issues-helper", name="issues-helper", composite=False) - source_access = Scope(id="scope-source-access", name="source-access") - issues_access = Scope(id="scope-issues-access", name="issues-access") - source_read = Scope(id="scope-source-read", name="source-read") - source_write = Scope(id="scope-source-write", name="source-write") - issues_read = Scope(id="scope-issues-read", name="issues-read") - issues_write = Scope(id="scope-issues-write", name="issues-write") + role, scope = _roles(), _scopes() + + def rules(pairs: list[tuple[str, str]]) -> list[PolicyRule]: + return [PolicyRule(role=role[r], scope=scope[s]) for r, s in pairs] agent = AgentPolicyModel( - agent_id="github-agent", - agent_roles=[source_helper, issues_helper], - agent_scopes=[source_access, issues_access], + agent_id=scn.AGENT_ID, + agent_roles=[role[name] for name in scn.AGENT_ROLES], + agent_scopes=[scope[name] for name in scn.AGENT_SCOPES], source_roles={}, - subject_roles={"dev-user": [developer], "test-user": [tester]}, - target_scopes={"github-tool": [source_read, source_write, issues_read, issues_write]}, - inbound_rules=[ - PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_access), - PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=issues_access), - PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_access), - ], - outbound_rules=[ - PolicyRule(role=source_helper, scope=source_read), - PolicyRule(role=source_helper, scope=source_write), - PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_read), - PolicyRule(role=issues_helper, scope=issues_write), - ], - outbound_subject_rules=[ - PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_read), - PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=source_write), - PolicyRule(role=developer, scope=issues_read), - PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_read), - PolicyRule(role=tester, scope=issues_write), - ], + subject_roles={user: [role[role_name]] for user, role_name in scn.USERS.items()}, + target_scopes={scn.TOOL_ID: [scope[name] for name in scn.TOOL_SCOPES]}, + inbound_rules=rules(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS), + outbound_rules=rules(scn.OUTBOUND_PAIRS), + outbound_subject_rules=rules(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS), ) return PolicyModel(agents=[agent]) -def start_service() -> subprocess.Popen: - OUTPUT_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - env = dict(os.environ) - env["REGO_OUTPUT_DIR"] = str(OUTPUT_DIR) - env["PYTHONPATH"] = str(SRC) + os.pathsep + env.get("PYTHONPATH", "") - return subprocess.Popen( - [sys.executable, "-m", "uvicorn", - "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", - "--host", "127.0.0.1", "--port", str(PORT)], - env=env, - ) - - -def wait_until_ready(timeout: float = 15.0) -> None: - deadline = time.time() + timeout - while time.time() < deadline: - try: - if requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/health", timeout=1).status_code == 200: - return - except requests.RequestException: - pass - time.sleep(0.3) - raise RuntimeError(f"service not ready at {BASE_URL} within {timeout}s") - - def main() -> None: - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"] = BASE_URL # consumed by the library - from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy # import after env is set + os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"] = BASE_URL # consumed by the library + from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy # import after env is set - proc = start_service() - try: - wait_until_ready() + OUTPUT_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + opa = Service( + "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", + port=PORT, + env={"REGO_OUTPUT_DIR": str(OUTPUT_DIR)}, + ) + with running_services([opa], src=SRC): apply_policy(build_model()) - finally: - proc.send_signal(signal.SIGTERM) - try: - proc.wait(timeout=5) - except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: - proc.kill() - - print(f"Rego written to: {OUTPUT_DIR}") - for path in sorted(OUTPUT_DIR.glob("*.rego")): - print(f" {path.name}") + + print_rego_dir(OUTPUT_DIR) if __name__ == "__main__": From 0a69bc2fe4ca0db182626bc293d5e6d300774f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 20:03:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 188/273] docs(aiac): record 5.3 launcher deviations in policy-pipeline spec Document two implementation deviations found while building and running the 5.3 policy-pipeline integration test: - Location + Prior art: the launcher was factored into test/integration/policy_pipeline.py plus shared launcher.py (uvicorn subprocess lifecycle) and scenario.py (the canonical github-agent scenario and single source of truth); the 5.2 launcher generate_rego.py was refactored onto both, with output verified byte-identical. - Further Notes: Keycloak caps realm-role and client descriptions at 255 chars, so the launcher provisions shortened renderings of the four over-limit descriptions while scenario.py keeps the verbatim text. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 25 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index a0684c500..8e0d3c639 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ > the only integration-test PRD. ## Location -`aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py` +`aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py`, plus two shared modules it imports: +`aiac/test/integration/scenario.py` — the canonical `github-agent` scenario as pure data (the single +source of truth the *Further Notes* mandate) — and `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared +`uvicorn` subprocess-lifecycle helpers. The `5.2` launcher `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` was +refactored onto both so the two launchers cannot drift. ## Description @@ -162,10 +166,13 @@ Policy Store DB and the provisioned Keycloak realm. assertions — the reviewer eyeballs the two `.rego` files against [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). The value is the concrete, real-pipeline `.rego` output for a known scenario. -- **Prior art.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established the shape this test - reuses: `uvicorn` subprocess spawn, `GET /health` poll, env-before-import ordering, `finally` - teardown, and print-the-dir. The live-Keycloak pytest suite (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) is - the marker-gated counterpart for the read-side services. +- **Prior art, shared not copied.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established + the shape this test reuses — `uvicorn` subprocess spawn, `GET /health` poll, env-before-import + ordering, `finally` teardown, and print-the-dir. Rather than duplicate it, that machinery lives in + the shared `test/integration/launcher.py`, and the fixed scenario lives in + `test/integration/scenario.py`; `generate_rego.py` was refactored onto both (its `.rego` output + verified byte-identical to before the refactor). The live-Keycloak pytest suite + (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) is the marker-gated counterpart for the read-side services. ## Relationship to other integration tests @@ -204,6 +211,14 @@ Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. - Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. +- **Keycloak truncates long descriptions (255 chars).** Keycloak caps realm-role and client + descriptions at 255 characters, and four scenario descriptions exceed it (`developer`, `tester`, and + the `github-agent` / `github-tool` client descriptions). The launcher therefore provisions + **shortened (≤255) renderings** of those four into Keycloak — the client ones keep the "Agent" / + "Tool" keyword the IdP `type` inference relies on — while `scenario.py` keeps the **verbatim** text + as the source of truth. The PRB reads the shortened `developer` / `tester` text back from Keycloak, + so the shortened renderings must stay semantically consistent with the verbatim descriptions and the + role→access facts above. ## Blocked-by From 854460094d4559e96e2b20651f06f60e1f3e038a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 21:07:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 189/273] feat(aiac): mark AIAC-provisioned roles/scopes and filter Keycloak built-ins from PCE embed Introduce the aiac.managed naming convention: the IdP Configuration Service stamps every role and client scope it provisions with the Keycloak attribute aiac.managed=true (realm-role values are lists, client-scope values are strings) and returns full role representations so the marker survives reads. Role/Scope models surface the marker via an aiac_managed property. The Policy Computation Engine's P2 embed now keeps only AIAC-managed entities, dropping Keycloak built-ins (default client scopes, default-roles-<realm>) from agent_roles / agent_scopes. This makes the generated agent embed hold only domain entities and be deterministic across runs. Updates component specs, the PRD conventions section, and unit tests. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 1 + .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 10 ++++-- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 6 ++++ .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 4 +-- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 27 ++++++++++++++ .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 36 ++++++++++++++----- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 9 +++-- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 30 ++++++++++++++++ .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 16 ++++++++- aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- 10 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index e3d53f84d..438d14c6a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -571,3 +571,4 @@ Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-inte - IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes - `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package - NATS consumer must **await** handler completion before issuing ack — fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is prohibited; premature ack breaks at-least-once delivery guarantees +- AIAC provisioning marker: every role and client scope AIAC provisions carries the Keycloak attribute `aiac.managed` = `true`, distinguishing AIAC-provisioned entities from Keycloak's built-ins (default client scopes, `default-roles-<realm>`). Realm-role attribute values are lists (`["true"]`), client-scope values are plain strings (`"true"`). The IdP Configuration Service stamps it on create and returns full role representations so it survives reads; the Policy Computation Engine filters on it (`Role.aiac_managed` / `Scope.aiac_managed`) when embedding each agent's own roles/scopes (P2) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 42e240724..d4317edd9 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | |--------|------|------------------------|-------------| | GET | `/subjects` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All subjects (users) in realm; filtered to subjects with a specific role when `role_id` query param is provided | -| GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | +| GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` (full representation, `brief_representation=False`) | All realm-level roles, including attributes (so the `aiac.managed` marker is visible) | | GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{subject_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and service permission assignments for a subject | | GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id `POST /scopes`: Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: -1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the scope at realm level. +1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": "true"}})` to create the scope at realm level. The `aiac.managed` attribute is the AIAC provisioning marker (client-scope attribute values are plain strings). 2. Returns `201 Created` with the created scope JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a scope with that name already exists. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: `POST /roles`: Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: -1. Calls `admin.create_realm_role({"name": ..., "description": ...})` to create the role at realm level. +1. Calls `admin.create_realm_role({"name": ..., "description": ..., "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}})` to create the role at realm level. The `aiac.managed` attribute is the AIAC provisioning marker (realm-role attribute values are lists of strings). 2. Returns `201 Created` with the created role JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a role with that name already exists. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter specif All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. +### AIAC provisioning marker (`aiac.managed`) + +Every role and client scope this service creates is stamped with the Keycloak attribute `aiac.managed` = `true` — the AIAC naming convention that distinguishes AIAC-provisioned entities from Keycloak's own built-ins (default client scopes, the `default-roles-<realm>` composite). Attribute value shape differs by entity: realm-role attribute values are lists (`{"aiac.managed": ["true"]}`), client-scope attribute values are plain strings (`{"aiac.managed": "true"}`). Because Keycloak's brief role representation omits attributes, `GET /roles` requests the full representation so the marker survives the read. Downstream consumers (the Policy Computation Engine's P2 embed) filter on this marker to keep only domain entities. + ## Configuration Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index 88dce7d11..c5fd81a0e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ Represents a role (Keycloak: realm role). | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | | | `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | | | `childRoles` | `list[Role]` | `composites.realm` | `[]` | +| `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | `{}` | + +Roles also expose an `aiac_managed` property (`bool`): `True` when `attributes` carries the AIAC provisioning marker `aiac.managed` (realm-role attribute values are lists, so the marker appears as `["true"]`). See the naming convention in the idp-configuration-service spec. #### `Service` @@ -90,6 +93,9 @@ Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). | `id` | `str` | `id` | | `name` | `str` | `name` | | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | +| `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | + +Scopes also expose an `aiac_managed` property (`bool`): `True` when `attributes` carries the AIAC provisioning marker `aiac.managed` (client-scope attribute values are plain strings, so the marker appears as `"true"`). See the naming convention in the idp-configuration-service spec. ### Usage diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md index d021104a8..6f2962eb0 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, the engine executes thes 5. **P4 — only agents are modelled.** Routing only ever creates an `AgentPolicyModel` for a service identified as an **agent** (one owning the rule's role, or exposing the agent scope). A pure-target **Tool** therefore never gets its own model — no `github_tool.*.rego` is emitted. The agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded on the agent's model. -6. **P2 — embed each agent's own identity.** For every agent model the PCE writes, set `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` from that agent's `Service` record in the catalog (its own service-account realm roles and exposed scopes). A realm-level agent with no owning service in the catalog keeps `[]`. Without this, both generated gates would deny-all (inbound `subject_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_scopes`; outbound `target_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_roles`). +6. **P2 — embed each agent's own identity.** For every agent model the PCE writes, set `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` from that agent's `Service` record in the catalog (its own service-account realm roles and exposed scopes). Only **AIAC-provisioned** entities are embedded: the PCE keeps only roles/scopes carrying the `aiac.managed` marker (`Role.aiac_managed` / `Scope.aiac_managed`) and drops Keycloak's built-ins — the default client scopes (`profile`, `email`, `roles`, `web-origins`, `acr`, `basic`, `service_account`) and the `default-roles-<realm>` composite — that every OIDC client / service account carries. This keeps the embed to domain entities only and makes it deterministic across runs (built-ins are returned in an arbitrary order by Keycloak). A realm-level agent with no owning service in the catalog keeps `[]`. Without the embed, both generated gates would deny-all (inbound `subject_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_scopes`; outbound `target_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_roles`). 7. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store Key behaviors to assert: - **Routing by kind (P5b):** a (user role, agent scope) rule lands in the exposing agent's `inbound_rules`; a (agent role, tool scope) rule lands in the owning agent's `outbound_rules` with a `target_scopes[tool]` entry; a (user role, tool scope) rule lands in `outbound_subject_rules` of the agent whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope. - A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool produces no model. -- **P2:** each written agent model carries its own `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` read from the service catalog; an agent with no catalog roles/scopes keeps `[]`. +- **P2:** each written agent model carries its own `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` read from the service catalog, filtered to AIAC-provisioned entities (the `aiac.managed` marker) so Keycloak built-ins are excluded; an agent with no AIAC-managed catalog roles/scopes keeps `[]`. - **P4:** a pure-target **Tool** service is never written as its own model, even though it exposes a scope the agent reaches; the agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded. - `get_subjects_by_role` records `subject_roles` keyed by the subject's string `username` with the typed `Role` in the value list (for both user→agent and user→tool rules). - `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Scope` in the value list; every relationship map has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index f5e6663e9..3c18973be 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -2,6 +2,21 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, model_validator +# AIAC naming convention: every role and client scope AIAC provisions carries the Keycloak +# attribute ``aiac.managed`` with value ``true``. Keycloak's own built-ins (default client +# scopes, ``default-roles-<realm>``) never carry it, so consumers filter on this marker to +# distinguish AIAC-provisioned entities. Realm-role attribute values are lists of strings +# (``{"aiac.managed": ["true"]}``); client-scope attribute values are plain strings +# (``{"aiac.managed": "true"}``) — the helper below tolerates both shapes. +AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE = "aiac.managed" + + +def _is_aiac_managed(attributes: dict[str, Any]) -> bool: + value = attributes.get(AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE) + if isinstance(value, list): + return "true" in value + return value == "true" + class Subject(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") @@ -23,6 +38,12 @@ class Role(BaseModel): description: str | None = None composite: bool childRoles: list["Role"] = [] + attributes: dict[str, Any] = {} + + @property + def aiac_managed(self) -> bool: + """True when this role carries the ``aiac.managed`` provisioning marker.""" + return _is_aiac_managed(self.attributes) class Service(BaseModel): @@ -74,6 +95,12 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): id: str name: str description: str | None = None + attributes: dict[str, Any] = {} + + @property + def aiac_managed(self) -> bool: + """True when this scope carries the ``aiac.managed`` provisioning marker.""" + return _is_aiac_managed(self.attributes) Subject.model_rebuild() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 828a94b47..d3fddd9ba 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ _cache: dict[str, KeycloakAdmin] = {} _lock = threading.Lock() +# AIAC naming convention: stamp every role/scope this service provisions with the +# ``aiac.managed=true`` Keycloak attribute so downstream consumers (the Policy Computation +# Engine) can keep only AIAC-provisioned entities and drop Keycloak built-ins. Defined locally +# because this service image ships only ``main.py`` (the aiac library is not on its path); it +# mirrors ``AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE`` in ``aiac.idp.configuration.models``. Realm-role attribute +# values are lists of strings; client-scope attribute values are plain strings. +_AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE = "aiac.managed" + def _get_or_create_admin(realm: str) -> KeycloakAdmin: if realm not in _cache: @@ -144,9 +152,12 @@ def list_service_scopes(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admi @app.post("/services/{service_id}/scopes", status_code=201) def create_scope(service_id: str, body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( - {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} - ) + scope_id = admin.create_client_scope({ + "name": body.name, + "description": body.description, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "attributes": {_AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE: "true"}, # AIAC provisioning marker + }) admin.add_client_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id, {}) return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) except KeycloakError as e: @@ -167,7 +178,9 @@ def assign_scope_to_service(service_id: str, scope_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin @app.get("/roles") def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - return admin.get_realm_roles() + # brief_representation=False so realm-role attributes (incl. the aiac.managed marker) + # are returned; the brief representation Keycloak returns by default omits them. + return admin.get_realm_roles(brief_representation=False) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -175,7 +188,11 @@ def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): @app.post("/roles", status_code=201) def create_role(body: _RoleCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - admin.create_realm_role({"name": body.name, "description": body.description}) + admin.create_realm_role({ + "name": body.name, + "description": body.description, + "attributes": {_AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE: ["true"]}, # AIAC provisioning marker + }) return admin.get_realm_role(body.name) except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 409: @@ -202,9 +219,12 @@ def list_scopes(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): @app.post("/scopes", status_code=201) def create_scope_standalone(body: _ScopeCreate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - scope_id = admin.create_client_scope( - {"name": body.name, "description": body.description, "protocol": "openid-connect"} - ) + scope_id = admin.create_client_scope({ + "name": body.name, + "description": body.description, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "attributes": {_AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE: "true"}, # AIAC provisioning marker + }) return admin.get_client_scope(scope_id) except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 409: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index 01fd39ed4..e77fe6f30 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -204,11 +204,14 @@ def record_subjects(m: AgentPolicyModel, role: Role) -> None: _purge_roles(existing, input_role_ids) _merge(existing, delta) # P2: each written agent embeds its own service-account roles and exposed - # scopes. Realm-level agents (no owning service in the catalog) keep []. + # scopes. Only AIAC-provisioned entities (carrying the aiac.managed marker) are + # embedded — Keycloak built-ins (default client scopes, default-roles-<realm>) are + # dropped so the model holds only domain entities. Realm-level agents (no owning + # service in the catalog) keep []. svc = catalog.get(agent_id) if svc is not None: - existing.agent_roles = list(svc.roles) - existing.agent_scopes = list(svc.scopes) + existing.agent_roles = [r for r in svc.roles if r.aiac_managed] + existing.agent_scopes = [s for s in svc.scopes if s.aiac_managed] apply_agent_policy(agent_id, existing) written.append(existing) diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index fcbda277d..54a24892f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -27,6 +27,36 @@ def _err(status=500): return resp +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# aiac.managed marker surfaced on Role / Scope (naming convention) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestAiacManagedMarker: + def test_role_with_marker_is_managed(self): + role = Role.model_validate( + {"id": "r1", "name": "source-helper", "composite": False, + "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}} + ) + assert role.aiac_managed is True + + def test_role_without_marker_is_not_managed(self): + role = Role.model_validate( + {"id": "r1", "name": "default-roles-realm", "composite": False} + ) + assert role.aiac_managed is False + + def test_scope_with_marker_is_managed(self): + scope = Scope.model_validate( + {"id": "s1", "name": "source-access", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": "true"}} + ) + assert scope.aiac_managed is True + + def test_scope_without_marker_is_not_managed(self): + scope = Scope.model_validate({"id": "s1", "name": "profile"}) + assert scope.aiac_managed is False + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Factory method # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 3233cc6e3..8941e7903 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ def test_returns_json_array(self): assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + def test_requests_full_representation_for_attributes(self): + # The aiac.managed marker lives in role attributes, which Keycloak's brief + # representation omits — the endpoint must ask for the full representation. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [] + _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + admin.get_realm_roles.assert_called_once_with(brief_representation=False) + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /services @@ -320,6 +328,7 @@ def test_creates_scope_with_openid_connect_protocol(self): assert call_payload["protocol"] == "openid-connect" assert call_payload["name"] == "read" assert call_payload["description"] == "desc" + assert call_payload["attributes"] == {"aiac.managed": "true"} def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): admin = MagicMock() @@ -394,6 +403,7 @@ def test_creates_scope_with_openid_connect_protocol(self): assert payload["protocol"] == "openid-connect" assert payload["name"] == "read" assert payload["description"] == "desc" + assert payload["attributes"] == {"aiac.managed": "true"} def test_returns_409_on_duplicate_name(self): admin = MagicMock() @@ -496,7 +506,11 @@ def test_creates_role_with_correct_payload(self): admin.get_realm_role.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "reader"} _make_client(admin).post(f"/roles?realm={REALM}", json={"name": "reader", "description": "desc"}) payload = admin.create_realm_role.call_args[0][0] - assert payload == {"name": "reader", "description": "desc"} + assert payload == { + "name": "reader", + "description": "desc", + "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}, + } def test_returns_409_on_duplicate_name(self): admin = MagicMock() diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index a7fa8f315..87e7f1ee1 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -30,12 +30,17 @@ # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # builders # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None) -> Role: - return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or []) +def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None, aiac_managed=True) -> Role: + # Roles in these tests model AIAC-provisioned agent roles, so they carry the marker by + # default; pass aiac_managed=False to simulate a Keycloak built-in (e.g. default-roles-<realm>). + attributes = {"aiac.managed": ["true"]} if aiac_managed else {} + return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or [], attributes=attributes) -def _scope(id="s-write", name="write") -> Scope: - return Scope(id=id, name=name) +def _scope(id="s-write", name="write", aiac_managed=True) -> Scope: + # AIAC-provisioned by default; pass aiac_managed=False for a Keycloak built-in (e.g. profile). + attributes = {"aiac.managed": "true"} if aiac_managed else {} + return Scope(id=id, name=name, attributes=attributes) def _service(service_id, id=None, enabled=True, type=None, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: @@ -256,6 +261,29 @@ def test_agent_without_catalog_roles_scopes_keeps_empty(): assert m.agent_scopes == [] +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 6b — P2: only AIAC-provisioned roles/scopes (carrying the aiac.managed # +# marker) are embedded; Keycloak built-ins (default-roles-<realm>, profile, ...) # +# are dropped from the agent's embed. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_builtin_roles_and_scopes_are_filtered_from_embed(): + helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") # AIAC-provisioned + default_roles = _role("r-def", "default-roles-aiac", aiac_managed=False) # Keycloak built-in + src_access = _scope("s-src-access", "source-access") # AIAC-provisioned + profile = _scope("s-profile", "profile", aiac_managed=False) # Keycloak built-in + agent = _agent( + "github-agent", + roles=[helper, default_roles], + scopes=[src_access, profile], + ) + rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=src_access) + res = run_engine([rule], catalog=[agent], scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}) + + m = res.written["github-agent"] + assert m.agent_roles == [helper] # default-roles-<realm> dropped + assert m.agent_scopes == [src_access] # profile dropped + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Cycle 7 — P4: a pure-target Tool service is never modelled, even though it # # exposes the scope the agent reaches; the agent -> tool target_scopes edge # From 0d37879ab1c42a0a1759e39e7ffc43dab6c2fa5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 23:39:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 190/273] feat(aiac): canonical client.type attribute for service typing with IdP setter Drive service type (Agent/Tool) from the Keycloak client attribute client.type instead of substring-matching the client description. Keep 'service type' as the AIAC-facing concept; the attribute name is confined to the IdP service (writes) and the library mapping layer (reads). - models.py: SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE = 'client.type'; resolution precedence explicit -> client.type -> spiffe:// -> None (list value -> None). - api.py: remove TEMP description-keyword inference; add Configuration.set_service_type() -> POST /services/{id}/type. - main.py: new POST /services/{id}/type endpoint merging client.type into existing client attributes via update_client. - Tests: plain-string-vs-list invariant, setter coverage (library + service endpoint), drop description-keyword/set_service_type-removed guards. - PRD: library-idp, idp-configuration-service, uc1-service-onboarding updated for client.type + set_service_type + case normalization. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 1 + .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 10 +++ .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 19 ++++- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 27 ++++--- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 13 ++- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 27 +++++++ .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 81 +++++++++++++++++-- aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py | 37 +++++++-- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 54 +++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 243 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 15c7890c9..e883c4844 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp`. - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). + - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). Case must be normalized at this persistence step: `ServiceType` is lowercase (`agent`/`tool`) but `client.type` is capitalized (`Agent`/`Tool`) to match `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]` — map `agent`→`Agent`, `tool`→`Tool`. ### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md index d4317edd9..fef5db1f6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{subject_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and service permission assignments for a subject | | GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/type` | `admin.get_client(service_id)` → `admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {...}})` | Set a service's type via the `client.type` client attribute | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service's account | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | @@ -38,6 +39,15 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id 2. Returns `200 OK` with the client JSON on success. 3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. +All service reads (`GET /services`, `GET /services/{service_id}`) return the Keycloak client representation **unmodified**, so client `attributes` — including `client.type` — flow through verbatim for the library's generic-model mapping (`Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`) to resolve service type. The Keycloak attribute name is confined to this service (writes) and the library mapping layer (reads); it is never exposed to library callers. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/type`: +Accepts JSON body `{"type": "Agent" | "Tool"}` (rejected with `422` otherwise). It: +1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)` and copies its existing `attributes`. +2. Sets the **`client.type`** attribute to the (capitalized, plain-string) type value and calls `admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {...}})`. The existing attributes are merged, not clobbered. +3. Returns `200 OK` with the updated client JSON (re-fetched via `admin.get_client`). +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + `POST /scopes`: Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": "true"}})` to create the scope at realm level. The `aiac.managed` attribute is the AIAC provisioning marker (client-scope attribute values are plain strings). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index c5fd81a0e..a0b02448b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -80,10 +80,19 @@ Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). | `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | | | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | `None` | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | -| `type` | `Literal["Agent", "Tool"] \| None` | `attributes.type` | `None` | +| `type` | `Literal["Agent", "Tool"] \| None` | `attributes.client.type` | `None` | | `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(roles for this client)_ | `[]` | | `scopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(default client scopes)_ | `[]` | +**Service type resolution** (`Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`, a `model_validator(mode="before")`). AIAC calls the concept "service type" everywhere; the backing Keycloak client attribute is named **`client.type`**. Resolution precedence: + +1. An explicit `type` already present on the input wins (never overridden). +2. Otherwise the Keycloak client attribute **`client.type`** ∈ {`Agent`, `Tool`} — a **plain string**. Client attribute values are plain strings; a **list** value (e.g. `["Agent"]`, the shape realm-role attributes use) fails the check and resolves to `None`. Capitalization matches `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]`. +3. Otherwise a `clientId` starting with `spiffe://` implies an `Agent` workload. +4. Otherwise `None`. + +The attribute is set via `Configuration.set_service_type` (below); its authoritative origin is UC1 `classify_service` (see the aiac-agent UC1 spec), which persists the discovered service type onto the client. There is **no** description-keyword inference — typing is attribute/`spiffe://`-only. + #### `Scope` Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). @@ -148,6 +157,8 @@ class Configuration: def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: ... def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: ... + + def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service: ... ``` `get_scopes()` — simple read: @@ -228,6 +239,12 @@ class Configuration: 3. Re-fetches the service via `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response. +`set_service_type(service: Service, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/type` with body `{"type": service_type}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. +2. The service persists the value onto the Keycloak client as the **`client.type`** attribute (a plain string, capitalized). The Keycloak attribute name is an IdP-Service/mapping-layer detail — callers pass the generic `service_type` and never see it. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response (`type` now resolved from the new attribute). + ### Configuration Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index 707e7cba1..f3f21b160 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import os from pathlib import Path +from typing import Literal import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv @@ -72,15 +73,9 @@ def _build_service(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role], all_scopes: dict roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] - # TEMP: infer type from description when not set by Keycloak attributes - desc = raw.get("description") or "" - inferred_type: str | None = None - if "Agent" in desc: - inferred_type = "Agent" - elif "Tool" in desc: - inferred_type = "Tool" - patch = {"type": inferred_type} if inferred_type and not raw.get("type") else {} - return Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes, **patch}) + # Type resolution is handled entirely by Service._resolve_keycloak_fields + # (client.type attribute → spiffe:// clientId → None); the library does not infer it here. + return Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes}) def _all_roles_map(self) -> dict[str, Role]: return {r.id: r for r in self.get_roles()} @@ -140,6 +135,20 @@ def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: self._check(get_resp) return Service.model_validate(get_resp.json()) + def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service: + """Persist a service's type onto the Keycloak client as the ``client.type`` attribute. + + The value is stored capitalized (``Agent``/``Tool``) so ``Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`` + resolves it back on read. Returns the updated ``Service``. + """ + resp = requests.post( + f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/type", + json={"type": service_type}, + params=self._params(), + ) + self._check(resp) + return Service.model_validate(resp.json()) + def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: resp = requests.post( f"{self._base_url()}/roles", diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index 3c18973be..a2edef263 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ # (``{"aiac.managed": "true"}``) — the helper below tolerates both shapes. AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE = "aiac.managed" +# Keycloak attribute that carries a service's (client's) type. AIAC calls the concept +# "service type" everywhere (``Service.type`` ∈ {``Agent``,``Tool``}); the underlying Keycloak +# client attribute is named ``client.type``. The value is a plain string (``"Agent"``/``"Tool"``, +# capitalized to match ``Literal["Agent","Tool"]``) — a list value fails resolution → type ``None``. +SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE = "client.type" + def _is_aiac_managed(attributes: dict[str, Any]) -> bool: value = attributes.get(AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE) @@ -76,11 +82,12 @@ def _resolve_keycloak_fields(cls, data: Any) -> Any: if client_id and not data.get("serviceId"): updates["serviceId"] = client_id - # Resolve service type: explicit Keycloak attribute takes precedence, - # then SPIFFE-format clientId implies an agent workload. + # Resolve service type. Precedence: explicit ``type`` (already set, skipped here) → + # Keycloak ``client.type`` attribute (plain string ∈ {Agent,Tool}) → SPIFFE-format + # clientId ⇒ Agent → None. A list-valued attribute fails the string check → None. if data.get("type") is None: attrs = data.get("attributes") or {} - stored_type = attrs.get("kagenti.service.type") + stored_type = attrs.get(SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE) if stored_type in ("Agent", "Tool"): updates["type"] = stored_type elif client_id and str(client_id).startswith("spiffe://"): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index d3fddd9ba..b57834e75 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import threading from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from pathlib import Path +from typing import Literal from dotenv import load_dotenv from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query @@ -21,6 +22,12 @@ # values are lists of strings; client-scope attribute values are plain strings. _AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE = "aiac.managed" +# Keycloak client attribute carrying a service's type. AIAC calls the concept "service type" +# (``Agent``/``Tool``); the Keycloak attribute is named ``client.type`` and its value is a plain +# string. Mirrors ``SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE`` in ``aiac.idp.configuration.models`` (the aiac library +# is not on this service image's path, so it is redefined locally). +_SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE = "client.type" + def _get_or_create_admin(realm: str) -> KeycloakAdmin: if realm not in _cache: @@ -59,6 +66,10 @@ class _RoleCreate(BaseModel): description: str = "" +class _ServiceTypeUpdate(BaseModel): + type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] + + @app.get("/subjects") def list_subjects( realm: str = Query(...), @@ -113,6 +124,22 @@ def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.post("/services/{service_id}/type", status_code=200) +def set_service_type( + service_id: str, body: _ServiceTypeUpdate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin) +): + try: + client = admin.get_client(service_id) + # Merge into the existing attributes so we don't clobber other client attributes; + # Keycloak replaces the whole attributes map on update. + attributes = dict(client.get("attributes") or {}) + attributes[_SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE] = body.type # capitalized plain string + admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": attributes}) + return admin.get_client(service_id) + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.get("/services/{service_id}/roles") def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index 54a24892f..e76547ae8 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -330,14 +330,17 @@ def test_returns_single_enriched_service(self, monkeypatch): assert result.roles[0].name == "viewer" assert result.scopes[0].name == "read:data" - def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): + def test_type_resolved_from_client_type_attribute(self, monkeypatch): + # Typing comes from the client.type attribute (via Service._resolve_keycloak_fields), + # never from the description — the description-keyword fallback has been removed. monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) raw = { "id": self.SERVICE_ID, "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, "name": "my-agent", - "description": "An Agent service", + "description": "An Agent service", # keyword present but ignored "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Tool"}, } with patch( "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", @@ -350,7 +353,29 @@ def test_infers_type_from_description_when_not_set(self, monkeypatch): ], ): result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) - assert result.type == "Agent" + assert result.type == "Tool" + + def test_type_not_inferred_from_description(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + raw = { + "id": self.SERVICE_ID, + "clientId": self.SERVICE_ID, + "name": "my-agent", + "description": "An Agent service", # no attribute → type stays None + "enabled": True, + } + with patch( + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(raw), # GET /services/svc-001 + _ok([]), # GET /roles + _ok([]), # GET /scopes + _ok([]), # GET /services/svc-001/roles + _ok([]), # GET /services/svc-001/scopes + ], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_service(self.SERVICE_ID) + assert result.type is None def test_raises_when_primary_fetch_returns_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) @@ -404,13 +429,55 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_every_request(self, monkeypatch): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# set_service_type — removed +# set_service_type — writes the client.type attribute # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestSetServiceTypeRemoved: - def test_set_service_type_does_not_exist(self): - assert not hasattr(Configuration(REALM), "set_service_type") +class TestSetServiceType: + def _make_service(self, **kwargs): + defaults = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True} + return Service.model_validate({**defaults, **kwargs}) + + def test_returns_updated_service_with_type(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + updated = { + "id": "svc-uuid", + "clientId": "svc-uuid", + "name": "my-svc", + "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Agent"}, + } + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(updated, 200)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(service, "Agent") + assert isinstance(result, Service) + assert result.type == "Agent" + + def test_posts_to_correct_url_with_type_body(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Tool"}} + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(updated, 200)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(service, "Tool") + assert m.call_args[0][0] == f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/type" + assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"type": "Tool"} + + def test_forwards_realm_as_query_param(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Agent"}} + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(updated, 200)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(service, "Agent") + assert m.call_args[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_err(502)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(service, "Agent") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py index b3496134e..ec9ff640e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py @@ -260,24 +260,24 @@ def test_valid_display_name_not_replaced_by_clientId(self): class TestServiceTypeResolution: - def test_type_agent_from_kagenti_attribute(self): + def test_type_agent_from_client_type_attribute(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c1", "clientId": "some-agent", "enabled": True, - "attributes": {"kagenti.service.type": "Agent"}, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Agent"}, } ) assert s.type == "Agent" - def test_type_tool_from_kagenti_attribute(self): + def test_type_tool_from_client_type_attribute(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c2", "clientId": "github-tool", "enabled": True, - "attributes": {"kagenti.service.type": "Tool"}, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Tool"}, } ) assert s.type == "Tool" @@ -292,6 +292,17 @@ def test_type_agent_from_spiffe_clientId(self): ) assert s.type == "Agent" + def test_type_none_when_no_attribute_and_non_spiffe_clientId(self): + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c3b", + "clientId": "mlflow", + "enabled": True, + "attributes": {}, + } + ) + assert s.type is None + def test_explicit_type_not_overridden_by_validator(self): s = Service.model_validate( { @@ -303,13 +314,27 @@ def test_explicit_type_not_overridden_by_validator(self): ) assert s.type == "Tool" - def test_unknown_kagenti_attribute_value_gives_none(self): + def test_unknown_client_type_attribute_value_gives_none(self): s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c5", "clientId": "mlflow", "enabled": True, - "attributes": {"kagenti.service.type": "Unknown"}, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Unknown"}, + } + ) + assert s.type is None + + def test_list_valued_client_type_attribute_gives_none(self): + # Plain-string invariant: client attributes are plain strings. A list value + # (as realm-role attributes use) fails the ``in ("Agent","Tool")`` check → type None. + # Regression guard for the silent empty-pipeline-output failure mode. + s = Service.model_validate( + { + "id": "c6", + "clientId": "mlflow", + "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"client.type": ["Agent"]}, } ) assert s.type is None diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 8941e7903..9897d8cae 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -371,6 +371,60 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /services/{service_id}/type +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestSetServiceType: + def test_returns_200_with_updated_client(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.side_effect = [ + {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "my-app", "attributes": {}}, + {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "my-app", "attributes": {"client.type": "Agent"}}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/type?realm={REALM}", json={"type": "Agent"} + ) + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()["attributes"] == {"client.type": "Agent"} + + def test_sets_client_type_attribute_via_update_client(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "attributes": {"existing": "keep"}} + _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/type?realm={REALM}", json={"type": "Tool"}) + # existing attributes preserved; client.type merged in (not clobbered) + admin.update_client.assert_called_once_with( + "svc-uuid", {"attributes": {"existing": "keep", "client.type": "Tool"}} + ) + + def test_stores_capitalized_plain_string_value(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "attributes": {}} + _make_client(admin).post(f"/services/svc-uuid/type?realm={REALM}", json={"type": "Agent"}) + payload = admin.update_client.call_args[0][1] + assert payload["attributes"]["client.type"] == "Agent" # plain string, not a list + + def test_rejects_invalid_type_with_422(self): + admin = MagicMock() + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/type?realm={REALM}", json={"type": "agent"} + ) + assert resp.status_code == 422 + + def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.side_effect = KeycloakError(error_message="not found", response_code=404) + resp = _make_client(admin).post( + f"/services/svc-uuid/type?realm={REALM}", json={"type": "Agent"} + ) + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # POST /scopes # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From 8304b75fe910a6bb6a3fb6e4e4b8b802236fdef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 23:56:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 191/273] docs(aiac): make policy-pipeline scenario descriptions generic and type via client.type attribute Rework the policy-pipeline integration-test spec so client typing is driven by the client.type Keycloak attribute (written via Configuration.set_service_type / POST /services/{id}/type, or the attribute directly) rather than Agent/Tool keywords in descriptions: - Replace all entity/role/scope descriptions with a generic, keyword-free set (<=255 chars, no policy grants, no owning-client naming), written verbatim. - Rewrite the entity-descriptions preamble to the attribute mechanism. - Add a read-back type guard step (Configuration.get_service .type assertion) before the pipeline runs; provisioning sanity check, write-only ethos kept. - Expand policy.md Version 2 (abstract) with an agent-capability line so mapping (c) survives deny-by-default and both variants reproduce the Rego. - Delete the 255-char truncation Further Notes bullet; reframe the consistency contract so descriptions drop out of the role->access fact triad. - Sweep stale _build_service / keyword / 255 / shortened / verbatim references. Docs-only (per handoff 06); the launcher code changes are described, not written. The 5.3 issue is gitignored and updated locally only. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 146 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 8e0d3c639..8b6acd059 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ ## Location `aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py`, plus two shared modules it imports: -`aiac/test/integration/scenario.py` — the canonical `github-agent` scenario as pure data (the single -source of truth the *Further Notes* mandate) — and `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared +`aiac/test/integration/scenario.py` — the canonical `github-agent` scenario as pure data (one of the +role→access fact sources the *Further Notes* mandate — the pair-lists, alongside the *Scenario* table +and both `policy.md` variants) — and `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared `uvicorn` subprocess-lifecycle helpers. The `5.2` launcher `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` was refactored onto both so the two launchers cannot drift. @@ -49,15 +50,24 @@ Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patche - via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** (test fixture): create realm `AIAC_TEST_REALM`; create users `dev-user` and `test-user`; create realm roles `developer` and `tester`; assign roles to users; create the `github-agent` and `github-tool` clients with the descriptions in - *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)* so the IdP library's `type` inference - (`_build_service`) tags them **Agent** / **Tool**. + *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)* and with the `client.type` + client attribute set to the plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"` respectively, so `Service` type + resolution tags them from the attribute (not from description prose). Set the type via the product + surface `Configuration.set_service_type(service, type)` (`POST /services/{id}/type`) or by writing + the `client.type` attribute directly at client create. The attribute value is a plain string, + **not** a list — a list fails the `in ("Agent","Tool")` check, resolves the type to `None`, and + yields empty pipeline output. - via the **aiac IdP `Configuration` library** (the real product surface the PCE reads back): create the client roles (`source-helper`, `issues-helper`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) with the descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*, and map roles→services and scopes→services so `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` and `get_service().roles` / `.scopes` resolve correctly. -4. **Proto-UC1 orchestration** — run the three PRB mappings against a pinned LLM (`temperature=0`) and +4. **Read-back type guard** — after provisioning, call `Configuration.get_service` for both clients and + assert each resolved `.type` (`github-agent` ⇒ `Agent`, `github-tool` ⇒ `Tool`) **before** spawning + the pipeline; abort with a clear message otherwise. This is a provisioning sanity check on the + `client.type` attribute, **not** a Rego-output assertion — the test stays write-only. +5. **Proto-UC1 orchestration** — run the three PRB mappings against a pinned LLM (`temperature=0`) and concatenate the results into one `list[PolicyRule]`: - **(a)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope)` per agent scope → user→agent-scope rules. - **(b)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, tool_scope)` per tool scope → user→tool-scope rules. @@ -68,12 +78,13 @@ Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patche Store. The PCE resolves the IdP relationships, builds the `github-agent` model (with `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes`; mapping (b) routed into `outbound_subject_rules`; and **no** `github-tool` model), writes it to the store, and pushes it to the OPA stub. -5. **Terminate the three subprocesses in `finally`.** -6. **Print** `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and the two `.rego` filenames. +6. **Terminate the three subprocesses in `finally`.** +7. **Print** `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and the two `.rego` filenames. -**Write-only.** The script performs no read-back and makes **no assertions**. The realm is left in -place; the `.rego` files are left on disk for eyeballing. There is no pass/fail exit contract beyond -the script running to completion. +**Write-only.** Apart from the step-4 provisioning type guard (a `Configuration.get_service` `.type` +check on the freshly provisioned attribute), the script reads nothing back and makes **no assertions** +on the pipeline output. The realm is left in place; the `.rego` files are left on disk for eyeballing. +There is no pass/fail exit contract on the generated Rego beyond the script running to completion. ## Expected output @@ -107,8 +118,8 @@ through the real pipeline rather than a hand-built `PolicyModel`. | `developer` | source read/write + issues read | | `tester` | issues read/write | -Role → access (confirmed with the user; the single source of truth the descriptions and both -`policy.md` versions below must agree with): +Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` versions below and the +`scenario.py` pair-lists must agree with — the generic descriptions are not part of this triad): - `developer` — source read/write, issues read. - `tester` — issues read/write. @@ -157,13 +168,19 @@ Policy Store DB and the provisioned Keycloak realm. - **Highest seam available.** Real libraries + real services + real Keycloak + real LLM. The launcher drives the pipeline through its real surfaces — the IdP `Configuration` library, the PRB entry points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`), and the PCE's `compute_and_apply` — and observes the real - filesystem output. The only shortcut is the OPA filesystem stub (same as `5.2`). It asserts nothing; - it produces artefacts a human reviews. + filesystem output. The only shortcut is the OPA filesystem stub (same as `5.2`). It makes no + assertions on the pipeline output; it produces artefacts a human reviews. +- **Attribute-based client typing + read-back guard.** Clients are typed by the `client.type` + attribute (plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`), provisioned by the launcher — not by description + keywords. Because that attribute drives whether the PCE emits an agent model (and suppresses the tool + model), the launcher reads each service back via `Configuration.get_service` and asserts its `.type` + before running the pipeline, aborting on mismatch. This is a **provisioning** sanity check, not a + Rego-output assertion — the write-only ethos is preserved. - **Self-contained subprocess lifecycle.** The launcher spawns IdP (7071), Policy Store (7074), and OPA (7072) as `uvicorn` subprocesses, polls each `GET /health` before use, and tears them all down in `finally`. Keycloak and the LLM are **external** (reached via env). - **Write-only, human-verified.** LLM nondeterminism is tolerated precisely because there are no - assertions — the reviewer eyeballs the two `.rego` files against + assertions on the output — the reviewer eyeballs the two `.rego` files against [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). The value is the concrete, real-pipeline `.rego` output for a known scenario. - **Prior art, shared not copied.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established @@ -204,21 +221,21 @@ Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. ## Further Notes -- The scenario is deliberately fixed. The role→access facts in the *Scenario* table, the entity/role/ - scope descriptions, and **both** `policy.md` versions in *Scenario inputs* must be kept mutually - consistent — they are a single source of truth. If the role→access facts change, update all three +- The scenario is deliberately fixed. The role→access facts are owned by **three** artefacts that must + agree: the *Scenario* table, **both** `policy.md` versions in *Scenario inputs*, and the + `scenario.py` pair-lists (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`). The + entity/role/scope **descriptions no longer encode those facts** — they are generic and functional and + drop out of the fact triad; they must stay generic and simply not contradict the facts. If the + role→access facts change, update the *Scenario* table, both `policy.md` variants, and the pair-lists together so the eyeballed output stays reviewable. - Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's - output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. -- **Keycloak truncates long descriptions (255 chars).** Keycloak caps realm-role and client - descriptions at 255 characters, and four scenario descriptions exceed it (`developer`, `tester`, and - the `github-agent` / `github-tool` client descriptions). The launcher therefore provisions - **shortened (≤255) renderings** of those four into Keycloak — the client ones keep the "Agent" / - "Tool" keyword the IdP `type` inference relies on — while `scenario.py` keeps the **verbatim** text - as the source of truth. The PRB reads the shortened `developer` / `tester` text back from Keycloak, - so the shortened renderings must stay semantically consistent with the verbatim descriptions and the - role→access facts above. + output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. The abstract variant now + carries an agent-capability line (the `source-helper` / `issues-helper` bullet) so mapping (c) + survives deny-by-default and both variants reproduce the same Rego. +- Descriptions are ≤255 characters and written **verbatim** into Keycloak; there is no shortened / + verbatim split. (Keycloak caps role and client descriptions at 255 chars, and the generic descriptions + are authored to stay within that cap.) ## Blocked-by @@ -242,66 +259,54 @@ with the user; keep them in sync with the *Scenario* table (see *Further Notes*) ### Entity descriptions -The `github-agent` and `github-tool` client descriptions deliberately contain the words **"Agent"** / -**"Tool"** so the IdP library's `type` inference (`_build_service`) tags them correctly (needed by the -type-based suppression that omits the tool model). +The descriptions are **generic and keyword-free** — they describe what each entity/role/scope *does*, +carry no policy grant ("Resolves to…") and no owning-client naming, and stay within Keycloak's 255-char +cap so they are written verbatim (no shortened renderings). Client `type` is **not** inferred from +description prose: the launcher provisions each client's `client.type` attribute (the type UC1 +discovers from the agent card / `kagenti.io/type` label) as a plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`, so +`Service` type resolution ([../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) +tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keyword fallback. **`github-agent`** — client (Agent): -> GitHub Agent — an autonomous agent that acts on a user's GitHub source repositories and issue tracker -> on the user's behalf. It performs source-code work (inspecting repository file contents and committing -> changes) and issue-management work (reading issue threads and creating or updating issues). Its -> source-code responsibility is represented by the `source-helper` client role and gated at the agent -> boundary by the `source-access` scope; its issue-management responsibility is represented by the -> `issues-helper` client role and gated by the `issues-access` scope. The agent does not call GitHub -> directly — it delegates each concrete operation to the `github-tool`, so its own scopes describe -> capabilities it may exercise while the tool's scopes describe the operations those capabilities -> resolve to. +> Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an issue tracker. It +> inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates issues and their +> threads. **`github-tool`** — client (Tool): -> GitHub Tool — a capability provider that exposes fine-grained, least-privilege operations against -> GitHub source repositories and the issue tracker. It offers four distinct operations, each represented -> by its own scope: read source (`source-read`) and write source (`source-write`) for repository file -> contents, and read issues (`issues-read`) and write issues (`issues-write`) for the issue tracker. The -> tool performs the actual GitHub calls; every caller (such as the `github-agent` acting for a user) -> must present the specific scope for each operation it invokes. +> Capability provider Tool for source repositories and an issue tracker. It performs read and write +> operations on repository source contents and on issues and their comment threads. **`developer`** — realm role (user): -> Developer — an engineering user who works on the codebase. A developer needs full read and write -> access to source repository contents (to inspect and change code) and read access to the issue tracker -> (to see reported work), but does not modify issues. Resolves to source read, source write, and issues -> read. +> Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining code) and +> fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and consults issues for +> defect reports. **`tester`** — realm role (user): -> Tester — a quality-assurance user who works through the issue tracker. A tester needs full read and -> write access to issues (to file, triage, and update defect and test reports) but does not touch source -> repository contents. Resolves to issues read and issues write. +> Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through the issue +> tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue tracker, not in source. ### Role & scope descriptions **Client roles (agent):** -- `source-helper` — The github-agent's client role for source-code operations. Groups the agent's - ability to read and write repository source content; gated at the agent boundary by `source-access`, - and downstream resolves to the tool's `source-read` / `source-write`. -- `issues-helper` — The github-agent's client role for issue operations. Groups the agent's ability to - read and write issues; gated at the agent boundary by `issues-access`, and downstream resolves to the - tool's `issues-read` / `issues-write`. +- `source-helper` — Client role for source-code operations, covering reading and writing repository + source content. +- `issues-helper` — Client role for issue-tracker operations, covering reading and writing issues and + their threads. **Agent scopes:** -- `source-access` — Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's source capability (the - `source-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's source-code functions. -- `issues-access` — Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's issues capability (the - `issues-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's issue functions. +- `source-access` — Scope granting use of a source-code capability — invoking source-code functions such + as reading and changing repository contents. +- `issues-access` — Scope granting use of an issue-management capability — invoking issue functions such + as reading and updating issues. **Tool scopes:** -- `source-read` — Tool operation: read source repository contents (file listings and file bodies). - Read-only. -- `source-write` — Tool operation: create, modify, or delete source repository contents (commits / - file writes). -- `issues-read` — Tool operation: read issues and their comments/threads. Read-only. -- `issues-write` — Tool operation: create and update issues (open, edit, comment, close). +- `source-read` — Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only. +- `source-write` — Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes. +- `issues-read` — Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only. +- `issues-write` — Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close. ### `policy.md` — Version 1 (explicit) @@ -330,11 +335,14 @@ policy supports it; deny by default. ### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) Relies on the PRB / LLM to expand "read and modify source" into the concrete scopes. Encodes the same -role→access facts as Version 1. +role→access facts as Version 1. The third bullet is an abstract agent-capability line so mapping (c) +(agent-role→tool-scope) survives the PRB's deny-by-default-on-silence rule and both variants reproduce +the same Rego. ```markdown Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. - Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. - Testers may read and modify issues. +- The source-helper role covers reading and modifying source; the issues-helper role covers reading and modifying issues. ``` From 5ab2fa170e00b9c5d44a63c0a08e4af3248fdc77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 15:34:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 192/273] docs(aiac): reframe policy-pipeline spec as asserting opa-eval pytest test Converts the policy-pipeline integration-test spec from a write-only launcher into an asserting @pytest.mark.integration test that uses the standalone `opa eval` binary as its verification oracle (handoff 07, docs only; code is handoff 08). - test_policy_pipeline.py replaces policy_pipeline.py; adds probe.rego; reuses launcher.py + scenario.py. - opa discovery: $OPA_BIN -> PATH -> pytest.skip. - Per-cell truth-table assertions over both policy.md variants: inbound vs data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow; outbound vs the probe query data.probe.outbound.allow, binding function_name with token-set soft-match (split on [._-]+, lowercased). - New devops-user/devops inbound-deny case, conveyed by role description only (deny-by-default; policy.md unchanged). - Rego persists per variant in rego_out/<variant>/; OPA_BIN env added; pytest runbook; Testing Decisions and Out of Scope reframed. The 5.3 issue and implementation-plan.md are updated locally to match but are gitignored (not part of this commit). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 250 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 178 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 8b6acd059..2637dfe2d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Integration Test: policy-pipeline — `policy_pipeline.py` +# Integration Test: policy-pipeline — `test_policy_pipeline.py` > **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. > Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` @@ -8,20 +8,28 @@ > the only integration-test PRD. ## Location -`aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py`, plus two shared modules it imports: -`aiac/test/integration/scenario.py` — the canonical `github-agent` scenario as pure data (one of the -role→access fact sources the *Further Notes* mandate — the pair-lists, alongside the *Scenario* table -and both `policy.md` variants) — and `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared -`uvicorn` subprocess-lifecycle helpers. The `5.2` launcher `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` was -refactored onto both so the two launchers cannot drift. +`aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py` — a pytest module marked `@pytest.mark.integration`. +It imports two shared modules: `aiac/test/integration/scenario.py` — the canonical `github-agent` +scenario as pure data (one of the role→access fact sources the *Further Notes* mandate — the pair-lists, +alongside the *Scenario* table and both `policy.md` variants) — and `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` +— the shared `uvicorn` subprocess-lifecycle helpers. It also ships a new +`aiac/test/integration/probe.rego` — a small standalone Rego module used only as the outbound +verification query (see *[What it does](#what-it-does)*). The `5.2` launcher +`test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` was refactored onto the same `launcher.py` + `scenario.py` so the two +launchers cannot drift. ## Description -A standalone launcher script that drives the **whole identity→policy pipeline** — -**Keycloak → PRB → PCE → OPA Policy Writer** — end-to-end and leaves the generated Rego on disk for a -human to eyeball. It is **not** a pytest test, **not** part of CI, and **not** marked -`@pytest.mark.integration` — it is run by hand when an operator wants to see the actual `.rego` output -produced by the real pipeline for a known scenario. +A `@pytest.mark.integration` test that drives the **whole identity→policy pipeline** — +**Keycloak → PRB → PCE → OPA Policy Writer** — end-to-end, then **asserts** the generated Rego decides +correctly by running the standalone `opa eval` binary as its verification oracle. The `.rego` files are +still left on disk per policy variant, so the test doubles as the eyeball workflow: running the test +*is* the eyeball. There is no separate standalone script. + +The generated Rego is the **artifact under test** — the LLM/PCE that produced it might be wrong — so the +test never trusts it. Instead it feeds `opa eval` requests derived from the **scenario spec (the +intended policy)** and asserts the real Rego admits/denies each one as the scenario truth table +requires. A mismatch fails the test and names the exact cell. This is the same *flavor* as the PDP Policy Writer launcher ([pdp-policy-writer.md](pdp-policy-writer.md), issue `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`) but @@ -34,8 +42,16 @@ emit Rego. Nothing is mocked; the only shortcut is that the OPA target is the fi Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patched `AuthorizationPolicy` CR — identical to `5.2`. +Because it needs a live Keycloak and a real LLM, it is `@pytest.mark.integration` and stays out of the +default unit-test run (`-m "not integration"`); it additionally `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is +found. + ### What it does +The pipeline (provision → PRB → PCE → OPA) is driven **once per `policy.md` variant** — `explicit` and +`abstract` — each writing into its own `rego_out/<variant>/` directory. `opa eval` then asserts the +scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below describe one such run. + 1. **Set service URLs in env before importing the aiac libraries.** Export `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`, `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, and `AIAC_REALM` *before* importing the aiac libraries — the libraries read env at import time. This is the pattern @@ -44,12 +60,14 @@ Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patche until ready, with a bounded timeout: - IdP Configuration Service — `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app` on `7071`. - Policy Store — its ASGI app on `7074`, with `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` pointed at a fresh temp dir. - - OPA Policy Writer — `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` on `7072`, with `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and - the Policy Store DB path in its env. + - OPA Policy Writer — `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` on `7072`, with `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` + (pointed at the current variant's `rego_out/<variant>/`) and the Policy Store DB path in its env. 3. **Provision Keycloak** (idempotent — delete-if-exists the realm first, then create): - via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** (test fixture): create realm `AIAC_TEST_REALM`; create - users `dev-user` and `test-user`; create realm roles `developer` and `tester`; assign roles to - users; create the `github-agent` and `github-tool` clients with the descriptions in + users `dev-user`, `test-user`, and `devops-user`; create realm roles `developer`, `tester`, and + `devops`; assign roles to users (`devops-user`→`devops`, which maps to **no** agent/tool scope — + the inbound deny case, see *[Scenario](#scenario)*); create the `github-agent` and `github-tool` + clients with the descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)* and with the `client.type` client attribute set to the plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"` respectively, so `Service` type resolution tags them from the attribute (not from description prose). Set the type via the product @@ -66,7 +84,7 @@ Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patche 4. **Read-back type guard** — after provisioning, call `Configuration.get_service` for both clients and assert each resolved `.type` (`github-agent` ⇒ `Agent`, `github-tool` ⇒ `Tool`) **before** spawning the pipeline; abort with a clear message otherwise. This is a provisioning sanity check on the - `client.type` attribute, **not** a Rego-output assertion — the test stays write-only. + `client.type` attribute, distinct from the step-7 Rego-decision assertions. 5. **Proto-UC1 orchestration** — run the three PRB mappings against a pinned LLM (`temperature=0`) and concatenate the results into one `list[PolicyRule]`: - **(a)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope)` per agent scope → user→agent-scope rules. @@ -78,20 +96,64 @@ Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patche Store. The PCE resolves the IdP relationships, builds the `github-agent` model (with `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes`; mapping (b) routed into `outbound_subject_rules`; and **no** `github-tool` model), writes it to the store, and pushes it to the OPA stub. -6. **Terminate the three subprocesses in `finally`.** -7. **Print** `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and the two `.rego` filenames. - -**Write-only.** Apart from the step-4 provisioning type guard (a `Configuration.get_service` `.type` -check on the freshly provisioned attribute), the script reads nothing back and makes **no assertions** -on the pipeline output. The realm is left in place; the `.rego` files are left on disk for eyeballing. -There is no pass/fail exit contract on the generated Rego beyond the script running to completion. +6. **Terminate the three subprocesses in `finally`.** The realm and the `.rego` files are left in + place for eyeballing. +7. **Assert the truth table with `opa eval`.** Once both variants' Rego is on disk, evaluate a matrix of + **(request JSON, rego file)** tuples with the standalone `opa` binary and hard-assert each decision + against the scenario truth table (see *[Expected output](#expected-output)*): + - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → else `shutil.which("opa")` → else `pytest.skip("opa not + found")`. Missing `opa` skips (does not fail) the suite. + - **Inbound** — one node per `(variant × subject)`. Request `{"subject": <id>}` (source omitted, so + the generated `source_ok` passes) is evaluated against the real + `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. Coarse "can this user reach the agent at all" — there is + no intent field. + - **Outbound** — one node per `(variant × subject × function_name)`, where `function_name` is the + agent's operation (a tool scope). Because the generated `allow` / `subject_ok` are existential and + ignore any scope, the outbound decision is evaluated by a **probe query**, + `data.probe.outbound.allow` (defined in `test/integration/probe.rego`), which binds + `input.function_name` against the generated data maps and requires **both** the user→tool gate and + the agent→tool gate to admit the function. Request shape `{"subject", "target", "function_name"}`. + - **Soft match** `function_name`↔scope — the probe compares names by splitting **both** on `[._-]+`, + lowercasing, and comparing as **sets** (token-set equality): `source.read`, `read_source`, and + `Source-Read` all match `source-read`; bare `source` matches nothing. + - The expected verdict for every cell is **computed from** the scenario pair-lists + (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS` in `scenario.py`), not from a second + hand-maintained copy — a wrong LLM/PCE mapping therefore fails the test. A failing node names the + exact `variant / subject / function_name` cell. ## Expected output -Exactly **two** files in `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`: +The test passes when `opa eval` decides every cell of the scenario truth table as follows, for **both** +policy variants. Verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario.py` pair-lists (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / +`OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`), not a hand-maintained copy — this table is the human- +readable rendering of them. + +`USERS`: `dev-user`→`developer`, `test-user`→`tester`, `devops-user`→`devops`. + +**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`, from `INBOUND_PAIRS`, user-role→agent-scope): + +| Subject | Inbound | +|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | +| test-user | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | + +**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, from `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` +user→tool; the agent→tool gate covers all four scopes, so the user gate discriminates): + +| | source-read | source-write | issues-read | issues-write | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| test-user | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | + +Alongside the assertions, each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in its +`rego_out/<variant>/` for eyeballing: - `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated. + (`devops-user` holds `devops`, which maps to no agent scope, so it is absent from `subject_roles` and + denied inbound.) - `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the new **user→tool** gate (mapping (b), grouped from `outbound_subject_rules` into `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, matched against @@ -105,24 +167,29 @@ the **ID-only** package shapes in ## Scenario -A single agent + tool + two users, fixed so the generated Rego is reproducible and reviewable by +A single agent + tool + three users, fixed so the generated Rego is reproducible and reviewable by inspection. This is the same canonical `github-agent` worked example as `5.2`, driven end to end -through the real pipeline rather than a hand-built `PolicyModel`. +through the real pipeline rather than a hand-built `PolicyModel`, plus a third `devops-user` that +exercises the deny-by-default path. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| | Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-e2e`) | | Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-helper`, `issues-helper`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | | Tool | `github-tool` (scopes `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) | -| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`) | +| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | | `developer` | source read/write + issues read | | `tester` | issues read/write | +| `devops` | no access (inbound deny; denied every outbound function) | Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` versions below and the `scenario.py` pair-lists must agree with — the generic descriptions are not part of this triad): - `developer` — source read/write, issues read. - `tester` — issues read/write. +- `devops` — no access. Conveyed by the **role description only** — it is absent from every pair-list + and both `policy.md` variants are **unchanged** (deny-by-default), so it is denied inbound and on + every outbound function. ## Configuration (env) @@ -131,93 +198,117 @@ Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` | `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds | — (required) | -| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the launcher provisions | `aiac-e2e` | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the test provisions | `aiac-e2e` | | `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-e2e` | | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | IdP Configuration Service base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | Policy Store base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | OPA Policy Writer base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | -| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Dir the OPA stub subprocess writes `.rego` to; printed at end | operator-chosen local dir | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Base dir the OPA stub subprocess writes `.rego` to; the test points it at `rego_out/<variant>/` per variant and leaves the files on disk | operator-chosen local dir | | `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | Policy Store DB path for the subprocess (fresh temp dir) | temp | -| `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | PRB whole-file policy — path to the `policy.md` variant to feed the PRB | `/etc/aiac/policy.md` | +| `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | PRB whole-file policy — path to the `policy.md` variant fed to the PRB; the test sets it per variant (`policy.explicit.md`, `policy.abstract.md`) | `/etc/aiac/policy.md` | | `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`) | — (required) | +| `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary used as the verification oracle; else `PATH` (`shutil.which`), else the test `pytest.skip`s | — (optional; PATH lookup) | -> When the launcher is written, confirm the Policy Store's ASGI import path and its DB-path env-var +> When the test is written, confirm the Policy Store's ASGI import path and its DB-path env-var > name against the Policy Store component spec / issue — `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` is the placeholder used > here; use the real one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which `policy.md` variant (see > *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*) the PRB reads. ## Runbook -Runnable only once the pipeline fixes (handoffs 01 + 02, P1–P5) have landed. +Runnable only once the pipeline fixes (handoffs 01 + 02, P1–P5) have landed, and requires a live +Keycloak, a real LLM, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). ```bash -# env: KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-e2e -.venv/bin/python test/integration/policy_pipeline.py -# then inspect the printed REGO_OUTPUT_DIR, e.g.: -# github_agent.inbound.rego (user->agent gate; subject_roles dev-user/test-user) -# github_agent.outbound.rego (user->tool AND agent->tool gates) -# (no github_tool.*.rego) +# env: KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN +.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v +# ~30 parametrized nodes (variant × subject inbound; variant × subject × function_name outbound). +# A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: +# test_outbound[abstract-test-user-source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed +# The generated Rego is left on disk per variant for eyeballing: +# rego_out/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# rego_out/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# (no github_tool.*.rego in either) ``` -Eyeball against the adjusted package shapes in +The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found (`$OPA_BIN` → `PATH`). Eyeball the persisted +Rego against the adjusted package shapes in [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md); optionally inspect the Policy Store DB and the provisioned Keycloak realm. ## Testing Decisions -- **Highest seam available.** Real libraries + real services + real Keycloak + real LLM. The launcher - drives the pipeline through its real surfaces — the IdP `Configuration` library, the PRB entry points - (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`), and the PCE's `compute_and_apply` — and observes the real - filesystem output. The only shortcut is the OPA filesystem stub (same as `5.2`). It makes no - assertions on the pipeline output; it produces artefacts a human reviews. +- **Highest seam available, verified by a real oracle.** Real libraries + real services + real Keycloak + + real LLM. The test drives the pipeline through its real surfaces — the IdP `Configuration` library, + the PRB entry points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`), and the PCE's `compute_and_apply` — + and then verifies the real filesystem output with the standalone **`opa eval`** binary. The only + shortcut is the OPA filesystem stub (same as `5.2`). A good test here asserts only **external + behavior** — the policy *decisions* the generated Rego makes for scenario-derived requests — never the + internal Rego structure (which the OPA Policy Writer's own unit tests own). +- **Rego is the artifact under test; the scenario is the oracle.** The LLM/PCE that produced the Rego + might be wrong, so the expected verdicts are **computed from** the scenario pair-lists + (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`), not from a second hand-maintained + copy or from the Rego itself. A wrong role→scope mapping therefore fails the test at the exact cell. +- **Outbound needs a probe.** The generated `allow` / `subject_ok` are existential and ignore any + scope, so a raw query cannot answer "may this subject invoke *this* function." A small + `test/integration/probe.rego` (`data.probe.outbound.allow`) binds `input.function_name` against the + generated data maps and requires **both** the user→tool and agent→tool gates to admit it. Names are + compared by **token-set equality** (split on `[._-]+`, lowercased) so `source.read` / `read_source` / + `Source-Read` all match `source-read` while bare `source` matches nothing. - **Attribute-based client typing + read-back guard.** Clients are typed by the `client.type` - attribute (plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`), provisioned by the launcher — not by description - keywords. Because that attribute drives whether the PCE emits an agent model (and suppresses the tool - model), the launcher reads each service back via `Configuration.get_service` and asserts its `.type` - before running the pipeline, aborting on mismatch. This is a **provisioning** sanity check, not a - Rego-output assertion — the write-only ethos is preserved. -- **Self-contained subprocess lifecycle.** The launcher spawns IdP (7071), Policy Store (7074), and OPA + attribute (plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`), provisioned by the test — not by description keywords. + Because that attribute drives whether the PCE emits an agent model (and suppresses the tool model), + the test reads each service back via `Configuration.get_service` and asserts its `.type` before + running the pipeline, aborting on mismatch. This is a **provisioning** sanity check, distinct from the + Rego-decision assertions. +- **Self-contained subprocess lifecycle.** The test spawns IdP (7071), Policy Store (7074), and OPA (7072) as `uvicorn` subprocesses, polls each `GET /health` before use, and tears them all down in - `finally`. Keycloak and the LLM are **external** (reached via env). -- **Write-only, human-verified.** LLM nondeterminism is tolerated precisely because there are no - assertions on the output — the reviewer eyeballs the two `.rego` files against - [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). The value is the - concrete, real-pipeline `.rego` output for a known scenario. + `finally`. Keycloak and the LLM are **external** (reached via env); `opa` is an external binary. +- **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** The PRB LLM is pinned to `temperature=0`, and the **explicit** + `policy.md` variant states each `(role, scope)` grant outright, so its mapping is stable. The + **abstract** variant is *also* asserted against the same truth table — accepting some flakiness, since + it leans on the LLM to expand prose into concrete scopes — because it is a valuable signal and the + test is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of the default CI run. - **Prior art, shared not copied.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established the shape this test reuses — `uvicorn` subprocess spawn, `GET /health` poll, env-before-import - ordering, `finally` teardown, and print-the-dir. Rather than duplicate it, that machinery lives in - the shared `test/integration/launcher.py`, and the fixed scenario lives in - `test/integration/scenario.py`; `generate_rego.py` was refactored onto both (its `.rego` output - verified byte-identical to before the refactor). The live-Keycloak pytest suite - (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) is the marker-gated counterpart for the read-side services. + ordering, and `finally` teardown. Rather than duplicate it, that machinery lives in the shared + `test/integration/launcher.py`, and the fixed scenario lives in `test/integration/scenario.py`; + `generate_rego.py` was refactored onto both (its `.rego` output verified byte-identical to before the + refactor). The live-Keycloak pytest suite (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) is the sibling + marker-gated, decision-asserting counterpart for the read-side services and is the prior art for the + `@pytest.mark.integration` + `opa eval` shape. ## Relationship to other integration tests This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). -- Distinct from the **live-Keycloak pytest integration tests** (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) — a - different flavor: `@pytest.mark.integration`, run in/near CI against a live Keycloak/NATS, asserting - on typed responses. +- Same flavor as the **live-Keycloak pytest integration tests** (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) — + both are `@pytest.mark.integration`, run outside the default unit run against live dependencies, and + assert on decisions. This test additionally uses `opa eval` as its oracle and skips when `opa` is + absent. - **Broader than** the OPA-stub-only **PDP Policy Writer** launcher ([pdp-policy-writer.md](pdp-policy-writer.md), `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`): `5.2` - hand-builds a `PolicyModel` and exercises only OPA; this test adds Keycloak provisioning + PRB + PCE - in front of the **same** OPA stub, so both eyeball their output against the same package shapes. + hand-builds a `PolicyModel`, exercises only OPA, and is still a write-only eyeball launcher; this test + adds Keycloak provisioning + PRB + PCE in front of the **same** OPA stub and **asserts** the resulting + decisions with `opa eval`. Both still leave `.rego` on disk against the same package shapes. Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. ## Out of Scope -- **Writing `policy_pipeline.py` or any P1–P5 pipeline code** — this spec *describes* the launcher; the - launcher itself is written in a later session against the fixed pipeline (tracked by - `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md` and the prerequisite issues). +- **Writing `test_policy_pipeline.py`, `probe.rego`, or any P1–P5 pipeline code** — this spec + *describes* the test; the test itself is written in a later session against the fixed pipeline + (tracked by `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md` and the prerequisite issues). - **The Rego generator, the canonical policy model, the PRB, and the PCE implementations** — specified and unit-tested by their own components ([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md), [../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md), [../components/policy-computation-engine.md](../components/policy-computation-engine.md), and the PRB - component spec), not here. + component spec), not here. In particular, the internal **structure** of the generated Rego is the + Policy Writer's concern; this test asserts only the **decisions** that Rego makes. - **The Kubernetes-CR Policy Writer (1.13)** — this test targets the filesystem **stub** (1.14) only. -- **Automated pass/fail** — no assertions, no CI wiring, no `@pytest.mark.integration`. +- **Default-CI wiring** — the test is `@pytest.mark.integration` and requires live Keycloak + LLM + an + `opa` binary, so it runs on demand, not in the default `-m "not integration"` unit run. ## Further Notes @@ -236,6 +327,12 @@ Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. - Descriptions are ≤255 characters and written **verbatim** into Keycloak; there is no shortened / verbatim split. (Keycloak caps role and client descriptions at 255 chars, and the generic descriptions are authored to stay within that cap.) +- The `devops` role's **zero access** is conveyed by its **role description only**. It is absent from + every pair-list (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`) and both `policy.md` + variants are **unchanged**, so deny-by-default alone denies it inbound and on every outbound function — + which is precisely what the truth table's `devops-user` row asserts. Because `devops-user` lives in + the shared `scenario.py`, it also appears in the `5.2` launcher's eyeball output (denied everywhere); + that is intentional and keeps the two launchers consistent. ## Blocked-by @@ -262,7 +359,7 @@ with the user; keep them in sync with the *Scenario* table (see *Further Notes*) The descriptions are **generic and keyword-free** — they describe what each entity/role/scope *does*, carry no policy grant ("Resolves to…") and no owning-client naming, and stay within Keycloak's 255-char cap so they are written verbatim (no shortened renderings). Client `type` is **not** inferred from -description prose: the launcher provisions each client's `client.type` attribute (the type UC1 +description prose: the test provisions each client's `client.type` attribute (the type UC1 discovers from the agent card / `kagenti.io/type` label) as a plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`, so `Service` type resolution ([../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keyword fallback. @@ -285,6 +382,15 @@ tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keywor > Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through the issue > tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue tracker, not in source. +**`devops`** — realm role (user): +> DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime environments; does not +> author source code and does not manage the issue tracker. + +> The `devops` description is deliberately **unrelated** to source and issue work, so the PRB derives no +> agent or tool scope for it and deny-by-default leaves `devops-user` denied everywhere — the inbound +> deny case. It is added to the realm-role set only; the pair-lists and both `policy.md` variants stay +> unchanged (see *Further Notes*). + ### Role & scope descriptions **Client roles (agent):** From 94d036a5f28af75e898c286ea0496d353e65eae8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 19:20:19 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 193/273] test(aiac): add policy-pipeline OPA-eval integration test; align scenario to spec MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Convert the write-only policy_pipeline.py launcher into a parametrized pytest suite (5.3) that verifies the generated Rego with the standalone `opa` binary against the scenario truth table — explicit + abstract policy variants, inbound plus outbound (function-name soft-match via a probe). - Add probe.rego (outbound function_name token soft-match) and test_policy_pipeline.py: a session fixture drives the real IdP->PRB->PCE pipeline for both policy variants and leaves the Rego under rego_out/; ~34 parametrized nodes assert opa verdicts against scenario.py. Marked integration (skipped without -m integration; skips if opa is absent). Remove the superseded policy_pipeline.py (helpers ported). - scenario.py: add devops-user/devops (deny-by-default) and replace every entity/role/scope description with the spec's generic, keyword-free, <=255-char versions; drop the now-obsolete truncated _KEYCLOAK_DESCRIPTIONS copy and _kc_desc shortening in the launcher. - Type services via the client.type attribute (Configuration.set_service_type) in provision_via_config. The IdP no longer infers type from description keywords, so without this the PCE built an empty model and wrote no Rego. - policy.abstract.md: add the agent-capability bullet so the abstract variant's agent-role->tool-scope mapping survives the generic descriptions. Verified: offline suite green; live suite 34/34 (both variants). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md | 1 + aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py | 254 ------------ aiac/test/integration/probe.rego | 34 ++ aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 81 ++-- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 363 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 432 insertions(+), 301 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/probe.rego create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md index 77033478f..f480d1099 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; den - Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. - Testers may read and modify issues. +- The source-helper role covers reading and modifying source; the issues-helper role covers reading and modifying issues. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py deleted file mode 100644 index 63c01e9e7..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy_pipeline.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,254 +0,0 @@ -"""Drive the whole identity->policy pipeline end-to-end and leave the Rego on disk to eyeball. - -Standalone launcher (NOT pytest, NOT CI, NOT ``@pytest.mark.integration``) for the fixed -``github-agent`` scenario. It provisions a live Keycloak realm, spawns the IdP Configuration, -Policy Store, and OPA Policy Writer services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, runs the real Policy -Rules Builder (real LLM) to map roles->scopes, then the real Policy Computation Engine to build -the ``PolicyModel`` and push it to the OPA filesystem stub. Nothing is mocked; the only shortcut is -that OPA writes ``.rego`` files instead of patching a Kubernetes CR (same stub as the 5.2 launcher). - -Write-only: no read-back, no assertions. The realm is left in place and the ``.rego`` files are -left on disk for a human to compare against the package shapes in -``inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md``. - -Spec: inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md -Issue: inception/issues/testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md - -Run (with KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported; realm defaults to aiac-e2e): - .venv/bin/python test/integration/policy_pipeline.py -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import logging -import os -import sys -import tempfile -from pathlib import Path -from urllib.parse import urlsplit - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ -REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ -SRC = REPO_ROOT / "src" -sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves -sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC)) # so ``import aiac.*`` resolves - -from test.integration import scenario as scn # noqa: E402 -from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 - Service, - print_rego_dir, - require_env, - resolve_output_dir, - running_services, -) - -# --- Resolve config + set env BEFORE importing aiac (the libraries read env at import time) --- -TEST_REALM = os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) -os.environ["AIAC_REALM"] = TEST_REALM # the PCE reads back the realm we provision -os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") -os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") -os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") -os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", str(HERE / "policy.explicit.md")) -os.environ.setdefault("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") # inherited by the IdP subprocess - -from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin # noqa: E402 -from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError # noqa: E402 - -from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules # noqa: E402 -from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration # noqa: E402 -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope # noqa: E402 -from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply # noqa: E402 -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule # noqa: E402 - - -def _host_port(url: str, default_port: int) -> tuple[str, int]: - parts = urlsplit(url) - return parts.hostname or "127.0.0.1", parts.port or default_port - - -def _connect_admin() -> KeycloakAdmin: - """Connect to the admin realm so the launcher can create/delete the test realm.""" - creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") - admin_realm = os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"] - return KeycloakAdmin( - server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], - realm_name=admin_realm, - user_realm_name=admin_realm, - username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], - password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - ) - - -# Keycloak caps realm-role and client descriptions at 255 chars. These four scenario descriptions -# exceed it, so the launcher provisions a <=255 rendering that preserves the meaning (the client -# ones keep the "Agent" / "Tool" keyword the IdP type inference needs). scenario.py keeps the -# verbatim text as the source of truth; the PRB reads the shortened developer / tester text back -# from Keycloak. -_KEYCLOAK_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = { - "developer": ( - "Developer — an engineering user who needs read and write access to source repository " - "contents and read access to the issue tracker, but does not modify issues. Resolves to " - "source read, source write, and issues read." - ), - "tester": ( - "Tester — a quality-assurance user who needs full read and write access to issues (to " - "file, triage, and update reports) but does not touch source repository contents. " - "Resolves to issues read and issues write." - ), - scn.AGENT_ID: ( - "GitHub Agent — an autonomous agent acting on a user's GitHub repositories and issue " - "tracker, delegating each operation to the github-tool. Source: `source-helper` / " - "`source-access`; issues: `issues-helper` / `issues-access`." - ), - scn.TOOL_ID: ( - "GitHub Tool — a capability provider exposing fine-grained operations against GitHub: read " - "source (`source-read`), write source (`source-write`), read issues (`issues-read`), write " - "issues (`issues-write`). It performs the actual GitHub calls." - ), -} - - -def _kc_desc(name: str, full: str) -> str: - """Keycloak-storable (<=255 char) description for ``name``: the shortened rendering when the - verbatim ``full`` description is over Keycloak's limit, else ``full`` unchanged.""" - desc = _KEYCLOAK_DESCRIPTIONS.get(name, full) - if len(desc) > 255: - raise ValueError(f"Keycloak description for {name!r} is {len(desc)} chars (>255)") - return desc - - -def provision_keycloak_admin(admin: KeycloakAdmin, test_realm: str) -> None: - """Provision the realm via ``python-keycloak`` (idempotent: delete-if-exists, then create). - - Creates the realm, the ``developer`` / ``tester`` realm roles, the ``dev-user`` / ``test-user`` - users (with role assignments), and the ``github-agent`` / ``github-tool`` clients. The agent - client enables a service account so its client roles can be assigned to it later. - """ - try: - admin.delete_realm(test_realm) - except KeycloakError: - pass # realm absent — nothing to delete - admin.create_realm({"realm": test_realm, "enabled": True}) - admin.change_current_realm(test_realm) - - for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): - admin.create_realm_role({"name": name, "description": _kc_desc(name, description)}, skip_exists=True) - - for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): - user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) - admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) - admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) - - def _client(client_id: str, description: str) -> dict: - return { - "clientId": client_id, - "enabled": True, - "description": description, - "protocol": "openid-connect", - "publicClient": False, # confidential — required for a service account - "serviceAccountsEnabled": True, - "standardFlowEnabled": False, - } - - admin.create_client(_client(scn.AGENT_ID, _kc_desc(scn.AGENT_ID, scn.AGENT_DESCRIPTION)), skip_exists=True) - admin.create_client(_client(scn.TOOL_ID, _kc_desc(scn.TOOL_ID, scn.TOOL_DESCRIPTION)), skip_exists=True) - - -def provision_via_config(config: Configuration) -> None: - """Provision client roles + scopes and their service mappings through the aiac IdP library. - - This is the real product surface the PCE reads back: it creates the agent/tool scopes and the - agent client roles, then maps scopes->services and client-roles->agent so ``get_services_by_*`` - and ``get_service().roles/.scopes`` resolve. - """ - agent_scopes = {name: config.create_scope(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items()} - tool_scopes = {name: config.create_scope(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.TOOL_SCOPES.items()} - agent_roles = {name: config.create_role(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.AGENT_ROLES.items()} - - services = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} - agent_svc, tool_svc = services[scn.AGENT_ID], services[scn.TOOL_ID] - - for scope in agent_scopes.values(): - config.map_scope_to_service(agent_svc, scope) - for scope in tool_scopes.values(): - config.map_scope_to_service(tool_svc, scope) - for role in agent_roles.values(): - config.map_role_to_service(agent_svc, role) - - -def _read_back(config: Configuration) -> tuple[dict[str, Role], dict[str, Scope]]: - """Read roles + scopes back through the IdP library (carrying real ids + descriptions).""" - roles = {r.name: r for r in config.get_roles()} - scopes = {s.name: s for s in config.get_scopes()} - return roles, scopes - - -def orchestrate_prb(roles: dict[str, Role], scopes: dict[str, Scope]) -> list[PolicyRule]: - """Proto-UC1: run the three PRB mappings against the real LLM and concatenate the rules.""" - user_roles = [roles[name] for name in scn.USER_ROLES] - agent_scopes = [scopes[name] for name in scn.AGENT_SCOPES] - tool_scopes = [scopes[name] for name in scn.TOOL_SCOPES] - agent_roles = [roles[name] for name in scn.AGENT_ROLES] - - rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] - for agent_scope in agent_scopes: # (a) user role -> agent scope - rules += build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope) - for tool_scope in tool_scopes: # (b) user role -> tool scope - rules += build_scope_rules(user_roles, tool_scope) - for agent_role in agent_roles: # (c) agent role -> tool scopes - rules += build_role_rules(agent_role, tool_scopes) - return rules - - -def main() -> None: - logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(levelname)s %(name)s: %(message)s") - # Fail fast on inputs that have no safe default (the PRB LLM has none either). - require_env( - "KEYCLOAK_URL", - "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", - "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD", - "LLM_BASE_URL", - "LLM_MODEL", - "LLM_API_KEY", - ) - - output_dir = resolve_output_dir(HERE / "rego_out") - output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - db_path = os.environ.get("AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH") or str( - Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="aiac-store-")) / "policy_model.db" - ) - - admin = _connect_admin() - provision_keycloak_admin(admin, TEST_REALM) - - idp_host, idp_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL"], 7071) - store_host, store_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL"], 7074) - opa_host, opa_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"], 7072) - services = [ - Service("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app", port=idp_port, host=idp_host), - Service( - "aiac.policy.store.service.main:app", - port=store_port, - host=store_host, - env={"AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH": db_path}, - ), - Service( - "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", - port=opa_port, - host=opa_host, - env={"REGO_OUTPUT_DIR": str(output_dir)}, - ), - ] - - with running_services(services, src=SRC): - config = Configuration.for_realm(TEST_REALM) - provision_via_config(config) - roles, scopes = _read_back(config) - rules = orchestrate_prb(roles, scopes) - compute_and_apply(rules, override=False) - - print_rego_dir(output_dir) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main() diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego b/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7489560a --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +package probe.outbound +import future.keywords + +# Outbound decision probe for the fixed `github_agent` scenario. The generated +# `github_agent.outbound.rego` exposes only data + an `allow` keyed on a concrete +# tool scope; this probe binds an inbound `input.function_name` to a tool scope by +# soft-matching their token sets, so the test can drive the outbound gate the way a +# caller would (by function name) rather than by pre-resolved scope. +gen := data.authz.github_agent.outbound + +# Case/separator-insensitive token set: "Source.Read" and "source-read" both -> {"source","read"}. +tokens(s) := {lower(t) | some t in regex.split(`[._-]+`, s)} + +# Tool scopes the user (subject) is entitled to on the target. +subject_scopes contains scope if { + some role in gen.subject_roles[input.subject] + some scope in gen.outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] + scope in gen.target_scopes[input.target] +} + +# Tool scopes the agent is entitled to on the target. +agent_allowed contains scope if { + some role in gen.agent_roles + some scope in gen.agent_role_scopes[role] + scope in gen.target_scopes[input.target] +} + +default allow := false +allow if { + some s in subject_scopes + tokens(s) == tokens(input.function_name) + some a in agent_allowed + tokens(a) == tokens(input.function_name) +} diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index ed938cced..9c775894b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ USERS: dict[str, str] = { "dev-user": "developer", "test-user": "tester", + "devops-user": "devops", } # Fixed dev password for the provisioned test users (throwaway realm). @@ -32,86 +33,72 @@ # --- Descriptions (verbatim from the spec's *Scenario inputs*) ------------------------------ # -# The client descriptions deliberately contain the words "Agent" / "Tool" so the IdP library's -# type inference (``_build_service``) tags them Agent / Tool — the tool tag is what makes the PCE -# omit the tool model. +# These descriptions feed the PRB's LLM role→scope mapping. They do NOT drive service typing: +# the IdP types services via the canonical ``client.type`` attribute (set by the launcher through +# ``config.set_service_type``), not by inferring "Agent"/"Tool" from the description text. AGENT_DESCRIPTION = ( - "GitHub Agent — an autonomous agent that acts on a user's GitHub source repositories and " - "issue tracker on the user's behalf. It performs source-code work (inspecting repository " - "file contents and committing changes) and issue-management work (reading issue threads and " - "creating or updating issues). Its source-code responsibility is represented by the " - "`source-helper` client role and gated at the agent boundary by the `source-access` scope; " - "its issue-management responsibility is represented by the `issues-helper` client role and " - "gated by the `issues-access` scope. The agent does not call GitHub directly — it delegates " - "each concrete operation to the `github-tool`, so its own scopes describe capabilities it may " - "exercise while the tool's scopes describe the operations those capabilities resolve to." + "Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an issue tracker. " + "It inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates issues and " + "their threads." ) TOOL_DESCRIPTION = ( - "GitHub Tool — a capability provider that exposes fine-grained, least-privilege operations " - "against GitHub source repositories and the issue tracker. It offers four distinct " - "operations, each represented by its own scope: read source (`source-read`) and write source " - "(`source-write`) for repository file contents, and read issues (`issues-read`) and write " - "issues (`issues-write`) for the issue tracker. The tool performs the actual GitHub calls; " - "every caller (such as the `github-agent` acting for a user) must present the specific scope " - "for each operation it invokes." + "Capability provider Tool for source repositories and an issue tracker. It performs read and " + "write operations on repository source contents and on issues and their comment threads." ) # name -> description. Realm roles held by users. USER_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { "developer": ( - "Developer — an engineering user who works on the codebase. A developer needs full read " - "and write access to source repository contents (to inspect and change code) and read " - "access to the issue tracker (to see reported work), but does not modify issues. " - "Resolves to source read, source write, and issues read." + "Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining " + "code) and fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and " + "consults issues for defect reports." ), "tester": ( - "Tester — a quality-assurance user who works through the issue tracker. A tester needs " - "full read and write access to issues (to file, triage, and update defect and test " - "reports) but does not touch source repository contents. Resolves to issues read and " - "issues write." + "Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through " + "the issue tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue " + "tracker, not in source." + ), + # Deny-by-default control: devops appears in no INBOUND/OUTBOUND pair below. Its description is + # deliberately unrelated to source and issue work, so the PRB derives no agent or tool scope for + # it and deny-by-default leaves devops-user denied everywhere. + "devops": ( + "DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime " + "environments; does not author source code and does not manage the issue tracker." ), } # name -> description. The github-agent's client roles. AGENT_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { "source-helper": ( - "The github-agent's client role for source-code operations. Groups the agent's ability " - "to read and write repository source content; gated at the agent boundary by " - "`source-access`, and downstream resolves to the tool's `source-read` / `source-write`." + "Client role for source-code operations, covering reading and writing repository source " + "content." ), "issues-helper": ( - "The github-agent's client role for issue operations. Groups the agent's ability to read " - "and write issues; gated at the agent boundary by `issues-access`, and downstream " - "resolves to the tool's `issues-read` / `issues-write`." + "Client role for issue-tracker operations, covering reading and writing issues and their " + "threads." ), } # name -> description. Agent-boundary scopes exposed by the github-agent. AGENT_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { "source-access": ( - "Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's source capability (the " - "`source-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's source-code functions." + "Scope granting use of a source-code capability — invoking source-code functions such as " + "reading and changing repository contents." ), "issues-access": ( - "Agent-boundary scope granting use of the github-agent's issues capability (the " - "`issues-helper` role). A user holding it may invoke the agent's issue functions." + "Scope granting use of an issue-management capability — invoking issue functions such as " + "reading and updating issues." ), } # name -> description. Fine-grained operations exposed by the github-tool. TOOL_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { - "source-read": ( - "Tool operation: read source repository contents (file listings and file bodies). " - "Read-only." - ), - "source-write": ( - "Tool operation: create, modify, or delete source repository contents (commits / file " - "writes)." - ), - "issues-read": "Tool operation: read issues and their comments/threads. Read-only.", - "issues-write": "Tool operation: create and update issues (open, edit, comment, close).", + "source-read": "Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only.", + "source-write": "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes.", + "issues-read": "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only.", + "issues-write": "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close.", } # --- Role → access facts (name-level; the single source of truth) --------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c2ff585bf --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +"""End-to-end policy-pipeline integration test — the generated Rego is the artifact under test. + +Parametrized pytest suite for the fixed ``github-agent`` scenario (spec: +``inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md``). A single session fixture drives the +whole identity->policy pipeline with nothing mocked: it provisions a live Keycloak realm, spawns the +IdP Configuration, Policy Store, and OPA Policy Writer services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, runs the +real Policy Rules Builder (real LLM) to map roles->scopes, then the real Policy Computation Engine to +build the ``PolicyModel`` and push ``.rego`` files to the OPA filesystem stub. It does this twice — +once for the explicit ``policy.md`` and once for the abstract one — and leaves both Rego sets on disk +under ``rego_out/<variant>/``. + +Each test then evaluates the generated Rego with the standalone ``opa`` binary and asserts the verdict +against the scenario's role->access truth table (``scenario.py``). A wrong LLM/PCE mapping fails the +exact ``variant / subject[ / function_name]`` cell. The outbound gate is driven by ``function_name`` +(reformatted to exercise the soft match) through ``probe.rego``; the inbound gate queries the real +inbound ``allow`` directly. + +This is the pytest replacement for the former write-only ``policy_pipeline.py`` launcher; its helpers +were ported here verbatim. + +Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to aiac-e2e): + .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v +Without ``-m integration`` the suite is skipped; without ``opa`` each node skips at runtime. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import logging +import os +import shutil +import subprocess +import sys +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path +from urllib.parse import urlsplit + +import pytest + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +SRC = REPO_ROOT / "src" +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves +sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC)) # so ``import aiac.*`` resolves + +from test.integration import scenario as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 + Service, + require_env, + running_services, +) + +# --- Resolve config + set env BEFORE importing aiac (the libraries read env at import time) --- +TEST_REALM = os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) +os.environ["AIAC_REALM"] = TEST_REALM # the PCE reads back the realm we provision +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") +os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", str(HERE / "policy.explicit.md")) # overridden per variant +os.environ.setdefault("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") # inherited by the IdP subprocess + +from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin # noqa: E402 +from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError # noqa: E402 + +from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules # noqa: E402 +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration # noqa: E402 +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope # noqa: E402 +from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply # noqa: E402 +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule # noqa: E402 + +log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +VARIANTS = ("explicit", "abstract") + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Ported helpers (verbatim from the former policy_pipeline.py launcher) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def _host_port(url: str, default_port: int) -> tuple[str, int]: + parts = urlsplit(url) + return parts.hostname or "127.0.0.1", parts.port or default_port + + +def _connect_admin() -> KeycloakAdmin: + """Connect to the admin realm so the launcher can create/delete the test realm.""" + creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + admin_realm = os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"] + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=admin_realm, + user_realm_name=admin_realm, + username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +def provision_keycloak_admin(admin: KeycloakAdmin, test_realm: str) -> None: + """Provision the realm via ``python-keycloak`` (idempotent: delete-if-exists, then create). + + Driven entirely off ``scenario.py``: creates the realm, every ``scn.USER_ROLES`` realm role + (``developer`` / ``tester`` / ``devops``), every ``scn.USERS`` user (with role assignments), and + the ``github-agent`` / ``github-tool`` clients. The agent client enables a service account so + its client roles can be assigned to it later. + """ + try: + admin.delete_realm(test_realm) + except KeycloakError: + pass # realm absent — nothing to delete + admin.create_realm({"realm": test_realm, "enabled": True}) + admin.change_current_realm(test_realm) + + for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): + admin.create_realm_role({"name": name, "description": description}, skip_exists=True) + + for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): + user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) + admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) + + def _client(client_id: str, description: str) -> dict: + return { + "clientId": client_id, + "enabled": True, + "description": description, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "publicClient": False, # confidential — required for a service account + "serviceAccountsEnabled": True, + "standardFlowEnabled": False, + } + + admin.create_client(_client(scn.AGENT_ID, scn.AGENT_DESCRIPTION), skip_exists=True) + admin.create_client(_client(scn.TOOL_ID, scn.TOOL_DESCRIPTION), skip_exists=True) + + +def provision_via_config(config: Configuration) -> None: + """Provision client roles + scopes and their service mappings through the aiac IdP library. + + This is the real product surface the PCE reads back: it creates the agent/tool scopes and the + agent client roles, then maps scopes->services and client-roles->agent so ``get_services_by_*`` + and ``get_service().roles/.scopes`` resolve. NOT idempotent — call exactly once per realm. + """ + agent_scopes = {name: config.create_scope(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items()} + tool_scopes = {name: config.create_scope(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.TOOL_SCOPES.items()} + agent_roles = {name: config.create_role(name, desc) for name, desc in scn.AGENT_ROLES.items()} + + services = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} + agent_svc, tool_svc = services[scn.AGENT_ID], services[scn.TOOL_ID] + + for scope in agent_scopes.values(): + config.map_scope_to_service(agent_svc, scope) + for scope in tool_scopes.values(): + config.map_scope_to_service(tool_svc, scope) + for role in agent_roles.values(): + config.map_role_to_service(agent_svc, role) + + # Type the services via the canonical ``client.type`` attribute using the IdP setter. The IdP no + # longer infers type from the description (``_build_service`` leaves it to the ``client.type`` + # attribute / spiffe:// clientId). The Agent tag makes the PCE build the agent model; the Tool + # tag makes it omit the tool model. Without this the PCE builds an empty model — nothing is + # stored and no rego is written. + config.set_service_type(agent_svc, "Agent") + config.set_service_type(tool_svc, "Tool") + + +def _read_back(config: Configuration) -> tuple[dict[str, Role], dict[str, Scope]]: + """Read roles + scopes back through the IdP library (carrying real ids + descriptions).""" + roles = {r.name: r for r in config.get_roles()} + scopes = {s.name: s for s in config.get_scopes()} + return roles, scopes + + +def orchestrate_prb(roles: dict[str, Role], scopes: dict[str, Scope]) -> list[PolicyRule]: + """Proto-UC1: run the three PRB mappings against the real LLM and concatenate the rules.""" + user_roles = [roles[name] for name in scn.USER_ROLES] + agent_scopes = [scopes[name] for name in scn.AGENT_SCOPES] + tool_scopes = [scopes[name] for name in scn.TOOL_SCOPES] + agent_roles = [roles[name] for name in scn.AGENT_ROLES] + + rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] + for agent_scope in agent_scopes: # (a) user role -> agent scope + rules += build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope) + for tool_scope in tool_scopes: # (b) user role -> tool scope + rules += build_scope_rules(user_roles, tool_scope) + for agent_role in agent_roles: # (c) agent role -> tool scopes + rules += build_role_rules(agent_role, tool_scopes) + return rules + + +# ====================================================================================== +# OPA evaluation +# ====================================================================================== + + +def opa_bin() -> str: + """Path to the ``opa`` binary, or skip the calling test if it cannot be found.""" + found = os.environ.get("OPA_BIN") or shutil.which("opa") + if not found: + pytest.skip("opa binary not found (set OPA_BIN or add opa to PATH)") + return found + + +def opa_eval(rego_paths: list[Path], query: str, input_doc: dict) -> bool: + """Evaluate ``query`` against the given Rego file(s) with ``input_doc`` on stdin; return the + boolean result. Raises (via ``check=True``) if OPA rejects the Rego or the query errors.""" + cmd = [ + opa_bin(), + "eval", + "-f", + "json", + *sum((["-d", str(p)] for p in rego_paths), []), + "--stdin-input", + query, + ] + out = subprocess.run( + cmd, input=json.dumps(input_doc), capture_output=True, text=True, check=True + ).stdout + return json.loads(out)["result"][0]["expressions"][0]["value"] + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Expected-verdict oracle (pure functions over the scenario truth table) +# ====================================================================================== + +_INBOUND_SOURCES = {role for role, _ in scn.INBOUND_PAIRS} # user-roles that may reach some agent scope +_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT = set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) # (user-role, tool-scope) the subject may reach +_AGENT_REACHABLE = {scope for _, scope in scn.OUTBOUND_PAIRS} # tool-scopes some agent role reaches + + +def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: + """A user may call the agent iff their realm role appears as a source in ``INBOUND_PAIRS``.""" + return scn.USERS[subject] in _INBOUND_SOURCES + + +def expected_outbound(subject: str, scope: str) -> bool: + """A user's call resolves to a tool scope iff the subject is entitled to it + (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) *and* some agent role is entitled to it (``OUTBOUND_PAIRS``).""" + return (scn.USERS[subject], scope) in _OUTBOUND_SUBJECT and scope in _AGENT_REACHABLE + + +def reformat_function_name(scope: str) -> str: + """Render a tool scope as a differently-cased/separated ``function_name`` to exercise the + probe's token soft-match: ``source-read`` -> ``Source.Read``.""" + return ".".join(part.capitalize() for part in scope.split("-")) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Session fixture — the one-time pipeline run (both policy variants) +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="session") +def pipeline() -> dict[str, Path]: + """Provision Keycloak once, then run the real PRB+PCE pipeline for each policy variant, leaving + ``.rego`` on disk under ``rego_out/<variant>/``. Returns ``{variant: rego_dir}``.""" + require_env( + "KEYCLOAK_URL", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", + "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD", + "LLM_BASE_URL", + "LLM_MODEL", + "LLM_API_KEY", + ) + + admin = _connect_admin() + provision_keycloak_admin(admin, TEST_REALM) + + idp_host, idp_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL"], 7071) + store_host, store_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL"], 7074) + opa_host, opa_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"], 7072) + + idp = Service("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app", port=idp_port, host=idp_host) + results: dict[str, Path] = {} + + # IdP stays up across both variants; the store/opa pair is restarted per variant so each variant + # writes into a fresh store (compute_and_apply merges onto the existing model with override=False). + with running_services([idp], src=SRC): + config = Configuration.for_realm(TEST_REALM) + provision_via_config(config) # exactly once — not idempotent + roles, scopes = _read_back(config) + + for variant in VARIANTS: + rego_dir = HERE / "rego_out" / variant + rego_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + db_path = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"aiac-store-{variant}-")) / "policy_model.db" + os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_FILE"] = str(HERE / f"policy.{variant}.md") # read per PRB call + log.info("variant %s: policy=%s rego_dir=%s", variant, os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_FILE"], rego_dir) + + store = Service( + "aiac.policy.store.service.main:app", + port=store_port, + host=store_host, + env={"AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH": str(db_path)}, + ) + opa = Service( + "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", + port=opa_port, + host=opa_host, + env={"REGO_OUTPUT_DIR": str(rego_dir)}, + ) + with running_services([store, opa], src=SRC): + rules = orchestrate_prb(roles, scopes) + compute_and_apply(rules, override=False) + results[variant] = rego_dir + + yield results + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Tests +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +def test_inbound(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str, subject: str) -> None: + """The generated inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some agent scope.""" + rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.inbound.rego" + allowed = opa_eval([rego], "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) + assert allowed == expected_inbound(subject) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("scope", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) +def test_outbound(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str, subject: str, scope: str) -> None: + """The generated outbound gate (via the probe) allows a subject's call to a tool operation iff + both the subject and some agent role are entitled to that operation's scope.""" + rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" + fn = reformat_function_name(scope) # soft-match rendering, e.g. source-read -> Source.Read + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, HERE / "probe.rego"], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": subject, "target": scn.TOOL_ID, "function_name": fn}, + ) + assert allowed == expected_outbound(subject, scope) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +def test_outbound_unknown_target_denied(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str) -> None: + """An otherwise-allowed call to an unknown target is denied (target not in target_scopes).""" + rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, HERE / "probe.rego"], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": "dev-user", "target": "unknown-tool", "function_name": "Source.Read"}, + ) + assert allowed is False + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +def test_outbound_soft_match_not_overbroad(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str) -> None: + """A function name whose tokens match no scope is denied — guards against soft-match over-match.""" + rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, HERE / "probe.rego"], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": "dev-user", "target": scn.TOOL_ID, "function_name": "delete_everything"}, + ) + assert allowed is False From 2f099549401e4f5f9e5d167441cf5124f17ab477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 14:25:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 194/273] docs(aiac): elaborate policy-pipeline roles; rename agent roles to source-operator/issues-operator Elaborate the abstract policy's developer/tester rules with each role's work-context (drawn from the Developer/Tester descriptions) while keeping them scope-name-free. Rename the agent client roles source-helper/ issues-helper to source-operator/issues-operator across the spec and the scenario implementation, and move the elaborated operation descriptions onto the agent-role definitions so the abstract policy.md no longer needs a dedicated agent-capability bullet for PRB mapping (c). Uses the plural issues-operator (not issue-operator): the singular token deterministically trips the PRB LLM auditor into conflating the agent role with the tester user, rejecting the valid (tester, issues-write) grant. The plural form is consistent with every other issues-* name and passes. Verified: policy-pipeline integration test 34/34 PASSED (both explicit and abstract variants); offline suite 263 passed, 34 deselected. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 35 ++++++++++--------- aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md | 5 ++- aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md | 4 +-- aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 20 +++++------ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 2637dfe2d..ccf4e560a 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below **not** a list — a list fails the `in ("Agent","Tool")` check, resolves the type to `None`, and yields empty pipeline output. - via the **aiac IdP `Configuration` library** (the real product surface the PCE reads back): create - the client roles (`source-helper`, `issues-helper`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, + the client roles (`source-operator`, `issues-operator`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) with the descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*, and map roles→services and scopes→services so `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` and `get_service().roles` / @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ exercises the deny-by-default path. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| | Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-e2e`) | -| Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-helper`, `issues-helper`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | +| Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-operator`, `issues-operator`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | | Tool | `github-tool` (scopes `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) | | Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | | `developer` | source read/write + issues read | @@ -321,9 +321,10 @@ Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. together so the eyeballed output stays reviewable. - Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's - output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. The abstract variant now - carries an agent-capability line (the `source-helper` / `issues-helper` bullet) so mapping (c) - survives deny-by-default and both variants reproduce the same Rego. + output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. The abstract variant + carries **no** agent-capability bullet; it relies on the elaborated `source-operator` / + `issues-operator` role descriptions (provisioned into Keycloak) for mapping (c), so it survives + deny-by-default and both variants reproduce the same Rego. - Descriptions are ≤255 characters and written **verbatim** into Keycloak; there is no shortened / verbatim split. (Keycloak caps role and client descriptions at 255 chars, and the generic descriptions are authored to stay within that cap.) @@ -395,10 +396,10 @@ tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keywor **Client roles (agent):** -- `source-helper` — Client role for source-code operations, covering reading and writing repository - source content. -- `issues-helper` — Client role for issue-tracker operations, covering reading and writing issues and - their threads. +- `source-operator` — Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, + creating, and modifying files. +- `issues-operator` — Covers read and write access to the issue tracker — reading, filing, updating, + and commenting on issues and their threads. **Agent scopes:** @@ -434,21 +435,21 @@ policy supports it; deny by default. - tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. ## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) -- source-helper may perform source-read and source-write. -- issues-helper may perform issues-read and issues-write. +- source-operator may perform source-read and source-write. +- issues-operator may perform issues-read and issues-write. ``` ### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) Relies on the PRB / LLM to expand "read and modify source" into the concrete scopes. Encodes the same -role→access facts as Version 1. The third bullet is an abstract agent-capability line so mapping (c) -(agent-role→tool-scope) survives the PRB's deny-by-default-on-silence rule and both variants reproduce -the same Rego. +role→access facts as Version 1. It carries **no** agent-capability bullet; mapping (c) +(agent-role→tool-scope) is instead derived from the elaborated `source-operator` / `issues-operator` +role descriptions (see *Role & scope descriptions*), so it survives the PRB's deny-by-default-on-silence +rule and both variants reproduce the same Rego. ```markdown Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. -- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. -- Testers may read and modify issues. -- The source-helper role covers reading and modifying source; the issues-helper role covers reading and modifying issues. +- Developers work primarily in source — writing and maintaining code — and consult the issue tracker only to follow defect reports; grant them full read and write access to source contents, and read-only access to issues. +- Testers work exclusively in the issue tracker — filing, triaging, and updating defect reports — and do not work in source; grant them full read and write access to issues, and no access to source. ``` diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md index f480d1099..cca6c4601 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. -- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. -- Testers may read and modify issues. -- The source-helper role covers reading and modifying source; the issues-helper role covers reading and modifying issues. +- Developers work primarily in source — writing and maintaining code — and consult the issue tracker only to follow defect reports; grant them full read and write access to source contents, and read-only access to issues. +- Testers work exclusively in the issue tracker — filing, triaging, and updating defect reports — and do not work in source; grant them full read and write access to issues, and no access to source. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md index 6eec1cf38..08582c278 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md @@ -12,5 +12,5 @@ policy supports it; deny by default. - tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. ## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) -- source-helper may perform source-read and source-write. -- issues-helper may perform issues-read and issues-write. +- source-operator may perform source-read and source-write. +- issues-operator may perform issues-read and issues-write. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index 9c775894b..f32deeaac 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -71,13 +71,13 @@ # name -> description. The github-agent's client roles. AGENT_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { - "source-helper": ( - "Client role for source-code operations, covering reading and writing repository source " - "content." + "source-operator": ( + "Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, creating, " + "and modifying files." ), - "issues-helper": ( - "Client role for issue-tracker operations, covering reading and writing issues and their " - "threads." + "issues-operator": ( + "Covers read and write access to the issue tracker — reading, filing, updating, and " + "commenting on issues and their threads." ), } @@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ ] OUTBOUND_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ - ("source-helper", "source-read"), - ("source-helper", "source-write"), - ("issues-helper", "issues-read"), - ("issues-helper", "issues-write"), + ("source-operator", "source-read"), + ("source-operator", "source-write"), + ("issues-operator", "issues-read"), + ("issues-operator", "issues-write"), ] OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ From dc3b5b2a5f45569dfda5e8a59927d40a2d658cce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 14:53:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 195/273] fix(aiac): scope PRB auditor to one access relationship per verdict MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The PRB LLM auditor could wrongly reject a valid grant when a policy describes several access relationships over the same entities. A tool operation granted to exactly one subject that also appeared under a different relationship (agent-role -> tool operations) was mis-attributed to the agent-role dimension, so the auditor denied the subject's grant and the builder raised PolicyRulesBuilderError, aborting the run. Surfaced by the policy-pipeline integration test after the agent client role was named issue-operator (singular): the auditor treated that agent-role statement as authoritative for a user-role question and rejected (tester, issues-write). A name sweep showed only the person-like singular issue-operator tripped it — a lexical collision on top of a structural gap. Fix: an auditor-only meta-rule (_AUDITOR_DIMENSION) instructing it to judge each candidate independently and to treat a policy statement about a non-candidate entity as a different relationship — never evidence for or against a candidate's grant. Phrased "explicit statement or unambiguous description" so the abstract policy variant's description-based mapping is not made stricter; proposer and shared safety rules untouched. Adds an integration regression test pinning the known-bad singular name, and a breadcrumb in scenario.py on the deliberate plural issues-operator. Validated: regression test PASSED live; policy-pipeline 34/34 both variants (no regression); PRB unit tests 10 passed; offline suite 263 passed, 35 deselected. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py | 27 ++++-- .../test_auditor_dimension_integration.py | 89 +++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 8 ++ 3 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py index 49f7e0268..4bc792b6f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py @@ -1,10 +1,13 @@ """Lean proposer/auditor message builders for both PRB directions. No worked examples, no domain content. The static system message carries the -task framing plus two safety meta-rules (deny-by-default / policy-silence, and -stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity). Everything variable — policy -text, focal entity, candidates, and any auditor feedback — goes in the user -message so it is observable in tests. +task framing plus two shared safety meta-rules (deny-by-default / policy-silence, +and stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity). The auditor carries one +additional relationship-scoping rule: a policy statement about an entity that is +not among the candidates describes a different access relationship and is not +evidence for or against a candidate's grant (see _AUDITOR_DIMENSION). Everything +variable — policy text, focal entity, candidates, and any auditor feedback — goes +in the user message so it is observable in tests. """ from langchain_core.messages import BaseMessage, HumanMessage, SystemMessage @@ -16,9 +19,23 @@ "2) Stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity described below; ignore anything else." ) _PROPOSER_SYSTEM = "You map access policy to concrete grants.\n" + _SAFETY + +# Auditor-only meta-rule. A policy may state several distinct access relationships over the same +# entities (e.g. which subjects may reach a capability, and which operations a capability bundles). +# The auditor judges ONE relationship at a time — whether each listed candidate is granted the focal +# entity — so a statement about a NON-candidate entity describes a different relationship and must not +# count against a candidate's otherwise-supported grant. Without this, a scope granted to a single +# subject that ALSO appears on the other side of a different relation can be wrongly rejected. +_AUDITOR_DIMENSION = ( + "\n3) A policy may describe several different access relationships over the same entities. Judge " + "each candidate independently, by what the policy grants THAT candidate in relation to the focal " + "entity — an explicit statement or an unambiguous description. A policy statement about an entity " + "that is NOT among the listed candidates concerns a different relationship: it is never evidence " + "for or against a candidate's grant, even when it names the focal entity." +) _AUDITOR_SYSTEM = ( "You audit a proposed set of grants. Approve only if every granted pair is " - "policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in.\n" + _SAFETY + "policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in.\n" + _SAFETY + _AUDITOR_DIMENSION ) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec660bae0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +"""Integration regression for the auditor relationship-scoping rule (prompts._AUDITOR_DIMENSION). + +Reproduces a field failure: a policy that grants a tool operation to exactly one subject AND names +that same operation under a *different* relationship (agent-role -> tool operations) made the LLM +auditor conflate the two relationships and wrongly deny the subject's grant. The trigger was the +singular actor-noun agent role name ``issue-operator``, which the auditor read as competing with the +``tester`` subject; it rejected the valid ``(tester, issues-write)`` grant, aborting the whole PRB run. + +The fix is an auditor-only meta-rule: a policy statement about an entity that is NOT among the +candidates describes a different relationship and is not evidence for or against a candidate's grant. +This test pins the known-bad singular name so the collision cannot silently return. + +Requires a live LLM (``@pytest.mark.integration``); skips when ``LLM_BASE_URL`` is unset. It does not +touch Keycloak or any service — it calls ``build_scope_rules`` directly with a temp policy file. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + +# Section 3 deliberately uses the SINGULAR ``issue-operator`` that historically tripped the auditor. +# ``tester`` is granted ``issues-write`` ONLY under "Users -> tool operations"; ``issue-operator`` is a +# different (agent-role) relationship and must not count against tester's grant. +_POLICY = """\ +# Access Control Policy + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis; deny by default. + +## Users -> tool operations (subject may reach the tool) +- developer may perform source-read, source-write, and issues-read. +- tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. + +## Agent roles -> tool operations (agent may reach the tool) +- source-operator may perform source-read and source-write. +- issue-operator may perform issues-read and issues-write. +""" + +_USER_ROLES = { + "developer": "Developer — an engineering user who writes and maintains source code.", + "tester": "Tester — a quality-assurance user who files, triages, and updates issue reports.", + "devops": "DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime environments.", +} +_ISSUES_WRITE_DESC = "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close." + + +@pytest.fixture +def _bad_name_policy(): + """Point AIAC_POLICY_FILE at the known-bad policy; skip when no live LLM is configured.""" + if not os.getenv("LLM_BASE_URL"): + pytest.skip("LLM_BASE_URL unset — PRB auditor regression needs a live LLM") + f = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".md", delete=False) + f.write(_POLICY) + f.close() + prev = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_FILE") + os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_FILE"] = f.name + try: + yield + finally: + Path(f.name).unlink(missing_ok=True) + if prev is None: + os.environ.pop("AIAC_POLICY_FILE", None) + else: + os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_FILE"] = prev + + +def test_auditor_admits_single_subject_grant_despite_competing_relation(_bad_name_policy): + """(tester, issues-write) must be granted even though the singular ``issue-operator`` agent role + names issues-write under a different relationship. Pre-fix, the auditor rejected and the builder + raised PolicyRulesBuilderError; post-fix it returns exactly the tester grant.""" + from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_scope_rules + + user_roles = [ + Role(id=f"role-{name}", name=name, description=desc, composite=False) + for name, desc in _USER_ROLES.items() + ] + issues_write = Scope(id="scope-issues-write", name="issues-write", description=_ISSUES_WRITE_DESC) + + rules = build_scope_rules(user_roles, issues_write) + + granted = {r.role.name for r in rules} + assert granted == {"tester"}, f"expected only tester granted issues-write, got {sorted(granted)}" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index f32deeaac..6a91da2bd 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ } # name -> description. The github-agent's client roles. +# +# NOTE: ``issues-operator`` is intentionally PLURAL. The singular ``issue-operator`` reads to the PRB +# LLM auditor as an actor competing with the ``tester`` subject and makes it wrongly reject the valid +# (tester, issues-write) grant in mapping (b), aborting the pipeline. Plural is also consistent with +# every other issues-* name (issues-access / issues-read / issues-write). The PRB auditor was hardened +# against this class of collision (see issues/agent/3.20-policy-rules-builder.md, "Follow-up: auditor +# relationship-scoping"), but keep +# the plural here regardless — do not "tidy" it to singular to match source-operator. AGENT_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { "source-operator": ( "Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, creating, " From ff28299ba017e3004a0175ad15514f0763c6e613 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 17:41:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 196/273] fix(aiac): converge PRB output across explicit/abstract policy variants The two policy-pipeline variants describe the same access model but had drifted to semantically different grant sets: the abstract variant dropped developer->issues-access (inbound under-grant) and invented source-operator->issues-read (outbound over-grant). Both were verdict-neutral, so the coarse opa-eval oracle kept the suite green while the generated policy was wrong. Root cause: whole-policy single-context inference. The relationship-scoping rule was auditor-only and its "not among the candidates" wording excluded the focal role's own description in the agent-role->tool-op mapping, while same-theme subject prose bled across relationships. - prompts.py: _AUDITOR_DIMENSION -> shared _MAPPING_RULES on both proposer and auditor. Rule 3 (capability projection): any covered operation grants the scope, so read-only access still earns it. Rule 4 (relationship scoping, corrected): judge each grant only by evidence about that candidate and the focal entity; ignore any other entity, even a same-theme one. - test_policy_pipeline.py: capture PRB rules per variant; add grant-set equivalence + truth-table assertions (compare (role, scope) sets, not Rego text). These failed before the fix. - docs: sync PRB spec Prompts section and pipeline-test spec (step 8); update auditor-regression docstring for the shared rule. Verified live (Azure/gpt-5-mini): pipeline 43/43 both variants; auditor regression 1; PRB unit 10; offline suite 263. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 24 +++-- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 17 +++- .../agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py | 57 +++++++----- .../test_auditor_dimension_integration.py | 8 +- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 88 ++++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md index d6fbbe151..8e5ded712 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -122,11 +122,25 @@ class ScopeRulesState(_PRBWorking): # roles: list[Role]; scope: Scope ### Prompts -Lean + safety meta-rules only — task framing, the structured-output contract, -**deny-by-default / policy-silence** (grant a pair only if the policy supports it), and -**scope-strictly-to-focal**. No worked examples or domain heuristics; all substantive reasoning -is deferred to the (user-authored) policy content. The auditor prompt mirrors this: approve -only if every granted pair is policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in. +Lean — task framing, the structured-output contract, and two **safety** meta-rules +(**deny-by-default / policy-silence** — grant a pair only if the policy supports it — and +**scope-strictly-to-focal**). On top of those, two shared **mapping** rules (`_MAPPING_RULES`) +govern how evidence becomes a grant: + +- **Capability projection** — a scope names a *set* of operations; any one covered operation + established for a candidate (by the policy or by the focal/candidate descriptions) grants the + whole scope, so partial (e.g. read-only) access still earns it. +- **Relationship scoping** — a policy may state several access relationships over the same + entities; each grant is judged only by evidence about *that* candidate and the focal entity, and + a statement about an entity that is neither the focal nor a candidate (even a same-theme one) is a + different relationship that never counts either way. + +No worked examples or domain heuristics; all substantive reasoning is deferred to the +(user-authored) policy content and the entity descriptions. The **proposer and auditor share the +same rule set** — both make the same grant decision, so a rule on only one side lets the two +diverge (they did: see issue 3.20 *Follow-up: cross-variant convergence*). The auditor adds only +its framing: approve only if every granted pair is policy-supported and nothing unsupported +slipped in. ### LLM + retries diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index ccf4e560a..b12111aec 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -120,6 +120,15 @@ scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS` in `scenario.py`), not from a second hand-maintained copy — a wrong LLM/PCE mapping therefore fails the test. A failing node names the exact `variant / subject / function_name` cell. +8. **Assert grant-set equivalence (semantic, beyond the decision oracle).** The `opa eval` matrix in + step 7 is deliberately coarse: inbound `allow` only checks "reaches *some* agent scope," and the + agent→tool gate covers all four scopes so only the user gate discriminates — so a **verdict-neutral** + mapping error (a missing or spurious `(role, scope)` grant) passes step 7 unseen. To close that gap + the test also captures the PRB's `list[PolicyRule]` per variant and asserts, as order-independent + `(role, scope)` **sets** per gate, that **each variant equals the `scenario.py` truth table** and + **the two variants equal each other**. This compares grant *sets*, not Rego text (formatting/ordering + may differ; the grant set may not). This is what enforces the *both variants reproduce the same Rego* + intent stated in *Further Notes*. ## Expected output @@ -266,9 +275,11 @@ Policy Store DB and the provisioned Keycloak realm. `finally`. Keycloak and the LLM are **external** (reached via env); `opa` is an external binary. - **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** The PRB LLM is pinned to `temperature=0`, and the **explicit** `policy.md` variant states each `(role, scope)` grant outright, so its mapping is stable. The - **abstract** variant is *also* asserted against the same truth table — accepting some flakiness, since - it leans on the LLM to expand prose into concrete scopes — because it is a valuable signal and the - test is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of the default CI run. + **abstract** variant leans on the LLM to expand prose + descriptions into concrete scopes; both + variants are asserted not only cell-by-cell via `opa eval` (step 7) but at the **grant-set** level + (step 8) — each variant's `(role, scope)` set must equal the truth table *and* the other variant's. + Grant-set equivalence catches the verdict-neutral under/over-grants the decision oracle hides. Some + model-dependence remains, which is why the suite is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. - **Prior art, shared not copied.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established the shape this test reuses — `uvicorn` subprocess spawn, `GET /health` poll, env-before-import ordering, and `finally` teardown. Rather than duplicate it, that machinery lives in the shared diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py index 4bc792b6f..f0ae1fcb8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ No worked examples, no domain content. The static system message carries the task framing plus two shared safety meta-rules (deny-by-default / policy-silence, -and stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity). The auditor carries one -additional relationship-scoping rule: a policy statement about an entity that is -not among the candidates describes a different access relationship and is not -evidence for or against a candidate's grant (see _AUDITOR_DIMENSION). Everything -variable — policy text, focal entity, candidates, and any auditor feedback — goes -in the user message so it is observable in tests. +and stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity) and two shared mapping rules +(capability projection and relationship scoping — see _MAPPING_RULES). Both the +proposer and the auditor reason under the same rules because both make the same +grant decision. Everything variable — policy text, focal entity, candidates, and +any auditor feedback — goes in the user message so it is observable in tests. """ from langchain_core.messages import BaseMessage, HumanMessage, SystemMessage @@ -18,24 +17,42 @@ "if the policy is silent, do not grant.\n" "2) Stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity described below; ignore anything else." ) -_PROPOSER_SYSTEM = "You map access policy to concrete grants.\n" + _SAFETY -# Auditor-only meta-rule. A policy may state several distinct access relationships over the same -# entities (e.g. which subjects may reach a capability, and which operations a capability bundles). -# The auditor judges ONE relationship at a time — whether each listed candidate is granted the focal -# entity — so a statement about a NON-candidate entity describes a different relationship and must not -# count against a candidate's otherwise-supported grant. Without this, a scope granted to a single -# subject that ALSO appears on the other side of a different relation can be wrongly rejected. -_AUDITOR_DIMENSION = ( - "\n3) A policy may describe several different access relationships over the same entities. Judge " - "each candidate independently, by what the policy grants THAT candidate in relation to the focal " - "entity — an explicit statement or an unambiguous description. A policy statement about an entity " - "that is NOT among the listed candidates concerns a different relationship: it is never evidence " - "for or against a candidate's grant, even when it names the focal entity." +# Shared mapping rules appended to BOTH system messages so the proposer and the auditor decide grants +# under the same reasoning (a proposer-only or auditor-only rule lets the two sides diverge). +# +# Rule 3 (capability projection): a scope/capability names a SET of operations; any one covered +# operation established for a candidate — by the policy OR by the focal/candidate descriptions — +# grants the whole scope (read-only still counts). Without this, a candidate with partial access to +# a capability's domain is wrongly dropped — e.g. a read-only "consults issues" subject failing to +# earn the issue-management agent scope. +# Rule 4 (relationship scoping): a policy may state several distinct access relationships over the +# same entities. Each grant is judged by what the policy/descriptions establish for THAT candidate +# in relation to the focal entity; a statement about an entity that is NEITHER the focal entity NOR +# a candidate describes a different relationship and is never evidence. The "neither focal nor +# candidate" scoping matters in BOTH directions: focal=scope/candidates=roles (mapping a/b) and +# focal=role/candidates=scopes (mapping c) — in the latter the focal role's OWN description must +# still count, so it must not be treated as a non-candidate to ignore. Without this a scope that +# appears in two relationships bleeds across them — wrongly rejecting a single-subject grant, or +# inventing an agent-role grant from an unrelated subject statement. +_MAPPING_RULES = ( + "\n3) A scope or capability names a set of operations (see its description). Grant it to a " + "candidate when the policy — or the focal entity's and the candidate's own descriptions — shows " + "that candidate performs ANY operation the scope covers; partial access (e.g. read-only) still " + "grants the scope. A candidate shown to perform no covered operation is denied (rule 1).\n" + "4) A policy may describe several different access relationships over the same entities. Judge " + "each candidate independently, by what the policy or the descriptions establish for THAT candidate " + "in relation to the focal entity. Base each grant only on evidence about that specific candidate " + "and the focal entity; a statement about any OTHER entity — even one sharing the same domain or " + "theme (e.g. a differently-named role or subject with related access) — concerns a different " + "relationship and is never evidence for or against the grant, even when it names the focal entity " + "or the scope." ) + +_PROPOSER_SYSTEM = "You map access policy to concrete grants.\n" + _SAFETY + _MAPPING_RULES _AUDITOR_SYSTEM = ( "You audit a proposed set of grants. Approve only if every granted pair is " - "policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in.\n" + _SAFETY + _AUDITOR_DIMENSION + "policy-supported and nothing unsupported slipped in.\n" + _SAFETY + _MAPPING_RULES ) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py index ec660bae0..ba1f10643 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/policy_rules_builder/test_auditor_dimension_integration.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Integration regression for the auditor relationship-scoping rule (prompts._AUDITOR_DIMENSION). +"""Integration regression for the relationship-scoping mapping rule (prompts._MAPPING_RULES, rule 4). Reproduces a field failure: a policy that grants a tool operation to exactly one subject AND names that same operation under a *different* relationship (agent-role -> tool operations) made the LLM @@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ singular actor-noun agent role name ``issue-operator``, which the auditor read as competing with the ``tester`` subject; it rejected the valid ``(tester, issues-write)`` grant, aborting the whole PRB run. -The fix is an auditor-only meta-rule: a policy statement about an entity that is NOT among the +The fix is a relationship-scoping meta-rule: a policy statement about an entity that is NOT among the candidates describes a different relationship and is not evidence for or against a candidate's grant. -This test pins the known-bad singular name so the collision cannot silently return. +Originally auditor-only; now shared by the proposer and auditor (``_MAPPING_RULES``) so the two sides +decide grants under the same reasoning. This test pins the known-bad singular name so the collision +cannot silently return. Requires a live LLM (``@pytest.mark.integration``); skips when ``LLM_BASE_URL`` is unset. It does not touch Keycloak or any service — it calls ``build_scope_rules`` directly with a temp policy file. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index c2ff585bf..7c823df1e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -247,15 +247,53 @@ def reformat_function_name(scope: str) -> str: return ".".join(part.capitalize() for part in scope.split("-")) +# --- Grant-set extraction (semantic-equivalence oracle) ------------------------------------- +# +# The two policy variants describe the SAME access model, so the PRB must derive the same set of +# grants from each (Rego text/ordering may differ — the grant set may not). ``orchestrate_prb`` +# returns all three mappings concatenated; the four name spaces are disjoint, so each PolicyRule +# is classified into its gate by ``(role.name, scope.name)`` membership. + +_USER_ROLE_NAMES = set(scn.USER_ROLES) +_AGENT_ROLE_NAMES = set(scn.AGENT_ROLES) +_AGENT_SCOPE_NAMES = set(scn.AGENT_SCOPES) +_TOOL_SCOPE_NAMES = set(scn.TOOL_SCOPES) + + +def grant_sets(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]]: + """Classify a flat PRB rule list into the three gate grant sets, each a set of + ``(role_name, scope_name)`` pairs: ``inbound`` (user role -> agent scope), + ``outbound_subject`` (user role -> tool scope), ``outbound_target`` (agent role -> tool scope).""" + sets: dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]] = {"inbound": set(), "outbound_subject": set(), "outbound_target": set()} + for r in rules: + pair = (r.role.name, r.scope.name) + if r.role.name in _USER_ROLE_NAMES and r.scope.name in _AGENT_SCOPE_NAMES: + sets["inbound"].add(pair) + elif r.role.name in _USER_ROLE_NAMES and r.scope.name in _TOOL_SCOPE_NAMES: + sets["outbound_subject"].add(pair) + elif r.role.name in _AGENT_ROLE_NAMES and r.scope.name in _TOOL_SCOPE_NAMES: + sets["outbound_target"].add(pair) + return sets + + +_TRUTH: dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]] = { + "inbound": set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS), + "outbound_subject": set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS), + "outbound_target": set(scn.OUTBOUND_PAIRS), +} + + # ====================================================================================== # Session fixture — the one-time pipeline run (both policy variants) # ====================================================================================== @pytest.fixture(scope="session") -def pipeline() -> dict[str, Path]: +def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: """Provision Keycloak once, then run the real PRB+PCE pipeline for each policy variant, leaving - ``.rego`` on disk under ``rego_out/<variant>/``. Returns ``{variant: rego_dir}``.""" + ``.rego`` on disk under ``rego_out/<variant>/``. Returns + ``{variant: {"rego_dir": Path, "rules": list[PolicyRule]}}`` — the rules are the PRB's grant set, + captured so the equivalence/truth-table assertions can compare grants directly (not Rego text).""" require_env( "KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", @@ -273,7 +311,7 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, Path]: opa_host, opa_port = _host_port(os.environ["AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL"], 7072) idp = Service("aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app", port=idp_port, host=idp_host) - results: dict[str, Path] = {} + results: dict[str, dict] = {} # IdP stays up across both variants; the store/opa pair is restarted per variant so each variant # writes into a fresh store (compute_and_apply merges onto the existing model with override=False). @@ -304,7 +342,7 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, Path]: with running_services([store, opa], src=SRC): rules = orchestrate_prb(roles, scopes) compute_and_apply(rules, override=False) - results[variant] = rego_dir + results[variant] = {"rego_dir": rego_dir, "rules": rules} yield results @@ -316,9 +354,9 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, Path]: @pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) @pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) -def test_inbound(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str, subject: str) -> None: +def test_inbound(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, subject: str) -> None: """The generated inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some agent scope.""" - rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.inbound.rego" + rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / "github_agent.inbound.rego" allowed = opa_eval([rego], "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) assert allowed == expected_inbound(subject) @@ -326,10 +364,10 @@ def test_inbound(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str, subject: str) -> None: @pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) @pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) @pytest.mark.parametrize("scope", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) -def test_outbound(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str, subject: str, scope: str) -> None: +def test_outbound(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, subject: str, scope: str) -> None: """The generated outbound gate (via the probe) allows a subject's call to a tool operation iff both the subject and some agent role are entitled to that operation's scope.""" - rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" + rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" fn = reformat_function_name(scope) # soft-match rendering, e.g. source-read -> Source.Read allowed = opa_eval( [rego, HERE / "probe.rego"], @@ -340,9 +378,9 @@ def test_outbound(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str, subject: str, scope: @pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) -def test_outbound_unknown_target_denied(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str) -> None: +def test_outbound_unknown_target_denied(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str) -> None: """An otherwise-allowed call to an unknown target is denied (target not in target_scopes).""" - rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" + rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" allowed = opa_eval( [rego, HERE / "probe.rego"], "data.probe.outbound.allow", @@ -352,12 +390,38 @@ def test_outbound_unknown_target_denied(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str) @pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) -def test_outbound_soft_match_not_overbroad(pipeline: dict[str, Path], variant: str) -> None: +def test_outbound_soft_match_not_overbroad(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str) -> None: """A function name whose tokens match no scope is denied — guards against soft-match over-match.""" - rego = pipeline[variant] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" + rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / "github_agent.outbound.rego" allowed = opa_eval( [rego, HERE / "probe.rego"], "data.probe.outbound.allow", {"subject": "dev-user", "target": scn.TOOL_ID, "function_name": "delete_everything"}, ) assert allowed is False + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Semantic-equivalence tests — the two policy variants must yield the SAME grant set +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("gate", list(_TRUTH)) +def test_grant_set_matches_truth_table(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, gate: str) -> None: + """Each variant's PRB grant set for each gate equals the scenario truth table. Catches both + under-grants (a missing pair) and over-grants (an unsupported pair) that the coarse allow/deny + oracle above cannot see.""" + got = grant_sets(pipeline[variant]["rules"])[gate] + assert got == _TRUTH[gate], f"{variant} {gate}: missing={_TRUTH[gate] - got} extra={got - _TRUTH[gate]}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("gate", list(_TRUTH)) +def test_variants_are_semantically_equivalent(pipeline: dict[str, dict], gate: str) -> None: + """The explicit and abstract variants describe the same access model, so the PRB must derive the + same grant set from each. Compared as order-independent sets (Rego text/ordering may differ).""" + explicit = grant_sets(pipeline["explicit"]["rules"])[gate] + abstract = grant_sets(pipeline["abstract"]["rules"])[gate] + assert explicit == abstract, ( + f"{gate}: variants diverge — only-explicit={explicit - abstract} only-abstract={abstract - explicit}" + ) From 0c85274d4651dc08bd9506a432b3d09a0449e23c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 17:47:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 197/273] chore(aiac): gitignore policy-pipeline integration-test rego_out The 5.3 policy-pipeline integration test regenerates .rego per run under test/integration/rego_out/ (left on disk for eyeballing, not source of truth), mirroring the already-ignored 5.2 launcher output. probe.rego is a committed fixture outside rego_out/, so it stays tracked. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/.gitignore | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/.gitignore b/aiac/.gitignore index de6a0e747..ac57adcfe 100644 --- a/aiac/.gitignore +++ b/aiac/.gitignore @@ -5,3 +5,8 @@ inception/handoffs/ # PDP policy writer integration-test scratch output (test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py) test/pdp/policy/rego_out/ + +# policy-pipeline integration-test generated Rego (test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py); +# regenerated per run, left on disk for eyeballing — not source of truth. probe.rego is a +# committed fixture and is not under rego_out/, so it stays tracked. +test/integration/rego_out/ From 9f8b61bb9ffecf40a3cdf401d89f28d9a6f5888a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 18:36:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 198/273] refactor(aiac): remove spiffe:// clientId type fallback in IdP models A spiffe:// clientId signals SPIRE-enablement, not agent-vs-tool, so inferring type=Agent from it mis-typed SPIRE-enabled tools. Drop the fallback in Service._resolve_keycloak_fields; precedence is now explicit type -> client.type attribute -> None. The operator's kagenti.io/type label (persisted as client.type) is the authoritative type signal. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 9 +++++---- aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py | 8 ++++++-- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index f3f21b160..c596a23c1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def _build_service(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role], all_scopes: dict service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] # Type resolution is handled entirely by Service._resolve_keycloak_fields - # (client.type attribute → spiffe:// clientId → None); the library does not infer it here. + # (client.type attribute → None); the library does not infer it here. return Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes}) def _all_roles_map(self) -> dict[str, Role]: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index a2edef263..97fb716af 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -83,15 +83,16 @@ def _resolve_keycloak_fields(cls, data: Any) -> Any: updates["serviceId"] = client_id # Resolve service type. Precedence: explicit ``type`` (already set, skipped here) → - # Keycloak ``client.type`` attribute (plain string ∈ {Agent,Tool}) → SPIFFE-format - # clientId ⇒ Agent → None. A list-valued attribute fails the string check → None. + # Keycloak ``client.type`` attribute (plain string ∈ {Agent,Tool}) → None. A + # list-valued or unrecognized attribute fails the string check → None. clientId + # shape (e.g. ``spiffe://``) is not consulted: it signals SPIRE-enablement, not + # agent-vs-tool — the operator's ``kagenti.io/type`` label (persisted as + # ``client.type``) is the authoritative type signal. if data.get("type") is None: attrs = data.get("attributes") or {} stored_type = attrs.get(SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE) if stored_type in ("Agent", "Tool"): updates["type"] = stored_type - elif client_id and str(client_id).startswith("spiffe://"): - updates["type"] = "Agent" return {**data, **updates} if updates else data diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py index ec9ff640e..54d0bf71e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_models.py @@ -282,7 +282,11 @@ def test_type_tool_from_client_type_attribute(self): ) assert s.type == "Tool" - def test_type_agent_from_spiffe_clientId(self): + def test_type_none_from_spiffe_clientId_without_attribute(self): + # A spiffe:// clientId means the workload is SPIRE-enabled, not that it is an + # agent. Without a client.type attribute the type stays None regardless of + # clientId shape; the operator's kagenti.io/type label (persisted as client.type) + # is the authoritative agent/tool signal. s = Service.model_validate( { "id": "c3", @@ -290,7 +294,7 @@ def test_type_agent_from_spiffe_clientId(self): "enabled": True, } ) - assert s.type == "Agent" + assert s.type is None def test_type_none_when_no_attribute_and_non_spiffe_clientId(self): s = Service.model_validate( diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index 7c823df1e..031658a64 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ def provision_via_config(config: Configuration) -> None: config.map_role_to_service(agent_svc, role) # Type the services via the canonical ``client.type`` attribute using the IdP setter. The IdP no - # longer infers type from the description (``_build_service`` leaves it to the ``client.type`` - # attribute / spiffe:// clientId). The Agent tag makes the PCE build the agent model; the Tool + # longer infers type from the description or clientId shape (``_build_service`` leaves it to the + # ``client.type`` attribute). The Agent tag makes the PCE build the agent model; the Tool # tag makes it omit the tool model. Without this the PCE builds an empty model — nothing is # stored and no rego is written. config.set_service_type(agent_svc, "Agent") From dba699fc17c0f983a3194dd719659d4294b36ecf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 18:56:50 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 199/273] docs(aiac): label-based onboarding classification + hybrid MCP tool lookup - uc1: classify_service routes on kagenti.io/type (not entity_id/SPIFFE format); analyze_tool resolves the MCP endpoint via client.name split + K8s Service lookup gated on protocol.kagenti.io/mcp - library-idp: drop the spiffe:// => Agent type-resolution fallback (a spiffe:// clientId means SPIRE-enabled, not necessarily an agent) - gh-issues: upstream request for kagenti-operator to stamp protocol.kagenti.io/mcp on MCP tool Services at deploy time Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md | 62 +++++++++++++++++++ .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 39 ++++++------ .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 5 +- 3 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md b/aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e86da742 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# feat(kagenti-operator): stamp `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` on MCP tool Services at deploy time + +> **For:** Kagenti platform / kagenti-operator team. +> **Filed by:** AIAC (kagenti-extensions). This is a cross-repo dependency of AIAC Service Onboarding. + +## Summary + +AIAC Service Onboarding discovers an MCP tool's capabilities by calling `tools/list` on the tool's +MCP endpoint. It locates that endpoint by finding the tool's Kubernetes `Service` and confirming the +Service is an MCP server via the **`protocol.kagenti.io/mcp`** label. Today that label is applied +**manually** — the operator only *reads* `protocol.kagenti.io/*` and never *stamps* the MCP label — +so tool onboarding silently depends on deployment hygiene the platform does not enforce. + +**Request:** have the platform apply `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` automatically to MCP tool Services at +deploy time. + +## Problem description + +AIAC's `analyze_tool` node resolves a tool's MCP endpoint as +`http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp` and **gates** on the Service carrying +`protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` as the correctness signal that the Service is truly an MCP server (rather +than blindly POSTing `tools/list` to an arbitrary Service). + +Current operator behavior: + +- It applies **`kagenti.io/type`** (`agent`/`tool`) to workloads via the `AgentRuntime` CR + (`internal/controller/agentruntime_controller.go`). +- It **reads** `protocol.kagenti.io/*` labels for protocol/agent-card discovery + (`internal/controller/agentcard_controller.go`). +- It does **not** stamp `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` anywhere. + +Consequence: a tool can have `kagenti.io/type=tool` **and** an operator-registered Keycloak client +(both operator-managed) yet be missing the MCP label — so AIAC onboarding fails with a `502` until +someone runs `kubectl label` by hand. This was exactly the manual step required to onboard +`github-tool-mcp` in the `team1` namespace during AIAC bring-up. + +## Proposed change + +Apply `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` to a tool's `Service` automatically at deploy time. Reasonable +homes (team's choice): + +- the tool Helm chart / deployment template, or +- the `AgentRuntime` reconcile path when the workload is `kagenti.io/type=tool`, or +- the operator when it manages a tool workload's Service. + +Keep the existing **presence/empty-string** semantics (the label value is `""`; consumers match on +key presence, not `=true`). + +## Acceptance criteria + +- [ ] MCP tool Services carry `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` **without** a manual `kubectl label` step. +- [ ] Where/how the label is applied is documented. +- [ ] Existing manually-labelled Services (e.g. `github-tool-mcp`) remain compatible (idempotent). + +## Context / references + +- AIAC design — hybrid MCP endpoint lookup and the label gate: `analyze_tool` node in the AIAC UC1 + Service Onboarding spec; AIAC issue 6.2 (`analyze_tool` service lookup strategy). +- Operator today: reads `protocol.kagenti.io/*` (`internal/controller/agentcard_controller.go`); + applies `kagenti.io/type` via `AgentRuntime` (`internal/controller/agentruntime_controller.go`); + no MCP-label stamping. +- AIAC MCP-discovery handoff, open item #1 ("automate label stamping"). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index e883c4844..d51a68ff7 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -79,18 +79,17 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv ### Nodes -- **`classify_service`**: determines service type. +- **`classify_service`**: resolves identity + determines service type from the operator's authoritative `kagenti.io/type` label (values `agent`/`tool`) — **not** from the `entity_id` format. 1. Store `service_id = trigger.entity_id` (Keycloak `client_id`). - 2. Check format: - - **SPIFFE format** `spiffe://{domain}/ns/{namespace}/sa/{serviceAccount}` → extract `namespace` and `workload_name = serviceAccount`; continue to step 3. - - **Any other format** → `service_type = tool`; `namespace = None`; `workload_name = None`; route to `analyze_tool`. No K8s access. - 3. LIST pods in `namespace`, find one whose `spec.serviceAccountName == workload_name`. Returns `502` on Kubernetes API failure or pod not found. - 4. Validate `kagenti.io/type` label on the pod (applied by kagenti-operator): + 2. Resolve identity: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` → `client.name`, which the kagenti-operator sets to `"{namespace}/{workload_name}"` for every workload (agents and tools, SPIRE-enabled or not). Split on the first `/` → store `namespace` and `workload_name`. `502` if `client.name` has no `/` (namespace unrecoverable). + 3. LIST pods in `namespace`; select the pod owned by `workload_name` via `ownerReferences` (Deployment → ReplicaSet name prefix, or `StatefulSet`/`Sandbox` name match). `502` on Kubernetes API failure or no matching pod. + 4. Read the `kagenti.io/type` label on that pod: - `agent` → `service_type = agent`; route to `analyze_agent`. + - `tool` → `service_type = tool`; route to `analyze_tool`. - Absent or any other value → `502` (inconsistent deployment). - > K8s access: `list` on `pods` in the target namespace. Agent path only. - > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied exclusively by the kagenti-operator admission webhook. + > K8s access: `list` on `pods` in the target namespace (both paths). + > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied by the kagenti-operator (via the AgentRuntime CR) and propagated to pod labels; it is the operator's own agent/tool discriminator (`SkipReason`, kagenti-operator `internal/clientreg/names.go`). The operator only registers a Keycloak client for a workload that already carries this label, so it is effectively guaranteed for operator-registered clients; a missing/invalid value still fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + label). The `entity_id` format (SPIFFE vs plain) reflects whether SPIRE is enabled, **not** the service type, so it is not used for classification. - **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR. 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one matching `workload_name`. @@ -105,18 +104,20 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv > K8s access: `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. -- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools. - 1. Resolve `workload_name`: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` → `workload_name = client.name`. - 2. Locate MCP endpoint: **TBD** — see issue [`inception/issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md`](../../issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md). - 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. - 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: +- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools. `namespace` + `workload_name` are already resolved by `classify_service` (from the `client.name` split). MCP endpoint lookup uses the **hybrid Keycloak→K8s strategy** decided in issue [`6.2`](../../issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md): the Keycloak client name supplied the key `{namespace, workload_name}`; K8s supplies the reachable endpoint. + 1. Locate MCP endpoint: + a. GET the K8s `Service` named `workload_name` in `namespace` (operator convention: Service name == workload name). + b. Require the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label present on that Service; `502` (actionable) if absent — the label is applied at deploy time, not stamped by the operator. + c. Build `http://{workload_name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp`, where `port` is the Service's first port (not hardcoded). + 2. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. + 3. Produce `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[]` (tools do not initiate further calls) - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` - 5. Returns `502` on config API failure, endpoint lookup failure, or MCP call failure. + 4. Returns `502` on Service/label lookup failure or MCP call failure. - > K8s access: none. Tool path uses config API only (pending issue 6.2). - > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp`. + > K8s access: `get` on `services` in the workload namespace (tool path). Identity is resolved by `classify_service` (config API). + > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). Case must be normalized at this persistence step: `ServiceType` is lowercase (`agent`/`tool`) but `client.type` is capitalized (`Agent`/`Tool`) to match `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]` — map `agent`→`Agent`, `tool`→`Tool`. @@ -128,8 +129,8 @@ Extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| | `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id` | -| `namespace` | `str \| None` | Parsed from SPIFFE URI; agents only | -| `workload_name` | `str \| None` | From SPIFFE URI (agents) or config API (tools) | +| `namespace` | `str \| None` | From the `client.name` split in `classify_service` (agents and tools) | +| `workload_name` | `str \| None` | From the `client.name` split in `classify_service` (agents and tools) | | `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; routing field | | `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | @@ -212,4 +213,4 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ - PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). - PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). - Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. -- MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — tracked in `inception/issues/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md`. +- MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — **resolved** (hybrid Keycloak→K8s) in `inception/issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md` and reflected in the `analyze_tool` node above. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index a0b02448b..ce689450c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -88,10 +88,9 @@ Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). 1. An explicit `type` already present on the input wins (never overridden). 2. Otherwise the Keycloak client attribute **`client.type`** ∈ {`Agent`, `Tool`} — a **plain string**. Client attribute values are plain strings; a **list** value (e.g. `["Agent"]`, the shape realm-role attributes use) fails the check and resolves to `None`. Capitalization matches `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]`. -3. Otherwise a `clientId` starting with `spiffe://` implies an `Agent` workload. -4. Otherwise `None`. +3. Otherwise `None`. -The attribute is set via `Configuration.set_service_type` (below); its authoritative origin is UC1 `classify_service` (see the aiac-agent UC1 spec), which persists the discovered service type onto the client. There is **no** description-keyword inference — typing is attribute/`spiffe://`-only. +The attribute is set via `Configuration.set_service_type` (below); its authoritative origin is UC1 Service Onboarding — `classify_service` **discovers** the type from the operator's `kagenti.io/type` label and `provision_service` **persists** it onto the client via `set_service_type` (see the aiac-agent UC1 spec). There is **no** `spiffe://` clientId fallback and **no** description-keyword inference — typing is `client.type`-attribute-only. (The former `spiffe:// ⇒ Agent` fallback was **removed**: a `spiffe://` clientId indicates a SPIRE-enabled workload, **not** necessarily an agent — it could mis-type a SPIRE-enabled tool — so clients without a `client.type` attribute now resolve to `None`.) #### `Scope` From dc696f019cb2ab66e31f93f6511877e3fd113aed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 19:08:40 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 200/273] chore(aiac): untrack and gitignore gh-issues drafts MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The MCP-label draft was filed on GitHub as kagenti/kagenti-extensions#658. gh-issues/ drafts mirror GitHub issues (the source of truth), so ignore the directory like inception/issues,plans,handoffs — and untrack the one file that had been committed. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/.gitignore | 1 + .../kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md | 62 ------------------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 62 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md diff --git a/aiac/.gitignore b/aiac/.gitignore index ac57adcfe..056215a93 100644 --- a/aiac/.gitignore +++ b/aiac/.gitignore @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ inception/plans/ inception/issues/ inception/handoffs/ +inception/gh-issues/ # PDP policy writer integration-test scratch output (test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py) test/pdp/policy/rego_out/ diff --git a/aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md b/aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5e86da742..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -# feat(kagenti-operator): stamp `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` on MCP tool Services at deploy time - -> **For:** Kagenti platform / kagenti-operator team. -> **Filed by:** AIAC (kagenti-extensions). This is a cross-repo dependency of AIAC Service Onboarding. - -## Summary - -AIAC Service Onboarding discovers an MCP tool's capabilities by calling `tools/list` on the tool's -MCP endpoint. It locates that endpoint by finding the tool's Kubernetes `Service` and confirming the -Service is an MCP server via the **`protocol.kagenti.io/mcp`** label. Today that label is applied -**manually** — the operator only *reads* `protocol.kagenti.io/*` and never *stamps* the MCP label — -so tool onboarding silently depends on deployment hygiene the platform does not enforce. - -**Request:** have the platform apply `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` automatically to MCP tool Services at -deploy time. - -## Problem description - -AIAC's `analyze_tool` node resolves a tool's MCP endpoint as -`http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp` and **gates** on the Service carrying -`protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` as the correctness signal that the Service is truly an MCP server (rather -than blindly POSTing `tools/list` to an arbitrary Service). - -Current operator behavior: - -- It applies **`kagenti.io/type`** (`agent`/`tool`) to workloads via the `AgentRuntime` CR - (`internal/controller/agentruntime_controller.go`). -- It **reads** `protocol.kagenti.io/*` labels for protocol/agent-card discovery - (`internal/controller/agentcard_controller.go`). -- It does **not** stamp `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` anywhere. - -Consequence: a tool can have `kagenti.io/type=tool` **and** an operator-registered Keycloak client -(both operator-managed) yet be missing the MCP label — so AIAC onboarding fails with a `502` until -someone runs `kubectl label` by hand. This was exactly the manual step required to onboard -`github-tool-mcp` in the `team1` namespace during AIAC bring-up. - -## Proposed change - -Apply `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` to a tool's `Service` automatically at deploy time. Reasonable -homes (team's choice): - -- the tool Helm chart / deployment template, or -- the `AgentRuntime` reconcile path when the workload is `kagenti.io/type=tool`, or -- the operator when it manages a tool workload's Service. - -Keep the existing **presence/empty-string** semantics (the label value is `""`; consumers match on -key presence, not `=true`). - -## Acceptance criteria - -- [ ] MCP tool Services carry `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` **without** a manual `kubectl label` step. -- [ ] Where/how the label is applied is documented. -- [ ] Existing manually-labelled Services (e.g. `github-tool-mcp`) remain compatible (idempotent). - -## Context / references - -- AIAC design — hybrid MCP endpoint lookup and the label gate: `analyze_tool` node in the AIAC UC1 - Service Onboarding spec; AIAC issue 6.2 (`analyze_tool` service lookup strategy). -- Operator today: reads `protocol.kagenti.io/*` (`internal/controller/agentcard_controller.go`); - applies `kagenti.io/type` via `AgentRuntime` (`internal/controller/agentruntime_controller.go`); - no MCP-label stamping. -- AIAC MCP-discovery handoff, open item #1 ("automate label stamping"). From 1546c51318daec2d77a2bbac5136b8caeb4e0a82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 19:26:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 201/273] docs: Clarify UC1 own-vs-other roles/scopes and self-mapping invariant State the Service Policy sub-agent's self-mapping invariant explicitly: the PRB is never handed an (own role, own scope) pair. Add own-vs-other terminology and describe the two complementary guards (exclusion + call direction) that make own-with-own unrepresentable. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index d51a68ff7..6678a1cf5 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -165,9 +165,18 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): **Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's own roles + scopes (from Provision output), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. -The two call directions prevent self-mapping and keep each PRB call's semantic intent crisp: -- `build_scope_rules(other_roles, agent_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* -- `build_role_rules(agent_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (agent path only) +**Terminology — own vs other (used throughout this section):** +- **Own roles / own scopes** — the roles and scopes the just-provisioned service defines for *itself*: exactly `service_provision.roles` / `service_provision.scopes`, written into the IdP by Service Provision. +- **Other roles / other scopes** — every *pre-existing* role/scope in the IdP universe **minus** the new service's own entities. These belong to other services. + +**Self-mapping invariant (must hold):** the PRB must **never** be handed an *(own role, own scope)* pair — a service's own role must never be mapped to its own scope. Onboarding only ever grants **cross-service** access: *who else* may call this service, and (agents only) *what else* this service may call. A service's own role reaching its own scope is not something onboarding needs to author (that access is intrinsic and out of scope here) and would pollute the policy set. The Service Policy sub-agent guarantees the invariant **by construction** through two complementary guards: + +1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the "other" side).** Own roles are removed from `other_roles` and own scopes from `other_scopes` before any PRB call (steps 2–3). Flattening runs *after* exclusion and cannot reintroduce an own role: the just-provisioned roles are brand new and are not yet referenced as `childRoles` by any existing role. +2. **Call direction (each call's "self" side is one own entity of the *opposite* kind).** Each PRB call pairs a single own entity with the other-side universe, never own-with-own, and keeps the semantic intent crisp: + - `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, own_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* (an **own scope** against **other roles**) + - `build_role_rules(own_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (an **own role** against **other scopes**; agent path only) + +Neither guard alone is sufficient — exclusion keeps own entities off the other side, and the call direction keeps the self side and the other side of *opposite* kinds (a scope vs roles, or a role vs scopes). Together they make an *(own role, own scope)* pair unrepresentable in any PRB call. ### Steps From 1c08a03a125562cbb1b2cd51f15ea95b284d1d1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 21:46:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 202/273] feat(aiac): Service Provision sub-agent (UC1) + shared ServiceType Implement the UC1 Service Provision sub-agent (issue 3.4) test-first with its unit tests (issue 4.3): - provision/{types,state,nodes,graph}.py: classify_service -> [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] -> provision_service, compiled StateGraph routing on service_type. - All nodes non-LLM. IdP access via the idp-library Configuration only (never the IdP service). K8s/MCP access behind lazy-import seams so unit tests stay hermetic. - Failures surface as HTTPException(502) naming the workload and specific label. idp-library changes: - Define ServiceType(str, Enum) in idp.configuration.models and reuse it for Service.type and set_service_type (was Literal["Agent","Tool"]); value-compatible. - Add idempotent Configuration.create_service_role / create_service_scope (create-or-get by name + map), duck-typed so the library never imports the agent. Docs: add the 'IdP access - library, not service' statement across the aiac-agent spec, UC1/2/3 sub-PRDs, and library-idp.md; document ServiceType + the new methods. 32 provision tests + 5 idp tests added; full unit suite green (300 passed). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 4 + .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 39 ++- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 2 + .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 2 + .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 30 ++- .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/graph.py | 37 +++ .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 255 ++++++++++++++++++ .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py | 25 ++ .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/types.py | 32 +++ aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 48 +++- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 19 +- aiac/test/agent/uc/__init__.py | 0 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py | 0 .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py | 0 .../provision/test_analyze_agent.py | 76 ++++++ .../onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py | 102 +++++++ .../provision/test_classify_service.py | 115 ++++++++ .../uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py | 103 +++++++ .../provision/test_provision_service.py | 112 ++++++++ .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 93 ++++++- 21 files changed, 1068 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/types.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_provision_service.py diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index eaee76091..8ea49039e 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: > **Note:** Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). +### IdP access — library, not service + +Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC3 Role) performs **all** IdP reads and writes through the **idp-library** API — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — and **never** calls the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. The library owns the HTTP transport, retry/backoff, and Keycloak↔model mapping; sub-agents depend only on its typed `Configuration` methods (e.g. `get_service`, `get_roles`, `get_scopes`, `create_service_role`, `create_service_scope`, `set_service_type`). The shared service-type vocabulary is `aiac.idp.configuration.models.ServiceType` (`Agent`/`Tool`) — the same enum used by `Service.type`. See [library-idp.md](library-idp.md). + --- ## Endpoints diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 6678a1cf5..74357689c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ > **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +> **IdP access — library, not service.** All IdP reads and writes go through the **idp-library** API (`aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration`), **never** the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. See [aiac-agent.md → IdP access](../aiac-agent.md#idp-access--library-not-service). + ## Triggers | Source | Subject / Path | @@ -67,9 +69,9 @@ No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond seque **Nature:** LLM-based. Classifies the new service (agent or tool), derives roles + scopes from AgentCard / MCP manifest, and **writes them into the IdP**. -All IdP writes and reads target **`aiac.idp.configuration.api`**: -- `create_service_role(service_id, role)` — idempotent (create-or-get) -- `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` — idempotent (create-or-get) +All IdP writes and reads target the **idp-library** — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — not the IdP service directly: +- `create_service_role(service_id, role)` — idempotent (create-or-get by name, then map) +- `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` — idempotent (create-or-get by name, then map) ### Graph @@ -83,10 +85,12 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv 1. Store `service_id = trigger.entity_id` (Keycloak `client_id`). 2. Resolve identity: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` → `client.name`, which the kagenti-operator sets to `"{namespace}/{workload_name}"` for every workload (agents and tools, SPIRE-enabled or not). Split on the first `/` → store `namespace` and `workload_name`. `502` if `client.name` has no `/` (namespace unrecoverable). 3. LIST pods in `namespace`; select the pod owned by `workload_name` via `ownerReferences` (Deployment → ReplicaSet name prefix, or `StatefulSet`/`Sandbox` name match). `502` on Kubernetes API failure or no matching pod. - 4. Read the `kagenti.io/type` label on that pod: - - `agent` → `service_type = agent`; route to `analyze_agent`. - - `tool` → `service_type = tool`; route to `analyze_tool`. - - Absent or any other value → `502` (inconsistent deployment). + 4. Read the `kagenti.io/type` label on that pod and normalize it to a `ServiceType` + member via `ServiceType(label.capitalize())` — the label is lowercase + (`agent`/`tool`); `ServiceType` values are capitalized (`Agent`/`Tool`): + - `agent` → `ServiceType.AGENT`; route to `analyze_agent`. + - `tool` → `ServiceType.TOOL`; route to `analyze_tool`. + - Absent or any other value (normalization raises `ValueError`) → `502` (inconsistent deployment). > K8s access: `list` on `pods` in the target namespace (both paths). > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied by the kagenti-operator (via the AgentRuntime CR) and propagated to pod labels; it is the operator's own agent/tool discriminator (`SkipReason`, kagenti-operator `internal/clientreg/names.go`). The operator only registers a Keycloak client for a workload that already carries this label, so it is effectively guaranteed for operator-registered clients; a missing/invalid value still fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + label). The `entity_id` format (SPIFFE vs plain) reflects whether SPIRE is enabled, **not** the service type, so it is not used for classification. @@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). - - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). Case must be normalized at this persistence step: `ServiceType` is lowercase (`agent`/`tool`) but `client.type` is capitalized (`Agent`/`Tool`) to match `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]` — map `agent`→`Agent`, `tool`→`Tool`. + - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). No case mapping is needed here: `service_type` is a `ServiceType` (values `Agent`/`Tool`), already matching `client.type` and `Service.type`. Case normalization happens once, upstream, when `classify_service` reads the lowercase `kagenti.io/type` label. ### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` @@ -136,11 +140,24 @@ Extends `BaseAgentState` with: ### Types +`ServiceType` is **not** redefined here — it is imported from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` +(the same enum backing `Service.type`), so the sub-agent, the IdP library, and the IdP service +share one vocabulary: + ```python +# aiac.idp.configuration.models — shared, reused by the sub-agent (do not duplicate): class ServiceType(str, Enum): - agent = "agent" - tool = "tool" + AGENT = "Agent" # values capitalized to match the Keycloak client.type attribute + TOOL = "Tool" +``` +The remaining types are sub-agent–local (in `provision/types.py`). `RoleDefinition` / +`ScopeDefinition` are deliberately distinct from the IdP `Role` / `Scope` models: a derived +role/scope is a pre-persistence *name + description* with no Keycloak `id` yet (idp `Role` +requires `id` + `composite`, `Scope` requires `id`), so it cannot be an idp model until +`provision_service` writes it. + +```python class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): name: str description: str @@ -211,7 +228,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ │ ├── graph.py ← ServiceProvisionGraph (LLM-based StateGraph) │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service │ ├── state.py ← OnboardingProvisionState - │ └── types.py ← ServiceType, RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision + │ └── types.py ← RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision (ServiceType imported from aiac.idp.configuration.models) └── service_policy/ ├── __init__.py └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md index 72c169b05..7dd923fef 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ > **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +> **IdP access — library, not service.** All IdP reads and writes go through the **idp-library** API (`aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration`), **never** the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. See [aiac-agent.md → IdP access](../aiac-agent.md#idp-access--library-not-service). + ## Triggers | Source | Subject / Path | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md index 0087f0145..4f8fca800 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ > **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. +> **IdP access — library, not service.** All IdP reads and writes go through the **idp-library** API (`aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration`), **never** the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. See [aiac-agent.md → IdP access](../aiac-agent.md#idp-access--library-not-service). + ## Triggers | Source | Subject / Path | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index ce689450c..d65548148 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -80,18 +80,20 @@ Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). | `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | | | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | `None` | | `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | -| `type` | `Literal["Agent", "Tool"] \| None` | `attributes.client.type` | `None` | +| `type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `attributes.client.type` | `None` | | `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(roles for this client)_ | `[]` | | `scopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(default client scopes)_ | `[]` | **Service type resolution** (`Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`, a `model_validator(mode="before")`). AIAC calls the concept "service type" everywhere; the backing Keycloak client attribute is named **`client.type`**. Resolution precedence: 1. An explicit `type` already present on the input wins (never overridden). -2. Otherwise the Keycloak client attribute **`client.type`** ∈ {`Agent`, `Tool`} — a **plain string**. Client attribute values are plain strings; a **list** value (e.g. `["Agent"]`, the shape realm-role attributes use) fails the check and resolves to `None`. Capitalization matches `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]`. +2. Otherwise the Keycloak client attribute **`client.type`** ∈ {`Agent`, `Tool`} — a **plain string**. Client attribute values are plain strings; a **list** value (e.g. `["Agent"]`, the shape realm-role attributes use) fails the check and resolves to `None`. Capitalization matches the `ServiceType` values. 3. Otherwise `None`. The attribute is set via `Configuration.set_service_type` (below); its authoritative origin is UC1 Service Onboarding — `classify_service` **discovers** the type from the operator's `kagenti.io/type` label and `provision_service` **persists** it onto the client via `set_service_type` (see the aiac-agent UC1 spec). There is **no** `spiffe://` clientId fallback and **no** description-keyword inference — typing is `client.type`-attribute-only. (The former `spiffe:// ⇒ Agent` fallback was **removed**: a `spiffe://` clientId indicates a SPIRE-enabled workload, **not** necessarily an agent — it could mis-type a SPIRE-enabled tool — so clients without a `client.type` attribute now resolve to `None`.) +> **`ServiceType`** (`aiac.idp.configuration.models`) is a `str` enum — `AGENT = "Agent"`, `TOOL = "Tool"` — shared by `Service.type`, `set_service_type`, and the aiac-agent sub-agents (one vocabulary, no duplication). Values are capitalized to match the `client.type` attribute; because it subclasses `str`, `ServiceType.AGENT == "Agent"`, so it is a drop-in for the former `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]`. The operator's lowercase `kagenti.io/type` pod label is normalized to a member via `ServiceType(label.capitalize())` in UC1 `classify_service`. + #### `Scope` Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). @@ -157,7 +159,13 @@ class Configuration: def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: ... def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: ... - def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service: ... + # Idempotent create-or-get (by name) + map to the service. Accept any object exposing + # .name / .description (e.g. the aiac-agent RoleDefinition / ScopeDefinition), so the + # library never imports the agent layer. + def create_service_role(self, service_id: str, role) -> Role: ... + def create_service_scope(self, service_id: str, scope) -> Scope: ... + + def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service: ... ``` `get_scopes()` — simple read: @@ -238,8 +246,20 @@ class Configuration: 3. Re-fetches the service via `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response. -`set_service_type(service: Service, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service`: -1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/type` with body `{"type": service_type}`, appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. +`create_service_role(service_id: str, role) -> Role`: idempotent create-or-get + map. +1. `get_roles()` and reuse an existing realm role whose `name == role.name`; otherwise `create_role(role.name, role.description)`. +2. `map_role_to_service(get_service(service_id), resolved_role)` (itself idempotent). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx HTTP status. Returns the resolved `Role`. +4. `role` is any object exposing `.name` / `.description` (e.g. the aiac-agent `RoleDefinition`); the library does not import the agent layer. + +`create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope) -> Scope`: idempotent create-or-get + map. +1. `get_scopes()` and reuse an existing client scope whose `name == scope.name`; otherwise `create_scope(scope.name, scope.description)`. +2. `map_scope_to_service(get_service(service_id), resolved_scope)` (itself idempotent). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx HTTP status. Returns the resolved `Scope`. +4. `scope` is any object exposing `.name` / `.description` (e.g. the aiac-agent `ScopeDefinition`). + +`set_service_type(service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/type` with body `{"type": <value>}` (the `ServiceType`'s `Agent`/`Tool` value; a bare `"Agent"`/`"Tool"` string is accepted too since `ServiceType` is a `str` enum), appending `?realm=<self.realm>`. 2. The service persists the value onto the Keycloak client as the **`client.type`** attribute (a plain string, capitalized). The Keycloak attribute name is an IdP-Service/mapping-layer detail — callers pass the generic `service_type` and never see it. 3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. 4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response (`type` now resolved from the new attribute). diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a11e64b60 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +"""Compiled StateGraph for the Service Provision sub-agent (UC1). + + START -> classify_service -> [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] -> provision_service -> END + +The conditional edge routes on `service_type` (set by `classify_service`). All nodes are +non-LLM; no LLM is built here. +""" + +from langgraph.graph import END, START, StateGraph + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType + +from .nodes import analyze_agent, analyze_tool, classify_service, provision_service +from .state import OnboardingProvisionState + + +def _route(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> str: + return "analyze_agent" if state.service_type is ServiceType.AGENT else "analyze_tool" + + +def build_provision_graph(): + g = StateGraph(OnboardingProvisionState) + g.add_node("classify_service", classify_service) + g.add_node("analyze_agent", analyze_agent) + g.add_node("analyze_tool", analyze_tool) + g.add_node("provision_service", provision_service) + + g.add_edge(START, "classify_service") + g.add_conditional_edges( + "classify_service", + _route, + {"analyze_agent": "analyze_agent", "analyze_tool": "analyze_tool"}, + ) + g.add_edge("analyze_agent", "provision_service") + g.add_edge("analyze_tool", "provision_service") + g.add_edge("provision_service", END) + return g.compile() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e90563a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +"""Nodes for the Service Provision sub-agent (UC1). + +All nodes are **non-LLM**. Graph: + + START -> classify_service -> [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] -> provision_service -> END + +IdP access is via the **idp-library** `Configuration` (the `_config` seam), never the IdP +service directly. Kubernetes access is via the `_core_v1` / `_custom_objects` seams, which +lazily import the `kubernetes` client so unit tests (which patch the seams) never need it +installed. Any upstream failure surfaces as an `HTTPException(502, ...)` whose message names +the workload and the specific missing/invalid label — actionable, never silent. +""" + +import os + +from fastapi import HTTPException +from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential + +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType + +from .state import OnboardingProvisionState +from .types import RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision + +_TYPE_LABEL = "kagenti.io/type" +_MCP_LABEL = "protocol.kagenti.io/mcp" +_AGENTCARD_GROUP = "agent.kagenti.dev" +_AGENTCARD_VERSION = "v1alpha1" +_AGENTCARD_PLURAL = "agentcards" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Seams (patched in unit tests) # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def _config() -> Configuration: + return Configuration.for_realm(os.getenv("KEYCLOAK_REALM", "")) + + +def _core_v1(): + """CoreV1Api client (pods, services). Lazily imports kubernetes so tests that patch + this seam never require the package.""" + from kubernetes import client, config + + _load_kube_config(config) + return client.CoreV1Api() + + +def _custom_objects(): + """CustomObjectsApi client (AgentCard CRs). Lazily imports kubernetes.""" + from kubernetes import client, config + + _load_kube_config(config) + return client.CustomObjectsApi() + + +def _load_kube_config(config) -> None: + try: + config.load_incluster_config() + except Exception: + config.load_kube_config() + + +def _mcp_tools_list(endpoint: str) -> list[dict]: + """POST a JSON-RPC `tools/list` to an MCP endpoint and return the tool manifest list. + Each tool is a dict with `name` and (optional) `description`.""" + import requests + + resp = requests.post( + endpoint, + json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, + headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, + ) + resp.raise_for_status() + return (resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools", []) + + +def _run_upstream(fn): + """Run an upstream call with bounded retries (UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES), reraising the last + error so the caller can convert it to a 502.""" + retryer = Retrying( + stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), + wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), + reraise=True, + ) + return retryer(fn) + + +def _select_pod(pods, workload_name: str): + """The pod owned by ``workload_name``: a Deployment's ReplicaSet (name prefix + ``{workload}-``), or a StatefulSet / Sandbox whose name equals ``workload``.""" + for pod in pods: + for owner in getattr(pod.metadata, "owner_references", None) or []: + if owner.kind == "ReplicaSet" and owner.name.startswith(f"{workload_name}-"): + return pod + if owner.kind in ("StatefulSet", "Sandbox") and owner.name == workload_name: + return pod + return None + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Nodes # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def classify_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: + """Resolve identity and determine service type from the operator's `kagenti.io/type` + pod label (authoritative — not the entity_id format).""" + service_id = state.trigger.entity_id + + try: + service = _run_upstream(lambda: _config().get_service(service_id)) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException(502, f"IdP config unavailable resolving service {service_id!r}: {e}") + + name = service.name or "" + if "/" not in name: + raise HTTPException( + 502, + f"client.name {name!r} for service {service_id!r} has no '/': " + "namespace/workload_name unrecoverable", + ) + namespace, workload_name = name.split("/", 1) + + try: + pods = _run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().list_namespaced_pod(namespace).items) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException(502, f"Kubernetes pod LIST failed in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}") + + pod = _select_pod(pods, workload_name) + if pod is None: + raise HTTPException( + 502, f"no pod owned by workload {workload_name!r} in namespace {namespace!r}" + ) + + label = (getattr(pod.metadata, "labels", None) or {}).get(_TYPE_LABEL) + try: + service_type = ServiceType((label or "").capitalize()) + except ValueError: + raise HTTPException( + 502, + f"workload {workload_name!r}: {_TYPE_LABEL} label missing or invalid " + f"(got {label!r}, expected 'agent' or 'tool')", + ) + + return { + "service_id": service_id, + "namespace": namespace, + "workload_name": workload_name, + "service_type": service_type, + } + + +def analyze_agent(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: + """Derive an agent's roles + scopes from its AgentCard CR (non-LLM). Falls back to a + default access scope for legacy deployments with no AgentCard.""" + namespace, workload = state.namespace, state.workload_name + role = RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.agent", description="Agent role") + + try: + resp = _run_upstream( + lambda: _custom_objects().list_namespaced_custom_object( + group=_AGENTCARD_GROUP, + version=_AGENTCARD_VERSION, + namespace=namespace, + plural=_AGENTCARD_PLURAL, + ) + ) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException(502, f"Kubernetes AgentCard LIST failed in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}") + + card = next( + (c for c in resp.get("items", []) if (c.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") == workload), + None, + ) + if card is None: + provision = ServiceProvision( + roles=[role], + scopes=[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.access", description="Default access scope")], + reasoning="partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned", + ) + return {"service_provision": provision} + + skills = (card.get("spec") or {}).get("skills", []) + scopes = [ + ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "")) + for s in skills + ] + provision = ServiceProvision( + roles=[role], + scopes=scopes, + reasoning=f"derived from AgentCard: {len(skills)} skills", + ) + return {"service_provision": provision} + + +def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: + """Discover a tool's scopes from its MCP `tools/list` manifest (non-LLM). Endpoint is + resolved via the hybrid Keycloak->K8s strategy (issue 6.2): identity from `classify_service`, + reachable endpoint from the K8s Service.""" + namespace, workload = state.namespace, state.workload_name + + try: + svc = _run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().read_namespaced_service(workload, namespace)) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException( + 502, f"Kubernetes Service GET failed for {workload!r} in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}" + ) + + labels = getattr(svc.metadata, "labels", None) or {} + if _MCP_LABEL not in labels: + raise HTTPException( + 502, + f"Service {workload!r} in namespace {namespace!r} is missing the {_MCP_LABEL!r} " + "label (deploy-time prerequisite for MCP tool discovery)", + ) + + port = svc.spec.ports[0].port + endpoint = f"http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp" + + try: + tools = _run_upstream(lambda: _mcp_tools_list(endpoint)) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException(502, f"MCP tools/list failed at {endpoint}: {e}") + + scopes = [ + ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{t['name']}", description=t.get("description", "")) + for t in tools + ] + provision = ServiceProvision( + roles=[], + scopes=scopes, + reasoning=f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools", + ) + return {"service_provision": provision} + + +def provision_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: + """Write the derived roles + scopes into the IdP (idempotent create-or-get + map) and + persist the discovered service type onto the Keycloak client, via the idp-library. + Returns the `ServiceProvision` + `service_type` to the Orchestrator.""" + config = _config() + provision = state.service_provision + service_id = state.service_id + + try: + for role in provision.roles: + _run_upstream(lambda role=role: config.create_service_role(service_id, role)) + for scope in provision.scopes: + _run_upstream(lambda scope=scope: config.create_service_scope(service_id, scope)) + service = _run_upstream(lambda: config.get_service(service_id)) + _run_upstream(lambda: config.set_service_type(service, state.service_type)) + except HTTPException: + raise + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException(502, f"IdP Configuration Service unavailable provisioning {service_id!r}: {e}") + + return {"service_provision": provision, "service_type": state.service_type} diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a66857f30 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +"""LangGraph state for the Service Provision sub-agent (UC1). + +``Trigger`` is the minimal trigger context carried into the graph: the entity id +(Keycloak ``client_id``) that originated the ``aiac.apply.service.{id}`` event / HTTP call. +""" + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType + +from .types import ServiceProvision + + +class Trigger(BaseModel): + entity_id: str + + +class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseModel): + trigger: Trigger + + service_id: str | None = None # Keycloak client_id = trigger.entity_id + namespace: str | None = None # from client.name split in classify_service + workload_name: str | None = None # from client.name split in classify_service + service_type: ServiceType | None = None + service_provision: ServiceProvision | None = None diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/types.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/types.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..14428ea5e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/types.py @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +"""Types for the Service Provision sub-agent (UC1). + +``ServiceType`` is intentionally *not* redefined here — it is reused from +``aiac.idp.configuration.models`` (the same enum backing ``Service.type``), so the +sub-agent, the IdP library, and the IdP service share one vocabulary. + +``RoleDefinition`` / ``ScopeDefinition`` are deliberately distinct from the IdP +``Role`` / ``Scope`` models: a derived role/scope is a pre-persistence *name + description* +with no Keycloak ``id`` yet, so it cannot be an idp model until ``provision_service`` writes it. +""" + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType + +__all__ = ["ServiceType", "RoleDefinition", "ScopeDefinition", "ServiceProvision"] + + +class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + + +class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + + +class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): + roles: list[RoleDefinition] + scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] + reasoning: str # machine-generated provenance string diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index c596a23c1..7c6adbb4f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -1,11 +1,20 @@ import os from pathlib import Path -from typing import Literal +from typing import Protocol import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType, Subject + + +class _NamedDefinition(Protocol): + """Structural type for a not-yet-persisted role/scope: just a name + description. + Lets ``create_service_role`` / ``create_service_scope`` accept the agent layer's + ``RoleDefinition`` / ``ScopeDefinition`` without the IdP library importing the agent.""" + + name: str + description: str load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") @@ -135,20 +144,47 @@ def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: self._check(get_resp) return Service.model_validate(get_resp.json()) - def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"]) -> Service: + def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service: """Persist a service's type onto the Keycloak client as the ``client.type`` attribute. - The value is stored capitalized (``Agent``/``Tool``) so ``Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`` - resolves it back on read. Returns the updated ``Service``. + The value is stored capitalized (``Agent``/``Tool`` — ``ServiceType``'s values) so + ``Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`` resolves it back on read. Returns the updated + ``Service``. A bare ``"Agent"``/``"Tool"`` string is accepted too (``ServiceType`` is a + ``str`` enum). """ + value = service_type.value if isinstance(service_type, ServiceType) else service_type resp = requests.post( f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/type", - json={"type": service_type}, + json={"type": value}, params=self._params(), ) self._check(resp) return Service.model_validate(resp.json()) + def create_service_role(self, service_id: str, role: _NamedDefinition) -> Role: + """Idempotent create-or-get of a realm role by name, then map it to ``service_id``. + + If a realm role with ``role.name`` already exists it is reused (no duplicate create); + otherwise it is created. The role is then mapped to the service's service-account + (``map_role_to_service`` is itself idempotent). Returns the resolved ``Role``. + """ + existing = next((r for r in self.get_roles() if r.name == role.name), None) + resolved = existing or self.create_role(role.name, role.description) + self.map_role_to_service(self.get_service(service_id), resolved) + return resolved + + def create_service_scope(self, service_id: str, scope: _NamedDefinition) -> Scope: + """Idempotent create-or-get of a client scope by name, then map it to ``service_id``. + + If a client scope with ``scope.name`` already exists it is reused; otherwise it is + created. The scope is then mapped to the service as a default client scope + (``map_scope_to_service`` is itself idempotent). Returns the resolved ``Scope``. + """ + existing = next((s for s in self.get_scopes() if s.name == scope.name), None) + resolved = existing or self.create_scope(scope.name, scope.description) + self.map_scope_to_service(self.get_service(service_id), resolved) + return resolved + def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: resp = requests.post( f"{self._base_url()}/roles", diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index 97fb716af..40ed1b4c0 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -1,7 +1,20 @@ -from typing import Any, Literal +from enum import Enum +from typing import Any from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, model_validator + +class ServiceType(str, Enum): + """Canonical service-type vocabulary, shared by the IdP library, the IdP service, and the + AIAC agent sub-agents. Values are capitalized (``Agent``/``Tool``) to match the Keycloak + ``client.type`` attribute; as a ``str`` enum, ``ServiceType.AGENT == "Agent"`` holds, so it + is a drop-in for the former ``Literal["Agent", "Tool"]``. The operator's ``kagenti.io/type`` + pod label is lowercase (``agent``/``tool``) and is normalized to a member via + ``ServiceType(label.capitalize())`` at classification time.""" + + AGENT = "Agent" + TOOL = "Tool" + # AIAC naming convention: every role and client scope AIAC provisions carries the Keycloak # attribute ``aiac.managed`` with value ``true``. Keycloak's own built-ins (default client # scopes, ``default-roles-<realm>``) never carry it, so consumers filter on this marker to @@ -13,7 +26,7 @@ # Keycloak attribute that carries a service's (client's) type. AIAC calls the concept # "service type" everywhere (``Service.type`` ∈ {``Agent``,``Tool``}); the underlying Keycloak # client attribute is named ``client.type``. The value is a plain string (``"Agent"``/``"Tool"``, -# capitalized to match ``Literal["Agent","Tool"]``) — a list value fails resolution → type ``None``. +# capitalized to match ``ServiceType``) — a list value fails resolution → type ``None``. SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE = "client.type" @@ -60,7 +73,7 @@ class Service(BaseModel): name: str | None = None description: str | None = None enabled: bool - type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] | None = None + type: ServiceType | None = None roles: list["Role"] = [] scopes: list["Scope"] = [] diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3bc27482d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Provision `analyze_agent` node (UC1, issue 4.3). + +Kubernetes access (AgentCard CRs) is mocked via the `_custom_objects` seam. +""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger + +NS = "team-a" +WORKLOAD = "weather" + + +def _state(): + return OnboardingProvisionState( + trigger=Trigger(entity_id="svc-123"), namespace=NS, workload_name=WORKLOAD + ) + + +def _card(name=WORKLOAD, skills=None): + return {"metadata": {"name": name}, "spec": {"skills": skills or []}} + + +def _run(items=None, list_exc=None): + with patch.object(nodes, "_custom_objects") as co: + client = MagicMock() + if list_exc is not None: + client.list_namespaced_custom_object.side_effect = list_exc + else: + client.list_namespaced_custom_object.return_value = {"items": items or []} + co.return_value = client + return nodes.analyze_agent(_state()) + + +class TestAnalyzeAgentFound: + def test_one_agent_role_and_one_scope_per_skill(self): + skills = [ + {"name": "forecast", "description": "Get forecast"}, + {"name": "history", "description": "Historical data"}, + ] + provision = _run(items=[_card(skills=skills)])["service_provision"] + + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.agent"] + assert provision.roles[0].description == "Agent role" + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.forecast", f"{WORKLOAD}.history"] + assert provision.scopes[0].description == "Get forecast" + assert "derived from AgentCard: 2 skills" == provision.reasoning + + +class TestAnalyzeAgentLegacyFallback: + def test_no_agentcard_yields_default_access_scope_and_partial_reasoning(self): + provision = _run(items=[])["service_provision"] + + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.agent"] + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.access"] + assert provision.scopes[0].description == "Default access scope" + assert "partial: no AgentCard found" in provision.reasoning + + def test_agentcard_present_but_no_name_match_is_legacy_fallback(self): + provision = _run(items=[_card(name="other-agent", skills=[{"name": "x", "description": "y"}])])[ + "service_provision" + ] + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.access"] + assert "partial: no AgentCard found" in provision.reasoning + + +class TestAnalyzeAgent502: + def test_k8s_agentcards_list_failure_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(list_exc=RuntimeError("apiserver down")) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f1b11151 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Provision `analyze_tool` node (UC1, issue 4.3). + +Kubernetes Service lookup (`_core_v1` seam) and the MCP `tools/list` call (`_mcp_tools_list` +seam) are mocked. `namespace` + `workload_name` are pre-set on state by `classify_service`. +""" + +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger + +NS = "team-a" +WORKLOAD = "github-tool" +MCP_LABEL = "protocol.kagenti.io/mcp" + + +def _state(): + return OnboardingProvisionState( + trigger=Trigger(entity_id="svc-9"), namespace=NS, workload_name=WORKLOAD + ) + + +def _svc(labels, port=8080): + return SimpleNamespace( + metadata=SimpleNamespace(labels=labels), + spec=SimpleNamespace(ports=[SimpleNamespace(port=port)]), + ) + + +def _run(svc=None, read_exc=None, tools=None, mcp_exc=None): + with ( + patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(nodes, "_mcp_tools_list") as mcp, + ): + core = MagicMock() + if read_exc is not None: + core.read_namespaced_service.side_effect = read_exc + else: + core.read_namespaced_service.return_value = svc + core_v1.return_value = core + if mcp_exc is not None: + mcp.side_effect = mcp_exc + else: + mcp.return_value = tools or [] + result = nodes.analyze_tool(_state()) + return result, mcp + + +class TestAnalyzeToolFound: + def test_scopes_one_per_tool_roles_empty_and_endpoint_built(self): + tools = [ + {"name": "create_issue", "description": "Open an issue"}, + {"name": "list_repos", "description": "List repos"}, + ] + result, mcp = _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), tools=tools) + provision = result["service_provision"] + + assert provision.roles == [] + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [ + f"{WORKLOAD}.create_issue", + f"{WORKLOAD}.list_repos", + ] + assert provision.scopes[0].description == "Open an issue" + assert "derived from MCP manifest: 2 tools" == provision.reasoning + mcp.assert_called_once_with(f"http://{WORKLOAD}.{NS}.svc.cluster.local:8080/mcp") + + def test_endpoint_uses_services_first_port(self): + _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}, port=9000), tools=[])[1].assert_called_once_with( + f"http://{WORKLOAD}.{NS}.svc.cluster.local:9000/mcp" + ) + + +class TestAnalyzeToolEmpty: + def test_empty_tools_list_yields_no_roles_no_scopes(self): + provision = _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), tools=[])[0]["service_provision"] + assert provision.roles == [] + assert provision.scopes == [] + + +class TestAnalyzeTool502: + def test_service_without_mcp_label_is_502_naming_workload_and_label(self): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(svc=_svc({"app": "x"})) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + assert WORKLOAD in ei.value.detail + assert MCP_LABEL in ei.value.detail + + def test_service_get_failure_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(read_exc=RuntimeError("404 not found")) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_mcp_call_failure_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), mcp_exc=RuntimeError("connection refused")) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bbbf6751c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Provision `classify_service` node (UC1, issue 4.3). + +The idp-library `Configuration` (via the `_config` seam) and the Kubernetes API (via the +`_core_v1` seam) are mocked — no live services. All provision nodes are non-LLM. +""" + +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service, ServiceType + +ENTITY = "svc-123" + + +def _state(): + return OnboardingProvisionState(trigger=Trigger(entity_id=ENTITY)) + + +def _service(name="team-a/weather"): + return Service.model_validate({"id": ENTITY, "clientId": ENTITY, "name": name, "enabled": True}) + + +def _pod(labels, owner_kind="ReplicaSet", owner_name="weather-abc123"): + return SimpleNamespace( + metadata=SimpleNamespace( + labels=labels, + owner_references=[SimpleNamespace(kind=owner_kind, name=owner_name)], + ) + ) + + +def _core(pods): + core = MagicMock() + core.list_namespaced_pod.return_value = SimpleNamespace(items=pods) + return core + + +def _run(service=None, pods=None, get_service_exc=None, list_pods_exc=None): + with patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1: + if get_service_exc is not None: + cfg.return_value.get_service.side_effect = get_service_exc + else: + cfg.return_value.get_service.return_value = service + core = _core(pods or []) + if list_pods_exc is not None: + core.list_namespaced_pod.side_effect = list_pods_exc + core_v1.return_value = core + return nodes.classify_service(_state()) + + +class TestClassifyServiceHappyPaths: + def test_agent_label_routes_to_agent_and_sets_identity(self): + result = _run(service=_service(), pods=[_pod({"kagenti.io/type": "agent"})]) + assert result["service_id"] == ENTITY + assert result["namespace"] == "team-a" + assert result["workload_name"] == "weather" + assert result["service_type"] is ServiceType.AGENT + + def test_tool_label_routes_to_tool(self): + result = _run(service=_service(), pods=[_pod({"kagenti.io/type": "tool"})]) + assert result["service_type"] is ServiceType.TOOL + assert result["namespace"] == "team-a" + assert result["workload_name"] == "weather" + + def test_service_id_stored_from_trigger_entity_id(self): + result = _run(service=_service(), pods=[_pod({"kagenti.io/type": "agent"})]) + assert result["service_id"] == ENTITY + + def test_statefulset_owner_matched_by_exact_name(self): + pod = _pod({"kagenti.io/type": "tool"}, owner_kind="StatefulSet", owner_name="weather") + result = _run(service=_service(), pods=[pod]) + assert result["service_type"] is ServiceType.TOOL + + +class TestClassifyService502s: + def test_label_absent_is_502_naming_workload_and_label(self): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(service=_service(), pods=[_pod({})]) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + assert "weather" in ei.value.detail + assert "kagenti.io/type" in ei.value.detail + + def test_label_unknown_value_is_502(self): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(service=_service(), pods=[_pod({"kagenti.io/type": "sidecar"})]) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_client_name_without_slash_is_502(self): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(service=_service(name="no-slash-name"), pods=[_pod({"kagenti.io/type": "agent"})]) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_config_api_down_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(get_service_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 503"), pods=[]) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_k8s_pod_list_failure_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(service=_service(), list_pods_exc=RuntimeError("boom")) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_no_pod_owned_by_workload_is_502(self): + unrelated = _pod({"kagenti.io/type": "agent"}, owner_name="other-xyz") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _run(service=_service(), pods=[unrelated]) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + assert "weather" in ei.value.detail diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7f5144409 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Provision graph wiring (UC1, issue 3.4). + +Covers the conditional routing on `service_type` and end-to-end node wiring with all +external seams (idp-library `Configuration`, Kubernetes, MCP) mocked. +""" + +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import graph as graph_mod +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service, ServiceType + +ENTITY = "svc-1" + + +def _get(result, key): + return result[key] if isinstance(result, dict) else getattr(result, key) + + +def _pod(type_value): + return SimpleNamespace( + metadata=SimpleNamespace( + labels={"kagenti.io/type": type_value}, + owner_references=[SimpleNamespace(kind="ReplicaSet", name="weather-abc")], + ) + ) + + +def _service(): + return Service.model_validate( + {"id": ENTITY, "clientId": ENTITY, "name": "team-a/weather", "enabled": True} + ) + + +class TestRoute: + def test_agent_routes_to_analyze_agent(self): + state = OnboardingProvisionState(trigger=Trigger(entity_id=ENTITY), service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) + assert graph_mod._route(state) == "analyze_agent" + + def test_tool_routes_to_analyze_tool(self): + state = OnboardingProvisionState(trigger=Trigger(entity_id=ENTITY), service_type=ServiceType.TOOL) + assert graph_mod._route(state) == "analyze_tool" + + +class TestGraphCompiles: + def test_build_returns_compiled_graph(self): + assert graph_mod.build_provision_graph() is not None + + +class TestEndToEnd: + def _invoke(self): + return graph_mod.build_provision_graph().invoke( + OnboardingProvisionState(trigger=Trigger(entity_id=ENTITY)) + ) + + def test_agent_path_end_to_end(self): + with ( + patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, + patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(nodes, "_custom_objects") as co, + ): + cfg.return_value.get_service.return_value = _service() + core = MagicMock() + core.list_namespaced_pod.return_value = SimpleNamespace(items=[_pod("agent")]) + core_v1.return_value = core + co.return_value.list_namespaced_custom_object.return_value = { + "items": [ + { + "metadata": {"name": "weather"}, + "spec": {"skills": [{"name": "forecast", "description": "d"}]}, + } + ] + } + result = self._invoke() + + assert _get(result, "service_type") is ServiceType.AGENT + provision = _get(result, "service_provision") + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == ["weather.agent"] + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == ["weather.forecast"] + cfg.return_value.set_service_type.assert_called_once() + + def test_tool_path_end_to_end(self): + with ( + patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, + patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(nodes, "_mcp_tools_list", return_value=[{"name": "t1", "description": "d"}]), + ): + cfg.return_value.get_service.return_value = _service() + core = MagicMock() + core.list_namespaced_pod.return_value = SimpleNamespace(items=[_pod("tool")]) + core.read_namespaced_service.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + metadata=SimpleNamespace(labels={"protocol.kagenti.io/mcp": ""}), + spec=SimpleNamespace(ports=[SimpleNamespace(port=8080)]), + ) + core_v1.return_value = core + result = self._invoke() + + assert _get(result, "service_type") is ServiceType.TOOL + provision = _get(result, "service_provision") + assert provision.roles == [] + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == ["weather.t1"] diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_provision_service.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_provision_service.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..be11d8a7f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_provision_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Provision `provision_service` node (UC1, issue 4.3). + +The idp-library `Configuration` is mocked via the `_config` seam — no service HTTP layer. +""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.types import ( + RoleDefinition, + ScopeDefinition, + ServiceProvision, +) +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service, ServiceType + +SERVICE_ID = "svc-123" + + +def _state(roles, scopes, service_type=ServiceType.AGENT, reasoning="r"): + return OnboardingProvisionState( + trigger=Trigger(entity_id=SERVICE_ID), + service_id=SERVICE_ID, + namespace="team-a", + workload_name="weather", + service_type=service_type, + service_provision=ServiceProvision(roles=roles, scopes=scopes, reasoning=reasoning), + ) + + +def _service(): + return Service.model_validate({"id": SERVICE_ID, "clientId": SERVICE_ID, "enabled": True}) + + +def _run(state, *, get_service_exc=None): + with patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg: + conf = MagicMock() + if get_service_exc is not None: + conf.get_service.side_effect = get_service_exc + else: + conf.get_service.return_value = _service() + cfg.return_value = conf + result = nodes.provision_service(state) + return result, conf + + +class TestProvisionServiceWrites: + def test_create_service_role_called_once_per_role(self): + roles = [ + RoleDefinition(name="weather.agent", description="Agent role"), + RoleDefinition(name="weather.admin", description="Admin role"), + ] + _, conf = _run(_state(roles, [])) + assert conf.create_service_role.call_count == 2 + conf.create_service_role.assert_has_calls( + [call(SERVICE_ID, roles[0]), call(SERVICE_ID, roles[1])] + ) + + def test_create_service_scope_called_once_per_scope(self): + scopes = [ + ScopeDefinition(name="weather.forecast", description="Forecast"), + ScopeDefinition(name="weather.history", description="History"), + ] + _, conf = _run(_state([], scopes)) + assert conf.create_service_scope.call_count == 2 + conf.create_service_scope.assert_has_calls( + [call(SERVICE_ID, scopes[0]), call(SERVICE_ID, scopes[1])] + ) + + def test_no_entries_makes_no_create_calls(self): + _, conf = _run(_state([], [])) + conf.create_service_role.assert_not_called() + conf.create_service_scope.assert_not_called() + + +class TestProvisionServicePersistsType: + def test_set_service_type_called_with_resolved_service_type(self): + _, conf = _run(_state([], [], service_type=ServiceType.TOOL)) + assert conf.set_service_type.call_count == 1 + passed_service, passed_type = conf.set_service_type.call_args.args + assert passed_type is ServiceType.TOOL + assert passed_service is conf.get_service.return_value + + def test_agent_type_persisted_as_capitalized_value(self): + _, conf = _run(_state([], [], service_type=ServiceType.AGENT)) + assert conf.set_service_type.call_args.args[1] == "Agent" + + +class TestProvisionServiceReturn: + def test_returns_service_provision_and_service_type_to_orchestrator(self): + roles = [RoleDefinition(name="weather.agent", description="Agent role")] + state = _state(roles, [], service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) + result, _ = _run(state) + assert result["service_provision"] is state.service_provision + assert result["service_type"] is ServiceType.AGENT + + +class TestProvisionService502: + def test_idp_unavailable_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + roles = [RoleDefinition(name="weather.agent", description="Agent role")] + state = _state(roles, []) + with patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg: + conf = MagicMock() + conf.create_service_role.side_effect = RuntimeError("HTTP 503") + cfg.return_value = conf + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + nodes.provision_service(state) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index e76547ae8..f1967241c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -1,11 +1,12 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.idp.configuration.""" +from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType, Subject REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" @@ -479,6 +480,96 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(service, "Agent") + def test_accepts_service_type_enum(self, monkeypatch): + # ServiceType is a str enum; set_service_type unwraps it to the plain "Agent"/"Tool" value. + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + service = self._make_service() + updated = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "svc-uuid", "name": "my-svc", "enabled": True, + "attributes": {"client.type": "Agent"}} + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.post", return_value=_ok(updated, 200)) as m: + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).set_service_type(service, ServiceType.AGENT) + assert m.call_args[1].get("json") == {"type": "Agent"} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# create_service_role / create_service_scope — idempotent create-or-get + map +# (tested by patching the Configuration methods they compose) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCreateServiceRole: + def _svc(self): + return Service.model_validate({"id": "svc-1", "clientId": "svc-1", "enabled": True}) + + def test_creates_role_when_absent_then_maps_to_service(self): + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) + role_def = SimpleNamespace(name="app.agent", description="Agent role") + created = Role(id="r-1", name="app.agent", description="Agent role", composite=False) + svc = self._svc() + with ( + patch.object(cfg, "get_roles", return_value=[]), + patch.object(cfg, "create_role", return_value=created) as create, + patch.object(cfg, "get_service", return_value=svc), + patch.object(cfg, "map_role_to_service", return_value=svc) as mapper, + ): + result = cfg.create_service_role("svc-1", role_def) + create.assert_called_once_with("app.agent", "Agent role") + mapper.assert_called_once_with(svc, created) + assert result is created + + def test_reuses_existing_role_without_creating(self): + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) + role_def = SimpleNamespace(name="app.agent", description="Agent role") + existing = Role(id="r-1", name="app.agent", description="Agent role", composite=False) + svc = self._svc() + with ( + patch.object(cfg, "get_roles", return_value=[existing]), + patch.object(cfg, "create_role") as create, + patch.object(cfg, "get_service", return_value=svc), + patch.object(cfg, "map_role_to_service", return_value=svc) as mapper, + ): + result = cfg.create_service_role("svc-1", role_def) + create.assert_not_called() + mapper.assert_called_once_with(svc, existing) + assert result is existing + + +class TestCreateServiceScope: + def _svc(self): + return Service.model_validate({"id": "svc-1", "clientId": "svc-1", "enabled": True}) + + def test_creates_scope_when_absent_then_maps_to_service(self): + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) + scope_def = SimpleNamespace(name="app.read", description="Read tool") + created = Scope(id="s-1", name="app.read", description="Read tool") + svc = self._svc() + with ( + patch.object(cfg, "get_scopes", return_value=[]), + patch.object(cfg, "create_scope", return_value=created) as create, + patch.object(cfg, "get_service", return_value=svc), + patch.object(cfg, "map_scope_to_service", return_value=svc) as mapper, + ): + result = cfg.create_service_scope("svc-1", scope_def) + create.assert_called_once_with("app.read", "Read tool") + mapper.assert_called_once_with(svc, created) + assert result is created + + def test_reuses_existing_scope_without_creating(self): + cfg = Configuration.for_realm(REALM) + scope_def = SimpleNamespace(name="app.read", description="Read tool") + existing = Scope(id="s-1", name="app.read", description="Read tool") + svc = self._svc() + with ( + patch.object(cfg, "get_scopes", return_value=[existing]), + patch.object(cfg, "create_scope") as create, + patch.object(cfg, "get_service", return_value=svc), + patch.object(cfg, "map_scope_to_service", return_value=svc) as mapper, + ): + result = cfg.create_service_scope("svc-1", scope_def) + create.assert_not_called() + mapper.assert_called_once_with(svc, existing) + assert result is existing + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_scopes From 1b65c53862ba4343acb9dd67c4859cdeaee80033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 22:40:49 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 203/273] feat(aiac): Service Policy sub-agent (UC1) + shared run_upstream helper Add the deterministic Service Policy sub-agent (UC1 stage 2): ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_id, service_type) fetches the service's own roles/scopes from the IdP via get_service, reads the excluded-self role/scope universe, flattens roles to their closure, invokes the PRB (build_scope_rules per own scope; build_role_rules per own-role-closure member on the agent path), and returns a merged list[PolicyRule]. Enforces the no-self-mapping invariant by construction and surfaces IdP unavailability as 502; PRB errors propagate. Extract the duplicated retry helper into shared/upstream.py (run_upstream) and use it from both the Service Policy and Service Provision sub-agents. Move the kubernetes import in provision/nodes.py to module top level (drop the lazy-import shim). Update the aiac-agent PRD (run_upstream in Error Handling + shared/ in the file tree) and the UC1 spec (run(service_id, service_type) contract). Tests: 11 new unit tests for the sub-agent; full non-integration suite 311 passed. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 3 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 31 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py | 29 ++ .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 52 +-- .../uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py | 0 .../uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py | 77 +++++ .../uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py | 0 .../onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py | 307 ++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index 8ea49039e..cac7d3974 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ ChromaDB collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`. ## Error Handling -All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. +All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. This is centralised in the shared `run_upstream(fn)` helper (`agent/shared/upstream.py`), which is transport-agnostic: it re-raises the original exception after the final attempt, and each caller maps it to the status below (e.g. an IdP/Kubernetes failure → `502`). | Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | |---|---| @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ Upstream failures propagate as bare HTTP error responses (see table above), rais ``` aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── controller/ +├── shared/ ← flatten_role (roles.py), run_upstream (upstream.py) ├── uc/ │ ├── onboarding/ │ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → service_policy, returns list[PolicyRule] diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 74357689c..246a14b3c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipeline: 1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. -2. **Service Policy** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), package into `list[tuple]`, return to the Orchestrator. +2. **Service Policy** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), call the PRB for each applicable pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. The Orchestrator returns `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. The Controller calls the PCE with that `override` flag; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. UC1 is **incremental** — existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access — so the mode is always append (`override=False`). @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ flowchart TD **Sequence:** 1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. -2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. +2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy re-reads the service's own roles/scopes from the IdP by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted them), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. 3. Return `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. @@ -180,15 +180,17 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): **Nature:** deterministic IdP reader + PRB invoker. -**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's own roles + scopes (from Provision output), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. +**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's `service_id`, fetch its own roles + scopes from the IdP (`get_service(service_id)`), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. + +**Why `service_id`, not `ServiceProvision`:** own roles/scopes must be id-bearing `Role`/`Scope` — `flatten_role` needs a `Role` (with `childRoles`) and the PRB builds `PolicyRule(role=Role, scope=Scope)`. The Provision-time `RoleDefinition`/`ScopeDefinition` carry only name+description (no Keycloak id), so they cannot be passed to the PRB. Provision has already persisted these entities, so `get_service(service_id).roles` / `.scopes` returns them with ids. **Terminology — own vs other (used throughout this section):** -- **Own roles / own scopes** — the roles and scopes the just-provisioned service defines for *itself*: exactly `service_provision.roles` / `service_provision.scopes`, written into the IdP by Service Provision. +- **Own roles / own scopes** — the roles and scopes the just-provisioned service defines for *itself*, fetched from the IdP by `service_id`: `service.roles` / `service.scopes` (`get_service(service_id)`). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. - **Other roles / other scopes** — every *pre-existing* role/scope in the IdP universe **minus** the new service's own entities. These belong to other services. **Self-mapping invariant (must hold):** the PRB must **never** be handed an *(own role, own scope)* pair — a service's own role must never be mapped to its own scope. Onboarding only ever grants **cross-service** access: *who else* may call this service, and (agents only) *what else* this service may call. A service's own role reaching its own scope is not something onboarding needs to author (that access is intrinsic and out of scope here) and would pollute the policy set. The Service Policy sub-agent guarantees the invariant **by construction** through two complementary guards: -1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the "other" side).** Own roles are removed from `other_roles` and own scopes from `other_scopes` before any PRB call (steps 2–3). Flattening runs *after* exclusion and cannot reintroduce an own role: the just-provisioned roles are brand new and are not yet referenced as `childRoles` by any existing role. +1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the "other" side).** Own roles are removed from `other_roles` and own scopes from `other_scopes` before any PRB call (steps 3–4). Flattening runs *after* exclusion and cannot reintroduce an own role: the just-provisioned roles are brand new and are not yet referenced as `childRoles` by any existing role. 2. **Call direction (each call's "self" side is one own entity of the *opposite* kind).** Each PRB call pairs a single own entity with the other-side universe, never own-with-own, and keeps the semantic intent crisp: - `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, own_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* (an **own scope** against **other roles**) - `build_role_rules(own_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (an **own role** against **other scopes**; agent path only) @@ -197,14 +199,15 @@ Neither guard alone is sufficient — exclusion keeps own entities off the other ### Steps -1. Receive `service_provision: ServiceProvision` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. -2. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service_provision.roles}`). -3. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the new service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service_provision.scopes}`). -4. **Flatten roles to their closure** before any PRB call, via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): expand `other_roles` into the union of every role's closure, de-duplicated by `role.id` (call this `flattened_other_roles`); on the agent path, also expand each of `service_provision.roles`. -5. Call PRB and merge: - - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. - - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each scope in `service_provision.scopes`; for each role in `service_provision.roles`, call `build_role_rules(r, other_scopes)` **once per role `r` in that role's closure**. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. -6. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. (The Orchestrator pairs it with `override=False` for the Controller — see [Architecture overview](#architecture-overview).) +1. Receive `service_id: str` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. +2. Fetch the service's **own roles + scopes** from the IdP by `service_id` via `aiac.idp.configuration.api` (`get_service(service_id)` → `service.roles` / `service.scopes`, id-bearing `Role`/`Scope`). +3. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service.roles}`). +4. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service.scopes}`). +5. **Flatten roles to their closure** before any PRB call, via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): expand `other_roles` into the union of every role's closure, de-duplicated by `role.id` (call this `flattened_other_roles`); on the agent path, also expand each of the service's own roles. +6. Call PRB and merge: + - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each of the service's own scopes. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. + - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each own scope; for each of the service's own roles, call `build_role_rules(r, other_scopes)` **once per role `r` in that role's closure**. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. +7. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. (The Orchestrator pairs it with `override=False` for the Controller — see [Architecture overview](#architecture-overview).) **Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to each `agent_role`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). @@ -231,7 +234,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ │ └── types.py ← RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision (ServiceType imported from aiac.idp.configuration.models) └── service_policy/ ├── __init__.py - └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_provision, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] + └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_id, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] ``` ## Out of scope diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..400d31bc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +"""Shared upstream-call helper for the agent layer. + +`run_upstream` wraps a zero-arg callable in a bounded retry loop for transient upstream +failures (IdP Configuration Service, Kubernetes API, MCP endpoints). It is deliberately +transport-agnostic: it retries then **re-raises the original exception**, leaving each +caller to map the failure to the right HTTP status at the service boundary (e.g. +``HTTPException(502)`` for IdP/Kubernetes — see the Error Handling table in +``aiac-agent.md``). The retry budget is read from ``UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES`` (default 3) at +call time, so tests can tune it via the environment. + +Consolidates the retry helper that was previously inlined in each onboarding sub-agent; +callers today are the UC1 Provision (``provision/nodes.py``) and Service Policy +(``service_policy/runner.py``) sub-agents. +""" + +import os + +from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential + + +def run_upstream(fn): + """Run ``fn`` with bounded retries (``UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES``, default 3) and exponential + backoff, reraising the last error so the caller can convert it to a 502.""" + retryer = Retrying( + stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), + wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), + reraise=True, + ) + return retryer(fn) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py index 7e90563a2..d07b12cb1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -6,16 +6,16 @@ IdP access is via the **idp-library** `Configuration` (the `_config` seam), never the IdP service directly. Kubernetes access is via the `_core_v1` / `_custom_objects` seams, which -lazily import the `kubernetes` client so unit tests (which patch the seams) never need it -installed. Any upstream failure surfaces as an `HTTPException(502, ...)` whose message names -the workload and the specific missing/invalid label — actionable, never silent. +unit tests patch. Any upstream failure surfaces as an `HTTPException(502, ...)` whose message +names the workload and the specific missing/invalid label — actionable, never silent. """ import os from fastapi import HTTPException -from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential +from kubernetes import client, config +from aiac.agent.shared.upstream import run_upstream from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType @@ -37,23 +37,18 @@ def _config() -> Configuration: def _core_v1(): - """CoreV1Api client (pods, services). Lazily imports kubernetes so tests that patch - this seam never require the package.""" - from kubernetes import client, config - - _load_kube_config(config) + """CoreV1Api client (pods, services).""" + _load_kube_config() return client.CoreV1Api() def _custom_objects(): - """CustomObjectsApi client (AgentCard CRs). Lazily imports kubernetes.""" - from kubernetes import client, config - - _load_kube_config(config) + """CustomObjectsApi client (AgentCard CRs).""" + _load_kube_config() return client.CustomObjectsApi() -def _load_kube_config(config) -> None: +def _load_kube_config() -> None: try: config.load_incluster_config() except Exception: @@ -74,17 +69,6 @@ def _mcp_tools_list(endpoint: str) -> list[dict]: return (resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools", []) -def _run_upstream(fn): - """Run an upstream call with bounded retries (UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES), reraising the last - error so the caller can convert it to a 502.""" - retryer = Retrying( - stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), - wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), - reraise=True, - ) - return retryer(fn) - - def _select_pod(pods, workload_name: str): """The pod owned by ``workload_name``: a Deployment's ReplicaSet (name prefix ``{workload}-``), or a StatefulSet / Sandbox whose name equals ``workload``.""" @@ -106,7 +90,7 @@ def classify_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: service_id = state.trigger.entity_id try: - service = _run_upstream(lambda: _config().get_service(service_id)) + service = run_upstream(lambda: _config().get_service(service_id)) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"IdP config unavailable resolving service {service_id!r}: {e}") @@ -120,7 +104,7 @@ def classify_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: namespace, workload_name = name.split("/", 1) try: - pods = _run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().list_namespaced_pod(namespace).items) + pods = run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().list_namespaced_pod(namespace).items) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"Kubernetes pod LIST failed in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}") @@ -155,7 +139,7 @@ def analyze_agent(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: role = RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.agent", description="Agent role") try: - resp = _run_upstream( + resp = run_upstream( lambda: _custom_objects().list_namespaced_custom_object( group=_AGENTCARD_GROUP, version=_AGENTCARD_VERSION, @@ -198,7 +182,7 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: namespace, workload = state.namespace, state.workload_name try: - svc = _run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().read_namespaced_service(workload, namespace)) + svc = run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().read_namespaced_service(workload, namespace)) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( 502, f"Kubernetes Service GET failed for {workload!r} in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}" @@ -216,7 +200,7 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: endpoint = f"http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp" try: - tools = _run_upstream(lambda: _mcp_tools_list(endpoint)) + tools = run_upstream(lambda: _mcp_tools_list(endpoint)) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"MCP tools/list failed at {endpoint}: {e}") @@ -242,11 +226,11 @@ def provision_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: try: for role in provision.roles: - _run_upstream(lambda role=role: config.create_service_role(service_id, role)) + run_upstream(lambda role=role: config.create_service_role(service_id, role)) for scope in provision.scopes: - _run_upstream(lambda scope=scope: config.create_service_scope(service_id, scope)) - service = _run_upstream(lambda: config.get_service(service_id)) - _run_upstream(lambda: config.set_service_type(service, state.service_type)) + run_upstream(lambda scope=scope: config.create_service_scope(service_id, scope)) + service = run_upstream(lambda: config.get_service(service_id)) + run_upstream(lambda: config.set_service_type(service, state.service_type)) except HTTPException: raise except Exception as e: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1fc5b0d10 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +"""Service Policy sub-agent (UC1). + +Second of the two stages sequenced by the Service Onboarding Orchestrator, run after +Service Provision. Deterministic (non-LLM): reads the full IdP role/scope universe +*excluding the just-provisioned service's own entities*, flattens roles to their closure +via ``flatten_role`` (3.2) before any PRB call, invokes the Policy Rules Builder for each +applicable pair, and returns a single ``list[PolicyRule]``. It applies nothing — the +Orchestrator/Controller make the single ``compute_and_apply`` (PCE) call afterwards. + +IdP access is via the **idp-library** ``Configuration`` (the ``_config`` seam), never the +IdP Configuration Service directly. Own roles/scopes are fetched from the IdP by +``service_id`` (``get_service`` → id-bearing ``Role``/``Scope``), so they are usable as PRB +inputs and can be flattened; ``RoleDefinition``/``ScopeDefinition`` (no id) are never passed +to the PRB. +""" + +import os + +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules +from aiac.agent.shared.roles import flatten_role +from aiac.agent.shared.upstream import run_upstream +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + + +def _config() -> Configuration: + return Configuration.for_realm(os.getenv("KEYCLOAK_REALM", "")) + + +def _flatten_dedup(roles): + """Union of every role's closure, de-duplicated by ``role.id``.""" + out = [] + seen: set[str] = set() + for role in roles: + for member in flatten_role(role): + if member.id not in seen: + seen.add(member.id) + out.append(member) + return out + + +class ServicePolicyUpdate: + @staticmethod + def run(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: + config = _config() + + try: + service = run_upstream(lambda: config.get_service(service_id)) + all_roles = run_upstream(config.get_roles) + all_scopes = run_upstream(config.get_scopes) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException( + 502, f"IdP Configuration Service unavailable for service {service_id!r}: {e}" + ) + + own_roles = service.roles + own_scopes = service.scopes + + own_role_names = {r.name for r in own_roles} + own_scope_names = {s.name for s in own_scopes} + + other_roles = [r for r in all_roles if r.name not in own_role_names] + other_scopes = [s for s in all_scopes if s.name not in own_scope_names] + + flattened_other_roles = _flatten_dedup(other_roles) + + rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] + for scope in own_scopes: + rules.extend(build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)) + if service_type is ServiceType.AGENT: + for own_role in own_roles: + for role in flatten_role(own_role): + rules.extend(build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)) + return rules diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..315329e18 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Policy sub-agent (UC1, issue 4.4). + +The idp-library `Configuration` is mocked via the `_config` seam, and the PRB entry +points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`) are patched on the runner module — +no live services, no LLM. The sub-agent is deterministic and applies nothing. +""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.service_policy import runner +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule + +SERVICE_ID = "svc-123" + + +def _role(name, *, role_id=None, composite=False, children=None): + return Role( + id=role_id or f"{name}-id", + name=name, + description=name, + composite=composite, + childRoles=children or [], + ) + + +def _scope(name, *, scope_id=None): + return Scope(id=scope_id or f"{name}-id", name=name, description=name) + + +def _service(own_roles, own_scopes): + return Service.model_validate( + { + "id": SERVICE_ID, + "clientId": SERVICE_ID, + "enabled": True, + "roles": [r.model_dump() for r in own_roles], + "scopes": [s.model_dump() for s in own_scopes], + } + ) + + +def _rule(role, scope): + return PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) + + +def _invoke( + service_type, + *, + own_roles, + own_scopes, + all_roles, + all_scopes, + scope_rules=None, + role_rules=None, + get_service_exc=None, + get_roles_exc=None, +): + """Run ServicePolicyUpdate.run with all IdP + PRB calls mocked. + + `scope_rules` / `role_rules` are optional side_effect callables; default to + returning an empty list so calls are counted without inventing rule content. + `get_service_exc` / `get_roles_exc` inject IdP-read failures. + """ + with ( + patch.object(runner, "_config") as cfg, + patch.object(runner, "build_scope_rules") as bsr, + patch.object(runner, "build_role_rules") as brr, + ): + conf = MagicMock() + if get_service_exc is not None: + conf.get_service.side_effect = get_service_exc + else: + conf.get_service.return_value = _service(own_roles, own_scopes) + if get_roles_exc is not None: + conf.get_roles.side_effect = get_roles_exc + else: + conf.get_roles.return_value = all_roles + conf.get_scopes.return_value = all_scopes + cfg.return_value = conf + bsr.side_effect = scope_rules or (lambda roles, scope: []) + brr.side_effect = role_rules or (lambda role, scopes: []) + result = runner.ServicePolicyUpdate.run(SERVICE_ID, service_type) + return result, bsr, brr, conf + + +class TestTool: + def test_single_scope_calls_build_scope_rules_once_and_merges(self): + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") + other_role = _role("github.agent") + rule = _rule(other_role, own_scope) + + result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + own_roles=[], + own_scopes=[own_scope], + all_roles=[other_role], + all_scopes=[own_scope], + scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [rule], + ) + + assert bsr.call_count == 1 + passed_roles, passed_scope = bsr.call_args.args + assert passed_scope.name == "weather.forecast" + assert [r.name for r in passed_roles] == ["github.agent"] + brr.assert_not_called() + assert result == [rule] + + def test_build_scope_rules_once_per_own_scope_and_results_merged(self): + s1, s2 = _scope("weather.forecast"), _scope("weather.history") + other = _role("github.agent") + r1, r2 = _rule(other, s1), _rule(other, s2) + + result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + own_roles=[], + own_scopes=[s1, s2], + all_roles=[other], + all_scopes=[s1, s2], + scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [r1] if scope.name == s1.name else [r2], + ) + + assert bsr.call_count == 2 + assert {c.args[1].name for c in bsr.call_args_list} == {s1.name, s2.name} + brr.assert_not_called() + assert result == [r1, r2] + + +class TestAgent: + def test_scope_rules_per_own_scope_and_role_rules_per_own_role(self): + own_role = _role("weather.agent") + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") + other_role = _role("github.agent") + other_scope = _scope("github.issue") + scope_rule = _rule(other_role, own_scope) + role_rule = _rule(own_role, other_scope) + + result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.AGENT, + own_roles=[own_role], + own_scopes=[own_scope], + all_roles=[own_role, other_role], + all_scopes=[own_scope, other_scope], + scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [scope_rule], + role_rules=lambda role, scopes: [role_rule], + ) + + # scope side: once per own scope, roles list is the other-role universe + assert bsr.call_count == 1 + s_roles, s_scope = bsr.call_args.args + assert s_scope.name == "weather.forecast" + assert [r.name for r in s_roles] == ["github.agent"] + + # role side: once per own role, scopes list is the other-scope universe + assert brr.call_count == 1 + r_role, r_scopes = brr.call_args.args + assert r_role.name == "weather.agent" + assert [s.name for s in r_scopes] == ["github.issue"] + + assert result == [scope_rule, role_rule] + + +class TestFlattening: + def test_composite_other_role_expanded_to_closure_deduped_by_id(self): + reader = _role("github.reader", role_id="reader-id") + # composite whose closure includes reader, which also appears standalone + admin = _role("github.admin", role_id="admin-id", composite=True, children=[reader]) + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") + + _, bsr, _, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + own_roles=[], + own_scopes=[own_scope], + all_roles=[admin, reader], + all_scopes=[own_scope], + ) + + passed_roles = bsr.call_args.args[0] + # closure of admin (admin + reader) unioned with standalone reader, deduped by id + assert [r.name for r in passed_roles] == ["github.admin", "github.reader"] + assert [r.id for r in passed_roles] == ["admin-id", "reader-id"] + + def test_composite_own_agent_role_calls_build_role_rules_per_closure_member(self): + sub = _role("weather.reader", role_id="wr-id") + own_role = _role("weather.admin", role_id="wa-id", composite=True, children=[sub]) + other_scope = _scope("github.issue") + + _, _, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.AGENT, + own_roles=[own_role], + own_scopes=[], + all_roles=[own_role, sub], + all_scopes=[other_scope], + ) + + assert brr.call_count == 2 + assert {c.args[0].name for c in brr.call_args_list} == {"weather.admin", "weather.reader"} + + +class TestSelfExclusion: + def test_own_role_and_scope_excluded_from_other_universe(self): + own_role, own_scope = _role("weather.agent"), _scope("weather.forecast") + other_role, other_scope = _role("github.agent"), _scope("github.issue") + + _, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.AGENT, + own_roles=[own_role], + own_scopes=[own_scope], + all_roles=[own_role, other_role], + all_scopes=[own_scope, other_scope], + ) + + # own role never in the roles list handed to build_scope_rules + assert [r.name for r in bsr.call_args.args[0]] == ["github.agent"] + # own scope never in the scopes list handed to build_role_rules + assert [s.name for s in brr.call_args.args[1]] == ["github.issue"] + + +class TestSelfMappingInvariant: + def test_no_own_role_in_any_scope_call_and_no_own_scope_in_any_role_call(self): + own_roles = [_role("weather.agent"), _role("weather.admin")] + own_scopes = [_scope("weather.forecast"), _scope("weather.history")] + other_roles = [_role("github.agent"), _role("slack.bot")] + other_scopes = [_scope("github.issue"), _scope("slack.post")] + own_role_names = {r.name for r in own_roles} + own_scope_names = {s.name for s in own_scopes} + + _, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.AGENT, + own_roles=own_roles, + own_scopes=own_scopes, + all_roles=own_roles + other_roles, + all_scopes=own_scopes + other_scopes, + ) + + # across ALL build_scope_rules calls, no roles list contains an own role + for c in bsr.call_args_list: + assert own_role_names.isdisjoint({r.name for r in c.args[0]}) + # across ALL build_role_rules calls, no scopes list contains an own scope + for c in brr.call_args_list: + assert own_scope_names.isdisjoint({s.name for s in c.args[1]}) + + +class TestEmptyUniverse: + def test_no_other_entities_invokes_prb_with_empty_lists_and_returns_empty(self): + own_role, own_scope = _role("weather.agent"), _scope("weather.forecast") + + result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.AGENT, + own_roles=[own_role], + own_scopes=[own_scope], + all_roles=[own_role], # only the service's own entities exist + all_scopes=[own_scope], + ) + + assert bsr.call_count == 1 + assert bsr.call_args.args[0] == [] # empty other-roles universe + assert brr.call_count == 1 + assert brr.call_args.args[1] == [] # empty other-scopes universe + assert result == [] + + +class TestErrors: + def test_idp_unavailable_is_502_after_retries(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "2") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + own_roles=[], + own_scopes=[], + all_roles=[], + all_scopes=[], + get_service_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 503"), + ) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_idp_get_roles_unavailable_is_502(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + own_roles=[], + own_scopes=[_scope("weather.forecast")], + all_roles=[], + all_scopes=[_scope("weather.forecast")], + get_roles_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 500"), + ) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_prb_exception_propagates_no_partial_apply(self): + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") + + def _boom(roles, scope): + raise RuntimeError("LLM/ChromaDB failure") + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LLM/ChromaDB failure"): + _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + own_roles=[], + own_scopes=[own_scope], + all_roles=[_role("github.agent")], + all_scopes=[own_scope], + scope_rules=_boom, + ) From 7838ab0f5b3db7816200486bdcaf82109b075ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 22:53:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 204/273] refactor(aiac): Rename Service Policy sub-agent to Service Policy Builder Rename the UC1 onboarding sub-agent across code, PRD, and issues: - ServicePolicyUpdate -> ServicePolicyBuilder, .run() -> .build() - module service_policy/runner.py -> policy_builder/builder.py - "Service Policy" stage -> "Service Policy Builder" in PRD/issues, including the Service Onboarding Orchestrator references Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 2 +- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 14 +++++++------- .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 2 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 16 ++++++++-------- aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py | 4 ++-- .../src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py | 2 +- .../__init__.py | 0 .../runner.py => policy_builder/builder.py} | 6 +++--- .../__init__.py | 0 .../test_builder.py} | 16 ++++++++-------- 10 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/{service_policy => policy_builder}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/{service_policy/runner.py => policy_builder/builder.py} (95%) rename aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/{service_policy => policy_builder}/__init__.py (100%) rename aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/{service_policy/test_runner.py => policy_builder/test_builder.py} (95%) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 438d14c6a..26b9dd818 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via th | Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | |---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy (sequential) | +| Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy Builder (sequential) | | Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | | Role Update | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role sub-agent | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index cac7d3974..f2e24648c 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches t | Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy | `list[PolicyRule]` | +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy Builder | `list[PolicyRule]` | | Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build or Rebuild (TBD) | `list[PolicyRule]` | | Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `list[PolicyRule]` | @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC1["Orchestrator"] SA1["Service Provision"] - SA2["Service Policy"] + SA2["Service Policy Builder"] ORC1 --> SA1 ORC1 --> SA2 end @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | Notes | |---|---|---|---| -| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy (IdP reader + PRB invoker) | +| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy Builder (IdP reader + PRB invoker) | | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | | @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: ### IdP access — library, not service -Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC3 Role) performs **all** IdP reads and writes through the **idp-library** API — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — and **never** calls the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. The library owns the HTTP transport, retry/backoff, and Keycloak↔model mapping; sub-agents depend only on its typed `Configuration` methods (e.g. `get_service`, `get_roles`, `get_scopes`, `create_service_role`, `create_service_scope`, `set_service_type`). The shared service-type vocabulary is `aiac.idp.configuration.models.ServiceType` (`Agent`/`Tool`) — the same enum used by `Service.type`. See [library-idp.md](library-idp.md). +Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy Builder, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC3 Role) performs **all** IdP reads and writes through the **idp-library** API — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — and **never** calls the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. The library owns the HTTP transport, retry/backoff, and Keycloak↔model mapping; sub-agents depend only on its typed `Configuration` methods (e.g. `get_service`, `get_roles`, `get_scopes`, `create_service_role`, `create_service_scope`, `set_service_type`). The shared service-type vocabulary is `aiac.idp.configuration.models.ServiceType` (`Agent`/`Tool`) — the same enum used by `Service.type`. See [library-idp.md](library-idp.md). --- @@ -206,14 +206,14 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/ ├── shared/ ← flatten_role (roles.py), run_upstream (upstream.py) ├── uc/ │ ├── onboarding/ -│ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → service_policy, returns list[PolicyRule] +│ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy_builder, returns list[PolicyRule] │ │ ├── provision/ ← LLM sub-agent: classify, analyze, write to IdP -│ │ └── service_policy/ ← IdP reader + PRB invoker: read IdP, call PRB, return list[PolicyRule] +│ │ └── policy_builder/ ← IdP reader + PRB invoker: read IdP, call PRB, return list[PolicyRule] │ ├── policy_update/ │ │ ├── build/ ← calls PRB, returns list[PolicyRule]; TBD internals │ │ └── rebuild/ ← delegates to Build; TBD internals │ └── role_update/ ← calls PRB with (role, all_scopes), returns list[PolicyRule] -└── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called by Service Policy, Build, and Role sub-agent +└── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called by Service Policy Builder, Build, and Role sub-agent ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md index 8e5ded712..523c92a95 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ retry layers, kept distinct: | Use Case | Caller | Function(s) called | |---|---|---| -| UC1 — Service Onboarding | Service Policy sub-agent | `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` per agent/tool scope + `build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)` per agent role (agent path only) | +| UC1 — Service Onboarding | Service Policy Builder sub-agent | `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` per agent/tool scope + `build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)` per agent role (agent path only) | | UC2 — Policy Update (Build) | Build sub-agent | TBD | | UC3 — Role Update | Role sub-agent | `build_role_rules(role, all_scopes)` — one call | diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 246a14b3c..0882568f6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipeline: 1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. -2. **Service Policy** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), call the PRB for each applicable pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. +2. **Service Policy Builder** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), call the PRB for each applicable pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. The Orchestrator returns `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. The Controller calls the PCE with that `override` flag; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. UC1 is **incremental** — existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access — so the mode is always append (`override=False`). @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ flowchart TD subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] ORC["Orchestrator"] SA_PROV["Service Provision\n(LLM)"] - SA_POL["Service Policy\n(deterministic)"] + SA_POL["Service Policy Builder\n(deterministic)"] ORC --> SA_PROV ORC --> SA_POL end @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ flowchart TD **Sequence:** 1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. -2. Call `ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy re-reads the service's own roles/scopes from the IdP by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted them), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. +2. Call `ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy Builder re-reads the service's own roles/scopes from the IdP by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted them), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. 3. Return `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. @@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): --- -## Sub-agent: Service Policy +## Sub-agent: Service Policy Builder -`onboarding/service_policy/` +`onboarding/policy_builder/` **Nature:** deterministic IdP reader + PRB invoker. @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): - **Own roles / own scopes** — the roles and scopes the just-provisioned service defines for *itself*, fetched from the IdP by `service_id`: `service.roles` / `service.scopes` (`get_service(service_id)`). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. - **Other roles / other scopes** — every *pre-existing* role/scope in the IdP universe **minus** the new service's own entities. These belong to other services. -**Self-mapping invariant (must hold):** the PRB must **never** be handed an *(own role, own scope)* pair — a service's own role must never be mapped to its own scope. Onboarding only ever grants **cross-service** access: *who else* may call this service, and (agents only) *what else* this service may call. A service's own role reaching its own scope is not something onboarding needs to author (that access is intrinsic and out of scope here) and would pollute the policy set. The Service Policy sub-agent guarantees the invariant **by construction** through two complementary guards: +**Self-mapping invariant (must hold):** the PRB must **never** be handed an *(own role, own scope)* pair — a service's own role must never be mapped to its own scope. Onboarding only ever grants **cross-service** access: *who else* may call this service, and (agents only) *what else* this service may call. A service's own role reaching its own scope is not something onboarding needs to author (that access is intrinsic and out of scope here) and would pollute the policy set. The Service Policy Builder sub-agent guarantees the invariant **by construction** through two complementary guards: 1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the "other" side).** Own roles are removed from `other_roles` and own scopes from `other_scopes` before any PRB call (steps 3–4). Flattening runs *after* exclusion and cannot reintroduce an own role: the just-provisioned roles are brand new and are not yet referenced as `childRoles` by any existing role. 2. **Call direction (each call's "self" side is one own entity of the *opposite* kind).** Each PRB call pairs a single own entity with the other-side universe, never own-with-own, and keeps the semantic intent crisp: @@ -232,9 +232,9 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service │ ├── state.py ← OnboardingProvisionState │ └── types.py ← RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision (ServiceType imported from aiac.idp.configuration.models) - └── service_policy/ + └── policy_builder/ ├── __init__.py - └── runner.py ← ServicePolicyUpdate.run(service_id, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] + └── builder.py ← ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] ``` ## Out of scope diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py index 400d31bc2..2af31af2a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ call time, so tests can tune it via the environment. Consolidates the retry helper that was previously inlined in each onboarding sub-agent; -callers today are the UC1 Provision (``provision/nodes.py``) and Service Policy -(``service_policy/runner.py``) sub-agents. +callers today are the UC1 Provision (``provision/nodes.py``) and Service Policy Builder +(``policy_builder/builder.py``) sub-agents. """ import os diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py index 3ba65026d..bca48c274 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ """Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) — stub. -Two-stage (Provision → Service Policy) orchestration lands in 3.4/3.5/3.6. +Two-stage (Provision → Service Policy Builder) orchestration lands in 3.4/3.5/3.6. At the foundation stage it returns an empty rule set with ``override=False`` (service onboarding merges additively). """ diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py similarity index 95% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index 1fc5b0d10..5c63f8d29 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/runner.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Service Policy sub-agent (UC1). +"""Service Policy Builder sub-agent (UC1). Second of the two stages sequenced by the Service Onboarding Orchestrator, run after Service Provision. Deterministic (non-LLM): reads the full IdP role/scope universe @@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ def _flatten_dedup(roles): return out -class ServicePolicyUpdate: +class ServicePolicyBuilder: @staticmethod - def run(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: + def build(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: config = _config() try: diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/__init__.py similarity index 100% rename from aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/__init__.py rename to aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/__init__.py diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py similarity index 95% rename from aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py rename to aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py index 315329e18..b0e6117c7 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/service_policy/test_runner.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -"""Unit tests for the Service Policy sub-agent (UC1, issue 4.4). +"""Unit tests for the Service Policy Builder sub-agent (UC1, issue 4.4). The idp-library `Configuration` is mocked via the `_config` seam, and the PRB entry -points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`) are patched on the runner module — +points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`) are patched on the builder module — no live services, no LLM. The sub-agent is deterministic and applies nothing. """ @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import pytest from fastapi import HTTPException -from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.service_policy import runner +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.policy_builder import builder from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule @@ -59,16 +59,16 @@ def _invoke( get_service_exc=None, get_roles_exc=None, ): - """Run ServicePolicyUpdate.run with all IdP + PRB calls mocked. + """Run ServicePolicyBuilder.build with all IdP + PRB calls mocked. `scope_rules` / `role_rules` are optional side_effect callables; default to returning an empty list so calls are counted without inventing rule content. `get_service_exc` / `get_roles_exc` inject IdP-read failures. """ with ( - patch.object(runner, "_config") as cfg, - patch.object(runner, "build_scope_rules") as bsr, - patch.object(runner, "build_role_rules") as brr, + patch.object(builder, "_config") as cfg, + patch.object(builder, "build_scope_rules") as bsr, + patch.object(builder, "build_role_rules") as brr, ): conf = MagicMock() if get_service_exc is not None: @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ def _invoke( cfg.return_value = conf bsr.side_effect = scope_rules or (lambda roles, scope: []) brr.side_effect = role_rules or (lambda role, scopes: []) - result = runner.ServicePolicyUpdate.run(SERVICE_ID, service_type) + result = builder.ServicePolicyBuilder.build(SERVICE_ID, service_type) return result, bsr, brr, conf From 7d56f1f304d883270d835c5b8778541048a8ff8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 23:01:49 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 205/273] =?UTF-8?q?feat(aiac):=20Service=20Onboarding=20Or?= =?UTF-8?q?chestrator=20(UC1)=20=E2=80=94=20provision=20=E2=86=92=20policy?= =?UTF-8?q?=20builder?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Implement the two-stage orchestrator (issue 3.6): invoke the Service Provision graph, feed its discovered service_type into ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type), and return (list[PolicyRule], override=False) to the Controller. No Apply/PCE stage here; override is always False (UC1 is additive). Add unit tests (issue 4.5) with both sub-agents mocked independently: both-succeed pass-through, provision-failure (builder not called), and builder-failure propagation. Remove the now-obsolete unmocked stub test for onboard_service in test_routes.py. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py | 30 ++++++-- aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py | 6 -- .../agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py index bca48c274..1144082fd 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/orchestrator.py @@ -1,12 +1,32 @@ -"""Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) — stub. +"""Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1). -Two-stage (Provision → Service Policy Builder) orchestration lands in 3.4/3.5/3.6. -At the foundation stage it returns an empty rule set with ``override=False`` -(service onboarding merges additively). +The only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a **two-stage** pipeline. Invoked by +the Controller for the ``aiac.apply.service.{id}`` / ``POST /apply/service/{service_id}`` +trigger, it sequences the two sub-agents and returns ``(list[PolicyRule], override=False)``: + + 1. Service Provision — classifies the service and writes its roles/scopes into the IdP, + producing the discovered ``service_type``. + 2. Service Policy Builder — reads the excluded-self IdP universe and builds the rules. + +There is **no Apply stage** here: the Controller makes the single +``compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)`` (PCE) call. UC1 is incremental, so ``override`` +is always ``False`` (append; existing roles keep their other access). + +**Replay safety (at-least-once delivery):** Provision IdP writes are idempotent and the PCE +reconcile is idempotent, so a crash between stages simply re-runs the full pipeline to +convergence on NATS redelivery. No rollback logic. """ +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.policy_builder.builder import ServicePolicyBuilder +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.graph import build_provision_graph +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule def onboard_service(service_id: str) -> tuple[list[PolicyRule], bool]: - return [], False + provision = build_provision_graph().invoke( + OnboardingProvisionState(trigger=Trigger(entity_id=service_id)) + ) + service_type = provision["service_type"] + rules = ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type) + return rules, False diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py index 8f3012a52..d07e3febd 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py @@ -104,12 +104,6 @@ def test_handler_upstream_error_surfaces_status_and_skips_pce(): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Stub contract: the per-route override each handler returns (no mocks). # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_onboard_service_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_false(): - from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.orchestrator import onboard_service - - assert onboard_service("svc-1") == ([], False) - - def test_build_policy_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_false(): from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.build import build_policy diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..341484555 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +"""Unit tests for the Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1, issue 4.5). + +The Orchestrator is a plain function that sequences exactly two stages: +Service Provision (a compiled StateGraph) -> Service Policy Builder. Both are mocked +here via the module-level `build_provision_graph` / `ServicePolicyBuilder` seams — no +live graph, IdP, Kubernetes, or LLM. The Orchestrator applies nothing (no PCE call); it +returns `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller, which makes the single +`compute_and_apply` call afterwards. +""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException + +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding import orchestrator +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType + +SERVICE_ID = "svc-1" + + +class TestBothStagesSucceed: + def test_provision_result_fed_to_builder_and_rules_returned_with_override_false(self): + # The Orchestrator treats the rule list as opaque — the builder (mocked) owns + # PolicyRule construction, so a sentinel list is enough to prove pass-through. + rules = [object()] + graph = MagicMock() + graph.invoke.return_value = {"service_type": ServiceType.AGENT} + + with ( + patch.object(orchestrator, "build_provision_graph", return_value=graph), + patch.object(orchestrator, "ServicePolicyBuilder") as spb, + ): + spb.build.return_value = rules + result = orchestrator.onboard_service(SERVICE_ID) + + # service_type produced by Provision is fed into the Service Policy Builder + spb.build.assert_called_once_with(SERVICE_ID, ServiceType.AGENT) + # Orchestrator returns the builder's rules paired with the append flag + assert result == (rules, False) + + +class TestProvisionFails: + def test_builder_not_called_and_provision_error_propagates(self): + graph = MagicMock() + graph.invoke.side_effect = HTTPException(502, "IdP config unavailable") + + with ( + patch.object(orchestrator, "build_provision_graph", return_value=graph), + patch.object(orchestrator, "ServicePolicyBuilder") as spb, + ): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: + orchestrator.onboard_service(SERVICE_ID) + + assert exc.value.status_code == 502 + spb.build.assert_not_called() + + +class TestBuilderFails: + def test_builder_error_propagates_after_provision_ran(self): + graph = MagicMock() + graph.invoke.return_value = {"service_type": ServiceType.TOOL} + + with ( + patch.object(orchestrator, "build_provision_graph", return_value=graph), + patch.object(orchestrator, "ServicePolicyBuilder") as spb, + ): + spb.build.side_effect = HTTPException(502, "IdP Configuration Service unavailable") + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: + orchestrator.onboard_service(SERVICE_ID) + + assert exc.value.status_code == 502 + # Provision ran before the builder was reached + graph.invoke.assert_called_once() From 89ec0da1cb337597eccd65674182ab6839c631e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 23:47:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 206/273] refactor(aiac): Relocate run_upstream to project level and push retries to transport boundary Move the run_upstream retry helper from agent/shared/upstream.py to the project-level aiac.shared.upstream so any layer can reuse it, and push transport retries down from the agent call sites to where the calls happen: - idp-library Configuration retries each HTTP request via a new _request helper (no compounding in composite create-or-get methods) - _mcp_tools_list wraps its own POST in run_upstream - new provision/kube.py seam holds the K8s client and retrying operations (list_pods, read_service, list_agentcards); nodes call them plainly run_upstream is now generic so callers keep their return types. Tests repoint K8s patches to kube.* and pin UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES=1 for the Configuration unit tests (retry now lives in the library). Requirements docs (aiac-agent.md, library-idp.md) updated to match. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/components/aiac-agent.md | 30 +++--- .../requirements/components/library-idp.md | 3 + .../uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py | 7 +- .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py | 63 ++++++++++++ .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 78 ++++++--------- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 97 ++++++++++--------- aiac/src/aiac/shared/__init__.py | 0 aiac/src/aiac/{agent => }/shared/upstream.py | 18 ++-- .../provision/test_analyze_agent.py | 4 +- .../onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py | 4 +- .../provision/test_classify_service.py | 4 +- .../uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py | 8 +- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 7 ++ 13 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/shared/__init__.py rename aiac/src/aiac/{agent => }/shared/upstream.py (62%) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md index f2e24648c..5b2952c52 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ ChromaDB collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`. ## Error Handling -All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. This is centralised in the shared `run_upstream(fn)` helper (`agent/shared/upstream.py`), which is transport-agnostic: it re-raises the original exception after the final attempt, and each caller maps it to the status below (e.g. an IdP/Kubernetes failure → `502`). +All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. The retry primitive is the project-level shared `run_upstream(fn)` helper (`aiac/shared/upstream.py`), which is transport-agnostic: it re-raises the original exception after the final attempt. Retry is applied at the **transport boundary**, not at the agent call sites — inside the idp-library `Configuration` (its `_request` helper), inside the provision MCP helper (`_mcp_tools_list`), and inside the provision Kubernetes seam (`uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py`). Each caller then maps the re-raised failure to the status below (e.g. an IdP/Kubernetes failure → `502`). | Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | |---|---| @@ -201,19 +201,21 @@ Upstream failures propagate as bare HTTP error responses (see table above), rais ## File Structure ``` -aiac/src/aiac/agent/ -├── controller/ -├── shared/ ← flatten_role (roles.py), run_upstream (upstream.py) -├── uc/ -│ ├── onboarding/ -│ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy_builder, returns list[PolicyRule] -│ │ ├── provision/ ← LLM sub-agent: classify, analyze, write to IdP -│ │ └── policy_builder/ ← IdP reader + PRB invoker: read IdP, call PRB, return list[PolicyRule] -│ ├── policy_update/ -│ │ ├── build/ ← calls PRB, returns list[PolicyRule]; TBD internals -│ │ └── rebuild/ ← delegates to Build; TBD internals -│ └── role_update/ ← calls PRB with (role, all_scopes), returns list[PolicyRule] -└── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called by Service Policy Builder, Build, and Role sub-agent +aiac/src/aiac/ +├── shared/ ← project-level shared: run_upstream (upstream.py) — transport retry primitive +└── agent/ + ├── controller/ + ├── shared/ ← flatten_role (roles.py) + ├── uc/ + │ ├── onboarding/ + │ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy_builder, returns list[PolicyRule] + │ │ ├── provision/ ← LLM sub-agent: classify, analyze, write to IdP; kube.py = retrying K8s seam + │ │ └── policy_builder/ ← IdP reader + PRB invoker: read IdP, call PRB, return list[PolicyRule] + │ ├── policy_update/ + │ │ ├── build/ ← calls PRB, returns list[PolicyRule]; TBD internals + │ │ └── rebuild/ ← delegates to Build; TBD internals + │ └── role_update/ ← calls PRB with (role, all_scopes), returns list[PolicyRule] + └── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called by Service Policy Builder, Build, and Role sub-agent ``` Docker build command (run from repo root): diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md index d65548148..97d5f8572 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md @@ -125,11 +125,14 @@ HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. +**Transport retries.** Every HTTP call is issued through a private `_request(method, path, **kwargs)` helper that wraps the request in the project-level `run_upstream` retry primitive (`aiac.shared.upstream`): transient failures are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times (default `3`) with exponential backoff before a non-2xx status is raised as `RuntimeError`. Retry lives inside the library (not in callers), and applies at the leaf request, so composite methods (`create_service_role` / `create_service_scope`) retry each sub-request without compounding. + ### Dependencies ``` requests pydantic python-dotenv +tenacity ``` ### Class: `Configuration` diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index 5c63f8d29..7a345877b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules from aiac.agent.shared.roles import flatten_role -from aiac.agent.shared.upstream import run_upstream from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule @@ -48,9 +47,9 @@ def build(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: config = _config() try: - service = run_upstream(lambda: config.get_service(service_id)) - all_roles = run_upstream(config.get_roles) - all_scopes = run_upstream(config.get_scopes) + service = config.get_service(service_id) + all_roles = config.get_roles() + all_scopes = config.get_scopes() except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( 502, f"IdP Configuration Service unavailable for service {service_id!r}: {e}" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fb10177a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +"""Kubernetes access seam for the Service Provision sub-agent (UC1). + +Owns the `kubernetes` client seams (`_core_v1`, `_custom_objects`, `_load_kube_config`) and +exposes the small set of read operations the provision nodes need. Each operation wraps its +client call in ``run_upstream`` so transient API failures are retried at the transport +boundary — the nodes call these plainly and only map the final failure to +``HTTPException(502)``. Unit tests patch the ``_core_v1`` / ``_custom_objects`` seams here. +""" + +from kubernetes import client, config + +from aiac.shared.upstream import run_upstream + +_AGENTCARD_GROUP = "agent.kagenti.dev" +_AGENTCARD_VERSION = "v1alpha1" +_AGENTCARD_PLURAL = "agentcards" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Seams (patched in unit tests) # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def _load_kube_config() -> None: + try: + config.load_incluster_config() + except Exception: + config.load_kube_config() + + +def _core_v1(): + """CoreV1Api client (pods, services).""" + _load_kube_config() + return client.CoreV1Api() + + +def _custom_objects(): + """CustomObjectsApi client (AgentCard CRs).""" + _load_kube_config() + return client.CustomObjectsApi() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Retrying operations # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def list_pods(namespace: str | None): + """Pods in ``namespace`` (the ``.items`` list), with bounded transport retries.""" + return run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().list_namespaced_pod(namespace).items) + + +def read_service(name: str | None, namespace: str | None): + """A single Service by name, with bounded transport retries.""" + return run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().read_namespaced_service(name, namespace)) + + +def list_agentcards(namespace: str | None) -> dict: + """List AgentCard CRs in ``namespace`` (raw dict response), with bounded transport retries.""" + return run_upstream( + lambda: _custom_objects().list_namespaced_custom_object( + group=_AGENTCARD_GROUP, + version=_AGENTCARD_VERSION, + namespace=namespace, + plural=_AGENTCARD_PLURAL, + ) + ) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py index d07b12cb1..ff9ed70f4 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -5,28 +5,26 @@ START -> classify_service -> [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] -> provision_service -> END IdP access is via the **idp-library** `Configuration` (the `_config` seam), never the IdP -service directly. Kubernetes access is via the `_core_v1` / `_custom_objects` seams, which -unit tests patch. Any upstream failure surfaces as an `HTTPException(502, ...)` whose message -names the workload and the specific missing/invalid label — actionable, never silent. +service directly. Kubernetes access is via the `kube` seam module (`list_pods`, +`read_service`, `list_agentcards`), which retries internally. Any upstream failure surfaces +as an `HTTPException(502, ...)` whose message names the workload and the specific +missing/invalid label — actionable, never silent. """ import os from fastapi import HTTPException -from kubernetes import client, config -from aiac.agent.shared.upstream import run_upstream from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType +from aiac.shared.upstream import run_upstream +from .kube import list_agentcards, list_pods, read_service from .state import OnboardingProvisionState from .types import RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision _TYPE_LABEL = "kagenti.io/type" _MCP_LABEL = "protocol.kagenti.io/mcp" -_AGENTCARD_GROUP = "agent.kagenti.dev" -_AGENTCARD_VERSION = "v1alpha1" -_AGENTCARD_PLURAL = "agentcards" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # @@ -36,37 +34,22 @@ def _config() -> Configuration: return Configuration.for_realm(os.getenv("KEYCLOAK_REALM", "")) -def _core_v1(): - """CoreV1Api client (pods, services).""" - _load_kube_config() - return client.CoreV1Api() - - -def _custom_objects(): - """CustomObjectsApi client (AgentCard CRs).""" - _load_kube_config() - return client.CustomObjectsApi() - - -def _load_kube_config() -> None: - try: - config.load_incluster_config() - except Exception: - config.load_kube_config() - - def _mcp_tools_list(endpoint: str) -> list[dict]: """POST a JSON-RPC `tools/list` to an MCP endpoint and return the tool manifest list. - Each tool is a dict with `name` and (optional) `description`.""" + Each tool is a dict with `name` and (optional) `description`. Bounded transport retries + are applied here so callers just map the final failure to a 502.""" import requests - resp = requests.post( - endpoint, - json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, - headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, - ) - resp.raise_for_status() - return (resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools", []) + def _do(): + resp = requests.post( + endpoint, + json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, + headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, + ) + resp.raise_for_status() + return (resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools", []) + + return run_upstream(_do) def _select_pod(pods, workload_name: str): @@ -90,7 +73,7 @@ def classify_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: service_id = state.trigger.entity_id try: - service = run_upstream(lambda: _config().get_service(service_id)) + service = _config().get_service(service_id) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"IdP config unavailable resolving service {service_id!r}: {e}") @@ -104,7 +87,7 @@ def classify_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: namespace, workload_name = name.split("/", 1) try: - pods = run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().list_namespaced_pod(namespace).items) + pods = list_pods(namespace) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"Kubernetes pod LIST failed in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}") @@ -139,14 +122,7 @@ def analyze_agent(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: role = RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.agent", description="Agent role") try: - resp = run_upstream( - lambda: _custom_objects().list_namespaced_custom_object( - group=_AGENTCARD_GROUP, - version=_AGENTCARD_VERSION, - namespace=namespace, - plural=_AGENTCARD_PLURAL, - ) - ) + resp = list_agentcards(namespace) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"Kubernetes AgentCard LIST failed in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}") @@ -182,7 +158,7 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: namespace, workload = state.namespace, state.workload_name try: - svc = run_upstream(lambda: _core_v1().read_namespaced_service(workload, namespace)) + svc = read_service(workload, namespace) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( 502, f"Kubernetes Service GET failed for {workload!r} in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}" @@ -200,7 +176,7 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: endpoint = f"http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp" try: - tools = run_upstream(lambda: _mcp_tools_list(endpoint)) + tools = _mcp_tools_list(endpoint) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"MCP tools/list failed at {endpoint}: {e}") @@ -226,11 +202,11 @@ def provision_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: try: for role in provision.roles: - run_upstream(lambda role=role: config.create_service_role(service_id, role)) + config.create_service_role(service_id, role) for scope in provision.scopes: - run_upstream(lambda scope=scope: config.create_service_scope(service_id, scope)) - service = run_upstream(lambda: config.get_service(service_id)) - run_upstream(lambda: config.set_service_type(service, state.service_type)) + config.create_service_scope(service_id, scope) + service = config.get_service(service_id) + config.set_service_type(service, state.service_type) except HTTPException: raise except Exception as e: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index 7c6adbb4f..df6f65652 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from dotenv import load_dotenv from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType, Subject +from aiac.shared.upstream import run_upstream class _NamedDefinition(Protocol): @@ -37,47 +38,60 @@ def _check(self, resp) -> None: if not resp.ok: raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") + def _request(self, method: str, path: str, **kwargs): + """Issue an HTTP request to the config service with bounded transport retries. + + Dispatches to the named ``requests.get`` / ``requests.post`` (not ``requests.request``) + so callers and tests keep a stable, mockable surface. Retries transient failures via + ``run_upstream`` and raises on a non-OK response (``_check``), so callers just consume + ``resp.json()``. Retrying at this leaf boundary means composite methods + (``create_service_role`` / ``create_service_scope``) retry each sub-request without + compounding. + """ + caller = getattr(requests, method.lower()) + + def _do(): + resp = caller(f"{self._base_url()}{path}", **kwargs) + self._check(resp) + return resp + + return run_upstream(_do) + def _build_subject(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role]) -> Subject: subject_id = raw["id"] - assignments_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments", params=self._params() + assignments_resp = self._request( + "GET", f"/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments", params=self._params() ) - self._check(assignments_resp) realm_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in assignments_resp.json().get("realmMappings", [])} roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in realm_role_ids] return Subject.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles}) def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: - resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/subjects", params=self._params()) - self._check(resp) + resp = self._request("GET", "/subjects", params=self._params()) all_roles = self._all_roles_map() return [self._build_subject(raw, all_roles) for raw in resp.json()] def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: - resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/roles", params=self._params()) - self._check(resp) + resp = self._request("GET", "/roles", params=self._params()) roles = [] for raw in resp.json(): role_data = dict(raw) if raw.get("composite"): - composites_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/roles/{raw['name']}/composites", params=self._params() + composites_resp = self._request( + "GET", f"/roles/{raw['name']}/composites", params=self._params() ) - self._check(composites_resp) role_data["childRoles"] = composites_resp.json() roles.append(Role.model_validate(role_data)) return roles def _build_service(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role], all_scopes: dict[str, Scope]) -> Service: service_id = raw["id"] - roles_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/roles", params=self._params() + roles_resp = self._request( + "GET", f"/services/{service_id}/roles", params=self._params() ) - self._check(roles_resp) - scopes_resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() + scopes_resp = self._request( + "GET", f"/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() ) - self._check(scopes_resp) service_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in roles_resp.json()} roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} @@ -93,15 +107,13 @@ def _all_scopes_map(self) -> dict[str, Scope]: return {s.id: s for s in self.get_scopes()} def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: - resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services", params=self._params()) - self._check(resp) + resp = self._request("GET", "/services", params=self._params()) all_roles = self._all_roles_map() all_scopes = self._all_scopes_map() return [self._build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes) for raw in resp.json()] def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: - resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service_id}", params=self._params()) - self._check(resp) + resp = self._request("GET", f"/services/{service_id}", params=self._params()) return self._build_service(resp.json(), self._all_roles_map(), self._all_scopes_map()) def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: @@ -109,11 +121,9 @@ def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: return [s for s in self.get_services() if any(r.id == role.id for r in s.roles)] def get_subjects_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Subject]: - resp = requests.get( - f"{self._base_url()}/subjects", - params={"role_id": role.id, "realm": self.realm}, + resp = self._request( + "GET", "/subjects", params={"role_id": role.id, "realm": self.realm} ) - self._check(resp) return [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: @@ -121,27 +131,23 @@ def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: return [s for s in self.get_services() if any(sc.id == scope.id for sc in s.scopes)] def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: - resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", params=self._params()) - self._check(resp) + resp = self._request("GET", "/scopes", params=self._params()) return [Scope.model_validate(s) for s in resp.json()] def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: - resp = requests.post( - f"{self._base_url()}/scopes", + resp = self._request( + "POST", + "/scopes", json={"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}, params=self._params(), ) - self._check(resp) return Scope.model_validate(resp.json()) def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: - resp = requests.post( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/scopes/{scope.id}", - params=self._params(), + self._request( + "POST", f"/services/{service.id}/scopes/{scope.id}", params=self._params() ) - self._check(resp) - get_resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}", params=self._params()) - self._check(get_resp) + get_resp = self._request("GET", f"/services/{service.id}", params=self._params()) return Service.model_validate(get_resp.json()) def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service: @@ -153,12 +159,12 @@ def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Servi ``str`` enum). """ value = service_type.value if isinstance(service_type, ServiceType) else service_type - resp = requests.post( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/type", + resp = self._request( + "POST", + f"/services/{service.id}/type", json={"type": value}, params=self._params(), ) - self._check(resp) return Service.model_validate(resp.json()) def create_service_role(self, service_id: str, role: _NamedDefinition) -> Role: @@ -186,20 +192,17 @@ def create_service_scope(self, service_id: str, scope: _NamedDefinition) -> Scop return resolved def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: - resp = requests.post( - f"{self._base_url()}/roles", + resp = self._request( + "POST", + "/roles", json={"name": role_name, "description": role_description}, params=self._params(), ) - self._check(resp) return Role.model_validate(resp.json()) def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: - resp = requests.post( - f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}", - params=self._params(), + self._request( + "POST", f"/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}", params=self._params() ) - self._check(resp) - get_resp = requests.get(f"{self._base_url()}/services/{service.id}", params=self._params()) - self._check(get_resp) + get_resp = self._request("GET", f"/services/{service.id}", params=self._params()) return Service.model_validate(get_resp.json()) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/shared/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/shared/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py b/aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py similarity index 62% rename from aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py rename to aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py index 2af31af2a..bdceb9c9d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/shared/upstream.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Shared upstream-call helper for the agent layer. +"""Shared upstream-call helper (project-level). `run_upstream` wraps a zero-arg callable in a bounded retry loop for transient upstream failures (IdP Configuration Service, Kubernetes API, MCP endpoints). It is deliberately @@ -8,19 +8,25 @@ ``aiac-agent.md``). The retry budget is read from ``UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES`` (default 3) at call time, so tests can tune it via the environment. -Consolidates the retry helper that was previously inlined in each onboarding sub-agent; -callers today are the UC1 Provision (``provision/nodes.py``) and Service Policy Builder -(``policy_builder/builder.py``) sub-agents. +Lives at the project root (``aiac.shared``) so any layer can reuse it without importing from +the ``agent`` package. Retry now lives at the transport boundary: the idp-library +``Configuration`` methods, the ``_mcp_tools_list`` helper, and the provision k8s seam +(``provision/kube.py``) each call it internally so the agent nodes no longer orchestrate +retries. """ import os +from typing import Callable, TypeVar from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential +T = TypeVar("T") -def run_upstream(fn): + +def run_upstream(fn: Callable[[], T]) -> T: """Run ``fn`` with bounded retries (``UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES``, default 3) and exponential - backoff, reraising the last error so the caller can convert it to a 502.""" + backoff, reraising the last error so the caller can convert it to a 502. Returns whatever + ``fn`` returns (the return type is preserved for callers).""" retryer = Retrying( stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py index 3bc27482d..94a673f66 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import pytest from fastapi import HTTPException -from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import kube, nodes from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger NS = "team-a" @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ def _card(name=WORKLOAD, skills=None): def _run(items=None, list_exc=None): - with patch.object(nodes, "_custom_objects") as co: + with patch.object(kube, "_custom_objects") as co: client = MagicMock() if list_exc is not None: client.list_namespaced_custom_object.side_effect = list_exc diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py index 1f1b11151..fb871c616 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import pytest from fastapi import HTTPException -from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import kube, nodes from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger NS = "team-a" @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ def _svc(labels, port=8080): def _run(svc=None, read_exc=None, tools=None, mcp_exc=None): with ( - patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(kube, "_core_v1") as core_v1, patch.object(nodes, "_mcp_tools_list") as mcp, ): core = MagicMock() diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py index bbbf6751c..ccdd9bac5 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_classify_service.py @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import pytest from fastapi import HTTPException -from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import kube, nodes from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service, ServiceType @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ def _core(pods): def _run(service=None, pods=None, get_service_exc=None, list_pods_exc=None): - with patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1: + with patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, patch.object(kube, "_core_v1") as core_v1: if get_service_exc is not None: cfg.return_value.get_service.side_effect = get_service_exc else: diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py index 7f5144409..07aa756ae 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import graph as graph_mod -from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import nodes +from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision import kube, nodes from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.provision.state import OnboardingProvisionState, Trigger from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service, ServiceType @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ def _invoke(self): def test_agent_path_end_to_end(self): with ( patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, - patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1, - patch.object(nodes, "_custom_objects") as co, + patch.object(kube, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(kube, "_custom_objects") as co, ): cfg.return_value.get_service.return_value = _service() core = MagicMock() @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ def test_agent_path_end_to_end(self): def test_tool_path_end_to_end(self): with ( patch.object(nodes, "_config") as cfg, - patch.object(nodes, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(kube, "_core_v1") as core_v1, patch.object(nodes, "_mcp_tools_list", return_value=[{"name": "t1", "description": "d"}]), ): cfg.return_value.get_service.return_value = _service() diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index f1967241c..e0e9c8f70 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def _single_attempt(monkeypatch): + """Configuration now retries transient failures internally (``_request`` → ``run_upstream``). + Pin the budget to a single attempt so error-path unit tests stay fast and single-call.""" + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + + def _ok(json_data, status=200): resp = MagicMock() resp.ok = True From e977da4e4c7b6d3483066ba902774a781d055f9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:46:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 207/273] Fix(aiac): Reconcile PRB deny-by-default with description-based grants Rule 1 required policy-text support while rule 3 allowed description-based support; under policy silence the abstract policy-pipeline variant resolved the contradiction randomly (over-granting source-operator->issues-read or under-granting issues-operator->{}). Reconcile rule 1 to accept policy OR the focal/candidate descriptions (never other entities), and add a principle-based agent-role->tool line to the abstract test policy so mapping (c) is anchored in policy rather than description-only inference. Integration 43/43 (incl. the two previously-failing outbound_target tests), unit 313 passed. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py | 8 ++++++-- aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md | 1 + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py index f0ae1fcb8..265346c79 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py @@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ _SAFETY = ( "Rules:\n" - "1) Deny by default: grant a pair only if the provided policy explicitly supports it; " - "if the policy is silent, do not grant.\n" + "1) Deny by default: grant a pair only when it is supported by evidence about the focal entity " + "itself — either the provided policy, OR the focal entity's and the candidate's own descriptions " + "establishing that the candidate performs an operation the scope covers (see rule 3). Policy " + "silence is not by itself a reason to deny a pair the descriptions already establish, nor a " + "license to grant one they do not; when neither the policy nor those descriptions support the " + "pair, do not grant. A statement about any OTHER entity is never support (see rule 4).\n" "2) Stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity described below; ignore anything else." ) diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md index cca6c4601..af19f59ec 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; den - Developers work primarily in source — writing and maintaining code — and consult the issue tracker only to follow defect reports; grant them full read and write access to source contents, and read-only access to issues. - Testers work exclusively in the issue tracker — filing, triaging, and updating defect reports — and do not work in source; grant them full read and write access to issues, and no access to source. +- The agent's internal operator roles are each confined to their own domain: grant every operator role exactly the tool operations within the domain it is responsible for, and nothing outside that domain. From 25d54e2d6a9e8ec0316fa05a68caab530b0d3124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 01:20:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 208/273] Refactor(aiac): Factor generic policy into the PRB prompt Extract the two universal policy clauses out of the scenario policy file and into the Policy Rules Builder prompt, so every policy decision sees them regardless of which scenario policy is read: - _GRANT_ACCESS: the least-privilege deny-by-default directive, a prompt string prepended ahead of any file-based policy. - generic_policy.md (new, bundled next to the module): the agent operator-role domain-confinement clause; loaded once at import. - _policy_block() composes directive -> generic -> scenario for both the proposer and auditor POLICY blocks. policy.abstract.md is trimmed to only its scenario-specific bullets; the policy-pipeline spec's abstract example drops the deny-by-default paragraph (the explicit variant and file are left as-is by design). CLAUDE.md now documents test/integration/.env and the integration run command. Unit suite 313 passed; policy-pipeline + auditor-dimension integration 44 passed (state matches the committed files). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 10 +++++++ .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 8 +++-- .../policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md | 6 ++++ .../agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py | 30 ++++++++++++++++--- aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md | 3 -- 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index 07e3d0c06..fd20e6386 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ For current file list, `ls` or `find` under `src/aiac/`. Use `ls test/` to discover current test directories. +**Integration tests** (`-m integration`) need live config — Keycloak + admin creds + an LLM +endpoint (`opa` on PATH for the policy-pipeline suite). Those variables live in +`test/integration/.env` (gitignored): `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_API_KEY`, `LLM_MODEL`, `KEYCLOAK_URL`, +`KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME`, `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD`. Source it before running: + +```bash +set -a; . test/integration/.env; set +a +.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/ -m integration +``` + **Smoke test** (requires live service at `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, default `http://127.0.0.1:7071`): ```bash diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index b12111aec..6eff1570b 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -330,6 +330,12 @@ Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. drop out of the fact triad; they must stay generic and simply not contradict the facts. If the role→access facts change, update the *Scenario* table, both `policy.md` variants, and the pair-lists together so the eyeballed output stays reviewable. +- The least-privilege **deny-by-default** directive is supplied by the PRB prompt itself + (`_GRANT_ACCESS` in `agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py`), which prepends it — followed by the + bundled generic baseline policy (`generic_policy.md`) — ahead of the scenario `policy.md` on every + call, so every policy decision gets it regardless of which variant is read. The **explicit** variant + still spells the directive out (its whole point is to state everything outright); the **abstract** + variant relies on the prompt and does not restate it — do not re-add it to the abstract variant. - Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. The abstract variant @@ -459,8 +465,6 @@ role descriptions (see *Role & scope descriptions*), so it survives the PRB's de rule and both variants reproduce the same Rego. ```markdown -Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. - - Developers work primarily in source — writing and maintaining code — and consult the issue tracker only to follow defect reports; grant them full read and write access to source contents, and read-only access to issues. - Testers work exclusively in the issue tracker — filing, triaging, and updating defect reports — and do not work in source; grant them full read and write access to issues, and no access to source. ``` diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d90003189 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# Generic Access Control Policy + +This baseline policy applies to every policy decision, on top of the +scenario-specific policy that follows it. Read both together as one policy. + +- The agent's internal operator roles are each confined to their own domain: grant every operator role exactly the tool operations within the domain it is responsible for, and nothing outside that domain. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py index 265346c79..83155c4b1 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py @@ -1,16 +1,38 @@ """Lean proposer/auditor message builders for both PRB directions. -No worked examples, no domain content. The static system message carries the -task framing plus two shared safety meta-rules (deny-by-default / policy-silence, +No worked examples, no scenario domain content. The static system message carries +the task framing plus two shared safety meta-rules (deny-by-default / policy-silence, and stay strictly scoped to the single focal entity) and two shared mapping rules (capability projection and relationship scoping — see _MAPPING_RULES). Both the proposer and the auditor reason under the same rules because both make the same grant decision. Everything variable — policy text, focal entity, candidates, and any auditor feedback — goes in the user message so it is observable in tests. + +The user message's POLICY block is built from three layers, in order: the +least-privilege deny-by-default directive (``_GRANT_ACCESS`` here in the prompt), +the bundled generic baseline policy (``generic_policy.md`` — agent operator-role +domain confinement, applies to every policy decision), and finally the scenario policy +text. Factoring the universal clauses out of the file means a scenario policy file +only has to state what is specific to that scenario; the baseline is always present. """ +from pathlib import Path + from langchain_core.messages import BaseMessage, HumanMessage, SystemMessage +# Least-privilege framing that heads every POLICY block, before any file-based policy. +_GRANT_ACCESS = "Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default." + +# Generic baseline policy, bundled next to this module and prepended to every scenario policy. +# Loaded once at import (static, domain-agnostic — safe to read eagerly). +_GENERIC_POLICY = (Path(__file__).parent / "generic_policy.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip() + + +def _policy_block(policy_text: str) -> str: + """Compose the POLICY block: least-privilege directive, then the generic baseline, then the + scenario policy.""" + return f"{_GRANT_ACCESS}\n\n{_GENERIC_POLICY}\n\n{policy_text}" + _SAFETY = ( "Rules:\n" "1) Deny by default: grant a pair only when it is supported by evidence about the focal entity " @@ -67,7 +89,7 @@ def build_proposer_messages( contract: str, audit_feedback: str | None, ) -> list[BaseMessage]: - body = f"POLICY:\n{policy_text}\n\nFOCAL ENTITY:\n{focal}\n\nCANDIDATES:\n{candidates}\n\n{contract}" + body = f"POLICY:\n{_policy_block(policy_text)}\n\nFOCAL ENTITY:\n{focal}\n\nCANDIDATES:\n{candidates}\n\n{contract}" if audit_feedback: body += f"\n\nA prior proposal was REJECTED. Fix per this feedback:\n{audit_feedback}" return [SystemMessage(content=_PROPOSER_SYSTEM), HumanMessage(content=body)] @@ -80,7 +102,7 @@ def build_auditor_messages( selected_names: list[str], ) -> list[BaseMessage]: body = ( - f"POLICY:\n{policy_text}\n\nFOCAL ENTITY:\n{focal}\n\nCANDIDATES:\n{candidates}\n\n" + f"POLICY:\n{_policy_block(policy_text)}\n\nFOCAL ENTITY:\n{focal}\n\nCANDIDATES:\n{candidates}\n\n" f"PROPOSED SELECTION (names): {selected_names}" ) return [SystemMessage(content=_AUDITOR_SYSTEM), HumanMessage(content=body)] diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md index af19f59ec..4fc56a667 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.abstract.md @@ -1,5 +1,2 @@ -Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. - - Developers work primarily in source — writing and maintaining code — and consult the issue tracker only to follow defect reports; grant them full read and write access to source contents, and read-only access to issues. - Testers work exclusively in the issue tracker — filing, triaging, and updating defect reports — and do not work in source; grant them full read and write access to issues, and no access to source. -- The agent's internal operator roles are each confined to their own domain: grant every operator role exactly the tool operations within the domain it is responsible for, and nothing outside that domain. From 9be73e2fcd047d641a09a3200e54db101351dd0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 02:32:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 209/273] Docs(aiac): Add github-agent demo spec (source + issue A2A agent) Specify a real, deployable Kagenti github-agent that realises the canonical github-agent used by the AIAC policy-pipeline integration test: an A2A agent (A2A SDK 1.x + CrewAI + crewai-tools MCP) with two skills (source repository operations, issue & PR tracker operations) over the existing github-tool MCP server, wiring the scenario source + issue tool subset. Covers the AgentCard, curated tool allow-list, LLM presets (ollama/openai/claude), and aiac-level k8s deployment. Implementation is decomposed into gitignored working issues under inception/issues/demo/ (GA-1..GA-9) and entry-pointed by the handoff inception/handoffs/handoff-github-agent-implementation.md. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../requirements/demo/github-agent.md | 245 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 245 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88ee64d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +# Demo Spec: `github-agent` (A2A) — source + issue operations over `github-tool` + +> **Status:** spec (design source of truth). Implementation is decomposed into +> `inception/issues/demo/GA-*.md` and entry-pointed by +> `inception/handoffs/handoff-github-agent-implementation.md`. +> +> **This is a demo/reference agent**, not part of the AIAC service tree (`src/aiac/`). It is a +> self-contained, deployable A2A agent that realises the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC +> policy-pipeline integration test. + +--- + +## 1. Purpose & scenario mapping + +The AIAC policy-pipeline integration test +([`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md)) +and its fixture ([`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py)) are written +around a canonical **`github-agent`**: an autonomous A2A agent that acts on a user's behalf against +**source repositories** and an **issue tracker**, calling the **`github-tool`** MCP server. Until now +that agent has existed only as test data; this spec defines a **real, deployable** agent that matches it. + +The existing runnable reference, `agent-examples/a2a/git_issue_agent`, is **issue-only and single-skill**. +This agent generalises it to the scenario's **two capability areas**. + +### Mapping to the policy-pipeline scenario + +| Scenario element | This agent | +|---|---| +| Agent client `github-agent` (type **Agent**) | This A2A agent | +| Agent role `source-operator` → agent scope `source-access` | **Skill 1** — Source repository operations | +| Agent role `issues-operator` → agent scope `issues-access` | **Skill 2** — Issue & PR tracker operations | +| Tool `github-tool` scopes `source-read`/`source-write` | Source tool allow-list (see §5) | +| Tool `github-tool` scopes `issues-read`/`issues-write` | Issue/PR tool allow-list (see §5) | + +The agent does **not** know or enforce these scopes itself — AIAC/OPA + AuthBridge do. The agent simply +exposes the two capability areas; the AuthBridge sidecar performs inbound JWT validation and outbound +RFC-8693 token exchange, and the `github-tool` MitM swaps the exchanged token for a GitHub PAT by scope. + +### Related artefacts +- Scenario spec: [`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) +- Scenario fixture: [`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py) +- Existing (issue-only) agent card: [`../../analysis/github-agent-card.json`](../../analysis/github-agent-card.json) +- `github-tool` MCP tool catalog (44 tools): [`../../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json`](../../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json) +- Reference agent: `agent-examples/a2a/git_issue_agent/` +- Reference deployment: `kagenti-extensions/authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/` + +--- + +## 2. Architecture + +Reuse the `git_issue_agent` stack verbatim — do not introduce a new framework: + +- **A2A SDK 1.x** server (route factories, `AgentInterface`, snake_case card fields). Binds `0.0.0.0` + on `PORT` (default **8000**). `create_jsonrpc_routes(..., enable_v0_3_compat=True)` — **required** + because Kagenti uses A2A 0.3 client libraries — plus the agent card at both + `/.well-known/agent-card.json` and legacy `/.well-known/agent.json`. +- **CrewAI** orchestration (`Agent`/`Crew`/`Task`, `Process.sequential`), LLM via **litellm** (`crewai.LLM`). +- **`crewai-tools[mcp]` `MCPServerAdapter`** — per-request connection to the MCP tool over + `transport="streamable-http"` at `MCP_URL` (default `http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`), inside a + `with` block, torn down after each request. +- **Auth (three tiers, verbatim from the reference `GithubExecutor.execute`):** + 1. `GITHUB_TOKEN` env set → `Authorization: Bearer <token>` to MCP; + 2. else pass through the inbound request's `Authorization` header + (`context.call_context.state["headers"]["authorization"]`) — the AuthBridge/Envoy path; + 3. else unauthenticated + warning. + +``` + A2A client ──(JSON-RPC /)──► github-agent (:8000) + │ CrewAI: prereq extract → researcher + └──(streamable-http, MCP_URL)──► github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp ──► GitHub + (AuthBridge sidecar: inbound JWT validation; outbound RFC-8693 token exchange for MCP_URL host) +``` + +--- + +## 3. AgentCard (two skills — comprehensive) + +Built in `a2a_agent.py::get_agent_card()`. Fields: + +- **name:** `Github agent` +- **version:** `1.0.0` +- **description:** *"Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an + issue tracker. It inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates + issues and their threads."* (verbatim from the scenario's `github-agent` description so the card and + the policy-pipeline fixture agree). +- **supported_interfaces:** `[AgentInterface(url=<AGENT_ENDPOINT or http://host:port/>, protocol_binding="JSONRPC")]` +- **capabilities:** `AgentCapabilities(streaming=True)` +- **default_input_modes / default_output_modes:** `["text"]` +- **security_schemes:** single `Bearer` → `HTTPAuthSecurityScheme(scheme="bearer", bearer_format="JWT", description="OAuth 2.0 JWT token")` +- **skills:** two `AgentSkill`s: + +| id | name | description | tags | examples | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| `source_operations` | Source repository operations | Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits. | `git, github, source, repositories, files, branches, commits` | "Show the README of kagenti/kagenti", "List the branches of owner/repo", "Create a branch and commit a fix to owner/repo" | +| `issue_operations` | Issue & PR tracker operations | Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests. | `git, github, issues, pull-requests` | "List open issues in kubernetes/kubernetes", "Open an issue in owner/repo titled …", "Summarise PR #42 in owner/repo" | + +> The existing `git_issue_agent` card ([`../../analysis/github-agent-card.json`](../../analysis/github-agent-card.json)) +> has a single `github_issue_agent` skill — this card supersedes it with the two-skill shape. + +--- + +## 4. Agent internals + +Generalise the reference two-phase CrewAI flow from issue-only to source + issues: + +- **Phase A — prerequisite extraction.** A no-tools CrewAI agent parses the query into a generalised + `GithubQueryInfo`. Reuse the reference's robustness measures: **avoid `output_pydantic`** (fails on + small Ollama models) and parse raw JSON from the LLM text via a flat-object regex + (`re.search(r"\{[^{}]*\}", raw)`); coerce string arrays to lists. + + ```python + class GithubQueryInfo(BaseModel): + owner: str | None = None + repo: str | None = None + ref: str | None = None # branch / tag / sha, if named + path: str | None = None # file path, if named + numbers: list[int] | None = None # issue or PR numbers + ``` + + **Validation gates** (return a helpful message, no tool call, when unmet): + - `numbers` present → `owner` **and** `repo` required. + - `repo` present → `owner` required. + +- **Phase B — researcher.** One CrewAI "GitHub operations" agent wired with the **curated tool set** + (§5), `inject_date=True`, bounded `max_iter`/`max_retry_limit`, `respect_context_window=True`. A + generalised ReAct `TOOL_CALL_PROMPT` with a tool-selection decision tree spanning **source** + (files / branches / commits / code search) and **issues / PRs**, and a generalised `INFO_PARSER_PROMPT` + for Phase A. Identifiers (owner/repo/numbers) are copied verbatim; the final answer is grounded only + in tool output. + +`event.py` (streaming `Event` ABC) and `llm.py` (`CrewLLM`, incl. the Ollama `num_ctx=8192` bump) are +copied verbatim from the reference. + +--- + +## 5. Tool wiring (scenario source + issue) + +`github-tool` federates 44 GitHub tools at startup. This agent wires only the **source + issue** subset +that matches the scenario scopes, via an **explicit name allow-list** in `github_agent/tools.py` (robust +vs the reference's substring matching). The executor keeps only MCP tools whose `.name` is in the set +and raises `RuntimeError` if none resolve. An `ENABLED_TOOLS` env var (comma-separated) overrides the +default set. + +**Source (`source-access` → tool `source-read`/`source-write`):** +- read: `get_file_contents`, `list_branches`, `get_commit`, `list_commits`, `search_code` +- write: `create_or_update_file`, `delete_file`, `push_files`, `create_branch` + +**Issue & PR (`issues-access` → tool `issues-read`/`issues-write`):** +- read: `issue_read`, `list_issues`, `search_issues`, `list_issue_types`, `pull_request_read`, `list_pull_requests` +- write: `issue_write`, `add_issue_comment`, `sub_issue_write`, `create_pull_request`, `update_pull_request` + +**Excluded by default** (out of the policy-pipeline scenario; one edit / `ENABLED_TOOLS` to add back): +Teams & Users (`get_me`, `get_team_members`, `get_teams`), Security (`run_secret_scanning`), and +repo-lifecycle / release tools (`create_repository`, `fork_repository`, `list_tags`, `get_tag`, +`get_label`, releases). These are named in the module so they are trivially re-enabled. + +> The allow-list is a single editable constant grouped by skill/scope so the source/issue split stays +> legible and auditable against the scenario. + +--- + +## 6. Configuration & LLM presets + +Config via `github_agent/config.py` (`pydantic-settings`), adapted from the reference: + +| Variable | Description | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `TASK_MODEL_ID` | litellm model id | `ollama/ibm/granite4:latest` | +| `LLM_API_BASE` | OpenAI-compatible base URL | `http://host.docker.internal:11434` | +| `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM API key | `my_api_key` | +| `MODEL_TEMPERATURE` | Sampling temperature | `0` | +| `EXTRA_HEADERS` | Extra LLM headers (JSON) | `{}` | +| `MCP_URL` | MCP tool endpoint | `http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` | +| `MCP_TIMEOUT` | MCP connect timeout (s) | `600` | +| `ENABLED_TOOLS` | Override the curated tool allow-list (comma-separated) | (unset → §5 default) | +| `PORT` | A2A listen port | `8000` | +| `LOG_LEVEL` | Log level | `INFO` | +| `GITHUB_TOKEN` | Static Bearer to MCP (else inbound passthrough) | (unset) | +| `ISSUER` | Expected `iss` of inbound JWTs (informational) | (unset) | +| `AGENT_ENDPOINT` | Override the URL advertised in the card | (unset) | + +**Env presets shipped:** +- `.env.ollama` **(default)** — `ollama/ibm/granite4:latest`, `LLM_API_BASE=http://host.docker.internal:11434`. +- `.env.openai` — `gpt-4o-mini`, key from k8s secret `openai-secret`. +- `.env.claude` — litellm Anthropic (`TASK_MODEL_ID=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` + from k8s secret `claude-secret`); native Anthropic endpoint (no `LLM_API_BASE`). +- `.env.template` — documented placeholders + `MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`. + +--- + +## 7. Deployment (aiac level) + +Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the github-issue demo. Namespace +`team1` (installer-provided ConfigMaps/secrets assumed present). + +- **`github-agent-deployment.yaml`** — `ServiceAccount` + `Deployment` + `Service` + `AgentRuntime`: + - Pod labels `kagenti.io/inject: enabled`, `kagenti.io/spire: enabled`. + - Container port `8000`; env `MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`, + `JWKS_URI=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs`, + LLM vars, `PORT`, `LOG_LEVEL`; `/shared` `emptyDir` for operator-mounted client creds. + - `Service` `8080 → 8000` (ClusterIP). + - `AgentRuntime{ type: agent, targetRef: this Deployment }` — enrolls the workload (operator applies + `kagenti.io/type=agent`, registers a Keycloak client, injects the AuthBridge sidecar). + - Image `github-agent:latest`, `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` (kind-load; name is a documented knob). +- **`configmaps.yaml`** — `authbridge-config` (Keycloak URL/realm/issuer) + `authproxy-routes` with the + outbound token-exchange route: + ```yaml + - host: "github-tool-mcp" + target_audience: "github-tool" + token_scopes: "openid github-tool-aud github-full-access" + ``` +- **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** the existing `github-tool` Deployment/Service + (`authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`) + `github-tool-secrets`, a running + Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`). + +**Wiring invariant:** agent `MCP_URL` host (`github-tool-mcp`) == `authproxy-routes` host == tool +Service name; exchanged audience (`github-tool`) == tool `AUDIENCE`. + +--- + +## 8. Verification + +**Local (no cluster — primary gate):** +1. `cd aiac/demo/agents/github_agent && uv lock && uv sync`. +2. `podman build -t github-agent:latest .`. +3. Startup + card: run `uv run --no-sync server` (or `test_startup.exp`), then + `curl -s localhost:8000/.well-known/agent-card.json | jq '.name, .skills[].id'` → + `"Github agent"` + `source_operations`, `issue_operations`. +4. (Optional; needs a GitHub PAT + reachable LLM) `GITHUB_TOKEN=… MCP_URL=https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/`, + send an A2A `message/send` read query and confirm a grounded, tool-cited answer. + +**Cluster (HITL — live Kagenti + Keycloak + LLM + tool PAT):** +5. `kind load docker-image github-agent:latest --name kagenti`. +6. Ensure `github-tool` + `github-tool-secrets` exist in `team1`. +7. `kubectl apply -f k8s/configmaps.yaml -f k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml`. +8. Confirm AuthBridge injection + `kagenti.io/type=agent`; `kubectl port-forward svc/github-agent 8080:8080 -n team1`; + send an authenticated A2A message; verify token exchange reaches `github-tool` and an answer returns. + +--- + +## 9. Out of scope +- Any changes to `github_tool` (reused as-is). +- Any changes to the AIAC pipeline, `policy-pipeline.md`, or the integration test. +- Wiring the agent into `agent-examples` CI (`build.yaml`) — aiac/demo images build independently. +- Onboarding this agent through the AIAC UC1 pipeline (separate activity; the card here is its input). From d8931686aafc00d8ec7aa9b47fa420454bb992f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 03:45:20 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 210/273] Docs(aiac): Spec UC-1 onboarding-pipeline integration test + github-tool demo Add the discovery-driven sibling of the policy-pipeline integration test, validating the phase-1 deliverable end-to-end: deploy the real github-agent + a simplified 4-op github-tool, drive real UC-1 onboarding (POST /apply/service/{id}) to infer roles/scopes, and assert the generated Rego with opa eval. Same scenario facts/tables as policy-pipeline; Rego is semantically similar (workload-prefixed names, degenerate agent->tool gate), not byte-identical. - inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md (new) - inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md (new; minimal 4-op MCP tool) - inception/requirements/PRD.md: index the new integration test Operator realm mechanism (per-namespace authbridge-config KEYCLOAK_REALM, preserved per operator #433) and {service_id} resolution (client.name lookup; SPIFFE-URI id under SPIRE) confirmed against operator source. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 3 +- .../requirements/demo/github-tool.md | 290 ++++++++++++ .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 445 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 737 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md create mode 100644 aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 26b9dd818..d773ceefe 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -556,8 +556,9 @@ Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are spe |---|---|---| | PDP Policy Writer — `generate_rego.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) that boots the OPA stub locally, applies a `PolicyModel` through `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md](integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md) | | `policy-pipeline` — `policy_pipeline.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) driving the full identity→policy pipeline — provisions a Keycloak realm + entities, runs the three PRB mappings, applies via the PCE, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/policy-pipeline.md](integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) | +| `uc1-onboarding-pipeline` — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` | Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline` validating the **phase-1** deliverable: deploys the real `github-agent` + a simplified `github-tool` to a live Kagenti cluster, drives **real UC-1 onboarding** (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) to infer roles/scopes, and asserts the generated Rego with `opa eval`. Same scenario facts/tables as `policy-pipeline`; Rego is semantically similar (not byte-identical). `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md](integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md) | -Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`; the policy-pipeline integration test in `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. +Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`; the policy-pipeline integration test in `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`; the UC-1 onboarding pipeline integration test in `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`. --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fa1f8b0e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +# Demo Spec: `github-tool` (MCP) — minimal source + issue tool for UC-1 onboarding + +> **Status:** spec (design source of truth). This document describes the files to be built; +> it does not create them. +> +> **This is a demo/reference tool**, not part of the AIAC service tree (`src/aiac/`). It is a +> self-contained, deployable MCP tool server whose sole job is to make **UC-1 service onboarding** +> (`../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md`, node `analyze_tool`) discover exactly the +> four canonical `github-tool` scenario scopes, deterministically. It is the tool sibling of the +> agent spec at [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md). + +--- + +## 1. Purpose & scenario mapping + +The AIAC phase-1 deliverable ([`../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md`](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md)) +demonstrates **service onboarding (UC-1)** end-to-end for one agent (`github-agent`) and one tool +(`github-tool`): AIAC classifies each service, discovers its capabilities, provisions the identities +they need, models access, and emits rules — which are then validated by **rule evaluation**, not by +live traffic. Phase 1 is explicitly **"Deploy + discover + evaluate": no live A2A traffic and no live +enforcement.** The tool is onboarded and its scopes are evaluated; it is **never actually driven by +the agent.** + +This spec defines the **tool half** of that demo: a **real, deployable MCP endpoint** that answers +`tools/list` with exactly four tools, so that UC-1's `analyze_tool` node derives exactly the four +canonical scenario tool scopes. + +### How UC-1 consumes this tool + +From `analyze_tool` (`../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md`): + +1. **`classify_service`** resolves identity from the Keycloak client's `client.name` (the operator sets + it to `"{namespace}/{workload_name}"`), splits on the first `/` → `namespace` + `workload_name`, + LISTs pods in the namespace, finds the pod owned by `workload_name`, and reads the `kagenti.io/type` + pod label. It **must be `tool`** → routes to `analyze_tool`. +2. **`analyze_tool`** does `read_service(workload_name, namespace)` (the K8s Service named + `workload_name`), **requires the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label** on that Service (a deploy-time + prerequisite — the operator does **not** stamp it), takes the Service's **first port**, and POSTs + JSON-RPC `tools/list` to + `http://{workload_name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp`. +3. UC-1 derives **one scope per returned tool**: + `ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description)`. + +So with workload `github-tool` and a tool named `source-read`, the provisioned scope is +`github-tool.source-read` with `description =` that tool's description. + +### Mapping to the policy-pipeline scenario + +The canonical scenario ([`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py), +`TOOL_SCOPES`) and its spec +([`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md), +*Role & scope descriptions → Tool scopes*) fix **four** `github-tool` scopes. This tool exposes +exactly the four MCP tools whose names + descriptions make UC-1 reproduce them: + +| Scenario tool scope | MCP tool name | UC-1-derived scope (`workload_name=github-tool`) | +|---|---|---| +| `source-read` | `source-read` | `github-tool.source-read` | +| `source-write` | `source-write` | `github-tool.source-write` | +| `issues-read` | `issues-read` | `github-tool.issues-read` | +| `issues-write` | `issues-write` | `github-tool.issues-write` | + +The tool does **not** know or enforce these scopes — AIAC/OPA + AuthBridge do (in later phases). +Phase 1 only discovers and evaluates them. + +### Related artefacts +- Phase-1 deliverable: [`../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md`](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md) +- UC-1 `analyze_tool`: [`../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md`](../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) +- Scenario fixture (`TOOL_SCOPES`): [`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py) +- Scenario spec: [`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) +- Sibling agent spec: [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md) +- Reference deployment: `kagenti-extensions/authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/` + +--- + +## 2. Relationship to the real `github-tool` (deliberate divergence) + +The sibling agent spec ([`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md) §2, §5, §7) is written against a +**production** `github-tool`: a real MCP server reachable at `github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` that federates +**44 real GitHub tools** and proxies calls to the GitHub API (swapping the exchanged token for a GitHub +PAT by scope in a MitM). That tool is the runtime target for live A2A traffic in later phases. + +**This spec deliberately diverges from that production tool** in three ways, and the divergences are +intentional: + +1. **Four tools, not 44.** This tool exposes exactly `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, + `issues-write` — one per canonical scenario scope — so UC-1 discovery yields *exactly* the four + scenario tool scopes and nothing else. The production 44-tool catalog would yield 44 fine-grained + scopes that do not match the scenario truth table. +2. **Stub handlers, no GitHub.** Tool **calls** are trivial no-op/echo stubs; there are no real GitHub + API calls, no PAT, and no MitM. Phase 1 drives no live traffic, so nothing calls the tools. +3. **Workload name `github-tool`, not `github-tool-mcp`.** See §6 (naming invariants). The scenario + entity id is `github-tool`, which keeps UC-1 identity resolution clean. + +In short: this is a **purpose-built, minimal stand-in** used ONLY to make UC-1's discovery deterministic +for the phase-1 demo. It is distinct from — and not a replacement for — the production 44-tool +`github-tool` referenced by [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md). When later phases wire live traffic, +they use the production tool; this stand-in serves the discover-and-evaluate loop only. + +--- + +## 3. The four MCP tools (verbatim scenario descriptions) + +Exactly four tools. Names are chosen so UC-1 derives `github-tool.<name>`; descriptions are copied +**verbatim** from `scenario.py::TOOL_SCOPES` / the policy-pipeline spec's *Tool scopes* section (each is +≤255 chars, authored to be generic/keyword-free so the PRB maps them correctly — do not paraphrase): + +| Tool name | Description (verbatim) | +|---|---| +| `source-read` | `Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only.` | +| `source-write` | `Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes.` | +| `issues-read` | `Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only.` | +| `issues-write` | `Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close.` | + +Each tool has a **minimal / empty** `inputSchema` (`{"type": "object", "properties": {}}`) — phase 1 +inspects only `name` + `description`, never arguments. + +> **Invariant:** the description strings here must remain byte-identical to `TOOL_SCOPES` in +> `scenario.py`. UC-1 copies them into `ScopeDefinition.description`, and the PRB LLM maps roles→scopes +> from that text; a drift would change the provisioned scope descriptions and could move the truth +> table. If `TOOL_SCOPES` changes, change this table with it. + +--- + +## 4. MCP server (minimal, real, deployable) + +A tiny, self-contained MCP server that serves **JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP at path `/mcp`** and correctly +answers `tools/list` with the four tools of §3. + +- **Transport / protocol:** JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP `POST /mcp` (the MCP streamable-HTTP endpoint + convention `analyze_tool` posts to). It must respond to a `tools/list` request with the four tools + (each `name` + `description` + minimal `inputSchema`). Implementing the MCP `initialize` handshake is + fine but not required by UC-1, which posts `tools/list` directly. +- **Stack:** a small Python server, consistent with the repo (Python 3.12). Either the official MCP + Python SDK in streamable-HTTP mode, or a hand-rolled minimal ASGI/HTTP handler for `POST /mcp` — pick + whichever keeps the image smallest and the `tools/list` contract obvious. No CrewAI, no A2A, no LLM. +- **Tool registry:** a single editable constant — the four `(name, description, inputSchema)` tuples of + §3 — so the list stays legible and auditable against `scenario.py::TOOL_SCOPES`. +- **Tool-CALL handlers:** trivial **no-op / echo stubs**. A `tools/call` for any of the four returns a + stub result (e.g. a text content block echoing the tool name + received arguments, or a fixed + `"stub: not implemented in phase-1 demo"` message). They perform **no** GitHub work. This is + acceptable because phase 1 drives no live traffic — but the endpoint must still be a **real, + deployable MCP server** that answers `tools/list`. +- **Location:** self-contained under `aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/`, mirroring the agent's + `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/` layout. Ships its own `Dockerfile`, dependency manifest, and the + `k8s/` manifests of §7. +- **Listen:** binds `0.0.0.0` on a container `PORT` (see §5) and serves `/mcp`. + +``` + UC-1 analyze_tool ──(JSON-RPC POST /mcp: tools/list)──► github-tool (:PORT) ──► 4 tools + (resolves http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:{first-port}/mcp) + (phase 1: no tools/call traffic — stub handlers are never exercised by the agent) +``` + +--- + +## 5. Configuration + +Minimal env, adapted to the tiny server: + +| Variable | Description | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `PORT` | HTTP listen port serving `/mcp` | `9090` | +| `LOG_LEVEL` | Log level | `INFO` | + +No Keycloak, LLM, GitHub PAT, JWKS, or audience config — the demo tool performs no auth and no upstream +calls (contrast the github-issue demo's `github-tool`, which needs PATs + issuer/JWKS/audience). Any +auth enforcement in front of this tool is AuthBridge/MitM's job in later phases, not this container's. + +--- + +## 6. Naming & consistency invariants + +State these explicitly; UC-1 identity resolution depends on all of them holding: + +- **One name everywhere:** workload name == K8s `Deployment` name == K8s `Service` name == the + `AgentRuntime` `targetRef.name` == the Keycloak client's workload segment == **`github-tool`**. + Consequently: + - the operator sets the Keycloak client `client.name = "team1/github-tool"`, so `classify_service` + splits it into `namespace=team1`, `workload_name=github-tool`; + - `analyze_tool` resolves the endpoint to + `http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:{first-port}/mcp`; + - UC-1 derives scopes `github-tool.source-read`, `github-tool.source-write`, + `github-tool.issues-read`, `github-tool.issues-write`. +- **Keycloak client id == `github-tool`** — matches `scenario.py`'s `TOOL_ID = "github-tool"`, so the + scenario/integration test and this deployed tool agree on the entity id. +- **Divergence from the github-issue demo (`github-tool-mcp`) is intentional.** The github-issue demo + and [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md) use a Service named **`github-tool-mcp`** on port `9090`. + This demo names both the workload and the Service **`github-tool`** because: + - the canonical scenario entity id is `github-tool` (`scenario.py` `TOOL_ID`), and UC-1 derives the + scope prefix from the **workload name** — a `github-tool-mcp` workload would yield + `github-tool-mcp.source-read`, not the canonical `github-tool.source-read`; + - `analyze_tool` relies on the operator convention **Service name == workload name**, so the Service + must also be `github-tool` for endpoint resolution to work off `client.name`. + Net: keeping a single `github-tool` name across workload / Service / Keycloak client keeps UC-1 + resolution clean and the derived scopes canonical. (The production live-traffic path continues to use + `github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` per the agent spec; the two are separate deployments.) + +--- + +## 7. Deployment (aiac level) + +Manifests live under `aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/`, adapted from the sibling agent's §7 and the +github-issue demo's `github-tool-deployment.yaml`. Namespace **`team1`** (installer-provided +ConfigMaps/secrets assumed present), consistent with the agent spec. + +- **`github-tool-deployment.yaml`** — `Deployment` + `Service` + `AgentRuntime`: + - **`Deployment`** named `github-tool`. Container port serves `/mcp` (default `9090`). Env `PORT`, + `LOG_LEVEL`. Image `github-tool:latest`, `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` (kind-load; name is a + documented knob). No GitHub PAT / issuer / JWKS / audience env (unlike the github-issue tool). + - **Pod label `kagenti.io/type: tool`** — this is what `classify_service` reads. Applied by the + operator via the `AgentRuntime` (see below); relying on the operator to stamp it, rather than + hand-setting it, keeps it consistent with the operator's own discriminator. + - **`Service`** named `github-tool` (ClusterIP), selecting the Deployment's pods. Its **first port** + maps to the container's `/mcp` port (e.g. `port: 9090 → targetPort: 9090`). `analyze_tool` uses the + Service's **first** port, so keep `/mcp`'s port first. + - **Service label `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` MUST be present** — a **deploy-time prerequisite** for + `analyze_tool` (the operator does **not** stamp it; `analyze_tool` returns `502` if absent). Set it + explicitly on the Service metadata (e.g. `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp: "true"`). + - **`AgentRuntime{ type: tool, targetRef: { apiVersion: apps/v1, kind: Deployment, name: github-tool } }`** + — enrolls the workload so the kagenti-operator applies `kagenti.io/type=tool` to the pod and + registers a Keycloak client with `client.name = "team1/github-tool"`. Unlike the github-issue demo + (which omits `kagenti.io/type` to skip AuthBridge entirely), this demo **needs** `type: tool` so the + pod carries `kagenti.io/type=tool` for UC-1 `classify_service`. + +- **No `configmaps.yaml` needed here** — the tool has no `authbridge-config` / `authproxy-routes` + dependency (it neither validates inbound JWTs nor does outbound token exchange in phase 1). The agent + spec's `authproxy-routes` still targets the **production** `github-tool-mcp` host and is unrelated to + this stand-in. + +- **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** a running Kagenti cluster with the kagenti-operator + (Keycloak realm as configured by the installer, namespace `team1`), so the `AgentRuntime` is + reconciled into a Keycloak client + pod label. + +**Wiring invariant:** `AgentRuntime.targetRef.name` == `Deployment` name == `Service` name == +`github-tool`; the `Service` carries the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label and exposes `/mcp` as its first +port; the operator-applied pod label is `kagenti.io/type=tool`; the operator-registered Keycloak +`client.name` is `team1/github-tool`. + +--- + +## 8. Verification + +**Local (no cluster — primary gate):** +1. `cd aiac/demo/tools/github_tool` and build: `podman build -t github-tool:latest .`. +2. Run the container (`-e PORT=9090 -p 9090:9090`), then POST a JSON-RPC `tools/list` to `/mcp` and + confirm the four tool names: + ```bash + curl -s -X POST localhost:9090/mcp \ + -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ + -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list","params":{}}' \ + | jq -r '.result.tools[].name' | sort + # → issues-read, issues-write, source-read, source-write + ``` +3. Confirm each returned tool's `description` is byte-identical to the matching `TOOL_SCOPES` entry in + `scenario.py` (e.g. `jq '.result.tools[] | {name, description}'`). + +**Cluster (HITL — live Kagenti + Keycloak + operator):** +4. `kind load docker-image github-tool:latest --name kagenti`. +5. `kubectl apply -f k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`. +6. Confirm the operator applied the pod label: `kubectl get pod -l app=github-tool -n team1 + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.labels.kagenti\.io/type}'` → `tool`. +7. Confirm the Service carries the MCP label: `kubectl get svc github-tool -n team1 + -o jsonpath='{.metadata.labels.protocol\.kagenti\.io/mcp}'` → present. +8. Confirm the operator registered a Keycloak client with `client.name = "team1/github-tool"` (via the + Keycloak admin API / IdP `Configuration` library). +9. From inside the cluster (or via `kubectl port-forward svc/github-tool 9090:9090 -n team1`), POST + `tools/list` to `http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp` and confirm the four tools — + the exact call UC-1 `analyze_tool` makes. +10. (End-to-end) Trigger UC-1 onboarding for `github-tool` and confirm it provisions scopes + `github-tool.source-read` / `github-tool.source-write` / `github-tool.issues-read` / + `github-tool.issues-write`, and writes **no rules for the tool alone** (per the phase-1 acceptance + criteria). + +--- + +## 9. Out of scope + +- **Real GitHub API calls / real source & issue operations** — tool-call handlers are stubs; there is + no GitHub PAT and no upstream. +- **Auth enforcement inside the tool** — no inbound JWT validation, no outbound token exchange, no + audience/scope checks. AuthBridge / the MitM handle enforcement in later phases. +- **The production 44-tool federation** — this stand-in exposes only the four canonical scenario tools + (see §2); the real `github-tool` (`github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`) is unchanged and used by the live-traffic + path. +- **Being agent-executable** — phase 1 drives no A2A traffic, so the tool is discovered and evaluated but + never invoked by `github-agent`. +- **Any changes to the AIAC pipeline, UC-1, `policy-pipeline.md`, or the integration test** — this tool + is an input to UC-1 discovery, not a change to it. +- **Building this tool into `agent-examples` CI** — aiac/demo images build independently (as with the + agent spec). diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..314d547e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -0,0 +1,445 @@ +# Integration Test: uc1-onboarding-pipeline — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. Integration-test +> specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` (a sibling of +> `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) +> is the index of them. This is the **uc1-onboarding-pipeline** integration test — the phase-1 +> service-onboarding demo driven end-to-end through the **real UC-1 agent** against **really-deployed** +> demo workloads — not the definition of integration testing in general. + +> **Relationship to `policy-pipeline`.** This test is the **discovery-driven sibling** of +> [policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md). The *scenario facts and the truth tables are identical* (same +> three users, same role→access facts, same inbound/outbound matrices). The **difference** is provenance: +> where `policy-pipeline` *hand-provisions* the agent/tool roles and scopes with clean fixed names and +> then calls the PRB mappings directly, this test *infers them via real UC-1 onboarding* of deployed +> workloads. That inference is what makes the generated Rego **semantically similar but not byte-identical** +> to `policy-pipeline` (see *[Semantic similarity, not byte-identity](#semantic-similarity-not-byte-identity)*). + +## Location + +`aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` — a pytest module marked +`@pytest.mark.integration`. It imports two shared modules: + +- `aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py` — a **new** scenario module (sibling of the existing + `scenario.py`, kept separate so `5.2`/`5.3` are unaffected). It carries the phase-1 users/roles, the two + `policy.md` variants, and the pair-lists expressed over the **discovered, workload-prefixed** names + (`github-tool.source-read`, `github-agent.source_operations`, …), which are what the generated Rego + actually contains. +- `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared `kubectl`/port-forward + `opa` helpers (extended from + the `5.3` launcher; see *[Testing Decisions](#testing-decisions)*). + +It also ships `aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego` — a standalone Rego module used only as the outbound +verification query, adapted from `5.3`'s `probe.rego` to match against **full discovered scope names** +(no prefix-stripping soft match; see step 7). + +## Description + +A `@pytest.mark.integration` test that validates the **phase-1 deliverable** +([../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md)) and confirms the runnable +demo: it deploys the real **`github-agent`** and a simplified **`github-tool`** to a live Kagenti/Kind +cluster, drives the **real UC-1 Service Onboarding agent** (`onboard_service` via the Controller's HTTP +trigger) for each, and then **asserts** the generated Rego decides correctly by running the standalone +`opa eval` binary as its verification oracle. + +Phase-1 is explicit that **live enforcement / live traffic is out of scope** — correctness is shown by +**evaluating the generated rules**, not by routing real requests. So this test is *Deploy + discover + +evaluate*: the agent and tool are really deployed and really discovered by UC-1 (classify from the +`kagenti.io/type` label, read the AgentCard, read the MCP `tools/list`, provision roles/scopes into +Keycloak, model access, emit Rego), but **no A2A message is ever sent through the agent**. + +The generated Rego is the **artifact under test** — the LLM/PCE that produced it might be wrong — so the +test never trusts it. Expected verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists (the +intended policy), and the real Rego is asserted to admit/deny each scenario-derived request as the truth +table requires. A mismatch fails the test and names the exact cell. + +Because it needs a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, it is `@pytest.mark.integration` +and stays out of the default unit run (`-m "not integration"`); it additionally `pytest.skip`s when no +`opa` binary is found. + +### Topology + +- **AIAC runs on the host? No — in-cluster.** The pipeline is driven **inside the cluster** so UC-1's + `analyze_tool` can reach the tool's MCP endpoint at its cluster-internal DNS name + (`github-tool.{ns}.svc.cluster.local`). The test triggers onboarding over HTTP against the in-cluster + AIAC Controller (`POST /apply/service/{service_id}`), reachable via `kubectl port-forward`. +- **Two AIAC stacks, one per policy variant.** Because the PRB reads its policy from `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` + (a file/ConfigMap **baked into the AIAC pod**, not selectable per request), the two `policy.md` + variants (`explicit`, `abstract`) are served by **two independent in-cluster AIAC stacks** — each an + AIAC agent + its own Policy Store + its own OPA Policy Writer, mounting its own variant. The **IdP + Configuration Service and Keycloak are shared** (provisioning is variant-independent and idempotent). +- **Rego capture.** Each stack's OPA Policy Writer writes `.rego` (the filesystem stub — phase-1 emits to + a filesystem location, **not** the K8s CR) into a mounted volume. The test `kubectl cp`/`exec`s each + variant's `.rego` out to a host temp dir `rego_out/<variant>/`, then runs the `opa eval` oracle on the + host. + +### What it does + +The pipeline (deploy → onboard tool → onboard agent → emit Rego) is driven **once per `policy.md` variant** +— against that variant's AIAC stack — each writing into its own `rego_out/<variant>/`. `opa eval` then +asserts the truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 describe the run. + +0. **Point the demo namespace at the dedicated realm (test fixture).** Before deploying workloads, set + `KEYCLOAK_REALM=<AIAC_TEST_REALM>` in the demo namespace's **`authbridge-config`** ConfigMap. The + kagenti-operator reads the realm per-namespace from this key and **preserves an admin/CI-set value** + (operator issue #433), so the operator registers *this* namespace's clients into the test realm with + **no operator restart or cluster-wide change**. (Default without this is `kagenti`.) +1. **Provision the realm's users + realm roles (test fixture).** UC-1 does **not** create users or realm + roles, so the fixture provisions them via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** into the dedicated test + realm (`AIAC_TEST_REALM`), **before** onboarding (the Service Policy Builder reads the full realm-role + universe): users `dev-user`, `test-user`, `devops-user`; realm roles `developer`, `tester`, `devops` + (with the generic ≤255-char descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs)* — the PRB reads + them); role assignments (`devops-user`→`devops`, which maps to **no** scope — the deny case). + Provisioning is idempotent (create-or-get); state is **left in place** on teardown (the shared realm is + never deleted/recreated — reruns converge). + +2. **Deploy the demo workloads.** `kubectl apply` the simplified **`github-tool`** + ([../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md)) and the real **`github-agent`** + ([../demo/github-agent.md](../demo/github-agent.md)) into the demo namespace. Wait until: pods Ready; + the kagenti-operator has **registered a Keycloak client** for each (with `client.name = + "{namespace}/{workload}"`) and applied the `kagenti.io/type` pod label (`tool`/`agent`); the + `github-agent` **AgentCard CR** is present; the tool **Service** carries the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` + label and answers `tools/list`. + +3. **Onboard the tool, then the agent (real UC-1), against each variant's AIAC stack.** Order matters — + the tool is onboarded first so its scopes exist when the agent's Service Policy Builder reads the scope + universe: + > **Resolving `{service_id}`.** The trigger takes the Keycloak **client id**, which is **not** the + > string `github-tool`: the operator sets `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"` but the client *id* is + > `"{ns}/{workload}"` only when SPIRE is off — with `--spire-trust-domain` set it is a SPIFFE URI + > (`spiffe://<trust-domain>/ns/{ns}/sa/{sa}`). The test resolves the id by looking up the client whose + > **name** is `"{ns}/github-tool"` (resp. `"{ns}/github-agent"`) via the Configuration library / + > Keycloak admin, then triggers with that id. + + - `POST /apply/service/{github-tool client id}` → UC-1 classifies it a **Tool** from the label, reads + the MCP manifest, provisions scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, + issues-write}` (verbatim tool descriptions), sets `client.type=Tool`. **No rules are written for the + tool directly.** + - `POST /apply/service/{github-agent client id}` → UC-1 classifies it an **Agent** from the label, + reads the AgentCard, provisions role `github-agent.agent` + scopes + `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}` (from the two skills), sets `client.type=Agent`, + then the Service Policy Builder maps the realm roles→scopes via the real PRB (real LLM, + `temperature=0`) and the Controller calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)` → the OPA writer + emits `github_agent.inbound.rego` + `github_agent.outbound.rego`. + +4. **Capture the Rego.** `kubectl cp`/`exec` each variant stack's OPA-writer output to + `rego_out/<variant>/`. + +5. **Repeat steps 3–4 for the second variant** (the other AIAC stack). Provisioning re-runs are idempotent + and variant-independent; only the emitted Rego differs. + +6. **Teardown in `finally`.** Delete the demo workloads (operator de-registers the clients); leave the + realm, users, realm roles, and `.rego` files in place for eyeballing. AIAC stacks may be left running or + torn down per the harness. + +7. **Assert the truth table with `opa eval`.** For each variant's captured Rego, evaluate a matrix of + **(request JSON, rego file)** tuples with the standalone `opa` binary and hard-assert each decision: + - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → `shutil.which("opa")` → `pytest.skip("opa not found")`. + - **Inbound** — one node per `(variant × subject)`. Request `{"subject": <id>}` against + `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. Coarse existential "can this user reach the agent at all"; + the discovered agent-scope names (`github-agent.source_operations` / `.issue_operations`) do not need + to match anything — inbound has no function field. + - **Outbound (user gate only)** — one node per `(variant × subject × function_name)`, where + `function_name` is a **full discovered tool-scope name** (`github-tool.source-read`, …). Evaluated by + the probe query `data.probe.outbound.allow` (in `probe_uc1.rego`), which binds `input.function_name` + against the generated **user→tool** data maps (`subject_ok`) **only**. The agent→tool gate + (`target_ok`) is **not** probed — under UC-1's single generic `github-agent.agent` role it is + degenerate/empty (see *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agent-tool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*), matching + phase-1's "user-gating dimension only." + - **Name matching** — because `scenario_uc1.py` stores the **full discovered scope names**, the probe + matches `input.function_name` to a scope by **exact string equality** (no prefix-stripping token-set + soft match — that was `5.3`'s device for bare names; here both sides are already prefixed). + - The expected verdict for every cell is **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists, not a + second hand-maintained copy. A failing node names the exact `variant / subject / function_name` cell. + +8. **Assert grant-set equivalence (semantic, from the Rego).** The pipeline runs inside the AIAC pod, so + the test never sees the intermediate `list[PolicyRule]`. Grant-set equivalence is therefore re-derived + from the **generated Rego data maps**: dump each variant's user→tool grant map (via `opa eval + data.authz.github_agent.outbound...`) and each variant's inbound `subject_roles`/`agent_scopes`, and + assert, as order-independent `(role, scope)` **sets**, that **each variant equals the `scenario_uc1.py` + truth table** and **the two variants equal each other**. This compares grant *sets*, not Rego text + (formatting/name-ordering may differ; the grant set may not) — the semantic-similarity guarantee this + test makes. It catches verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse `opa eval` oracle hides. + +## Expected output + +The test passes when `opa eval` decides every cell of the scenario truth table as follows, for **both** +policy variants. Verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists, not a hand-maintained +copy — these tables are the human-readable rendering of them. They are **identical to policy-pipeline's** +(only the underlying scope-name strings differ). + +`USERS`: `dev-user`→`developer`, `test-user`→`tester`, `devops-user`→`devops`. + +**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`, user-role→agent-scope, existential): + +| Subject | Inbound | +|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | +| test-user | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | + +**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, user→tool gate only; `function_name` +is the full discovered scope name, shown here by its bare suffix for readability): + +| | github-tool.source-read | github-tool.source-write | github-tool.issues-read | github-tool.issues-write | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| test-user | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | + +Each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in its `rego_out/<variant>/`: + +- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. + `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated with the + **discovered** names `[github-agent.source_operations, github-agent.issue_operations]`. (`devops-user` + holds `devops`, which maps to no agent scope, so it is absent and denied inbound.) +- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok + }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the **user→tool** gate (populated: `subject_role_scopes` grouping + developer/tester → `github-tool.*` scopes). Its **`target_ok`** (agent→tool) is **degenerate/empty** + under the single generic `github-agent.agent` role — documented, not asserted (see below). + +Explicitly **no** `github_tool.*.rego` — the pipeline emits no tool model (the tool is a pure target; +phase-1 acceptance requires "no rules written for the tool alone"). + +### Semantic similarity, not byte-identity + +This test's Rego is **semantically similar** to `policy-pipeline`'s but **not byte-identical**, for two +baked-in reasons in the (frozen) UC-1 provisioning: + +1. **Workload-prefixed names.** UC-1 names every scope `{workload}.{name}`, so the data maps hold + `github-tool.source-read` / `github-agent.source_operations` where `policy-pipeline` holds bare + `source-read` / `source-access`. Same **file set + package shapes**; different name strings. +2. **Degenerate `target_ok`.** UC-1 emits one generic `github-agent.agent` role (description `"Agent + role"`), which the PRB cannot map to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the agent→tool gate + is empty — where `policy-pipeline`'s two operator roles populate it across all four scopes. + +Both are inherent to running real UC-1; making the Rego byte-identical would require unfreezing UC-1 +(dropping the prefix + deriving per-skill agent roles) or abandoning UC-1 discovery (which would collapse +this test into `policy-pipeline`). The test therefore asserts **same files + same decisions + equivalent +grant sets**, not identical text. + +### The agent→tool gate (degenerate by design) + +Phase-1 states outbound access is an **intersection** of the user→tool gate and the agent→tool gate, but +that "the agent holds all of `github-tool`'s scopes, so this demo exercises the **user-gating dimension +only**; the agent-role gate is not exercised here" (deferred to a future two-tool demo). Under real UC-1 +the single generic `github-agent.agent` role yields an **empty** `target_ok`, so the generated `allow` +(`subject_ok AND target_ok`) would deny everything. The probe therefore evaluates **`subject_ok` only**, +which is exactly the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. The empty `target_ok` is documented as a known +UC-1 limitation, not a test failure. + +## Scenario + +The phase-1 scenario — identical role→access facts to `policy-pipeline`, driven end-to-end through real +UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads rather than a hand-built provisioning step. + +| Element | Value | +|---------|-------| +| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (dedicated; default `aiac-uc1-e2e`) | +| Agent | `github-agent` — **discovered** role `github-agent.agent`; scopes `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (from AgentCard skills) | +| Tool | `github-tool` (simplified) — **discovered** scopes `github-tool.source-read`, `github-tool.source-write`, `github-tool.issues-read`, `github-tool.issues-write` (from MCP `tools/list`) | +| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | +| `developer` | source read/write + issues read | +| `tester` | issues read/write | +| `devops` | no access (inbound deny; denied every outbound function) | + +Role → access (the fixed facts both `policy.md` variants and the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists must agree +with; the generic descriptions are not part of this triad): + +- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. +- `tester` — issues read/write. +- `devops` — no access. Conveyed by the **role description only** — absent from every pair-list and both + `policy.md` variants (deny-by-default), so denied inbound and on every outbound function. + +## Configuration (env) + +| Variable | Purpose | Default | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `KUBECONFIG` | Kubeconfig for the live Kagenti/Kind cluster | — (required) | +| `AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE` | Namespace the demo workloads deploy into | `team1` | +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds (for user/realm-role provisioning) | — (required) | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Dedicated realm the test uses; the fixture sets `KEYCLOAK_REALM` on the demo namespace's `authbridge-config` ConfigMap so the operator registers this namespace's clients into it (per-namespace, no cluster-wide change) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | +| `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the AIAC stacks read back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | +| `AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL` / `AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL` | Base URL of each variant's in-cluster AIAC Controller (via port-forward) for `POST /apply/service/{id}` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` / `:7080` | +| `AIAC_OPA_POD_EXPLICIT` / `AIAC_OPA_POD_ABSTRACT` | OPA-writer pod (or PVC) per variant to `kubectl cp` `.rego` from | — (resolved from labels) | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Host base dir the captured `.rego` is copied to; `rego_out/<variant>/` per variant, left on disk | operator-chosen local dir | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`); consumed by the in-cluster AIAC pods | — (required) | +| `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary (oracle); else `PATH`, else `pytest.skip` | — (optional; PATH lookup) | + +> When the test is written, confirm: the Controller trigger path and port; and the OPA writer's output +> path / how the two variant stacks are deployed and addressed. The realm mechanism (per-namespace +> `authbridge-config` `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, preserved by the operator — issue #433) and the `{service_id}` +> resolution (look up the client by `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"`; the id is a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE) +> are **confirmed** against the operator source and reflected above. + +## Runbook + +Runnable only against a live Kagenti/Kind cluster (operator + Keycloak + SPIRE) **configured to register +clients into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`**, with the two AIAC variant stacks deployable, a real LLM, the demo agent +(GA-1…9) and simplified tool images built + kind-loaded, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). + +```bash +# env: KUBECONFIG + KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-uc1-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN +.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py -m integration -v +# Parametrized nodes: (variant × subject) inbound + (variant × subject × function_name) outbound + grant-set equivalence. +# A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: +# test_outbound[abstract-test-user-github-tool.source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed +# The generated Rego is left on disk per variant for eyeballing: +# rego_out/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# rego_out/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# (no github_tool.*.rego in either) +``` + +The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found. Eyeball the persisted Rego against the ID-only +package shapes in [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md); +optionally inspect the provisioned Keycloak realm and the discovered scopes. + +## Testing Decisions + +- **Highest seam available, verified by a real oracle.** Real deployed workloads + real kagenti-operator + + real UC-1 onboarding + real PRB/PCE + real Keycloak + real LLM. The test drives the pipeline through + its production trigger (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) and verifies the real filesystem Rego with the + standalone `opa eval` binary. A good test here asserts only **external behavior** — the *decisions* the + generated Rego makes — never internal Rego structure. +- **Rego is the artifact under test; the scenario is the oracle.** Expected verdicts are computed from + `scenario_uc1.py`, not from the Rego. A wrong role→scope mapping fails the test at the exact cell. +- **Deploy + discover + evaluate, no live traffic.** Per phase-1, enforcement/token-exchange/live A2A is + out of scope; correctness is shown by evaluating the generated rules. The agent pod need only exist + (labelled `kagenti.io/type=agent`, AgentCard present); the simplified tool need only answer `tools/list` + — neither is driven with real requests. +- **In-cluster AIAC for MCP reachability.** UC-1's `analyze_tool` posts `tools/list` to a + cluster-internal DNS name, so the pipeline runs in-cluster (triggered over HTTP) rather than in-process + on the host, which cannot resolve `*.svc.cluster.local`. +- **Two AIAC stacks for two variants.** The PRB policy is baked into the pod (`AIAC_POLICY_FILE`), so each + `policy.md` variant is served by its own AIAC stack; Keycloak + the IdP Configuration Service are shared + (provisioning is variant-independent and idempotent). +- **User gate only.** UC-1's single generic agent role yields an empty `target_ok`; the outbound probe + evaluates `subject_ok` alone, matching phase-1's user-gating-only intent. The agent-role gate is + deferred (needs a second tool the agent is not mapped to). +- **Semantic similarity, from the Rego.** Since the pipeline runs in-pod, grant-set equivalence is + re-derived from the generated Rego data maps (not an in-process `list[PolicyRule]`), and compares grant + *sets* across variants and vs the scenario — the semantic-similarity guarantee, not byte-identity. +- **Dedicated realm, leave-in-place.** A dedicated test realm (`AIAC_TEST_REALM`) the operator is + configured for; the shared realm is never deleted/recreated, so cleanup is idempotent leave-in-place + (users/roles create-or-get; UC-1 writes idempotent; demo workloads deleted so the operator de-registers + the clients). +- **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** The PRB LLM is pinned `temperature=0`; both variants are asserted + cell-by-cell (`opa eval`) and at the grant-set level. Some model-dependence remains, which is why the + suite is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. +- **Prior art, shared not copied.** Reuses the `5.3` shape (`@pytest.mark.integration`, `opa` + discovery/skip, per-variant `rego_out/`, scenario-as-oracle, probe query) via the shared + `launcher.py`/`scenario_uc1.py`, adapted from in-process/subprocess to deploy/port-forward/`kubectl cp`. + +## Relationship to other integration tests + +This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD +([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). + +- **Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline`** ([policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md), + `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`): identical scenario facts and truth tables, but this + test *infers* the agent/tool entities via **real UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads** instead of + hand-provisioning them, so its Rego is semantically similar (not byte-identical) and it validates the + **phase-1** deliverable end-to-end. +- Same `@pytest.mark.integration` + `opa eval` flavor as the live-Keycloak pytest tests + (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) and `policy-pipeline`; skips when `opa` is absent. + +Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`. + +## Out of Scope + +- **Writing `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`, `probe_uc1.rego`, `scenario_uc1.py`** — this spec + *describes* the test; the test is written in a later session (tracked by + `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`). +- **The UC-1 agent, PRB, PCE, OPA writer, and demo `github-agent` implementations** — specified/tested by + their own components/issues, not here. In particular UC-1's discovery naming and single-generic-role + behavior are **fixed**; this test observes them, it does not change them. +- **Building the simplified `github-tool`** — its own build issue (a `blocked-by` of this test); the tool + is specified in [../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md). +- **Live enforcement / A2A traffic / token exchange / K8s-CR Policy Writer** — Phase-2+; this test targets + the filesystem stub and evaluates rules, per phase-1 out-of-scope. +- **Default-CI wiring** — `@pytest.mark.integration`; runs on demand. + +## Further Notes + +- **Fact triad.** The role→access facts are owned by three artefacts that must agree: the *Scenario* + table, **both** `policy.md` variants, and the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists. Entity/role/scope + descriptions are generic and functional and must not contradict the facts. +- **Two variants in the discovered world** (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** variant that + enumerates each `(user-role → discovered scope)` pair by its full prefixed name, and an **abstract** + variant (phase-1's intent-only prose). **Neither names the agent role** — doing so would populate + `target_ok` and break both the user-gate-only decision and cross-variant equivalence. Both are + user-intent-only, both leave `target_ok` degenerate, and both must produce the **same discovered grant + set**. +- **`devops` zero access** is conveyed by its role description only; it is absent from every pair-list and + both `policy.md` variants (deny-by-default denies it inbound and on every outbound function). +- **Descriptions ≤255 chars, verbatim into Keycloak.** The tool-scope descriptions are the verbatim + scenario descriptions the simplified tool returns from `tools/list`; the agent-scope descriptions come + from the AgentCard skills; the realm-role descriptions are provisioned by the fixture. + +## Blocked-by + +- Simplified `github-tool` build issue (see [../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md)). +- Demo `github-agent` implementation — `demo/GA-1…GA-9` (deployable agent + AgentCard). +- UC-1 Service Onboarding — `agent/service-onboarding/3.6-service-onboarding-orchestrator.md` (**done**). +- The PRB / PCE / OPA-writer / Policy-Store prerequisites shared with `5.3`. +- A live Kagenti/Kind cluster + operator (registers clients into `AIAC_TEST_REALM` via the demo + namespace's `authbridge-config` `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, set by the fixture — per-namespace, confirmed against + the operator source); the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` Service label applied at deploy time + (`../../gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`); an `opa` binary at test time. + +## Scenario inputs + +These are **functional** inputs — the PRB reads the descriptions and the `policy.md` to produce the +role→scope mappings. The entity/role/scope descriptions are **generic and keyword-free**; client `type` +is set by UC-1 from the `kagenti.io/type` label (not description prose). + +### Discovered entities (what UC-1 provisions) + +- **`github-tool`** (Tool) → scopes, from the simplified tool's MCP `tools/list` (verbatim descriptions): + - `github-tool.source-read` — "Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only." + - `github-tool.source-write` — "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes." + - `github-tool.issues-read` — "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only." + - `github-tool.issues-write` — "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close." +- **`github-agent`** (Agent) → role `github-agent.agent` (description "Agent role") + scopes from the + AgentCard skills: + - `github-agent.source_operations` — "Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits." + - `github-agent.issue_operations` — "Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests." + +### Realm roles (provisioned by the fixture) + +- `developer` — "Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining code) and fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and consults issues for defect reports." +- `tester` — "Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through the issue tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue tracker, not in source." +- `devops` — "DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime environments; does not author source code and does not manage the issue tracker." + +### `policy.md` — Version 1 (explicit) + +Enumerates each `(user-role → discovered scope)` pair by name. **No agent-role→tool-scope section** +(target_ok is deferred). Deny by default. + +```markdown +# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this +policy supports it; deny by default. + +## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) +- developer may use github-agent.source_operations and github-agent.issue_operations. +- tester may use github-agent.issue_operations. + +## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +- developer may perform github-tool.source-read, github-tool.source-write, and github-tool.issues-read. +- tester may perform github-tool.issues-read and github-tool.issues-write. +``` + +### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) + +Phase-1's intent-only prose. Encodes the same facts; relies on the PRB/LLM to expand intent into the +discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. + +```markdown +Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. + +- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. +- Testers may read and modify issues. +``` From bbbd1cc6a48976d3abb8c45bb220ff3dd53fae39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 10:53:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 211/273] Test(aiac): Assert onboarding orchestrator invokes provision graph with service_id trigger Add a unit test guarding the service_id -> provision-graph wiring in the Service Onboarding Orchestrator (issue 4.5). The existing tests verified the service_id -> ServicePolicyBuilder path but never inspected the graph's argument, so a dropped or hardcoded trigger.entity_id would pass unnoticed. The new test asserts graph.invoke receives an OnboardingProvisionState whose trigger.entity_id equals the service_id. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- .../agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py index 341484555..7d30bf9b2 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/test_orchestrator.py @@ -39,6 +39,23 @@ def test_provision_result_fed_to_builder_and_rules_returned_with_override_false( # Orchestrator returns the builder's rules paired with the append flag assert result == (rules, False) + def test_provision_graph_invoked_with_service_id_in_trigger(self): + # The service_id must reach Provision as the trigger's entity_id (Keycloak + # client_id) — otherwise Provision classifies the wrong service. The other + # tests never inspect the graph's argument, so this guards that wiring. + graph = MagicMock() + graph.invoke.return_value = {"service_type": ServiceType.AGENT} + + with ( + patch.object(orchestrator, "build_provision_graph", return_value=graph), + patch.object(orchestrator, "ServicePolicyBuilder") as spb, + ): + spb.build.return_value = [object()] + orchestrator.onboard_service(SERVICE_ID) + + (state,), _ = graph.invoke.call_args + assert state.trigger.entity_id == SERVICE_ID + class TestProvisionFails: def test_builder_not_called_and_provision_error_propagates(self): From 08113fc71803fb64f1423f0fd56b5c126cde0e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 11:07:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 212/273] Feat: Add minimal github-tool MCP demo server (UC-1 discovery) 4-op MCP stub (`source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) that lets UC-1 `analyze_tool` deterministically discover the four canonical scenario scopes (`github-tool.*`). Runs FastMCP in stateless + json_response mode so UC-1 can POST `tools/list` without an initialize handshake. - server.py: FastMCP app with TOOLS registry; descriptions byte-identical to scenario.py::TOOL_SCOPES; no-arg stubs produce empty inputSchema - test/: 4 pytest tests via Starlette TestClient (names, descriptions, inputSchema, tools/call stub) - Dockerfile: python:3.12-slim, CMD ["python", "server.py"] - k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml: Deployment + ServiceAccount + Service (protocol.kagenti.io/mcp label) + AgentRuntime{type:tool} in namespace team1 Closes: inception/issues/demo/github-tool-build.md Unblocks: inception/issues/testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile | 15 ++++ .../k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/pytest.ini | 1 + aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt | 5 ++ aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/server.py | 36 ++++++++ aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/__init__.py | 0 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/conftest.py | 8 ++ .../tools/github_tool/test/test_server.py | 59 +++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 209 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/pytest.ini create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/server.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/conftest.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/test_server.py diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b2ffacd9e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +FROM python:3.12-slim + +WORKDIR /app + +COPY requirements.txt . +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir mcp[cli] uvicorn[standard] + +COPY server.py . + +ENV PORT=9090 +ENV LOG_LEVEL=INFO + +EXPOSE 9090 + +CMD ["python", "server.py"] diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b0630a3bf --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +--- +# github-tool — simplified 4-scope MCP stub for UC-1 onboarding. +# +# DISTINCT from the production 44-tool github-tool-mcp used by the github-agent +# for live GitHub operations. These two coexist under different Service names: +# github-tool (this file, port 9090) — UC-1 discovery, client.name = "team1/github-tool" +# github-tool-mcp (authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/) — agent execution +# +# Naming invariants (do not rename): +# workload name == Service name == "github-tool" +# analyze_tool endpoint: http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp +# +# kagenti.io/type=tool is applied by the kagenti-operator when it reconciles +# the AgentRuntime below; do not hand-set it here. +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ServiceAccount +metadata: + name: github-tool + namespace: team1 + +--- +apiVersion: apps/v1 +kind: Deployment +metadata: + name: github-tool + namespace: team1 +spec: + replicas: 1 + selector: + matchLabels: + app: github-tool + template: + metadata: + labels: + app: github-tool + spec: + serviceAccountName: github-tool + containers: + - name: github-tool + image: github-tool:latest + imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent + ports: + - containerPort: 9090 + env: + - name: PORT + value: "9090" + - name: LOG_LEVEL + value: "INFO" +--- +# Service — exposes /mcp as the first (and only) port. +# The protocol.kagenti.io/mcp label is a deploy-time prerequisite: +# analyze_tool returns 502 if this label is absent. +# The operator does NOT stamp it; it must be set explicitly here. +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: github-tool + namespace: team1 + labels: + protocol.kagenti.io/mcp: "true" +spec: + selector: + app: github-tool + ports: + - name: mcp + port: 9090 + targetPort: 9090 + type: ClusterIP +--- +# AgentRuntime — enrolls the workload so the kagenti-operator: +# - applies kagenti.io/type=tool to the pod (read by classify_service), and +# - registers a Keycloak client with client.name = "team1/github-tool" +# (so analyze_tool derives scopes github-tool.{source-read,...}). +apiVersion: agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1 +kind: AgentRuntime +metadata: + name: github-tool + namespace: team1 +spec: + type: tool + targetRef: + apiVersion: apps/v1 + kind: Deployment + name: github-tool diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/pytest.ini b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/pytest.ini new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eea2c1802 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/pytest.ini @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +[pytest] diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c79a92505 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +mcp[cli]>=1.9.0 +uvicorn[standard]>=0.34.0 +httpx>=0.28.0 +pytest>=8.0.0 +pytest-asyncio>=0.25.0 diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/server.py b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/server.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c6f2da79e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/server.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +import os + +from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP + +# Single editable registry — one entry per canonical UC-1 scope. +# Names match scenario.py::TOOL_SCOPES keys; descriptions are verbatim copies. +TOOLS = [ + ("source-read", "Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only."), + ("source-write", "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes."), + ("issues-read", "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only."), + ("issues-write", "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close."), +] + +mcp = FastMCP("github-tool", host="0.0.0.0", json_response=True, stateless_http=True) + +for _tool_name, _tool_desc in TOOLS: + def _make_stub(name: str): + def stub() -> str: + return f"stub: {name} not implemented in phase-1 demo" + + stub.__name__ = name.replace("-", "_") + return stub + + mcp.add_tool(fn=_make_stub(_tool_name), name=_tool_name, description=_tool_desc) + +app = mcp.streamable_http_app() + +if __name__ == "__main__": + import uvicorn + + uvicorn.run( + app, + host="0.0.0.0", + port=int(os.getenv("PORT", "9090")), + log_level=os.getenv("LOG_LEVEL", "info").lower(), + ) diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/__init__.py b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/conftest.py b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/conftest.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3f93ad297 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/conftest.py @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +# server.py importable as `server` +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parents[1])) + +# scenario.py importable as `scenario` +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parents[4] / "test" / "integration")) diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/test_server.py b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/test_server.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8f36aa9e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/test/test_server.py @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +import pytest +from starlette.testclient import TestClient + +from scenario import TOOL_SCOPES + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="module") +def client(): + from server import app + + with TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=True) as c: + yield c + + +def _tools_list(client: TestClient) -> list[dict]: + response = client.post( + "/mcp", + json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, + headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == 200 + return response.json()["result"]["tools"] + + +class TestToolsList: + def test_returns_exactly_four_tool_names(self, client): + tools = _tools_list(client) + assert {t["name"] for t in tools} == set(TOOL_SCOPES.keys()) + + def test_descriptions_match_scenario(self, client): + tools = _tools_list(client) + by_name = {t["name"]: t["description"] for t in tools} + for name, expected in TOOL_SCOPES.items(): + assert by_name[name] == expected, f"description mismatch for {name!r}" + + def test_input_schema_is_minimal(self, client): + tools = _tools_list(client) + for tool in tools: + schema = tool["inputSchema"] + assert schema["type"] == "object" + assert schema["properties"] == {} + + +class TestToolsCall: + def test_valid_tool_returns_stub_content(self, client): + response = client.post( + "/mcp", + json={ + "jsonrpc": "2.0", + "id": 2, + "method": "tools/call", + "params": {"name": "source-read", "arguments": {}}, + }, + headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == 200 + body = response.json() + assert "result" in body + assert body["result"]["content"] From 3085e24e3e2ef0f7f40de4167181844212571089 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 11:16:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 213/273] =?UTF-8?q?Feat(aiac):=20Add=20github-agent=20demo?= =?UTF-8?q?=20(GA-1=E2=80=A6GA-9)?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Self-contained A2A agent project at aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/: - Two-skill AgentCard: source_operations + issue_operations - CrewAI two-phase flow: prereq extraction + GitHub researcher - Curated 20-tool allow-list from the 44-tool github-tool catalog - Auth three-tier: GITHUB_TOKEN → inbound header → unauthenticated - K8s manifests: ServiceAccount + Deployment + Service(8080→8000) + AgentRuntime{type: agent}; authbridge-config + authproxy-routes - LLM presets: Ollama (default), OpenAI, Claude (.env.template committed) - 28 unit tests: test_tools (9), test_agent_card (11), test_prereq (8) - Docs: README with deploy walkthrough; github-agent.md cross-reference to sibling github-tool UC-1 onboarding stub Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore | 4 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.env.template | 28 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile | 15 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md | 113 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py | 235 ++ .../github_agent/github_agent/__init__.py | 0 .../github_agent/github_agent/agents.py | 79 + .../github_agent/github_agent/config.py | 66 + .../github_agent/github_agent/data_types.py | 25 + .../agents/github_agent/github_agent/event.py | 8 + .../agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py | 22 + .../agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py | 113 + .../github_agent/github_agent/prompts.py | 127 + .../agents/github_agent/github_agent/tools.py | 42 + .../agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml | 64 + .../k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml | 174 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml | 45 + .../github_agent/test/test_agent_card.py | 95 + .../agents/github_agent/test/test_prereq.py | 92 + .../agents/github_agent/test/test_tools.py | 110 + .../demo/agents/github_agent/test_startup.exp | 23 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock | 3121 +++++++++++++++++ .../requirements/demo/github-agent.md | 13 +- 23 files changed, 4611 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.env.template create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/agents.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/config.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/data_types.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/event.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/prompts.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/tools.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_agent_card.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_prereq.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_tools.py create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test_startup.exp create mode 100644 aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000..84c3acfec --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +.venv + +# `expect` scripts +test_startup.exp diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.env.template b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.env.template new file mode 100644 index 000000000..65b53af09 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.env.template @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# Github Agent - configuration template +# Copy to .env and fill in your values. + +# LLM configuration +TASK_MODEL_ID=ollama/ibm/granite4:latest +LLM_API_BASE=http://host.docker.internal:11434 +LLM_API_KEY=my_api_key +MODEL_TEMPERATURE=0 + +# MCP Tool endpoint +MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp + +# Agent service +PORT=8000 +LOG_LEVEL=INFO + +# Optional: static GitHub PAT passed to MCP as Bearer token. +# If unset, the inbound Authorization header (AuthBridge path) is forwarded instead. +GITHUB_TOKEN= + +# Optional: override the URL advertised in the agent card +AGENT_ENDPOINT= + +# Optional: override the curated tool allow-list (comma-separated tool names) +ENABLED_TOOLS= + +# Optional: expected issuer of inbound JWTs (informational) +ISSUER= diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1a9b0ffd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:python3.12-bookworm-slim +ARG RELEASE_VERSION="main" + +WORKDIR /app +COPY . . +RUN uv sync --no-cache --locked --link-mode copy + +ENV PRODUCTION_MODE=True \ + HOME=/app \ + RELEASE_VERSION=${RELEASE_VERSION} + +RUN chown -R 1001:1001 /app +USER 1001 + +CMD ["uv", "run", "--no-sync", "server"] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..973165df0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +# github-agent + +An autonomous A2A agent that acts on a user's behalf against GitHub **source repositories** and an **issue/PR tracker**, using the [`github-tool`](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-extensions) MCP server. + +This agent implements the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC policy-pipeline integration test — the two skills match the policy scenario's `source-operator` and `issues-operator` roles. + +## Skills + +| Skill id | Name | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `source_operations` | Source repository operations | Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits. | +| `issue_operations` | Issue & PR tracker operations | Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests. | + +## Prerequisite: `github-tool-mcp` (production tool) + +This agent connects to **`github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`** — the production 44-tool MCP server — at `MCP_URL`. +Deploy it before starting the agent: + +``` +authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml +``` + +> **Not the same as `demo/tools/github_tool/`.** +> `demo/tools/github_tool/` is a simplified 4-tool stub (`source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, +> `issues-write`) deployed as Service `github-tool` for **UC-1 onboarding discovery** only. +> The agent never connects to it — it connects to the production `github-tool-mcp` server which +> exposes the 44-tool GitHub API federation. + +## Configuration + +All settings are read from environment variables (or a `.env` file). Copy one of the presets: + +| Preset | Description | +|---|---| +| `.env.ollama` | Default — local Ollama (ibm/granite4) | +| `.env.openai` | OpenAI gpt-4o-mini | +| `.env.claude` | Anthropic Claude Sonnet | +| `.env.template` | Documented placeholder for all vars | + +### Variables + +| Variable | Description | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `TASK_MODEL_ID` | litellm model id | `ollama/ibm/granite4:latest` | +| `LLM_API_BASE` | OpenAI-compatible base URL | `http://host.docker.internal:11434` | +| `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM API key | `my_api_key` | +| `MODEL_TEMPERATURE` | Sampling temperature | `0` | +| `EXTRA_HEADERS` | Extra LLM headers (JSON) | `{}` | +| `MCP_URL` | MCP tool endpoint | `http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` | +| `MCP_TIMEOUT` | MCP connect timeout (s) | `600` | +| `ENABLED_TOOLS` | Override the curated tool allow-list (comma-separated) | (unset → default set) | +| `PORT` | A2A listen port | `8000` | +| `LOG_LEVEL` | Log level | `INFO` | +| `GITHUB_TOKEN` | Static Bearer to MCP (else inbound passthrough) | (unset) | +| `ISSUER` | Expected `iss` of inbound JWTs (informational) | (unset) | +| `AGENT_ENDPOINT` | Override the URL advertised in the card | (unset) | + +## Running locally + +```bash +cd aiac/demo/agents/github_agent +cp .env.ollama .env # or another preset +uv sync +uv run server +# In another terminal: +curl -s localhost:8000/.well-known/agent-card.json | python3 -m json.tool +``` + +Optionally, run `expect -f test_startup.exp` instead to check startup automatically. + +## Deploying to Kagenti (Kind cluster) + +Prerequisites: a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`) with `github-tool` already deployed. + +1. **Build the image:** + ```bash + cd aiac/demo/agents/github_agent + podman build -t github-agent:latest . + # or: docker build -t github-agent:latest . + ``` + +2. **Load into the Kind cluster:** + ```bash + kind load docker-image github-agent:latest --name kagenti + ``` + +3. **Apply manifests:** + ```bash + kubectl apply -f k8s/configmaps.yaml + kubectl apply -f k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml + ``` + +4. **Confirm AuthBridge injection:** + ```bash + kubectl get pod -n team1 -l app.kubernetes.io/name=github-agent -o jsonpath='{.items[0].spec.containers[*].name}' + ``` + You should see the `authbridge-proxy` (or `envoy-proxy`) sidecar alongside `agent`. + +5. **Port-forward and send a message:** + ```bash + kubectl port-forward svc/github-agent 8080:8080 -n team1 & + # Send an A2A message/send request: + curl -s http://localhost:8080/.well-known/agent-card.json | python3 -m json.tool + ``` + +## Architecture + +``` +A2A client ──(JSON-RPC /)──► github-agent (:8000) + │ CrewAI: prereq extract → researcher + └──(streamable-http, MCP_URL)──► github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp ──► GitHub + (AuthBridge sidecar: inbound JWT validation; outbound RFC-8693 token exchange for MCP_URL host) +``` diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bd8c0c5b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +""" +Module for A2A Agent. +""" + +import logging +import os +import sys +import traceback + +import uvicorn +from crewai_tools import MCPServerAdapter +from crewai_tools.adapters.tool_collection import ToolCollection + +from a2a.server.agent_execution import AgentExecutor, RequestContext +from a2a.server.events.event_queue import EventQueue +from a2a.server.request_handlers import DefaultRequestHandler +from a2a.server.routes import create_agent_card_routes, create_jsonrpc_routes +from a2a.server.tasks import InMemoryTaskStore, TaskUpdater +from a2a.helpers import new_task_from_user_message, new_text_part +from a2a.types import ( + AgentCapabilities, + AgentCard, + AgentInterface, + AgentSkill, + TaskState, + SecurityScheme, + HTTPAuthSecurityScheme, +) +from starlette.applications import Starlette + +from github_agent.config import settings, Settings +from github_agent.event import Event +from github_agent.tools import select_enabled_tools + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +logging.basicConfig(level=settings.LOG_LEVEL, stream=sys.stdout, format="%(levelname)s: %(message)s") + + +def get_agent_card(host: str, port: int): + """Returns the Agent Card for the Github Agent.""" + capabilities = AgentCapabilities(streaming=True) + + skill_source = AgentSkill( + id="source_operations", + name="Source repository operations", + description="Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits.", + tags=["git", "github", "source", "repositories", "files", "branches", "commits"], + examples=[ + "Show the README of kagenti/kagenti", + "List the branches of owner/repo", + "Create a branch and commit a fix to owner/repo", + ], + ) + + skill_issue = AgentSkill( + id="issue_operations", + name="Issue & PR tracker operations", + description="Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests.", + tags=["git", "github", "issues", "pull-requests"], + examples=[ + "List open issues in kubernetes/kubernetes", + "Open an issue in owner/repo titled ...", + "Summarise PR #42 in owner/repo", + ], + ) + + if settings.AGENT_ENDPOINT: + url = settings.AGENT_ENDPOINT.rstrip("/") + "/" + else: + url = f"http://{host}:{port}/" + + return AgentCard( + name="Github agent", + description=( + "Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an issue tracker. " + "It inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates issues and their threads." + ), + supported_interfaces=[AgentInterface(url=url, protocol_binding="JSONRPC")], + version="1.0.0", + default_input_modes=["text"], + default_output_modes=["text"], + capabilities=capabilities, + skills=[skill_source, skill_issue], + security_schemes={ + "Bearer": SecurityScheme( + http_auth_security_scheme=HTTPAuthSecurityScheme( + scheme="bearer", bearer_format="JWT", description="OAuth 2.0 JWT token" + ) + ) + }, + ) + + +class A2AEvent(Event): + """ + A class to handle events for A2A Agent. + + Attributes: + task_updater (TaskUpdater): The task updater instance. + """ + + def __init__(self, task_updater: TaskUpdater): + """ + Initializes the A2AEvent instance. + + Args: + task_updater (TaskUpdater): The task updater instance. + """ + self.task_updater = task_updater + + async def emit_event(self, message: str, final: bool = False) -> None: + """ + Emits an event with the given message. + + Args: + message (str): The event message. + final (bool): Whether the event is final. Defaults to False. + """ + logger.info("Emitting event %s", message) + + if final: + parts = [new_text_part(message)] + await self.task_updater.add_artifact(parts) + await self.task_updater.complete() + else: + await self.task_updater.update_status( + TaskState.TASK_STATE_WORKING, + self.task_updater.new_agent_message([new_text_part(message)]), + ) + + +class GithubExecutor(AgentExecutor): + """ + A class to handle execution for A2A Agent. + """ + + async def _run_agent(self, messages: dict, settings: Settings, event_emitter: Event, toolkit: ToolCollection): + from github_agent.main import GithubAgent + + github_agent = GithubAgent( + config=settings, + eventer=event_emitter, + mcp_toolkit=toolkit, + ) + result = await github_agent.execute(messages) + await event_emitter.emit_event(result, True) + + async def execute(self, context: RequestContext, event_queue: EventQueue): + """ + Executes the task. + + Args: + context (RequestContext): The request context. + event_queue (EventQueue): The event queue instance. + + Returns: + None + """ + # If GITHUB_TOKEN is set, pass it as Bearer header to MCP. + # If not set, assume AuthBridge handles auth transparently (envoy injects tokens). + headers = {} + if settings.GITHUB_TOKEN: + headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {settings.GITHUB_TOKEN}" + elif context.call_context and (context.call_context.state or {}).get("headers", {}).get("authorization"): + headers["Authorization"] = context.call_context.state["headers"]["authorization"] + else: + logging.warning( + "No GITHUB_TOKEN or inbound Authorization header; outbound requests will be unauthenticated" + ) + + user_input = [context.get_user_input()] + task = context.current_task + if not task: + task = new_task_from_user_message(context.message) + await event_queue.enqueue_event(task) + task_updater = TaskUpdater(event_queue, task.id, task.context_id) + event_emitter = A2AEvent(task_updater) + messages = [] + for message in user_input: + messages.append( + { + "role": "User", + "content": message, + } + ) + + # Hook up MCP tools + try: + if settings.MCP_URL: + logging.info("Connecting to MCP server at %s", settings.MCP_URL) + + server_params = { + "url": settings.MCP_URL, + "transport": "streamable-http", + "headers": headers, + } + with MCPServerAdapter(server_params, connect_timeout=settings.MCP_TIMEOUT) as mcp_tools: + curated_tools = select_enabled_tools(mcp_tools, settings) + if not curated_tools: + raise RuntimeError( + "No enabled tools found from the GitHub MCP server. " + "Check the ENABLED_TOOLS setting and ensure the server is reachable." + ) + await self._run_agent(messages, settings, event_emitter, curated_tools) + else: + await self._run_agent(messages, settings, event_emitter, None) + + except Exception as e: + traceback.print_exc() + await event_emitter.emit_event( + f"I'm sorry I was unable to fulfill your request. I encountered the following exception: {str(e)}", True + ) + + async def cancel(self, context: RequestContext, event_queue: EventQueue) -> None: + """ + Not implemented + """ + raise Exception("cancel not supported") + + +def run(): + """ + Runs the A2A Agent application. + """ + agent_card = get_agent_card(host="0.0.0.0", port=settings.SERVICE_PORT) + request_handler = DefaultRequestHandler( + agent_executor=GithubExecutor(), + task_store=InMemoryTaskStore(), + agent_card=agent_card, + ) + routes = create_jsonrpc_routes(request_handler, rpc_url="/", enable_v0_3_compat=True) + routes += create_agent_card_routes(agent_card) + routes += create_agent_card_routes(agent_card, card_url="/.well-known/agent.json") + app = Starlette(routes=routes) + uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=settings.SERVICE_PORT) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/agents.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/agents.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fa2ba63c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/agents.py @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +from crewai import Agent, Crew, Process, Task +from github_agent.config import Settings +from github_agent.llm import CrewLLM +from github_agent.prompts import TOOL_CALL_PROMPT, INFO_PARSER_PROMPT + + +class GithubAgents: + def __init__(self, config: Settings, github_tools): + self.llm = CrewLLM(config) + + ################### + # Pre-requisite extractor (no tools) + ################### + self.prereq_identifier = Agent( + role="Pre-requisite Extractor", + goal="Extract information about GitHub artifacts from the user's query", + backstory=INFO_PARSER_PROMPT, + verbose=True, + llm=self.llm.llm, + ) + + self.prereq_identifier_task = Task( + description="User query: {request}", + agent=self.prereq_identifier, + expected_output=( + 'A JSON object with keys "owner", "repo", "ref", "path", "numbers". ' + 'Example: {"owner": "kagenti", "repo": "kagenti", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null}' + ), + ) + + self.prereq_id_crew = Crew( + agents=[self.prereq_identifier], + tasks=[self.prereq_identifier_task], + process=Process.sequential, + verbose=True, + ) + + ################### + # GitHub operations researcher + ################### + self.github_researcher = Agent( + role="GitHub Operations Analyst", + goal=( + "Answer the user's query using MCP tools. " + "Prefer read-only operations. Be explicit about repo owner/name and filters." + ), + backstory=TOOL_CALL_PROMPT, + tools=github_tools, + verbose=True, + llm=self.llm.llm, + inject_date=True, + max_iter=6, + max_retry_limit=3, + respect_context_window=True, + ) + + self.github_query_task = Task( + description=( + "Use GitHub MCP tools to answer the user's query.\n" + "User query: {request}\n" + "Repository owner: {owner}\n" + "Repository name: {repo}\n" + "Branch/tag/sha: {ref}\n" + "File path: {path}\n" + "Issue/PR numbers: {numbers}" + ), + agent=self.github_researcher, + expected_output=( + "A well formatted, detailed report directly answering the user's query, " + "citing the tool output to support the answer." + ), + ) + + self.crew = Crew( + agents=[self.github_researcher], + tasks=[self.github_query_task], + process=Process.sequential, + verbose=True, + ) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/config.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/config.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..75accc315 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/config.py @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +import json +import os +from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings +from pydantic import model_validator +from pydantic import Field +from typing import Literal, Optional + + +class Settings(BaseSettings): + LOG_LEVEL: Literal["DEBUG", "INFO", "WARNING", "ERROR", "CRITICAL"] = Field( + os.getenv("LOG_LEVEL", "INFO"), + description="Application log level", + ) + TASK_MODEL_ID: str = Field( + os.getenv("TASK_MODEL_ID", "ollama/ibm/granite4:latest"), + description="The ID of the task model", + ) + LLM_API_BASE: str = Field( + os.getenv("LLM_API_BASE", "http://host.docker.internal:11434"), + description="The URL for OpenAI API", + ) + LLM_API_KEY: str = Field(os.getenv("LLM_API_KEY", "my_api_key"), description="The key for OpenAI API") + EXTRA_HEADERS: dict = Field({}, description="Extra headers for the OpenAI API") + MODEL_TEMPERATURE: float = Field( + os.getenv("MODEL_TEMPERATURE", 0), + description="The temperature for the model", + ge=0, + ) + MCP_URL: str = Field( + os.getenv("MCP_URL", "http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp"), + description="Endpoint for the MCP server", + ) + MCP_TIMEOUT: int = Field(os.getenv("MCP_TIMEOUT", 600), description="Timeout in seconds for MCP server connection") + ENABLED_TOOLS: Optional[str] = Field( + os.getenv("ENABLED_TOOLS", None), + description="Comma-separated list of tool names to enable (overrides the default curated allow-list)", + ) + + # auth variables for token validation + ISSUER: Optional[str] = Field(os.getenv("ISSUER", None), description="The issuer for incoming JWT tokens") + AGENT_ENDPOINT: Optional[str] = Field( + os.getenv("AGENT_ENDPOINT", None), + description="Override the URL advertised in the agent card", + ) + SERVICE_PORT: int = Field(os.getenv("PORT", 8000), description="Port on which the service will run.") + GITHUB_TOKEN: Optional[str] = Field( + os.getenv("GITHUB_TOKEN", None), + description="If not using agent with authorization, the default Github token to use", + ) + + class Config: + env_file = ".env" + env_file_encoding = "utf-8" + + @model_validator(mode="after") + def validate_extra_headers(self) -> "Settings": + if os.getenv("EXTRA_HEADERS"): + try: + self.EXTRA_HEADERS = json.loads(os.getenv("EXTRA_HEADERS")) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + raise ValueError("EXTRA_HEADERS must be a valid JSON string") + + return self + + +settings = Settings() # type: ignore[call-arg] diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/data_types.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/data_types.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d97d6065d --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/data_types.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import json +from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator + + +class GithubQueryInfo(BaseModel): + owner: str | None = Field(None, description="The repository owner or organization.") + repo: str | None = Field(None, description="The repository name.") + ref: str | None = Field(None, description="Branch, tag, or sha if named.") + path: str | None = Field(None, description="File path if named.") + numbers: list[int] | None = Field( + None, description="Issue or PR numbers mentioned by the user." + ) + + @field_validator("numbers", mode="before") + @classmethod + def coerce_string_to_list(cls, v): + """Small LLMs often serialize arrays as strings in tool call args.""" + if isinstance(v, str): + try: + parsed = json.loads(v) + if isinstance(parsed, list): + return parsed + except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError): + pass + return v diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/event.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/event.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..511156326 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/event.py @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +from abc import ABC, abstractmethod + + +class Event(ABC): + @abstractmethod + async def emit_event(self, message: str, final: bool = False) -> None: + """Emit Event""" + pass diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c3f6d1579 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +from crewai import LLM +from github_agent.config import Settings + + +class CrewLLM: + def __init__(self, config: Settings): + kwargs = {} + if config.EXTRA_HEADERS is not None and None not in config.EXTRA_HEADERS: + kwargs["extra_headers"] = config.EXTRA_HEADERS + + # For Ollama models, pass num_ctx to set the context window size. + # Ollama defaults to 2048 tokens which is too small for agent workflows. + if config.TASK_MODEL_ID.startswith(("ollama/", "ollama_chat/")): + kwargs["num_ctx"] = 8192 + + self.llm = LLM( + model=config.TASK_MODEL_ID, + base_url=config.LLM_API_BASE, + api_key=config.LLM_API_KEY, + temperature=config.MODEL_TEMPERATURE, + **kwargs, + ) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..626d44dbe --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +import json +import logging +import re +import sys + +from crewai_tools.adapters.tool_collection import ToolCollection + +from github_agent.agents import GithubAgents +from github_agent.config import Settings, settings +from github_agent.data_types import GithubQueryInfo +from github_agent.event import Event + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +logging.basicConfig(level=settings.LOG_LEVEL, stream=sys.stdout, format="%(levelname)s: %(message)s") + + +def _parse_prereq_from_raw(raw: str) -> GithubQueryInfo: + """Parse GithubQueryInfo from raw LLM text when instructor/pydantic parsing fails. + + Some Ollama models don't produce structured tool calls that crewai's instructor + integration expects. This fallback extracts JSON from the raw text output. + """ + # Only matches flat JSON (no nested braces). Sufficient for the current + # GithubQueryInfo schema; revisit if the model gains nested fields. + json_match = re.search(r"\{[^{}]*\}", raw) + if json_match: + try: + data = json.loads(json_match.group()) + return GithubQueryInfo(**data) + except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError): + pass + + logger.warning("Could not parse prereq JSON from raw output: %s", raw) + return GithubQueryInfo() + + +class GithubAgent: + def __init__( + self, + config: Settings, + eventer: Event = None, + mcp_toolkit: ToolCollection = None, + logger=None, + ): + self.agents = GithubAgents(config, mcp_toolkit) + self.eventer = eventer + self.logger = logger or logging.getLogger(__name__) + + async def _send_event(self, message: str, final: bool = False): + logger.info(message) + if self.eventer: + await self.eventer.emit_event(message, final) + else: + logger.warning("No event handler registered") + + def extract_user_input(self, body): + content = body[-1]["content"] + latest_content = "" + + if isinstance(content, str): + latest_content = content + else: + for item in content: + if item["type"] == "text": + latest_content += item["text"] + else: + self.logger.warning(f"Ignoring content with type {item['type']}") + + return latest_content + + async def _get_prereq_output(self, query: str) -> GithubQueryInfo: + """Run the prereq crew and extract GithubQueryInfo from raw text output. + + We avoid using crewai's output_pydantic because it relies on instructor's + tool-call-based parsing, which fails with Ollama models that don't produce + structured tool calls. Instead, we ask the LLM for JSON and parse it ourselves. + """ + try: + await self.agents.prereq_id_crew.kickoff_async( + inputs={"request": query, "repo": "", "owner": "", "ref": "", "path": "", "numbers": []} + ) + raw = self.agents.prereq_identifier_task.output.raw + self.logger.info(f"Prereq raw output: {raw}") + return _parse_prereq_from_raw(raw) + except Exception as e: + self.logger.warning(f"Prereq crew failed: {e}") + return GithubQueryInfo() + + async def execute(self, user_input): + query = self.extract_user_input(user_input) + await self._send_event("Evaluating requirements...") + prereq = await self._get_prereq_output(query) + + # Validation gates — return helpful message without tool call when unmet + if prereq.numbers: + if not prereq.owner or not prereq.repo: + return "When supplying issue or PR numbers, you must provide both a repository name and owner." + if prereq.repo: + if not prereq.owner: + return "When supplying a repository name, you must also provide an owner of the repo." + + await self._send_event("Searching GitHub...") + await self.agents.crew.kickoff_async( + inputs={ + "request": query, + "owner": prereq.owner, + "repo": prereq.repo, + "ref": prereq.ref, + "path": prereq.path, + "numbers": prereq.numbers, + } + ) + return self.agents.github_query_task.output.raw diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/prompts.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/prompts.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88dca7925 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/prompts.py @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +TOOL_CALL_PROMPT = """ +You are a GitHub operations analyst with access to MCP tools that can read and write GitHub repositories, issues, and pull requests. +You will receive instructions in the following format: + User query: The original query/instruction from the user + Repository owner: The github owner they are referring to, if present + Repository name: The github repo they are referring to, if present + Branch/tag/sha: The git ref they are referring to, if present + File path: The file path they are referring to, if present + Issue/PR numbers: Any issue or PR numbers they are referring to, if present + +YOUR JOB +1. Decide whether the user's request can be fulfilled with a tool from the catalog. +2. When a tool is required, emit **only** a single tool call in the exact format below. +3. Use the exact owner, repo, ref, path, and numbers as written by the user as input to the tools, without modification. +4. After tool results arrive, produce the final answer grounded strictly in those results. + +## *MODES* +──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +⚙️ TOOL CALL PHASE + +- If a tool is required, you MUST output EXACTLY the following four lines in this order: + 1) Thought: <one short sentence> + 2) Action: <tool name> + 3) Action Input: <a single-line JSON object with only the schema's keys/values> + 4) Observation: <leave blank – this will be filled by the system> + +- After the Observation is provided by the system, output: + Thought: I now know the final answer + Final Answer: <answer grounded ONLY in the tool output> + +STRICT RULES FOR TOOL CALLS +- Output NOTHING except those exact lines when calling a tool. No code fences, no XML, no extra braces. +- The JSON after "Action Input:" MUST be valid and single-line. No trailing commas, no extra closing braces. +- Use ONLY properties defined in the tool schema (required + optional). Exact key names and value types. +- Use only one tool per call. +- Always copy owner/organization names, repository names, file paths, ref names, and issue/PR numbers exactly as provided by the user or upstream context. Do not truncate, split, normalize, or otherwise modify these identifiers. +- When a tool call succeeds, do not immediately call another tool just to reformat or summarize the same results. + +CORRECT EXAMPLE +Thought: The user provided owner and repo; list_issues fits. +Action: list_issues +Action Input: {"owner":"kagenti","repo":"kagenti"} +Observation: + +──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +🧩 FINAL ANSWER PHASE + +After tool results arrive: +- Synthesize the returned data to produce a human-readable answer grounded only in the tool output. +- Summarize or aggregate long lists instead of echoing raw JSON. +- Clearly cite or reference the tool results. +- If a tool failed or inputs were missing, say so explicitly. + + Thought: I now know the final answer + Final Answer: <answer grounded ONLY in the tool output> + +──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES + +Choose the right tool based on the user's intent: + +**SOURCE OPERATIONS** (files, branches, commits, code) +- `get_file_contents` — retrieve the content of a file at an optional ref; requires owner, repo, path +- `list_branches` — list branches; requires owner, repo +- `get_commit` — get details of a specific commit; requires owner, repo, sha +- `list_commits` — list commits on a branch; requires owner, repo; optional ref +- `search_code` — search for code across repositories; use when no specific repo is given or searching across repos +- `create_or_update_file` — create or update a file; requires owner, repo, path, message, content +- `delete_file` — delete a file; requires owner, repo, path, message, sha +- `push_files` — push multiple files in one commit; requires owner, repo, branch, files, message +- `create_branch` — create a new branch; requires owner, repo, branch name + +**ISSUE & PR OPERATIONS** (issues, pull requests, comments) +- `issue_read` — get details of a specific issue; requires owner, repo, issue_number +- `list_issues` — list issues; requires owner and repo; optional state, labels, etc. +- `search_issues` — search issues across repos or within a repo; use when no specific repo is given +- `list_issue_types` — enumerate available issue types for an organization; requires org +- `pull_request_read` — get details of a specific PR; requires owner, repo, pull_number +- `list_pull_requests` — list PRs in a repo; requires owner and repo +- `issue_write` — create or update an issue; requires owner, repo +- `add_issue_comment` — add a comment to an issue; requires owner, repo, issue_number, body +- `sub_issue_write` — create or update a sub-issue; requires owner, repo, issue_number +- `create_pull_request` — create a pull request; requires owner, repo, title, head, base +- `update_pull_request` — update an existing PR; requires owner, repo, pull_number + +Decision rules: +- For source content: use `get_file_contents` when path is given, `list_branches` for branches, `search_code` for broad code search. +- For issues: prefer `list_issues` when owner+repo are known; use `search_issues` for broad searches. +- For PRs: prefer `list_pull_requests` when owner+repo are known; use `pull_request_read` when PR number is given. +- Never infer missing identifiers. +- Never call a tool when you do not have all required parameters. +- When owner/repo/ref/path/issue identifiers are provided, reuse them verbatim. + +Examples: +- "Show README of kagenti/kagenti" → get_file_contents (owner=kagenti, repo=kagenti, path=README.md) +- "List branches of owner/repo" → list_branches +- "Open issues in kagenti/agent-examples" → list_issues +- "Find issues mentioning timeout across all repos" → search_issues +- "Sub-issues under #134 in openai/triton" → sub_issue_write / issue_read with issue_number +- "PR #42 in owner/repo" → pull_request_read + +Carefully inspect the user's request for filters such as labels, date ranges, keywords, state (open/closed), etc. Use available optional parameters where appropriate. +""" + +INFO_PARSER_PROMPT = """ +You are an analyst that will extract out information from a user's instruction/query to determine the following information, if it exists: +- Github owner or organization +- Github repository +- Branch, tag, or sha (ref) if explicitly named +- File path if explicitly named +- Issue or PR number(s) + +Extraction Rules: +- Copy owner/organization names, repository names, ref names, file paths, and issue/PR identifiers exactly as the user typed them. Preserve casing, punctuation, spacing, diacritics, and hyphenation; never rewrite, normalize, or translate these strings. +- Only return values that are explicitly present in the user request. If any item is missing, output None for that field. +- Do not infer or guess missing identifiers. If you are unsure about any value, leave it as None. + +Output format: a JSON object with keys "owner", "repo", "ref", "path", "numbers". +Example: {"owner": "kagenti", "repo": "kagenti", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null} + +Examples: +- "summarize open issues across the foo organization" → {"owner": "foo", "repo": null, "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null} +- "kagenti/agent-examples" → {"owner": "kagenti", "repo": "agent-examples", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null} +- "Show README of kagenti/kagenti on branch main" → {"owner": "kagenti", "repo": "kagenti", "ref": "main", "path": "README.md", "numbers": null} +- "How long has issue 2 in modelcontextprotocol/servers been open?" → {"owner": "modelcontextprotocol", "repo": "servers", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": [2]} +- "Review PR #87 for CoolOrg/Next-Gen-Repo" → {"owner": "CoolOrg", "repo": "Next-Gen-Repo", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": [87]} +""" diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/tools.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/tools.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..db8c0b7f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/tools.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +import logging + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +# Module constants grouped by skill/scope per spec §5: +SOURCE_READ = ["get_file_contents", "list_branches", "get_commit", "list_commits", "search_code"] +SOURCE_WRITE = ["create_or_update_file", "delete_file", "push_files", "create_branch"] +ISSUE_READ = ["issue_read", "list_issues", "search_issues", "list_issue_types", + "pull_request_read", "list_pull_requests"] +ISSUE_WRITE = ["issue_write", "add_issue_comment", "sub_issue_write", + "create_pull_request", "update_pull_request"] +DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS = SOURCE_READ + SOURCE_WRITE + ISSUE_READ + ISSUE_WRITE + +# Named-but-excluded (documented; re-enable via ENABLED_TOOLS): +EXCLUDED = ["get_me", "get_team_members", "get_teams", "run_secret_scanning", + "create_repository", "fork_repository", "list_tags", "get_tag", "get_label"] + + +def enabled_tool_names(settings) -> list[str]: + """Return the list of enabled tool names from settings or the default curated list.""" + if settings.ENABLED_TOOLS: + return [name.strip() for name in settings.ENABLED_TOOLS.split(",")] + return DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS + + +def select_enabled_tools(mcp_tools, settings) -> list: + """Filter mcp_tools keeping only items whose .name is in the enabled set. + + Logs dropped tool names at DEBUG level. + Caller raises RuntimeError if the result is empty — not this function's job. + """ + allowed = set(enabled_tool_names(settings)) + kept = [] + dropped = [] + for tool in mcp_tools: + if tool.name in allowed: + kept.append(tool) + else: + dropped.append(tool.name) + if dropped: + logger.debug("Dropping MCP tools not in enabled set: %s", dropped) + return kept diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a80335b32 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# Demo-specific ConfigMap overrides for GitHub Issue Agent + AuthBridge +# +# The Kagenti installer already creates correct defaults for authbridge-config, +# spiffe-helper-config, and envoy-config (with the kagenti realm). This file +# overrides: +# - authbridge-config: Keycloak connection, inbound validation, and outbound exchange settings +# - authproxy-routes: per-target token exchange routes +# +# Authbridge defaults to "passthrough" for outbound traffic, meaning +# requests to unknown hosts (LLM APIs, telemetry, etc.) pass through without +# token exchange. Only hosts listed in authproxy-routes get token exchange. +# +# Usage: +# kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml +# +# Note: These manifests default to namespace "team1". If you deploy to a different +# namespace, update the metadata.namespace accordingly. + +--- +# authbridge-config ConfigMap - Unified config for both client-registration and envoy-proxy +# +# This ConfigMap controls: +# 1. Client registration: KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM for Keycloak client setup +# 2. INBOUND validation: Validates JWT tokens on incoming requests to the agent +# 3. OUTBOUND exchange: Exchanges tokens when the agent calls the GitHub tool +# +# KEYCLOAK_URL and KEYCLOAK_REALM match the installer defaults (kagenti realm) +# and are included because kubectl apply replaces the entire ConfigMap. +# TOKEN_URL and ISSUER are auto-derived from KEYCLOAK_URL + KEYCLOAK_REALM. +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: authbridge-config + namespace: team1 +data: + KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" + # TOKEN_URL: Auto-derived from KEYCLOAK_URL + KEYCLOAK_REALM. Only set explicitly + # when the token endpoint differs from the standard Keycloak path. + # TOKEN_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token" + # ISSUER: Set explicitly because the internal KEYCLOAK_URL differs from the frontend URL. + ISSUER: "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/realms/kagenti" + # Audience validation is automatic — uses CLIENT_ID from /shared/client-id.txt + # (written by client-registration or operator). No manual configuration needed. + +--- +# authproxy-routes ConfigMap - Per-target token exchange routes +# +# Defines which outbound hosts should get token exchange. All other hosts +# pass through unchanged (the default outbound policy is "passthrough"). +# This allows the agent to call LLM APIs, telemetry endpoints, and other +# services without interference from the token exchange proxy. +# +# Update the host pattern if the github-tool service name or namespace changes. +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: authproxy-routes + namespace: team1 +data: + routes.yaml: | + - host: "github-tool-mcp" + target_audience: "github-tool" + token_scopes: "openid github-tool-aud github-full-access" diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..58488e02e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +# GitHub Agent Deployment with AuthBridge +# +# This deployment uses the kagenti-operator webhook to automatically inject +# a single combined AuthBridge sidecar (post-kagenti-extensions#411). The exact +# container shape depends on the resolved AuthBridge mode: +# - proxy-sidecar (default): one container "authbridge-proxy" from the +# "authbridge" image. spiffe-helper is bundled inside; gated per-workload +# by SPIRE_ENABLED. +# - envoy-sidecar: a "proxy-init" init container (iptables) plus one +# container "envoy-proxy" from the "authbridge-envoy" image (Envoy + +# ext_proc + bundled spiffe-helper). +# Either way the sidecar handles inbound JWT validation, outbound token +# exchange (HTTP), and HTTPS passthrough. +# +# Keycloak client registration is operator-managed (no in-pod sidecar); +# the operator creates a kagenti-keycloak-client-credentials-<hash> Secret +# and the webhook mounts it at /shared/client-{id,secret}.txt. +# +# The agent container: +# - Runs the A2A GitHub Agent on port 8000 +# - Calls the GitHub MCP tool via HTTP (MCP_URL below) +# - Token exchange to the tool is handled transparently by the AuthBridge sidecar +# +# Labels (on Pod template): +# kagenti.io/inject: enabled - Enables AuthBridge sidecar injection +# kagenti.io/spire: enabled - Enables SPIRE-based identity (set to "disabled" if no SPIRE) +# +# kagenti.io/type is applied automatically by the operator when the +# AgentRuntime CR (at the end of this file) is created. +# +# Prerequisites (NOT created by this file — must exist before applying): +# 1. github-tool Deployment + Service named "github-tool-mcp" (the MCP tool server) +# 2. github-tool-secrets Secret (GitHub token used by the tool) +# 3. authbridge-config ConfigMap (apply configmaps.yaml first) +# 4. authproxy-routes ConfigMap (apply configmaps.yaml first) +# +# Invariant: MCP_URL host ("github-tool-mcp") == authproxy-routes host entry +# ("github-tool-mcp") == the Kubernetes Service name for the tool server. +# All three must match or token exchange will not fire for tool calls. +# +# Usage: +# kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml +# kubectl apply -f github-agent-deployment.yaml + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ServiceAccount +metadata: + name: github-agent + namespace: team1 + +--- +apiVersion: apps/v1 +kind: Deployment +metadata: + name: github-agent + namespace: team1 + labels: + app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent +spec: + replicas: 1 + selector: + matchLabels: + app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent + template: + metadata: + labels: + app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent + kagenti.io/inject: enabled + kagenti.io/spire: enabled + spec: + serviceAccountName: github-agent + containers: + - name: agent + image: github-agent:latest + imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent + ports: + - containerPort: 8000 + name: http + env: + # LLM configuration - Ollama (local LLM) + # Matches upstream .env.ollama from agent-examples repo + - name: TASK_MODEL_ID + value: "ollama/ibm/granite4:latest" + # Ollama API base URL. Required by litellm (used by crewai >=1.10). + # For Docker Desktop / Kind: http://host.docker.internal:11434 + # For in-cluster Ollama: http://ollama.ollama.svc:11434 + - name: LLM_API_BASE + value: "http://host.docker.internal:11434" + - name: OLLAMA_API_BASE + value: "http://host.docker.internal:11434" + - name: LLM_API_KEY + value: "ollama" + - name: MODEL_TEMPERATURE + value: "0" + # For OpenAI (uncomment and set your key): + # - name: TASK_MODEL_ID + # value: "gpt-4.1-nano" + # - name: LLM_API_KEY + # valueFrom: + # secretKeyRef: + # name: openai-secret + # key: apikey + # - name: OPENAI_API_KEY + # valueFrom: + # secretKeyRef: + # name: openai-secret + # key: apikey + + # Agent service settings + # PORT tells the agent where to listen for A2A traffic. + # The kagenti operator may override this via proxy-sidecar + # port-stealing to relocate the agent to a free port. + - name: PORT + value: "8000" + - name: LOG_LEVEL + value: "DEBUG" + + # MCP Tool endpoint - the GitHub tool service + # AuthBridge will exchange the token when the agent calls this URL. + # This hostname MUST match the authproxy-routes host entry and the + # Kubernetes Service name for the tool (see invariant in header above). + - name: MCP_URL + value: "http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp" + + # JWKS URI for validating incoming tokens from Keycloak + - name: JWKS_URI + value: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs" + resources: + limits: + cpu: 500m + memory: 512Mi + requests: + cpu: 100m + memory: 128Mi + volumeMounts: + - name: shared-data + mountPath: /shared + volumes: + - name: shared-data + emptyDir: {} + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: github-agent + namespace: team1 +spec: + selector: + app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent + ports: + - port: 8080 + targetPort: 8000 + protocol: TCP + type: ClusterIP + +--- +# AgentRuntime triggers operator-managed Keycloak client registration +# (creates kagenti-keycloak-client-credentials-<hash> Secret with +# client-id.txt and client-secret.txt that the authbridge sidecar +# mounts at /shared/). The operator also applies kagenti.io/type=agent +# to the Deployment and Pod template, enabling webhook sidecar injection. +apiVersion: agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1 +kind: AgentRuntime +metadata: + name: github-agent + namespace: team1 +spec: + type: agent + targetRef: + apiVersion: apps/v1 + kind: Deployment + name: github-agent diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f4cfd353f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +[project] +name = "github-agent" +version = "0.1.0" +requires-python = ">=3.11,<3.13" +description = "Github Agent module" +dependencies = [ + "python-dotenv>=1.2.2", + "a2a-sdk>=1.1.0,<2", + # We use 1.6.1 instead of the latest because + # crewai requires openai>=2.30.0 + # but litellm requires openai==2.24.0 + "crewai[litellm]>=1.6.1", + "litellm>=1.90.2", # Indirect, prevents CVE-2026-42271 + "crewai-tools[mcp]>=1.6.1", + "urllib3>=2.7.0", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2025-66418 + "python-multipart>=0.0.32", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-24486 + "cryptography>=48.0.0,<49", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-26007 + "pyasn1>=0.6.3", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-30922 + "starlette>=1.3.1", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2025-62727 + "pillow>=12.3.0", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-40192 + "lxml>=6.1.1", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-41066 + "orjson>=3.11.6", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2025-67221 + # CVE-2026-45829 (chromadb): no fixed version published; crewai pins chromadb<1.2. + # Vulnerability requires running a chromadb HTTP server with trust_remote_code=true, + # which this agent does not do. +] + +[tool.ruff] +line-length = 120 +target-version = "py311" + +[project.scripts] +server = "a2a_agent:run" + +[build-system] +requires = ["hatchling"] +build-backend = "hatchling.build" + +[dependency-groups] +dev = [ + "pytest>=9.1.1", +] + +[tool.pytest.ini_options] +testpaths = ["test"] diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_agent_card.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_agent_card.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eb90f1cf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_agent_card.py @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +import os +import json +import pytest +from starlette.testclient import TestClient +from starlette.applications import Starlette +from a2a.server.routes import create_agent_card_routes + +from a2a_agent import get_agent_card + + +@pytest.fixture +def card(): + return get_agent_card("localhost", 8000) + + +def test_card_name_and_version(card): + assert card.name == "Github agent" + assert card.version == "1.0.0" + + +def test_card_description(card): + assert card.description == ( + "Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an issue tracker. " + "It inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates issues and their threads." + ) + + +def test_card_two_skills(card): + assert len(card.skills) == 2 + skill_ids = {s.id for s in card.skills} + assert skill_ids == {"source_operations", "issue_operations"} + + +def test_skill_tags_and_examples(card): + skills_by_id = {s.id: s for s in card.skills} + + source = skills_by_id["source_operations"] + assert "github" in source.tags + assert len(source.examples) >= 1 + + issue = skills_by_id["issue_operations"] + assert "github" in issue.tags + assert len(issue.examples) >= 1 + + +def test_bearer_security_scheme(card): + assert "Bearer" in card.security_schemes + assert card.security_schemes["Bearer"].http_auth_security_scheme.scheme == "bearer" + + +def test_agent_interface_jsonrpc(card): + assert card.supported_interfaces[0].protocol_binding == "JSONRPC" + + +def test_agent_endpoint_override(): + import a2a_agent + + original = a2a_agent.settings.AGENT_ENDPOINT + a2a_agent.settings.AGENT_ENDPOINT = "http://custom.host:9999" + try: + card = get_agent_card("localhost", 8000) + assert card.supported_interfaces[0].url == "http://custom.host:9999/" + finally: + a2a_agent.settings.AGENT_ENDPOINT = original + + +def test_capabilities_streaming(card): + assert card.capabilities.streaming is True + + +def test_input_output_modes(card): + assert list(card.default_input_modes) == ["text"] + assert list(card.default_output_modes) == ["text"] + + +def test_well_known_agent_card_route(card): + routes = create_agent_card_routes(card) + app = Starlette(routes=routes) + client = TestClient(app) + response = client.get("/.well-known/agent-card.json") + assert response.status_code == 200 + data = response.json() + assert data["name"] == "Github agent" + assert len(data["skills"]) == 2 + + +def test_well_known_agent_json_route(card): + routes = create_agent_card_routes(card, card_url="/.well-known/agent.json") + app = Starlette(routes=routes) + client = TestClient(app) + response = client.get("/.well-known/agent.json") + assert response.status_code == 200 + data = response.json() + assert data["name"] == "Github agent" + assert len(data["skills"]) == 2 diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_prereq.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_prereq.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a152b2936 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_prereq.py @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +import pytest +from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock + +from github_agent.data_types import GithubQueryInfo +from github_agent.main import GithubAgent, _parse_prereq_from_raw +from github_agent.config import Settings + + +def make_agent(prereq_raw="", researcher_raw="done"): + config = Settings() # type: ignore + agent = GithubAgent(config=config) + agent.agents.prereq_identifier_task = MagicMock() + agent.agents.prereq_identifier_task.output = MagicMock(raw=prereq_raw) + agent.agents.prereq_id_crew = MagicMock() + agent.agents.prereq_id_crew.kickoff_async = AsyncMock(return_value=None) + agent.agents.github_query_task = MagicMock() + agent.agents.github_query_task.output = MagicMock(raw=researcher_raw) + agent.agents.crew = MagicMock() + agent.agents.crew.kickoff_async = AsyncMock(return_value=None) + return agent + + +def test_github_query_info_parses_flat_json(): + info = GithubQueryInfo(owner="kagenti", repo="my-repo", ref="main", path="README.md", numbers=[1, 2]) + assert info.owner == "kagenti" + assert info.repo == "my-repo" + assert info.ref == "main" + assert info.path == "README.md" + assert info.numbers == [1, 2] + + +def test_numbers_string_coercion(): + info = GithubQueryInfo(numbers="[1, 2]") + assert info.numbers == [1, 2] + + +def test_parse_prereq_from_raw_valid_json(): + raw = '{"owner": "foo", "repo": "bar", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null}' + result = _parse_prereq_from_raw(raw) + assert result.owner == "foo" + assert result.repo == "bar" + assert result.ref is None + assert result.numbers is None + + +def test_parse_prereq_from_raw_unparseable(): + result = _parse_prereq_from_raw("not json at all") + assert result.owner is None + assert result.repo is None + assert result.ref is None + assert result.path is None + assert result.numbers is None + + +@pytest.mark.anyio +async def test_gate_numbers_without_owner_repo(): + prereq_raw = '{"owner": null, "repo": null, "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": [42]}' + agent = make_agent(prereq_raw=prereq_raw) + result = await agent.execute([{"role": "User", "content": "Issue 42"}]) + assert "must provide both" in result.lower() + agent.agents.crew.kickoff_async.assert_not_called() + + +@pytest.mark.anyio +async def test_gate_repo_without_owner(): + prereq_raw = '{"owner": null, "repo": "myrepo", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null}' + agent = make_agent(prereq_raw=prereq_raw) + result = await agent.execute([{"role": "User", "content": "list issues in myrepo"}]) + assert "must also provide an owner" in result.lower() + agent.agents.crew.kickoff_async.assert_not_called() + + +@pytest.mark.anyio +async def test_happy_path_researcher_called(): + prereq_raw = '{"owner": "kagenti", "repo": "myrepo", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null}' + agent = make_agent(prereq_raw=prereq_raw, researcher_raw="done") + result = await agent.execute([{"role": "User", "content": "list issues in kagenti/myrepo"}]) + agent.agents.crew.kickoff_async.assert_called_once() + assert result == "done" + + +@pytest.mark.anyio +async def test_happy_path_researcher_inputs(): + prereq_raw = '{"owner": "kagenti", "repo": "myrepo", "ref": null, "path": null, "numbers": null}' + agent = make_agent(prereq_raw=prereq_raw) + await agent.execute([{"role": "User", "content": "list issues in kagenti/myrepo"}]) + call_kwargs = agent.agents.crew.kickoff_async.call_args + inputs = call_kwargs.kwargs.get("inputs") or call_kwargs.args[0] if call_kwargs.args else {} + if not inputs: + inputs = call_kwargs[1].get("inputs", {}) + assert inputs.get("owner") == "kagenti" + assert inputs.get("repo") == "myrepo" diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_tools.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_tools.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc42f2172 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test/test_tools.py @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +import pytest +from github_agent.tools import ( + DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS, + EXCLUDED, + SOURCE_READ, + SOURCE_WRITE, + ISSUE_READ, + ISSUE_WRITE, + enabled_tool_names, + select_enabled_tools, +) + +# Extra tool names that appear in the full 44-tool github-tool catalog but are not in the +# enabled set — used to build a representative stub list of the expected catalog size. +_EXTRA_CATALOG_TOOLS = [ + "get_me", "get_team_members", "get_teams", "run_secret_scanning", + "create_repository", "fork_repository", "list_tags", "get_tag", "get_label", + "create_release", "list_releases", "get_release", "get_repository", + "list_repositories", "watch_repository", "unwatch_repository", + "get_file_metadata", "list_directory", "get_tree", + "create_gist", "list_gists", + "get_discussion", "list_discussions", +] + + +class FakeTool: + def __init__(self, name): + self.name = name + + +class FakeSettings: + def __init__(self, enabled_tools=None): + self.ENABLED_TOOLS = enabled_tools + + +def test_select_keeps_enabled_tools(): + all_tools = [FakeTool(n) for n in DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS + EXCLUDED] + settings = FakeSettings() + result = select_enabled_tools(all_tools, settings) + result_names = {t.name for t in result} + for name in DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS: + assert name in result_names, f"{name} should be in result" + for name in EXCLUDED: + assert name not in result_names, f"{name} should not be in result" + + +def test_select_with_override(): + all_tools = [FakeTool(n) for n in DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS + EXCLUDED] + settings = FakeSettings(enabled_tools="issue_read,list_issues") + result = select_enabled_tools(all_tools, settings) + result_names = [t.name for t in result] + assert result_names == ["issue_read", "list_issues"] + + +def test_whitespace_tolerance(): + all_tools = [FakeTool(n) for n in DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS + EXCLUDED] + settings = FakeSettings(enabled_tools=" issue_read , list_issues ") + result = select_enabled_tools(all_tools, settings) + result_names = [t.name for t in result] + assert result_names == ["issue_read", "list_issues"] + + +def test_default_tools_no_duplicates(): + assert len(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS) == len(set(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS)) + + +def test_default_tools_union_of_groups(): + assert set(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS) == set(SOURCE_READ + SOURCE_WRITE + ISSUE_READ + ISSUE_WRITE) + + +def test_source_vs_issue_membership(): + default_set = set(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS) + for name in SOURCE_READ: + assert name in default_set + for name in SOURCE_WRITE: + assert name in default_set + for name in ISSUE_READ: + assert name in default_set + for name in ISSUE_WRITE: + assert name in default_set + + +def test_excluded_tools_absent_by_default(): + default_set = set(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS) + for name in EXCLUDED: + assert name not in default_set, f"{name} should not appear in DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS" + + +def test_stub_44_tool_catalog_filtered_to_default(): + """Simulate the full github-tool catalog (~44 tools); default set filters it to exactly DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS.""" + catalog = DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS + _EXTRA_CATALOG_TOOLS + # Pad to 44 entries if the catalog is shorter (adds unused dummy names) + while len(catalog) < 44: + catalog = catalog + [f"_dummy_{len(catalog)}"] + tools = [FakeTool(n) for n in catalog[:44]] + result = select_enabled_tools(tools, FakeSettings()) + result_names = {t.name for t in result} + assert result_names == set(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS) + assert len(result) == len(DEFAULT_ENABLED_TOOLS) + + +def test_executor_raises_runtime_error_on_empty_selection(): + """GithubExecutor raises RuntimeError when select_enabled_tools returns an empty list.""" + from a2a_agent import GithubExecutor + import inspect + + # Verify the RuntimeError guard is present in the execute source + src = inspect.getsource(GithubExecutor.execute) + assert "RuntimeError" in src + assert "tools found" in src.lower() or "enabled tools" in src.lower() diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test_startup.exp b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test_startup.exp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..881ef4a5c --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/test_startup.exp @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# This script tests if the server has dependencies and reaches the point of starting its server. + +# Run with `expect -f test_startup.exp` + +set timeout 120 + +# This is similar to the Dockerfile CMD +set child_pid [spawn env HOST=localhost PORT=8001 uv run --locked server] + +expect { + "Uvicorn running on" { + # Unlike the other servers, this one opens a child process. + # Without the explicit `pkill -P` it would leave a `uv` 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[`../../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json`](../../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json) - Reference agent: `agent-examples/a2a/git_issue_agent/` - Reference deployment: `kagenti-extensions/authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/` +- **Sibling tool spec (UC-1 onboarding fixture):** [`github-tool.md`](github-tool.md) — a simplified + 4-tool stub (`source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) deployed as Service + `github-tool`. **This is not the tool this agent connects to.** The agent connects to the production + 44-tool server at `github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`. Both coexist in namespace `team1` under different + Service names. --- @@ -209,9 +214,11 @@ Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the gith target_audience: "github-tool" token_scopes: "openid github-tool-aud github-full-access" ``` -- **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** the existing `github-tool` Deployment/Service - (`authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`) + `github-tool-secrets`, a running - Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`). +- **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** the existing **production** `github-tool` Deployment/Service + (`authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`, Service name `github-tool-mcp`) + + `github-tool-secrets`, a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`). + The sibling UC-1 stub at `demo/tools/github_tool/` (Service `github-tool`) is a separate deployment + for AIAC onboarding discovery and is **not** a runtime dependency of this agent. **Wiring invariant:** agent `MCP_URL` host (`github-tool-mcp`) == `authproxy-routes` host == tool Service name; exchanged audience (`github-tool`) == tool `AUDIENCE`. From d5d08082291654602e28f052dcfebcdf1ce644e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 12:28:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 214/273] =?UTF-8?q?Feat(aiac):=20Add=20k8s=20deployment=20?= =?UTF-8?q?manifests=20Phase=201=20=E2=80=94=20Interface=20Pod,=20Policy?= =?UTF-8?q?=20Store,=20Agent?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - pdp-interface-deployment.yaml: Kagenti Interface Pod (aiac-pdp-config + aiac-pdp-policy-opa containers), aiac-pdp-config ConfigMap, keycloak-admin-secret placeholder, two ClusterIP Services (7071, 7072) - policy-store-statefulset.yaml: aiac-policy-store StatefulSet, 1 Gi RWO PVC at /data, headless + ClusterIP Service (7074) - agent-deployment.yaml: aiac-agent Deployment with aiac-init init container, aiac-agent-config ConfigMap, ServiceAccount + ClusterRole + ClusterRoleBinding (pods/services/agentcards), aiac-agent-service ClusterIP (7070) - idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml: renamed from pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml; fixed image name (aiac-pdp-config), ConfigMap name (aiac-pdp-config), pod name - aiac-deployment-guide.md: renamed + expanded from install-pdp-config-service.md; covers full deployment (build, load, secrets, apply order, verify, redeploy) - PRD.md: manifest table updated — event-broker and rag-statefulset marked pending; split tracked in issues 4.2 (done), 4.19, 4.20 Closes issue 4.2 (Phase 1). Issues 4.19 and 4.20 track Phase 2/3. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 4 +- aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml | 107 ++++++++++ aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 197 ++++++++++++++++++ ...ml => idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml} | 18 +- aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md | 158 -------------- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 100 +++++++++ aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml | 68 ++++++ 7 files changed, 483 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md rename aiac/k8s/{pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml => idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml} (68%) delete mode 100644 aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml create mode 100644 aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index d773ceefe..59f250400 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -454,9 +454,9 @@ Four separate manifest files: |------|----------| | `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Writer container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | | `aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet (Policy Store container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` _(pending)_ | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` _(pending)_ | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7f61fe451 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-agent-config + namespace: aiac-system +data: + LLM_BASE_URL: "https://api.anthropic.com" + LLM_MODEL: "claude-sonnet-5" + AIAC_AC_MODEL: "RBAC" + +--- +# Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: +# +# kubectl create secret generic aiac-agent-secret \ +# -n aiac-system \ +# --from-literal=LLM_API_KEY=<your-api-key> +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ServiceAccount +metadata: + name: aiac-agent + namespace: aiac-system + +--- +apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 +kind: ClusterRole +metadata: + name: aiac-agent +rules: + - apiGroups: [""] + resources: ["pods"] + verbs: ["get", "list"] + - apiGroups: [""] + resources: ["services"] + verbs: ["get"] + - apiGroups: ["agent.kagenti.dev"] + resources: ["agentcards"] + verbs: ["list"] + +--- +apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 +kind: ClusterRoleBinding +metadata: + name: aiac-agent +roleRef: + apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io + kind: ClusterRole + name: aiac-agent +subjects: + - kind: ServiceAccount + name: aiac-agent + namespace: aiac-system + +--- +apiVersion: apps/v1 +kind: Deployment +metadata: + name: aiac-agent + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + replicas: 1 + selector: + matchLabels: + app: aiac-agent + template: + metadata: + labels: + app: aiac-agent + spec: + serviceAccountName: aiac-agent + initContainers: + - name: aiac-init + image: aiac-agent:latest + imagePullPolicy: Never + # Waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service + # to be healthy, then creates the aiac-events JetStream stream idempotently. + command: ["python", "-m", "aiac.agent.init"] + envFrom: + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-pdp-config + containers: + - name: aiac-agent + image: aiac-agent:latest + imagePullPolicy: Never + ports: + - containerPort: 7070 + envFrom: + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-pdp-config + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-agent-config + - secretRef: + name: aiac-agent-secret + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: aiac-agent-service + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + selector: + app: aiac-agent + ports: + - name: agent + port: 7070 + targetPort: 7070 diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..960376b0f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +# AIAC — Kubernetes Installation Guide + +This guide covers the full AIAC deployment in the `aiac-system` namespace. + +## Components deployed + +| Manifest | Contents | Port(s) | +|---|---|---| +| `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | Kagenti Interface Pod (IdP Configuration Service + PDP Policy Writer) + 2 ClusterIP Services | 7071, 7072 | +| `policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | Policy Store StatefulSet + 1 Gi PVC + headless Service + ClusterIP Service | 7074 | +| `agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (init container + AIAC Agent) + ClusterIP Service | 7070 | + +## Prerequisites + +- Kubernetes cluster with `kubectl` configured for the target cluster. +- Keycloak reachable from within the cluster (default: `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080`). +- For local Kind clusters: `kind` CLI and `docker`. + +## 1 — Build the images + +Run from the repo root (`kagenti-extensions/`): + +```bash +# IdP Configuration Service (Interface Pod container 1) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local aiac/src/ + +# PDP Policy Writer — OPA (Interface Pod container 2) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local aiac/src/ + +# Policy Store +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-policy-store:local aiac/src/ + +# AIAC Agent (also used as the init container) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-agent:local aiac/src/ +``` + +## 2 — Load images into the cluster + +**Kind (local development)** + +```bash +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local --name <cluster-name> +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local --name <cluster-name> +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-policy-store:local --name <cluster-name> +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-agent:local --name <cluster-name> +``` + +**Remote registry** — tag, push, then update the `image:` fields in the manifests to match. + +## 3 — Create the admin secret + +The Interface Pod requires a `keycloak-admin-secret` Secret. Create it once per cluster before applying the manifests: + +```bash +kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ + -n aiac-system \ + --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=<admin-user> \ + --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<admin-password> +``` + +> `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` contains placeholder credentials for reference only. +> For any non-local environment, create the secret manually and remove the `stringData` block. + +## 4 — Configure the environment + +Edit the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` to match your environment: + +| Key | Default | Used by | +|-----|---------|---------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | `kagenti` | PDP Policy Writer | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | `master` | IdP Configuration Service | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | Agent | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | Agent | +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | Agent | +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | `/data/state.db` | Policy Store | +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | Agent | +| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7073` | Agent | +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | Agent | + +## 5 — Deploy + +Apply in dependency order: + +```bash +# 1. Interface Pod — creates the namespace, ConfigMap, Secret, and ClusterIP Services +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml + +# 2. Policy Store — needs the aiac-system namespace +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml + +# 3. Agent — init container waits for Interface Pod + Policy Store to be healthy +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml +``` + +Wait for all pods to be ready: + +```bash +kubectl wait deployment/aiac-interface -n aiac-system --for=condition=Available --timeout=120s +kubectl wait statefulset/aiac-policy-store -n aiac-system --for=jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}'=1 --timeout=120s +kubectl wait deployment/aiac-agent -n aiac-system --for=condition=Available --timeout=120s +``` + +## 6 — Verify + +Port-forward each service and check its health endpoint: + +```bash +# IdP Configuration Service +kubectl port-forward svc/aiac-pdp-config-service 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & +curl http://localhost:7071/health +# {"status":"ok"} + +# PDP Policy Writer +kubectl port-forward svc/aiac-pdp-policy-service 7072:7072 -n aiac-system & +curl http://localhost:7072/health +# {"status":"ok"} + +# Policy Store +kubectl port-forward svc/aiac-policy-store-service 7074:7074 -n aiac-system & +curl http://localhost:7074/health +# {"status":"ok"} + +# AIAC Agent +kubectl port-forward svc/aiac-agent-service 7070:7070 -n aiac-system & +curl http://localhost:7070/health +# {"status":"ok"} + +pkill -f "port-forward" +``` + +Run the IdP data smoke test: + +```bash +kubectl port-forward svc/aiac-pdp-config-service 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & +cd aiac +.venv/bin/python test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py +pkill -f "port-forward.*7071" +``` + +## Redeploying after a code change + +```bash +# Rebuild the changed image, e.g. IdP Configuration Service: +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local aiac/src/ +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local --name <cluster-name> + +# Restart the affected deployment: +kubectl rollout restart deployment/aiac-interface -n aiac-system +``` + +--- + +## Isolated dev: IdP Configuration Service only + +To test the IdP Configuration Service in isolation without deploying the full stack, use the standalone dev pod manifest: + +```bash +kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml +kubectl wait pod/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod -n aiac-system \ + --for=condition=Ready --timeout=60s +``` + +See [idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml](idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml) for the minimal ConfigMap and pod spec. + +--- + +## IdP Configuration Service API reference + +All endpoints accept a `?realm=<realm>` query parameter. `/health` uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. + +| Method | Path | Description | +|--------|------|-------------| +| GET | `/subjects` | List users | +| GET | `/roles` | List realm roles | +| GET | `/services` | List clients | +| GET | `/scopes` | List client scopes | +| GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | Realm and service role mappings for a user | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | Client roles for a service | +| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | Composite roles for a realm role | +| GET | `/health` | Readiness probe — `200 ok` or `503 unavailable` | + +All list endpoints return a JSON array. `/subjects/{id}/assignments` returns: + +```json +{ + "realmMappings": [...], + "serviceMappings": { "<clientId>": { "mappings": [...] } } +} +``` + +Errors from Keycloak are returned as `502` with `{"error": "<message>"}`. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml similarity index 68% rename from aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml rename to aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml index b6dcc05b9..30a77743d 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # DEV / ISOLATED TESTING ONLY # -# This manifest deploys the PDP Configuration Service as a standalone Pod for +# This manifest deploys the IdP Configuration Service as a standalone Pod for # isolated development and testing. It does NOT reflect the production topology. # -# In production both PDP services run as containers in a single PDP Interface Pod -# defined in pdp-interface-deployment.yaml (issue 4.2). +# In production both interface services run as containers in a single Kagenti Interface Pod +# defined in pdp-interface-deployment.yaml. --- apiVersion: v1 @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ metadata: apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: - name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config + name: aiac-pdp-config namespace: aiac-system data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" @@ -43,19 +43,19 @@ stringData: apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: - name: pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod + name: idp-configuration-keycloak-pod namespace: aiac-system labels: - app: pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod + app: idp-configuration-keycloak-pod spec: containers: - - name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service - image: localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local + - name: aiac-pdp-config + image: localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7071 envFrom: - configMapRef: - name: aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config + name: aiac-pdp-config - secretRef: name: keycloak-admin-secret diff --git a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md b/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md deleted file mode 100644 index 285992022..000000000 --- a/aiac/k8s/install-pdp-config-service.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -# PDP Configuration Service — Standalone Dev Installation - -> **Dev / isolated testing only.** -> This guide deploys the PDP Configuration Service as a standalone Pod. -> It does not reflect the production topology. -> -> In production both PDP services run as containers in a single Kagenti Interface Pod -> defined in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` (issue 4.2). - -The PDP Configuration Service is a read-only FastAPI proxy over the Keycloak Admin REST API. -It exposes PDP-domain entity paths (`/subjects`, `/roles`, `/services`, `/scopes`, …) and is -consumed by the AIAC agent and library clients. - -**Port:** 7071 -**Source:** `src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/` -**Manifest:** `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` - -## Prerequisites - -- Kubernetes cluster with the `aiac-system` namespace (created by the manifest). -- Keycloak reachable from within the cluster (default: `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080`). -- `kubectl` configured for the target cluster. -- For local Kind clusters: `kind` CLI and `docker`. - -## 1 — Build the image - -```bash -cd aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak -docker build -t localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local . -``` - -## 2 — Load the image into the cluster - -**Kind (local development)** - -```bash -kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local --name <cluster-name> -``` - -**Remote registry** - -```bash -docker tag localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local <registry>/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:<tag> -docker push <registry>/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:<tag> -``` - -Update the `image:` field in `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` to match. - -## 3 — Create the admin secret - -The manifest references a `keycloak-admin-secret` Secret that must exist before the pod starts. -Create it once per cluster: - -```bash -kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ - -n aiac-system \ - --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=<admin-user> \ - --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<admin-password> -``` - -> The manifest contains placeholder credentials for reference only. For any non-local -> environment, create the secret manually as shown above and remove the `stringData` block -> from the manifest. - -## 4 — Configure the environment - -Edit the `aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config` ConfigMap in `k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml` to match your -environment: - -| Key | Default | Description | -|-----|---------|-------------| -| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | Keycloak base URL (in-cluster) | -| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | `master` | Default realm used at startup | - -## 5 — Deploy - -```bash -kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml -``` - -Expected output: - -``` -namespace/aiac-system created (or unchanged) -configmap/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-config created (or configured) -secret/keycloak-admin-secret configured -pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod created -``` - -Wait for the pod to be ready: - -```bash -kubectl wait pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod -n aiac-system \ - --for=condition=Ready --timeout=60s -``` - -## 6 — Verify - -Port-forward and hit the health endpoint: - -```bash -kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & -curl http://localhost:7071/health -# {"status":"ok"} - -# When done, kill the port-forward: -pkill -f "port-forward.*7071" -``` - -Run the full data smoke test using the project virtual environment: - -```bash -kubectl port-forward pod/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod 7071:7071 -n aiac-system & -cd aiac -.venv/bin/python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py -pkill -f "port-forward.*7071" -``` - -## Redeploying after a code change - -```bash -# 1. Rebuild -cd aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak -docker build -t localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local . - -# 2. Reload into Kind -kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-configuration-keycloak-service:local --name <cluster-name> - -# 3. Bounce the pod -kubectl delete pod pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod -n aiac-system -kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml -``` - -## API reference - -All endpoints use the realm configured via the `KEYCLOAK_REALM` environment variable. - -| Method | Path | Description | -|--------|------|-------------| -| GET | `/subjects` | List users | -| GET | `/roles` | List realm roles | -| GET | `/services` | List clients | -| GET | `/scopes` | List client scopes | -| GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | Realm and service role mappings for a user | -| GET | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | Client roles for a service | -| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | Composite roles for a realm role | -| GET | `/health` | Readiness probe — `200 ok` or `503 unavailable` | - -All list endpoints return a JSON array. `/subjects/{id}/assignments` returns: - -```json -{ - "realmMappings": [...], - "serviceMappings": { "<clientId>": { "mappings": [...] } } -} -``` - -Errors from Keycloak are returned as `502` with `{"error": "<message>"}`. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..449acbdf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-pdp-config + namespace: aiac-system +data: + KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" + AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" + AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" + AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" + AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" + NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" + AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" + AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" + +--- +# Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: +# +# kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ +# -n aiac-system \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Secret +metadata: + name: keycloak-admin-secret + namespace: aiac-system +type: Opaque +stringData: + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME: "admin" + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "admin" + +--- +apiVersion: apps/v1 +kind: Deployment +metadata: + name: aiac-interface + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + replicas: 1 + selector: + matchLabels: + app: aiac-interface + template: + metadata: + labels: + app: aiac-interface + spec: + containers: + - name: aiac-pdp-config + image: aiac-pdp-config:latest + imagePullPolicy: Never + ports: + - containerPort: 7071 + envFrom: + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-pdp-config + - secretRef: + name: keycloak-admin-secret + - name: aiac-pdp-policy-opa + image: aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest + imagePullPolicy: Never + ports: + - containerPort: 7072 + envFrom: + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-pdp-config + - secretRef: + name: keycloak-admin-secret + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: aiac-pdp-config-service + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + selector: + app: aiac-interface + ports: + - name: idp-config + port: 7071 + targetPort: 7071 + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: aiac-pdp-policy-service + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + selector: + app: aiac-interface + ports: + - name: pdp-policy + port: 7072 + targetPort: 7072 diff --git a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0b5e91acd --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +--- +apiVersion: apps/v1 +kind: StatefulSet +metadata: + name: aiac-policy-store + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + replicas: 1 + serviceName: aiac-policy-store-headless + selector: + matchLabels: + app: aiac-policy-store + template: + metadata: + labels: + app: aiac-policy-store + spec: + containers: + - name: aiac-policy-store + image: aiac-policy-store:latest + imagePullPolicy: Never + ports: + - containerPort: 7074 + envFrom: + - configMapRef: + name: aiac-pdp-config + volumeMounts: + - name: policy-store-data + mountPath: /data + volumeClaimTemplates: + - metadata: + name: policy-store-data + spec: + accessModes: + - ReadWriteOnce + resources: + requests: + storage: 1Gi + +--- +# Headless Service for StatefulSet DNS +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: aiac-policy-store-headless + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + clusterIP: None + selector: + app: aiac-policy-store + ports: + - name: policy-store + port: 7074 + targetPort: 7074 + +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Service +metadata: + name: aiac-policy-store-service + namespace: aiac-system +spec: + selector: + app: aiac-policy-store + ports: + - name: policy-store + port: 7074 + targetPort: 7074 From dd591498addcf819b44f9b5040edecf8ac875f0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 13:05:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 215/273] =?UTF-8?q?Fix(aiac):=20Phase=201=20k8s=20?= =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=20Policy=20Store=20own=20ConfigMap,=20keycloak=20PDP?= =?UTF-8?q?=20Policy=20Writer?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - policy-store-statefulset.yaml: add aiac-policy-store-config ConfigMap (AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH); switch StatefulSet envFrom from aiac-pdp-config to aiac-policy-store-config - pdp-interface-deployment.yaml: remove AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH from aiac-pdp-config (belongs to Policy Store only); swap PDP Policy Writer container from aiac-pdp-policy-opa to aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak (Phase 1 mock; Phase 2 OPA swap tracked in issue 4.18) - aiac-deployment-guide.md: update build/load commands to keycloak image; add Phase 2 OPA upgrade section - PRD.md: split aiac-pdp-config and aiac-policy-store-config ConfigMap templates; fix Policy Store mount reference; add keycloak Phase 1 build command alongside OPA Phase 2 - policy-store.md: remove stale rename-migration table; replace with canonical K8s resource names Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md | 23 ++++++++++++++--- .../requirements/components/policy-store.md | 8 +----- aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 25 +++++++++++++++---- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 5 ++-- aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml | 11 +++++++- 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md index 59f250400..e2dc5c837 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md @@ -458,17 +458,20 @@ Four separate manifest files: | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` _(pending)_ | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` _(pending)_ | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | -The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-pdp-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. +The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-policy-store-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. ### Docker images Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. ```bash -# Build IdP Configuration Service (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) +# Build IdP Configuration Service (Kagenti Interface Pod container 1) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ -# Build PDP Policy Writer — OPA implementation (deployed as a container in the Kagenti Interface Pod) +# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 mock (Kagenti Interface Pod container 2; writes Rego to filesystem) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 2 OPA (replaces mock via issue 4.18; writes to AuthorizationPolicy CR) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ # Build Policy Store (deployed as StatefulSet aiac-policy-store) @@ -497,12 +500,24 @@ data: AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" - AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" ``` +`AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` is absent — it belongs to `aiac-policy-store-config` (defined in `policy-store-statefulset.yaml`), not to the shared ConfigMap. + +### `aiac-policy-store-config` ConfigMap template + +```yaml +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-policy-store-config +data: + AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" +``` + Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before applying. --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md index b83c630c9..e73953063 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md @@ -160,10 +160,4 @@ See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library - The K8s manifests issue must create the `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet, its `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`), and a headless Service. No CRD or RBAC is needed — the service does not touch the Kubernetes API. - `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) — consistent with the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR convention. The JSON column avoids a translation layer. - `agent_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. The `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. -- **K8s rename summary:** - -| Old | New | -|-----|-----| -| `aiac-pdp-state` StatefulSet | `aiac-policy-store` | -| `aiac-pdp-state-service:7074` | `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | -| `AIAC_PDP_STATE_URL` env var (in clients) | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | +- K8s resource names: StatefulSet `aiac-policy-store`, ClusterIP Service `aiac-policy-store-service:7074`, env var `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index 960376b0f..61539f38d 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This guide covers the full AIAC deployment in the `aiac-system` namespace. | Manifest | Contents | Port(s) | |---|---|---| -| `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | Kagenti Interface Pod (IdP Configuration Service + PDP Policy Writer) + 2 ClusterIP Services | 7071, 7072 | +| `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | Kagenti Interface Pod (IdP Configuration Service + PDP Policy Writer **Phase 1 mock** `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`) + 2 ClusterIP Services | 7071, 7072 | | `policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | Policy Store StatefulSet + 1 Gi PVC + headless Service + ClusterIP Service | 7074 | | `agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (init container + AIAC Agent) + ClusterIP Service | 7070 | @@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ Run from the repo root (`kagenti-extensions/`): docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ -t localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local aiac/src/ -# PDP Policy Writer — OPA (Interface Pod container 2) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local aiac/src/ +# PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 mock (Interface Pod container 2, writes Rego to filesystem) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local aiac/src/ # Policy Store docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile \ ```bash kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local --name <cluster-name> -kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local --name <cluster-name> +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local --name <cluster-name> kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-policy-store:local --name <cluster-name> kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-agent:local --name <cluster-name> ``` @@ -156,6 +156,21 @@ kubectl rollout restart deployment/aiac-interface -n aiac-system --- +## Phase 2: Upgrading to the OPA PDP Policy Writer + +Phase 2 replaces the mock PDP Policy Writer with the OPA implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`), which writes Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. The ClusterIP Service name and port are unchanged — no Agent reconfiguration required. + +See issue [4.18 — K8s: OPA image swap + AuthorizationPolicy CR + RBAC](../inception/issues/deployment/4.18-k8s-opa-authorizationpolicy-rbac.md) for the full procedure (image swap, ServiceAccount, ClusterRole, ClusterRoleBinding, CR instance). + +```bash +# Build Phase 2 PDP Policy Writer image +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local aiac/src/ +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local --name <cluster-name> +``` + +--- + ## Isolated dev: IdP Configuration Service only To test the IdP Configuration Service in isolation without deploying the full stack, use the standalone dev pod manifest: diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml index 449acbdf1..053cc88cb 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ data: AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" - AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" @@ -60,8 +59,8 @@ spec: name: aiac-pdp-config - secretRef: name: keycloak-admin-secret - - name: aiac-pdp-policy-opa - image: aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest + - name: aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak + image: aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7072 diff --git a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml index 0b5e91acd..5fdfa80e1 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml @@ -1,3 +1,12 @@ +--- +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-policy-store-config + namespace: aiac-system +data: + AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" + --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: StatefulSet @@ -23,7 +32,7 @@ spec: - containerPort: 7074 envFrom: - configMapRef: - name: aiac-pdp-config + name: aiac-policy-store-config volumeMounts: - name: policy-store-data mountPath: /data From 84cc2ae254828bbf009582af3b33e9d5277456e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 14:00:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 216/273] fix: use localhost/...:local image names in AIAC k8s production manifests Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml | 4 ++-- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 4 ++-- aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml index 7f61fe451..6d62f8a75 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ spec: serviceAccountName: aiac-agent initContainers: - name: aiac-init - image: aiac-agent:latest + image: localhost/aiac-agent:local imagePullPolicy: Never # Waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service # to be healthy, then creates the aiac-events JetStream stream idempotently. @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ spec: name: aiac-pdp-config containers: - name: aiac-agent - image: aiac-agent:latest + image: localhost/aiac-agent:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7070 diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml index 053cc88cb..c2f5aa660 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ spec: spec: containers: - name: aiac-pdp-config - image: aiac-pdp-config:latest + image: localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7071 @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ spec: - secretRef: name: keycloak-admin-secret - name: aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak - image: aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest + image: localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7072 diff --git a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml index 5fdfa80e1..c7e2cf0ca 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ spec: spec: containers: - name: aiac-policy-store - image: aiac-policy-store:latest + image: localhost/aiac-policy-store:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7074 From 560f921d6e1c9881657c58d4ad493d7e50291d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 16:53:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 217/273] =?UTF-8?q?docs:=20reorganise=20inception/=20into?= =?UTF-8?q?=20docs/=20=E2=80=94=20specs,=20issues,=20handoffs,=20gh-issues?= =?UTF-8?q?,=20analysis?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Move all planning and specification artefacts out of inception/ into docs/: - inception/requirements/ → docs/specs/ - inception/issues/ → docs/issues/ (gitignored) - inception/handoffs/ → docs/handoffs/ (gitignored) - inception/gh-issues/ → docs/gh-issues/ (gitignored) - inception/analysis/ → docs/analysis/ Update all cross-references (markdown links, bare path strings, Python docstrings) across docs/specs/, docs/issues/, docs/handoffs/, k8s/, test/integration/, and CLAUDE.md to reflect the new paths. Remove inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md (superseded). Update .gitignore to use docs/ patterns instead of inception/. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <oblinder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder <olegb@il.ibm.com> --- aiac/.gitignore | 7 +- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 16 +- aiac/docs/analysis/discover_mcp_services.py | 41 +++ aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json | 33 +++ .../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.html | 218 ++++++++++++++++ .../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json | 238 ++++++++++++++++++ .../keycloak-access-control-analysis.md | 1 - .../specs}/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 0 .../requirements => docs/specs}/PRD.md | 2 +- .../specs}/components/aiac-agent.md | 0 .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 0 .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 4 +- .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 0 .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 0 .../specs}/components/event-broker.md | 0 .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 0 .../specs}/components/keycloak-service.md | 0 .../specs}/components/library-idp.md | 0 .../specs}/components/library-pdp-policy.md | 0 .../specs}/components/library-policy-store.md | 0 .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 0 .../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 0 .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 0 .../specs}/components/policy-model.md | 0 .../specs}/components/policy-store.md | 0 .../specs}/components/rag-ingest-service.md | 0 .../specs}/components/rag-knowledge-base.md | 0 .../specs}/demo/github-agent.md | 4 +- .../specs}/demo/github-tool.md | 0 .../event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md | 0 .../integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md | 2 +- .../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 2 +- .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 2 +- aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md | 224 ----------------- aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 2 +- 37 files changed, 552 insertions(+), 248 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/docs/analysis/discover_mcp_services.py create mode 100644 aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json create mode 100644 aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.html create mode 100644 aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json rename aiac/{inception => docs}/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md (99%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/PRD.md (99%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/aiac-agent.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md (97%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/event-broker.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/idp-configuration-service.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/keycloak-service.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/library-idp.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/library-pdp-policy.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/library-policy-store.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/policy-computation-engine.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/policy-model.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/policy-store.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/rag-ingest-service.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/components/rag-knowledge-base.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/demo/github-agent.md (99%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/demo/github-tool.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md (100%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md (98%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md (99%) rename aiac/{inception/requirements => docs/specs}/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md (99%) delete mode 100644 aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md diff --git a/aiac/.gitignore b/aiac/.gitignore index 056215a93..314fa2ad4 100644 --- a/aiac/.gitignore +++ b/aiac/.gitignore @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # AIAC working artefacts (regenerated; not source of truth) -inception/plans/ -inception/issues/ -inception/handoffs/ -inception/gh-issues/ +docs/issues/ +docs/handoffs/ +docs/gh-issues/ # PDP policy writer integration-test scratch output (test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py) test/pdp/policy/rego_out/ diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index fd20e6386..f83d5acc1 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -4,22 +4,22 @@ All paths below are relative to `kagenti-extensions/aiac/`. ## Requirements / PRD docs -`inception/requirements/PRD.md` — master PRD. -`inception/requirements/components/` — per-component specs. +`docs/specs/PRD.md` — master PRD. +`docs/specs/components/` — per-component specs. -For current file list, `ls inception/requirements/` and `ls inception/requirements/components/`. +For current file list, `ls docs/specs/` and `ls docs/specs/components/`. ## Requirements directory — link-following policy -When a document under `inception/requirements/` contains a markdown link to another file, use the AskUserQuestion tool to ask before reading it — present "Yes" and "No" as clickable options. If the user picks Yes, read the file normally. If No, treat the link as a label and continue without reading it. +When a document under `docs/specs/` contains a markdown link to another file, use the AskUserQuestion tool to ask before reading it — present "Yes" and "No" as clickable options. If the user picks Yes, read the file normally. If No, treat the link as a label and continue without reading it. ## Issue tracking -Issues are tracked as local markdown files under `inception/issues/`, not on GitHub. +Issues are tracked as local markdown files under `docs/issues/`, not on GitHub. Never use `gh` commands to create, update, or list issues — always read/write the local files directly. -`inception/issues/implementation-plan.md` — overall implementation plan. -For current issue list, `ls` the subdirectories under `inception/issues/`. +`docs/issues/implementation-plan.md` — overall implementation plan. +For current issue list, `ls` the subdirectories under `docs/issues/`. ## Issue tracking — codebase inspection policy @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ When working on an issue would benefit from inspecting the relevant source code, ## Handoffs -Per-task handoff documents live under `inception/handoffs/` — one markdown file per task, numeric-prefixed (e.g. `01-update-issues.md`, `02-update-source-and-tests.md`). When asked to generate a handoff, write it here (not a scratch/temp path). Each handoff must be self-contained — background, task, exact files, and acceptance criteria — so a fresh session can execute it without the originating conversation. +Per-task handoff documents live under `docs/handoffs/` — one markdown file per task, numeric-prefixed (e.g. `01-update-issues.md`, `02-update-source-and-tests.md`). When asked to generate a handoff, write it here (not a scratch/temp path). Each handoff must be self-contained — background, task, exact files, and acceptance criteria — so a fresh session can execute it without the originating conversation. ## Source code diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/discover_mcp_services.py b/aiac/docs/analysis/discover_mcp_services.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..172953659 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/discover_mcp_services.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +# Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +"""Discover all Kubernetes services explicitly exposed as MCP servers.""" + +from kubernetes import client, config + +# Load config: in-cluster if available, else fall back to kubeconfig +try: + config.load_incluster_config() +except config.ConfigException: + config.load_kube_config() + +v1 = client.CoreV1Api() + +# Find all Kubernetes services explicitly exposed as MCP servers. +# The label value is "" (empty string) — the selector matches on key presence. +mcp_services = v1.list_namespaced_service( + namespace="team1", + label_selector="protocol.kagenti.io/mcp", +) + +for svc in mcp_services.items: + # Build the internal ClusterIP endpoint + cluster_url = ( + f"http://{svc.metadata.name}.{svc.metadata.namespace}" + f".svc.cluster.local:{svc.spec.ports[0].port}/mcp" + ) + print(f"Discovered available tool endpoint: {cluster_url}") diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5bb546487 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +{ + "capabilities": { + "streaming": true + }, + "defaultInputModes": ["text"], + "defaultOutputModes": ["text"], + "description": "Answer queries about Github issues", + "name": "Github issue agent", + "preferredTransport": "JSONRPC", + "protocolVersion": "0.3.0", + "securitySchemes": { + "Bearer": { + "bearerFormat": "JWT", + "description": "OAuth 2.0 JWT token", + "scheme": "bearer", + "type": "http" + } + }, + "skills": [ + { + "description": "Answer queries about Github issues", + "examples": [ + "Find me the issues with the most comments in kubernetes/kubernetes", + "Show all issues assigned to me across any repository" + ], + "id": "github_issue_agent", + "name": "Github issue agent", + "tags": ["git", "github", "issues"] + } + ], + "url": "http://0.0.0.0:8000/", + "version": "1.0.0" +} diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.html b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24b795c32 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.html @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> +<meta charset="UTF-8"> +<title>GitHub MCP Tool Descriptions + + + +
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GitHub MCP Tool Descriptions

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Endpoint: http://github-tool-mcp.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp  ·  44 tools  ·  Server: MitM MCP Broker v0.0.1  ·  Upstream: api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/

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Issues 7
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ToolDescription
issue_readGet information about a specific issue in a GitHub repository.
issue_writeCreate a new or update an existing issue in a GitHub repository.
list_issuesList issues in a GitHub repository. For pagination, use the endCursor from the previous response's pageInfo in the after parameter.
add_issue_commentAdd a comment and/or reaction to a specific issue or issue comment in a GitHub repository. Use with pull requests as well (pass pull request number as issue_number), but only if the user is not asking specifically to add or react to review comments. At least one of body or reaction is required.
list_issue_fieldsList issue fields for a repository or organization. Returns field definitions including name, type (text, number, date, single_select), and for single_select fields the list of valid option names. When repo is omitted, returns org-level fields directly.
list_issue_typesList supported issue types for a repository or its owner organization. When repo is omitted, returns org-level issue types directly.
sub_issue_writeAdd a sub-issue to a parent issue in a GitHub repository.
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Pull Requests 11
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ToolDescription
pull_request_readGet information on a specific pull request in a GitHub repository.
list_pull_requestsList pull requests in a GitHub repository. If the user specifies an author, use search_pull_requests instead.
create_pull_requestCreate a new pull request in a GitHub repository.
merge_pull_requestMerge a pull request in a GitHub repository.
update_pull_requestUpdate an existing pull request in a GitHub repository.
update_pull_request_branchUpdate the branch of a pull request with the latest changes from the base branch.
pull_request_review_writeCreate, submit, or delete a pull request review. Methods: create, submit_pending, delete_pending, resolve_thread, unresolve_thread.
add_comment_to_pending_reviewAdd a review comment to the requester's latest pending pull request review. A pending review needs to already exist.
add_reply_to_pull_request_commentAdd a reply and/or reaction to an existing pull request comment. At least one of body or reaction is required.
request_copilot_reviewRequest a GitHub Copilot code review for a pull request. Use for automated feedback before requesting a human reviewer.
search_pull_requestsSearch for pull requests in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:pr.
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Repositories 4
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ToolDescription
create_repositoryCreate a new GitHub repository in your account or specified organization.
fork_repositoryFork a GitHub repository to your account or specified organization.
list_repository_collaboratorsList collaborators of a GitHub repository. Results are paginated; response includes nextPage, prevPage, firstPage, and lastPage fields.
search_repositoriesFind GitHub repositories by name, description, readme, topics, or other metadata. Perfect for discovering projects or locating specific repositories.
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Files 4
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ToolDescription
get_file_contentsGet the contents of a file or directory from a GitHub repository.
create_or_update_fileCreate or update a single file in a GitHub repository. SHA must be provided for existing file updates. Use git rev-parse <branch>:<path> to obtain the SHA before updating.
delete_fileDelete a file from a GitHub repository.
push_filesPush multiple files to a GitHub repository in a single commit.
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Branches & Tags 5
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ToolDescription
create_branchCreate a new branch in a GitHub repository.
list_branchesList branches in a GitHub repository.
list_tagsList git tags in a GitHub repository.
get_tagGet details about a specific git tag in a GitHub repository.
get_labelGet a specific label from a repository.
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Commits 3
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ToolDescription
get_commitGet details for a commit from a GitHub repository.
list_commitsGet list of commits of a branch in a GitHub repository. Returns at least 30 results per page (up to 100 with perPage parameter).
search_commitsSearch for commits across GitHub repositories using GitHub's commit search syntax. Useful for finding specific changes, authors, or messages. Searches the default branch only.
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Releases 3
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ToolDescription
get_latest_releaseGet the latest release in a GitHub repository.
get_release_by_tagGet a specific release by its tag name in a GitHub repository.
list_releasesList releases in a GitHub repository.
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Search 4
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ToolDescription
search_codeFast and precise code search across ALL GitHub repositories using GitHub's native search engine. Best for finding exact symbols, functions, classes, or specific code patterns.
search_issuesSearch for issues in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:issue.
search_pull_requestsSearch for pull requests in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:pr.
search_usersFind GitHub users by username, real name, or other profile information. Useful for locating developers, contributors, or team members.
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Teams & Users 3
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ToolDescription
get_meGet details of the authenticated GitHub user. Use when a request is about the user's own GitHub profile, or when information is missing to build other tool calls.
get_team_membersGet member usernames of a specific team in an organization. Limited to organizations accessible with current credentials.
get_teamsGet details of the teams the user is a member of. Limited to organizations accessible with current credentials.
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Security 1
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ToolDescription
run_secret_scanningScan files, content, or recent changes for secrets such as API keys, passwords, tokens, and credentials. Accepts a single string or array of strings containing raw file contents or diff hunks. Content must not be empty. Only files within the codebase should be scanned; skip files in .gitignore.
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Made with IBM Bob

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+ + diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e6f74f97 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +{ + "endpoint": "http://github-tool-mcp.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp", + "server": "MitM MCP Broker v0.0.1", + "upstream": "https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/", + "total_tools": 44, + "categories": [ + { + "category": "Issues", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "issue_read", + "description": "Get information about a specific issue in a GitHub repository." + }, + { + "name": "issue_write", + "description": "Create a new or update an existing issue in a GitHub repository." + }, + { + "name": "list_issues", + "description": "List issues in a GitHub repository. For pagination, use the 'endCursor' from the previous response's 'pageInfo' in the 'after' parameter." + }, + { + "name": "add_issue_comment", + "description": "Add a comment and/or reaction to a specific issue or issue comment in a GitHub repository. Use this tool with pull requests as well (in this case pass pull request number as issue_number), but only if user is not asking specifically to add or react to review comments. At least one of body or reaction is required." + }, + { + "name": "list_issue_fields", + "description": "List issue fields for a repository or organization. Returns field definitions including name, type (text, number, date, single_select), and for single_select fields the list of valid option names. When repo is omitted, returns org-level fields directly." + }, + { + "name": "list_issue_types", + "description": "List supported issue types for a repository or its owner organization. When repo is omitted, returns org-level issue types directly." + }, + { + "name": "sub_issue_write", + "description": "Add a sub-issue to a parent issue in a GitHub repository." + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Pull Requests", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "pull_request_read", + "description": "Get information on a specific pull request in GitHub repository." + }, + { + "name": "list_pull_requests", + "description": "List pull requests in a GitHub repository. If the user specifies an author, then DO NOT use this tool and use the search_pull_requests tool instead." + }, + { + "name": "create_pull_request", + "description": "Create a new pull request in a GitHub repository." + }, + { + "name": "merge_pull_request", + "description": "Merge a pull request in a GitHub repository." + }, + { + "name": "update_pull_request", + "description": "Update an existing pull request in a GitHub repository." + }, + { + "name": "update_pull_request_branch", + "description": "Update the branch of a pull request with the latest changes from the base branch." + }, + { + "name": "pull_request_review_write", + "description": "Create and/or submit, delete review of a pull request.\n\nAvailable methods:\n- create: Create a new review of a pull request. If \"event\" parameter is provided, the review is submitted. If \"event\" is omitted, a pending review is created.\n- submit_pending: Submit an existing pending review of a pull request. This requires that a pending review exists for the current user on the specified pull request. The \"body\" and \"event\" parameters are used when submitting the review.\n- delete_pending: Delete an existing pending review of a pull request. This requires that a pending review exists for the current user on the specified pull request.\n- resolve_thread: Resolve a review thread. Requires only \"threadId\" parameter with the thread's node ID (e.g., PRRT_kwDOxxx). The owner, repo, and pullNumber parameters are not used for this method. Resolving an already-resolved thread is a no-op.\n- unresolve_thread: Unresolve a previously resolved review thread. Requires only \"threadId\" parameter. The owner, repo, and pullNumber parameters are not used for this method. Unresolving an already-unresolved thread is a no-op." + }, + { + "name": "add_comment_to_pending_review", + "description": "Add review comment to the requester's latest pending pull request review. A pending review needs to already exist to call this (check with the user if not sure)." + }, + { + "name": "add_reply_to_pull_request_comment", + "description": "Add a reply and/or reaction to an existing pull request comment. This can create a new comment linked as a reply to the specified comment, add an emoji reaction to the specified comment, or do both. At least one of body or reaction is required." + }, + { + "name": "request_copilot_review", + "description": "Request a GitHub Copilot code review for a pull request. Use this for automated feedback on pull requests, usually before requesting a human reviewer." + }, + { + "name": "search_pull_requests", + "description": "Search for pull requests in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:pr" + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Repositories", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "create_repository", + "description": "Create a new GitHub repository in your account or specified organization" + }, + { + "name": "fork_repository", + "description": "Fork a GitHub repository to your account or specified organization" + }, + { + "name": "list_repository_collaborators", + "description": "List collaborators of a GitHub repository. Results are paginated; the response includes `nextPage`, `prevPage`, `firstPage`, and `lastPage` fields. To get the next page, use the `nextPage` value as the `page` parameter." + }, + { + "name": "search_repositories", + "description": "Find GitHub repositories by name, description, readme, topics, or other metadata. Perfect for discovering projects, finding examples, or locating specific repositories across GitHub." + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Files", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "get_file_contents", + "description": "Get the contents of a file or directory from a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "create_or_update_file", + "description": "Create or update a single file in a GitHub repository. \nIf updating, you should provide the SHA of the file you want to update. Use this tool to create or update a file in a GitHub repository remotely; do not use it for local file operations.\n\nIn order to obtain the SHA of original file version before updating, use the following git command:\ngit rev-parse :\n\nSHA MUST be provided for existing file updates." + }, + { + "name": "delete_file", + "description": "Delete a file from a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "push_files", + "description": "Push multiple files to a GitHub repository in a single commit" + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Branches & Tags", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "create_branch", + "description": "Create a new branch in a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "list_branches", + "description": "List branches in a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "list_tags", + "description": "List git tags in a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "get_tag", + "description": "Get details about a specific git tag in a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "get_label", + "description": "Get a specific label from a repository." + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Commits", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "get_commit", + "description": "Get details for a commit from a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "list_commits", + "description": "Get list of commits of a branch in a GitHub repository. Returns at least 30 results per page by default, but can return more if specified using the perPage parameter (up to 100)." + }, + { + "name": "search_commits", + "description": "Search for commits across GitHub repositories using GitHub's commit search syntax. Useful for finding specific changes, authors, or messages across one or many repositories. Searches the default branch only." + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Releases", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "get_latest_release", + "description": "Get the latest release in a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "get_release_by_tag", + "description": "Get a specific release by its tag name in a GitHub repository" + }, + { + "name": "list_releases", + "description": "List releases in a GitHub repository" + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Search", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "search_code", + "description": "Fast and precise code search across ALL GitHub repositories using GitHub's native search engine. Best for finding exact symbols, functions, classes, or specific code patterns." + }, + { + "name": "search_issues", + "description": "Search for issues in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:issue" + }, + { + "name": "search_pull_requests", + "description": "Search for pull requests in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:pr" + }, + { + "name": "search_users", + "description": "Find GitHub users by username, real name, or other profile information. Useful for locating developers, contributors, or team members." + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Teams & Users", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "get_me", + "description": "Get details of the authenticated GitHub user. Use this when a request is about the user's own profile for GitHub. Or when information is missing to build other tool calls." + }, + { + "name": "get_team_members", + "description": "Get member usernames of a specific team in an organization. Limited to organizations accessible with current credentials" + }, + { + "name": "get_teams", + "description": "Get details of the teams the user is a member of. Limited to organizations accessible with current credentials" + } + ] + }, + { + "category": "Security", + "tools": [ + { + "name": "run_secret_scanning", + "description": "Scan files, content, or recent changes for secrets such as API keys, passwords, tokens, and credentials.\n\nThis tool is intended for targeted scans of specific files, snippets, or diffs provided directly as content. The files parameter accepts either a single string or an array of strings containing raw file contents or diff hunks, and returns detected secrets with their locations and related secret scanning metadata. Content must not be empty. For full repository scanning, other mechanisms are available.\n\nCaveats:\n\n- Only files within the codebase should be scanned. Files outside of the codebase should not be sent.\n- Files listed in .gitignore should be skipped." + } + ] + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md b/aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md similarity index 99% rename from aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md rename to aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md index 8e5b65486..753a2cc3d 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md @@ -633,7 +633,6 @@ no AuthBridge changes required. | `authlib/auth/auth.go` | `HandleInbound`: the three JWT checks (signature, issuer, audience) | | `authlib/plugins/tokenexchange/exchange/client.go` | RFC 8693 exchange POST construction | | `authbridge/demos/token-exchange-routes/README.md` | `authproxy-routes` ConfigMap shape and troubleshooting | -| `aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md` | Conceptual guide: roles vs scopes, hybrid vs pure PDP/PEP | --- diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md similarity index 99% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index e2dc5c837..386d23077 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only ### Integration test specifications -Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are specified **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` — a **sibling of `components/`**, following the same "one spec per unit" convention the component PRDs use. This section is the dedicated index of those specs (mirroring the Component Summary in §5) and grows as tests are added; each entry is a distinct integration test with its own spec. +Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are specified **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` — a **sibling of `components/`**, following the same "one spec per unit" convention the component PRDs use. This section is the dedicated index of those specs (mirroring the Component Summary in §5) and grows as tests are added; each entry is a distinct integration test with its own spec. | Integration test | Description | Spec | |---|---|---| diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md similarity index 97% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 0882568f6..8027a1dc6 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv 4. Returns `502` on Service/label lookup failure or MCP call failure. > K8s access: `get` on `services` in the workload namespace (tool path). Identity is resolved by `classify_service` (config API). - > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`inception/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. + > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`docs/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). No case mapping is needed here: `service_type` is a `ServiceType` (values `Agent`/`Tool`), already matching `client.type` and `Service.type`. Case normalization happens once, upstream, when `classify_service` reads the lowercase `kagenti.io/type` label. @@ -242,4 +242,4 @@ aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ - PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). - PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). - Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. -- MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — **resolved** (hybrid Keycloak→K8s) in `inception/issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md` and reflected in the `analyze_tool` node above. +- MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — **resolved** (hybrid Keycloak→K8s) in `docs/issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md` and reflected in the `analyze_tool` node above. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/event-broker.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/idp-configuration-service.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/keycloak-service.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-idp.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp-policy.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-pdp-policy.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/library-policy-store.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-computation-engine.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-model.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/policy-store.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-ingest-service.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/components/rag-knowledge-base.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md similarity index 99% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md index 05b76573f..4e99a8e79 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-agent.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Demo Spec: `github-agent` (A2A) — source + issue operations over `github-tool` > **Status:** spec (design source of truth). Implementation is decomposed into -> `inception/issues/demo/GA-*.md` and entry-pointed by -> `inception/handoffs/handoff-github-agent-implementation.md`. +> `docs/issues/demo/GA-*.md` and entry-pointed by +> `docs/handoffs/handoff-github-agent-implementation.md`. > > **This is a demo/reference agent**, not part of the AIAC service tree (`src/aiac/`). It is a > self-contained, deployable A2A agent that realises the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/demo/github-tool.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md b/aiac/docs/specs/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md similarity index 100% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md similarity index 98% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md index 7381780c4..53a49c75f 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Integration Test: PDP Policy Writer (OPA) — `generate_rego.py` > **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. -> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` +> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` > (a sibling of `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section > ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) is the index of them. This is the **PDP Policy Writer (OPA)** integration > test — not the definition of integration testing in general, and not the only integration-test PRD. diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md similarity index 99% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 6eff1570b..48ec152d7 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Integration Test: policy-pipeline — `test_policy_pipeline.py` > **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. -> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` +> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` > (a sibling of `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section > ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) is the index of them. This is the **policy-pipeline** integration test — > the full identity→policy pipeline — not the definition of integration testing in general, and not diff --git a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md similarity index 99% rename from aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md rename to aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index 314d547e5..4cb5bcf57 100644 --- a/aiac/inception/requirements/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Integration Test: uc1-onboarding-pipeline — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` > **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. Integration-test -> specs live **one spec per test** under `inception/requirements/integration-test/` (a sibling of +> specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` (a sibling of > `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) > is the index of them. This is the **uc1-onboarding-pipeline** integration test — the phase-1 > service-onboarding demo driven end-to-end through the **real UC-1 agent** against **really-deployed** diff --git a/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md b/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md deleted file mode 100644 index 28ab8db06..000000000 --- a/aiac/inception/keycloak-roles-vs-scopes.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ -# Keycloak: Client Roles vs Client Scopes - -## Definitions - -**Client Role** — a named permission defined within a specific client (e.g., `my-app:admin`). Represents what a user is authorized to do inside that application. Assigned to users or groups. - -**Client Scope** — a reusable container that bundles claims, role mappers, and protocol mappers. Controls what gets included in a token when a client requests it. Defined at the realm level and shared across clients. - -| | Client Role | Client Scope | -|---|---|---| -| **What it is** | A named permission/authority | A reusable claim bundle | -| **Defined on** | A specific client | Realm level, shared across clients | -| **Controls** | What a user is authorized to do | What appears in the access token | -| **Assigned to** | Users / groups | Clients (as default or optional scope) | - -## Role-to-Scope Mapping - -The relationship is not one-to-one. It is flexible in both directions. - -- **One scope → many roles**: a `reporting` scope can inject `analytics-service:read`, `data-warehouse:export`, and `audit-log:view` in a single grant. -- **One role → many scopes**: `user-service:read` can appear in both a `basic-access` (default) and a `user-management` (optional) scope. -- **Scope with no roles**: carries only protocol mappers (e.g., `email`, `given_name`). The built-in OIDC `profile` and `email` scopes work this way. -- **Role with no scope**: a role assigned directly to a user appears in the token without any scope involvement, as long as the default `roles` mapper is active. -- **Many clients, one scope**: a `service-account` scope defined once at the realm level can be assigned as a default to many backend clients, avoiding per-client configuration. - -## Are Scopes Required for RBAC or ABAC? - -No. - -### RBAC without scopes - -Assign client roles directly to users or groups. The roles land in the token via the default `roles` mapper. The application reads `resource_access["my-app"].roles` and gates access. - -```json -{ "resource_access": { "my-app": { "roles": ["admin"] } } } -``` - -### ABAC without scopes - -Add a custom user attribute mapper directly on the client. It injects attributes into the token, which the app or a policy engine (e.g., OPA) evaluates for access decisions. - -```json -{ "department": "finance", "clearance": "secret" } -``` - -## When Scopes Are Worth Using - -- **Multi-client reuse** — same role bundle or attribute set needed across many clients -- **OAuth2 consent flows** — user explicitly grants a third-party app access to specific capabilities -- **Least-privilege token narrowing** — client requests a reduced scope to get a token with fewer permissions than the user holds -- **Federation / external IdP** — normalizing incoming claims from an external provider across all clients - -## Summary - -For internal applications, direct role and attribute mappers on the client are simpler and sufficient. Scopes become worthwhile when many clients share the same access model, or when doing OAuth2 delegation flows where the user consents to what a client may access on their behalf. - ---- - -## How a Client Requests a Scope (Technical Detail) - -The `scope` parameter is a space-separated string sent in the POST body to Keycloak's token endpoint. It is a *ceiling request* — Keycloak returns only the claims/roles mapped by those scopes, even if the subject holds broader permissions. - -``` -POST /realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token -grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange -subject_token= -audience=github-tool -scope=openid github-tool-aud github-full-access -``` - -Keycloak evaluates three constraints before issuing the narrowed token: - -| Constraint | What Keycloak checks | -|---|---| -| Client allowed? | Is `token-exchange` enabled on the acting client? | -| Scope registered? | Is the requested scope configured on the target client? | -| Subject holds it? | Does the subject token's holder actually have access to that scope? | - -## How It Works in Kagenti / AuthBridge - -The requesting entity is never the application developer manually — it is **AuthBridge's token-exchange plugin** acting transparently on behalf of the workload. - -### 1. Static route configuration (`authproxy-routes` ConfigMap) - -An operator declares per outbound target what scopes to request: - -```yaml -routes: - - host: "github-tool-mcp" - target_audience: "github-tool" - token_scopes: "openid github-tool-aud github-full-access" -``` - -### 2. Intercept outbound request - -When the workload makes an HTTP call to `github-tool-mcp`, AuthBridge's forward proxy intercepts it, matches the host against the route table, and resolves the target audience and scopes. - -### 3. RFC 8693 token exchange call - -AuthBridge calls Keycloak's token endpoint with the subject token, audience, and scope. Keycloak mints a new, narrowed access token. AuthBridge injects it into the outbound request — the workload itself is unaware. - -### 4. End result - -Even if the calling agent holds `read`, `write`, and `admin` roles, the token delivered to `github-tool` contains only the claims mapped by the requested scopes. The token is valid for exactly one target audience, for the duration of that call. - ---- - -## Keycloak as PDP, AuthBridge as Pure PEP - -Without automated policy management, the natural Kagenti design is a hybrid PDP/PEP: AuthBridge influences policy by declaring `token_scopes` in the route config. Keycloak validates and issues accordingly, but the *intent* lives in AuthBridge. This is the baseline to reason from. - -AIAC (AI-based Access Control) is the system that replaces this hybrid with a clean PDP/PEP split. The mechanism is described in detail in [The Kagenti/AIAC Solution](#the-kagentiaiac-solution) below; this section establishes the structural change that AIAC implements. - -### What changes - -AuthBridge sends the exchange request **without a `scope` parameter** — only the `audience`: - -``` -POST /realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token -grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange -subject_token= -audience=github-tool -``` - -Keycloak then applies its own configured policies to determine what goes into the issued token. - -### How Keycloak carries the policy - -| Mechanism | How it works | -|---|---| -| **Default scopes on the target client** | Scopes listed as default are always included in any token issued for that audience, regardless of what the requester asks. | -| **Token exchange policies (Keycloak 26+)** | Fine-grained policies define, per `(calling_client → target_client)` pair, exactly what scopes are granted. Policy lives entirely in Keycloak. | -| **Optional scopes** | A scope marked optional on the target client is only included if explicitly requested. Not requesting it = not included. The optional/default split is itself a policy instrument. | - -### Structural comparison - -| | Current (hybrid) | Pure PDP/PEP | -|---|---|---| -| Where scope policy lives | `authproxy-routes` in AuthBridge | Keycloak client config / exchange policies | -| AuthBridge sends | `audience` + `scope` | `audience` only | -| Keycloak role | Validates and enforces ceiling | Decides and issues | -| AuthBridge role | Influences and enforces | Enforces only | - -### Tradeoffs - -**Pro:** Keycloak becomes the single source of truth for what a service is allowed to receive. Policy is auditable in one place. - -**Con:** When no `scope` is sent, Keycloak defaults to issuing all default scopes for the target client. If those defaults are broad, the least-privilege guarantee depends on careful default scope configuration on each target client — the discipline shifts from AuthBridge route config to Keycloak realm config. - -**Con:** Requires Keycloak 26+ token exchange policies for per-caller-pair scope control. Below that, only per-target defaults are available. - -### Implementation requirements - -1. Remove `token_scopes` from `authproxy-routes` -2. Audit and tighten default scopes on every target client in Keycloak -3. Use Keycloak 26+ token exchange policies if per-caller-pair scope control is needed -4. AIAC owns this configuration — encoding access policy as composite role mappings (Phase 1) or Rego rules (Phase 2) rather than per-route scope declarations in AuthBridge - ---- - -## The Kagenti/AIAC Solution - -AIAC implements and maintains the clean PDP/PEP split described above. It introduces a **policy management layer** between the natural-language policy source and the PDP, removing the need for any policy knowledge inside AuthBridge. - -### Three-Layer Architecture - -| Layer | Component | Responsibility | -|---|---|---| -| **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Reads natural-language policy from RAG store; translates it to PDP configuration on every trigger | -| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | Keycloak (Phase 1) / OPA (Phase 2) | Evaluates what a caller may access; issues scoped tokens | -| **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens with `audience` only; forwards narrowed credentials; carries no policy knowledge | - -AuthBridge is a pure PEP in both phases. The PDP backend is the only moving part between phases. - -### Phase 1: Keycloak Composite Role Mappings as PDP Policy - -AIAC manages **realm role → service permission composite mappings** in Keycloak. Each realm role (e.g., `data-analyst`) is a composite that bundles the exact client-level permissions it should grant on each downstream service. When the caller's realm role changes or a new service is onboarded, AIAC recomputes and applies a minimal mapping delta. - -AuthBridge performs the token exchange with `audience` only: - -``` -POST /realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token -grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange -subject_token= -audience=target-service -``` - -Keycloak applies the composite mappings managed by AIAC and issues a token containing exactly the permissions the caller's realm role entitles on `target-service`. The `token_scopes` field is absent from `authproxy-routes`; routes carry only routing intent (`host` → `target_audience`). - -The discipline of keeping composite mappings tight is delegated entirely to AIAC. It reacts to four trigger types: - -| Trigger | Scope | What AIAC does | -|---|---|---| -| `client/{id}` (new service onboarded) | Single new service | Provisions permissions/scopes on the client; maps all realm roles that should access it | -| `realm-role/{id}` (role created/updated) | Single affected role | Recomputes composite mappings for that role only | -| `build` (policy document updated, incremental) | Minimal delta | Retrieves updated policy from RAG store; applies diff to composite mappings | -| `rebuild` (operator-initiated, full reset) | All mappings | Clears all composites; recomputes from scratch | - -This covers the "Con" identified above — broad default scopes are controlled not by per-operator discipline but by automated, policy-driven AIAC recomputation. - -### Phase 2: OPA as PDP — LLM-Generated Rego - -Phase 2 replaces composite role mappings with LLM-generated Rego rules evaluated by OPA. AIAC generates Rego from the same natural-language policy RAG store and writes it to OPA via the PDP Policy Service — the same stable interface, different backend. - -**Transition sequence:** - -1. AIAC clears all composite mappings from Keycloak (Keycloak reverts to a pure token issuer with no embedded access policy). -2. The PDP Policy Service pod is swapped to the OPA implementation — same `aiac-pdp-policy-service` ClusterIP, same API contract. This is a deployment swap only. -3. AIAC begins writing LLM-generated Rego rules to OPA instead of composite mappings to Keycloak. - -AuthBridge is unaffected. It continues sending audience-only token exchange requests. The PDP has changed; the PEP has not. - -Phase 2 achieves a stronger separation: Rego rules express policy in a purpose-built, human-auditable language rather than as implicit Keycloak composite graph traversals. - -### Comparison - -| Concern | Hybrid (pre-AIAC) | AIAC Phase 1 (Keycloak) | AIAC Phase 2 (OPA) | -|---|---|---|---| -| Where access policy lives | `authproxy-routes` in AuthBridge | RAG store → Keycloak composite mappings | RAG store → OPA Rego rules | -| AuthBridge sends | `audience` + `scope` | `audience` only | `audience` only | -| PDP | Keycloak (validates ceiling) | Keycloak (decides from composites) | OPA (decides from Rego) | -| Policy auditability | Fragmented across route configs | Single source: RAG store + Keycloak composites | Single source: RAG store + Rego | -| New service onboarding | Manual: add scopes to every caller's route | Automated: AIAC provisions on `CLIENT_CREATED` | Automated: AIAC provisions on `CLIENT_CREATED` | -| Phase transition cost | — | Baseline | PDP pod swap; AuthBridge and AIAC unchanged | diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index 61539f38d..72d64709d 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ kubectl rollout restart deployment/aiac-interface -n aiac-system Phase 2 replaces the mock PDP Policy Writer with the OPA implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`), which writes Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. The ClusterIP Service name and port are unchanged — no Agent reconfiguration required. -See issue [4.18 — K8s: OPA image swap + AuthorizationPolicy CR + RBAC](../inception/issues/deployment/4.18-k8s-opa-authorizationpolicy-rbac.md) for the full procedure (image swap, ServiceAccount, ClusterRole, ClusterRoleBinding, CR instance). +See issue [4.18 — K8s: OPA image swap + AuthorizationPolicy CR + RBAC](../docs/issues/deployment/4.18-k8s-opa-authorizationpolicy-rbac.md) for the full procedure (image swap, ServiceAccount, ClusterRole, ClusterRoleBinding, CR instance). ```bash # Build Phase 2 PDP Policy Writer image diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index 6a91da2bd..26ed77b2d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ provisions the same entities into a live Keycloak realm and feeds the descriptions to the PRB. Keeping the scenario in one place is what the spec's *Further Notes* mandate — the role→access facts, the entity/role/scope descriptions, and both ``policy.md`` variants must stay mutually -consistent (spec: ``inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md``, *Scenario* + +consistent (spec: ``docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md``, *Scenario* + *Scenario inputs*). Pure data: this module imports nothing (no aiac, no stdlib beyond the language) so a launcher can diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index 031658a64..df28c43d7 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ """End-to-end policy-pipeline integration test — the generated Rego is the artifact under test. Parametrized pytest suite for the fixed ``github-agent`` scenario (spec: -``inception/requirements/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md``). A single session fixture drives the +``docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md``). A single session fixture drives the whole identity->policy pipeline with nothing mocked: it provisions a live Keycloak realm, spawns the IdP Configuration, Policy Store, and OPA Policy Writer services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, runs the real Policy Rules Builder (real LLM) to map roles->scopes, then the real Policy Computation Engine to From 29fa0930b4427a4305a665c94e5f65a4840713a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:08:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 218/273] Test(aiac): Add UC-1 onboarding-pipeline integration test (5.4) Discovery-driven sibling of 5.3's policy-pipeline test: deploys the simplified github-tool + real github-agent, drives real UC-1 onboarding (POST /apply/service/{id}) per policy variant, and asserts the emitted Rego with opa eval against the scenario_uc1 truth table. - scenario_uc1.py: oracle over the discovered, workload-prefixed names (github-tool.*, github-agent.*) + both policy.md variants. - probe_uc1.rego: outbound user-gate probe, exact-name match; degenerate agent->tool gate not probed. - launcher.py: kubectl apply/delete/rollout/cp, port-forward, and opa helpers ($OPA_BIN->PATH->pytest.skip). - test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py: @pytest.mark.integration; inbound + outbound (user-gate) truth table + grant-set equivalence, per variant. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/test/integration/launcher.py | 166 ++++++- aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego | 29 ++ aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py | 165 +++++++ .../test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py | 432 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 786 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py index 3d8da9d6c..04bb4858b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py @@ -1,17 +1,24 @@ -"""Shared machinery for the standalone integration-test launchers. +"""Shared machinery for the integration-test launchers. -Both ``test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py`` (5.2) and ``test/integration/policy_pipeline.py`` (5.3) -spawn aiac services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, poll each ``GET /health`` until ready, run some -work, and tear the subprocesses down. This module holds that shared lifecycle so neither launcher -duplicates it. +The subprocess half — spawn aiac services as ``uvicorn`` subprocesses, poll each ``GET /health`` +until ready, run some work, tear them down — is used by ``test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py`` (5.2) +and ``test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py`` (5.3). + +The cluster half — ``kubectl`` apply/delete/rollout/cp, ``kubectl port-forward``, and the ``opa`` +oracle — is used by ``test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`` (5.4), which drives a real +Kagenti/Kind cluster rather than in-process subprocesses. It imports only the standard library and ``requests`` — never ``aiac`` — so a launcher may import -it *before* setting the environment variables the aiac libraries read at import time. +it *before* setting the environment variables the aiac libraries read at import time. ``pytest`` is +imported lazily inside ``opa_bin`` (only 5.4 uses it, and only under pytest) so the module stays +importable in the standalone launchers. """ from __future__ import annotations +import json import os +import shutil import signal import subprocess import sys @@ -133,3 +140,150 @@ def print_rego_dir(output_dir: Path) -> None: print(f"Rego written to: {output_dir}") for path in sorted(output_dir.glob("*.rego")): print(f" {path.name}") + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Cluster helpers (5.4) — kubectl apply/delete/rollout/get/cp + port-forward +# ====================================================================================== +# +# Thin wrappers around the ``kubectl`` CLI (no in-process K8s client — keeps launcher.py +# dependency-free and mirrors what an operator would run by hand). Every call honours +# ``KUBECONFIG`` from the environment. Failures raise ``subprocess.CalledProcessError`` with the +# captured stderr, so the caller's assertion message names the failing command. + + +def kubectl(*args: str, input_text: str | None = None, timeout: float = 60.0) -> str: + """Run ``kubectl `` and return stdout (raising on non-zero exit). ``input_text`` is + piped to stdin (e.g. for ``kubectl apply -f -``).""" + proc = subprocess.run( + ["kubectl", *args], + input=input_text, + capture_output=True, + text=True, + timeout=timeout, + ) + if proc.returncode != 0: + raise subprocess.CalledProcessError( + proc.returncode, ["kubectl", *args], output=proc.stdout, stderr=proc.stderr + ) + return proc.stdout + + +def kubectl_apply(manifest_path: Path, *, namespace: str | None = None) -> None: + """``kubectl apply -f `` (optionally ``-n ``).""" + args = ["apply", "-f", str(manifest_path)] + if namespace: + args += ["-n", namespace] + kubectl(*args) + + +def kubectl_delete(manifest_path: Path, *, namespace: str | None = None, timeout: float = 120.0) -> None: + """``kubectl delete -f --ignore-not-found`` — safe to call in teardown even if + the workloads are already gone.""" + args = ["delete", "-f", str(manifest_path), "--ignore-not-found", "--wait=true"] + if namespace: + args += ["-n", namespace] + kubectl(*args, timeout=timeout) + + +def kubectl_rollout_status(resource: str, *, namespace: str, timeout: float = 180.0) -> None: + """Block until ``resource`` (e.g. ``deployment/github-tool``) is rolled out, or raise.""" + kubectl( + "rollout", "status", resource, "-n", namespace, f"--timeout={int(timeout)}s", timeout=timeout + 10 + ) + + +def kubectl_get_json(resource: str, *, namespace: str | None = None) -> dict: + """``kubectl get -o json`` parsed to a dict (a single object or a ``List``).""" + args = ["get", resource, "-o", "json"] + if namespace: + args += ["-n", namespace] + return json.loads(kubectl(*args)) + + +def kubectl_cp(pod: str, remote_path: str, local_path: Path, *, namespace: str, container: str | None = None) -> None: + """``kubectl cp /: `` — copy a file/dir out of a pod.""" + args = ["cp", f"{namespace}/{pod}:{remote_path}", str(local_path)] + if container: + args += ["-c", container] + kubectl(*args, timeout=120.0) + + +def resolve_pod(selector: str, *, namespace: str) -> str: + """Return the name of the first pod matching a label ``selector`` (e.g. ``app=aiac-opa``).""" + out = kubectl( + "get", "pods", "-n", namespace, "-l", selector, + "-o", "jsonpath={.items[0].metadata.name}", + ) + if not out.strip(): + raise RuntimeError(f"no pod matches selector {selector!r} in namespace {namespace!r}") + return out.strip() + + +@contextmanager +def port_forward(target: str, *, namespace: str, local_port: int, remote_port: int, + ready_url: str | None = None, timeout: float = 30.0) -> Iterator[str]: + """Run ``kubectl port-forward :`` for the duration of the block, + yielding the local ``http://127.0.0.1:`` base URL. + + ``target`` is a kubectl port-forward target (``svc/aiac-controller``, ``deploy/...``, ``pod/...``). + If ``ready_url`` is given it is polled until it answers (any HTTP status) before yielding; + otherwise a short fixed grace period is used (the Controller exposes no ``/health``). + """ + proc = subprocess.Popen( + ["kubectl", "port-forward", "-n", namespace, target, f"{local_port}:{remote_port}"], + stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + ) + base_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{local_port}" + try: + deadline = time.time() + timeout + while time.time() < deadline: + if proc.poll() is not None: + err = proc.stderr.read().decode() if proc.stderr else "" + raise RuntimeError(f"port-forward to {target} exited early: {err}") + if ready_url is None: + time.sleep(1.0) + break + try: + requests.get(ready_url, timeout=1) + break + except requests.RequestException: + time.sleep(0.3) + yield base_url + finally: + terminate(proc) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# OPA oracle (5.4) — standalone ``opa eval`` as the verification binary +# ====================================================================================== + + +def opa_bin() -> str: + """Path to the ``opa`` binary (``$OPA_BIN`` -> ``PATH``), or ``pytest.skip`` the calling test. + Absence SKIPS, never fails (spec/issue acceptance).""" + found = os.environ.get("OPA_BIN") or shutil.which("opa") + if not found: + import pytest + + pytest.skip("opa binary not found (set OPA_BIN or add opa to PATH)") + return found + + +def opa_eval(rego_paths: list[Path], query: str, input_doc: dict) -> object: + """Evaluate ``query`` against the given Rego file(s) with ``input_doc`` on stdin, returning the + result value. Raises (via ``check=True``) if OPA rejects the Rego or the query errors.""" + cmd = [ + opa_bin(), + "eval", + "-f", + "json", + *sum((["-d", str(p)] for p in rego_paths), []), + "--stdin-input", + query, + ] + out = subprocess.run( + cmd, input=json.dumps(input_doc), capture_output=True, text=True, check=True + ).stdout + return json.loads(out)["result"][0]["expressions"][0]["value"] diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego b/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego new file mode 100644 index 000000000..655773fcf --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +package probe.outbound +import future.keywords + +# Outbound decision probe for the discovery-driven UC-1 `github_agent` scenario. Adapted from +# 5.3's `probe.rego` for two UC-1-specific facts: +# +# 1. USER GATE ONLY. Under real UC-1 the single generic `github-agent.agent` role maps to no +# specific tool scope, so the generated `target_ok` (agent->tool) is degenerate/empty and the +# real `allow` (subject_ok AND target_ok) would deny everything. This probe therefore binds +# against the `subject_ok` maps ALONE — the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. `target_ok` +# is documented as degenerate, not probed. +# +# 2. EXACT-NAME MATCH. `scenario_uc1.py` stores the FULL discovered scope names +# (`github-tool.source-read`, ...) — the same strings the generated data maps contain — so +# `input.function_name` is matched to a subject scope by plain string equality. No 5.3-style +# prefix-stripping token-set soft match (that was 5.3's device for bare names; here both sides +# are already prefixed). +gen := data.authz.github_agent.outbound + +# Tool scopes the user (subject) is entitled to, via the generated user->tool data maps only. +subject_scopes contains scope if { + some role in gen.subject_roles[input.subject] + some scope in gen.outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] +} + +default allow := false +allow if { + input.function_name in subject_scopes +} diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c339ed3f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +"""The UC-1 (discovery-driven) ``github-agent`` scenario — the oracle for +``test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py``. + +Sibling of the hand-provisioned ``scenario.py`` (kept separate so 5.2/5.3 are untouched). Same +*role -> access facts and truth tables*; the difference is **provenance and naming**. Here the +agent/tool roles and scopes are not hand-picked — they are what **real UC-1 onboarding** discovers +and provisions from the deployed workloads, so every scope is **workload-prefixed** +(``github-tool.source-read``, ``github-agent.source_operations``) and the agent contributes a single +generic ``github-agent.agent`` role. The pair-lists below are therefore expressed over those +**discovered, prefixed** names — exactly the strings the generated Rego data maps contain — so the +test's expected verdicts are *computed from* this module, never from the Rego under test. + +This module is **pure data**: it imports nothing (no ``aiac``, no stdlib beyond the language) so the +test can import it before its env-before-import step, just like ``scenario.py``. + +Fact triad (spec ``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md`` -> *Further +Notes*): the *Scenario* table, **both** ``policy.md`` variants (``POLICY_EXPLICIT`` / +``POLICY_ABSTRACT`` below), and the pair-lists here must all agree. The generic entity/role/scope +descriptions are functional and keyword-free and must not contradict the facts. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +# --- Realm + deployment identifiers --------------------------------------------------------- + +# Dedicated test realm (never deleted/recreated). The operator registers the demo namespace's +# clients into it because the fixture sets KEYCLOAK_REALM on that namespace's authbridge-config. +REALM_DEFAULT = "aiac-uc1-e2e" + +# Namespace the demo workloads deploy into (operator registers clients as "{ns}/{workload}"). +DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT = "team1" + +# Workload names == Service names == Keycloak client.name suffix. The trigger id is the Keycloak +# *clientId* of the client whose *name* is "{ns}/{workload}" (a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE, else the +# bare "{ns}/{workload}"); the test resolves it by name, never by assuming the string. +AGENT_WORKLOAD = "github-agent" +TOOL_WORKLOAD = "github-tool" + +# username -> the realm role the user holds +USERS: dict[str, str] = { + "dev-user": "developer", + "test-user": "tester", + "devops-user": "devops", +} + +# Fixed dev password for the provisioned test users (throwaway realm). +USER_PASSWORD = "password" + +# --- Realm-role descriptions (provisioned by the fixture; verbatim from the spec) ----------- +# +# The PRB reads these descriptions when expanding the abstract policy. ``devops`` is deliberately +# unrelated to source/issue work: it appears in no pair-list and neither policy variant, so +# deny-by-default leaves devops-user denied inbound and on every outbound function. + +USER_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { + "developer": ( + "Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining " + "code) and fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and " + "consults issues for defect reports." + ), + "tester": ( + "Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through " + "the issue tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue " + "tracker, not in source." + ), + "devops": ( + "DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime " + "environments; does not author source code and does not manage the issue tracker." + ), +} + +# --- Discovered entities (what real UC-1 onboarding provisions) ----------------------------- +# +# These are NOT provisioned by the test — UC-1 discovers them (tool scopes from the MCP +# ``tools/list`` manifest, agent role/scopes from the AgentCard skills) and writes them into +# Keycloak. They are recorded here only so the pair-lists and the grant-set equivalence check can +# reference the exact prefixed strings the generated Rego contains. + +# The single generic agent role UC-1 emits (hardcoded ``f"{workload}.agent"``, description +# "Agent role"). It cannot be mapped to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the +# agent->tool gate (``target_ok``) is degenerate/empty — documented, not asserted (see +# ``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS`` below and the spec's *The agent->tool gate*). +AGENT_ROLE = "github-agent.agent" + +# name -> description. Agent-boundary scopes, from the AgentCard skills (verbatim descriptions). +AGENT_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { + "github-agent.source_operations": ( + "Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, " + "and commits." + ), + "github-agent.issue_operations": ( + "Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests." + ), +} + +# name -> description. Fine-grained tool operations, from the simplified tool's MCP ``tools/list`` +# (verbatim descriptions — identical text to ``scenario.py``'s tool scopes, only prefixed). +TOOL_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { + "github-tool.source-read": "Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only.", + "github-tool.source-write": "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes.", + "github-tool.issues-read": "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only.", + "github-tool.issues-write": "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close.", +} + +# --- Role -> access facts (over the DISCOVERED, prefixed names; the single source of truth) -- +# +# Identical *decisions* to ``scenario.py``; only the scope-name strings are prefixed. Each set maps +# 1:1 to a generated Rego gate: +# INBOUND_PAIRS — user role -> agent scope (inbound; user may call the agent) +# OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS — user role -> tool scope (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +# OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS — agent role -> tool scope (outbound target; DEGENERATE under UC-1) + +INBOUND_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ + ("developer", "github-agent.source_operations"), + ("developer", "github-agent.issue_operations"), + ("tester", "github-agent.issue_operations"), +] + +OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ + ("developer", "github-tool.source-read"), + ("developer", "github-tool.source-write"), + ("developer", "github-tool.issues-read"), + ("tester", "github-tool.issues-read"), + ("tester", "github-tool.issues-write"), +] + +# Agent->tool gate. Deliberately EMPTY: UC-1's single generic ``github-agent.agent`` role maps to no +# specific tool scope under deny-by-default, so ``target_ok`` is degenerate. The outbound probe +# evaluates ``subject_ok`` only (spec: *user-gating dimension only*); this list documents the empty +# gate and is not probed. +OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [] + +# --- The two policy.md variants (baked into the two AIAC stacks out of band) ---------------- +# +# The AIAC pods mount their own ``policy.md`` (via AIAC_POLICY_FILE); the test does not feed these +# at runtime. They live here as the fact-triad anchor — verbatim from the spec's *Scenario inputs*. +# Both are USER-INTENT-ONLY: neither names the agent role (naming it would populate ``target_ok`` +# and break both the user-gate-only decision and cross-variant equivalence). Both must yield the +# SAME discovered grant set. + +# Version 1 (explicit): enumerates each (user-role -> discovered scope) pair by its full prefixed +# name. No agent-role->tool-scope section. Deny by default. +POLICY_EXPLICIT = """\ +# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this +policy supports it; deny by default. + +## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) +- developer may use github-agent.source_operations and github-agent.issue_operations. +- tester may use github-agent.issue_operations. + +## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +- developer may perform github-tool.source-read, github-tool.source-write, and github-tool.issues-read. +- tester may perform github-tool.issues-read and github-tool.issues-write. +""" + +# Version 2 (abstract): intent-only prose. Same facts; relies on the PRB/LLM to expand intent into +# the discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. +POLICY_ABSTRACT = """\ +Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. + +- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. +- Testers may read and modify issues. +""" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a342f86fd --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +"""End-to-end UC-1 onboarding-pipeline integration test — the generated Rego is the artifact under +test, produced by *real UC-1 onboarding of really-deployed workloads*. + +Discovery-driven sibling of ``test_policy_pipeline.py`` (5.3): identical scenario facts and truth +tables (``scenario_uc1.py`` mirrors ``scenario.py``'s decisions), but where 5.3 hand-provisions the +agent/tool roles/scopes with clean bare names and calls the PRB directly, this test **infers** them +via the production trigger — it deploys the simplified ``github-tool`` + the real ``github-agent`` to +a live Kagenti/Kind cluster, drives the in-cluster UC-1 Service Onboarding agent +(``POST /apply/service/{client_id}``) for each, and asserts the emitted Rego decides correctly with +the standalone ``opa eval`` binary. + +Because real UC-1 names every scope ``{workload}.{name}`` and emits one generic ``github-agent.agent`` +role, the Rego is **semantically similar but not byte-identical** to 5.3's: workload-prefixed names, +and a degenerate (empty) agent->tool gate. The outbound probe therefore evaluates the **user gate +only** (``subject_ok``) — phase-1's user-gating dimension — and matches ``function_name`` to a scope +by **exact string equality** (both sides already prefixed). See +``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``. + +*Deploy + discover + evaluate — no A2A traffic, no live enforcement* (phase-1 out of scope). + +Topology (spec § Topology): AIAC runs **in-cluster** (so UC-1's ``analyze_tool`` can reach the tool's +``*.svc.cluster.local`` MCP endpoint); the test triggers over HTTP via ``kubectl port-forward``. Two +independent AIAC stacks serve the two ``policy.md`` variants (``explicit`` / ``abstract``) — a +documented **precondition**, addressed by ``AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL`` / ``AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL``. The IdP +Configuration Service + Keycloak are shared. Each variant's ``.rego`` is ``kubectl cp``'d out to +``rego_out_uc1//`` (kept separate from 5.3's ``rego_out/``) and evaluated on the host. + +Run (needs a live cluster + operator + Keycloak + the two AIAC stacks + real LLM in-pod; ``opa`` on +PATH or ``$OPA_BIN``; realm defaults to ``aiac-uc1-e2e``): + .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py -m integration -v +Without ``-m integration`` the suite is not collected; without ``opa`` each node skips at runtime. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import logging +import os +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import requests + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves + +from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 + kubectl, + kubectl_apply, + kubectl_cp, + kubectl_delete, + kubectl_rollout_status, + opa_eval, + port_forward, + require_env, + resolve_pod, +) + +log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +VARIANTS = ("explicit", "abstract") + +# --- Config (env) — spec § Configuration ---------------------------------------------------- +TEST_REALM = os.environ.get("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) +NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE", scn.DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT) +ADMIN_REALM = os.environ.get("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") +VARIANT_URL = { + "explicit": os.environ.get("AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7070"), + "abstract": os.environ.get("AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7080"), +} +# OPA-writer pod + rego path per variant (for kubectl cp). Pod name may be given explicitly or +# resolved from a label selector; the writer's output dir defaults to /rego (REGO_OUTPUT_DIR). +OPA_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_NAMESPACE", NAMESPACE) +OPA_REGO_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH", "/rego") +OPA_POD_ENV = {"explicit": "AIAC_OPA_POD_EXPLICIT", "abstract": "AIAC_OPA_POD_ABSTRACT"} +OPA_SELECTOR = { # fallback when the pod name is not given explicitly + "explicit": os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR_EXPLICIT", "app=aiac-opa-explicit"), + "abstract": os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR_ABSTRACT", "app=aiac-opa-abstract"), +} +# Host base dir for captured Rego. Distinct from 5.3's rego_out/ so the two suites never clobber. +REGO_BASE = Path(os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", str(HERE / "rego_out_uc1"))) + +# Demo manifests (repo-relative). +TOOL_MANIFEST = REPO_ROOT / "demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml" +AGENT_CONFIGMAPS = REPO_ROOT / "demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml" +AGENT_MANIFEST = REPO_ROOT / "demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml" + +INBOUND_REGO = "github_agent.inbound.rego" +OUTBOUND_REGO = "github_agent.outbound.rego" + +# ====================================================================================== +# Keycloak provisioning (users + realm roles) — the test fixture UC-1 does NOT do +# ====================================================================================== + + +def _connect_admin(): + """Connect to the admin realm so the fixture can create the test realm + provision users.""" + from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin + + creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, + user_realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, + username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +def provision_realm_and_users(admin, realm: str) -> None: + """Idempotently ensure the dedicated realm exists and holds ``scenario_uc1``'s users + realm + roles (with descriptions the PRB reads). Never deletes/recreates — reruns converge (spec: shared + realm, leave-in-place).""" + from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + + try: + admin.create_realm({"realm": realm, "enabled": True}) + except KeycloakError: + pass # already exists — leave in place + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + + for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): + admin.create_realm_role({"name": name, "description": description}, skip_exists=True) + + for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): + user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) + admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) + + +def resolve_client_id(admin, realm: str, client_name: str) -> str: + """Return the Keycloak *clientId* of the client whose *name* is ``client_name`` (the operator + sets ``client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"``; the id is a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE, else the same + string). The UC-1 trigger takes this clientId — never assume the bare string.""" + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + for client in admin.get_clients(): + if client.get("name") == client_name: + return client["clientId"] + raise AssertionError(f"no Keycloak client with name {client_name!r} in realm {realm!r}") + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Cluster deployment + readiness +# ====================================================================================== + + +def _set_namespace_realm(namespace: str, realm: str) -> None: + """Set ``KEYCLOAK_REALM`` on the namespace's ``authbridge-config`` ConfigMap so the operator + registers this namespace's clients into the test realm (per-namespace; the operator preserves an + admin/CI-set value — operator issue #433). Done before the workloads' AgentRuntimes reconcile.""" + kubectl( + "patch", "configmap", "authbridge-config", "-n", namespace, "--type", "merge", + "-p", f'{{"data":{{"KEYCLOAK_REALM":"{realm}"}}}}', + ) + + +def _deploy_workloads() -> None: + kubectl_apply(AGENT_CONFIGMAPS) # authbridge-config + authproxy-routes first + _set_namespace_realm(NAMESPACE, TEST_REALM) # ...then pin the realm before pods register + kubectl_apply(TOOL_MANIFEST) + kubectl_apply(AGENT_MANIFEST) + + +def _delete_workloads() -> None: + # Delete the deployment manifests (incl. AgentRuntimes) so the operator de-registers the + # clients. ConfigMaps + realm + users + captured .rego are left in place (spec step 6). + for manifest in (AGENT_MANIFEST, TOOL_MANIFEST): + try: + kubectl_delete(manifest) + except Exception as exc: # best-effort teardown — never mask the test result + log.warning("teardown: delete %s failed: %s", manifest.name, exc) + + +def _poll(check, *, desc: str, timeout: float = 180.0, interval: float = 3.0): + """Poll ``check()`` until it returns truthy (returning that value), or fail after ``timeout``.""" + import time + + deadline = time.time() + timeout + last = None + while time.time() < deadline: + try: + last = check() + if last: + return last + except Exception as exc: # transient during rollout — keep polling + last = exc + time.sleep(interval) + raise AssertionError(f"timed out after {timeout}s waiting for: {desc} (last={last!r})") + + +def _pod_type_label(namespace: str, app_selector: str) -> str | None: + out = kubectl( + "get", "pods", "-n", namespace, "-l", app_selector, + "-o", "jsonpath={.items[0].metadata.labels.kagenti\\.io/type}", + ) + return out.strip() or None + + +def _agentcard_present(namespace: str, name: str) -> bool: + out = kubectl( + "get", "agentcard", name, "-n", namespace, "--ignore-not-found", + "-o", "jsonpath={.metadata.name}", + ) + return out.strip() == name + + +def _tool_answers_tools_list(namespace: str) -> bool: + """Port-forward the tool Service and confirm its MCP ``tools/list`` returns tools.""" + with port_forward( + f"svc/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}", namespace=namespace, local_port=19090, remote_port=9090 + ) as base: + resp = requests.post( + f"{base}/mcp", + json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, + headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, + timeout=5, + ) + resp.raise_for_status() + return bool((resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools")) + + +def _wait_for_workloads(admin) -> None: + """Block until both workloads are Ready, the operator has registered their Keycloak clients and + applied ``kagenti.io/type`` labels, the AgentCard CR exists, and the tool answers ``tools/list`` + (spec step 2).""" + kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}", namespace=NAMESPACE) + kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}", namespace=NAMESPACE) + + _poll( + lambda: resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}"), + desc=f"operator registers client {NAMESPACE}/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}", + ) + _poll( + lambda: resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}"), + desc=f"operator registers client {NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}", + ) + _poll( + lambda: _pod_type_label(NAMESPACE, f"app={scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}") == "tool", + desc=f"kagenti.io/type=tool on {scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD} pod", + ) + _poll( + lambda: _pod_type_label(NAMESPACE, f"app.kubernetes.io/name={scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}") == "agent", + desc=f"kagenti.io/type=agent on {scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD} pod", + ) + _poll( + lambda: _agentcard_present(NAMESPACE, scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD), + desc=f"AgentCard CR {scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD} present", + ) + _poll(lambda: _tool_answers_tools_list(NAMESPACE), desc="tool answers tools/list") + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Onboarding trigger + Rego capture +# ====================================================================================== + + +def _trigger_onboard(base_url: str, client_id: str) -> None: + """``POST /apply/service/{client_id}`` against a variant's Controller; assert 200.""" + resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/apply/service/{client_id}", timeout=120) + assert resp.status_code == 200, ( + f"onboard {client_id!r} at {base_url}: HTTP {resp.status_code} — {resp.text[:500]}" + ) + + +def _capture_rego(variant: str, rego_dir: Path) -> None: + """``kubectl cp`` the variant stack's inbound + outbound Rego from its OPA-writer pod.""" + pod = os.environ.get(OPA_POD_ENV[variant]) or resolve_pod(OPA_SELECTOR[variant], namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE) + for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): + kubectl_cp( + pod, f"{OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/{filename}", rego_dir / filename, namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE + ) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Session fixture — deploy, provision, onboard both variants, capture Rego +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="session") +def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: + """Deploy the demo workloads once, provision users/roles once, then onboard **tool then agent** + against each variant's in-cluster AIAC stack, capturing each variant's ``.rego`` to + ``rego_out_uc1//``. Yields ``{variant: {"rego_dir": Path}}``. Teardown deletes the demo + workloads (operator de-registers clients); realm/users/rego are left in place.""" + require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + + admin = _connect_admin() + provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) + + results: dict[str, dict] = {} + try: + _deploy_workloads() + _wait_for_workloads(admin) + + tool_id = resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}") + agent_id = resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}") + + for variant in VARIANTS: + base_url = VARIANT_URL[variant] + _trigger_onboard(base_url, tool_id) # tool first — its scopes must exist for the agent + _trigger_onboard(base_url, agent_id) # then agent — PRB reads the scope universe + + rego_dir = REGO_BASE / variant + rego_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + _capture_rego(variant, rego_dir) + results[variant] = {"rego_dir": rego_dir} + log.info("variant %s: rego captured to %s", variant, rego_dir) + + yield results + finally: + _delete_workloads() + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Expected-verdict oracle (pure functions over the scenario_uc1 truth table) +# ====================================================================================== + +_INBOUND_SOURCES = {role for role, _ in scn.INBOUND_PAIRS} # user-roles reaching some agent scope +_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT = set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) # (user-role, tool-scope) the subject may reach + + +def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: + """A user may call the agent iff their realm role sources some agent scope (``INBOUND_PAIRS``).""" + return scn.USERS[subject] in _INBOUND_SOURCES + + +def expected_outbound(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: + """User gate only: a user's call to a tool function is allowed iff the subject is entitled to that + scope (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``). The agent->tool gate is degenerate under UC-1 (not probed).""" + return (scn.USERS[subject], function_name) in _OUTBOUND_SUBJECT + + +# --- Grant-set extraction (semantic-equivalence oracle, re-derived from the generated Rego) --- + + +def _opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: + """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``.""" + return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) + + +def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: + """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` map.""" + m = _opa_dump(rego_dir / OUTBOUND_REGO, "data.authz.github_agent.outbound.outbound_subject_role_scopes") + return {(role, scope) for role, scopes in (m or {}).items() for scope in scopes} + + +def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: + """User-role->agent-scope grant set from the inbound Rego's ``role_scopes`` restricted to the + published ``agent_scopes`` (a role may list scopes the agent does not expose; those don't grant).""" + rego = rego_dir / INBOUND_REGO + role_scopes = _opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.role_scopes") or {} + agent_scopes = set(_opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.agent_scopes") or []) + return { + (role, scope) + for role, scopes in role_scopes.items() + for scope in scopes + if scope in agent_scopes + } + + +_TRUTH: dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]] = { + "inbound": set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS), + "outbound_subject": set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS), +} +_GRANTS = {"inbound": inbound_grants, "outbound_subject": outbound_subject_grants} + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Tests — opa eval the truth table (verdicts computed from scenario_uc1) +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +def test_inbound(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, subject: str) -> None: + """Inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some (discovered) agent scope.""" + rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / INBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval([rego], "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) + assert allowed == expected_inbound(subject), f"{variant} / {subject}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("function_name", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) +def test_outbound(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, subject: str, function_name: str) -> None: + """Outbound user gate (via ``probe_uc1.rego``) allows a subject's call to a tool function iff the + subject is entitled to that full discovered scope name (exact match; agent gate not probed).""" + rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / OUTBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, HERE / "probe_uc1.rego"], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": subject, "function_name": function_name}, + ) + assert allowed == expected_outbound(subject, function_name), f"{variant} / {subject} / {function_name}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +def test_no_tool_rego(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str) -> None: + """The pipeline emits no tool model — exactly the two agent files, no ``github_tool.*.rego``.""" + rego_dir = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] + assert not list(rego_dir.glob("github_tool*.rego")), "unexpected tool Rego emitted" + for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): + assert (rego_dir / filename).exists(), f"missing {filename}" + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Semantic-equivalence tests — grant sets re-derived from the generated Rego +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("gate", list(_TRUTH)) +def test_grant_set_matches_truth_table(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, gate: str) -> None: + """Each variant's grant set (re-derived from its Rego) equals the ``scenario_uc1`` truth table — + catching verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse allow/deny oracle cannot see.""" + got = _GRANTS[gate](pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"]) + assert got == _TRUTH[gate], f"{variant} {gate}: missing={_TRUTH[gate] - got} extra={got - _TRUTH[gate]}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("gate", list(_TRUTH)) +def test_variants_are_semantically_equivalent(pipeline: dict[str, dict], gate: str) -> None: + """The two policy variants describe the same access model, so their Rego must yield the same + grant set (compared as order-independent sets; text/name-ordering may differ).""" + explicit = _GRANTS[gate](pipeline["explicit"]["rego_dir"]) + abstract = _GRANTS[gate](pipeline["abstract"]["rego_dir"]) + assert explicit == abstract, ( + f"{gate}: variants diverge — only-explicit={explicit - abstract} only-abstract={abstract - explicit}" + ) From 16856dfcf3555ad018e16db9e23d357f6c53d9f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:10:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 219/273] Chore(aiac): Retarget github demo manifests to aiac-demo namespace Move the github-agent + github-tool demo manifests from team1 to the dedicated aiac-demo namespace/realm and pin the agent image to localhost/github-agent:latest for the local Kind install. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml | 17 ++++++++--------- .../k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml | 12 ++++++------ .../github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml | 14 +++++++------- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml index a80335b32..90887ee9f 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml @@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ # Usage: # kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml # -# Note: These manifests default to namespace "team1". If you deploy to a different -# namespace, update the metadata.namespace accordingly. +# Note: These manifests are configured for namespace "aiac-demo". --- # authbridge-config ConfigMap - Unified config for both client-registration and envoy-proxy @@ -24,22 +23,22 @@ # 2. INBOUND validation: Validates JWT tokens on incoming requests to the agent # 3. OUTBOUND exchange: Exchanges tokens when the agent calls the GitHub tool # -# KEYCLOAK_URL and KEYCLOAK_REALM match the installer defaults (kagenti realm) -# and are included because kubectl apply replaces the entire ConfigMap. +# KEYCLOAK_URL and KEYCLOAK_REALM are included because kubectl apply replaces +# the entire ConfigMap. # TOKEN_URL and ISSUER are auto-derived from KEYCLOAK_URL + KEYCLOAK_REALM. apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: name: authbridge-config - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" - KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "aiac-demo" # TOKEN_URL: Auto-derived from KEYCLOAK_URL + KEYCLOAK_REALM. Only set explicitly # when the token endpoint differs from the standard Keycloak path. - # TOKEN_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token" + # TOKEN_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/aiac-demo/protocol/openid-connect/token" # ISSUER: Set explicitly because the internal KEYCLOAK_URL differs from the frontend URL. - ISSUER: "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/realms/kagenti" + ISSUER: "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/realms/aiac-demo" # Audience validation is automatic — uses CLIENT_ID from /shared/client-id.txt # (written by client-registration or operator). No manual configuration needed. @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: name: authproxy-routes - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo data: routes.yaml: | - host: "github-tool-mcp" diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml index 58488e02e..d77cb6e64 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml @@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo labels: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent spec: @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ spec: serviceAccountName: github-agent containers: - name: agent - image: github-agent:latest + image: localhost/github-agent:latest imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent ports: - containerPort: 8000 @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ spec: # JWKS URI for validating incoming tokens from Keycloak - name: JWKS_URI - value: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs" + value: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/aiac-demo/protocol/openid-connect/certs" resources: limits: cpu: 500m @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo spec: selector: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ apiVersion: agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1 kind: AgentRuntime metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo spec: type: agent targetRef: diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml index b0630a3bf..d2f6c66fe 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ # # Naming invariants (do not rename): # workload name == Service name == "github-tool" -# analyze_tool endpoint: http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp +# analyze_tool endpoint: http://github-tool.aiac-demo.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp # # kagenti.io/type=tool is applied by the kagenti-operator when it reconciles # the AgentRuntime below; do not hand-set it here. @@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo spec: replicas: 1 selector: @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec: serviceAccountName: github-tool containers: - name: github-tool - image: github-tool:latest + image: localhost/github-tool:latest imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent ports: - containerPort: 9090 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo labels: protocol.kagenti.io/mcp: "true" spec: @@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ spec: --- # AgentRuntime — enrolls the workload so the kagenti-operator: # - applies kagenti.io/type=tool to the pod (read by classify_service), and -# - registers a Keycloak client with client.name = "team1/github-tool" +# - registers a Keycloak client with client.name = "aiac-demo/github-tool" # (so analyze_tool derives scopes github-tool.{source-read,...}). apiVersion: agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1 kind: AgentRuntime metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: team1 + namespace: aiac-demo spec: type: tool targetRef: From e9995123e917fa44a81999837027498f50791190 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:38:07 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 220/273] Docs: Add AIAC specification documents Import the AIAC PRD and per-component specs under aiac/docs/specs/ as the basis for the upstream contribution. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 270 ++++++++ aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 590 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md | 244 ++++++++ .../aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md | 178 ++++++ .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 245 ++++++++ .../aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md | 64 ++ .../components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md | 88 +++ aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md | 122 ++++ .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 159 +++++ .../docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md | 81 +++ aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md | 300 +++++++++ .../specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md | 112 ++++ .../specs/components/library-policy-store.md | 112 ++++ .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 80 +++ .../specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 304 +++++++++ .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 178 ++++++ aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md | 171 +++++ aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md | 163 +++++ .../specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md | 89 +++ .../specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md | 31 + aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md | 252 ++++++++ aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md | 290 +++++++++ .../event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md | 197 ++++++ .../integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md | 173 +++++ .../specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 470 ++++++++++++++ .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 445 +++++++++++++ 26 files changed, 5408 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md create mode 100644 aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a9255fb48 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +# AIAC Architectural Summary + +## Abstract + +AI-based Access Control (AIAC) is a Kagenti platform extension that automates RBAC/ABAC policy +enforcement for AI agents running on Kubernetes. A LangGraph-based AI agent continuously translates +a natural-language access control policy — stored in a vector knowledge base — into concrete +permission configurations in the active Policy Decision Point (PDP), eliminating manual policy +administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. The PDP backend is OPA, +which evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; Keycloak remains the identity provider for entity +management (subjects, roles, services). + +--- + +## Problem Description + +Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Every call must carry a token scoped to +exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. Without a dedicated +policy management layer, access policy ends up scattered across per-deployment configuration, +creating three compounding problems: + +1. **Policy drift** — new services and roles are onboarded without corresponding permission + updates because there is no automated mechanism to apply them. +2. **Distributed policy intent** — no single authoritative source declares what roles may do; + policy knowledge is fragmented across deployments. +3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping OPA policy rules consistent with a growing fleet + of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. + +--- + +## Problem Solution + +AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concerns: + +| Layer | Component | Responsibility | +|---|---|---| +| **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | + +The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle +events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG +knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated +PDP Policy Writer. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target +`audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and +issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. +**Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC.** + +--- + +## Major Use-Cases + +### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (On-boarding / Off-boarding) + +**Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. + +The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves +relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current OPA policy state, and asks the LLM to +compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected entity. The diff is validated by a +second LLM pass and applied to OPA as updated Rego rules. Supports both **auto-apply** (fully +automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. + +### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation + +**Trigger:** An operator ingests updated documents into the RAG store. + +After ingestion the RAG Ingest Service publishes a build event. The AIAC Agent retrieves all +relevant context, computes a full policy diff against current OPA state, and applies the delta. +A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all OPA policy rules before +recomputing from scratch — used when policy changes are too broad for incremental diff. + +### UC-3 · Entitlements Review + +**Trigger:** Operator request (on-demand or scheduled). + +The agent evaluates all current OPA policy rules — including manually added ones that AIAC did +not create — against the natural-language policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and +policy-agnostic entitlements, enabling audit and remediation workflows. + +### UC-4 · Access Request + +**Trigger:** User request via chatbot. + +A user requests an entitlement grant. The agent verifies the request against the policy +(permissive approach) and either auto-grants or routes to a human approver (man-in-the-loop). +Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during UC-3 reviews. + +--- + +## AIAC Component Architecture + +Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. + +| # | Component | Description | +|---|-----------|-------------| +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.policy.library`. | +| 3 | **Policy Store** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Computation Engine to read current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.policy.store.library`. | +| 4 | **Policy Computation Engine** | Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No service, no Kubernetes deployment. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from AIAC Agent sub-agents, queries IdP to resolve owning services, additively merges rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, and pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer. Single entry point: `compute_and_apply(rules)`. | +| 5 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 6 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 8 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to IdP and policy services via `aiac.idp.configuration`, `aiac.policy.model`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and `aiac.policy.computation` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | + +``` + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ ▲ + │ | + (𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘤𝘭𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴) (𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘻𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 𝘊𝘙) +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ + │ │ + │ │ + │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ │ Policy Store Pod │ + │ │ │ + │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ + │ │ │ Policy Store Service │ │ + │ │ │ │ │ + │ │ │ (SQLite policy.db) │ │ + │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ + │ │ ▲ │ + │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod └───────────────────┐ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ Policy Compute Engn │◄──│ AIAC Agent │◄─────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └──────────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ + │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) +┌─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ │ +│ Policy / Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ RAG Ingest Service │──►│ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ +│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +``` + +All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via +`kubectl port-forward` (operator/developer) or NATS publish (Keycloak SPI, RAG Ingest). + +--- + +## Kagenti / Keycloak / OPA Interfaces + +**AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** +The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library` and +`aiac.pdp.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components +needing typed access to IdP configuration and PDP policy state. + +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak** +The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic IdP entity +names (subjects, roles, services, scopes). The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle +events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. + +**AIAC ↔ OPA** +The PDP Policy Writer writes LLM-generated Rego rules to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. +Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. + +**AIAC ↔ Policy Management Service** +The Policy Management Service writes structured `AgentPolicyModel` data to a SQLite store +(in-memory cache + write-through to `/data/state.db` on a dedicated PVC) — the source of truth +for policy state that the AIAC Agent diffs against before writing updated Rego rules to OPA. + +**AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** +The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. +Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a dead-letter subject. + +--- + +## Call Flows + +#### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ CLIENT_CREATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.service.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ (durable consumer, at-least-once delivery) + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute AgentPolicyModel for new service (inbound + outbound rules) + │ 7. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. POST /policy/agents/{service_id} (write agent policy) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-1b · Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.role.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ REALM_ROLE_CREATED / REALM_ROLE_UPDATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.role.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute PolicyModel delta for all services affected by the role change + │ 6. [LLM] validate policy model against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.policy.build`) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /ingest/policy/{text|file|url} + ▼ + RAG Ingest Service + │ 2. upsert documents ──► ChromaDB + │ 3. publish aiac.apply.policy.build + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 4. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 7. [LLM] compute full PolicyModel delta against current OPA state + │ 8. POST /policy (write updated PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/policy/rebuild`, operator-only) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 3. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute complete PolicyModel from scratch + │ 6. POST /policy (write full PolicyModel) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + ▼ + (synchronous HTTP response to operator) +``` + +--- diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..386d23077 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -0,0 +1,590 @@ +# PRD: AI-based Access Control (AIAC) + +## Abstract + +AI-based Access Control (AIAC) is a Kagenti platform extension that automates RBAC/ABAC policy +enforcement for AI agents running on Kubernetes. A LangGraph-based AI agent continuously translates +a natural-language access control policy — stored in a vector knowledge base — into concrete +permission configurations in the active Policy Decision Point (PDP), eliminating manual policy +administration and preventing policy drift as services and roles evolve. The PDP backend is OPA, +which evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; Keycloak remains the identity provider for entity +management (subjects, roles, services). + +--- + +## 1. Problem Description + +Kagenti AI agents call services across a shared platform. Every call must carry a token scoped to +exactly the permissions the caller's role entitles on the target service. Without a dedicated +policy management layer, access policy ends up scattered across per-deployment configuration, +creating three compounding problems: + +1. **Policy drift** — new services and roles are onboarded without corresponding permission + updates because there is no automated mechanism to apply them. +2. **Distributed policy intent** — no single authoritative source declares what roles may do; + policy knowledge is fragmented across deployments. +3. **Manual administration overhead** — keeping OPA policy rules consistent with a growing fleet + of agents and tools requires ongoing human attention with no audit trail. + +--- + +## 2. Problem Solution + +AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concerns: a **Policy +Management** layer (AIAC Agent) that translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration, a +**Policy Decision** layer (OPA) that evaluates caller entitlements, and a **Policy Enforcement** +layer (AuthBridge) that intercepts traffic and exchanges tokens but carries no policy knowledge of +its own. + +The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle +events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG +knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated +PDP Policy Writer. **Policy intent lives entirely in the PDP, not in per-pod configuration.** + +--- + +## 3. Design Principles + +### PDP/PEP separation + +AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model: + +| Layer | Component | Role | +|---|---|---| +| **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; decides what a caller may access | +| **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | + +The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. + +This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration carries routing intent only (`host` → `target_audience`). Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC. + +--- + +## 4. Major Use-Cases + +### UC-1 · Continuous Access Reconciliation (On-boarding / Off-boarding) + +**Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. + +The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves +relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current OPA policy state, and asks the LLM to +compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected entity. The diff is validated by a +second LLM pass and applied to OPA as updated Rego rules. Supports both **auto-apply** (fully +automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. + +### UC-2 · Policy Update Reconciliation + +**Trigger:** An operator ingests updated documents into the RAG store. + +After ingestion the RAG Ingest Service publishes a build event. The AIAC Agent retrieves all +relevant context, computes a full policy diff against current OPA state, and applies the delta. +A `rebuild` variant (operator-only, direct HTTP) first clears all OPA policy rules before +recomputing from scratch — used when policy changes are too broad for incremental diff. + +### UC-3 · Entitlements Review + +**Trigger:** Operator request (on-demand or scheduled). + +The agent evaluates all current OPA policy rules — including manually added ones that AIAC did not +create — against the natural-language policy. It reports compliant, non-compliant, and +policy-agnostic entitlements, enabling audit and remediation workflows. + +### UC-4 · Access Request + +**Trigger:** User request via chatbot. + +A user requests an entitlement grant. The agent verifies the request against the policy +(permissive approach) and either auto-grants or routes to a human approver (man-in-the-loop). +Manually granted entitlements are flagged as policy-agnostic and surfaced during UC-3 reviews. + +--- + +## 5. Architecture Overview + +Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all implemented in Python 3.12. External dependencies: Keycloak Admin API, an LLM API, and an embedding API. The Keycloak SPI listener is defined in a separate PRD. + +### Component Summary + +| # | Component | Description | +|---|-----------|-------------| +| 1 | **IdP Configuration Service** | REST service that exposes IdP entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) for read and write operations. Read methods enrich services with assigned roles/scopes and enrich roles with child roles. Backed by Keycloak. Python library: `aiac.idp.configuration`. | +| 2 | **PDP Policy Writer** | REST service that applies LLM-generated Rego rules to the OPA backend. Writes derived Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Exposed as ClusterIP service `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`. Python library: `aiac.pdp.policy.library`. | +| 3 | **Policy Store** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Computation Engine to read current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.policy.store.library`. | +| 4 | **Policy Computation Engine** | Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No service, no Kubernetes deployment. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from AIAC Agent sub-agents, queries IdP to resolve owning services, additively merges rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, and pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer. Single entry point: `compute_and_apply(rules)`. | +| 5 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | +| 6 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | +| 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 8 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to IdP and policy services via `aiac.idp.configuration`, `aiac.policy.model`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and `aiac.policy.computation` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | + +### High-level architecture + +``` + (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗣𝗜) (𝗞𝘂𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗖𝗥 𝗔𝗣𝗜) + ▲ ▲ + │ | + (𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘳𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘴, 𝘤𝘭𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴) (𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘻𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 𝘊𝘙) +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ +│ Kagenti Interface Pod │ │ +│ │ │ │ +│ ┌───────┴──────┐ ┌────────┴───────┐ │ +│ │ IdP Config │ │ PDP Policy │ │ +│ │ Service │ │ Writer (OPA) │ │ +│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ +│ ▲ ▲ │ +└──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ + │ │ + │ │ + │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ + │ │ Policy Store Pod │ + │ │ │ + │ │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ + │ │ │ Policy Store Service │ │ + │ │ │ │ │ + │ │ │ (SQLite policy.db) │ │ + │ │ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ + │ │ ▲ │ + │ └──────────────────┼───────────────────┘ + │ │ +┌──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────┐ +│ Agent Pod └───────────────────┐ │ │ │ Event Broker Pod │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ +│ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ Policy Compute Engn │◄──│ AIAC Agent │◄─────────┼──┼──│ NATS JetStream │ │ +│ └──────────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ (𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺) │ │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ +│ │ │ │ ▲ ▲ │ +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┘ └─────────┼──────────────┼───────┘ + │ (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) (𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩) +┌─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┐ │ │ +│ Policy / Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) +│ ▼ │ +│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │ +│ │ RAG Ingest Service │──►│ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ +│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘ │ +└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +``` + +All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively via +`kubectl port-forward` (operator/developer) or NATS publish (Keycloak SPI, RAG Ingest). + +### Call Flows + +#### UC-1a · Service On-boarding (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ CLIENT_CREATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.service.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ (durable consumer, at-least-once delivery) + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /services, /roles, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. GET /services/{id}/roles, /services/{id}/scopes ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute list[PolicyRule] for new service (inbound + outbound rules) + │ 7. [LLM] validate policy rules against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 8. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-1b · Role On-boarding (`aiac.apply.role.{id}`) + +``` + Keycloak SPI + │ REALM_ROLE_CREATED / REALM_ROLE_UPDATED + │ 1. publish aiac.apply.role.{id} + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 2. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 3. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 4. semantic query (policy + domain knowledge) ──► ChromaDB + │ 5. [LLM] compute list[PolicyRule] delta for all services affected by the role change + │ 6. [LLM] validate policy rules against retrieved policy (second pass) + │ 7. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 8. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2a · Incremental Policy Update (`aiac.apply.policy.build`) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /ingest/policy/{text|file|url} + ▼ + RAG Ingest Service + │ 2. upsert documents ──► ChromaDB + │ 3. publish aiac.apply.policy.build + ▼ + NATS JetStream + │ 4. deliver event + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 5. GET /roles, /services, /assignments ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 6. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 7. [LLM] compute list[PolicyRule] delta against current OPA state + │ 8. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 9. ACK message + ▼ + NATS JetStream (message removed from pending) +``` + +#### UC-2b · Full Rebuild (`POST /apply/policy/rebuild`, operator-only) + +``` + Operator + │ 1. POST /apply/policy/rebuild (kubectl port-forward → Agent pod) + ▼ + AIAC Agent + │ 2. DELETE /policy (clear all OPA policy rules) ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + │ 3. DELETE /policy (clear Policy Store) ──► Policy Store + │ 4. GET /roles, /services (read fresh entity state) ──► IdP Configuration Service ──► Keycloak Admin REST + │ 5. retrieve full policy context ──► ChromaDB + │ 6. [LLM] compute complete list[PolicyRule] from scratch + │ 7. compute_and_apply(rules) ──► Policy Computation Engine + │ ├── get_services_by_role / get_services_by_scope ──► IdP Configuration Service + │ ├── get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy ──► Policy Store + │ └── apply_policy ──► PDP Policy Writer ──► AuthorizationPolicy CR + ▼ + (synchronous HTTP response to operator) +``` + +### Component dependencies + +| Component | Called by | Calls | Returns | +|-----------|-----------|-------|---------| +| IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | +| PDP Policy Writer — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | +| Policy Store (StatefulSet `aiac-policy-store`) | `aiac.policy.store.library` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | +| Policy Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation`) | AIAC Agent sub-UC agents | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | None (fire-and-forget; logs exceptions) | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.model`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Policy Computation Engine, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | +| `aiac.policy.model` | `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.policy.computation`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for policy entities (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `aiac.policy.computation` | PDP Policy Writer — OPA (HTTP) | None (writes Rego policy rules to AuthorizationPolicy CR) | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `aiac.policy.computation` | Policy Store (HTTP) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; None on write/delete | +| ChromaDB | RAG Ingest Service (writes), AIAC Agent (reads) | — | Policy and domain knowledge vectors | +| RAG Ingest Service | Developer (via `kubectl port-forward`) | ChromaDB, Embedding API, Event Broker | — | +| Event Broker (NATS JetStream) | Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service (publishers); NATS JetStream (DLQ routing) | — | Durable event delivery to AIAC Agent; DLQ on max retries | +| AIAC Agent | Event Broker (NATS consumer), operator (`/apply/policy/rebuild` HTTP direct) | Service Onboarding / Policy Update / Role Update orchestrators → `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.computation`, ChromaDB, LLM API, Kubernetes API | Rego policy written to AuthorizationPolicy CR; structured policy written to Policy Store (SQLite); provisioned service permissions/scopes (onboarding) | + +### Key architectural decisions + +- **Stateless PDP services are co-located in the Kagenti Interface Pod; the stateful Policy Store is separate.** IdP Configuration Service and PDP Policy Writer run as two containers in the Interface Pod, sharing a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. The Policy Store is a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) with its own PVC — decoupled from the Interface Pod's restart lifecycle. Three ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`, `aiac-policy-store-service:7074`) provide stable addressing. +- **Policy Computation Engine is a library, not a service.** `aiac.policy.computation` runs in-process within the AIAC Agent pod. It requires no Kubernetes deployment, no container image, and no ClusterIP Service. Sub-agents call `compute_and_apply(rules)` directly. +- **One CR + one SQLite store, distinct owners, distinct purposes.** The Policy Store owns a SQLite `agent_policies` table (backed by a 1 Gi RWO PVC) holding structured `AgentPolicyModel` data — the source of truth for policy state, served from an in-memory cache. The `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total, owned by the PDP Policy Writer) holds derived Rego packages for OPA runtime. The two services have no dependency on each other; both are driven by the PCE via their respective libraries. +- **`aiac.pdp.policy.library` has one caller: `aiac.policy.computation`.** AIAC Agent sub-agents do not call the PDP Policy Library directly; they call `compute_and_apply()` instead. This centralises all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. +- **Clean `idp` / `pdp` / `policy` Python namespace split.** IdP-related code (Keycloak entity management) lives under `aiac.idp.*`; PDP policy code (OPA Rego writing) lives under `aiac.pdp.*`; shared policy model and computation code lives under `aiac.policy.*`. +- **`aiac.policy.model` is dependency-free (only `pydantic` + `aiac.idp.configuration.models`).** `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` live in a neutral namespace importable by any consumer — Policy Store library, PDP Policy Library, PCE — without forcing a dependency on any service namespace. +- **`PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed objects.** They hold `Role` and `Scope` instances from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`, enabling the PCE to call `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope` without additional type conversion. +- **`AgentPolicyModel` relationship maps are keyed by string `id`.** `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` use the entity's string `id` as the dict key, so `Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` need no custom hash/eq and keep pydantic's default field-based equality. This also lets the maps serialize to JSON without a custom key serializer. +- **PCE merge semantics are additive only.** New rules are appended to existing `inbound_rules`/`outbound_rules`; existing rules are never removed. Rule revocation is TBD. +- **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. +- **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. +- **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. +- **RAG Pod runs ChromaDB and RAG Ingest Service together.** Exposed as `aiac-rag-service` on ports 8000 (ChromaDB default) and 7073 (RAG Ingest Service). +- **AIAC Agent is stateless.** Changes are applied immediately on trigger — no pending session or human confirmation step. +- **Event Broker decouples all automated triggers from the Agent.** The Keycloak SPI listener and RAG Ingest Service publish to NATS subjects; the Agent subscribes as a durable competing consumer. This removes all direct dependencies between trigger sources and the Agent. +- **`rebuild` bypasses the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via HTTP (`kubectl port-forward`). It is never published to NATS and has no NATS listener. +- **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. +- **Agent HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. +- **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. +- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. +- **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel`. +- **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. +- **`user/{id}` trigger not implemented.** OPA rules are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — OPA rule evaluation resolves entitlements from the caller's role automatically. + +--- + +## 6. Kagenti / Keycloak / OPA Interfaces + +**AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** +The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.configuration` and `aiac.pdp.policy.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to the IdP and PDP respectively. + +**AIAC ↔ Keycloak** +The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic entity names (subjects, roles, services, scopes, assignments). Read endpoints include per-service role and scope enrichment. The Keycloak SPI listener publishes entity lifecycle events to NATS; it is a separate component outside the AIAC codebase. + +**AIAC ↔ OPA** +The PDP Policy Writer (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each agent pod embeds two OPA plugin instances inside AuthBridge (one for the inbound pipeline, one for the outbound pipeline); each plugin fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. AuthBridge requires no changes when policy rules are updated. Full spec: [components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). + +**AIAC ↔ Event Broker (NATS JetStream)** +The Agent subscribes to the event stream as a durable consumer with at-least-once delivery. +Unacknowledged messages survive pod restarts; failed messages are routed to a dead-letter subject. +See Section 7.5 (Event Broker) and Section 8 (Deployment) for subject names and handler mapping. + +--- + +## 7. AIAC System Components + +### 7.1 IdP Configuration Service + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7071`) co-located with the PDP Policy Writer in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Manages IdP (Keycloak) entity data (subjects, roles, services, scopes) via Keycloak Admin REST API. Exposes read and write endpoints for configuration entities. Stateless. All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=` query parameter; returns `422` if absent. `/health` requires no realm parameter — it uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` directly. `KeycloakAdmin` instances are created lazily per realm and cached in a thread-safe map; the admin always authenticates via the realm in `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`. + +**Full spec:** [components/idp-configuration-service.md](components/idp-configuration-service.md) + +--- + +### 7.2 PDP Policy Writer + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7072`, `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) co-located with the IdP Configuration Service in the **Kagenti Interface Pod**. Writes LLM-generated Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. Each AuthBridge OPA plugin instance fetches its Rego packages from the CR at startup. + +**Full spec:** [components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) + +--- + +### 7.3 Policy Store + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-policy-store-service`) deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`) mounted at `/data`. Owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database (`/data/state.db`) as the authoritative structured policy store. All GET requests are served from the in-memory cache; mutations write through to SQLite synchronously; on pod restart the cache is repopulated from SQLite. The Policy Computation Engine reads current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging and writes updated state after each computation. The PDP Policy Writer has no dependency on the Policy Store; the SQLite store and `AuthorizationPolicy` CR are written by distinct services and serve distinct purposes. + +**Full spec:** [components/policy-store.md](components/policy-store.md) + +--- + +### 7.4 Policy Computation Engine + +Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No FastAPI, no Kubernetes deployment, no container image. Runs in-process within the AIAC Agent pod. AIAC Agent sub-UC agents call `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None` to translate partial policy rule lists into merged `AgentPolicyModel` objects and push them to OPA. + +The PCE is the **single point of coordination** between the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer: it reads current agent policy state, additively merges new rules, writes back to the Policy Store, then pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy()`. All exceptions are logged; none propagate to the caller. + +**Full spec:** [components/policy-computation-engine.md](components/policy-computation-engine.md) + +--- + +### 7.5 Library + +Python package at `aiac/src/`. Clean `idp` / `pdp` / `policy` namespace split: + +**IdP library** (Keycloak entity management): +- **`aiac.idp.configuration.models`** — dependency-free Pydantic models for IdP entities (`Subject`, `Role`, `Service`, `Scope`). Plain pydantic models with default field-based equality; not hashable and not used as dict keys. +- **`aiac.idp.configuration.api`** — HTTP client wrapping the IdP Configuration Service; read and write access to configuration entities; returns typed Pydantic instances; all methods require a `realm: str` parameter. Includes `get_services_by_role(role)` and `get_services_by_scope(scope)` used by the PCE. + +**Policy model** (shared, dependency-light): +- **`aiac.policy.model`** — canonical Pydantic models for policy entities (`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel`) with typed `Role`/`Scope`/`Service` fields. Importable by any consumer without pulling in HTTP or service dependencies. + +**Policy libraries** (OPA + Policy Store access): +- **`aiac.pdp.policy.library`** — HTTP client wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA). Four module-level functions: `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Called exclusively by `aiac.policy.computation`. +- **`aiac.policy.store.library`** — HTTP client wrapping the Policy Store. Six module-level functions: `get_policy`, `get_agent_policy`, `apply_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`, `delete_policy`. Returns `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` directly. Called exclusively by `aiac.policy.computation`. + +**Computation library** (policy rule processing): +- **`aiac.policy.computation`** — library module implementing `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None`. Orchestrates IdP resolution, Policy Store merge, and PDP Policy Writer push. + +**Full specs:** [components/library-idp.md](components/library-idp.md) · [components/library-pdp-policy.md](components/library-pdp-policy.md) · [components/library-policy-store.md](components/library-policy-store.md) · [components/policy-model.md](components/policy-model.md) · [components/policy-computation-engine.md](components/policy-computation-engine.md) + +--- + +### 7.6 Event Broker + +NATS JetStream pod (`aiac-event-broker-service:4222`). Decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides at-least-once delivery, replay on pod restart via `WorkQueuePolicy`, and a dead-letter subject (`aiac.apply.dlq`) after 5 failed deliveries. No authentication — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism. Stream: `aiac-events`, subjects `aiac.apply.>`, consumer group `aiac-agent-consumer`. + +**Full spec:** [components/event-broker.md](components/event-broker.md) + +--- + +### 7.7 AIAC Agent + +FastAPI + LangGraph service (`0.0.0.0:7070`). Receives automated triggers via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream durable consumer, `aiac-agent-consumer` queue group) and the operator-only `rebuild` command directly via HTTP. Structured as a thin **Controller** (`controller/routes.py`) that dispatches `/apply/*` handlers to three **Orchestrators**, each owning one or more compiled `StateGraph` sub-agents. A **NATS consumer** (asyncio background task in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler) is a thin adapter that receives NATS events and calls the same internal handler functions used by the HTTP endpoints: + +| Orchestrator | Trigger(s) | Sub-agents | +|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Provision → Service Policy Builder (sequential) | +| Policy Update | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `/apply/policy/rebuild` (HTTP) | Build sub-agent or Rebuild sub-agent (alternative) | +| Role Update | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role sub-agent | + +All sub-agent `StateGraph` instances are logically separated modules running within a single pod and process. Sub-UC agents produce `list[PolicyRule]` and call `compute_and_apply(rules)` — they do not call `aiac.policy.store.library` or `aiac.pdp.policy.library` directly. The **Policy Update** sub-agents compute a minimal rule delta between the current ChromaDB policy and live OPA state. The **Rebuild** variant additionally clears the Policy Store and all OPA policy rules before recomputing. The **Role Update** orchestrator computes rules for all services affected by the role change. The **Service Onboarding** orchestrator classifies the new service via the pod's `kagenti.io/type` label (for agents reads the `AgentCard` CR; for tools calls `tools/list` on the MCP endpoint discovered via K8s Service label lookup), then computes rules and calls `compute_and_apply`. Stateless; changes are applied immediately. Integrated retry with differentiated error codes per upstream. + +**Full spec:** [components/aiac-agent.md](components/aiac-agent.md) + +--- + +### 7.8 RAG Knowledge Base + +ChromaDB vector store (`aiac-rag-service:8000`) hosting two collections: `aiac-policies` (access control policy rules) and `aiac-domain-knowledge` (org/business context such as team rosters, application ownership, and department mappings). Both collections are managed by the RAG Ingest Service and read by the AIAC Agent. Co-located with the RAG Ingest Service in the RAG Pod. ChromaDB data is persisted on a 1 Gi PVC mounted at `/chroma/chroma`; the RAG Pod is a StatefulSet. + +**Full spec:** [components/rag-knowledge-base.md](components/rag-knowledge-base.md) + +--- + +### 7.9 RAG Ingest Service + +FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7073`) co-located with ChromaDB. Thirteen collection-parameterized endpoints across three semantics: complete collection replacement (`POST /ingest/{collection}/{text|file|url}`), document-level upsert (`POST /ingest/{collection}/update/{text|file|url}`), and explicit removal (`DELETE /ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}`). The `{collection}` slug is validated against `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). After every successful ingest the service publishes to `aiac.apply.policy.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). Developer access via `kubectl port-forward`. + +**Full spec:** [components/rag-ingest-service.md](components/rag-ingest-service.md) + +--- + +### 7.10 Keycloak SPI Listener + +A custom Keycloak Event Listener SPI (Java) that listens to Keycloak's internal event bus and translates entity-scoped events into NATS publish calls to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent subject schema is authoritative; the SPI PRD references it. + +| Keycloak Event | Event Broker subject | +|---|---| +| `REGISTER`, `UPDATE_PROFILE` (user events) | — (dropped; OPA rules are role-scoped and resolve entitlements from the caller's role automatically) | +| `CLIENT_CREATED` | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | +| Role created/updated | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | + +**Full spec:** TBD (separate PRD). + +--- + +## 8. Deployment + +### Kubernetes manifests + +Four separate manifest files: + +| File | Contents | +|------|----------| +| `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Writer container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | +| `aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet (Policy Store container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` _(pending)_ | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` _(pending)_ | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | + +The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-policy-store-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. + +### Docker images + +Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. + +```bash +# Build IdP Configuration Service (Kagenti Interface Pod container 1) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 mock (Kagenti Interface Pod container 2; writes Rego to filesystem) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 2 OPA (replaces mock via issue 4.18; writes to AuthorizationPolicy CR) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build Policy Store (deployed as StatefulSet aiac-policy-store) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile -t aiac-policy-store:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ + +# Build RAG Ingest Service +docker build -t aiac-rag-ingest:latest aiac/rag-ingest/ +``` + +The Event Broker uses the official `nats` Docker image with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag). No custom build required. + +### `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap template + +```yaml +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-pdp-config +data: + KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" + KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" + AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" + AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" + AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" + NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" + AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" + AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" +``` + +`AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` is absent — it belongs to `aiac-policy-store-config` (defined in `policy-store-statefulset.yaml`), not to the shared ConfigMap. + +### `aiac-policy-store-config` ConfigMap template + +```yaml +apiVersion: v1 +kind: ConfigMap +metadata: + name: aiac-policy-store-config +data: + AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" +``` + +Update `KEYCLOAK_URL` and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` for the target environment before applying. + +--- + +## 9. Testing + +Tests live in `aiac/test/`. + +### Unit tests + +| Target | What to mock | What to assert | +|--------|-------------|----------------| +| IdP Configuration Service endpoints | `KeycloakAdmin` methods (return fixture dicts) | Correct JSON response, 502 on Keycloak error | +| PDP Policy Writer (OPA) endpoints | Kubernetes CR write (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success, 502 on CR write error | +| Policy Store endpoints | SQLite `:memory:` database | Correct read/write/delete; 404 on missing agent; 502 on SQLite write error; 503 on SQLite open/query failure at `/health` | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` functions | Policy Store HTTP endpoints | Correct method + path per function; returns typed model on read; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.policy.model` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields; relationship maps keyed by string `id` round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate` with typed `Role` / `Scope` values preserved | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback; `get_services_by_role` and `get_services_by_scope` issue correct query params | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` functions | PDP Policy Writer HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | +| `aiac.policy.computation` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (import-boundary mocks) | Correct `apply_agent_policy` calls per resolved service; additive merge preserves existing rules; no duplicate rule insertion; `apply_policy` called once after all writes; exceptions logged, not propagated | +| Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | +| Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | +| Init container health-check | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence; NATS TCP refused then connected | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies healthy; `add_stream` called with correct config | +| AIAC Agent | TBD | TBD | + +### Integration tests + +Require a live Keycloak instance. Controlled by env vars: + +| Variable | Description | +|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Keycloak base URL | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Realm to query | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Admin username | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Admin password | + +Integration tests call the live IdP Configuration Service (running locally or via port-forward) and assert that results are non-empty lists of the correct type. Event Broker integration tests require a live NATS JetStream instance. + +Use a pytest marker (e.g. `@pytest.mark.integration`) so unit tests and integration tests can be run independently: + +```bash +pytest aiac/ -m "not integration" # unit only +pytest aiac/ -m integration # integration only +``` + +### Integration test specifications + +Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are specified **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` — a **sibling of `components/`**, following the same "one spec per unit" convention the component PRDs use. This section is the dedicated index of those specs (mirroring the Component Summary in §5) and grows as tests are added; each entry is a distinct integration test with its own spec. + +| Integration test | Description | Spec | +|---|---|---| +| PDP Policy Writer — `generate_rego.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) that boots the OPA stub locally, applies a `PolicyModel` through `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md](integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md) | +| `policy-pipeline` — `policy_pipeline.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) driving the full identity→policy pipeline — provisions a Keycloak realm + entities, runs the three PRB mappings, applies via the PCE, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/policy-pipeline.md](integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) | +| `uc1-onboarding-pipeline` — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` | Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline` validating the **phase-1** deliverable: deploys the real `github-agent` + a simplified `github-tool` to a live Kagenti cluster, drives **real UC-1 onboarding** (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) to infer roles/scopes, and asserts the generated Rego with `opa eval`. Same scenario facts/tables as `policy-pipeline`; Rego is semantically similar (not byte-identical). `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md](integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md) | + +Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`; the policy-pipeline integration test in `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`; the UC-1 onboarding pipeline integration test in `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`. + +--- + +## 10. Conventions and constraints + +- Python version: 3.12 +- Base Docker image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Linting: ruff (line length 120, target py312 per root `pyproject.toml`) +- Commits: DCO sign-off required (`git commit -s`); use `Assisted-By` not `Co-Authored-By` +- No auth on IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, RAG Ingest Service, or Event Broker — network isolation (ClusterIP + `kubectl port-forward`) is the access control mechanism +- IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, Agent, RAG Ingest Service, and Event Broker are not registered in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix; they have independent build processes +- `aiac/__init__.py` exists and is empty — `aiac` is a regular package, not a namespace package +- NATS consumer must **await** handler completion before issuing ack — fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is prohibited; premature ack breaks at-least-once delivery guarantees +- AIAC provisioning marker: every role and client scope AIAC provisions carries the Keycloak attribute `aiac.managed` = `true`, distinguishing AIAC-provisioned entities from Keycloak's built-ins (default client scopes, `default-roles-`). Realm-role attribute values are lists (`["true"]`), client-scope values are plain strings (`"true"`). The IdP Configuration Service stamps it on create and returns full role representations so it survives reads; the Policy Computation Engine filters on it (`Role.aiac_managed` / `Scope.aiac_managed`) when embedding each agent's own roles/scopes (P2) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5b2952c52 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +# Component PRD: AIAC Agent + +## Description + +A LangGraph-based AI agent service that enforces a natural-language access control policy against the live PDP state. Triggered via the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) for all automated triggers, and directly via HTTP for the operator-only `rebuild` command: + +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.service.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.role.{id}` subject (originated by Keycloak SPI role created/updated) +- **Event Broker** → `aiac.apply.policy.build` subject (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) +- **Operator/admin call** → `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` directly via `kubectl port-forward` (HTTP only — not routed through Event Broker) + +The Agent subscribes to the Event Broker as a durable competing consumer (`aiac-agent-consumer` queue group). It acknowledges each message only after successful processing — ensuring at-least-once delivery and automatic replay on pod restart. + +The `/apply/*` HTTP endpoints are retained as a debugging escape hatch. The **NATS consumer is a thin adapter layer** that receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal `/apply/*` handler functions — there is no duplicated business logic. + +The service is structured as a **Controller** (FastAPI routes) that dispatches to the **Service Onboarding Orchestrator** (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update and Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) directly, merges the results internally, and returns a single `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. + +| Use Case | Dispatch | Sub-agents | Sub-agent output | +|---|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding (UC1) | via Orchestrator | Service Provision + Service Policy Builder | `list[PolicyRule]` | +| Policy Update (UC2) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Build or Rebuild (TBD) | `list[PolicyRule]` | +| Role Update (UC3) | Controller → sub-agent directly | Role sub-agent | `list[PolicyRule]` | + +Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** (`agent/policy_rules_builder/`) for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, merges the results, and returns a single `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once — no shared apply node exists. The PCE owns all Policy Store ↔ PDP Policy Writer coordination. Neither sub-agents nor the Policy Rules Builder call `aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly. + +All components are **logically separated modules within a single pod and process** — no inter-service network calls between orchestrators and sub-agents. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.>"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/*\n(debugging + rebuild)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] + ORC1["Orchestrator"] + SA1["Service Provision"] + SA2["Service Policy Builder"] + ORC1 --> SA1 + ORC1 --> SA2 + end + + subgraph PU["Policy Update"] + SA4["Build"] + SA5["Rebuild"] + SA5 -->|"delegates"| SA4 + end + + subgraph RR["Role Update"] + SA6["Role"] + end + + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(rules)"] + + CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC1 + CTRL -->|"build"| SA4 + CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA5 + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA6 + + SA2 -->|"calls"| PRB + SA4 -->|"calls"| PRB + SA6 -->|"calls"| PRB + + ORC1 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA4 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA5 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + SA6 -->|"list[PolicyRule]"| CTRL + + CTRL -->|"merged rules"| PCE +``` + +--- + +## NATS Consumer + +A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespan` handler. It subscribes to the `aiac.apply.>` wildcard on the `aiac-events` NATS JetStream stream using the `aiac-agent-consumer` durable queue group. + +### Dispatch table + +| Subject pattern | Internal handler | +|---|---| +| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) | +| `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role Update sub-agent (UC3, via Controller) | +| `aiac.apply.policy.build` | Policy Update Build sub-agent (UC2, via Controller) | + +### Ack contract + +The consumer **awaits** the internal handler before issuing the NATS acknowledgement. On handler success → ack. On handler exception → do not ack; NATS redelivers after `AckWait`. After 5 unacknowledged redeliveries, NATS routes the message to `aiac.apply.dlq`. + +Fire-and-forget (`asyncio.create_task`) is explicitly prohibited — acking before handler completion would break at-least-once guarantees. + +### Failure isolation + +The consumer and the FastAPI HTTP server share the same process. If the Agent pod crashes mid-processing, the in-flight message was never acked and NATS redelivers it to the next pod instance. This prevents the consumer from exhausting retry counts against an unavailable handler (which would occur if they were separate containers). + +### Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | + +--- + +## Controller + +The Controller is a FastAPI routes layer (`controller/routes.py`). Its responsibilities are: + +- Parse the trigger type and entity ID from the request path. +- Dispatch to the Service Onboarding Orchestrator (UC1) or directly to the Policy Update / Role Update sub-agents (UC2, UC3). +- Receive the `list[PolicyRule]` returned by the Orchestrator or sub-agent (already merged by the sub-agent). +- Call `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. +- Return a bare HTTP status code to the caller; write summary and debug info to the log. + +No per-use-case business logic, retry handling, or state assembly lives in the Controller. PRB calls are owned by the producing sub-agents; the Controller's shared step is the single PCE call. + +--- + +## Use Cases + +Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: + +| Use Case | Sub-PRD | Trigger(s) | Notes | +|---|---|---|---| +| Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy Builder (IdP reader + PRB invoker) | +| Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | +| Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | | + +> **Note:** Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). + +### IdP access — library, not service + +Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy Builder, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC3 Role) performs **all** IdP reads and writes through the **idp-library** API — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — and **never** calls the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. The library owns the HTTP transport, retry/backoff, and Keycloak↔model mapping; sub-agents depend only on its typed `Configuration` methods (e.g. `get_service`, `get_roles`, `get_scopes`, `create_service_role`, `create_service_scope`, `set_service_type`). The shared service-type vocabulary is `aiac.idp.configuration.models.ServiceType` (`Agent`/`Tool`) — the same enum used by `Service.type`. See [library-idp.md](library-idp.md). + +--- + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Orchestrator | Sub-agent | +|---|---|---|---| +| POST | `/apply/policy/build` | Policy Update | Build | +| POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | +| POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | +| POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision | + +All endpoints return bare HTTP status codes: `200 OK` on success (no response body), and the status codes from the Error Handling table on upstream failure. Success responses carry no body; upstream failures are raised as FastAPI `HTTPException`s, so error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body (`{"detail": ...}`) alongside the status code. Summary, applied-rule details, and debug information are written to the service log. Validation failures surface as an error status and log entry; detailed reporting is specified in [policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). + +--- + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.idp.configuration.api` (in-process via PCE) | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (in-process via PCE) | +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) — used by `aiac.policy.store.library` (in-process via PCE) | +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | — | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `LLM_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `LLM_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | +| `AIAC_AC_MODEL` | `RBAC` | ConfigMap (accepted: `RBAC`, `ABAC`, `REBAC`) | +| `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` | `10` | ConfigMap | +| `MAX_CHANGES_PER_RUN` | `50` | ConfigMap | +| `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | `3` | ConfigMap | + +ChromaDB collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`. + +--- + +## Error Handling + +All upstream calls are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times with exponential backoff (`tenacity`) before propagating the error. The retry primitive is the project-level shared `run_upstream(fn)` helper (`aiac/shared/upstream.py`), which is transport-agnostic: it re-raises the original exception after the final attempt. Retry is applied at the **transport boundary**, not at the agent call sites — inside the idp-library `Configuration` (its `_request` helper), inside the provision MCP helper (`_mcp_tools_list`), and inside the provision Kubernetes seam (`uc/onboarding/provision/kube.py`). Each caller then maps the re-raised failure to the status below (e.g. an IdP/Kubernetes failure → `502`). + +| Upstream | HTTP status on final failure | +|---|---| +| ChromaDB | `503 Service Unavailable` | +| IdP Configuration Service | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| PDP Policy Writer | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| Kubernetes API | `502 Bad Gateway` | +| LLM API | `504 Gateway Timeout` | + +Upstream failures propagate as bare HTTP error responses (see table above), raised as FastAPI `HTTPException`s; the status code is authoritative and error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body (`{"detail": ...}`). All failure details are logged. + +--- + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7070` +- State: stateless — changes applied immediately, no pending session required +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` + +--- + +## File Structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/ +├── shared/ ← project-level shared: run_upstream (upstream.py) — transport retry primitive +└── agent/ + ├── controller/ + ├── shared/ ← flatten_role (roles.py) + ├── uc/ + │ ├── onboarding/ + │ │ ├── orchestrator.py ← sequences provision → policy_builder, returns list[PolicyRule] + │ │ ├── provision/ ← LLM sub-agent: classify, analyze, write to IdP; kube.py = retrying K8s seam + │ │ └── policy_builder/ ← IdP reader + PRB invoker: read IdP, call PRB, return list[PolicyRule] + │ ├── policy_update/ + │ │ ├── build/ ← calls PRB, returns list[PolicyRule]; TBD internals + │ │ └── rebuild/ ← delegates to Build; TBD internals + │ └── role_update/ ← calls PRB with (role, all_scopes), returns list[PolicyRule] + └── policy_rules_builder/ ← shared; called by Service Policy Builder, Build, and Role sub-agent +``` + +Docker build command (run from repo root): + +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-agent:latest \ + aiac/src/ +``` + +--- + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +langgraph +langchain-openai +chromadb +tenacity +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +requests +python-dotenv +kubernetes +nats-py +``` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..523c92a95 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +# Sub-PRD: AIAC Agent — Policy Rules Builder + +## Description + +The **Policy Rules Builder** (PRB) is a shared module at `agent/policy_rules_builder/`. It +exposes two module-level functions that producing sub-agents call directly. Each function +internally runs a LangGraph `StateGraph`; callers are decoupled from LangGraph mechanics. The +PRB fetches its own policy context (see **Policy source** below), reasons over it with an LLM, +and emits `list[PolicyRule]` scoped to the input. It does **not** call +`aiac.pdp.policy.library` or `aiac.policy.store.library` directly; only the PCE does. + +--- + +## Entry points + +```python +def build_role_rules(role: Role, scopes: list[Scope]) -> list[PolicyRule]: ... +def build_scope_rules(roles: list[Role], scope: Scope) -> list[PolicyRule]: ... +``` + +**`build_role_rules`** — role-centric: "given this role, which scopes does it get?" +Used for UC3 (Role Update). Called once per role with the full set of scopes relevant to the trigger. + +**`build_scope_rules`** — scope-centric: "given this scope, which roles may access it?" +Used as one of the calls for UC1 (Service Onboarding). See the Controller sub-PRD for the full UC1 dispatch pattern. + +Each call handles exactly **one focal entity** (the singular argument) against a list of +candidate counterparts; the caller (UC handler) does all iteration. + +--- + +## Policy source (two phases) + +Policy context is fetched behind a `PolicySource` seam, so the retrieval mechanism can change +without touching the rest of the graph. + +- **Phase 1 (current):** the entire access-control policy lives in a **single file**; the PRB + reads the whole file into the proposer prompt. No ChromaDB, no domain-knowledge collection. + Located via `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` (default `/etc/aiac/policy.md`), read as UTF-8; a + missing/unreadable file raises. +- **Phase 2 (later issue):** policy **and** domain knowledge live in a ChromaDB vector store; + the PRB does RAG retrieval over the `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge` collections + (query text derived from the focal entity), respecting `CHROMA_N_RESULTS`. This swaps in a + `ChromaPolicySource` at the same seam. + +--- + +## Contract + +| Aspect | Decision | +|---|---| +| Structure | LangGraph `StateGraph` — nodes `fetch → propose → precheck → audit → build`; `audit → propose` retry edge; two typed graphs (role / scope) sharing node helpers | +| Context retrieval | Two-phase via a `PolicySource` seam — Phase 1 whole-file read; Phase 2 ChromaDB RAG (both collections). See **Policy source** | +| Realm parameter | None — inputs are pre-resolved typed objects; the policy source is not realm-scoped | +| Trigger type in state | None — the function name encodes the direction; no routing field in state | +| Output shape | Proposer emits **names** (via `with_structured_output`); the PRB rebuilds `PolicyRule`s from the **typed inputs** filtered by name — never from LLM-produced fields | +| Dedup | PRB generates a full rule set; the PCE's additive merge handles dedup on write | +| LLM call pattern | **Propose → LLM auditor** (2 structured calls). Auditor rejection feeds its reason back into propose (bounded fix-and-retry, `MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES = 3`); raises on exhaustion | +| Empty result | An auditor-**approved** empty selection is a valid `[]` (deny-by-default). Empty proposals are still audited | +| Error contract | Raises on policy-source failure, LLM failure, or audit-budget exhaustion — no silent empty-list returns | + +--- + +## Internal graph design + +Both entry points compile the same node shape (two typed graphs sharing pure node helpers): + +``` +fetch ─► propose ─► precheck ─► audit ─┬─ approved ─► build ─► END + ▲ │ + └───────── retry ────────────┘ (audit feeds its reason back to propose) + │ + rejected & budget exhausted ─► RAISE (inside audit node) +``` + +- **fetch** — `PolicySource.fetch()` → `policy_text` (Phase 1: whole file). +- **propose** — proposer messages (policy + focal + candidates + any `audit_feedback`); + `with_structured_output(Selection)` → selected names + reasoning. +- **precheck** — deterministic: keep only names present in the candidate set (drop hallucinated + names; log drops). No LLM. +- **audit** — auditor messages; `with_structured_output(AuditVerdict)` → `{approved, reason}`. + Approved → continue; rejected → feed the reason back and retry, or raise once + `MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES` is exhausted. Empty proposals are audited too. +- **build** — reconstruct `PolicyRule`s from the typed inputs filtered by the approved names. + +### Structured-output schemas + +```python +class RoleSelection(BaseModel): # build_role_rules (role focal, scope candidates) + granted_scope_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + +class ScopeSelection(BaseModel): # build_scope_rules (scope focal, role candidates) + roles_with_access_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + +class AuditVerdict(BaseModel): + approved: bool + reason: str | None +``` + +The PRB rebuilds rules from the typed inputs, e.g. +`[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=s) for s in scopes if s.name in granted_scope_names]`. + +### State fields + +```python +class _PRBWorking(TypedDict): + policy_text: str + selected_names: list[str] + reasoning: str + approved: bool + audit_feedback: str | None + retry_count: int + rules: list[PolicyRule] + +class RoleRulesState(_PRBWorking): # role: Role; scopes: list[Scope] + ... +class ScopeRulesState(_PRBWorking): # roles: list[Role]; scope: Scope + ... +``` + +### Prompts + +Lean — task framing, the structured-output contract, and two **safety** meta-rules +(**deny-by-default / policy-silence** — grant a pair only if the policy supports it — and +**scope-strictly-to-focal**). On top of those, two shared **mapping** rules (`_MAPPING_RULES`) +govern how evidence becomes a grant: + +- **Capability projection** — a scope names a *set* of operations; any one covered operation + established for a candidate (by the policy or by the focal/candidate descriptions) grants the + whole scope, so partial (e.g. read-only) access still earns it. +- **Relationship scoping** — a policy may state several access relationships over the same + entities; each grant is judged only by evidence about *that* candidate and the focal entity, and + a statement about an entity that is neither the focal nor a candidate (even a same-theme one) is a + different relationship that never counts either way. + +No worked examples or domain heuristics; all substantive reasoning is deferred to the +(user-authored) policy content and the entity descriptions. The **proposer and auditor share the +same rule set** — both make the same grant decision, so a rule on only one side lets the two +diverge (they did: see issue 3.20 *Follow-up: cross-variant convergence*). The auditor adds only +its framing: approve only if every granted pair is policy-supported and nothing unsupported +slipped in. + +### LLM + retries + +`ChatOpenAI(base_url=LLM_BASE_URL, model=LLM_MODEL, api_key=LLM_API_KEY, temperature=0)`. Two +retry layers, kept distinct: + +- **`MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES`** (module constant, default `3`) — the semantic fix-and-retry loop + between audit and propose. +- **`UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES`** (env, default `3`) — tenacity (`stop_after_attempt`, exponential + backoff, `reraise=True`) around each LLM call for transport failures. The Phase-1 file read + does **not** retry; it raises directly. + +--- + +## Use-case dispatch + +| Use Case | Caller | Function(s) called | +|---|---|---| +| UC1 — Service Onboarding | Service Policy Builder sub-agent | `build_scope_rules(other_roles, scope)` per agent/tool scope + `build_role_rules(role, other_scopes)` per agent role (agent path only) | +| UC2 — Policy Update (Build) | Build sub-agent | TBD | +| UC3 — Role Update | Role sub-agent | `build_role_rules(role, all_scopes)` — one call | + +--- + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Used for | Phase | +|---|---|---| +| `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | Path to the whole-file access policy (default `/etc/aiac/policy.md`) | 1 | +| `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM calls | 1 | +| `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` | Transport retry budget for LLM (and, in Phase 2, ChromaDB) calls (tenacity, default `3`) | 1 | +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | ChromaDB endpoint | 2 | +| `CHROMA_N_RESULTS` | Number of results per ChromaDB query (default `10`) | 2 | + +`MAX_AUDIT_RETRIES` (default `3`) is a module constant, not an env var. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8027a1dc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +# Component Sub-PRD: UC1 — Service Onboarding + +> **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. + +> **IdP access — library, not service.** All IdP reads and writes go through the **idp-library** API (`aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration`), **never** the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. See [aiac-agent.md → IdP access](../aiac-agent.md#idp-access--library-not-service). + +## Triggers + +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI `CLIENT_CREATED`) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/service/{service_id}` | + +## Architecture overview + +UC1 is the only use case with an Orchestrator, because it is a two-stage pipeline: + +1. **Service Provision** (LLM-based): classify the new service, derive its roles + scopes, write them into the IdP. +2. **Service Policy Builder** (deterministic): read the full IdP role + scope universe (excluding the new service's own entities), call the PRB for each applicable pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. + +The Orchestrator returns `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. The Controller calls the PCE with that `override` flag; the PCE owns all rule reconciliation. UC1 is **incremental** — existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access — so the mode is always append (`override=False`). + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.service.{id}"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/service/{service_id}\n(debug)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph CO["Service Onboarding"] + ORC["Orchestrator"] + SA_PROV["Service Provision\n(LLM)"] + SA_POL["Service Policy Builder\n(deterministic)"] + ORC --> SA_PROV + ORC --> SA_POL + end + + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)"] + + CTRL -->|"service/:id"| ORC + SA_POL -->|"calls"| PRB + ORC -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override=False)"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules, override=False"| PCE +``` + +## Orchestrator + +`onboarding/orchestrator.py` + +**Sequence:** +1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. +2. Call `ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy Builder re-reads the service's own roles/scopes from the IdP by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted them), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. +3. Return `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. + +No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. + +**Replay safety (at-least-once delivery):** Service Provision IdP writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get by name: `create_service_role` / `create_service_scope` return the existing entity on a duplicate call). The PCE reconcile is also idempotent. If the pod crashes between Service Provision completing and the PCE call, NATS redelivers and the full pipeline re-runs safely to convergence. There is **no rollback logic**. + +--- + +## Sub-agent: Service Provision + +`onboarding/provision/` + +**Nature:** LLM-based. Classifies the new service (agent or tool), derives roles + scopes from AgentCard / MCP manifest, and **writes them into the IdP**. + +All IdP writes and reads target the **idp-library** — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — not the IdP service directly: +- `create_service_role(service_id, role)` — idempotent (create-or-get by name, then map) +- `create_service_scope(service_id, scope)` — idempotent (create-or-get by name, then map) + +### Graph + +``` +START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_service → END +``` + +### Nodes + +- **`classify_service`**: resolves identity + determines service type from the operator's authoritative `kagenti.io/type` label (values `agent`/`tool`) — **not** from the `entity_id` format. + 1. Store `service_id = trigger.entity_id` (Keycloak `client_id`). + 2. Resolve identity: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` → `client.name`, which the kagenti-operator sets to `"{namespace}/{workload_name}"` for every workload (agents and tools, SPIRE-enabled or not). Split on the first `/` → store `namespace` and `workload_name`. `502` if `client.name` has no `/` (namespace unrecoverable). + 3. LIST pods in `namespace`; select the pod owned by `workload_name` via `ownerReferences` (Deployment → ReplicaSet name prefix, or `StatefulSet`/`Sandbox` name match). `502` on Kubernetes API failure or no matching pod. + 4. Read the `kagenti.io/type` label on that pod and normalize it to a `ServiceType` + member via `ServiceType(label.capitalize())` — the label is lowercase + (`agent`/`tool`); `ServiceType` values are capitalized (`Agent`/`Tool`): + - `agent` → `ServiceType.AGENT`; route to `analyze_agent`. + - `tool` → `ServiceType.TOOL`; route to `analyze_tool`. + - Absent or any other value (normalization raises `ValueError`) → `502` (inconsistent deployment). + + > K8s access: `list` on `pods` in the target namespace (both paths). + > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied by the kagenti-operator (via the AgentRuntime CR) and propagated to pod labels; it is the operator's own agent/tool discriminator (`SkipReason`, kagenti-operator `internal/clientreg/names.go`). The operator only registers a Keycloak client for a workload that already carries this label, so it is effectively guaranteed for operator-registered clients; a missing/invalid value still fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + label). The `entity_id` format (SPIFFE vs plain) reflects whether SPIRE is enabled, **not** the service type, so it is not used for classification. + +- **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR. + 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one matching `workload_name`. + 2. **AgentCard found** → produce `ServiceProvision`: + - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{skill.name}", description=skill.description) for skill in card.skills]` + - `reasoning`: `f"derived from AgentCard: {len(skills)} skills"` + 3. **AgentCard not found** (legacy deployment) → produce minimal `ServiceProvision`: + - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.access", description="Default access scope")]` + - `reasoning`: `"partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned"` + + > K8s access: `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. + +- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools. `namespace` + `workload_name` are already resolved by `classify_service` (from the `client.name` split). MCP endpoint lookup uses the **hybrid Keycloak→K8s strategy** decided in issue [`6.2`](../../issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md): the Keycloak client name supplied the key `{namespace, workload_name}`; K8s supplies the reachable endpoint. + 1. Locate MCP endpoint: + a. GET the K8s `Service` named `workload_name` in `namespace` (operator convention: Service name == workload name). + b. Require the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label present on that Service; `502` (actionable) if absent — the label is applied at deploy time, not stamped by the operator. + c. Build `http://{workload_name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp`, where `port` is the Service's first port (not hardcoded). + 2. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. + 3. Produce `ServiceProvision`: + - `roles`: `[]` (tools do not initiate further calls) + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` + - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` + 4. Returns `502` on Service/label lookup failure or MCP call failure. + + > K8s access: `get` on `services` in the workload namespace (tool path). Identity is resolved by `classify_service` (config API). + > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`docs/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. + +- **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). + - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). No case mapping is needed here: `service_type` is a `ServiceType` (values `Agent`/`Tool`), already matching `client.type` and `Service.type`. Case normalization happens once, upstream, when `classify_service` reads the lowercase `kagenti.io/type` label. + +### State: `OnboardingProvisionState` + +Extends `BaseAgentState` with: + +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id` | +| `namespace` | `str \| None` | From the `client.name` split in `classify_service` (agents and tools) | +| `workload_name` | `str \| None` | From the `client.name` split in `classify_service` (agents and tools) | +| `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; routing field | +| `service_provision` | `ServiceProvision \| None` | Populated by `analyze_agent` or `analyze_tool` | + +### Types + +`ServiceType` is **not** redefined here — it is imported from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` +(the same enum backing `Service.type`), so the sub-agent, the IdP library, and the IdP service +share one vocabulary: + +```python +# aiac.idp.configuration.models — shared, reused by the sub-agent (do not duplicate): +class ServiceType(str, Enum): + AGENT = "Agent" # values capitalized to match the Keycloak client.type attribute + TOOL = "Tool" +``` + +The remaining types are sub-agent–local (in `provision/types.py`). `RoleDefinition` / +`ScopeDefinition` are deliberately distinct from the IdP `Role` / `Scope` models: a derived +role/scope is a pre-persistence *name + description* with no Keycloak `id` yet (idp `Role` +requires `id` + `composite`, `Scope` requires `id`), so it cannot be an idp model until +`provision_service` writes it. + +```python +class RoleDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + +class ScopeDefinition(BaseModel): + name: str + description: str + +class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): + roles: list[RoleDefinition] + scopes: list[ScopeDefinition] + reasoning: str # machine-generated provenance string +``` + +--- + +## Sub-agent: Service Policy Builder + +`onboarding/policy_builder/` + +**Nature:** deterministic IdP reader + PRB invoker. + +**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's `service_id`, fetch its own roles + scopes from the IdP (`get_service(service_id)`), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. + +**Why `service_id`, not `ServiceProvision`:** own roles/scopes must be id-bearing `Role`/`Scope` — `flatten_role` needs a `Role` (with `childRoles`) and the PRB builds `PolicyRule(role=Role, scope=Scope)`. The Provision-time `RoleDefinition`/`ScopeDefinition` carry only name+description (no Keycloak id), so they cannot be passed to the PRB. Provision has already persisted these entities, so `get_service(service_id).roles` / `.scopes` returns them with ids. + +**Terminology — own vs other (used throughout this section):** +- **Own roles / own scopes** — the roles and scopes the just-provisioned service defines for *itself*, fetched from the IdP by `service_id`: `service.roles` / `service.scopes` (`get_service(service_id)`). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. +- **Other roles / other scopes** — every *pre-existing* role/scope in the IdP universe **minus** the new service's own entities. These belong to other services. + +**Self-mapping invariant (must hold):** the PRB must **never** be handed an *(own role, own scope)* pair — a service's own role must never be mapped to its own scope. Onboarding only ever grants **cross-service** access: *who else* may call this service, and (agents only) *what else* this service may call. A service's own role reaching its own scope is not something onboarding needs to author (that access is intrinsic and out of scope here) and would pollute the policy set. The Service Policy Builder sub-agent guarantees the invariant **by construction** through two complementary guards: + +1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the "other" side).** Own roles are removed from `other_roles` and own scopes from `other_scopes` before any PRB call (steps 3–4). Flattening runs *after* exclusion and cannot reintroduce an own role: the just-provisioned roles are brand new and are not yet referenced as `childRoles` by any existing role. +2. **Call direction (each call's "self" side is one own entity of the *opposite* kind).** Each PRB call pairs a single own entity with the other-side universe, never own-with-own, and keeps the semantic intent crisp: + - `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, own_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* (an **own scope** against **other roles**) + - `build_role_rules(own_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (an **own role** against **other scopes**; agent path only) + +Neither guard alone is sufficient — exclusion keeps own entities off the other side, and the call direction keeps the self side and the other side of *opposite* kinds (a scope vs roles, or a role vs scopes). Together they make an *(own role, own scope)* pair unrepresentable in any PRB call. + +### Steps + +1. Receive `service_id: str` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. +2. Fetch the service's **own roles + scopes** from the IdP by `service_id` via `aiac.idp.configuration.api` (`get_service(service_id)` → `service.roles` / `service.scopes`, id-bearing `Role`/`Scope`). +3. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service.roles}`). +4. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service.scopes}`). +5. **Flatten roles to their closure** before any PRB call, via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): expand `other_roles` into the union of every role's closure, de-duplicated by `role.id` (call this `flattened_other_roles`); on the agent path, also expand each of the service's own roles. +6. Call PRB and merge: + - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each of the service's own scopes. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. + - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each own scope; for each of the service's own roles, call `build_role_rules(r, other_scopes)` **once per role `r` in that role's closure**. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. +7. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. (The Orchestrator pairs it with `override=False` for the Controller — see [Architecture overview](#architecture-overview).) + +**Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to each `agent_role`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). + +### Composite role flattening + +Every role passed to the PRB is first flattened to its **closure** via the shared +`flatten_role` helper (aiac-agent Shared Module): recursively collect the role and all +descendant roles from `role.childRoles` into a flat list, de-duplicated by `role.id` +(`Role` is not hashable, so de-duplication tracks seen `id`s rather than adding `Role` +objects to a `set`). A non-composite role yields a list containing only itself. The PRB +therefore receives already-flattened roles, and the PCE performs no further flattening. + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ +└── onboarding/ + ├── orchestrator.py + ├── provision/ + │ ├── __init__.py + │ ├── graph.py ← ServiceProvisionGraph (LLM-based StateGraph) + │ ├── nodes.py ← classify_service, analyze_agent, analyze_tool, provision_service + │ ├── state.py ← OnboardingProvisionState + │ └── types.py ← RoleDefinition, ScopeDefinition, ServiceProvision (ServiceType imported from aiac.idp.configuration.models) + └── policy_builder/ + ├── __init__.py + └── builder.py ← ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type) → list[PolicyRule] +``` + +## Out of scope + +- PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +- PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. +- MCP endpoint lookup strategy for tools — **resolved** (hybrid Keycloak→K8s) in `docs/issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md` and reflected in the `analyze_tool` node above. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7dd923fef --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# Component Sub-PRD: UC2 — Policy Update + +> **Status: TBD.** The internal design of the Build and Rebuild sub-agents is not yet defined. A dedicated grill session is required. + +> **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. + +> **IdP access — library, not service.** All IdP reads and writes go through the **idp-library** API (`aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration`), **never** the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. See [aiac-agent.md → IdP access](../aiac-agent.md#idp-access--library-not-service). + +## Triggers + +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.policy.build` (originated by RAG Ingest Service post-ingest) | +| HTTP (debug / operator) | `POST /apply/policy/build` | +| HTTP (operator only) | `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` (not routed through Event Broker) | + +## Architecture + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.policy.build"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/policy/build\nPOST /apply/policy/rebuild\n(debug / operator)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph PU["Policy Update (TBD)"] + SA_BUILD["Build sub-agent\n(TBD)"] + SA_REBUILD["Rebuild sub-agent\n(TBD)"] + end + + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)"] + + SA_REBUILD -->|"delegates"| SA_BUILD + SA_BUILD -->|"calls"| PRB + + CTRL -->|"build"| SA_BUILD + CTRL -->|"rebuild"| SA_REBUILD + SA_BUILD -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override)"| CTRL + SA_REBUILD -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override=True)"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules, override"| PCE +``` + +## What is known + +- **Two sub-agents:** Build (responds to `aiac.apply.policy.build` + `POST /apply/policy/build`) and Rebuild (responds to `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` only). +- Build calls the PRB directly, merges the results, and returns `(list[PolicyRule], override)` to the Controller. +- **Composite role flattening:** before calling the PRB, Build flattens every role it reads to its **closure** via the shared `flatten_role` helper — the role plus all descendant roles from `role.childRoles`, de-duplicated by `role.id` (a non-composite role yields just itself). The PRB receives already-flattened roles; the PCE performs no flattening. (Same helper and semantics as UC1 and UC3.) +- Rebuild delegates to Build for rule generation and returns Build's rules to the Controller. +- **Append vs override:** the sub-agent conveys an `override` flag to the Controller alongside its rules. **Rebuild is the full-rebuild case (`override=True`)** — the PCE purges every input role's mappings before applying (see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md)). **Build's** `override` value is **TBD** (whether an incremental post-ingest build appends or replaces). +- The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)` via the PCE — the same pattern as all other UCs. +- Internal behavior (how Build/Rebuild sub-agents derive their tuple content, what IdP data they read, whether any LLM node is involved) is **deferred** — to be resolved in a dedicated grill session. + +## Out of scope (this stub) + +- Build sub-agent internal design. +- Rebuild sub-agent internal design. +- PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +- PCE reconcile mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4f8fca800 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +# Component Sub-PRD: UC3 — Role Update + +> **Depends on:** [`../aiac-agent.md`](../aiac-agent.md) — NATS Consumer, Controller, Shared Module, Configuration, Error Handling, Runtime. + +> **IdP access — library, not service.** All IdP reads and writes go through the **idp-library** API (`aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration`), **never** the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. See [aiac-agent.md → IdP access](../aiac-agent.md#idp-access--library-not-service). + +## Triggers + +| Source | Subject / Path | +|---|---| +| Event Broker (NATS) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` (originated by Keycloak SPI role created/updated) | +| HTTP (debug) | `POST /apply/role/{role_id}` | + +## Architecture + +Single path, no create/update branch. The sub-agent is **deterministic** (non-LLM). + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + NATS["Event Broker\nNATS JetStream\naiac.apply.role.{id}"] + NATS_CONSUMER["NATS Consumer\nasyncio background task\nthin adapter"] + TRIGGERS["HTTP Triggers\nPOST /apply/role/{role_id}\n(debug)"] + CTRL["Controller\nroutes.py"] + + NATS -->|"durable queue group\naiac-agent-consumer"| NATS_CONSUMER + NATS_CONSUMER -->|"calls internal handler"| CTRL + TRIGGERS --> CTRL + + subgraph RR["Role Update"] + SA["Role sub-agent\ndeterministic"] + end + + PRB["Policy Rules Builder (shared)\nagent/policy_rules_builder/"] + PCE["Policy Computation Engine\naiac.policy.computation\ncompute_and_apply(merged_rules, override)"] + + SA -->|"calls"| PRB + + CTRL -->|"role/:id"| SA + SA -->|"(list[PolicyRule], override=True)"| CTRL + CTRL -->|"merged rules, override=True"| PCE +``` + +## Sub-agent: Role sub-agent + +**Nature:** deterministic, non-LLM. Pure IdP reader. + +**Steps:** +1. Read the triggering role (`role_id`) from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +2. **Flatten the triggering role to its closure** via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): the role itself plus all descendant roles from `role.childRoles`, de-duplicated by `role.id`. A non-composite role yields just itself. +3. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +4. Call `build_role_rules(r, all_scopes)` on the PRB **once per role `r` in the closure**, and merge the results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. +5. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` (paired with `override=True` — see [Controller behaviour](#controller-behaviour-for-this-uc)). + +**Output:** `(list[PolicyRule], override=True)`. + +### Composite role flattening + +The triggering role is flattened to its **closure** via the shared `flatten_role` helper +(aiac-agent Shared Module): recursively collect the role and all descendant roles from +`role.childRoles` into a flat list, de-duplicated by `role.id` (`Role` is not hashable, so +de-duplication tracks seen `id`s rather than adding `Role` objects to a `set`). A +non-composite role yields a list containing only itself. `build_role_rules` is then called +once per role in the closure, so the PRB receives already-flattened roles and the PCE +performs no further flattening. + +## Controller behaviour (for this UC) + +1. Receives `(list[PolicyRule], override=True)` from the Role sub-agent (PRB already called and merged internally). +2. Calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=True)` from `aiac.policy.computation`. + - With `override=True`, the PCE purges every input role's existing mappings (both directions, plus `target_scopes` reconciliation) before applying the fresh rules — an authoritative role-keyed replace. Because the sub-agent submits `build_role_rules(r, all_scopes)` output for the full closure, this replaces the complete mapping of the triggering role and every descendant. See [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +3. Returns bare HTTP status; writes summary + debug to log. + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/ +└── role_update/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── graph.py ← Role sub-agent StateGraph (deterministic) + ├── nodes.py ← fetch_role, fetch_all_scopes, package_tuple + └── state.py ← RoleUpdateState +``` + +## Out of scope + +- PRB internals — see [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +- PCE override (role-keyed replace) mechanics — see [`../policy-computation-engine.md`](../policy-computation-engine.md). +- Response body shape — no success body; handlers return bare HTTP status codes (error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body from the raised `HTTPException`). Summary + debug go to the log. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..972084539 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +# Component PRD: Event Broker + +## Description + +A NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers from the AIAC Agent. Producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) publish lightweight trigger events to named NATS subjects. The AIAC Agent subscribes as a durable competing consumer, guaranteeing at-least-once delivery and automatic replay of unprocessed events after pod restarts. + +The Event Broker is a single-node NATS JetStream instance. It owns no business logic — it is a pure transport layer. All policy decisions, orchestration, and state remain in the AIAC Agent. + +--- + +## Stream Configuration + +| Property | Value | +|---|---| +| Stream name | `aiac-events` | +| Subjects | `aiac.apply.>` | +| Retention policy | `WorkQueuePolicy` — message deleted from stream after acknowledgement | +| Consumer name | `aiac-agent-consumer` | +| Consumer type | Durable push consumer with queue group (competing consumers) | +| Authentication | None — ClusterIP network isolation is the access control mechanism | +| Dead-letter subject | `aiac.apply.dlq` | +| Max delivery attempts | 5 — message routed to DLQ after 5 unacknowledged redeliveries | + +--- + +## Subjects + +| Subject | Publisher | Consumer | Trigger | +|---|---|---|---| +| `aiac.apply.service.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak `CLIENT_CREATED` event | +| `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Keycloak SPI listener | AIAC Agent | Keycloak role created/updated | +| `aiac.apply.policy.build` | RAG Ingest Service | AIAC Agent | Post-ingest completion (any collection) | +| `aiac.apply.dlq` | NATS JetStream (automatic) | Operator (manual inspection) | Max delivery attempts exceeded | + +**`rebuild` is not routed through the Event Broker.** It is an operator-only command issued directly via `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` on the AIAC Agent using `kubectl port-forward`. + +--- + +## Message Payload + +All messages carry a minimal JSON payload containing only the entity ID: + +```json +{ "id": "" } +``` + +For `aiac.apply.policy.build`, the payload is empty (`{}`). The AIAC Agent pulls all required state from the PDP Configuration Service at processing time — the event payload is a trigger, not a data carrier. + +--- + +## Delivery Guarantees + +- **At-least-once delivery** — NATS redelivers any message not acknowledged within the `AckWait` window. +- **Exactly-one processing** — the Agent subscribes via a queue group (`aiac-agent-consumer`). Only one Agent pod receives each message; other pods in the group are not notified. +- **Replay on restart** — `WorkQueuePolicy` retains all unacknowledged messages. A restarted Agent pod automatically receives pending messages on reconnection. +- **DLQ on repeated failure** — after 5 unacknowledged redeliveries, NATS routes the message to `aiac.apply.dlq` for operator inspection. No message is silently dropped. + +--- + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | + +No authentication credentials are required. The NATS server runs with no-auth configuration. + +--- + +## Runtime + +- Image: `nats:latest` with JetStream enabled (`-js` flag) +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:4222` (NATS client port) +- Kubernetes ClusterIP service: `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` +- Base image: official `nats` Docker image + +--- + +## Kubernetes Manifest + +`aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` — NATS JetStream Pod Deployment + ClusterIP Service. + +--- + +## AIAC Init Container + +A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agent container starts. It orchestrates the AIAC startup sequence: + +1. **Wait for NATS** — poll `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` until TCP connection succeeds. +2. **Wait for PDP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. +3. **Wait for PDP Policy Writer** — poll `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL/health` until HTTP 200. +4. **Wait for RAG Ingest Service** — poll `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL/health` until HTTP 200 (confirms ChromaDB in the same RAG pod is also up). +5. **Create NATS JetStream stream** — call `js.add_stream()` idempotently with the `aiac-events` stream configuration. Safe to call on every restart. + +The init container uses `python:3.12-slim` with `nats-py` and `httpx`. It is version-controlled alongside the Agent. All dependency URLs are read from the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap. + +### Init Container Configuration + +| Variable | Source | Resolves to | +|---|---|---| +| `NATS_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | +| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | `http://aiac-rag-service:7073` | + +### Init Container Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +nats-py +httpx +``` + +--- + +## Testing + +| Target | What to mock | What to assert | +|---|---|---| +| Init container health-check loop | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies respond healthy | +| Init container stream creation | NATS JetStream `add_stream` call | Called with correct stream name, subjects, and retention policy; idempotent on second call | +| Agent NATS consumer dispatch | NATS message delivery | Correct `/apply/*` handler invoked for each subject pattern; message acked on success; message not acked on handler exception | +| DLQ routing | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message appears on `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fef5db1f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +# Component PRD: IdP Configuration Service + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns IdP (Keycloak) entity state in generic form for consumption by the AIAC Agent and library clients. Consolidates all Keycloak interactions into a single container. Stateless — no caching. Backed exclusively by Keycloak. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | +|--------|------|------------------------|-------------| +| GET | `/subjects` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All subjects (users) in realm; filtered to subjects with a specific role when `role_id` query param is provided | +| GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` (full representation, `brief_representation=False`) | All realm-level roles, including attributes (so the `aiac.managed` marker is visible) | +| GET | `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{subject_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and service permission assignments for a subject | +| GET | `/services` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All services (clients) | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/type` | `admin.get_client(service_id)` → `admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {...}})` | Set a service's type via the `client.type` client attribute | +| GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service's account | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | +| GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | +| POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | +| POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, ...)` | Assign existing realm role to service account | +| GET | `/health` | `admin.get_server_info()` — uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`; no `?realm=` param | Readiness probe | + +`GET /subjects?role_id={role_id}` (filtered variant): +1. Calls `admin.get_realm_role_by_id(role_id)` to resolve the role name from its ID. +2. Calls `admin.get_realm_role_members(role_name)` (`GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/users`) to retrieve users directly assigned to the role. +3. For each returned user, enriches with realm role assignments by calling `GET /subjects/{id}/assignments?realm=` (same enrichment as the unfiltered `GET /subjects` endpoint). +4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of enriched user objects. +5. Returns `[]` (empty array) when no subject holds the role directly. +6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`GET /services/{service_id}`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)`. +2. Returns `200 OK` with the client JSON on success. +3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +All service reads (`GET /services`, `GET /services/{service_id}`) return the Keycloak client representation **unmodified**, so client `attributes` — including `client.type` — flow through verbatim for the library's generic-model mapping (`Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`) to resolve service type. The Keycloak attribute name is confined to this service (writes) and the library mapping layer (reads); it is never exposed to library callers. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/type`: +Accepts JSON body `{"type": "Agent" | "Tool"}` (rejected with `422` otherwise). It: +1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)` and copies its existing `attributes`. +2. Sets the **`client.type`** attribute to the (capitalized, plain-string) type value and calls `admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {...}})`. The existing attributes are merged, not clobbered. +3. Returns `200 OK` with the updated client JSON (re-fetched via `admin.get_client`). +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /scopes`: +Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: +1. Calls `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": "true"}})` to create the scope at realm level. The `aiac.managed` attribute is the AIAC provisioning marker (client-scope attribute values are plain strings). +2. Returns `201 Created` with the created scope JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a scope with that name already exists. +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}`: +1. Calls `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign the scope as a default scope to the service. +2. Returns `201 Created` on success. +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if the scope is already assigned to the service. +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /roles`: +Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: +1. Calls `admin.create_realm_role({"name": ..., "description": ..., "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}})` to create the role at realm level. The `aiac.managed` attribute is the AIAC provisioning marker (realm-role attribute values are lists of strings). +2. Returns `201 Created` with the created role JSON (`{"id": ..., "name": ..., "description": ...}`). +3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a role with that name already exists. +4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` to get the service account user. +2. Extracts `user["id"]` from the result. +3. Calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` to return the realm roles assigned to the service account. +4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of realm role objects. +5. Returns `[]` (empty array) if `KeycloakError` has `response_code == 400` (service has no service account — not an error). +6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on other `KeycloakError`. + +`GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` to return the realm-level client scopes assigned as defaults to the service. +2. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client scope objects. +3. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` to get the service account user. +2. Extracts `user["id"]` from the result. +3. Calls `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])` to assign the realm role to the service account. +4. Returns `201 Created` on success. +5. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned. +6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + +All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=` query parameter specifying the Keycloak realm to operate in. Returns `422 Unprocessable Entity` if the parameter is absent. `/health` accepts no realm parameter — it calls `_get_or_create_admin(os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"])` directly. + +All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. + +### AIAC provisioning marker (`aiac.managed`) + +Every role and client scope this service creates is stamped with the Keycloak attribute `aiac.managed` = `true` — the AIAC naming convention that distinguishes AIAC-provisioned entities from Keycloak's own built-ins (default client scopes, the `default-roles-` composite). Attribute value shape differs by entity: realm-role attribute values are lists (`{"aiac.managed": ["true"]}`), client-scope attribute values are plain strings (`{"aiac.managed": "true"}`). Because Keycloak's brief role representation omits attributes, `GET /roles` requests the full representation so the marker survives the read. Downstream consumers (the Policy Computation Engine's P2 embed) filter on this marker to keep only domain entities. + +## Configuration + +Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Yes | Realm where the admin credentials live, e.g. `master` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7071` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Writer as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +``` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/ +├── __init__.py +└── configuration/ + ├── __init__.py + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── Dockerfile + ├── requirements.txt + └── main.py +``` + +Build command: +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ +``` + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Maintain a `dict[str, KeycloakAdmin]` cache keyed by realm name, protected by a `threading.Lock`. +- `get_admin(realm: str = Query(...))` is a FastAPI dependency. On each call it checks the cache; on a miss it acquires the lock, double-checks, and constructs a new `KeycloakAdmin(realm_name=realm, user_realm_name=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM, ...)`. FastAPI returns `422` automatically if `realm` is absent. +- All endpoints except `/health` declare `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. `/health` calls `_get_or_create_admin` directly with `os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]` — no FastAPI dependency, no realm query param. +- Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. +- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)`. Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no service account); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. +- `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. +- `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. +- `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])`. +- On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..362be1761 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +# ~~Component PRD: Keycloak Configuration Service~~ + +> **Superseded.** This component has been replaced by two separate services: +> - **IdP Configuration Service** (read endpoints) — see [idp-configuration-service.md](idp-configuration-service.md) +> - **PDP Policy Writer — Keycloak Implementation** (write endpoints) — see [pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) +> +> The content below is retained for reference only. + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns raw Keycloak JSON unchanged for read operations; forwards write operations directly. Stateless — no caching. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | +|--------|------|------------------------|-------------| +| GET | `/users` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` | All users in realm | +| GET | `/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | All realm-level roles | +| GET | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` | Realm and client role mappings for a user | +| GET | `/clients` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients` | All clients | +| GET | `/client-scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All client scopes | +| GET | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles` | Roles defined for a specific client | +| POST | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | Assign client roles to a user | +| DELETE | `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` | Revoke client roles from a user | +| POST | `/clients/{client_id}/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/roles` | Create a new role for a specific client | +| POST | `/clients/{client_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` then `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client_id}/default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create a realm-level scope and assign it to a client as a default scope (atomic) | +| DELETE | `/role-mappings` | loop: `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users` → per user `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{id}/role-mappings` → `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}` per client | Revoke all client role assignments for all users in the realm | + +Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter. When supplied, the request targets the named Keycloak realm instead of the service default (`KEYCLOAK_REALM`); a new `KeycloakAdmin` bound to that realm is instantiated per request. When omitted, the singleton admin initialised at startup is used. + +The GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `clientMappings` fields. The POST and DELETE endpoints for role-mapping operations accept a JSON array of role representation objects in the request body and return `204 No Content` on success. `POST /clients/{client_id}/roles` and `POST /clients/{client_id}/scopes` accept a JSON object with `name` and `description` fields and return `201 Created` with the created resource as JSON. `DELETE /role-mappings` returns `204 No Content` on success. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. + +## Configuration + +Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Yes | Realm name, e.g. `kagenti` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7070` +- Base image: `python:3.14-slim` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +``` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/ +├── Dockerfile +├── requirements.txt +└── main.py +``` + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. +- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. When `realm` is `None` it returns the startup singleton; when `realm` is set it returns a new `KeycloakAdmin` for that realm. +- Each endpoint declares `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)` — no per-route changes needed for realm routing. +- Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. +- POST `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}`: assign the provided roles and return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- DELETE `/users/{user_id}/role-mappings/clients/{client_id}`: revoke the provided roles and return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- POST `/clients/{client_id}/roles`: call `admin.create_client_role(client_id, {"name": ..., "description": ...})`; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created role representation. +- POST `/clients/{client_id}/scopes`: call `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the realm-level scope, then call `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(client_id, scope_id)` to assign it to the client; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created scope representation. +- DELETE `/role-mappings`: fetch all users; for each user fetch role mappings; for each client key in `clientMappings` call `admin.delete_client_roles_of_user(user_id, client_id, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)` when all revocations complete. +- On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..97d5f8572 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +# Component PRD: IdP Configuration Library (`aiac.idp.configuration`) + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/idp/ +└── configuration/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + ├── models.py # Subject, Role, Service, Scope + └── api.py # Configuration class — reads + writes IdP entities +``` + +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.idp.configuration.models` + +### Description +Dependency-free Pydantic `BaseModel` subclasses representing generic IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes). No HTTP client dependency — importable by any consumer without pulling in `requests` or `python-dotenv`. Model shapes are derived from Keycloak JSON but named generically. + +### Dependencies +``` +pydantic +``` + +### Pydantic models + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` to silently discard unknown fields. + +Model definition order: `Subject` → `Role` → `Service` → `Scope`. Because `Subject`, `Role`, and `Service` reference `Scope` (and `Subject` references `Role`) as forward references, the module calls `Subject.model_rebuild()`, `Role.model_rebuild()`, and `Service.model_rebuild()` after `Scope` is defined. + +`Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` use pydantic's default equality (field-based) and are **not hashable** — they define no custom `__hash__`/`__eq__` and are never used as dict keys or set members. The relationship maps in `AgentPolicyModel` (`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, `target_scopes`) are keyed by the entity's string `id` instead, so no identity override is needed. + +#### `Subject` + +Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | +|-------|------|----------------|---------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `username` | `str` | `username` | | +| `email` | `str \| None` | `email` | | +| `firstName` | `str \| None` | `firstName` | | +| `lastName` | `str \| None` | `lastName` | | +| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | +| `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(populated by `Configuration.get_subjects()` from `GET /subjects/{id}/assignments` → `realmMappings`; not present in the raw Keycloak user object)_ | `[]` | + +#### `Role` + +Represents a role (Keycloak: realm role). + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | +|-------|------|----------------|---------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `name` | `str` | `name` | | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | | +| `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | | +| `childRoles` | `list[Role]` | `composites.realm` | `[]` | +| `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | `{}` | + +Roles also expose an `aiac_managed` property (`bool`): `True` when `attributes` carries the AIAC provisioning marker `aiac.managed` (realm-role attribute values are lists, so the marker appears as `["true"]`). See the naming convention in the idp-configuration-service spec. + +#### `Service` + +Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | +|-------|------|----------------|---------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | | +| `serviceId` | `str \| None` | `clientId` | `None` | +| `name` | `str \| None` | `name` | | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | `None` | +| `enabled` | `bool` | `enabled` | | +| `type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `attributes.client.type` | `None` | +| `roles` | `list[Role]` | _(roles for this client)_ | `[]` | +| `scopes` | `list[Scope]` | _(default client scopes)_ | `[]` | + +**Service type resolution** (`Service._resolve_keycloak_fields`, a `model_validator(mode="before")`). AIAC calls the concept "service type" everywhere; the backing Keycloak client attribute is named **`client.type`**. Resolution precedence: + +1. An explicit `type` already present on the input wins (never overridden). +2. Otherwise the Keycloak client attribute **`client.type`** ∈ {`Agent`, `Tool`} — a **plain string**. Client attribute values are plain strings; a **list** value (e.g. `["Agent"]`, the shape realm-role attributes use) fails the check and resolves to `None`. Capitalization matches the `ServiceType` values. +3. Otherwise `None`. + +The attribute is set via `Configuration.set_service_type` (below); its authoritative origin is UC1 Service Onboarding — `classify_service` **discovers** the type from the operator's `kagenti.io/type` label and `provision_service` **persists** it onto the client via `set_service_type` (see the aiac-agent UC1 spec). There is **no** `spiffe://` clientId fallback and **no** description-keyword inference — typing is `client.type`-attribute-only. (The former `spiffe:// ⇒ Agent` fallback was **removed**: a `spiffe://` clientId indicates a SPIRE-enabled workload, **not** necessarily an agent — it could mis-type a SPIRE-enabled tool — so clients without a `client.type` attribute now resolve to `None`.) + +> **`ServiceType`** (`aiac.idp.configuration.models`) is a `str` enum — `AGENT = "Agent"`, `TOOL = "Tool"` — shared by `Service.type`, `set_service_type`, and the aiac-agent sub-agents (one vocabulary, no duplication). Values are capitalized to match the `client.type` attribute; because it subclasses `str`, `ServiceType.AGENT == "Agent"`, so it is a drop-in for the former `Literal["Agent", "Tool"]`. The operator's lowercase `kagenti.io/type` pod label is normalized to a member via `ServiceType(label.capitalize())` in UC1 `classify_service`. + +#### `Scope` + +Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). + +| Field | Type | Keycloak field | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `id` | `str` | `id` | +| `name` | `str` | `name` | +| `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | +| `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | + +Scopes also expose an `aiac_managed` property (`bool`): `True` when `attributes` carries the AIAC provisioning marker `aiac.managed` (client-scope attribute values are plain strings, so the marker appears as `"true"`). See the naming convention in the idp-configuration-service spec. + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject, Role, Scope, Service + +raw = tool_result["content"] # raw JSON list +subjects = [Subject.model_validate(s) for s in raw] +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.idp.configuration.api` + +### Description +HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides read and write access to IdP configuration entities (subjects, roles, services, scopes) and returns typed Pydantic model instances from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. + +All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. + +**Transport retries.** Every HTTP call is issued through a private `_request(method, path, **kwargs)` helper that wraps the request in the project-level `run_upstream` retry primitive (`aiac.shared.upstream`): transient failures are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times (default `3`) with exponential backoff before a non-2xx status is raised as `RuntimeError`. Retry lives inside the library (not in callers), and applies at the leaf request, so composite methods (`create_service_role` / `create_service_scope`) retry each sub-request without compounding. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +tenacity +``` + +### Class: `Configuration` + +Stateful client bound to a single realm. Construct via the factory method or directly. + +```python +class Configuration: + def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: ... + + @classmethod + def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Configuration": ... + + def get_subjects(self) -> list[Subject]: ... + def get_roles(self) -> list[Role]: ... + def get_services(self) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: ... + def get_scopes(self) -> list[Scope]: ... + + def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_services_by_scope(self, scope: Scope) -> list[Service]: ... + def get_subjects_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Subject]: ... + + def create_scope(self, scope_name: str, scope_description: str) -> Scope: ... + def map_scope_to_service(self, service: Service, scope: Scope) -> Service: ... + + def create_role(self, role_name: str, role_description: str) -> Role: ... + def map_role_to_service(self, service: Service, role: Role) -> Service: ... + + # Idempotent create-or-get (by name) + map to the service. Accept any object exposing + # .name / .description (e.g. the aiac-agent RoleDefinition / ScopeDefinition), so the + # library never imports the agent layer. + def create_service_role(self, service_id: str, role) -> Role: ... + def create_service_scope(self, service_id: str, scope) -> Scope: ... + + def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service: ... +``` + +`get_scopes()` — simple read: +1. Issue `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes`, always appending `?realm=`. +2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Parse the response into `list[Scope]` and return. + +`get_subjects()` — enriched with per-subject realm role assignments: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?realm=` — fetch the base user list. Keycloak does not include role assignments in the user representation. +2. Call `_all_roles_map()` once to build a `{id: Role}` lookup (fully hydrated via `get_roles()`). +3. For each subject, delegate to `_build_subject(raw, all_roles)` which issues `GET /subjects/{id}/assignments?realm=`, extracts `realmMappings` role IDs, filters the roles map, and returns a validated `Subject` with `roles` populated. +4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx HTTP status (primary or secondary calls). + +`get_services()` — fully-enriched read: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=` — fetch the base service list. +2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` once upfront to build `{id: Role}` and `{id: Scope}` lookup maps. +3. For each service, delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)` which issues: + - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=` → filter `all_roles` map → `Service.roles` + - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=` → filter `all_scopes` map → `Service.scopes` +4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +5. Return `list[Service]` with fully-enriched `roles` (including `childRoles`) and `scopes` (including `description`). + +> **Performance note:** `get_services()` issues 2N + 1 + (roles overhead) HTTP requests where N is the number of services. `get_roles()` is called once and its fully-enriched objects are shared across all services. If this becomes a bottleneck, enrichment should be moved server-side. + +`get_service(service_id)` — fetch a single service with the same full enrichment: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service_id}?realm=` — fetch the single service. +2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` to build lookup maps (same as `get_services()`). +3. Delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)`. +4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +5. Return a single enriched `Service`. + +> **Note:** Callers that previously called `get_services()` and filtered by ID should be switched to `get_service(service_id)` to avoid fetching the full list. + +`get_roles()` — enriched read: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles?realm=` — fetch all realm roles. +2. For each role, if `role.composite` is `True`: `GET /roles/{name}/composites?realm=` → `Role.childRoles` +3. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. +4. Return `list[Role]` with `childRoles` populated. + +`get_services_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Service]`: +1. Fetches the fully-enriched service list via `get_services()` and filters it **client-side**: returns those services whose `.roles` contains a role with `role.id`. The server `GET /services` endpoint has no `role_id` filter, so filtering happens in the library. +2. Returns an empty list when no service owns the role (e.g. a realm-level role). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx (propagated from `get_services()` / `_build_service()`). + +`get_services_by_scope(scope: Scope) -> list[Service]`: +1. Fetches the fully-enriched service list via `get_services()` and filters it **client-side**: returns those services whose `.scopes` contains a scope with `scope.id`. The server `GET /services` endpoint has no `scope_id` filter, so filtering happens in the library. +2. Returns an empty list when no service exposes the scope. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx (propagated from `get_services()` / `_build_service()`). + +> **Performance note:** because both methods delegate to `get_services()`, each call inherits its full fan-out cost (see the `get_services()` performance note above — `2N + 1 + roles` HTTP requests for N services). Acceptable for the low-frequency PCE resolution path. If it becomes a bottleneck, the right fix is a real server-side `role_id` / `scope_id` filter on `GET /services`. + +`get_subjects_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Subject]`: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?role_id={role.id}&realm=` +2. Returns all subjects (users) that have this role directly assigned, enriched with their full realm role assignments (same enrichment as `get_subjects()`). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. Returns an empty list when no subject holds the role. + +> **Note:** This method returns only subjects with a **direct** assignment of the given role. Composite role traversal (resolving `childRoles` and querying each) is the caller's responsibility — see PCE algorithm in `aiac.policy.computation`. + +`create_scope`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a scope with that name already exists). +3. Returns the created `Scope` instance parsed from the response. + +`map_scope_to_service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/scopes/{scope.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if the scope is already mapped to the service). +3. Re-fetches the service via `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response. + +`create_role`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles` with body `{"name": role_name, "description": role_description}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a role with that name already exists). +3. Returns the created `Role` instance parsed from the response. + +`map_role_to_service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/roles/{role.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if the role is already mapped to the service). +3. Re-fetches the service via `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}`, appending `?realm=`. +4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response. + +`create_service_role(service_id: str, role) -> Role`: idempotent create-or-get + map. +1. `get_roles()` and reuse an existing realm role whose `name == role.name`; otherwise `create_role(role.name, role.description)`. +2. `map_role_to_service(get_service(service_id), resolved_role)` (itself idempotent). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx HTTP status. Returns the resolved `Role`. +4. `role` is any object exposing `.name` / `.description` (e.g. the aiac-agent `RoleDefinition`); the library does not import the agent layer. + +`create_service_scope(service_id: str, scope) -> Scope`: idempotent create-or-get + map. +1. `get_scopes()` and reuse an existing client scope whose `name == scope.name`; otherwise `create_scope(scope.name, scope.description)`. +2. `map_scope_to_service(get_service(service_id), resolved_scope)` (itself idempotent). +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on any underlying non-2xx HTTP status. Returns the resolved `Scope`. +4. `scope` is any object exposing `.name` / `.description` (e.g. the aiac-agent `ScopeDefinition`). + +`set_service_type(service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service`: +1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service.id}/type` with body `{"type": }` (the `ServiceType`'s `Agent`/`Tool` value; a bare `"Agent"`/`"Tool"` string is accepted too since `ServiceType` is a `str` enum), appending `?realm=`. +2. The service persists the value onto the Keycloak client as the **`client.type`** attribute (a plain string, capitalized). The Keycloak attribute name is an IdP-Service/mapping-layer detail — callers pass the generic `service_type` and never see it. +3. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +4. Returns the updated `Service` instance parsed from the response (`type` now resolved from the new attribute). + +### Configuration + +Read from a `.env` file co-located with `api.py` (`aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/.env`) via `python-dotenv`. Falls back to the default if the file is absent or the key is not set. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | + +> **TBD:** whether `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` should be renamed to `AIAC_IDP_CONFIG_URL`. Not yet decided — keep `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` until this is resolved. + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration + +cfg = Configuration.for_realm("kagenti") +subjects = cfg.get_subjects() +for s in subjects: + print(s.username, s.email) + +scope = cfg.create_scope(scope_name="read", scope_description="Read access") +service = cfg.get_service("abc123") # preferred over get_services() + filter +updated_service = cfg.map_scope_to_service(service, scope) + +role = cfg.create_role(role_name="reader", role_description="Read-only access") +updated_service = cfg.map_role_to_service(updated_service, role) + +# PCE usage — resolve services owning a given role or scope +services_with_role = cfg.get_services_by_role(role) +services_with_scope = cfg.get_services_by_scope(scope) +``` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e6a2ba773 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-pdp-policy.md @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Library (`aiac.pdp.policy.library`) + +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) REST API. These modules have no dependency on Keycloak — all IdP operations use `aiac.idp.configuration`. + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/ +└── library/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── api.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +``` + +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api` + +### Description +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +No `realm` parameter — the PDP Policy Writer operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. + +**Primary consumer:** `aiac.policy.computation` — the Policy Computation Engine is the only caller. AIAC Agent sub-UC agents do not call this library directly; they call `compute_and_apply` instead. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +```python +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy — upsert Rego packages for all agents in the partial model + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} — upsert Rego packages for a single agent + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} — remove all Rego packages for agent (off-boarding) + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy — clear all Rego packages (rebuild pre-step) +``` + +### Configuration + +Read from `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `api.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel + +# Single-agent update (called by Policy Computation Engine) +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) + +# Full rebuild pre-step: clear all, then reapply +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) + +# Off-boarding +delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") +``` + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +**Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Writer HTTP; cover module-level functions). + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `apply_policy(model)` issues `POST /policy` with serialized `PolicyModel`. +- `apply_agent_policy(id, model)` issues `POST /policy/agents/{id}` with serialized `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `delete_agent_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`. +- `delete_policy()` issues `DELETE /policy`. +- Any non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. +- `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7072`. + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- **Keycloak interaction:** this library never calls Keycloak directly. All IdP operations go through `aiac.idp.configuration`. +- **Policy computation:** translating `list[PolicyRule]` into `AgentPolicyModel` objects is the responsibility of `aiac.policy.computation`, not this library. +- **Policy persistence:** the Policy Store (`aiac.policy.store`) owns structured `AgentPolicyModel` durability. This library targets the OPA runtime only. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The `aiac.pdp.library.policy` module (old path) is deprecated. All consumers must update imports to `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api`. +- Models (`PolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`) are imported from `aiac.policy.model.models`, not from the deprecated `aiac.pdp.library.models`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ad42598bc --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +# Component PRD: Policy Store Library (`aiac.policy.store.library`) + +Companion library for the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md). Follows the same pattern as `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — module-level functions, URL from env var via `python-dotenv`, `RuntimeError` on non-2xx. + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/` + +## Package structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/ +└── library/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── api.py # six module-level functions +``` + +All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: + +```python +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( + get_policy, get_agent_policy, + apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, + delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, +) +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +``` + +--- + +## Submodule: `aiac.policy.store.library.api` + +### Description +HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +### Dependencies +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Functions + +```python +def get_policy() -> PolicyModel + # GET /policy + +def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel + # GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy +``` + +### Configuration + +Read from `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-located with `api.py`). Falls back to the default if absent. + +| Variable | Default | +|----------|---------| +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( + get_policy, get_agent_policy, + apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, + delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, +) +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel + +# Read current state for additive merge +current = get_agent_policy("weather-agent") + +# Write updated state +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", updated_model) + +# Full rebuild +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) + +# Off-boarding +delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") +``` + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +**Seam:** HTTP boundary — mock responses from `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Writer HTTP; cover module-level functions). + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `get_policy()` issues `GET /policy`; response body deserialized to `PolicyModel`. +- `get_agent_policy(id)` issues `GET /policy/agents/{id}`; response body deserialized to `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `apply_policy(model)` issues `POST /policy` with serialized `PolicyModel`. +- `apply_agent_policy(id, model)` issues `POST /policy/agents/{id}` with serialized `AgentPolicyModel`. +- `delete_agent_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`. +- `delete_policy()` issues `DELETE /policy`. +- Any non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. +- `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7074`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..55ad9085e --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Writer — Keycloak Implementation + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. + +This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Writer. It is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. + +## Endpoints + +| Method | Path | Keycloak Admin API call | Description | +|--------|------|------------------------|-------------| +| POST | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Add service permissions (client roles) to a role composite | +| DELETE | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Remove service permissions (client roles) from a role composite | +| DELETE | `/composites` | loop: `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` → per role `GET .../composites` → `DELETE .../composites` | Revoke all composite mappings from all roles (rebuild) | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Create a new permission (client role) for a specific service | +| POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` then `PUT .../clients/{service_id}/default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create a realm-level scope and assign it to a service as a default scope (atomic) | + +Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter, same as the PDP Configuration Service. + +`POST /roles/{role_name}/composites` and `DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites` accept a JSON array of role representation objects `[{"id": "...", "name": "..."}]` and return `204 No Content` on success. + +`DELETE /composites` returns `204 No Content` on success. + +`POST /services/{service_id}/permissions` and `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes` accept a JSON object `{"name": "...", "description": "..."}` and return `201 Created` with the created resource as JSON. + +All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | Yes | Keycloak base URL, e.g. `http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Yes | Realm name, e.g. `kagenti` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` | Yes | Admin username (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Yes | Admin password (from `keycloak-admin-secret`) | + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` +- Deployment: co-located with PDP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +python-keycloak +``` + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ +├── __init__.py +└── policy/ + ├── __init__.py + └── keycloak/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── Dockerfile + ├── requirements.txt + └── main.py +``` + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Instantiate the default `KeycloakAdmin` once at startup using env vars. +- `get_admin` is a FastAPI dependency accepting `realm: str | None = Query(None)`. +- `POST /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.add_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, roles)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /composites`: fetch all roles via `admin.get_realm_roles()`; for each role call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name)`; if composites are non-empty call `admin.remove_composite_realm_roles_to_role(role_name, composites)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `POST /services/{service_id}/permissions`: call `admin.create_client_role(service_id, {"name": ..., "description": ...})`; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created permission representation. +- `POST /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.create_client_scope({"name": ..., "description": ..., "protocol": "openid-connect"})` to create the realm-level scope, then call `admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, scope_id)` to assign it to the service; return `JSONResponse(status_code=201)` with the created scope representation. +- On `KeycloakError`, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b234976a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +# Component PRD: PDP Policy Writer (OPA) + +## Location +`aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/` + +## Description +A FastAPI web service that translates a **Policy Model** into OPA Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resource. The OPA plugin embedded in each AuthBridge instance fetches the Rego packages relevant to its pod from this CR at startup. + +The service is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service:7072` ClusterIP. + +The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). + +--- + +## Pydantic models (`aiac.policy.model.models`) + +The Policy Writer deserializes the **canonical** `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` defined in [policy-model.md](policy-model.md) and imported from `aiac.policy.model.models`. This service does **not** define its own copies; the tables below summarize the fields the Rego generator consumes. (The former `aiac.pdp.library.models` module is deprecated — see policy-model.md "Replaces".) + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. + +### `PolicyRule` + +A single access rule pairing a typed role with a typed scope. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `role` | `Role` | +| `scope` | `Scope` | + +`Role` and `Scope` are the typed models from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. The Rego generator emits their `.name` as the string literal OPA matches against. + +### `AgentPolicyModel` + +Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `PolicyRule` entries plus supporting data maps used by the Rego packages. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | +| `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | +| `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source (calling service) **id** → roles held. **Optional** gate input — an absent source passes. | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (end-user) **id** → roles held. **Mandatory** gate input. | +| `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(subject_role, agent_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, target_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_subject_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Which users may reach the agent's targets: `(user_role, tool_scope)` tuples. Defaults to `[]`. | + +**`agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` provenance:** these carry the agent's **own** identity — the service-account realm roles it holds and the scopes it exposes. The Policy Computation Engine resolves them from the agent's IdP `Service` record (P2) and embeds them on every agent model it writes; a realm-level agent with no owning service keeps `[]`. + +**Inbound rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent for the agent scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `role_scopes` map (role → agent scopes) that the inbound package evaluates. + +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `agent_role_scopes` map (agent role → target scopes) that the outbound package evaluates. + +**Outbound subject rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` (a **user** role) is permitted to reach a **tool** exposing scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `outbound_subject_role_scopes` map (user role → tool scopes) that the **outbound** package's subject gate evaluates against `target_scopes[input.target]`. This is distinct from `inbound_rules` (user → *agent* scope): the outbound subject gate answers "may this user reach the tool?", not "may this user call the agent?". + +**Note on `target_scopes` direction:** the map is keyed by **target service id → allowed scopes** (the inverse of the former `scope_targets`, which was `scope → targets`). The outbound Rego generator emits this map **verbatim** and evaluates `target_scopes[input.target]` directly — there is no inversion (see below). + +### `PolicyModel` + +A partial or full system policy model. When sent to the PDP Policy Writer, contains only the agents whose policies have changed. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule +``` + +--- + +## Endpoints + +No `?realm=` parameter — the service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keycloak realm. + +| Method | Path | Body | Operation | +|--------|------|------|-----------| +| `POST` | `/policy` | `PolicyModel` | Upsert Rego packages for all agents in the partial model | +| `POST` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `AgentPolicyModel` | Upsert Rego packages for a single agent | +| `DELETE` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | Remove all Rego packages for a specific agent (off-boarding) | +| `DELETE` | `/policy` | — | Clear all Rego packages from the CR (rebuild pre-step) | +| `GET` | `/health` | — | Readiness probe | + +### Status codes + +| Endpoint | Success | Error | +|----------|---------|-------| +| `POST /policy` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` if CR write fails | +| `POST /policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` if CR write fails | +| `DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` if CR write fails | +| `DELETE /policy` | `204 No Content` | `502 Bad Gateway` if CR write fails | +| `GET /health` | `200 OK` `{"status": "ok"}` | `503 Service Unavailable` if CR is unreachable | + +--- + +## Rego package structure + +For each `AgentPolicyModel`, the service generates **two Rego packages**: one for the inbound pipeline and one for the outbound pipeline. The `agent_id` is slugified for use in the package name (hyphens → underscores, lowercase). + +**Input is identifiers only.** Both packages receive an input document of **IDs**, never roles or scopes: inbound input is `{subject, source}`, outbound input is `{subject, target}` (`subject` is the end-user id, `source` the calling service id, `target` the called service id). Every role/scope mapping is therefore **embedded in the package itself**, and the `allow` logic resolves IDs → roles → scopes internally. Because no per-request scope is supplied, the decision is **coarse**: a principal passes when it has access to **at least one** relevant scope. + +The generator embeds these symbols, derived from the `AgentPolicyModel`: + +| Rego symbol | Source | Shape | +|-------------|--------|-------| +| `subject_roles` | `model.subject_roles` | subject id → `[role.name, …]` | +| `source_roles` | `model.source_roles` | source id → `[role.name, …]` | +| `agent_scopes` | `model.agent_scopes` | `[scope.name, …]` | +| `agent_roles` | `model.agent_roles` | `[role.name, …]` | +| `role_scopes` | grouped `model.inbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (agent scopes granted per subject role) — **inbound package only** | +| `outbound_subject_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_subject_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes granted per user role) — **outbound package only** | +| `agent_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes per agent role) | +| `target_scopes` | `model.target_scopes` | target id → `[scope.name, …]` | + +### Inbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.inbound` + +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **inbound pipeline** — "who may call this agent". Input document: `{subject, source}` (IDs). **`subject` is mandatory; `source` is optional** (an absent source passes). A principal passes when it holds a role that grants at least one of the agent's own scopes (`agent_scopes`). + +```rego +package authz.{agent_slug}.inbound + +agent_scopes := ["{scope.name}", ...] # from agent_scopes + +subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } +source_roles := { "{source_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } + +role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from inbound_rules + +subject_ok if { + some role in subject_roles[input.subject] + some scope in role_scopes[role] + scope in agent_scopes +} +source_ok if { not input.source } # optional: absent source passes +source_ok if { + some role in source_roles[input.source] + some scope in role_scopes[role] + scope in agent_scopes +} + +default allow := false +allow if { subject_ok; source_ok } +``` + +### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` + +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here. + +```rego +package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound + +agent_roles := ["{role.name}", ...] # from agent_roles +agent_scopes := ["{scope.name}", ...] # from agent_scopes + +subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } + +outbound_subject_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_subject_rules (user role → tool scopes) +agent_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_rules (agent role → tool scopes) +target_scopes := { "{target_id}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from target_scopes + +# user may reach the tool: holds a role granting >=1 tool scope the target accepts +subject_ok if { + some role in subject_roles[input.subject] + some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] + scope in target_scopes[input.target] +} +# agent may reach the tool: agent role grants >=1 tool scope the target accepts +target_ok if { + some role in agent_roles + some scope in agent_role_scopes[role] + scope in target_scopes[input.target] +} + +default allow := false +allow if { subject_ok; target_ok } +``` + +A worked example (agent `github-agent`, users `developer`/`tester`, tool `github-tool`) is maintained alongside the tests. + +--- + +## Library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` + +HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. + +```python +def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy + +def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} + +def delete_policy() -> None + # DELETE /policy +``` + +### Dependencies + +``` +requests +pydantic +python-dotenv +``` + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule + +apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) +delete_policy() +apply_policy(full_model) +``` + +--- + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Required | Description | +|----------|----------|-------------| +| `AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_NAME` | TBD | Name of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to patch | +| `AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_NAMESPACE` | TBD | Namespace of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR | + +Authentication to the Kubernetes API: in-cluster service account (auto-detected by the `kubernetes` Python client). The pod's `ServiceAccount` must be bound to a `ClusterRole` granting `get`/`patch`/`update` on `AuthorizationPolicy` resources. The `ServiceAccount`, `ClusterRole`, and `ClusterRoleBinding` are declared in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`. + +For local development, the `kubernetes` client falls back to `~/.kube/config` automatically. + +> **Note:** `AuthorizationPolicy` CR schema and ConfigMap source for env vars are TBD. + +--- + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI +- Server: uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service:7072` +- Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) + +--- + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +kubernetes +pydantic +``` + +--- + +## File structure + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ +├── __init__.py +└── policy/ + ├── __init__.py + └── opa/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── Dockerfile + ├── requirements.txt + └── main.py + +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/ +├── __init__.py +└── library/ + ├── __init__.py + └── policy.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy + # (models now imported from aiac.policy.model.models) +``` + +Build command: +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ +``` + +--- + +## `main.py` behaviour notes + +- Load Kubernetes in-cluster config at startup via `kubernetes.config.load_incluster_config()`; fall back to `kubernetes.config.load_kube_config()` for local development. +- Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. +- `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: replace hyphens with underscores, lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment. +- `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. The inbound `role_scopes` map is **not** embedded in the outbound package. +- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. +- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. +- `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. +- `POST /policy`: iterate `model.agents`; for each call `_generate_inbound_rego` + `_generate_outbound_rego` + `_upsert_agent`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `POST /policy/agents/{agent_id}`: call `_generate_inbound_rego` + `_generate_outbound_rego` + `_upsert_agent`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id}`: call `_delete_agent(agent_id)`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- `DELETE /policy`: call `_delete_all()`; return `Response(status_code=204)`. +- On Kubernetes API error, return HTTP 502 with `{"error": str(e)}`. +- `GET /health`: attempt to `get` the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR; return `200 {"status": "ok"}` on success, `503` on failure. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6f2962eb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +# Component PRD: Policy Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation`) + +## Problem Statement + +AIAC Agent sub-agents produce `list[PolicyRule]` objects representing partial policy updates — a new onboarding event may produce a handful of rules covering one agent's inbound and outbound access. Before this component, merging those rules into full `AgentPolicyModel` objects required each sub-agent to independently: + +1. Query the IdP Configuration Service to resolve which services own each role and scope. +2. Read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store. +3. Additively merge the new rules into the existing model. +4. Write the updated model back to the Policy Store. +5. Build a `PolicyModel` and push it to the PDP Policy Writer. + +This bespoke logic was duplicated across every sub-agent that produced policy rules, making the merge semantics inconsistent and the IdP query pattern scattered. + +## Solution + +A pure Python library module `aiac.policy.computation` centralises all policy computation. Sub-agents call a single function `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None`, which handles IdP resolution, merging (additive append or override-replace), Policy Store read/write, and PDP Policy Writer invocation. No FastAPI service, no Kubernetes deployment — the module is imported directly into the calling sub-agent's process. + +--- + +## User Stories + +1. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to submit a list of `PolicyRule` objects and have them automatically merged into the relevant `AgentPolicyModel` records, so that I do not need to implement IdP resolution or storage merge logic. +2. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want the computation to be fire-and-forget, so that my sub-agent is not blocked waiting for Rego generation to complete. +3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve which services own a given `Role`, so that I know which `AgentPolicyModel` records receive new outbound rules. +4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve which services expose a given `Scope`, so that I know which `AgentPolicyModel` records receive new inbound rules. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read each affected agent's current `AgentPolicyModel` before merging, so that additive append does not lose previously established rules. +6. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to skip duplicate rules on append, so that re-processing the same event does not create redundant entries. +7. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to push the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer after all store writes succeed, so that OPA reflects the latest policy state. +8. As a developer, I want exceptions from the computation to be logged without propagating, so that a transient IdP or Policy Store failure does not crash the calling sub-agent. +9. As a developer, I want to import the engine from a stable path, so that the calling convention does not change as the module grows. + +--- + +## Implementation Decisions + +### Module Identity + +**Namespace:** `aiac.policy.computation` + +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/` + +**Package structure:** + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/policy/ +└── computation/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── engine.py # compute_and_apply +``` + +No FastAPI. No Kubernetes deployment. No container image. Imported as a library by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents. + +### Public API + +Single entry point: + +```python +def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None +``` + +- **Fire-and-forget:** the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and does not propagate them — a transient failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push must not crash the calling sub-agent. +- **`override`:** selects the merge mode (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)). `False` (default) appends additively; `True` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings. Set by the caller (the Controller) from the producing UC's choice — UC1 = `False`, UC3 = `True`, UC2 Rebuild = `True`, UC2 Build = TBD. +- Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply` + +### Algorithm + +Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, the engine executes these steps. + +> **Input rules arrive with roles already flattened to their closure** by the calling +> sub-agent (UC1/UC2/UC3) — the role itself plus all descendant roles (recursively via +> `role.childRoles`), de-duplicated by `role.id`. The PCE performs **no role flattening**; +> each rule's `role` is treated as-is (it may be a composite role or one of its children). + +0. **Service catalog + classification.** Resolve the full service catalog once via `Configuration.get_services() -> list[Service]`, keyed as `serviceId → Service`. Each `Service` carries its `type` (inferred as `Agent` / `Tool`), its own service-account realm roles, and its exposed scopes. A service is an **agent** iff `type == "Agent"`; any other service (notably `Tool`) is a **pure target**. This catalog drives both agent identity (P2) and the "only agents are modelled" rule (P4). `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` honor the **P1 client-side service filter**, so they return only services that genuinely own the role / expose the scope. + +1. **Classify and route each rule by kind (P5b).** The PCE is called with a single concatenated `list[PolicyRule]` spanning all three mappings, so each rule is classified by the kind of its role and scope and routed accordingly: + + | Rule kind (role, scope) | Routed to (on the agent model) | + |---|---| + | (user role, agent scope) | `inbound_rules` (+ `subject_roles`) | + | (user role, tool scope) | `outbound_subject_rules` (+ `subject_roles`) | + | (agent role, tool scope) | `outbound_rules` + `target_scopes[tool]` | + + - **Role kind** is read from ownership: `get_services_by_role(role)` returning an **agent** service ⇒ *agent role*; returning no agent (realm-level) ⇒ *user role*. + - **Scope kind** is read from exposure: `get_services_by_scope(scope)` returning an **agent** ⇒ *agent scope*; returning a **tool** ⇒ *tool scope*. + +2. **(agent role, tool scope) — mapping c:** for each agent owning the rule's role, add the rule to that agent's `outbound_rules`, and append the tool scope to `target_scopes[tool.serviceId]` for each tool exposing it (keyed by the tool's string `serviceId`, value is the typed `Scope`). This records "the agent may reach the tool". + +3. **(user role, agent scope) — mapping a:** for each agent exposing the rule's scope, add the rule to that agent's `inbound_rules`, and record the role's subjects — `get_subjects_by_role(role)` → append the typed `Role` to `subject_roles[subject.username]`. This records "the user may call the agent". + +4. **(user role, tool scope) — mapping b:** deferred until `target_scopes` is populated by mapping-c rules in the same batch. Then, for each agent model whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope, add the rule to that agent's `outbound_subject_rules` and record the role's subjects in `subject_roles`. This records "the user may reach the tool the agent targets" — the outbound subject gate. A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool is dropped (it cannot be attached to any agent). + +5. **P4 — only agents are modelled.** Routing only ever creates an `AgentPolicyModel` for a service identified as an **agent** (one owning the rule's role, or exposing the agent scope). A pure-target **Tool** therefore never gets its own model — no `github_tool.*.rego` is emitted. The agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded on the agent's model. + +6. **P2 — embed each agent's own identity.** For every agent model the PCE writes, set `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` from that agent's `Service` record in the catalog (its own service-account realm roles and exposed scopes). Only **AIAC-provisioned** entities are embedded: the PCE keeps only roles/scopes carrying the `aiac.managed` marker (`Role.aiac_managed` / `Scope.aiac_managed`) and drops Keycloak's built-ins — the default client scopes (`profile`, `email`, `roles`, `web-origins`, `acr`, `basic`, `service_account`) and the `default-roles-` composite — that every OIDC client / service account carries. This keeps the embed to domain entities only and makes it deterministic across runs (built-ins are returned in an arbitrary order by Keycloak). A realm-level agent with no owning service in the catalog keeps `[]`. Without the embed, both generated gates would deny-all (inbound `subject_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_scopes`; outbound `target_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_roles`). + +7. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. + - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. + - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate map list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by plain strings, merging is a plain dict-key lookup. P2's `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` are then set from the catalog (authoritative for the agent's own identity). + + Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. + +8. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). + +### Merge Semantics + +The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects the merge mode: + +- **`override=False` (default — additive append):** existing `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` entries are preserved; new rules and map entries are appended. De-duplication compares rules by value (`role.id` + `scope.id`) and map list values by the entity's `id`. This is the incremental path (e.g. UC1 Service Onboarding, where existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access). +- **`override=True` (authoritative role-keyed replace):** before appending, the engine purges every input role from the stored model (both directions + `target_scopes` reconciliation, per algorithm step 5) so the fresh rules become that role's complete mapping. Used by role-scoped recomputes (UC3 Role Update) and full rebuilds (UC2 Rebuild), where the input already represents each role's complete intended scope set. + +`override=True` provides **role-level** revocation — a role's stale mappings are removed before re-applying. Finer-grained single-rule revocation (removing one `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role) is still **TBD**. + +### Dependencies + +| Module | Purpose | +|--------|---------| +| `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services` (catalog: type + own roles/scopes), `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope`, `get_subjects_by_role` | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — push updated `PolicyModel` to OPA | + +### Not Called By + +The PCE is **not** called by: +- PDP Policy Writer — it is the downstream consumer, not a caller +- Policy Store — the store is pure CRUD with no computation +- IdP Configuration Service — the IdP service has no awareness of this module + +### Not Responsible For + +- Rule revocation (TBD) +- Bootstrapping `AgentPolicyModel` records for new agents (the store returns a 404; the engine creates a fresh model in that case) +- Translating `PolicyModel` → Rego packages (responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` / PDP Policy Writer) + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer — not internal merge logic directly. + +**Seam:** mock all downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: +- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog, carrying `type` + each service's own roles/scopes), `Configuration.get_services_by_role`, `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`, and `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role` +- `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` +- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy` + +Key behaviors to assert: +- **Routing by kind (P5b):** a (user role, agent scope) rule lands in the exposing agent's `inbound_rules`; a (agent role, tool scope) rule lands in the owning agent's `outbound_rules` with a `target_scopes[tool]` entry; a (user role, tool scope) rule lands in `outbound_subject_rules` of the agent whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope. +- A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool produces no model. +- **P2:** each written agent model carries its own `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` read from the service catalog, filtered to AIAC-provisioned entities (the `aiac.managed` marker) so Keycloak built-ins are excluded; an agent with no AIAC-managed catalog roles/scopes keeps `[]`. +- **P4:** a pure-target **Tool** service is never written as its own model, even though it exposes a scope the agent reaches; the agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded. +- `get_subjects_by_role` records `subject_roles` keyed by the subject's string `username` with the typed `Role` in the value list (for both user→agent and user→tool rules). +- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Scope` in the value list; every relationship map has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. +- The PCE does **not** flatten roles: `get_services_by_role` is called once per rule's role as-is (rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC); passing a rule with a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. +- With `override=False` (default), existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge (additive append). +- With `override=True`, every input role's stored mappings are purged from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules` (and dropped from `source_roles` / `subject_roles`, with `target_scopes` reconciled from surviving outbound rules) before the fresh rules are applied; the distinct input-role set is purged once, up-front. +- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate map list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. +- `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. +- An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock HTTP boundary pattern — apply the same approach at the library import boundary here). + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation is not yet designed — marked TBD. +- **Full policy rebuild:** the PCE handles incremental updates only. Full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. +- **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP queries go through `aiac.idp.configuration.library.Configuration`. The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. +- **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE does not store the input rule list — only the merged `AgentPolicyModel` output is persisted. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The PCE is the **only** caller of `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` from AIAC Agent sub-agents. Sub-agents no longer call the PDP Policy Library directly; they call `compute_and_apply` instead. +- `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` retains `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents. `PolicyRule` (now at `aiac.policy.model`) is imported from there. These helpers are not used by the PCE. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..55d194ab2 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +# Component PRD: Policy Model (`aiac.policy.model`) + +## Problem Statement + +`PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` were previously defined in `aiac.pdp.library.models`. Three independent consumers now need these types: + +- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — translates `PolicyModel` into HTTP calls to the PDP Policy Writer +- `aiac.policy.store.library` — reads/writes `AgentPolicyModel` from/to the Policy Store +- `aiac.policy.computation` — builds and merges `AgentPolicyModel` objects + +Keeping the canonical model definitions inside a PDP-namespaced module (`aiac.pdp.library.models`) forces both the Policy Store library and the Policy Computation Engine to take a dependency on the PDP package — a wrong-layer coupling. Any of the three consumers importing from `aiac.pdp.library.models` would create a transitive dependency on an unrelated service namespace. + +Additionally, the old `PolicyRule` used plain `str` for `role` and `scope`. The PCE algorithm requires typed `Role` and `Scope` objects (from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) to invoke `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`. + +Finally, the original `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` maps used pydantic model objects (`Service`, `Subject`, `Scope`) as dict keys. Model-object keys do not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without custom key handling, and they couple `aiac.policy.model` to the id-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` of the IdP models. The outbound map was also keyed by scope (`scope → targets`), whereas consumers need the inverse (`target → scopes`) to emit per-target authorization directly. + +## Solution + +A canonical, dependency-free model module at `aiac.policy.model` defines `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` with typed fields. No HTTP client, no service code — importable by any consumer without side effects. `PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed `Role` and `Scope` objects from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. + +The relationship maps (`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, `target_scopes`) are keyed by the string `id` of the referenced entity rather than by a typed object, so they serialize to JSON natively and carry no hashability requirement into `aiac.policy.model`. Typed `Role` / `Scope` objects are retained as the map *values* (and in `PolicyRule`), preserving the typing the PCE needs for IdP queries. The outbound map is `target_scopes` (`target service id → scopes permitted`), the inverse of the former `scope_targets`. + +--- + +## User Stories + +1. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to import `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` from a shared, neutral namespace, so that I do not take an unwanted dependency on the PDP package. +2. As the PDP Policy Library, I want to import `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` from `aiac.policy.model`, so that my HTTP serialization logic does not duplicate model definitions. +3. As the Policy Store Library, I want to import `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` from `aiac.policy.model`, so that response deserialization uses the same canonical types as every other consumer. +4. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to construct a `PolicyRule` with typed `Role` and `Scope` objects, so that the PCE can use them for IdP queries without additional type conversion. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` keyed by string entity IDs, so that I build them with `entity.id` and they serialize to JSON without custom key handling. +6. As a developer, I want all models to silently ignore unknown fields from API responses, so that IdP API additions do not break deserialization. +7. As the PDP Policy Library, I want outbound permissions expressed as `target service id → allowed scopes`, so that I can emit per-target authorization directly without inverting a `scope → targets` map. +8. As a consumer serializing an `AgentPolicyModel` to JSON, I want every relationship map to have string keys, so that `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. + +--- + +## Implementation Decisions + +### Module Identity + +**Namespace:** `aiac.policy.model` + +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/` + +**Package structure:** + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/policy/ +└── model/ + ├── __init__.py # empty + └── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +``` + +### Dependencies + +| Dependency | Purpose | +|------------|---------| +| `pydantic` | `BaseModel`, `ConfigDict` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope` (as map values and in `PolicyRule`) | + +No HTTP client dependency. No `requests`, no `python-dotenv`. + +### Pydantic Models + +All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. + +#### `PolicyRule` + +A single access rule pairing a typed role with a typed scope. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `role` | `Role` | Typed role from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | +| `scope` | `Scope` | Typed scope from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | + +#### `AgentPolicyModel` + +Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound rule sets are typed collections. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | +| `agent_roles` | `list[Role]` | Realm roles assigned to this agent | +| `agent_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | Scopes this agent exposes | +| `source_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: source (calling service) **id** → roles held. **Optional** gate input — an absent source passes. | +| `subject_roles` | `dict[str, list[Role]]` | Inbound: subject (end-user) **id** → roles held. **Mandatory** gate input. | +| `target_scopes` | `dict[str, list[Scope]]` | Outbound: target service **id** → scopes this agent may request on it | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Who may call this agent: `(subject_role, agent_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | What this agent may call: `(this_agent_role, target_scope)` tuples | +| `outbound_subject_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Which users may reach the agent's targets: `(user_role, tool_scope)` tuples. Defaults to `[]`. | + +**Inbound rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` is permitted to invoke this agent for the agent scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `inbound_rules` as a role → agent-scope map; its inbound gate is keyed on the subject id (mandatory), with the calling source id optional. + +**Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `outbound_rules` as an agent-role → target-scope map; its outbound gate requires both the subject and the agent to be authorized. + +**Outbound subject rule semantics:** `outbound_subject_rules` holds `(user role, tool scope)` pairs — the outbound subject gate; a user holding `role` may reach a tool exposing `scope`. It is the outbound counterpart of `inbound_rules` (which pairs a user role with an *agent* scope): where `inbound_rules` answers "may this user call the agent?", `outbound_subject_rules` answers "may this user reach the tool the agent targets?". The PDP Policy Writer groups it into `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (user role → tool-scope names) and matches against `target_scopes[input.target]`, not against `agent_scopes`. + +#### `PolicyModel` + +A partial or full system policy model. When sent to `POST /policy` on the Policy Store, it may contain only the agents whose policies have changed. + +| Field | Type | +|-------|------| +| `agents` | `list[AgentPolicyModel]` | + +### Map keys are string IDs + +`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` are keyed by the string `id` of the referenced Keycloak entity (source service id, subject id, target service id) rather than by the typed `Service` / `Subject` / `Scope` object. Rationale: + +- JSON object keys must be strings. A dict keyed by a pydantic model does not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without a custom key serializer; a `str` key serializes natively. +- The IdP models are plain pydantic models (default field-based equality, not hashable). Consumers build these maps with `entity.id` as the key. + +As a result, no field in `aiac.policy.model` uses a typed object as a dict key, and this module imports only `Role` and `Scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.models` (as map *values* and in `PolicyRule`). `Service` and `Subject` are no longer referenced here. + +### Usage + +```python +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope + +role = Role(id="r1", name="weather-reader", composite=False) +scope = Scope(id="s1", name="read") + +rule = PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) +agent_model = AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id="weather-agent", + agent_roles=[role], + agent_scopes=[scope], + source_roles={}, + subject_roles={"u1": [role]}, # keyed by subject id + target_scopes={"github-tool": [scope]}, # target service id → scopes + inbound_rules=[rule], + outbound_rules=[], + outbound_subject_rules=[], # (user_role, tool_scope) pairs; defaults to [] +) +model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) +``` + +### Replaces + +`aiac.pdp.library.models` is deprecated. All consumers must migrate their imports to `aiac.policy.model.models`. + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +**Seam:** model instantiation and serialization — no HTTP boundary, no mocking required. + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `PolicyRule` accepts typed `Role` and `Scope` objects; rejects plain `str` where `Role`/`Scope` is expected. +- `AgentPolicyModel` with string-ID keys in `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with the typed `Role` / `Scope` list values preserved. +- `target_scopes` maps a target service id to the list of `Scope` objects permitted on it (outbound direction is `target → scopes`, not `scope → targets`). +- `outbound_subject_rules` defaults to `[]` (constructors that omit it still validate) and round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with its `(user_role, tool_scope)` `PolicyRule` values preserved. +- A relationship map keyed by a plain string serializes to a JSON object without a custom key serializer. +- `ConfigDict(extra='ignore')` causes unknown fields to be silently discarded on `model_validate()`. + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- HTTP serialization logic — handled by `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.policy.store.service`, and `aiac.pdp.policy.library`. +- IdP API integration — `Service`, `Role`, `Scope` shapes are owned by `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. +- Rule revocation semantics — TBD; no model changes required until the design is finalised. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- Keying maps by string `id` sidesteps the previous reliance on id-only hashing of the IdP models: two records for the same Keycloak entity fetched at different times (with potentially different enrichment fields) collapse to the same string key regardless of those differences. +- `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` imports `PolicyRule` from `aiac.policy.model`. The `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers in that file remain in place and are used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents directly; they are not consumed by the PCE. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e73953063 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +# Component PRD: AIAC Policy Store + +## Problem Statement + +The AIAC Agent's Policy Computation Engine and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Writer translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: + +- The Policy Computation Engine cannot read current policy state for additive merging — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. +- Off-boarded agents leave no structured record of their removal. +- Pod restarts lose any in-flight policy construction context. + +## Solution + +A dedicated **AIAC Policy Store** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.policy.store.library`](library-policy-store.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.policy.library` pattern, used by the Policy Computation Engine to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. + +The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the Policy Store. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: + +| Artifact | Owner | Contents | +|---|---|---| +| SQLite `agent_policies` table | Policy Store | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | +| `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total) | PDP Policy Writer | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | + +--- + +## User Stories + +1. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the current `AgentPolicyModel` for a specific agent, so that I can additively append new rules without overwriting existing ones. +2. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the full `PolicyModel` (all agents), so that I can execute a whole-system policy rebuild. +3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to write an `AgentPolicyModel` to persistent storage, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. +4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. +6. As a consumer of the Policy Store library, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. +7. As an operator, I want the Policy Store deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. + +--- + +## Implementation Decisions + +### Policy Store Service + +**Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/` + +**Port:** `0.0.0.0:7074` + +**ClusterIP Service:** `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` + +**Deployment:** dedicated single-replica `StatefulSet` `aiac-policy-store`, with a `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, cluster-default StorageClass) mounted at `/data`. Fronted by a headless Service for stable pod DNS plus the `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` ClusterIP for clients. Not co-located with IdP Configuration / PDP Policy Writer. + +**Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. + +**Storage backend:** SQLite via `sqlite3` stdlib (zero extra dependency — `sqlite3` ships with the Python standard library). Database file: `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/policy_model.db`). + +**Schema:** + +```sql +CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies ( + agent_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, + spec TEXT NOT NULL -- AgentPolicyModel.model_dump() as JSON +); +``` + +**In-memory cache:** the service owns a full `PolicyModel` in memory as the authoritative serving layer: +- All `GET` requests served from memory (storage never queried at runtime). +- Every mutation writes through to SQLite synchronously before returning `204`. +- On pod restart: load all rows from SQLite → populate cache → begin serving. + +**Transaction strategy:** +- Full rebuild (`POST /policy`): `BEGIN` → `DELETE FROM agent_policies` → per-agent `INSERT` → `COMMIT`. Crash before `COMMIT` leaves the prior state intact (SQLite WAL rollback). +- Per-agent upsert (`POST /policy/agents/{id}`): `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies VALUES (?, ?)`. + +**Future normalization:** migrate to `agent_policies` + `policy_rules(agent_id, role, scope)` tables once `AgentPolicyModel`/`PolicyRule` schema stabilizes — a future observability UI will need queryable columns. JSON column in the current schema avoids migration churn during active development. + +**Endpoints:** + +| Method | Path | Body | Returns | +|---|---|---|---| +| `GET` | `/policy` | — | `PolicyModel` (all agents) | +| `GET` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | `AgentPolicyModel` | +| `POST` | `/policy` | `PolicyModel` | `204 No Content` | +| `POST` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `AgentPolicyModel` | `204 No Content` | +| `DELETE` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | `204 No Content` | +| `DELETE` | `/policy` | — | `204 No Content` | +| `GET` | `/health` | — | `200` / `503` | + +**Error responses:** +- `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "agent {id} not found"}` when `GET /policy/agents/{agent_id}` finds no entry in cache. +- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on SQLite write error for all write endpoints. +- `503 Service Unavailable` if `GET /health` cannot open or query the SQLite file. + +**`main.py` functions:** + +- `_get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection` — open `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` with `check_same_thread=False`; run `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` on first open. +- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel)` — `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`. +- `_get_agent(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel` — read from in-memory cache; raise `404` if absent. +- `_list_all() -> PolicyModel` — return in-memory cache directly. +- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)` — `DELETE FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?`; remove from cache. +- `_delete_all()` — `DELETE FROM agent_policies`; replace cache with empty `PolicyModel`. +- `_rebuild(model: PolicyModel)` — `BEGIN` → `DELETE FROM agent_policies` → per-agent `INSERT` → `COMMIT`; replace cache atomically. + +**Configuration:** + +| Variable | Source | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-policy-store-config`) | `/data/policy_model.db` | + +**Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `pydantic`. `sqlite3` is stdlib (no new dependency). + +**Imports:** `from aiac.policy.model import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel` + +**File structure:** + +``` +aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/ +├── __init__.py +├── Dockerfile +├── requirements.txt +└── main.py +``` + +Build command (run from repo root): +```bash +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ + -t aiac-policy-store:latest aiac/src/ +``` + +--- + +## Testing Decisions + +Good tests assert external behavior at the system boundary — not internal implementation details such as private helpers or field serialization choices. + +### Policy Store Service + +**Seam:** SQLite `:memory:` database — pass an in-memory connection to the service on startup instead of opening `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH`. All behavioral assertions remain valid; only the storage seam changes. + +Key behaviors to assert: +- `GET /policy/agents/{id}`: returns `AgentPolicyModel` deserialized from cache; `404` when agent not in cache. +- `GET /policy`: returns `PolicyModel` for all agents; empty `PolicyModel(agents=[])` when cache is empty. +- `POST /policy/agents/{id}`: `spec` stored in SQLite; cache updated; `204` returned. +- `POST /policy` (rebuild): SQLite `DELETE` + per-agent `INSERT` issued inside one transaction; cache replaced atomically; `204` returned. +- `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`: row removed from SQLite; removed from cache; `204`. +- `DELETE /policy`: all rows removed from SQLite; cache empty; `204`. +- SQLite write error on any write endpoint → `502`. +- SQLite file cannot be opened/queried on `GET /health` → `503`. + +See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library testing decisions. + +--- + +## Out of Scope + +- **Triggering Rego generation:** the Policy Store writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Writer is the responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (called by `aiac.policy.computation`). +- **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full result fits within one SQLite query and one HTTP response. +- **In-cluster mTLS between Policy Computation Engine and Policy Store:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. +- **Multi-writer / replica scale-out:** the current design is single-writer (single-replica StatefulSet, RWO PVC, SQLite). Future migration to a shared DB (e.g. PostgreSQL) is a backend swap; the HTTP contract is unchanged. + +--- + +## Further Notes + +- The K8s manifests issue must create the `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet, its `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`), and a headless Service. No CRD or RBAC is needed — the service does not touch the Kubernetes API. +- `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) — consistent with the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR convention. The JSON column avoids a translation layer. +- `agent_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. The `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. +- K8s resource names: StatefulSet `aiac-policy-store`, ClusterIP Service `aiac-policy-store-service:7074`, env var `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5c8692692 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-ingest-service.md @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +# Component PRD: RAG Ingest Service + +## Description +A FastAPI REST service co-located with ChromaDB in the RAG Pod. Accepts knowledge documents for any configured collection, chunks and embeds them, and writes the resulting vectors into the ChromaDB instance in the same Pod. Supports both access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`) through a single collection-parameterized API surface. Developer-driven ingestion is performed via `kubectl port-forward`. + +After every successful ingest operation the service publishes a trigger event to the **Event Broker** (NATS JetStream) on the `aiac.apply.policy.build` subject. This causes the AIAC Agent to recompute and apply the updated policy against the live PDP state. All three ingest semantics (replace, update, delete) publish `build`; `rebuild` is an explicit operator-only command issued directly to the Agent and is never triggered by the ingest service. + +## Endpoints + +The `{collection}` path segment must be a slug from `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` (default: `policy,domain-knowledge`). Unknown slug → 404. + +### Replace — wipe and reload the named collection + +| Method | Path | Body | Description | +|--------|------|------|-------------| +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/text` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "text": "..."}]}` | Replace entire named collection from a JSON body of text documents | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/file` | multipart upload (one or more files) | Replace entire named collection from uploaded files; `doc_id` = filename without extension | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/url` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "url": "..."}]}` | Replace entire named collection from a JSON body of URLs; service fetches each URL | + +**Replace semantics:** drops the ChromaDB collection and recreates it, then ingests all provided documents. Atomic at the collection level — partial failures roll back to an empty collection. An empty `docs` list wipes the collection. + +### Update — document-level upsert (additive, never deletes) + +| Method | Path | Body | Description | +|--------|------|------|-------------| +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/update/text` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "text": "..."}]}` | Upsert documents by `doc_id`; absent `doc_id`s in the collection are left untouched | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/update/file` | multipart upload (one or more files) | Upsert documents from uploaded files; `doc_id` = filename without extension | +| POST | `/ingest/{collection}/update/url` | `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "url": "..."}]}` | Upsert documents from URLs; only named `doc_id`s are affected | + +**Update semantics:** for each incoming `doc_id`, deletes existing chunks for that `doc_id` then inserts new chunks. All other `doc_id`s in the collection are untouched. An empty `docs` list is a no-op. + +### Delete — explicit removal + +| Method | Path | Description | +|--------|------|-------------| +| DELETE | `/ingest/{collection}/{doc_id}` | Remove all chunks belonging to `doc_id` from the named collection. `doc_id` not found → 404 | + +**Delete** is the only path that removes content from a collection. `/update/*` endpoints never delete as a side effect. + +## Post-ingest Event Broker notification + +After every successful ingest operation (replace, update, or delete), the service publishes `{"id": ""}` to `aiac.apply.policy.build` on the Event Broker (`NATS_URL`). The publish is non-blocking: ingest success is reported to the caller before the NATS publish completes. Publish failures are logged but do not cause the ingest endpoint to return an error. This preserves ingest availability even when the Event Broker is temporarily unavailable. + +The AIAC Agent's durable consumer receives the event and acknowledges it after successful processing. Delivery guarantees (at-least-once, replay on Agent restart) are managed by the Event Broker — the RAG Ingest Service is fire-and-forget from its perspective. + +## Collection slug → ChromaDB name mapping + +| Slug | ChromaDB Collection Name | +|------|--------------------------| +| `policy` | `aiac-policies` | +| `domain-knowledge` | `aiac-domain-knowledge` | + +## Ingest conventions + +- Chunking and embedding are applied uniformly across all operations and both collections. +- `doc_id` is stored in ChromaDB chunk metadata on every write to enable document-level update and deletion. +- `/text` and `/url` endpoints take a JSON body `{"docs": [{"id": "...", "text/url": "..."}]}`. +- `/file` endpoints use multipart upload; `doc_id` is derived from the filename (extension stripped). Filename collisions within one call → 400. + +## Configuration + +| Variable | Default | Source | +|----------|---------|--------| +| `CHROMA_URL` | `http://localhost:8000` | ConfigMap | +| `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` | `policy,domain-knowledge` | ConfigMap | +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | ConfigMap (`aiac-pdp-config`) | +| `EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `EMBEDDING_MODEL` | — | ConfigMap | +| `EMBEDDING_API_KEY` | — | Kubernetes Secret | + +Adding a third collection is a configuration-only change: add a new slug to `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` and a corresponding entry in the slug→name map. No code modification required. + +## Runtime + +- Framework: FastAPI with uvicorn +- Bind: `0.0.0.0:7073` +- Base image: `python:3.12-slim` + +## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) + +``` +fastapi +uvicorn[standard] +chromadb +httpx +nats-py +``` + +(Embedding model client TBD — depends on chosen embedding provider) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1b4efe807 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/rag-knowledge-base.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# Component PRD: RAG Knowledge Base + +## Description +A ChromaDB vector store that holds two named collections in a single instance: AIAC access control policies (`aiac-policies`) and org/business domain context (`aiac-domain-knowledge`). Deployed in a dedicated Kubernetes Pod alongside the RAG Ingest Service. The AIAC Agent retrieves relevant chunks from both collections at runtime via similarity search. + +## Technology +ChromaDB + +## Collections + +| Slug (wire) | ChromaDB Collection Name | Content | Written by | Read by | +|-------------|--------------------------|---------|------------|---------| +| `policy` | `aiac-policies` | Access control policy rules in natural language | RAG Ingest Service | Agent `fetch_policy` node | +| `domain-knowledge` | `aiac-domain-knowledge` | Org/business context — team rosters, application ownership, department mappings, who-does-what | RAG Ingest Service | Agent `fetch_domain_knowledge` node | + +The legal collection set is an open extension point governed by `AIAC_RAG_COLLECTIONS` on the RAG Ingest Service. Adding a new collection is a configuration-only change (new slug + ChromaDB name in the slug→name map) with no code modification required. + +## Deployment +Kubernetes **StatefulSet** in the RAG Pod, co-located with the RAG Ingest Service container. Exposed via the `aiac-rag-service` ClusterIP Service on port 8000 (ChromaDB default). Manifest: `rag-statefulset.yaml`. + +ChromaDB runs with `IS_PERSISTENT=TRUE` and `PERSIST_DIRECTORY=/chroma/chroma`. Data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma`. On pod recreation the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC; ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The RAG Pod runs as a single replica. + +## Access patterns + +| Consumer | Operation | Collection | +|----------|-----------|------------| +| RAG Ingest Service | Write (replace / upsert / delete) | Either collection, selected by `{collection}` slug in the request URL | +| AIAC Agent `fetch_policy` | Read (similarity search, top-N chunks) | `aiac-policies` | +| AIAC Agent `fetch_domain_knowledge` | Read (similarity search, top-N chunks) | `aiac-domain-knowledge` | + +Each chunk written to ChromaDB stores `doc_id` in its metadata to enable document-level upsert and targeted deletion. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e99a8e79 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +# Demo Spec: `github-agent` (A2A) — source + issue operations over `github-tool` + +> **Status:** spec (design source of truth). Implementation is decomposed into +> `docs/issues/demo/GA-*.md` and entry-pointed by +> `docs/handoffs/handoff-github-agent-implementation.md`. +> +> **This is a demo/reference agent**, not part of the AIAC service tree (`src/aiac/`). It is a +> self-contained, deployable A2A agent that realises the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC +> policy-pipeline integration test. + +--- + +## 1. Purpose & scenario mapping + +The AIAC policy-pipeline integration test +([`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md)) +and its fixture ([`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py)) are written +around a canonical **`github-agent`**: an autonomous A2A agent that acts on a user's behalf against +**source repositories** and an **issue tracker**, calling the **`github-tool`** MCP server. Until now +that agent has existed only as test data; this spec defines a **real, deployable** agent that matches it. + +The existing runnable reference, `agent-examples/a2a/git_issue_agent`, is **issue-only and single-skill**. +This agent generalises it to the scenario's **two capability areas**. + +### Mapping to the policy-pipeline scenario + +| Scenario element | This agent | +|---|---| +| Agent client `github-agent` (type **Agent**) | This A2A agent | +| Agent role `source-operator` → agent scope `source-access` | **Skill 1** — Source repository operations | +| Agent role `issues-operator` → agent scope `issues-access` | **Skill 2** — Issue & PR tracker operations | +| Tool `github-tool` scopes `source-read`/`source-write` | Source tool allow-list (see §5) | +| Tool `github-tool` scopes `issues-read`/`issues-write` | Issue/PR tool allow-list (see §5) | + +The agent does **not** know or enforce these scopes itself — AIAC/OPA + AuthBridge do. The agent simply +exposes the two capability areas; the AuthBridge sidecar performs inbound JWT validation and outbound +RFC-8693 token exchange, and the `github-tool` MitM swaps the exchanged token for a GitHub PAT by scope. + +### Related artefacts +- Scenario spec: [`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) +- Scenario fixture: [`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py) +- Existing (issue-only) agent card: [`../../analysis/github-agent-card.json`](../../analysis/github-agent-card.json) +- `github-tool` MCP tool catalog (44 tools): [`../../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json`](../../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json) +- Reference agent: `agent-examples/a2a/git_issue_agent/` +- Reference deployment: `kagenti-extensions/authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/` +- **Sibling tool spec (UC-1 onboarding fixture):** [`github-tool.md`](github-tool.md) — a simplified + 4-tool stub (`source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) deployed as Service + `github-tool`. **This is not the tool this agent connects to.** The agent connects to the production + 44-tool server at `github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`. Both coexist in namespace `team1` under different + Service names. + +--- + +## 2. Architecture + +Reuse the `git_issue_agent` stack verbatim — do not introduce a new framework: + +- **A2A SDK 1.x** server (route factories, `AgentInterface`, snake_case card fields). Binds `0.0.0.0` + on `PORT` (default **8000**). `create_jsonrpc_routes(..., enable_v0_3_compat=True)` — **required** + because Kagenti uses A2A 0.3 client libraries — plus the agent card at both + `/.well-known/agent-card.json` and legacy `/.well-known/agent.json`. +- **CrewAI** orchestration (`Agent`/`Crew`/`Task`, `Process.sequential`), LLM via **litellm** (`crewai.LLM`). +- **`crewai-tools[mcp]` `MCPServerAdapter`** — per-request connection to the MCP tool over + `transport="streamable-http"` at `MCP_URL` (default `http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`), inside a + `with` block, torn down after each request. +- **Auth (three tiers, verbatim from the reference `GithubExecutor.execute`):** + 1. `GITHUB_TOKEN` env set → `Authorization: Bearer ` to MCP; + 2. else pass through the inbound request's `Authorization` header + (`context.call_context.state["headers"]["authorization"]`) — the AuthBridge/Envoy path; + 3. else unauthenticated + warning. + +``` + A2A client ──(JSON-RPC /)──► github-agent (:8000) + │ CrewAI: prereq extract → researcher + └──(streamable-http, MCP_URL)──► github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp ──► GitHub + (AuthBridge sidecar: inbound JWT validation; outbound RFC-8693 token exchange for MCP_URL host) +``` + +--- + +## 3. AgentCard (two skills — comprehensive) + +Built in `a2a_agent.py::get_agent_card()`. Fields: + +- **name:** `Github agent` +- **version:** `1.0.0` +- **description:** *"Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an + issue tracker. It inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates + issues and their threads."* (verbatim from the scenario's `github-agent` description so the card and + the policy-pipeline fixture agree). +- **supported_interfaces:** `[AgentInterface(url=, protocol_binding="JSONRPC")]` +- **capabilities:** `AgentCapabilities(streaming=True)` +- **default_input_modes / default_output_modes:** `["text"]` +- **security_schemes:** single `Bearer` → `HTTPAuthSecurityScheme(scheme="bearer", bearer_format="JWT", description="OAuth 2.0 JWT token")` +- **skills:** two `AgentSkill`s: + +| id | name | description | tags | examples | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| `source_operations` | Source repository operations | Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits. | `git, github, source, repositories, files, branches, commits` | "Show the README of kagenti/kagenti", "List the branches of owner/repo", "Create a branch and commit a fix to owner/repo" | +| `issue_operations` | Issue & PR tracker operations | Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests. | `git, github, issues, pull-requests` | "List open issues in kubernetes/kubernetes", "Open an issue in owner/repo titled …", "Summarise PR #42 in owner/repo" | + +> The existing `git_issue_agent` card ([`../../analysis/github-agent-card.json`](../../analysis/github-agent-card.json)) +> has a single `github_issue_agent` skill — this card supersedes it with the two-skill shape. + +--- + +## 4. Agent internals + +Generalise the reference two-phase CrewAI flow from issue-only to source + issues: + +- **Phase A — prerequisite extraction.** A no-tools CrewAI agent parses the query into a generalised + `GithubQueryInfo`. Reuse the reference's robustness measures: **avoid `output_pydantic`** (fails on + small Ollama models) and parse raw JSON from the LLM text via a flat-object regex + (`re.search(r"\{[^{}]*\}", raw)`); coerce string arrays to lists. + + ```python + class GithubQueryInfo(BaseModel): + owner: str | None = None + repo: str | None = None + ref: str | None = None # branch / tag / sha, if named + path: str | None = None # file path, if named + numbers: list[int] | None = None # issue or PR numbers + ``` + + **Validation gates** (return a helpful message, no tool call, when unmet): + - `numbers` present → `owner` **and** `repo` required. + - `repo` present → `owner` required. + +- **Phase B — researcher.** One CrewAI "GitHub operations" agent wired with the **curated tool set** + (§5), `inject_date=True`, bounded `max_iter`/`max_retry_limit`, `respect_context_window=True`. A + generalised ReAct `TOOL_CALL_PROMPT` with a tool-selection decision tree spanning **source** + (files / branches / commits / code search) and **issues / PRs**, and a generalised `INFO_PARSER_PROMPT` + for Phase A. Identifiers (owner/repo/numbers) are copied verbatim; the final answer is grounded only + in tool output. + +`event.py` (streaming `Event` ABC) and `llm.py` (`CrewLLM`, incl. the Ollama `num_ctx=8192` bump) are +copied verbatim from the reference. + +--- + +## 5. Tool wiring (scenario source + issue) + +`github-tool` federates 44 GitHub tools at startup. This agent wires only the **source + issue** subset +that matches the scenario scopes, via an **explicit name allow-list** in `github_agent/tools.py` (robust +vs the reference's substring matching). The executor keeps only MCP tools whose `.name` is in the set +and raises `RuntimeError` if none resolve. An `ENABLED_TOOLS` env var (comma-separated) overrides the +default set. + +**Source (`source-access` → tool `source-read`/`source-write`):** +- read: `get_file_contents`, `list_branches`, `get_commit`, `list_commits`, `search_code` +- write: `create_or_update_file`, `delete_file`, `push_files`, `create_branch` + +**Issue & PR (`issues-access` → tool `issues-read`/`issues-write`):** +- read: `issue_read`, `list_issues`, `search_issues`, `list_issue_types`, `pull_request_read`, `list_pull_requests` +- write: `issue_write`, `add_issue_comment`, `sub_issue_write`, `create_pull_request`, `update_pull_request` + +**Excluded by default** (out of the policy-pipeline scenario; one edit / `ENABLED_TOOLS` to add back): +Teams & Users (`get_me`, `get_team_members`, `get_teams`), Security (`run_secret_scanning`), and +repo-lifecycle / release tools (`create_repository`, `fork_repository`, `list_tags`, `get_tag`, +`get_label`, releases). These are named in the module so they are trivially re-enabled. + +> The allow-list is a single editable constant grouped by skill/scope so the source/issue split stays +> legible and auditable against the scenario. + +--- + +## 6. Configuration & LLM presets + +Config via `github_agent/config.py` (`pydantic-settings`), adapted from the reference: + +| Variable | Description | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `TASK_MODEL_ID` | litellm model id | `ollama/ibm/granite4:latest` | +| `LLM_API_BASE` | OpenAI-compatible base URL | `http://host.docker.internal:11434` | +| `LLM_API_KEY` | LLM API key | `my_api_key` | +| `MODEL_TEMPERATURE` | Sampling temperature | `0` | +| `EXTRA_HEADERS` | Extra LLM headers (JSON) | `{}` | +| `MCP_URL` | MCP tool endpoint | `http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` | +| `MCP_TIMEOUT` | MCP connect timeout (s) | `600` | +| `ENABLED_TOOLS` | Override the curated tool allow-list (comma-separated) | (unset → §5 default) | +| `PORT` | A2A listen port | `8000` | +| `LOG_LEVEL` | Log level | `INFO` | +| `GITHUB_TOKEN` | Static Bearer to MCP (else inbound passthrough) | (unset) | +| `ISSUER` | Expected `iss` of inbound JWTs (informational) | (unset) | +| `AGENT_ENDPOINT` | Override the URL advertised in the card | (unset) | + +**Env presets shipped:** +- `.env.ollama` **(default)** — `ollama/ibm/granite4:latest`, `LLM_API_BASE=http://host.docker.internal:11434`. +- `.env.openai` — `gpt-4o-mini`, key from k8s secret `openai-secret`. +- `.env.claude` — litellm Anthropic (`TASK_MODEL_ID=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` + from k8s secret `claude-secret`); native Anthropic endpoint (no `LLM_API_BASE`). +- `.env.template` — documented placeholders + `MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`. + +--- + +## 7. Deployment (aiac level) + +Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the github-issue demo. Namespace +`team1` (installer-provided ConfigMaps/secrets assumed present). + +- **`github-agent-deployment.yaml`** — `ServiceAccount` + `Deployment` + `Service` + `AgentRuntime`: + - Pod labels `kagenti.io/inject: enabled`, `kagenti.io/spire: enabled`. + - Container port `8000`; env `MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`, + `JWKS_URI=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs`, + LLM vars, `PORT`, `LOG_LEVEL`; `/shared` `emptyDir` for operator-mounted client creds. + - `Service` `8080 → 8000` (ClusterIP). + - `AgentRuntime{ type: agent, targetRef: this Deployment }` — enrolls the workload (operator applies + `kagenti.io/type=agent`, registers a Keycloak client, injects the AuthBridge sidecar). + - Image `github-agent:latest`, `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` (kind-load; name is a documented knob). +- **`configmaps.yaml`** — `authbridge-config` (Keycloak URL/realm/issuer) + `authproxy-routes` with the + outbound token-exchange route: + ```yaml + - host: "github-tool-mcp" + target_audience: "github-tool" + token_scopes: "openid github-tool-aud github-full-access" + ``` +- **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** the existing **production** `github-tool` Deployment/Service + (`authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`, Service name `github-tool-mcp`) + + `github-tool-secrets`, a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`). + The sibling UC-1 stub at `demo/tools/github_tool/` (Service `github-tool`) is a separate deployment + for AIAC onboarding discovery and is **not** a runtime dependency of this agent. + +**Wiring invariant:** agent `MCP_URL` host (`github-tool-mcp`) == `authproxy-routes` host == tool +Service name; exchanged audience (`github-tool`) == tool `AUDIENCE`. + +--- + +## 8. Verification + +**Local (no cluster — primary gate):** +1. `cd aiac/demo/agents/github_agent && uv lock && uv sync`. +2. `podman build -t github-agent:latest .`. +3. Startup + card: run `uv run --no-sync server` (or `test_startup.exp`), then + `curl -s localhost:8000/.well-known/agent-card.json | jq '.name, .skills[].id'` → + `"Github agent"` + `source_operations`, `issue_operations`. +4. (Optional; needs a GitHub PAT + reachable LLM) `GITHUB_TOKEN=… MCP_URL=https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/`, + send an A2A `message/send` read query and confirm a grounded, tool-cited answer. + +**Cluster (HITL — live Kagenti + Keycloak + LLM + tool PAT):** +5. `kind load docker-image github-agent:latest --name kagenti`. +6. Ensure `github-tool` + `github-tool-secrets` exist in `team1`. +7. `kubectl apply -f k8s/configmaps.yaml -f k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml`. +8. Confirm AuthBridge injection + `kagenti.io/type=agent`; `kubectl port-forward svc/github-agent 8080:8080 -n team1`; + send an authenticated A2A message; verify token exchange reaches `github-tool` and an answer returns. + +--- + +## 9. Out of scope +- Any changes to `github_tool` (reused as-is). +- Any changes to the AIAC pipeline, `policy-pipeline.md`, or the integration test. +- Wiring the agent into `agent-examples` CI (`build.yaml`) — aiac/demo images build independently. +- Onboarding this agent through the AIAC UC1 pipeline (separate activity; the card here is its input). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fa1f8b0e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-tool.md @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +# Demo Spec: `github-tool` (MCP) — minimal source + issue tool for UC-1 onboarding + +> **Status:** spec (design source of truth). This document describes the files to be built; +> it does not create them. +> +> **This is a demo/reference tool**, not part of the AIAC service tree (`src/aiac/`). It is a +> self-contained, deployable MCP tool server whose sole job is to make **UC-1 service onboarding** +> (`../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md`, node `analyze_tool`) discover exactly the +> four canonical `github-tool` scenario scopes, deterministically. It is the tool sibling of the +> agent spec at [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md). + +--- + +## 1. Purpose & scenario mapping + +The AIAC phase-1 deliverable ([`../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md`](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md)) +demonstrates **service onboarding (UC-1)** end-to-end for one agent (`github-agent`) and one tool +(`github-tool`): AIAC classifies each service, discovers its capabilities, provisions the identities +they need, models access, and emits rules — which are then validated by **rule evaluation**, not by +live traffic. Phase 1 is explicitly **"Deploy + discover + evaluate": no live A2A traffic and no live +enforcement.** The tool is onboarded and its scopes are evaluated; it is **never actually driven by +the agent.** + +This spec defines the **tool half** of that demo: a **real, deployable MCP endpoint** that answers +`tools/list` with exactly four tools, so that UC-1's `analyze_tool` node derives exactly the four +canonical scenario tool scopes. + +### How UC-1 consumes this tool + +From `analyze_tool` (`../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md`): + +1. **`classify_service`** resolves identity from the Keycloak client's `client.name` (the operator sets + it to `"{namespace}/{workload_name}"`), splits on the first `/` → `namespace` + `workload_name`, + LISTs pods in the namespace, finds the pod owned by `workload_name`, and reads the `kagenti.io/type` + pod label. It **must be `tool`** → routes to `analyze_tool`. +2. **`analyze_tool`** does `read_service(workload_name, namespace)` (the K8s Service named + `workload_name`), **requires the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label** on that Service (a deploy-time + prerequisite — the operator does **not** stamp it), takes the Service's **first port**, and POSTs + JSON-RPC `tools/list` to + `http://{workload_name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp`. +3. UC-1 derives **one scope per returned tool**: + `ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description)`. + +So with workload `github-tool` and a tool named `source-read`, the provisioned scope is +`github-tool.source-read` with `description =` that tool's description. + +### Mapping to the policy-pipeline scenario + +The canonical scenario ([`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py), +`TOOL_SCOPES`) and its spec +([`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md), +*Role & scope descriptions → Tool scopes*) fix **four** `github-tool` scopes. This tool exposes +exactly the four MCP tools whose names + descriptions make UC-1 reproduce them: + +| Scenario tool scope | MCP tool name | UC-1-derived scope (`workload_name=github-tool`) | +|---|---|---| +| `source-read` | `source-read` | `github-tool.source-read` | +| `source-write` | `source-write` | `github-tool.source-write` | +| `issues-read` | `issues-read` | `github-tool.issues-read` | +| `issues-write` | `issues-write` | `github-tool.issues-write` | + +The tool does **not** know or enforce these scopes — AIAC/OPA + AuthBridge do (in later phases). +Phase 1 only discovers and evaluates them. + +### Related artefacts +- Phase-1 deliverable: [`../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md`](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md) +- UC-1 `analyze_tool`: [`../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md`](../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) +- Scenario fixture (`TOOL_SCOPES`): [`../../../test/integration/scenario.py`](../../../test/integration/scenario.py) +- Scenario spec: [`../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md`](../integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) +- Sibling agent spec: [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md) +- Reference deployment: `kagenti-extensions/authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/` + +--- + +## 2. Relationship to the real `github-tool` (deliberate divergence) + +The sibling agent spec ([`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md) §2, §5, §7) is written against a +**production** `github-tool`: a real MCP server reachable at `github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` that federates +**44 real GitHub tools** and proxies calls to the GitHub API (swapping the exchanged token for a GitHub +PAT by scope in a MitM). That tool is the runtime target for live A2A traffic in later phases. + +**This spec deliberately diverges from that production tool** in three ways, and the divergences are +intentional: + +1. **Four tools, not 44.** This tool exposes exactly `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, + `issues-write` — one per canonical scenario scope — so UC-1 discovery yields *exactly* the four + scenario tool scopes and nothing else. The production 44-tool catalog would yield 44 fine-grained + scopes that do not match the scenario truth table. +2. **Stub handlers, no GitHub.** Tool **calls** are trivial no-op/echo stubs; there are no real GitHub + API calls, no PAT, and no MitM. Phase 1 drives no live traffic, so nothing calls the tools. +3. **Workload name `github-tool`, not `github-tool-mcp`.** See §6 (naming invariants). The scenario + entity id is `github-tool`, which keeps UC-1 identity resolution clean. + +In short: this is a **purpose-built, minimal stand-in** used ONLY to make UC-1's discovery deterministic +for the phase-1 demo. It is distinct from — and not a replacement for — the production 44-tool +`github-tool` referenced by [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md). When later phases wire live traffic, +they use the production tool; this stand-in serves the discover-and-evaluate loop only. + +--- + +## 3. The four MCP tools (verbatim scenario descriptions) + +Exactly four tools. Names are chosen so UC-1 derives `github-tool.`; descriptions are copied +**verbatim** from `scenario.py::TOOL_SCOPES` / the policy-pipeline spec's *Tool scopes* section (each is +≤255 chars, authored to be generic/keyword-free so the PRB maps them correctly — do not paraphrase): + +| Tool name | Description (verbatim) | +|---|---| +| `source-read` | `Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only.` | +| `source-write` | `Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes.` | +| `issues-read` | `Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only.` | +| `issues-write` | `Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close.` | + +Each tool has a **minimal / empty** `inputSchema` (`{"type": "object", "properties": {}}`) — phase 1 +inspects only `name` + `description`, never arguments. + +> **Invariant:** the description strings here must remain byte-identical to `TOOL_SCOPES` in +> `scenario.py`. UC-1 copies them into `ScopeDefinition.description`, and the PRB LLM maps roles→scopes +> from that text; a drift would change the provisioned scope descriptions and could move the truth +> table. If `TOOL_SCOPES` changes, change this table with it. + +--- + +## 4. MCP server (minimal, real, deployable) + +A tiny, self-contained MCP server that serves **JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP at path `/mcp`** and correctly +answers `tools/list` with the four tools of §3. + +- **Transport / protocol:** JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP `POST /mcp` (the MCP streamable-HTTP endpoint + convention `analyze_tool` posts to). It must respond to a `tools/list` request with the four tools + (each `name` + `description` + minimal `inputSchema`). Implementing the MCP `initialize` handshake is + fine but not required by UC-1, which posts `tools/list` directly. +- **Stack:** a small Python server, consistent with the repo (Python 3.12). Either the official MCP + Python SDK in streamable-HTTP mode, or a hand-rolled minimal ASGI/HTTP handler for `POST /mcp` — pick + whichever keeps the image smallest and the `tools/list` contract obvious. No CrewAI, no A2A, no LLM. +- **Tool registry:** a single editable constant — the four `(name, description, inputSchema)` tuples of + §3 — so the list stays legible and auditable against `scenario.py::TOOL_SCOPES`. +- **Tool-CALL handlers:** trivial **no-op / echo stubs**. A `tools/call` for any of the four returns a + stub result (e.g. a text content block echoing the tool name + received arguments, or a fixed + `"stub: not implemented in phase-1 demo"` message). They perform **no** GitHub work. This is + acceptable because phase 1 drives no live traffic — but the endpoint must still be a **real, + deployable MCP server** that answers `tools/list`. +- **Location:** self-contained under `aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/`, mirroring the agent's + `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/` layout. Ships its own `Dockerfile`, dependency manifest, and the + `k8s/` manifests of §7. +- **Listen:** binds `0.0.0.0` on a container `PORT` (see §5) and serves `/mcp`. + +``` + UC-1 analyze_tool ──(JSON-RPC POST /mcp: tools/list)──► github-tool (:PORT) ──► 4 tools + (resolves http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:{first-port}/mcp) + (phase 1: no tools/call traffic — stub handlers are never exercised by the agent) +``` + +--- + +## 5. Configuration + +Minimal env, adapted to the tiny server: + +| Variable | Description | Default | +|---|---|---| +| `PORT` | HTTP listen port serving `/mcp` | `9090` | +| `LOG_LEVEL` | Log level | `INFO` | + +No Keycloak, LLM, GitHub PAT, JWKS, or audience config — the demo tool performs no auth and no upstream +calls (contrast the github-issue demo's `github-tool`, which needs PATs + issuer/JWKS/audience). Any +auth enforcement in front of this tool is AuthBridge/MitM's job in later phases, not this container's. + +--- + +## 6. Naming & consistency invariants + +State these explicitly; UC-1 identity resolution depends on all of them holding: + +- **One name everywhere:** workload name == K8s `Deployment` name == K8s `Service` name == the + `AgentRuntime` `targetRef.name` == the Keycloak client's workload segment == **`github-tool`**. + Consequently: + - the operator sets the Keycloak client `client.name = "team1/github-tool"`, so `classify_service` + splits it into `namespace=team1`, `workload_name=github-tool`; + - `analyze_tool` resolves the endpoint to + `http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:{first-port}/mcp`; + - UC-1 derives scopes `github-tool.source-read`, `github-tool.source-write`, + `github-tool.issues-read`, `github-tool.issues-write`. +- **Keycloak client id == `github-tool`** — matches `scenario.py`'s `TOOL_ID = "github-tool"`, so the + scenario/integration test and this deployed tool agree on the entity id. +- **Divergence from the github-issue demo (`github-tool-mcp`) is intentional.** The github-issue demo + and [`github-agent.md`](github-agent.md) use a Service named **`github-tool-mcp`** on port `9090`. + This demo names both the workload and the Service **`github-tool`** because: + - the canonical scenario entity id is `github-tool` (`scenario.py` `TOOL_ID`), and UC-1 derives the + scope prefix from the **workload name** — a `github-tool-mcp` workload would yield + `github-tool-mcp.source-read`, not the canonical `github-tool.source-read`; + - `analyze_tool` relies on the operator convention **Service name == workload name**, so the Service + must also be `github-tool` for endpoint resolution to work off `client.name`. + Net: keeping a single `github-tool` name across workload / Service / Keycloak client keeps UC-1 + resolution clean and the derived scopes canonical. (The production live-traffic path continues to use + `github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp` per the agent spec; the two are separate deployments.) + +--- + +## 7. Deployment (aiac level) + +Manifests live under `aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/`, adapted from the sibling agent's §7 and the +github-issue demo's `github-tool-deployment.yaml`. Namespace **`team1`** (installer-provided +ConfigMaps/secrets assumed present), consistent with the agent spec. + +- **`github-tool-deployment.yaml`** — `Deployment` + `Service` + `AgentRuntime`: + - **`Deployment`** named `github-tool`. Container port serves `/mcp` (default `9090`). Env `PORT`, + `LOG_LEVEL`. Image `github-tool:latest`, `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` (kind-load; name is a + documented knob). No GitHub PAT / issuer / JWKS / audience env (unlike the github-issue tool). + - **Pod label `kagenti.io/type: tool`** — this is what `classify_service` reads. Applied by the + operator via the `AgentRuntime` (see below); relying on the operator to stamp it, rather than + hand-setting it, keeps it consistent with the operator's own discriminator. + - **`Service`** named `github-tool` (ClusterIP), selecting the Deployment's pods. Its **first port** + maps to the container's `/mcp` port (e.g. `port: 9090 → targetPort: 9090`). `analyze_tool` uses the + Service's **first** port, so keep `/mcp`'s port first. + - **Service label `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` MUST be present** — a **deploy-time prerequisite** for + `analyze_tool` (the operator does **not** stamp it; `analyze_tool` returns `502` if absent). Set it + explicitly on the Service metadata (e.g. `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp: "true"`). + - **`AgentRuntime{ type: tool, targetRef: { apiVersion: apps/v1, kind: Deployment, name: github-tool } }`** + — enrolls the workload so the kagenti-operator applies `kagenti.io/type=tool` to the pod and + registers a Keycloak client with `client.name = "team1/github-tool"`. Unlike the github-issue demo + (which omits `kagenti.io/type` to skip AuthBridge entirely), this demo **needs** `type: tool` so the + pod carries `kagenti.io/type=tool` for UC-1 `classify_service`. + +- **No `configmaps.yaml` needed here** — the tool has no `authbridge-config` / `authproxy-routes` + dependency (it neither validates inbound JWTs nor does outbound token exchange in phase 1). The agent + spec's `authproxy-routes` still targets the **production** `github-tool-mcp` host and is unrelated to + this stand-in. + +- **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** a running Kagenti cluster with the kagenti-operator + (Keycloak realm as configured by the installer, namespace `team1`), so the `AgentRuntime` is + reconciled into a Keycloak client + pod label. + +**Wiring invariant:** `AgentRuntime.targetRef.name` == `Deployment` name == `Service` name == +`github-tool`; the `Service` carries the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label and exposes `/mcp` as its first +port; the operator-applied pod label is `kagenti.io/type=tool`; the operator-registered Keycloak +`client.name` is `team1/github-tool`. + +--- + +## 8. Verification + +**Local (no cluster — primary gate):** +1. `cd aiac/demo/tools/github_tool` and build: `podman build -t github-tool:latest .`. +2. Run the container (`-e PORT=9090 -p 9090:9090`), then POST a JSON-RPC `tools/list` to `/mcp` and + confirm the four tool names: + ```bash + curl -s -X POST localhost:9090/mcp \ + -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ + -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list","params":{}}' \ + | jq -r '.result.tools[].name' | sort + # → issues-read, issues-write, source-read, source-write + ``` +3. Confirm each returned tool's `description` is byte-identical to the matching `TOOL_SCOPES` entry in + `scenario.py` (e.g. `jq '.result.tools[] | {name, description}'`). + +**Cluster (HITL — live Kagenti + Keycloak + operator):** +4. `kind load docker-image github-tool:latest --name kagenti`. +5. `kubectl apply -f k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`. +6. Confirm the operator applied the pod label: `kubectl get pod -l app=github-tool -n team1 + -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.labels.kagenti\.io/type}'` → `tool`. +7. Confirm the Service carries the MCP label: `kubectl get svc github-tool -n team1 + -o jsonpath='{.metadata.labels.protocol\.kagenti\.io/mcp}'` → present. +8. Confirm the operator registered a Keycloak client with `client.name = "team1/github-tool"` (via the + Keycloak admin API / IdP `Configuration` library). +9. From inside the cluster (or via `kubectl port-forward svc/github-tool 9090:9090 -n team1`), POST + `tools/list` to `http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp` and confirm the four tools — + the exact call UC-1 `analyze_tool` makes. +10. (End-to-end) Trigger UC-1 onboarding for `github-tool` and confirm it provisions scopes + `github-tool.source-read` / `github-tool.source-write` / `github-tool.issues-read` / + `github-tool.issues-write`, and writes **no rules for the tool alone** (per the phase-1 acceptance + criteria). + +--- + +## 9. Out of scope + +- **Real GitHub API calls / real source & issue operations** — tool-call handlers are stubs; there is + no GitHub PAT and no upstream. +- **Auth enforcement inside the tool** — no inbound JWT validation, no outbound token exchange, no + audience/scope checks. AuthBridge / the MitM handle enforcement in later phases. +- **The production 44-tool federation** — this stand-in exposes only the four canonical scenario tools + (see §2); the real `github-tool` (`github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`) is unchanged and used by the live-traffic + path. +- **Being agent-executable** — phase 1 drives no A2A traffic, so the tool is discovered and evaluated but + never invoked by `github-agent`. +- **Any changes to the AIAC pipeline, UC-1, `policy-pipeline.md`, or the integration test** — this tool + is an input to UC-1 discovery, not a change to it. +- **Building this tool into `agent-examples` CI** — aiac/demo images build independently (as with the + agent spec). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md b/aiac/docs/specs/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bd2900416 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/event-broker-redhat-amq-evaluation.md @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +# Event Broker Alternatives: Red Hat AMQ Evaluation (Greenfield, Technology-Neutral) + +## Abstract + +This document evaluates Red Hat's AMQ messaging product family as a candidate for the AIAC Event +Broker role. The evaluation assumes a greenfield implementation — no part of the AIAC system +exists yet — and uses exclusively functional requirements derived from the PRD's use cases and +architectural principles. All technology-specific constraints (protocol names, client library +names, image identifiers, API call names) have been removed. The question asked is: can this +product satisfy what the system must do? + +**Conclusion:** AMQ Broker (Artemis) satisfies all functional requirements and is a technically +sound candidate. Remaining differentiators from NATS JetStream are operational: footprint, +configuration surface, and protocol fit for the AIAC event volume. AMQ Streams retains two +structural incompatibilities that cannot be resolved without changing the PRD's routing design. +AMQ Interconnect is disqualified by the durability requirement. + +--- + +## Functional Requirements + +Derived from the PRD's use cases and architectural decisions. All technology-specific language +has been removed — requirements state what the system must do, not how. + +| ID | Functional requirement | PRD source | +|----|------------------------|------------| +| FR1 | Events must survive the Agent pod going down and be re-delivered when it restarts — no silent event loss on transient consumer failure | §5 arch decisions, §7.4 | +| FR2 | Each event must be processed by exactly one Agent instance across competing replicas (work-queue semantics) | §7.4, §5 arch decisions | +| FR3 | Failed event processing must be retried a bounded number of times, then moved to a dead-letter destination for operator inspection — a persistently broken event must not block the queue | §7.4, §9 | +| FR4 | The broker must support per-entity event addressing: a new Keycloak client and a new role each produce distinct, independently routable events carrying the entity ID — the consumer must be able to subscribe to a wildcard that covers all entity-scoped events without inspecting message payloads | §7.4, §7.5, §7.8, §5 ("no business logic lives in the consumer") | +| FR5 | The Agent (Python 3.12, FastAPI, asyncio) must be able to consume events asynchronously as a background task; processing must complete before the event is acknowledged | §7.5, §10 | +| FR6 | The RAG Ingest Service (Python 3.12, FastAPI) must be able to publish events to the broker | §7.7 | +| FR7 | The Keycloak SPI (Java) must be able to publish events to the broker | §7.8 | +| FR8 | The broker must be deployable without authentication; Kubernetes ClusterIP network isolation is the intended access control boundary | §7.4, §10 | +| FR9 | The broker must run as a single Kubernetes pod with minimal configuration overhead; no Operator dependency | §8 | +| FR10 | An init container must be able to provision required broker resources idempotently at startup and health-check the broker before the Agent container starts | §5 arch decisions, §9 | + +--- + +## Candidate 1 — AMQ Broker (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis) + +**What it is:** A full-featured message broker with persistent storage (NIO journal), native +dead-letter support, and competing consumer semantics via `anycast` routing. Supports AMQP 1.0, +STOMP, MQTT, and OpenWire. Python client: `python-qpid-proton`. Java client: Artemis JMS or +Qpid Proton Java. + +### Assessment + +| Req | Requirement | Verdict | Detail | +|-----|-------------|---------|--------| +| **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Pass** | NIO journal persists messages to disk. Consumer reconnects and pending messages re-deliver automatically | +| **FR2** | Work-queue: one consumer per event | **Pass** | `anycast` routing type delivers each message to exactly one consumer across competing receivers — equivalent to work-queue semantics | +| **FR3** | Bounded retry + dead-letter | **Pass** | Native `dead-letter-address` + `max-delivery-attempts` configuration in `broker.xml`. Max attempts is a simple numeric setting | +| **FR4** | Per-entity dynamic addressing | **Pass** | Artemis supports hierarchical address wildcards (`aiac.apply.#` for multi-level, `*` for single-level). Addresses are auto-created on first publish when auto-create address policy is enabled — a new entity ID at runtime creates a new routable address automatically. A consumer on the wildcard address receives all matching events without payload inspection | +| **FR5** | Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | **Pass** | `python-qpid-proton` provides asyncio consumer with manual message settlement. Ack-after-processing is the standard AMQP disposition model — the consumer accepts or rejects a message after handler completion | +| **FR6** | Python publisher | **Pass** | `python-qpid-proton` sender is straightforward | +| **FR7** | Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | **Pass** | Artemis JMS client and Qpid Proton Java are both mature and well-supported | +| **FR8** | No-auth deployment | **Pass** | Configurable: `false` in `broker.xml`. One XML element; low friction | +| **FR9** | Single pod, no Operator, low footprint | **Partial** | Artemis runs standalone without an Operator. However, a `broker.xml` configuration file must be authored and mounted via ConfigMap — there is no single-flag enablement. RAM footprint is ~256–300 MB. For AIAC's event volume (tens of lifecycle events per day) this is significantly over-provisioned | +| **FR10** | Init container idempotent provisioning | **Pass** | Addresses and queues can be pre-declared in `broker.xml` — on broker start they exist before any consumer connects, making provisioning declarative and idempotent by design. Alternatively, the Artemis management REST API supports idempotent address creation at runtime. Health-checking via HTTP management endpoint | + +### Residual concern + +**FR9** is the only meaningful remaining differentiator. Artemis is operationally heavier than +warranted for the AIAC use case: + +- `broker.xml` must be authored, maintained, and mounted as a ConfigMap in the Event Broker + deployment manifest +- RAM footprint (~300 MB) is ~15× higher than a comparable lightweight broker for an event bus + that carries a handful of events per day +- Artemis was designed for enterprise JMS workloads with high message throughput and complex + routing topologies; the AIAC Event Broker is a simple lifecycle event bus + +These are operational trade-offs, not functional failures. The system works correctly with +Artemis — it is simply heavier than necessary. + +--- + +## Candidate 2 — AMQ Streams (Apache Kafka / Strimzi) + +**What it is:** A Kafka-based event streaming platform managed by the Strimzi Operator on +Kubernetes. Python client: `aiokafka` or `confluent-kafka-python`. Java client: Kafka producer. + +### Assessment + +| Req | Requirement | Verdict | Detail | +|-----|-------------|---------|--------| +| **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Pass** | Kafka topic retention provides message replay for a configured consumer group | +| **FR2** | Work-queue: one consumer per event | **Partial** | Kafka consumer groups deliver one message per partition. Work-queue semantics emerge only when partition count equals consumer count — it is not a single-setting guarantee and requires careful partition design | +| **FR3** | Bounded retry + dead-letter | **Fail** | Kafka has no native dead-letter queue or `max-delivery-attempts` concept. A DLQ must be implemented as application code: a separate retry topic, a retry consumer service, and a DLQ topic. This is infrastructure the PRD expects the broker to provide natively | +| **FR4** | Per-entity dynamic addressing | **Fail** | Kafka topics are static, pre-declared strings. A runtime-generated entity ID cannot become a new topic without administrator intervention. Per-entity routing collapses to per-type topics (e.g. one topic for all role events), requiring the consumer to inspect message payloads to identify the target entity. The PRD (§5) mandates a consumer that carries no business logic — payload-based routing contradicts this | +| **FR5** | Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | **Pass** | `aiokafka` is a mature asyncio Kafka client; manual commit after processing is idiomatic | +| **FR6** | Python publisher | **Pass** | `aiokafka` or `confluent-kafka-python` | +| **FR7** | Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | **Pass** | Kafka Java producer is the most mature producer client available | +| **FR8** | No-auth deployment | **Partial** | Kafka supports no-auth, but Strimzi configures mutual TLS by default; explicit opt-out via `KafkaListeners` spec is required | +| **FR9** | Single pod, no Operator | **Fail** | Strimzi Operator is the practical Kubernetes deployment path for Kafka. A single-node KRaft deployment without Operator is possible but not maintainable. Minimum footprint: ~1 GB RAM plus Operator pods | +| **FR10** | Init container idempotent provisioning | **Partial** | Kafka `AdminClient` supports idempotent topic creation. Feasible but requires a Kafka bootstrap connection and more setup than a simple health check | + +### Structural incompatibilities + +FR3 and FR4 fail regardless of implementation approach: + +**FR3 — no native DLQ:** Building bounded retry with dead-lettering requires a separate retry +consumer service, a retry topic, and a DLQ topic. This is application infrastructure, not broker +configuration. The PRD (§7.4) treats dead-lettering as a broker-level property. + +**FR4 — static topics vs dynamic addressing:** The PRD's per-entity event addressing is a +first-class routing feature. Collapsing `aiac.apply.role.{id}` to a static topic and +embedding the entity ID in the message payload changes the consumer contract and adds routing +logic to what §5 explicitly defines as a thin adapter with no business logic. This is a +PRD-level design change, not an implementation detail. + +--- + +## Candidate 3 — AMQ Interconnect (Apache Qpid Dispatch Router) + +**What it is:** A stateless AMQP 1.0 message router. Routes messages between endpoints with no +on-disk persistence. + +### Assessment + +| Req | Requirement | Verdict | Detail | +|-----|-------------|---------|--------| +| **FR1** | Events survive Agent pod restart | **Hard fail** | Interconnect is stateless by design. Messages in-flight when the Agent pod restarts are permanently lost | + +FR1 is an immediate disqualifier. UC-1 and UC-2 both depend on events surviving transient Agent +failures — this is a first-class architectural decision in §5. AMQ Interconnect can complement +AMQ Broker as a routing mesh but cannot serve as the AIAC Event Broker independently. + +--- + +## Consolidated Scorecard + +| Requirement | PRD anchor | NATS JetStream | AMQ Broker | AMQ Streams | AMQ Interconnect | +|-------------|------------|:--------------:|:----------:|:-----------:|:----------------:| +| FR1 Durable replay on pod restart | §5, §7.4 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| FR2 Work-queue / competing consumers | §7.4, §5 | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | +| FR3 DLQ after bounded retries | §7.4, §9 | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | +| FR4 Per-entity dynamic addressing, wildcard consumer | §7.4, §7.5, §7.8, §5 | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ⚠️ | +| FR5 Python asyncio consumer, ack-after-processing | §7.5, §10 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| FR6 Python publisher | §7.7 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | +| FR7 Java publisher (Keycloak SPI) | §7.8 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | +| FR8 No-auth viable | §7.4, §10 | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ | ✅ | +| FR9 Single pod, no Operator, low footprint | §8 | ✅ | ⚠️ | ❌ | ✅ | +| FR10 Init container idempotent provisioning | §5, §9 | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ | ❌ | + +✅ Satisfies requirement · ⚠️ Achievable with configuration trade-off · ❌ Cannot satisfy without design change + +--- + +## Comparative Analysis: AMQ Broker vs NATS JetStream + +With all technology-specific constraints removed, both candidates satisfy every functional +requirement. The decision reduces to operational fit. + +| Dimension | NATS JetStream | AMQ Broker (Artemis) | +|-----------|----------------|----------------------| +| FR1–FR3 delivery semantics | Native, zero-config | Native, `broker.xml` config | +| FR4 per-entity addressing | Hierarchical subjects, auto-routed | Hierarchical addresses, auto-create policy | +| FR5 Python asyncio consumer | Idiomatic, well-documented | Functional, lower-level API | +| FR7 Java publisher | NATS Java client | Artemis JMS / Qpid Proton Java | +| FR8 no-auth | Default, no config needed | One XML element in `broker.xml` | +| FR9 footprint | ~20 MB RAM, single flag | ~300 MB RAM, `broker.xml` ConfigMap | +| FR10 broker provisioning | Single API call, runtime | Declarative via `broker.xml` (no runtime call needed) | +| Protocol lineage | Purpose-built for microservice pub/sub | Enterprise JMS / AMQP 1.0 interoperability | +| Python ecosystem depth | Large community, extensive examples | Smaller community, sparser asyncio docs | +| Design envelope | Lightweight durable pub/sub | High-throughput enterprise queuing | + +The functional gap is closed. AMQ Broker is a technically valid choice. The remaining difference +is that it carries more operational weight (configuration, RAM, XML) than the AIAC Event Broker +role requires. + +--- + +## Conclusion + +**AMQ Broker (Artemis)** satisfies all ten functional requirements in a greenfield build. It +is a technically sound candidate. The single remaining concern — FR9, operational footprint — is +a trade-off, not a disqualifier: Artemis is ~15× heavier in RAM than warranted for an event bus +that carries tens of lifecycle events per day, and its XML-based configuration adds overhead +absent from simpler brokers. + +**AMQ Streams** retains two hard disqualifications regardless of implementation approach: no +native DLQ (FR3) and inability to support dynamic per-entity addressing (FR4). Resolving either +would require changing the PRD's routing design. + +**AMQ Interconnect** is disqualified by FR1. + +**Selection guidance:** + +| Condition | Recommended choice | +|-----------|-------------------| +| No pre-existing AMQ infrastructure; team is starting fresh | Lightweight broker matched to event volume — NATS JetStream | +| Team already operates AMQ Broker for other workloads | AMQ Broker — eliminate a dependency, reuse existing expertise | +| Platform standardised on AMQP 1.0 across services | AMQ Broker — protocol consistency has value | +| Minimising operational surface and configuration files is a priority | NATS JetStream | +| Red Hat support contract covers messaging infrastructure | AMQ Broker | diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53a49c75f --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +# Integration Test: PDP Policy Writer (OPA) — `generate_rego.py` + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. +> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` +> (a sibling of `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section +> ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) is the index of them. This is the **PDP Policy Writer (OPA)** integration +> test — not the definition of integration testing in general, and not the only integration-test PRD. + +## Location +`aiac/test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` + +## Description + +A standalone launcher script that exercises the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) **filesystem stub** +end-to-end and leaves the generated Rego on disk for a human to eyeball. It is **not** a pytest +test, **not** part of CI, and **not** marked `@pytest.mark.integration` — it is run by hand when an +operator wants to see the actual `.rego` output for a known scenario. + +The script drives the service through its real HTTP surface using the real client library, so it +covers the whole path: `PolicyModel` → HTTP → ASGI app → Rego generator → files on disk. Nothing is +mocked; the only shortcut is that the OPA target is the filesystem stub +([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) §1.14) rather than +the Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patched +`AuthorizationPolicy` CR. + +### What it does + +1. Choose a local `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` (a known directory the operator can inspect afterward). +2. Launch `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` as a **`uvicorn` subprocess** (no Docker), passing + `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` and `PORT` in its environment. +3. Poll `GET /health` until it returns `200 {"status": "ok"}` (the stub reports healthy once + `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` exists and is writable), with a bounded timeout. +4. Build the fixed `PolicyModel` scenario (below) and apply it via + `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api.apply_policy` — a real `POST /policy` over HTTP. +5. Terminate the `uvicorn` subprocess. +6. Print the `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` path so the operator knows where to look. + +**Write-only.** The script performs no read-back and makes **no assertions**. Verification is +manual: the operator opens the generated `.rego` files and confirms they match the package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) +(§ *Rego package structure*). There is no pass/fail exit contract beyond the script running to +completion. + +## Scenario + +A single agent, fixed so the generated Rego is reproducible and reviewable by inspection. The values +below are the canonical worked example referenced by +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md). + +| Element | Value | +|---------|-------| +| Agent | `github-agent` | +| Agent roles | `source-helper`, `issues-helper` | +| Agent scopes | `source-access`, `issues-access` | +| Subject (user) roles | `developer`, `tester` | +| Tool | `github-tool` | +| Tool scopes | `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write` | +| Calling service (source) | none | + +Role → access, as encoded by the model's inbound and outbound rules: + +- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. +- `tester` — issues read/write. + +This user→tool access is encoded in the model's `outbound_subject_rules` (`(user_role, tool_scope)` +pairs), which the outbound package renders as `outbound_subject_role_scopes`. The model's +`inbound_rules` (user→agent-scope) and `outbound_rules` (agent-role→tool-scope) are unchanged. + +Applying this `PolicyModel` produces exactly two files in `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`: + +- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound` +- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound` + +Both must match the **ID-only** package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md): input is IDs only +(`{subject, source}` inbound, `{subject, target}` outbound); all role/scope maps are embedded in the +package; the inbound gate is subject-mandatory + source-optional; the outbound gate requires both +subject and agent to pass, but its **subject** gate is now user→**tool** — it reads +`outbound_subject_role_scopes` (grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`) and matches against +`target_scopes[input.target]`, distinct from the inbound user→agent gate — while `target_ok` +(agent→tool, from `agent_roles` × `agent_role_scopes`) is unchanged; and `target_scopes` is emitted +verbatim (target id → scopes, no inversion). Because the input carries no per-request scope, the +decision is coarse — a principal passes on having access to **at least one** relevant scope. + +The `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` objects come from `aiac.policy.model.models` +([../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md)); the script constructs them in +Python rather than reading them from Keycloak. + +## Configuration (env) + +| Variable | Purpose | Default | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | Base URL the library client posts to; must point at the launched stub | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Directory the stub writes `.rego` files to; passed to the subprocess and printed at the end | operator-chosen local dir | +| `PORT` | Port the `uvicorn` subprocess binds; must agree with the host/port in `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `7072` | + +`PORT` and `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` must be kept consistent — the client posts to the URL, the +subprocess listens on the port. + +## Runbook + +```bash +.venv/bin/python test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +# then inspect the printed REGO_OUTPUT_DIR, e.g.: +# github_agent.inbound.rego +# github_agent.outbound.rego +``` + +To pin the output location and port explicitly: + +```bash +REGO_OUTPUT_DIR=/tmp/aiac-rego PORT=7072 \ +AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7072 \ + .venv/bin/python test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py +``` + +## Testing Decisions + +- **Highest seam available.** The test drives the service through its real HTTP boundary + (`AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`) using the real client library + ([../components/library-pdp-policy.md](../components/library-pdp-policy.md), `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api`), + and observes the real filesystem output. It asserts on **external behavior** (files produced on + disk), never on internal generator functions. +- **Launch as a `uvicorn` subprocess.** The script spawns + `uvicorn aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` as a child process (no Docker), polls `GET /health` + before applying the model, and terminates the subprocess at the end. This exercises the full + HTTP + ASGI stack the way a caller would, and keeps the service lifecycle self-contained. +- **Write-only, human-verified.** The value of this test is the concrete `.rego` output for a known + scenario — so a reviewer can confirm the ID-only redesign renders correctly. It intentionally + makes no automated assertions; the generator's assertable behavior is covered by the OPA + service/`rego.py` unit tests. +- **Prior art.** The stub itself and its unit tests (`test/pdp/service/policy/opa/`, + covering `main.py` and `rego.py`) verify endpoint and rendering behavior automatically; this + launcher complements them with an eyeball-the-output workflow. The live-Keycloak pytest + integration tests (issue `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) are the marker-gated counterpart for + the read-side services. + +## Relationship to other integration tests + +This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD +([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). It is distinct from the +**live-Keycloak pytest integration tests**, which are a different flavor — `@pytest.mark.integration`, +run in/near CI against a live Keycloak/NATS, asserting on typed responses — tracked by issue +`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`. This launcher, by contrast, is standalone, write-only, and +manually inspected. + +For the full identity→policy pipeline (Keycloak → PRB → PCE → OPA) — which drives the same +`github-agent` scenario end to end through the real Policy Computation Engine rather than a +hand-built `PolicyModel` — see [policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md). + +Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`. + +## Out of Scope + +- **The Rego generator implementation** — package rendering, `_slugify`, and the ID-only gate logic + are specified by [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) + and covered by the OPA service unit tests, not here. +- **The canonical policy model** — `PolicyModel` / `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyRule` shapes and + semantics belong to [../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md). +- **The Kubernetes-CR Policy Writer (1.13)** — this test targets the filesystem **stub** (1.14). The + CR-backed implementation and its `AuthorizationPolicy` schema are out of scope. +- **Live-Keycloak integration** — the marker-gated pytest integration tests (issue + `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`). +- **Automated pass/fail** — no assertions, no CI wiring, no `@pytest.mark.integration`. + +## Further Notes + +- Depends on the launcher script itself (created separately) and the OPA filesystem stub (issue + `pdp-policy-writer/1.14-pdp-policy-writer-opa-stub.md`, status: done). +- The scenario is deliberately fixed. If the canonical worked example in + [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) changes, update the + scenario table here to match so the generated Rego stays reviewable against a single source of + truth. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..48ec152d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -0,0 +1,470 @@ +# Integration Test: policy-pipeline — `test_policy_pipeline.py` + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. +> Integration-test specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` +> (a sibling of `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section +> ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) is the index of them. This is the **policy-pipeline** integration test — +> the full identity→policy pipeline — not the definition of integration testing in general, and not +> the only integration-test PRD. + +## Location +`aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py` — a pytest module marked `@pytest.mark.integration`. +It imports two shared modules: `aiac/test/integration/scenario.py` — the canonical `github-agent` +scenario as pure data (one of the role→access fact sources the *Further Notes* mandate — the pair-lists, +alongside the *Scenario* table and both `policy.md` variants) — and `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` +— the shared `uvicorn` subprocess-lifecycle helpers. It also ships a new +`aiac/test/integration/probe.rego` — a small standalone Rego module used only as the outbound +verification query (see *[What it does](#what-it-does)*). The `5.2` launcher +`test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` was refactored onto the same `launcher.py` + `scenario.py` so the two +launchers cannot drift. + +## Description + +A `@pytest.mark.integration` test that drives the **whole identity→policy pipeline** — +**Keycloak → PRB → PCE → OPA Policy Writer** — end-to-end, then **asserts** the generated Rego decides +correctly by running the standalone `opa eval` binary as its verification oracle. The `.rego` files are +still left on disk per policy variant, so the test doubles as the eyeball workflow: running the test +*is* the eyeball. There is no separate standalone script. + +The generated Rego is the **artifact under test** — the LLM/PCE that produced it might be wrong — so the +test never trusts it. Instead it feeds `opa eval` requests derived from the **scenario spec (the +intended policy)** and asserts the real Rego admits/denies each one as the scenario truth table +requires. A mismatch fails the test and names the exact cell. + +This is the same *flavor* as the PDP Policy Writer launcher +([pdp-policy-writer.md](pdp-policy-writer.md), issue `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`) but +**broader**: where `5.2` hand-builds a `PolicyModel` in Python and POSTs it to the OPA stub — +deliberately bypassing Keycloak, the PRB, and the PCE — this test provisions a **live Keycloak** realm, +calls the real **Policy Rules Builder (PRB)** to map roles→scopes with a real LLM, then calls the real +**Policy Computation Engine (PCE)** to build the `PolicyModel` and drive the **OPA Policy Writer** to +emit Rego. Nothing is mocked; the only shortcut is that the OPA target is the filesystem stub +([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) §1.14) rather than the +Kubernetes-CR implementation, so the output is `.rego` files instead of a patched +`AuthorizationPolicy` CR — identical to `5.2`. + +Because it needs a live Keycloak and a real LLM, it is `@pytest.mark.integration` and stays out of the +default unit-test run (`-m "not integration"`); it additionally `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is +found. + +### What it does + +The pipeline (provision → PRB → PCE → OPA) is driven **once per `policy.md` variant** — `explicit` and +`abstract` — each writing into its own `rego_out//` directory. `opa eval` then asserts the +scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below describe one such run. + +1. **Set service URLs in env before importing the aiac libraries.** Export `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, + `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`, `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, and `AIAC_REALM` *before* importing the aiac + libraries — the libraries read env at import time. This is the pattern + `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` already follows. +2. **Spawn the three services as `uvicorn` subprocesses** (no Docker) and poll each `GET /health` + until ready, with a bounded timeout: + - IdP Configuration Service — `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app` on `7071`. + - Policy Store — its ASGI app on `7074`, with `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` pointed at a fresh temp dir. + - OPA Policy Writer — `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` on `7072`, with `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` + (pointed at the current variant's `rego_out//`) and the Policy Store DB path in its env. +3. **Provision Keycloak** (idempotent — delete-if-exists the realm first, then create): + - via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** (test fixture): create realm `AIAC_TEST_REALM`; create + users `dev-user`, `test-user`, and `devops-user`; create realm roles `developer`, `tester`, and + `devops`; assign roles to users (`devops-user`→`devops`, which maps to **no** agent/tool scope — + the inbound deny case, see *[Scenario](#scenario)*); create the `github-agent` and `github-tool` + clients with the descriptions in + *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)* and with the `client.type` + client attribute set to the plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"` respectively, so `Service` type + resolution tags them from the attribute (not from description prose). Set the type via the product + surface `Configuration.set_service_type(service, type)` (`POST /services/{id}/type`) or by writing + the `client.type` attribute directly at client create. The attribute value is a plain string, + **not** a list — a list fails the `in ("Agent","Tool")` check, resolves the type to `None`, and + yields empty pipeline output. + - via the **aiac IdP `Configuration` library** (the real product surface the PCE reads back): create + the client roles (`source-operator`, `issues-operator`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, + `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) with the descriptions in + *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*, and map roles→services and + scopes→services so `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` and `get_service().roles` / + `.scopes` resolve correctly. +4. **Read-back type guard** — after provisioning, call `Configuration.get_service` for both clients and + assert each resolved `.type` (`github-agent` ⇒ `Agent`, `github-tool` ⇒ `Tool`) **before** spawning + the pipeline; abort with a clear message otherwise. This is a provisioning sanity check on the + `client.type` attribute, distinct from the step-7 Rego-decision assertions. +5. **Proto-UC1 orchestration** — run the three PRB mappings against a pinned LLM (`temperature=0`) and + concatenate the results into one `list[PolicyRule]`: + - **(a)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, agent_scope)` per agent scope → user→agent-scope rules. + - **(b)** `build_scope_rules(user_roles, tool_scope)` per tool scope → user→tool-scope rules. + - **(c)** `build_role_rules(agent_role, tool_scopes)` per agent role → agent-role→tool-scope rules. + + Concatenate into a single `list[PolicyRule]` and call + `aiac.policy.computation.engine.compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)` against a **fresh** Policy + Store. The PCE resolves the IdP relationships, builds the `github-agent` model (with `agent_roles` / + `agent_scopes`; mapping (b) routed into `outbound_subject_rules`; and **no** `github-tool` model), + writes it to the store, and pushes it to the OPA stub. +6. **Terminate the three subprocesses in `finally`.** The realm and the `.rego` files are left in + place for eyeballing. +7. **Assert the truth table with `opa eval`.** Once both variants' Rego is on disk, evaluate a matrix of + **(request JSON, rego file)** tuples with the standalone `opa` binary and hard-assert each decision + against the scenario truth table (see *[Expected output](#expected-output)*): + - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → else `shutil.which("opa")` → else `pytest.skip("opa not + found")`. Missing `opa` skips (does not fail) the suite. + - **Inbound** — one node per `(variant × subject)`. Request `{"subject": }` (source omitted, so + the generated `source_ok` passes) is evaluated against the real + `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. Coarse "can this user reach the agent at all" — there is + no intent field. + - **Outbound** — one node per `(variant × subject × function_name)`, where `function_name` is the + agent's operation (a tool scope). Because the generated `allow` / `subject_ok` are existential and + ignore any scope, the outbound decision is evaluated by a **probe query**, + `data.probe.outbound.allow` (defined in `test/integration/probe.rego`), which binds + `input.function_name` against the generated data maps and requires **both** the user→tool gate and + the agent→tool gate to admit the function. Request shape `{"subject", "target", "function_name"}`. + - **Soft match** `function_name`↔scope — the probe compares names by splitting **both** on `[._-]+`, + lowercasing, and comparing as **sets** (token-set equality): `source.read`, `read_source`, and + `Source-Read` all match `source-read`; bare `source` matches nothing. + - The expected verdict for every cell is **computed from** the scenario pair-lists + (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS` in `scenario.py`), not from a second + hand-maintained copy — a wrong LLM/PCE mapping therefore fails the test. A failing node names the + exact `variant / subject / function_name` cell. +8. **Assert grant-set equivalence (semantic, beyond the decision oracle).** The `opa eval` matrix in + step 7 is deliberately coarse: inbound `allow` only checks "reaches *some* agent scope," and the + agent→tool gate covers all four scopes so only the user gate discriminates — so a **verdict-neutral** + mapping error (a missing or spurious `(role, scope)` grant) passes step 7 unseen. To close that gap + the test also captures the PRB's `list[PolicyRule]` per variant and asserts, as order-independent + `(role, scope)` **sets** per gate, that **each variant equals the `scenario.py` truth table** and + **the two variants equal each other**. This compares grant *sets*, not Rego text (formatting/ordering + may differ; the grant set may not). This is what enforces the *both variants reproduce the same Rego* + intent stated in *Further Notes*. + +## Expected output + +The test passes when `opa eval` decides every cell of the scenario truth table as follows, for **both** +policy variants. Verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario.py` pair-lists (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / +`OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`), not a hand-maintained copy — this table is the human- +readable rendering of them. + +`USERS`: `dev-user`→`developer`, `test-user`→`tester`, `devops-user`→`devops`. + +**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`, from `INBOUND_PAIRS`, user-role→agent-scope): + +| Subject | Inbound | +|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | +| test-user | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | + +**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, from `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` +user→tool; the agent→tool gate covers all four scopes, so the user gate discriminates): + +| | source-read | source-write | issues-read | issues-write | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| test-user | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | + +Alongside the assertions, each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in its +`rego_out//` for eyeballing: + +- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. + `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated. + (`devops-user` holds `devops`, which maps to no agent scope, so it is absent from `subject_roles` and + denied inbound.) +- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; + target_ok }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the new **user→tool** gate (mapping (b), grouped from + `outbound_subject_rules` into `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, matched against + `target_scopes[input.target]`); its **`target_ok`** is the **agent→tool** gate (mapping (c), over + `agent_roles` × `agent_role_scopes`). `agent_roles` and `target_scopes` are populated. + +Explicitly **no** `github_tool.*.rego` — the pipeline emits no tool model. Eyeball both files against +the **ID-only** package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md) +(§ *Rego package structure*), the same source of truth `5.2` uses. + +## Scenario + +A single agent + tool + three users, fixed so the generated Rego is reproducible and reviewable by +inspection. This is the same canonical `github-agent` worked example as `5.2`, driven end to end +through the real pipeline rather than a hand-built `PolicyModel`, plus a third `devops-user` that +exercises the deny-by-default path. + +| Element | Value | +|---------|-------| +| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-e2e`) | +| Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-operator`, `issues-operator`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | +| Tool | `github-tool` (scopes `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) | +| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | +| `developer` | source read/write + issues read | +| `tester` | issues read/write | +| `devops` | no access (inbound deny; denied every outbound function) | + +Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` versions below and the +`scenario.py` pair-lists must agree with — the generic descriptions are not part of this triad): + +- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. +- `tester` — issues read/write. +- `devops` — no access. Conveyed by the **role description only** — it is absent from every pair-list + and both `policy.md` variants are **unchanged** (deny-by-default), so it is denied inbound and on + every outbound function. + +## Configuration (env) + +| Variable | Purpose | Default | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds | — (required) | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the test provisions | `aiac-e2e` | +| `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-e2e` | +| `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | IdP Configuration Service base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | +| `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | Policy Store base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | +| `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | OPA Policy Writer base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Base dir the OPA stub subprocess writes `.rego` to; the test points it at `rego_out//` per variant and leaves the files on disk | operator-chosen local dir | +| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | Policy Store DB path for the subprocess (fresh temp dir) | temp | +| `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | PRB whole-file policy — path to the `policy.md` variant fed to the PRB; the test sets it per variant (`policy.explicit.md`, `policy.abstract.md`) | `/etc/aiac/policy.md` | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`) | — (required) | +| `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary used as the verification oracle; else `PATH` (`shutil.which`), else the test `pytest.skip`s | — (optional; PATH lookup) | + +> When the test is written, confirm the Policy Store's ASGI import path and its DB-path env-var +> name against the Policy Store component spec / issue — `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` is the placeholder used +> here; use the real one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which `policy.md` variant (see +> *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*) the PRB reads. + +## Runbook + +Runnable only once the pipeline fixes (handoffs 01 + 02, P1–P5) have landed, and requires a live +Keycloak, a real LLM, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). + +```bash +# env: KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN +.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v +# ~30 parametrized nodes (variant × subject inbound; variant × subject × function_name outbound). +# A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: +# test_outbound[abstract-test-user-source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed +# The generated Rego is left on disk per variant for eyeballing: +# rego_out/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# rego_out/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# (no github_tool.*.rego in either) +``` + +The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found (`$OPA_BIN` → `PATH`). Eyeball the persisted +Rego against the adjusted package shapes in +[../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md); optionally inspect the +Policy Store DB and the provisioned Keycloak realm. + +## Testing Decisions + +- **Highest seam available, verified by a real oracle.** Real libraries + real services + real Keycloak + + real LLM. The test drives the pipeline through its real surfaces — the IdP `Configuration` library, + the PRB entry points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`), and the PCE's `compute_and_apply` — + and then verifies the real filesystem output with the standalone **`opa eval`** binary. The only + shortcut is the OPA filesystem stub (same as `5.2`). A good test here asserts only **external + behavior** — the policy *decisions* the generated Rego makes for scenario-derived requests — never the + internal Rego structure (which the OPA Policy Writer's own unit tests own). +- **Rego is the artifact under test; the scenario is the oracle.** The LLM/PCE that produced the Rego + might be wrong, so the expected verdicts are **computed from** the scenario pair-lists + (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`), not from a second hand-maintained + copy or from the Rego itself. A wrong role→scope mapping therefore fails the test at the exact cell. +- **Outbound needs a probe.** The generated `allow` / `subject_ok` are existential and ignore any + scope, so a raw query cannot answer "may this subject invoke *this* function." A small + `test/integration/probe.rego` (`data.probe.outbound.allow`) binds `input.function_name` against the + generated data maps and requires **both** the user→tool and agent→tool gates to admit it. Names are + compared by **token-set equality** (split on `[._-]+`, lowercased) so `source.read` / `read_source` / + `Source-Read` all match `source-read` while bare `source` matches nothing. +- **Attribute-based client typing + read-back guard.** Clients are typed by the `client.type` + attribute (plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`), provisioned by the test — not by description keywords. + Because that attribute drives whether the PCE emits an agent model (and suppresses the tool model), + the test reads each service back via `Configuration.get_service` and asserts its `.type` before + running the pipeline, aborting on mismatch. This is a **provisioning** sanity check, distinct from the + Rego-decision assertions. +- **Self-contained subprocess lifecycle.** The test spawns IdP (7071), Policy Store (7074), and OPA + (7072) as `uvicorn` subprocesses, polls each `GET /health` before use, and tears them all down in + `finally`. Keycloak and the LLM are **external** (reached via env); `opa` is an external binary. +- **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** The PRB LLM is pinned to `temperature=0`, and the **explicit** + `policy.md` variant states each `(role, scope)` grant outright, so its mapping is stable. The + **abstract** variant leans on the LLM to expand prose + descriptions into concrete scopes; both + variants are asserted not only cell-by-cell via `opa eval` (step 7) but at the **grant-set** level + (step 8) — each variant's `(role, scope)` set must equal the truth table *and* the other variant's. + Grant-set equivalence catches the verdict-neutral under/over-grants the decision oracle hides. Some + model-dependence remains, which is why the suite is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. +- **Prior art, shared not copied.** `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` (the `5.2` launcher) established + the shape this test reuses — `uvicorn` subprocess spawn, `GET /health` poll, env-before-import + ordering, and `finally` teardown. Rather than duplicate it, that machinery lives in the shared + `test/integration/launcher.py`, and the fixed scenario lives in `test/integration/scenario.py`; + `generate_rego.py` was refactored onto both (its `.rego` output verified byte-identical to before the + refactor). The live-Keycloak pytest suite (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) is the sibling + marker-gated, decision-asserting counterpart for the read-side services and is the prior art for the + `@pytest.mark.integration` + `opa eval` shape. + +## Relationship to other integration tests + +This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD +([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). + +- Same flavor as the **live-Keycloak pytest integration tests** (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) — + both are `@pytest.mark.integration`, run outside the default unit run against live dependencies, and + assert on decisions. This test additionally uses `opa eval` as its oracle and skips when `opa` is + absent. +- **Broader than** the OPA-stub-only **PDP Policy Writer** launcher + ([pdp-policy-writer.md](pdp-policy-writer.md), `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`): `5.2` + hand-builds a `PolicyModel`, exercises only OPA, and is still a write-only eyeball launcher; this test + adds Keycloak provisioning + PRB + PCE in front of the **same** OPA stub and **asserts** the resulting + decisions with `opa eval`. Both still leave `.rego` on disk against the same package shapes. + +Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. + +## Out of Scope + +- **Writing `test_policy_pipeline.py`, `probe.rego`, or any P1–P5 pipeline code** — this spec + *describes* the test; the test itself is written in a later session against the fixed pipeline + (tracked by `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md` and the prerequisite issues). +- **The Rego generator, the canonical policy model, the PRB, and the PCE implementations** — specified + and unit-tested by their own components ([../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md), + [../components/policy-model.md](../components/policy-model.md), + [../components/policy-computation-engine.md](../components/policy-computation-engine.md), and the PRB + component spec), not here. In particular, the internal **structure** of the generated Rego is the + Policy Writer's concern; this test asserts only the **decisions** that Rego makes. +- **The Kubernetes-CR Policy Writer (1.13)** — this test targets the filesystem **stub** (1.14) only. +- **Default-CI wiring** — the test is `@pytest.mark.integration` and requires live Keycloak + LLM + an + `opa` binary, so it runs on demand, not in the default `-m "not integration"` unit run. + +## Further Notes + +- The scenario is deliberately fixed. The role→access facts are owned by **three** artefacts that must + agree: the *Scenario* table, **both** `policy.md` versions in *Scenario inputs*, and the + `scenario.py` pair-lists (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`). The + entity/role/scope **descriptions no longer encode those facts** — they are generic and functional and + drop out of the fact triad; they must stay generic and simply not contradict the facts. If the + role→access facts change, update the *Scenario* table, both `policy.md` variants, and the pair-lists + together so the eyeballed output stays reviewable. +- The least-privilege **deny-by-default** directive is supplied by the PRB prompt itself + (`_GRANT_ACCESS` in `agent/policy_rules_builder/prompts.py`), which prepends it — followed by the + bundled generic baseline policy (`generic_policy.md`) — ahead of the scenario `policy.md` on every + call, so every policy decision gets it regardless of which variant is read. The **explicit** variant + still spells the directive out (its whole point is to state everything outright); the **abstract** + variant relies on the prompt and does not restate it — do not re-add it to the abstract variant. +- Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an + **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's + output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. The abstract variant + carries **no** agent-capability bullet; it relies on the elaborated `source-operator` / + `issues-operator` role descriptions (provisioned into Keycloak) for mapping (c), so it survives + deny-by-default and both variants reproduce the same Rego. +- Descriptions are ≤255 characters and written **verbatim** into Keycloak; there is no shortened / + verbatim split. (Keycloak caps role and client descriptions at 255 chars, and the generic descriptions + are authored to stay within that cap.) +- The `devops` role's **zero access** is conveyed by its **role description only**. It is absent from + every pair-list (`INBOUND_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS` / `OUTBOUND_PAIRS`) and both `policy.md` + variants are **unchanged**, so deny-by-default alone denies it inbound and on every outbound function — + which is precisely what the truth table's `devops-user` row asserts. Because `devops-user` lives in + the shared `scenario.py`, it also appears in the `5.2` launcher's eyeball output (denied everywhere); + that is intentional and keeps the two launchers consistent. + +## Blocked-by + +The pipeline can only produce correct output once handoffs 01 (P1, P3) and 02 (P2, P4, P5) land; those +are **resolved**, so this test is ready to be written. Component prerequisites: + +- PRB — `agent/3.20-policy-rules-builder.md` +- PCE — `policy/pce/8.10-policy-computation-engine.md` +- Policy model — `policy/model/8.1-policy-model.md` +- OPA filesystem stub — `pdp-policy-writer/1.14-pdp-policy-writer-opa-stub.md` +- Rego package generator — `pdp-policy-writer/1.10-rego-package-generator.md` +- pdp-policy library — `library/pdp/8.9-pdp-policy-library-rename.md` +- Policy Store library / service — `policy/store/8.7-policy-store-library.md` / + `policy/store/8.5-policy-store-service.md` + +## Scenario inputs (PRB functional inputs) + +These are **functional** inputs — the LLM reads the entity/role/scope descriptions and the `policy.md` +to produce the role→scope mappings, so they are part of the fixed scenario, not decoration. Confirmed +with the user; keep them in sync with the *Scenario* table (see *Further Notes*). + +### Entity descriptions + +The descriptions are **generic and keyword-free** — they describe what each entity/role/scope *does*, +carry no policy grant ("Resolves to…") and no owning-client naming, and stay within Keycloak's 255-char +cap so they are written verbatim (no shortened renderings). Client `type` is **not** inferred from +description prose: the test provisions each client's `client.type` attribute (the type UC1 +discovers from the agent card / `kagenti.io/type` label) as a plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`, so +`Service` type resolution ([../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) +tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keyword fallback. + +**`github-agent`** — client (Agent): +> Autonomous Agent acting on a user's behalf against source repositories and an issue tracker. It +> inspects and changes repository source contents and reads, creates, and updates issues and their +> threads. + +**`github-tool`** — client (Tool): +> Capability provider Tool for source repositories and an issue tracker. It performs read and write +> operations on repository source contents and on issues and their comment threads. + +**`developer`** — realm role (user): +> Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining code) and +> fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and consults issues for +> defect reports. + +**`tester`** — realm role (user): +> Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through the issue +> tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue tracker, not in source. + +**`devops`** — realm role (user): +> DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime environments; does not +> author source code and does not manage the issue tracker. + +> The `devops` description is deliberately **unrelated** to source and issue work, so the PRB derives no +> agent or tool scope for it and deny-by-default leaves `devops-user` denied everywhere — the inbound +> deny case. It is added to the realm-role set only; the pair-lists and both `policy.md` variants stay +> unchanged (see *Further Notes*). + +### Role & scope descriptions + +**Client roles (agent):** + +- `source-operator` — Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, + creating, and modifying files. +- `issues-operator` — Covers read and write access to the issue tracker — reading, filing, updating, + and commenting on issues and their threads. + +**Agent scopes:** + +- `source-access` — Scope granting use of a source-code capability — invoking source-code functions such + as reading and changing repository contents. +- `issues-access` — Scope granting use of an issue-management capability — invoking issue functions such + as reading and updating issues. + +**Tool scopes:** + +- `source-read` — Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only. +- `source-write` — Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes. +- `issues-read` — Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only. +- `issues-write` — Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close. + +### `policy.md` — Version 1 (explicit) + +Each granted `(role, scope)` pair is spelled out; the three sections map 1:1 to PRB mappings (a)/(b)/(c) +and to the expected Rego gates. + +```markdown +# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this +policy supports it; deny by default. + +## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) +- developer may use source-access and issues-access. +- tester may use issues-access. + +## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +- developer may perform source-read, source-write, and issues-read. +- tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. + +## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) +- source-operator may perform source-read and source-write. +- issues-operator may perform issues-read and issues-write. +``` + +### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) + +Relies on the PRB / LLM to expand "read and modify source" into the concrete scopes. Encodes the same +role→access facts as Version 1. It carries **no** agent-capability bullet; mapping (c) +(agent-role→tool-scope) is instead derived from the elaborated `source-operator` / `issues-operator` +role descriptions (see *Role & scope descriptions*), so it survives the PRB's deny-by-default-on-silence +rule and both variants reproduce the same Rego. + +```markdown +- Developers work primarily in source — writing and maintaining code — and consult the issue tracker only to follow defect reports; grant them full read and write access to source contents, and read-only access to issues. +- Testers work exclusively in the issue tracker — filing, triaging, and updating defect reports — and do not work in source; grant them full read and write access to issues, and no access to source. +``` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4cb5bcf57 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -0,0 +1,445 @@ +# Integration Test: uc1-onboarding-pipeline — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. Integration-test +> specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` (a sibling of +> `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) +> is the index of them. This is the **uc1-onboarding-pipeline** integration test — the phase-1 +> service-onboarding demo driven end-to-end through the **real UC-1 agent** against **really-deployed** +> demo workloads — not the definition of integration testing in general. + +> **Relationship to `policy-pipeline`.** This test is the **discovery-driven sibling** of +> [policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md). The *scenario facts and the truth tables are identical* (same +> three users, same role→access facts, same inbound/outbound matrices). The **difference** is provenance: +> where `policy-pipeline` *hand-provisions* the agent/tool roles and scopes with clean fixed names and +> then calls the PRB mappings directly, this test *infers them via real UC-1 onboarding* of deployed +> workloads. That inference is what makes the generated Rego **semantically similar but not byte-identical** +> to `policy-pipeline` (see *[Semantic similarity, not byte-identity](#semantic-similarity-not-byte-identity)*). + +## Location + +`aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` — a pytest module marked +`@pytest.mark.integration`. It imports two shared modules: + +- `aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py` — a **new** scenario module (sibling of the existing + `scenario.py`, kept separate so `5.2`/`5.3` are unaffected). It carries the phase-1 users/roles, the two + `policy.md` variants, and the pair-lists expressed over the **discovered, workload-prefixed** names + (`github-tool.source-read`, `github-agent.source_operations`, …), which are what the generated Rego + actually contains. +- `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared `kubectl`/port-forward + `opa` helpers (extended from + the `5.3` launcher; see *[Testing Decisions](#testing-decisions)*). + +It also ships `aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego` — a standalone Rego module used only as the outbound +verification query, adapted from `5.3`'s `probe.rego` to match against **full discovered scope names** +(no prefix-stripping soft match; see step 7). + +## Description + +A `@pytest.mark.integration` test that validates the **phase-1 deliverable** +([../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md)) and confirms the runnable +demo: it deploys the real **`github-agent`** and a simplified **`github-tool`** to a live Kagenti/Kind +cluster, drives the **real UC-1 Service Onboarding agent** (`onboard_service` via the Controller's HTTP +trigger) for each, and then **asserts** the generated Rego decides correctly by running the standalone +`opa eval` binary as its verification oracle. + +Phase-1 is explicit that **live enforcement / live traffic is out of scope** — correctness is shown by +**evaluating the generated rules**, not by routing real requests. So this test is *Deploy + discover + +evaluate*: the agent and tool are really deployed and really discovered by UC-1 (classify from the +`kagenti.io/type` label, read the AgentCard, read the MCP `tools/list`, provision roles/scopes into +Keycloak, model access, emit Rego), but **no A2A message is ever sent through the agent**. + +The generated Rego is the **artifact under test** — the LLM/PCE that produced it might be wrong — so the +test never trusts it. Expected verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists (the +intended policy), and the real Rego is asserted to admit/deny each scenario-derived request as the truth +table requires. A mismatch fails the test and names the exact cell. + +Because it needs a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, it is `@pytest.mark.integration` +and stays out of the default unit run (`-m "not integration"`); it additionally `pytest.skip`s when no +`opa` binary is found. + +### Topology + +- **AIAC runs on the host? No — in-cluster.** The pipeline is driven **inside the cluster** so UC-1's + `analyze_tool` can reach the tool's MCP endpoint at its cluster-internal DNS name + (`github-tool.{ns}.svc.cluster.local`). The test triggers onboarding over HTTP against the in-cluster + AIAC Controller (`POST /apply/service/{service_id}`), reachable via `kubectl port-forward`. +- **Two AIAC stacks, one per policy variant.** Because the PRB reads its policy from `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` + (a file/ConfigMap **baked into the AIAC pod**, not selectable per request), the two `policy.md` + variants (`explicit`, `abstract`) are served by **two independent in-cluster AIAC stacks** — each an + AIAC agent + its own Policy Store + its own OPA Policy Writer, mounting its own variant. The **IdP + Configuration Service and Keycloak are shared** (provisioning is variant-independent and idempotent). +- **Rego capture.** Each stack's OPA Policy Writer writes `.rego` (the filesystem stub — phase-1 emits to + a filesystem location, **not** the K8s CR) into a mounted volume. The test `kubectl cp`/`exec`s each + variant's `.rego` out to a host temp dir `rego_out//`, then runs the `opa eval` oracle on the + host. + +### What it does + +The pipeline (deploy → onboard tool → onboard agent → emit Rego) is driven **once per `policy.md` variant** +— against that variant's AIAC stack — each writing into its own `rego_out//`. `opa eval` then +asserts the truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 describe the run. + +0. **Point the demo namespace at the dedicated realm (test fixture).** Before deploying workloads, set + `KEYCLOAK_REALM=` in the demo namespace's **`authbridge-config`** ConfigMap. The + kagenti-operator reads the realm per-namespace from this key and **preserves an admin/CI-set value** + (operator issue #433), so the operator registers *this* namespace's clients into the test realm with + **no operator restart or cluster-wide change**. (Default without this is `kagenti`.) +1. **Provision the realm's users + realm roles (test fixture).** UC-1 does **not** create users or realm + roles, so the fixture provisions them via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** into the dedicated test + realm (`AIAC_TEST_REALM`), **before** onboarding (the Service Policy Builder reads the full realm-role + universe): users `dev-user`, `test-user`, `devops-user`; realm roles `developer`, `tester`, `devops` + (with the generic ≤255-char descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs)* — the PRB reads + them); role assignments (`devops-user`→`devops`, which maps to **no** scope — the deny case). + Provisioning is idempotent (create-or-get); state is **left in place** on teardown (the shared realm is + never deleted/recreated — reruns converge). + +2. **Deploy the demo workloads.** `kubectl apply` the simplified **`github-tool`** + ([../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md)) and the real **`github-agent`** + ([../demo/github-agent.md](../demo/github-agent.md)) into the demo namespace. Wait until: pods Ready; + the kagenti-operator has **registered a Keycloak client** for each (with `client.name = + "{namespace}/{workload}"`) and applied the `kagenti.io/type` pod label (`tool`/`agent`); the + `github-agent` **AgentCard CR** is present; the tool **Service** carries the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` + label and answers `tools/list`. + +3. **Onboard the tool, then the agent (real UC-1), against each variant's AIAC stack.** Order matters — + the tool is onboarded first so its scopes exist when the agent's Service Policy Builder reads the scope + universe: + > **Resolving `{service_id}`.** The trigger takes the Keycloak **client id**, which is **not** the + > string `github-tool`: the operator sets `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"` but the client *id* is + > `"{ns}/{workload}"` only when SPIRE is off — with `--spire-trust-domain` set it is a SPIFFE URI + > (`spiffe:///ns/{ns}/sa/{sa}`). The test resolves the id by looking up the client whose + > **name** is `"{ns}/github-tool"` (resp. `"{ns}/github-agent"`) via the Configuration library / + > Keycloak admin, then triggers with that id. + + - `POST /apply/service/{github-tool client id}` → UC-1 classifies it a **Tool** from the label, reads + the MCP manifest, provisions scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, + issues-write}` (verbatim tool descriptions), sets `client.type=Tool`. **No rules are written for the + tool directly.** + - `POST /apply/service/{github-agent client id}` → UC-1 classifies it an **Agent** from the label, + reads the AgentCard, provisions role `github-agent.agent` + scopes + `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}` (from the two skills), sets `client.type=Agent`, + then the Service Policy Builder maps the realm roles→scopes via the real PRB (real LLM, + `temperature=0`) and the Controller calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)` → the OPA writer + emits `github_agent.inbound.rego` + `github_agent.outbound.rego`. + +4. **Capture the Rego.** `kubectl cp`/`exec` each variant stack's OPA-writer output to + `rego_out//`. + +5. **Repeat steps 3–4 for the second variant** (the other AIAC stack). Provisioning re-runs are idempotent + and variant-independent; only the emitted Rego differs. + +6. **Teardown in `finally`.** Delete the demo workloads (operator de-registers the clients); leave the + realm, users, realm roles, and `.rego` files in place for eyeballing. AIAC stacks may be left running or + torn down per the harness. + +7. **Assert the truth table with `opa eval`.** For each variant's captured Rego, evaluate a matrix of + **(request JSON, rego file)** tuples with the standalone `opa` binary and hard-assert each decision: + - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → `shutil.which("opa")` → `pytest.skip("opa not found")`. + - **Inbound** — one node per `(variant × subject)`. Request `{"subject": }` against + `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. Coarse existential "can this user reach the agent at all"; + the discovered agent-scope names (`github-agent.source_operations` / `.issue_operations`) do not need + to match anything — inbound has no function field. + - **Outbound (user gate only)** — one node per `(variant × subject × function_name)`, where + `function_name` is a **full discovered tool-scope name** (`github-tool.source-read`, …). Evaluated by + the probe query `data.probe.outbound.allow` (in `probe_uc1.rego`), which binds `input.function_name` + against the generated **user→tool** data maps (`subject_ok`) **only**. The agent→tool gate + (`target_ok`) is **not** probed — under UC-1's single generic `github-agent.agent` role it is + degenerate/empty (see *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agent-tool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*), matching + phase-1's "user-gating dimension only." + - **Name matching** — because `scenario_uc1.py` stores the **full discovered scope names**, the probe + matches `input.function_name` to a scope by **exact string equality** (no prefix-stripping token-set + soft match — that was `5.3`'s device for bare names; here both sides are already prefixed). + - The expected verdict for every cell is **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists, not a + second hand-maintained copy. A failing node names the exact `variant / subject / function_name` cell. + +8. **Assert grant-set equivalence (semantic, from the Rego).** The pipeline runs inside the AIAC pod, so + the test never sees the intermediate `list[PolicyRule]`. Grant-set equivalence is therefore re-derived + from the **generated Rego data maps**: dump each variant's user→tool grant map (via `opa eval + data.authz.github_agent.outbound...`) and each variant's inbound `subject_roles`/`agent_scopes`, and + assert, as order-independent `(role, scope)` **sets**, that **each variant equals the `scenario_uc1.py` + truth table** and **the two variants equal each other**. This compares grant *sets*, not Rego text + (formatting/name-ordering may differ; the grant set may not) — the semantic-similarity guarantee this + test makes. It catches verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse `opa eval` oracle hides. + +## Expected output + +The test passes when `opa eval` decides every cell of the scenario truth table as follows, for **both** +policy variants. Verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists, not a hand-maintained +copy — these tables are the human-readable rendering of them. They are **identical to policy-pipeline's** +(only the underlying scope-name strings differ). + +`USERS`: `dev-user`→`developer`, `test-user`→`tester`, `devops-user`→`devops`. + +**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`, user-role→agent-scope, existential): + +| Subject | Inbound | +|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | +| test-user | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | + +**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, user→tool gate only; `function_name` +is the full discovered scope name, shown here by its bare suffix for readability): + +| | github-tool.source-read | github-tool.source-write | github-tool.issues-read | github-tool.issues-write | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| dev-user | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | +| test-user | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | +| devops-user | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | + +Each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in its `rego_out//`: + +- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. + `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated with the + **discovered** names `[github-agent.source_operations, github-agent.issue_operations]`. (`devops-user` + holds `devops`, which maps to no agent scope, so it is absent and denied inbound.) +- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok + }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the **user→tool** gate (populated: `subject_role_scopes` grouping + developer/tester → `github-tool.*` scopes). Its **`target_ok`** (agent→tool) is **degenerate/empty** + under the single generic `github-agent.agent` role — documented, not asserted (see below). + +Explicitly **no** `github_tool.*.rego` — the pipeline emits no tool model (the tool is a pure target; +phase-1 acceptance requires "no rules written for the tool alone"). + +### Semantic similarity, not byte-identity + +This test's Rego is **semantically similar** to `policy-pipeline`'s but **not byte-identical**, for two +baked-in reasons in the (frozen) UC-1 provisioning: + +1. **Workload-prefixed names.** UC-1 names every scope `{workload}.{name}`, so the data maps hold + `github-tool.source-read` / `github-agent.source_operations` where `policy-pipeline` holds bare + `source-read` / `source-access`. Same **file set + package shapes**; different name strings. +2. **Degenerate `target_ok`.** UC-1 emits one generic `github-agent.agent` role (description `"Agent + role"`), which the PRB cannot map to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the agent→tool gate + is empty — where `policy-pipeline`'s two operator roles populate it across all four scopes. + +Both are inherent to running real UC-1; making the Rego byte-identical would require unfreezing UC-1 +(dropping the prefix + deriving per-skill agent roles) or abandoning UC-1 discovery (which would collapse +this test into `policy-pipeline`). The test therefore asserts **same files + same decisions + equivalent +grant sets**, not identical text. + +### The agent→tool gate (degenerate by design) + +Phase-1 states outbound access is an **intersection** of the user→tool gate and the agent→tool gate, but +that "the agent holds all of `github-tool`'s scopes, so this demo exercises the **user-gating dimension +only**; the agent-role gate is not exercised here" (deferred to a future two-tool demo). Under real UC-1 +the single generic `github-agent.agent` role yields an **empty** `target_ok`, so the generated `allow` +(`subject_ok AND target_ok`) would deny everything. The probe therefore evaluates **`subject_ok` only**, +which is exactly the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. The empty `target_ok` is documented as a known +UC-1 limitation, not a test failure. + +## Scenario + +The phase-1 scenario — identical role→access facts to `policy-pipeline`, driven end-to-end through real +UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads rather than a hand-built provisioning step. + +| Element | Value | +|---------|-------| +| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (dedicated; default `aiac-uc1-e2e`) | +| Agent | `github-agent` — **discovered** role `github-agent.agent`; scopes `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (from AgentCard skills) | +| Tool | `github-tool` (simplified) — **discovered** scopes `github-tool.source-read`, `github-tool.source-write`, `github-tool.issues-read`, `github-tool.issues-write` (from MCP `tools/list`) | +| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | +| `developer` | source read/write + issues read | +| `tester` | issues read/write | +| `devops` | no access (inbound deny; denied every outbound function) | + +Role → access (the fixed facts both `policy.md` variants and the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists must agree +with; the generic descriptions are not part of this triad): + +- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. +- `tester` — issues read/write. +- `devops` — no access. Conveyed by the **role description only** — absent from every pair-list and both + `policy.md` variants (deny-by-default), so denied inbound and on every outbound function. + +## Configuration (env) + +| Variable | Purpose | Default | +|----------|---------|---------| +| `KUBECONFIG` | Kubeconfig for the live Kagenti/Kind cluster | — (required) | +| `AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE` | Namespace the demo workloads deploy into | `team1` | +| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds (for user/realm-role provisioning) | — (required) | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Dedicated realm the test uses; the fixture sets `KEYCLOAK_REALM` on the demo namespace's `authbridge-config` ConfigMap so the operator registers this namespace's clients into it (per-namespace, no cluster-wide change) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | +| `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the AIAC stacks read back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | +| `AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL` / `AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL` | Base URL of each variant's in-cluster AIAC Controller (via port-forward) for `POST /apply/service/{id}` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` / `:7080` | +| `AIAC_OPA_POD_EXPLICIT` / `AIAC_OPA_POD_ABSTRACT` | OPA-writer pod (or PVC) per variant to `kubectl cp` `.rego` from | — (resolved from labels) | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Host base dir the captured `.rego` is copied to; `rego_out//` per variant, left on disk | operator-chosen local dir | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`); consumed by the in-cluster AIAC pods | — (required) | +| `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary (oracle); else `PATH`, else `pytest.skip` | — (optional; PATH lookup) | + +> When the test is written, confirm: the Controller trigger path and port; and the OPA writer's output +> path / how the two variant stacks are deployed and addressed. The realm mechanism (per-namespace +> `authbridge-config` `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, preserved by the operator — issue #433) and the `{service_id}` +> resolution (look up the client by `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"`; the id is a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE) +> are **confirmed** against the operator source and reflected above. + +## Runbook + +Runnable only against a live Kagenti/Kind cluster (operator + Keycloak + SPIRE) **configured to register +clients into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`**, with the two AIAC variant stacks deployable, a real LLM, the demo agent +(GA-1…9) and simplified tool images built + kind-loaded, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). + +```bash +# env: KUBECONFIG + KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-uc1-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN +.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py -m integration -v +# Parametrized nodes: (variant × subject) inbound + (variant × subject × function_name) outbound + grant-set equivalence. +# A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: +# test_outbound[abstract-test-user-github-tool.source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed +# The generated Rego is left on disk per variant for eyeballing: +# rego_out/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# rego_out/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# (no github_tool.*.rego in either) +``` + +The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found. Eyeball the persisted Rego against the ID-only +package shapes in [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md); +optionally inspect the provisioned Keycloak realm and the discovered scopes. + +## Testing Decisions + +- **Highest seam available, verified by a real oracle.** Real deployed workloads + real kagenti-operator + + real UC-1 onboarding + real PRB/PCE + real Keycloak + real LLM. The test drives the pipeline through + its production trigger (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) and verifies the real filesystem Rego with the + standalone `opa eval` binary. A good test here asserts only **external behavior** — the *decisions* the + generated Rego makes — never internal Rego structure. +- **Rego is the artifact under test; the scenario is the oracle.** Expected verdicts are computed from + `scenario_uc1.py`, not from the Rego. A wrong role→scope mapping fails the test at the exact cell. +- **Deploy + discover + evaluate, no live traffic.** Per phase-1, enforcement/token-exchange/live A2A is + out of scope; correctness is shown by evaluating the generated rules. The agent pod need only exist + (labelled `kagenti.io/type=agent`, AgentCard present); the simplified tool need only answer `tools/list` + — neither is driven with real requests. +- **In-cluster AIAC for MCP reachability.** UC-1's `analyze_tool` posts `tools/list` to a + cluster-internal DNS name, so the pipeline runs in-cluster (triggered over HTTP) rather than in-process + on the host, which cannot resolve `*.svc.cluster.local`. +- **Two AIAC stacks for two variants.** The PRB policy is baked into the pod (`AIAC_POLICY_FILE`), so each + `policy.md` variant is served by its own AIAC stack; Keycloak + the IdP Configuration Service are shared + (provisioning is variant-independent and idempotent). +- **User gate only.** UC-1's single generic agent role yields an empty `target_ok`; the outbound probe + evaluates `subject_ok` alone, matching phase-1's user-gating-only intent. The agent-role gate is + deferred (needs a second tool the agent is not mapped to). +- **Semantic similarity, from the Rego.** Since the pipeline runs in-pod, grant-set equivalence is + re-derived from the generated Rego data maps (not an in-process `list[PolicyRule]`), and compares grant + *sets* across variants and vs the scenario — the semantic-similarity guarantee, not byte-identity. +- **Dedicated realm, leave-in-place.** A dedicated test realm (`AIAC_TEST_REALM`) the operator is + configured for; the shared realm is never deleted/recreated, so cleanup is idempotent leave-in-place + (users/roles create-or-get; UC-1 writes idempotent; demo workloads deleted so the operator de-registers + the clients). +- **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** The PRB LLM is pinned `temperature=0`; both variants are asserted + cell-by-cell (`opa eval`) and at the grant-set level. Some model-dependence remains, which is why the + suite is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. +- **Prior art, shared not copied.** Reuses the `5.3` shape (`@pytest.mark.integration`, `opa` + discovery/skip, per-variant `rego_out/`, scenario-as-oracle, probe query) via the shared + `launcher.py`/`scenario_uc1.py`, adapted from in-process/subprocess to deploy/port-forward/`kubectl cp`. + +## Relationship to other integration tests + +This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD +([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). + +- **Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline`** ([policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md), + `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`): identical scenario facts and truth tables, but this + test *infers* the agent/tool entities via **real UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads** instead of + hand-provisioning them, so its Rego is semantically similar (not byte-identical) and it validates the + **phase-1** deliverable end-to-end. +- Same `@pytest.mark.integration` + `opa eval` flavor as the live-Keycloak pytest tests + (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) and `policy-pipeline`; skips when `opa` is absent. + +Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`. + +## Out of Scope + +- **Writing `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`, `probe_uc1.rego`, `scenario_uc1.py`** — this spec + *describes* the test; the test is written in a later session (tracked by + `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`). +- **The UC-1 agent, PRB, PCE, OPA writer, and demo `github-agent` implementations** — specified/tested by + their own components/issues, not here. In particular UC-1's discovery naming and single-generic-role + behavior are **fixed**; this test observes them, it does not change them. +- **Building the simplified `github-tool`** — its own build issue (a `blocked-by` of this test); the tool + is specified in [../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md). +- **Live enforcement / A2A traffic / token exchange / K8s-CR Policy Writer** — Phase-2+; this test targets + the filesystem stub and evaluates rules, per phase-1 out-of-scope. +- **Default-CI wiring** — `@pytest.mark.integration`; runs on demand. + +## Further Notes + +- **Fact triad.** The role→access facts are owned by three artefacts that must agree: the *Scenario* + table, **both** `policy.md` variants, and the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists. Entity/role/scope + descriptions are generic and functional and must not contradict the facts. +- **Two variants in the discovered world** (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** variant that + enumerates each `(user-role → discovered scope)` pair by its full prefixed name, and an **abstract** + variant (phase-1's intent-only prose). **Neither names the agent role** — doing so would populate + `target_ok` and break both the user-gate-only decision and cross-variant equivalence. Both are + user-intent-only, both leave `target_ok` degenerate, and both must produce the **same discovered grant + set**. +- **`devops` zero access** is conveyed by its role description only; it is absent from every pair-list and + both `policy.md` variants (deny-by-default denies it inbound and on every outbound function). +- **Descriptions ≤255 chars, verbatim into Keycloak.** The tool-scope descriptions are the verbatim + scenario descriptions the simplified tool returns from `tools/list`; the agent-scope descriptions come + from the AgentCard skills; the realm-role descriptions are provisioned by the fixture. + +## Blocked-by + +- Simplified `github-tool` build issue (see [../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md)). +- Demo `github-agent` implementation — `demo/GA-1…GA-9` (deployable agent + AgentCard). +- UC-1 Service Onboarding — `agent/service-onboarding/3.6-service-onboarding-orchestrator.md` (**done**). +- The PRB / PCE / OPA-writer / Policy-Store prerequisites shared with `5.3`. +- A live Kagenti/Kind cluster + operator (registers clients into `AIAC_TEST_REALM` via the demo + namespace's `authbridge-config` `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, set by the fixture — per-namespace, confirmed against + the operator source); the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` Service label applied at deploy time + (`../../gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`); an `opa` binary at test time. + +## Scenario inputs + +These are **functional** inputs — the PRB reads the descriptions and the `policy.md` to produce the +role→scope mappings. The entity/role/scope descriptions are **generic and keyword-free**; client `type` +is set by UC-1 from the `kagenti.io/type` label (not description prose). + +### Discovered entities (what UC-1 provisions) + +- **`github-tool`** (Tool) → scopes, from the simplified tool's MCP `tools/list` (verbatim descriptions): + - `github-tool.source-read` — "Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only." + - `github-tool.source-write` — "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes." + - `github-tool.issues-read` — "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only." + - `github-tool.issues-write` — "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close." +- **`github-agent`** (Agent) → role `github-agent.agent` (description "Agent role") + scopes from the + AgentCard skills: + - `github-agent.source_operations` — "Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits." + - `github-agent.issue_operations` — "Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests." + +### Realm roles (provisioned by the fixture) + +- `developer` — "Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining code) and fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and consults issues for defect reports." +- `tester` — "Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through the issue tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue tracker, not in source." +- `devops` — "DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime environments; does not author source code and does not manage the issue tracker." + +### `policy.md` — Version 1 (explicit) + +Enumerates each `(user-role → discovered scope)` pair by name. **No agent-role→tool-scope section** +(target_ok is deferred). Deny by default. + +```markdown +# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool + +Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this +policy supports it; deny by default. + +## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) +- developer may use github-agent.source_operations and github-agent.issue_operations. +- tester may use github-agent.issue_operations. + +## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) +- developer may perform github-tool.source-read, github-tool.source-write, and github-tool.issues-read. +- tester may perform github-tool.issues-read and github-tool.issues-write. +``` + +### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) + +Phase-1's intent-only prose. Encodes the same facts; relies on the PRB/LLM to expand intent into the +discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. + +```markdown +Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. + +- Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. +- Testers may read and modify issues. +``` From 6b764be4354fe324a6016322f986f7c7cb79a7a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 13:01:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 221/273] Chore(aiac): Defer aiac-init and phase-gated env vars from Phase 1 deployment MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Remove the aiac-init init container from agent-deployment.yaml (deferred to Phase 2, issue 4.21). Remove NATS_URL, AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL, and AIAC_CHROMADB_URL from the aiac-pdp-config ConfigMap in pdp-interface-deployment.yaml — those services don't exist in Phase 1; the keys will be added by issues 4.19 (Event Broker) and 4.20 (RAG Pod). Update aiac-deployment-guide.md to mark the three keys as phase-gated. Update PRD.md and event-broker.md to reflect the Phase 1 scope. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 8 +++++--- aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md | 2 +- aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml | 13 +++---------- aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 6 +++--- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 5 ++--- 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index 386d23077..41569da9b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **NATS consumer is a thin adapter.** It receives events from the Event Broker and calls the same internal handler functions used by the debug HTTP endpoints. No business logic lives in the consumer. - **Agent HTTP endpoints are retained for debugging.** They are not the primary trigger path; the NATS consumer is. `kubectl port-forward` to the Agent is used only for `rebuild` and debugging. - **Event Broker uses WorkQueuePolicy.** Messages are removed from the stream after acknowledgement. Unacknowledged messages survive Agent pod restarts and are redelivered automatically. After 5 failed deliveries, messages are routed to `aiac.apply.dlq`. -- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. +- **AIAC init container gates Agent startup.** Before the Agent container starts, the init container waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service to be healthy, then creates the `aiac-events` JetStream stream idempotently. _(Deferred to Phase 2 — issue 4.21; the Phase 1 Agent pod runs without it.)_ - **All `__init__.py` files under `aiac.*` are empty.** Callers use explicit submodule paths: `from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Subject`, `from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel`. - **ChromaDB hosts two collections: `aiac-policies` and `aiac-domain-knowledge`.** Collection slug to ChromaDB name mapping: `policy` → `aiac-policies`, `domain-knowledge` → `aiac-domain-knowledge`. - **`user/{id}` trigger not implemented.** OPA rules are role-scoped; individual user creation/update does not require agent intervention — OPA rule evaluation resolves entitlements from the caller's role automatically. @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ Four separate manifest files: |------|----------| | `aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap + Kagenti Interface Pod Deployment (IdP Configuration Service container + PDP Policy Writer container) + two ClusterIP Services (`aiac-pdp-config-service:7071`, `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072`) | | `aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet (Policy Store container) + `volumeClaimTemplate` (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`, mounted at `/data`) + headless Service + `aiac-policy-store-service:7074` ClusterIP Service | -| `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (aiac-init container + AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service | +| `aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (AIAC Agent container) + ClusterIP Service _(Phase 1; `aiac-init` init container added in Phase 2, issue 4.21)_ | | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` _(pending)_ | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` _(pending)_ | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-poli # Build Policy Store (deployed as StatefulSet aiac-policy-store) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile -t aiac-policy-store:latest aiac/src/ -# Build Agent (includes aiac-init container) +# Build Agent (aiac-init init container deferred to Phase 2, issue 4.21) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile -t aiac-agent:latest aiac/src/ # Build RAG Ingest Service @@ -500,7 +500,9 @@ data: AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" + # Added in Phase 2 by issue 4.19 (Event Broker): NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" + # Added in Phase 3 by issue 4.20 (RAG Pod): AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" ``` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md index 972084539..bf8b80e4b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ No authentication credentials are required. The NATS server runs with no-auth co ## AIAC Init Container -A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agent container starts. It orchestrates the AIAC startup sequence: +A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agent container starts. It orchestrates the AIAC startup sequence. _Deployment of this container is deferred to Phase 2 (issue 4.21) — the Phase 1 Agent pod runs without it._ 1. **Wait for NATS** — poll `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` until TCP connection succeeds. 2. **Wait for PDP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml index 6d62f8a75..adc02a21b 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml @@ -68,16 +68,9 @@ spec: app: aiac-agent spec: serviceAccountName: aiac-agent - initContainers: - - name: aiac-init - image: localhost/aiac-agent:local - imagePullPolicy: Never - # Waits for NATS, IdP Configuration Service, PDP Policy Writer, and RAG Ingest Service - # to be healthy, then creates the aiac-events JetStream stream idempotently. - command: ["python", "-m", "aiac.agent.init"] - envFrom: - - configMapRef: - name: aiac-pdp-config + # aiac-init init container is deferred to Phase 2 (issue 4.21). + # It will gate startup on NATS + IdP Config + PDP Policy + RAG Ingest health + # and provision the aiac-events JetStream stream. containers: - name: aiac-agent image: localhost/aiac-agent:local diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index 72d64709d..80bb835d5 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ Edit the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` to match | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | Agent | | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | Agent | | `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | `/data/state.db` | Policy Store | -| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | Agent | -| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7073` | Agent | -| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | Agent | +| `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | Agent — **added in Phase 2** (Event Broker, issue 4.19) | +| `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7073` | Init container — **added in Phase 3** (RAG Pod, issue 4.20) | +| `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | Agent — **added in Phase 3** (RAG Pod, issue 4.20) | ## 5 — Deploy diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml index c2f5aa660..e829d99ef 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ data: AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071" AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL: "http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072" AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL: "http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074" - NATS_URL: "nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222" - AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:7073" - AIAC_CHROMADB_URL: "http://aiac-rag-service:8000" + # NATS_URL is added to this ConfigMap in Phase 2 (Event Broker, issue 4.19). + # AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL and AIAC_CHROMADB_URL are added in Phase 3 (RAG Pod, issue 4.20). --- # Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: From c983a3484746947fb6380ec89b8f88ce788d61da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 13:42:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 222/273] Chore(aiac): Retarget github demo manifests back to team1 namespace MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The github-agent + github-tool demo manifests were deployed into the aiac-demo namespace, which is not enrolled for AuthBridge sidecar injection: the operator's mutating webhook only fires in namespaces labeled kagenti-enabled=true (installer-provided, e.g. team1), so no sidecar was ever injected into aiac-demo pods. Move the workloads back to namespace team1 (namespace fields, the tool's service FQDN, and the derived team1/github-tool client name). The Keycloak realm remains aiac-demo (KEYCLOAK_REALM/ISSUER/JWKS_URI and the authproxy-routes) and images stay pinned to localhost/ for local builds — namespace and realm are independent axes. Align the github-agent spec's baseline-realm references to aiac-demo to match the shipped manifests. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml | 8 +++++--- .../github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml | 8 ++++---- .../github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml | 12 ++++++------ aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml index 90887ee9f..3ada41667 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml @@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ # Usage: # kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml # -# Note: These manifests are configured for namespace "aiac-demo". +# Note: These manifests are configured for namespace "team1" (installer-provided +# and enrolled for AuthBridge sidecar injection). The Keycloak realm remains +# "aiac-demo" (set via KEYCLOAK_REALM below); namespace and realm are independent. --- # authbridge-config ConfigMap - Unified config for both client-registration and envoy-proxy @@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: name: authbridge-config - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" KEYCLOAK_REALM: "aiac-demo" @@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: name: authproxy-routes - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 data: routes.yaml: | - host: "github-tool-mcp" diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml index d77cb6e64..41f6b175b 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml @@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 labels: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent spec: @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 spec: selector: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ apiVersion: agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1 kind: AgentRuntime metadata: name: github-agent - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 spec: type: agent targetRef: diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml index d2f6c66fe..69093a5fa 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ # # Naming invariants (do not rename): # workload name == Service name == "github-tool" -# analyze_tool endpoint: http://github-tool.aiac-demo.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp +# analyze_tool endpoint: http://github-tool.team1.svc.cluster.local:9090/mcp # # kagenti.io/type=tool is applied by the kagenti-operator when it reconciles # the AgentRuntime below; do not hand-set it here. @@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 spec: replicas: 1 selector: @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 labels: protocol.kagenti.io/mcp: "true" spec: @@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ spec: --- # AgentRuntime — enrolls the workload so the kagenti-operator: # - applies kagenti.io/type=tool to the pod (read by classify_service), and -# - registers a Keycloak client with client.name = "aiac-demo/github-tool" +# - registers a Keycloak client with client.name = "team1/github-tool" # (so analyze_tool derives scopes github-tool.{source-read,...}). apiVersion: agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1 kind: AgentRuntime metadata: name: github-tool - namespace: aiac-demo + namespace: team1 spec: type: tool targetRef: diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md index 4e99a8e79..9cd3d104e 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the gith - **`github-agent-deployment.yaml`** — `ServiceAccount` + `Deployment` + `Service` + `AgentRuntime`: - Pod labels `kagenti.io/inject: enabled`, `kagenti.io/spire: enabled`. - Container port `8000`; env `MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`, - `JWKS_URI=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs`, + `JWKS_URI=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/aiac-demo/protocol/openid-connect/certs`, LLM vars, `PORT`, `LOG_LEVEL`; `/shared` `emptyDir` for operator-mounted client creds. - `Service` `8080 → 8000` (ClusterIP). - `AgentRuntime{ type: agent, targetRef: this Deployment }` — enrolls the workload (operator applies @@ -216,7 +216,8 @@ Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the gith ``` - **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** the existing **production** `github-tool` Deployment/Service (`authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`, Service name `github-tool-mcp`) + - `github-tool-secrets`, a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`). + `github-tool-secrets`, a running Kagenti cluster with the dedicated `aiac-demo` Keycloak realm; + workloads deploy into namespace `team1` (installer-provided and enrolled for AuthBridge injection). The sibling UC-1 stub at `demo/tools/github_tool/` (Service `github-tool`) is a separate deployment for AIAC onboarding discovery and is **not** a runtime dependency of this agent. From dfbaaf79f97e6f065ceddada75a00049f4a277cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 15:09:57 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 223/273] Chore(aiac): Point github demo at existing kagenti realm Follow-up to the team1 namespace move. The demo manifests targeted the aiac-demo Keycloak realm, which does not exist in the installer-provided cluster: the operator's client-registration returned 404 Realm not found, so no client-credentials Secret was created and the injected pods hung in Init on the missing secret mount. Point KEYCLOAK_REALM / ISSUER / JWKS_URI back to the installer's kagenti realm (agent deployment + configmaps) and align the github-agent spec's baseline-realm references. Namespace stays team1; images stay localhost/. With this, client registration succeeds, the credentials Secret is created, and both github-agent and github-tool pods run 2/2 with the authbridge-proxy sidecar injected. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml | 10 +++++----- .../github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml index 3ada41667..362bcfb70 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ # kubectl apply -f configmaps.yaml # # Note: These manifests are configured for namespace "team1" (installer-provided -# and enrolled for AuthBridge sidecar injection). The Keycloak realm remains -# "aiac-demo" (set via KEYCLOAK_REALM below); namespace and realm are independent. +# and enrolled for AuthBridge sidecar injection) and the installer's +# "kagenti" Keycloak realm (set via KEYCLOAK_REALM below). --- # authbridge-config ConfigMap - Unified config for both client-registration and envoy-proxy @@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ metadata: namespace: team1 data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" - KEYCLOAK_REALM: "aiac-demo" + KEYCLOAK_REALM: "kagenti" # TOKEN_URL: Auto-derived from KEYCLOAK_URL + KEYCLOAK_REALM. Only set explicitly # when the token endpoint differs from the standard Keycloak path. - # TOKEN_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/aiac-demo/protocol/openid-connect/token" + # TOKEN_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/token" # ISSUER: Set explicitly because the internal KEYCLOAK_URL differs from the frontend URL. - ISSUER: "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/realms/aiac-demo" + ISSUER: "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/realms/kagenti" # Audience validation is automatic — uses CLIENT_ID from /shared/client-id.txt # (written by client-registration or operator). No manual configuration needed. diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml index 41f6b175b..74143da30 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ spec: # JWKS URI for validating incoming tokens from Keycloak - name: JWKS_URI - value: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/aiac-demo/protocol/openid-connect/certs" + value: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs" resources: limits: cpu: 500m diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md index 9cd3d104e..40c152a12 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the gith - **`github-agent-deployment.yaml`** — `ServiceAccount` + `Deployment` + `Service` + `AgentRuntime`: - Pod labels `kagenti.io/inject: enabled`, `kagenti.io/spire: enabled`. - Container port `8000`; env `MCP_URL=http://github-tool-mcp:9090/mcp`, - `JWKS_URI=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/aiac-demo/protocol/openid-connect/certs`, + `JWKS_URI=http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080/realms/kagenti/protocol/openid-connect/certs`, LLM vars, `PORT`, `LOG_LEVEL`; `/shared` `emptyDir` for operator-mounted client creds. - `Service` `8080 → 8000` (ClusterIP). - `AgentRuntime{ type: agent, targetRef: this Deployment }` — enrolls the workload (operator applies @@ -216,8 +216,8 @@ Manifests live under `aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/`, adapted from the gith ``` - **Prerequisite (reused, not created here):** the existing **production** `github-tool` Deployment/Service (`authbridge/demos/github-issue/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml`, Service name `github-tool-mcp`) + - `github-tool-secrets`, a running Kagenti cluster with the dedicated `aiac-demo` Keycloak realm; - workloads deploy into namespace `team1` (installer-provided and enrolled for AuthBridge injection). + `github-tool-secrets`, a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1` — + installer-provided and enrolled for AuthBridge injection). The sibling UC-1 stub at `demo/tools/github_tool/` (Service `github-tool`) is a separate deployment for AIAC onboarding discovery and is **not** a runtime dependency of this agent. From b51ebd5e072ea353e5de2ca4a86a1e917c45efcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:19:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 224/273] Docs(aiac): Reframe uc1-onboarding integration test as a rung ladder Rewrite the uc1-onboarding-pipeline integration-test spec from a single, unrunnable two-stack 'two-policy' test into a ladder against one in-cluster AIAC stack (OPA filesystem-stub writer, single abstract policy.md), with the demo workloads deployed + registered as a precondition: - rung 1: onboard agent only (inbound full, outbound empty) - rung 2: onboard agent then tool (PCE additive merge fills the agent outbound) - rung 3: onboard tool then agent (+ grant-set equivalence with rung 2) - rung 4: two-policy, deferred (two-stack topology discarded) Correct the stale 'order matters' claim to an order-independence requirement (divergence between rungs 2 and 3 is a bug), and update the PRD integration-test index/tracking entry to match. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 4 +- .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 563 +++++++----------- 2 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 335 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index 41569da9b..a69b0f64c 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -573,9 +573,9 @@ Beyond the marker-gated pytest tests above, individual integration tests are spe |---|---|---| | PDP Policy Writer — `generate_rego.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) that boots the OPA stub locally, applies a `PolicyModel` through `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md](integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md) | | `policy-pipeline` — `policy_pipeline.py` | Standalone launcher (no Docker) driving the full identity→policy pipeline — provisions a Keycloak realm + entities, runs the three PRB mappings, applies via the PCE, and writes the generated Rego to a known directory for manual inspection. Write-only; not `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/policy-pipeline.md](integration-test/policy-pipeline.md) | -| `uc1-onboarding-pipeline` — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` | Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline` validating the **phase-1** deliverable: deploys the real `github-agent` + a simplified `github-tool` to a live Kagenti cluster, drives **real UC-1 onboarding** (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) to infer roles/scopes, and asserts the generated Rego with `opa eval`. Same scenario facts/tables as `policy-pipeline`; Rego is semantically similar (not byte-identical). `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md](integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md) | +| `uc1-onboarding-pipeline` — a **ladder** of UC-1 onboarding tests | Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline` validating the **phase-1** deliverable against **one** in-cluster AIAC stack (OPA filesystem-stub writer, single abstract `policy.md`): with `github-agent` + a simplified `github-tool` **already deployed and registered** as Keycloak clients, three gradual rungs drive **real UC-1 onboarding** (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) — agent-only, agent→tool, tool→agent — and assert the generated Rego with `opa eval` (verdicts from `scenario_uc1.py`). Rungs 2/3 assert onboarding-**order-independence**. A fourth two-policy rung is **deferred** (two-stack topology discarded). Same scenario facts/tables as `policy-pipeline`; Rego semantically similar (not byte-identical). `@pytest.mark.integration`. | [integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md](integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md) | -Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`; the policy-pipeline integration test in `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`; the UC-1 onboarding pipeline integration test in `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`. +Tracking issues: the live-Keycloak pytest integration tests in `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`; the PDP Policy Writer integration test in `testing/5.2-pdp-writer-integration-test.md`; the policy-pipeline integration test in `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`; the UC-1 onboarding pipeline integration-test ladder in `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md` (epic) with rungs `testing/5.4.1`/`5.4.2`/`5.4.3` and the deferred two-policy `testing/5.4.4`. --- diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index 4cb5bcf57..e737c8a9b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -1,175 +1,160 @@ -# Integration Test: uc1-onboarding-pipeline — `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` - -> **One spec among several.** This document specifies a **single** integration test. Integration-test -> specs live **one spec per test** under `docs/specs/integration-test/` (a sibling of -> `components/`), and the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)) -> is the index of them. This is the **uc1-onboarding-pipeline** integration test — the phase-1 -> service-onboarding demo driven end-to-end through the **real UC-1 agent** against **really-deployed** -> demo workloads — not the definition of integration testing in general. - -> **Relationship to `policy-pipeline`.** This test is the **discovery-driven sibling** of -> [policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md). The *scenario facts and the truth tables are identical* (same -> three users, same role→access facts, same inbound/outbound matrices). The **difference** is provenance: -> where `policy-pipeline` *hand-provisions* the agent/tool roles and scopes with clean fixed names and -> then calls the PRB mappings directly, this test *infers them via real UC-1 onboarding* of deployed -> workloads. That inference is what makes the generated Rego **semantically similar but not byte-identical** -> to `policy-pipeline` (see *[Semantic similarity, not byte-identity](#semantic-similarity-not-byte-identity)*). +# Integration Test: uc1-onboarding-pipeline — a ladder of UC-1 onboarding tests + +> **One spec among several.** This document specifies the **UC-1 onboarding** integration tests. +> Integration-test specs live under `docs/specs/integration-test/` (a sibling of `components/`), indexed +> by the master PRD's *Integration test specifications* section ([../PRD.md](../PRD.md)). This is the +> phase-1 service-onboarding demo driven end-to-end through the **real UC-1 agent** against +> **really-deployed** demo workloads — not the definition of integration testing in general. + +> **Ladder, not one test.** This spec was previously a single "complete two-policy" test that assumed a +> **two-stack** topology (one AIAC stack per `policy.md` variant) which is **not deployed** and so could +> never run. It is now a **ladder** of three gradual, runnable tests against **one** AIAC stack, plus a +> **deferred** two-policy rung: +> +> | Rung | Issue | Onboards | Proves | +> |---|---|---|---| +> | 1 | `testing/5.4.1-uc1-onboard-agent-only.md` | agent only | agent discovery + inbound generation stand alone; outbound empty with no tool | +> | 2 | `testing/5.4.2-uc1-onboard-agent-then-tool.md` | agent → tool | onboarding the tool **after** the agent completes the agent's outbound (PCE additive merge) | +> | 3 | `testing/5.4.3-uc1-onboard-tool-then-agent.md` | tool → agent | the happy path; **and, vs rung 2, onboarding-order-independence** | +> | 4 | `testing/5.4.4-uc1-onboard-two-policies.md` | two policies | **deferred / TBD**; two-stack impl discarded | + +> **Relationship to `policy-pipeline`.** This is the **discovery-driven sibling** of +> [policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md). Identical *scenario facts and truth tables* (same three users, +> same role→access facts, same inbound/outbound matrices); the difference is provenance — `policy-pipeline` +> *hand-provisions* the agent/tool roles/scopes in process, this ladder *infers them via real UC-1 +> onboarding* of deployed workloads. That inference makes the generated Rego **semantically similar but not +> byte-identical** to `policy-pipeline` (see *[Semantic similarity](#semantic-similarity-not-byte-identity)*). ## Location -`aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py` — a pytest module marked -`@pytest.mark.integration`. It imports two shared modules: +`aiac/test/integration/` — pytest modules marked `@pytest.mark.integration`, one per rung (or one module +with one test per rung). They import two shared modules: -- `aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py` — a **new** scenario module (sibling of the existing - `scenario.py`, kept separate so `5.2`/`5.3` are unaffected). It carries the phase-1 users/roles, the two - `policy.md` variants, and the pair-lists expressed over the **discovered, workload-prefixed** names - (`github-tool.source-read`, `github-agent.source_operations`, …), which are what the generated Rego - actually contains. -- `aiac/test/integration/launcher.py` — the shared `kubectl`/port-forward + `opa` helpers (extended from - the `5.3` launcher; see *[Testing Decisions](#testing-decisions)*). +- `scenario_uc1.py` — the pure-data scenario (users/roles + the pair-lists expressed over the + **discovered, workload-prefixed** names `github-tool.source-read`, `github-agent.source_operations`, …). + The old two-variant machinery (`VARIANTS`, `POLICY_EXPLICIT`, per-variant URLs/pods) is removed; the + truth tables (`USERS`, `USER_ROLES`, `INBOUND_PAIRS`, `OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`, `TOOL_SCOPES`, + `AGENT_SCOPES`, `AGENT_ROLE`) and the single **abstract** `policy.md` remain. +- `launcher.py` — the shared `kubectl`/port-forward + `opa` helpers (`kubectl`, `kubectl_cp`, + `port_forward`, `resolve_pod`, `opa_eval`, `require_env`, …). -It also ships `aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego` — a standalone Rego module used only as the outbound -verification query, adapted from `5.3`'s `probe.rego` to match against **full discovered scope names** -(no prefix-stripping soft match; see step 7). +They also ship `probe_uc1.rego` — the outbound verification query, matching `input.function_name` against +the generated **user→tool** data maps by **exact string equality** on full discovered names. ## Description -A `@pytest.mark.integration` test that validates the **phase-1 deliverable** -([../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md](../../gh-issues/sub-issue-phase-1.md)) and confirms the runnable -demo: it deploys the real **`github-agent`** and a simplified **`github-tool`** to a live Kagenti/Kind -cluster, drives the **real UC-1 Service Onboarding agent** (`onboard_service` via the Controller's HTTP -trigger) for each, and then **asserts** the generated Rego decides correctly by running the standalone -`opa eval` binary as its verification oracle. +`@pytest.mark.integration` tests that validate the **phase-1 deliverable** and confirm the runnable demo: +they drive the **real UC-1 Service Onboarding agent** (`POST /apply/service/{id}` on the in-cluster AIAC +Controller) against **already-deployed** `github-agent` + simplified `github-tool`, and assert the +generated Rego decides correctly using the standalone `opa eval` binary as the oracle. Phase-1 is explicit that **live enforcement / live traffic is out of scope** — correctness is shown by -**evaluating the generated rules**, not by routing real requests. So this test is *Deploy + discover + -evaluate*: the agent and tool are really deployed and really discovered by UC-1 (classify from the -`kagenti.io/type` label, read the AgentCard, read the MCP `tools/list`, provision roles/scopes into -Keycloak, model access, emit Rego), but **no A2A message is ever sent through the agent**. +**evaluating the generated rules**, not by routing requests. So each rung is *onboard + evaluate*: the +workloads are really deployed and really discovered by UC-1 (classify from the `kagenti.io/type` label, +read the AgentCard / MCP `tools/list`, provision roles/scopes into Keycloak, model access, emit Rego), but +**no A2A message is ever sent through the agent**. The generated Rego is the **artifact under test** — the LLM/PCE that produced it might be wrong — so the -test never trusts it. Expected verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists (the -intended policy), and the real Rego is asserted to admit/deny each scenario-derived request as the truth -table requires. A mismatch fails the test and names the exact cell. - -Because it needs a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, it is `@pytest.mark.integration` -and stays out of the default unit run (`-m "not integration"`); it additionally `pytest.skip`s when no -`opa` binary is found. - -### Topology - -- **AIAC runs on the host? No — in-cluster.** The pipeline is driven **inside the cluster** so UC-1's - `analyze_tool` can reach the tool's MCP endpoint at its cluster-internal DNS name - (`github-tool.{ns}.svc.cluster.local`). The test triggers onboarding over HTTP against the in-cluster - AIAC Controller (`POST /apply/service/{service_id}`), reachable via `kubectl port-forward`. -- **Two AIAC stacks, one per policy variant.** Because the PRB reads its policy from `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` - (a file/ConfigMap **baked into the AIAC pod**, not selectable per request), the two `policy.md` - variants (`explicit`, `abstract`) are served by **two independent in-cluster AIAC stacks** — each an - AIAC agent + its own Policy Store + its own OPA Policy Writer, mounting its own variant. The **IdP - Configuration Service and Keycloak are shared** (provisioning is variant-independent and idempotent). -- **Rego capture.** Each stack's OPA Policy Writer writes `.rego` (the filesystem stub — phase-1 emits to - a filesystem location, **not** the K8s CR) into a mounted volume. The test `kubectl cp`/`exec`s each - variant's `.rego` out to a host temp dir `rego_out//`, then runs the `opa eval` oracle on the - host. - -### What it does - -The pipeline (deploy → onboard tool → onboard agent → emit Rego) is driven **once per `policy.md` variant** -— against that variant's AIAC stack — each writing into its own `rego_out//`. `opa eval` then -asserts the truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 describe the run. - -0. **Point the demo namespace at the dedicated realm (test fixture).** Before deploying workloads, set - `KEYCLOAK_REALM=` in the demo namespace's **`authbridge-config`** ConfigMap. The - kagenti-operator reads the realm per-namespace from this key and **preserves an admin/CI-set value** - (operator issue #433), so the operator registers *this* namespace's clients into the test realm with - **no operator restart or cluster-wide change**. (Default without this is `kagenti`.) -1. **Provision the realm's users + realm roles (test fixture).** UC-1 does **not** create users or realm - roles, so the fixture provisions them via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** into the dedicated test - realm (`AIAC_TEST_REALM`), **before** onboarding (the Service Policy Builder reads the full realm-role - universe): users `dev-user`, `test-user`, `devops-user`; realm roles `developer`, `tester`, `devops` - (with the generic ≤255-char descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs)* — the PRB reads - them); role assignments (`devops-user`→`devops`, which maps to **no** scope — the deny case). - Provisioning is idempotent (create-or-get); state is **left in place** on teardown (the shared realm is - never deleted/recreated — reruns converge). - -2. **Deploy the demo workloads.** `kubectl apply` the simplified **`github-tool`** - ([../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md)) and the real **`github-agent`** - ([../demo/github-agent.md](../demo/github-agent.md)) into the demo namespace. Wait until: pods Ready; - the kagenti-operator has **registered a Keycloak client** for each (with `client.name = - "{namespace}/{workload}"`) and applied the `kagenti.io/type` pod label (`tool`/`agent`); the - `github-agent` **AgentCard CR** is present; the tool **Service** carries the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` - label and answers `tools/list`. - -3. **Onboard the tool, then the agent (real UC-1), against each variant's AIAC stack.** Order matters — - the tool is onboarded first so its scopes exist when the agent's Service Policy Builder reads the scope - universe: - > **Resolving `{service_id}`.** The trigger takes the Keycloak **client id**, which is **not** the - > string `github-tool`: the operator sets `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"` but the client *id* is - > `"{ns}/{workload}"` only when SPIRE is off — with `--spire-trust-domain` set it is a SPIFFE URI - > (`spiffe:///ns/{ns}/sa/{sa}`). The test resolves the id by looking up the client whose - > **name** is `"{ns}/github-tool"` (resp. `"{ns}/github-agent"`) via the Configuration library / - > Keycloak admin, then triggers with that id. - - - `POST /apply/service/{github-tool client id}` → UC-1 classifies it a **Tool** from the label, reads - the MCP manifest, provisions scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, - issues-write}` (verbatim tool descriptions), sets `client.type=Tool`. **No rules are written for the - tool directly.** - - `POST /apply/service/{github-agent client id}` → UC-1 classifies it an **Agent** from the label, - reads the AgentCard, provisions role `github-agent.agent` + scopes - `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}` (from the two skills), sets `client.type=Agent`, - then the Service Policy Builder maps the realm roles→scopes via the real PRB (real LLM, - `temperature=0`) and the Controller calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)` → the OPA writer - emits `github_agent.inbound.rego` + `github_agent.outbound.rego`. - -4. **Capture the Rego.** `kubectl cp`/`exec` each variant stack's OPA-writer output to - `rego_out//`. - -5. **Repeat steps 3–4 for the second variant** (the other AIAC stack). Provisioning re-runs are idempotent - and variant-independent; only the emitted Rego differs. - -6. **Teardown in `finally`.** Delete the demo workloads (operator de-registers the clients); leave the - realm, users, realm roles, and `.rego` files in place for eyeballing. AIAC stacks may be left running or - torn down per the harness. - -7. **Assert the truth table with `opa eval`.** For each variant's captured Rego, evaluate a matrix of - **(request JSON, rego file)** tuples with the standalone `opa` binary and hard-assert each decision: - - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → `shutil.which("opa")` → `pytest.skip("opa not found")`. - - **Inbound** — one node per `(variant × subject)`. Request `{"subject": }` against - `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. Coarse existential "can this user reach the agent at all"; - the discovered agent-scope names (`github-agent.source_operations` / `.issue_operations`) do not need - to match anything — inbound has no function field. - - **Outbound (user gate only)** — one node per `(variant × subject × function_name)`, where - `function_name` is a **full discovered tool-scope name** (`github-tool.source-read`, …). Evaluated by - the probe query `data.probe.outbound.allow` (in `probe_uc1.rego`), which binds `input.function_name` - against the generated **user→tool** data maps (`subject_ok`) **only**. The agent→tool gate - (`target_ok`) is **not** probed — under UC-1's single generic `github-agent.agent` role it is - degenerate/empty (see *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agent-tool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*), matching - phase-1's "user-gating dimension only." - - **Name matching** — because `scenario_uc1.py` stores the **full discovered scope names**, the probe - matches `input.function_name` to a scope by **exact string equality** (no prefix-stripping token-set - soft match — that was `5.3`'s device for bare names; here both sides are already prefixed). - - The expected verdict for every cell is **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists, not a - second hand-maintained copy. A failing node names the exact `variant / subject / function_name` cell. - -8. **Assert grant-set equivalence (semantic, from the Rego).** The pipeline runs inside the AIAC pod, so - the test never sees the intermediate `list[PolicyRule]`. Grant-set equivalence is therefore re-derived - from the **generated Rego data maps**: dump each variant's user→tool grant map (via `opa eval - data.authz.github_agent.outbound...`) and each variant's inbound `subject_roles`/`agent_scopes`, and - assert, as order-independent `(role, scope)` **sets**, that **each variant equals the `scenario_uc1.py` - truth table** and **the two variants equal each other**. This compares grant *sets*, not Rego text - (formatting/name-ordering may differ; the grant set may not) — the semantic-similarity guarantee this - test makes. It catches verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse `opa eval` oracle hides. +tests never trust it. Expected verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists (the +intended policy). A mismatch fails the test and names the exact cell. + +Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, they are +`@pytest.mark.integration` (out of the default unit run, `-m "not integration"`) and additionally +`pytest.skip` when no `opa` binary is found. + +## Topology + +- **One in-cluster AIAC stack.** A single AIAC agent (Controller, `POST /apply/service/{id}`) + Policy + Store + **OPA Policy Writer (filesystem stub)**, mounting the **single abstract** `policy.md`. AIAC runs + in-cluster so UC-1's `analyze_tool` can reach the tool's MCP endpoint at its cluster-internal DNS name + (`github-tool.{ns}.svc.cluster.local`); the tests trigger over `kubectl port-forward`. +- **OPA filesystem-stub writer, not the Keycloak composite writer.** The stack must run + `aiac-pdp-policy-opa` (the filesystem stub: writes `{slug}.inbound.rego` + `{slug}.outbound.rego` to + `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`, default `/rego`) — **not** the Phase-1 `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` composite writer, + which manages Keycloak composite roles and emits **no Rego at all**. The `.rego` files are the artifact + under test; without the OPA writer there is nothing to capture. +- **Rego capture.** `kubectl cp` the writer's `/rego` to a host temp dir, then run `opa eval` on the host. + +## Preconditions (assumed, not performed by the tests) + +- **Workloads deployed + registered.** Both `github-agent` and simplified `github-tool` are **already + deployed** in `AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE` and **already registered as Keycloak clients** + (`client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"`) into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`. The tests do **not** `kubectl apply` + manifests or wait for operator registration / `kagenti.io/type` labels / AgentCard / `tools/list` — that + is deployment's job. + > **Resolving `{service_id}`.** The trigger takes the Keycloak **client id**, which is **not** the string + > `github-tool`: the operator sets `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"` but the client *id* is that string + > only when SPIRE is off — with `--spire-trust-domain` set it is a SPIFFE URI. Resolve the id by looking + > up the client whose **name** is `"{ns}/github-tool"` / `"{ns}/github-agent"`, then trigger with that id. +- **Users + realm roles.** The fixture provisions them (UC-1 does not) — see + *[Scenario](#scenario)* — via `KeycloakAdmin` into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`, **before** onboarding; idempotent; + left in place. + +## Per-rung flow + +**Keycloak cleanup → onboard (rung order) → validate end state → Keycloak cleanup.** + +1. **Cleanup** (before and after each rung). Unmap composites and delete the **agent's and tool's** + provisioned realm roles + client scopes, leaving the clients registered exactly as before the first + run; clear the writer's `/rego`. This gives every rung a clean slate and makes reruns converge. (With + the OPA writer there are no composites — the only Keycloak mutations are the roles/scopes the onboarding + agent provisions — but cleaning both is harmless and future-proofs against the Keycloak writer.) +2. **Onboard** in the rung's order via `POST /apply/service/{client_id}`. + - `POST /apply/service/{github-tool id}` → UC-1 classifies it a **Tool**, reads the MCP manifest, + provisions scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, issues-write}`, sets + `client.type=Tool`. **No rules are written for the tool directly.** + - `POST /apply/service/{github-agent id}` → UC-1 classifies it an **Agent**, reads the AgentCard, + provisions role `github-agent.agent` + scopes `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}`, + sets `client.type=Agent`; the Service Policy Builder maps roles→scopes via the real PRB (real LLM, + `temperature=0`) and the Controller calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)`. +3. **Validate two outcomes at the end** (no intermediate checks): + 1. **Keycloak provisioning.** The expected realm role(s) + client scopes exist with the expected + names/descriptions (via `KeycloakAdmin` / the IdP Configuration read API). + 2. **Generated Rego decisions.** `kubectl cp` the `/rego` files to the host and `opa eval`: + - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → `shutil.which("opa")` → `pytest.skip`. + - **Inbound** — per `subject`: `{"subject": }` vs `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. + - **Outbound (user gate only)** — per `(subject × function_name)`, `function_name` a full discovered + tool-scope name, via the probe `data.probe.outbound.allow` in `probe_uc1.rego`, which binds + `input.function_name` against the generated **user→tool** maps (`subject_ok`) **only**, by exact + string equality. The agent→tool gate (`target_ok`) is degenerate under UC-1's single generic + `github-agent.agent` role and is **documented, not probed** (see + *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agent-tool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*). + - **Grant sets** — re-derive the `(role, scope)` grant sets from the Rego data maps and compare, as + order-independent sets, to the `scenario_uc1.py` truth table. + - Verdicts are **computed from** `scenario_uc1.py`, never from the Rego. A failing node names the + exact cell. +4. **Cleanup** — restore the clients to their pre-run state. + +## Onboarding order is irrelevant (rungs 2 vs 3) + +The **final** policy must not depend on the order services are onboarded. This is a **requirement**: if +onboarding order changes the end state, that is a **bug** the ladder exists to catch — not an accepted +difference. (This corrects an earlier "order matters" note in this spec and the tracking issue.) + +Why it holds: `compute_and_apply` is **affected-agent** oriented and **additive** (`override=False`, see +[../components/policy-computation-engine.md](../components/policy-computation-engine.md)). When the **tool** +is onboarded, its Service Policy Builder pairs the tool's scopes against the rest of the role universe, +producing `(agent-role, tool-scope)` and `(user-role, tool-scope)` rules; the PCE resolves those roles to +the **agent** and merges them onto the agent's stored `AgentPolicyModel`, rewriting +`github_agent.outbound.rego`. So: + +- **Rung 2 (agent → tool):** agent onboarding leaves outbound empty; **tool onboarding fills it in**. +- **Rung 3 (tool → agent):** the tool's scopes already exist, so **agent onboarding produces the full + gate** in one pass. +- **Both converge** to the same grant sets. Rung 3 asserts grant-set equivalence with **rung 2**; a + divergence fails and names the differing gate. + +Rung 1 (agent only) is the exception by construction: with no tool onboarded there are no tool scopes in +the universe, so the outbound user gate is **empty** (all deny). Inbound is unaffected. ## Expected output -The test passes when `opa eval` decides every cell of the scenario truth table as follows, for **both** -policy variants. Verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists, not a hand-maintained -copy — these tables are the human-readable rendering of them. They are **identical to policy-pipeline's** -(only the underlying scope-name strings differ). +Verdicts are **computed from** the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists (these tables are the human-readable +rendering). They are **identical to policy-pipeline's** (only the scope-name strings differ). `USERS`: `dev-user`→`developer`, `test-user`→`tester`, `devops-user`→`devops`. -**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`, user-role→agent-scope, existential): +**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`; all rungs): | Subject | Inbound | |---|---| @@ -177,8 +162,8 @@ copy — these tables are the human-readable rendering of them. They are **ident | test-user | ✅ | | devops-user | ❌ | -**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, user→tool gate only; `function_name` -is the full discovered scope name, shown here by its bare suffix for readability): +**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, user→tool gate; suffixes shown for +readability) — **rungs 2 and 3** (with a tool onboarded): | | github-tool.source-read | github-tool.source-write | github-tool.issues-read | github-tool.issues-write | |---|---|---|---|---| @@ -186,217 +171,145 @@ is the full discovered scope name, shown here by its bare suffix for readability | test-user | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | | devops-user | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | -Each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in its `rego_out//`: +**Rung 1 (agent only):** the outbound table is **entirely deny** (empty user gate — no tool scopes). -- `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. - `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated with the - **discovered** names `[github-agent.source_operations, github-agent.issue_operations]`. (`devops-user` - holds `devops`, which maps to no agent scope, so it is absent and denied inbound.) -- `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok - }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the **user→tool** gate (populated: `subject_role_scopes` grouping - developer/tester → `github-tool.*` scopes). Its **`target_ok`** (agent→tool) is **degenerate/empty** - under the single generic `github-agent.agent` role — documented, not asserted (see below). - -Explicitly **no** `github_tool.*.rego` — the pipeline emits no tool model (the tool is a pure target; -phase-1 acceptance requires "no rules written for the tool alone"). +Each rung leaves on disk exactly `github_agent.inbound.rego` + `github_agent.outbound.rego`; explicitly +**no** `github_tool.*.rego` (the tool is a pure target; "no rules written for the tool alone"). ### Semantic similarity, not byte-identity -This test's Rego is **semantically similar** to `policy-pipeline`'s but **not byte-identical**, for two -baked-in reasons in the (frozen) UC-1 provisioning: +This ladder's Rego is **semantically similar** to `policy-pipeline`'s but **not byte-identical**, for two +baked-in reasons in (frozen) UC-1 provisioning: 1. **Workload-prefixed names.** UC-1 names every scope `{workload}.{name}`, so the data maps hold - `github-tool.source-read` / `github-agent.source_operations` where `policy-pipeline` holds bare - `source-read` / `source-access`. Same **file set + package shapes**; different name strings. -2. **Degenerate `target_ok`.** UC-1 emits one generic `github-agent.agent` role (description `"Agent - role"`), which the PRB cannot map to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the agent→tool gate - is empty — where `policy-pipeline`'s two operator roles populate it across all four scopes. + `github-tool.source-read` / `github-agent.source_operations` where `policy-pipeline` holds bare names. +2. **Degenerate `target_ok`.** UC-1 emits one generic `github-agent.agent` role, which the PRB cannot map + to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the agent→tool gate is empty. -Both are inherent to running real UC-1; making the Rego byte-identical would require unfreezing UC-1 -(dropping the prefix + deriving per-skill agent roles) or abandoning UC-1 discovery (which would collapse -this test into `policy-pipeline`). The test therefore asserts **same files + same decisions + equivalent -grant sets**, not identical text. +The tests therefore assert **same file set + same decisions + equivalent grant sets**, not identical text. ### The agent→tool gate (degenerate by design) -Phase-1 states outbound access is an **intersection** of the user→tool gate and the agent→tool gate, but +Phase-1 states outbound access is the **intersection** of the user→tool gate and the agent→tool gate, but that "the agent holds all of `github-tool`'s scopes, so this demo exercises the **user-gating dimension -only**; the agent-role gate is not exercised here" (deferred to a future two-tool demo). Under real UC-1 -the single generic `github-agent.agent` role yields an **empty** `target_ok`, so the generated `allow` -(`subject_ok AND target_ok`) would deny everything. The probe therefore evaluates **`subject_ok` only**, -which is exactly the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. The empty `target_ok` is documented as a known +only**." Under real UC-1 the single generic `github-agent.agent` role yields an **empty** `target_ok`, so +the full `allow` (`subject_ok AND target_ok`) would deny everything. The probe therefore evaluates +**`subject_ok` only** — the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. The empty `target_ok` is a documented UC-1 limitation, not a test failure. ## Scenario -The phase-1 scenario — identical role→access facts to `policy-pipeline`, driven end-to-end through real -UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads rather than a hand-built provisioning step. +Identical role→access facts to `policy-pipeline`, driven through real UC-1 onboarding of deployed +workloads. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| | Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (dedicated; default `aiac-uc1-e2e`) | | Agent | `github-agent` — **discovered** role `github-agent.agent`; scopes `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (from AgentCard skills) | -| Tool | `github-tool` (simplified) — **discovered** scopes `github-tool.source-read`, `github-tool.source-write`, `github-tool.issues-read`, `github-tool.issues-write` (from MCP `tools/list`) | -| Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | +| Tool | `github-tool` (simplified) — **discovered** scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, issues-write}` (from MCP `tools/list`) | +| Users | `dev-user` (`developer`), `test-user` (`tester`), `devops-user` (`devops`) | | `developer` | source read/write + issues read | | `tester` | issues read/write | -| `devops` | no access (inbound deny; denied every outbound function) | - -Role → access (the fixed facts both `policy.md` variants and the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists must agree -with; the generic descriptions are not part of this triad): - -- `developer` — source read/write, issues read. -- `tester` — issues read/write. -- `devops` — no access. Conveyed by the **role description only** — absent from every pair-list and both - `policy.md` variants (deny-by-default), so denied inbound and on every outbound function. +| `devops` | no access (inbound deny; denied every outbound function) — conveyed by **role description only**, absent from the `policy.md` (deny-by-default) | ## Configuration (env) | Variable | Purpose | Default | |----------|---------|---------| | `KUBECONFIG` | Kubeconfig for the live Kagenti/Kind cluster | — (required) | -| `AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE` | Namespace the demo workloads deploy into | `team1` | +| `AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE` | Namespace the demo workloads are deployed in (precondition) | `team1` | | `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | -| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds (for user/realm-role provisioning) | — (required) | -| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Dedicated realm the test uses; the fixture sets `KEYCLOAK_REALM` on the demo namespace's `authbridge-config` ConfigMap so the operator registers this namespace's clients into it (per-namespace, no cluster-wide change) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | -| `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the AIAC stacks read back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | -| `AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL` / `AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL` | Base URL of each variant's in-cluster AIAC Controller (via port-forward) for `POST /apply/service/{id}` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` / `:7080` | -| `AIAC_OPA_POD_EXPLICIT` / `AIAC_OPA_POD_ABSTRACT` | OPA-writer pod (or PVC) per variant to `kubectl cp` `.rego` from | — (resolved from labels) | -| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Host base dir the captured `.rego` is copied to; `rego_out//` per variant, left on disk | operator-chosen local dir | -| `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`); consumed by the in-cluster AIAC pods | — (required) | -| `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary (oracle); else `PATH`, else `pytest.skip` | — (optional; PATH lookup) | - -> When the test is written, confirm: the Controller trigger path and port; and the OPA writer's output -> path / how the two variant stacks are deployed and addressed. The realm mechanism (per-namespace -> `authbridge-config` `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, preserved by the operator — issue #433) and the `{service_id}` -> resolution (look up the client by `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"`; the id is a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE) -> are **confirmed** against the operator source and reflected above. +| `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds (user/realm-role provisioning + cleanup) | — (required) | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Dedicated realm the tests use (the demo namespace's clients are registered into it) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | +| `AIAC_CONTROLLER_URL` | Base URL of the in-cluster AIAC Controller (via port-forward) for `POST /apply/service/{id}` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | +| `AIAC_OPA_POD` / `AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR` | OPA-writer pod (or label selector) to `kubectl cp` `.rego` from | — (resolved from labels) | +| `AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH` | Writer output dir inside the pod | `/rego` | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Host dir the captured `.rego` is copied to | test temp dir | +| `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`); consumed by the in-cluster AIAC pod | — (required) | +| `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary (oracle); else `PATH`, else `pytest.skip` | — (optional) | + +> Single stack — one Controller URL, one OPA pod, one policy. The two-variant env +> (`AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL`/`AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL`, `AIAC_OPA_POD_EXPLICIT`/`_ABSTRACT`) is removed with the +> two-stack topology. ## Runbook -Runnable only against a live Kagenti/Kind cluster (operator + Keycloak + SPIRE) **configured to register -clients into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`**, with the two AIAC variant stacks deployable, a real LLM, the demo agent -(GA-1…9) and simplified tool images built + kind-loaded, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). +Runnable against a live Kagenti/Kind cluster (operator + Keycloak + SPIRE) with the AIAC stack running the +**OPA filesystem-stub writer**, `github-agent` + `github-tool` **already deployed and registered** into +`AIAC_TEST_REALM`, a real LLM, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). ```bash # env: KUBECONFIG + KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-uc1-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN -.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py -m integration -v -# Parametrized nodes: (variant × subject) inbound + (variant × subject × function_name) outbound + grant-set equivalence. +.venv/bin/pytest test/integration/ -m integration -k uc1_onboard -v # A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: -# test_outbound[abstract-test-user-github-tool.source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed -# The generated Rego is left on disk per variant for eyeballing: -# rego_out/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego -# rego_out/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego -# (no github_tool.*.rego in either) +# test_outbound[test-user-github-tool.source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed ``` -The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found. Eyeball the persisted Rego against the ID-only -package shapes in [../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md); -optionally inspect the provisioned Keycloak realm and the discovered scopes. +The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found. ## Testing Decisions -- **Highest seam available, verified by a real oracle.** Real deployed workloads + real kagenti-operator - + real UC-1 onboarding + real PRB/PCE + real Keycloak + real LLM. The test drives the pipeline through - its production trigger (`POST /apply/service/{id}`) and verifies the real filesystem Rego with the - standalone `opa eval` binary. A good test here asserts only **external behavior** — the *decisions* the - generated Rego makes — never internal Rego structure. -- **Rego is the artifact under test; the scenario is the oracle.** Expected verdicts are computed from - `scenario_uc1.py`, not from the Rego. A wrong role→scope mapping fails the test at the exact cell. -- **Deploy + discover + evaluate, no live traffic.** Per phase-1, enforcement/token-exchange/live A2A is - out of scope; correctness is shown by evaluating the generated rules. The agent pod need only exist - (labelled `kagenti.io/type=agent`, AgentCard present); the simplified tool need only answer `tools/list` - — neither is driven with real requests. -- **In-cluster AIAC for MCP reachability.** UC-1's `analyze_tool` posts `tools/list` to a - cluster-internal DNS name, so the pipeline runs in-cluster (triggered over HTTP) rather than in-process - on the host, which cannot resolve `*.svc.cluster.local`. -- **Two AIAC stacks for two variants.** The PRB policy is baked into the pod (`AIAC_POLICY_FILE`), so each - `policy.md` variant is served by its own AIAC stack; Keycloak + the IdP Configuration Service are shared - (provisioning is variant-independent and idempotent). -- **User gate only.** UC-1's single generic agent role yields an empty `target_ok`; the outbound probe - evaluates `subject_ok` alone, matching phase-1's user-gating-only intent. The agent-role gate is - deferred (needs a second tool the agent is not mapped to). -- **Semantic similarity, from the Rego.** Since the pipeline runs in-pod, grant-set equivalence is - re-derived from the generated Rego data maps (not an in-process `list[PolicyRule]`), and compares grant - *sets* across variants and vs the scenario — the semantic-similarity guarantee, not byte-identity. -- **Dedicated realm, leave-in-place.** A dedicated test realm (`AIAC_TEST_REALM`) the operator is - configured for; the shared realm is never deleted/recreated, so cleanup is idempotent leave-in-place - (users/roles create-or-get; UC-1 writes idempotent; demo workloads deleted so the operator de-registers - the clients). -- **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** The PRB LLM is pinned `temperature=0`; both variants are asserted - cell-by-cell (`opa eval`) and at the grant-set level. Some model-dependence remains, which is why the - suite is `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. -- **Prior art, shared not copied.** Reuses the `5.3` shape (`@pytest.mark.integration`, `opa` - discovery/skip, per-variant `rego_out/`, scenario-as-oracle, probe query) via the shared - `launcher.py`/`scenario_uc1.py`, adapted from in-process/subprocess to deploy/port-forward/`kubectl cp`. +- **Highest seam available, verified by a real oracle.** Real deployed workloads + real operator + real + UC-1 onboarding + real PRB/PCE + real Keycloak + real LLM, driven through the production trigger + (`POST /apply/service/{id}`), verified by the standalone `opa eval` binary. Assert only **external + behavior** — the decisions the Rego makes — never internal Rego structure. +- **Rego is the artifact under test; the scenario is the oracle.** Verdicts computed from `scenario_uc1.py`. +- **Onboard + evaluate, no live traffic.** Enforcement / token-exchange / live A2A is out of scope. +- **Deployment is a precondition.** The tests do not deploy or wait for registration; they cleanup → + onboard → validate → cleanup, so reruns are hermetic and cheap. +- **One stack, one policy, OPA filesystem stub.** Rungs 1–3 need only one AIAC stack; the OPA writer's + `/rego` output is what makes the pipeline observable. The Keycloak composite writer emits no Rego and is + not used. +- **Onboarding-order-independence is asserted, not assumed** (rungs 2 vs 3). A divergence is a bug. +- **User gate only.** UC-1's generic agent role yields an empty `target_ok`; the outbound probe evaluates + `subject_ok` alone (phase-1's user-gating-only intent). +- **Grant sets, semantic.** Equivalence is re-derived from the Rego data maps and compared as sets — the + semantic-similarity guarantee, not byte-identity. +- **Dedicated realm, leave-in-place; per-rung cleanup.** The realm/users/roles are never deleted; the + provisioned agent/tool roles/scopes are cleaned up per rung so onboarding runs from a clean slate. +- **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** PRB LLM pinned `temperature=0`; both cell-level and grant-set + assertions; `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. +- **Prior art, shared not copied.** Reuses the `5.3` shape (`opa` discovery/skip, scenario-as-oracle, + probe query) via `launcher.py`/`scenario_uc1.py`, adapted to deploy-precondition + port-forward + + `kubectl cp`. ## Relationship to other integration tests -This is **one** integration-test spec among several indexed by the master PRD -([../PRD.md](../PRD.md), § *Integration test specifications*). - - **Discovery-driven sibling of `policy-pipeline`** ([policy-pipeline.md](policy-pipeline.md), - `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`): identical scenario facts and truth tables, but this - test *infers* the agent/tool entities via **real UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads** instead of - hand-provisioning them, so its Rego is semantically similar (not byte-identical) and it validates the - **phase-1** deliverable end-to-end. -- Same `@pytest.mark.integration` + `opa eval` flavor as the live-Keycloak pytest tests - (`testing/5.1-integration-tests.md`) and `policy-pipeline`; skips when `opa` is absent. + `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`): identical scenario facts/tables, but this ladder + *infers* the entities via real UC-1 onboarding of deployed workloads. `5.3` also already asserts the + **cross-variant** (explicit vs abstract) grant-set equivalence in process, which covers the deferred + rung 4's core guarantee until an in-cluster two-policy approach is designed. +- Same `@pytest.mark.integration` + `opa eval` flavor as `testing/5.1-integration-tests.md` and + `policy-pipeline`; skips when `opa` is absent. -Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`. +Tracking issues: `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md` (epic) + `5.4.1`/`5.4.2`/`5.4.3` (rungs) ++ `5.4.4` (deferred two-policy). ## Out of Scope -- **Writing `test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`, `probe_uc1.rego`, `scenario_uc1.py`** — this spec - *describes* the test; the test is written in a later session (tracked by - `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md`). -- **The UC-1 agent, PRB, PCE, OPA writer, and demo `github-agent` implementations** — specified/tested by - their own components/issues, not here. In particular UC-1's discovery naming and single-generic-role - behavior are **fixed**; this test observes them, it does not change them. -- **Building the simplified `github-tool`** — its own build issue (a `blocked-by` of this test); the tool - is specified in [../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md). -- **Live enforcement / A2A traffic / token exchange / K8s-CR Policy Writer** — Phase-2+; this test targets - the filesystem stub and evaluates rules, per phase-1 out-of-scope. +- **Writing the rung tests + `probe_uc1.rego` + `scenario_uc1.py` edits** — this spec *describes* them; + they are written under the `5.4.x` issues. +- **The UC-1 agent, PRB, PCE, OPA writer, and demo `github-agent`** — specified/tested by their own + components/issues. UC-1's discovery naming and single-generic-role behavior are **fixed**; these tests + observe them. +- **Deploying / registering the workloads** — a precondition, not part of the tests. +- **Two-policy (rung 4)** — deferred; the two-stack topology is discarded and the in-cluster approach is + TBD (`testing/5.4.4-uc1-onboard-two-policies.md`). +- **Live enforcement / A2A / token exchange / K8s-CR Policy Writer** — Phase-2+; these tests target the + filesystem stub and evaluate rules. - **Default-CI wiring** — `@pytest.mark.integration`; runs on demand. -## Further Notes - -- **Fact triad.** The role→access facts are owned by three artefacts that must agree: the *Scenario* - table, **both** `policy.md` variants, and the `scenario_uc1.py` pair-lists. Entity/role/scope - descriptions are generic and functional and must not contradict the facts. -- **Two variants in the discovered world** (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** variant that - enumerates each `(user-role → discovered scope)` pair by its full prefixed name, and an **abstract** - variant (phase-1's intent-only prose). **Neither names the agent role** — doing so would populate - `target_ok` and break both the user-gate-only decision and cross-variant equivalence. Both are - user-intent-only, both leave `target_ok` degenerate, and both must produce the **same discovered grant - set**. -- **`devops` zero access** is conveyed by its role description only; it is absent from every pair-list and - both `policy.md` variants (deny-by-default denies it inbound and on every outbound function). -- **Descriptions ≤255 chars, verbatim into Keycloak.** The tool-scope descriptions are the verbatim - scenario descriptions the simplified tool returns from `tools/list`; the agent-scope descriptions come - from the AgentCard skills; the realm-role descriptions are provisioned by the fixture. - -## Blocked-by - -- Simplified `github-tool` build issue (see [../demo/github-tool.md](../demo/github-tool.md)). -- Demo `github-agent` implementation — `demo/GA-1…GA-9` (deployable agent + AgentCard). -- UC-1 Service Onboarding — `agent/service-onboarding/3.6-service-onboarding-orchestrator.md` (**done**). -- The PRB / PCE / OPA-writer / Policy-Store prerequisites shared with `5.3`. -- A live Kagenti/Kind cluster + operator (registers clients into `AIAC_TEST_REALM` via the demo - namespace's `authbridge-config` `KEYCLOAK_REALM`, set by the fixture — per-namespace, confirmed against - the operator source); the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` Service label applied at deploy time - (`../../gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`); an `opa` binary at test time. - ## Scenario inputs -These are **functional** inputs — the PRB reads the descriptions and the `policy.md` to produce the -role→scope mappings. The entity/role/scope descriptions are **generic and keyword-free**; client `type` -is set by UC-1 from the `kagenti.io/type` label (not description prose). +**Functional** inputs — the PRB reads the descriptions and the `policy.md` to produce the role→scope +mappings. Descriptions are **generic and keyword-free**; client `type` is set by UC-1 from the +`kagenti.io/type` label. ### Discovered entities (what UC-1 provisions) -- **`github-tool`** (Tool) → scopes, from the simplified tool's MCP `tools/list` (verbatim descriptions): +- **`github-tool`** (Tool) → scopes, from MCP `tools/list` (verbatim descriptions): - `github-tool.source-read` — "Read source repository contents: file listings and file bodies. Read-only." - `github-tool.source-write` — "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes." - `github-tool.issues-read` — "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only." @@ -412,30 +325,10 @@ is set by UC-1 from the `kagenti.io/type` label (not description prose). - `tester` — "Tester — a quality-assurance user who verifies software quality and tracks defects through the issue tracker: filing, triaging, and updating issue reports; works in the issue tracker, not in source." - `devops` — "DevOps — an operations user who manages deployment infrastructure and runtime environments; does not author source code and does not manage the issue tracker." -### `policy.md` — Version 1 (explicit) - -Enumerates each `(user-role → discovered scope)` pair by name. **No agent-role→tool-scope section** -(target_ok is deferred). Deny by default. - -```markdown -# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool - -Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this -policy supports it; deny by default. +### `policy.md` — the single (abstract) variant -## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) -- developer may use github-agent.source_operations and github-agent.issue_operations. -- tester may use github-agent.issue_operations. - -## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) -- developer may perform github-tool.source-read, github-tool.source-write, and github-tool.issues-read. -- tester may perform github-tool.issues-read and github-tool.issues-write. -``` - -### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) - -Phase-1's intent-only prose. Encodes the same facts; relies on the PRB/LLM to expand intent into the -discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. +Phase-1's intent-only prose. The PRB/LLM expands intent into the discovered scopes via the entity/role +descriptions. It **does not name the agent role** (doing so would populate `target_ok`). Deny by default. ```markdown Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. @@ -443,3 +336,7 @@ Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; den - Developers may read and modify source, and read issues. - Testers may read and modify issues. ``` + +> The **explicit** enumerated variant and cross-variant equivalence are deferred to rung 4 +> (`testing/5.4.4-uc1-onboard-two-policies.md`); the two-stack topology that served both variants is +> discarded. From 24767fc02bddb0258e883ef050fd121b60657507 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 02:49:09 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 225/273] Docs(aiac): Apply SPM/APM redesign across policy component specs Reflect the ServicePolicyModel/AgentPolicyModel two-layer redesign (handoffs 01-05) in the PRD component specs so the persisted source of truth moves from denormalised per-agent APMs to per-service SPMs, fixing the order-dependence bug where a user->tool-scope rule was lost when the tool onboarded before the agent. - policy-model.md: add ServicePolicyModel; mark AgentPolicyModel derived/ not-persisted; add Scope.serviceId, RoleKind, Role.kind, Role.actorIds; add Assumptions section. - idp-configuration-service.md / keycloak-service.md / library-idp.md: agent roles sourced from Keycloak client roles; populate kind/actorIds/ serviceId; fail-loud enforcement of Assumptions 1-3. - library-policy-store.md / policy-store.md: SPM-centric store surface (get_service_policy[_by_scope|_by_role], apply_service_policy); APMs no longer persisted. - policy-computation-engine.md: rewrite compute_and_apply around SPM routing + on-demand APM derivation + partial upsert (order-independent). Corresponding local issue files under docs/issues/ (implementation and testing) were updated in the same pass; they are gitignored and not part of this commit. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 39 +++- .../docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md | 2 + aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md | 47 +++- .../specs/components/library-policy-store.md | 108 +++++---- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 219 +++++++++++------- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md | 64 ++++- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md | 94 ++++---- 7 files changed, 388 insertions(+), 185 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md index fef5db1f6..ff8ff1f28 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/type` | `admin.get_client(service_id)` → `admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {...}})` | Set a service's type via the `client.type` client attribute | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | -| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` | Realm roles assigned to a service's account | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` | **Client roles defined on this service's client** — an agent's own roles (`R_A`). See "Agent roles are client roles" below. | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | | POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | @@ -69,12 +69,13 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: -1. Calls `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` to get the service account user. -2. Extracts `user["id"]` from the result. -3. Calls `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)` to return the realm roles assigned to the service account. -4. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of realm role objects. -5. Returns `[]` (empty array) if `KeycloakError` has `response_code == 400` (service has no service account — not an error). -6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on other `KeycloakError`. +1. Calls `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` to return the **client roles defined on this service's client** — an agent's own roles (`R_A` in the PCE derivation). +2. Each returned `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: true` and `containerId` = the client UUID, which the mapping layer uses to classify the role (`kind = Agent`) and resolve its owner (`actorIds` / `Scope.serviceId`). See "Agent roles are client roles, field population, and assumption enforcement" below. +3. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client role objects. +4. Returns `[]` (empty array) if `KeycloakError` has `response_code == 400` (service has no client roles — not an error). +5. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on other `KeycloakError`. + +> **Redesign note (SPM/APM):** this endpoint previously sourced a service's roles from the **realm roles assigned to its service account** (`get_client_service_account_user` → `get_realm_roles_of_user`). Under the SPM/APM redesign an agent's role is a Keycloak **client role** on the agent's own client (Assumption 3), so the endpoint now reads the client's client roles directly via `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)`. `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` to return the realm-level client scopes assigned as defaults to the service. @@ -97,6 +98,28 @@ All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subject Every role and client scope this service creates is stamped with the Keycloak attribute `aiac.managed` = `true` — the AIAC naming convention that distinguishes AIAC-provisioned entities from Keycloak's own built-ins (default client scopes, the `default-roles-` composite). Attribute value shape differs by entity: realm-role attribute values are lists (`{"aiac.managed": ["true"]}`), client-scope attribute values are plain strings (`{"aiac.managed": "true"}`). Because Keycloak's brief role representation omits attributes, `GET /roles` requests the full representation so the marker survives the read. Downstream consumers (the Policy Computation Engine's P2 embed) filter on this marker to keep only domain entities. +### Agent roles are client roles, field population, and assumption enforcement (SPM/APM) + +Under the SPM/APM policy-model redesign the Policy Computation Engine (PCE) performs **no IdP lookup for routing or classification** — it relies on entities being self-describing (`Role.kind`, `Role.actorIds`, `Scope.serviceId`; the fields are defined in the models spec). The IdP Configuration Service is the **only** layer that sees Keycloak's raw facts, so it is where these fields are populated and where the underlying assumptions are validated. Field definitions live with the models (library) spec; this service **populates** them. + +**Assumption 3 — an agent's role is a Keycloak _client role_; a user's role is a Keycloak _realm role_.** In Keycloak a `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: bool` and `containerId` (the client UUID for client roles, the realm id for realm roles). This service holds the invariant end-to-end: + +- **Agent roles are sourced from client roles.** `GET /services/{service_id}/roles` reads the client's client roles via `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` (not the realm roles of the service account). These are `R_A` — an agent's own roles, used throughout the PCE derivation. +- **User roles are realm roles.** `GET /roles` continues to read realm-level roles. + +**Field population** (in the Keycloak → generic-model mapping layer, from the raw facts above): + +- **`Role.kind` from the `clientRole` flag** — `clientRole == true` → `kind = Agent`; `false` (realm role) → `kind = User`. Kind is **never** inferred from role naming. +- **`Role.actorIds` per kind:** + - `Agent`: the owning agent's `serviceId` — resolved from the role's `containerId` → client (`clientId`) — and/or the agent service account(s) that hold the role. + - `User`: the **member usernames** of the role. This aligns with `GET /subjects?role_id=` / `get_subjects_by_role`, which already resolves a role → its member subjects; the usernames it returns are exactly `actorIds` for a user (realm) role. +- **`Scope.serviceId`** = the **owning client** — the client that defines/exposes the client scope. + +**Fail-loud enforcement at this boundary** (detectable here via membership queries; do not silently pick a side): + +- **Assumption 1 — no cross-kind role.** A role held by *both* human users and agent service accounts cannot be represented by a single `actorIds` list. On violation, **raise/log** rather than choosing one kind. +- **Assumption 2 — single scope owner.** `get_services_by_scope` returns `list[Service]` (Keycloak client scopes are realm-level and assignable to many clients). For **AIAC-managed** scopes (see the `aiac.managed` marker above) that list must have length 1; if Keycloak reports multiple owners, that is an invariant violation → **raise/log**. + ## Configuration Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): @@ -152,7 +175,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - `get_admin(realm: str = Query(...))` is a FastAPI dependency. On each call it checks the cache; on a miss it acquires the lock, double-checks, and constructs a new `KeycloakAdmin(realm_name=realm, user_realm_name=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM, ...)`. FastAPI returns `422` automatically if `realm` is absent. - All endpoints except `/health` declare `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. `/health` calls `_get_or_create_admin` directly with `os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]` — no FastAPI dependency, no realm query param. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. -- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)`. Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no service account); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. +- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` to return the **client roles defined on this service's client** (agent roles, `kind = Agent`). Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no client roles); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. - `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. - `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md index 362be1761..d0a8a11d7 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ > - **PDP Policy Writer — Keycloak Implementation** (write endpoints) — see [pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md](pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md) > > The content below is retained for reference only. +> +> **SPM/APM note.** The active split already reads client roles for agents (`GET /clients/{client_id}/roles`, below). Under the SPM/APM redesign an agent's role is a Keycloak **client role** on the agent's own client and a user's role is a **realm role** (Assumption 3); the IdP Configuration Service populates `Role.kind` (from the `clientRole` flag), `Role.actorIds`, and `Scope.serviceId` from these facts and fails loud on cross-kind roles (Assumption 1) and multi-owner AIAC-managed scopes (Assumption 2). See [idp-configuration-service.md](idp-configuration-service.md). ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md index 97d5f8572..a8b753f04 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Represents a user (Keycloak: `user`). #### `Role` -Represents a role (Keycloak: realm role). +Represents a role. Per Assumption 3 (policy-model spec), **user** roles are Keycloak realm roles and **agent** roles are Keycloak client roles on the agent's client; `kind` (a `RoleKind`) carries that distinction and is populated from Keycloak's `clientRole` flag at the IdP boundary. | Field | Type | Keycloak field | Default | |-------|------|----------------|---------| @@ -66,9 +66,20 @@ Represents a role (Keycloak: realm role). | `composite` | `bool` | `composite` | | | `childRoles` | `list[Role]` | `composites.realm` | `[]` | | `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | `{}` | +| `kind` | `RoleKind` | `clientRole` flag (user = realm role, agent = client role; resolved at the IdP boundary) | | +| `actorIds` | `list[str]` | _(subject/user IDs holding a user-kind role; populated service-side from `get_subjects_by_role`, handoff 02)_ | `[]` | + +> **Field pass-through (handoff 03 audit).** `kind`, `actorIds`, and `Scope.serviceId` are declared +> on the models by **handoff 01** and populated by the **IdP service** (handoff 02). The +> `Configuration` library deserializes them **automatically** — `model_validate` picks up any declared +> field present in the service JSON, and there is no hand-rolled field mapping that would omit them. +> `kind` is **authoritative**: the library never re-derives a role's user/agent kind client-side +> (e.g. by calling `get_services_by_role`). See the api-submodule audit note below. Roles also expose an `aiac_managed` property (`bool`): `True` when `attributes` carries the AIAC provisioning marker `aiac.managed` (realm-role attribute values are lists, so the marker appears as `["true"]`). See the naming convention in the idp-configuration-service spec. +> **SPM/APM (service-side).** `Role.actorIds` is populated per kind at the IdP boundary: for an **agent** (client) role, the owning client's `serviceId`(s) (resolved from the role's `containerId`); for a **user** (realm) role, the role's member usernames (aligned with `get_subjects_by_role`). The IdP service also fails loud on cross-kind roles (Assumption 1) and multi-owner AIAC-managed scopes (Assumption 2). See "Agent roles are client roles, field population, and assumption enforcement" in idp-configuration-service.md. + #### `Service` Represents a service (Keycloak: `client`). @@ -104,6 +115,11 @@ Represents a service scope (Keycloak: `client scope`). | `name` | `str` | `name` | | `description` | `str \| None` | `description` | | `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | +| `serviceId` | `str \| None` | _(the `serviceId`/`clientId` of the service that exposes this scope; declared by handoff 01, populated service-side by handoff 02)_ | + +> **Field pass-through (handoff 03 audit).** `Scope.serviceId` round-trips through the library's +> deserialization automatically (same `model_validate` pass-through as `Role.kind`/`actorIds`). It makes +> a scope's exposing service an explicit field read rather than something the client must infer. Scopes also expose an `aiac_managed` property (`bool`): `True` when `attributes` carries the AIAC provisioning marker `aiac.managed` (client-scope attribute values are plain strings, so the marker appears as `"true"`). See the naming convention in the idp-configuration-service spec. @@ -125,6 +141,17 @@ HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. +> **Handoff 03 audit outcome — no library code change required.** Once handoff 01 declares +> `Role.kind` / `Role.actorIds` / `Scope.serviceId` on the models and handoff 02 makes the IdP service +> populate them, the `Configuration` library surfaces them faithfully **with no code change**: it is a +> thin pass-through and pydantic `model_validate` picks up the declared fields automatically (no +> hand-rolled field mapping omits them). The P1 client-side filter in `get_services_by_role` / +> `get_services_by_scope` was already an `id`-membership field read (not an inference) and needs **no +> simplification**; it still returns only genuine owners/exposers. No client-side re-derivation of role +> kind exists or is introduced (`Role.kind` is authoritative); `get_services_by_role` is retained as a +> method. `get_subjects_by_role` stays consistent with a role's `actorIds` (both come from the same +> service-side source). See the per-method audit notes below. + **Transport retries.** Every HTTP call is issued through a private `_request(method, path, **kwargs)` helper that wraps the request in the project-level `run_upstream` retry primitive (`aiac.shared.upstream`): transient failures are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times (default `3`) with exponential backoff before a non-2xx status is raised as `RuntimeError`. Retry lives inside the library (not in callers), and applies at the leaf request, so composite methods (`create_service_role` / `create_service_scope`) retry each sub-request without compounding. ### Dependencies @@ -220,6 +247,18 @@ class Configuration: > **Performance note:** because both methods delegate to `get_services()`, each call inherits its full fan-out cost (see the `get_services()` performance note above — `2N + 1 + roles` HTTP requests for N services). Acceptable for the low-frequency PCE resolution path. If it becomes a bottleneck, the right fix is a real server-side `role_id` / `scope_id` filter on `GET /services`. +> **P1 client-side filter — handoff 03 audit (no change required).** With ownership now explicit on +> the entities (`Role.kind`/`actorIds`, `Scope.serviceId`), the P1 client-side filter was audited for +> possible simplification. **Outcome: the filter is retained as-is.** `get_services_by_role` / +> `get_services_by_scope` already select owners/exposers by **`id`-membership** in each service's +> enriched `.roles` / `.scopes` lists — that is a direct field read, **not an inference**, so there is +> nothing to simplify away. Membership in the service's `.scopes` remains the authoritative +> owner/exposer signal (consistent with the new `Scope.serviceId`); the two agree because both derive +> from the service-side truth. The filter still returns **only** genuine owners/exposers and returns +> `[]` for realm-level roles that no service owns. No client-side re-derivation of role kind is +> introduced by these methods; `get_services_by_role` is **retained as a method** — the PCE still uses +> it (e.g. its re-derivation trigger fallback) even though `Role.kind` is now the authoritative kind. + `get_subjects_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Subject]`: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?role_id={role.id}&realm=` 2. Returns all subjects (users) that have this role directly assigned, enriched with their full realm role assignments (same enrichment as `get_subjects()`). @@ -227,6 +266,12 @@ class Configuration: > **Note:** This method returns only subjects with a **direct** assignment of the given role. Composite role traversal (resolving `childRoles` and querying each) is the caller's responsibility — see PCE algorithm in `aiac.policy.computation`. +> **`actorIds` consistency — handoff 03 audit.** The subject/username set this method reports is the +> same set the **IdP service** uses to populate a user-kind role's `Role.actorIds` (handoff 02). The +> library surfaces both from the same service-side source, so there is **no divergence** between the +> `actorIds` carried on a returned `Role` and the subjects `get_subjects_by_role(role)` reports. The +> library does not recompute `actorIds` client-side. + `create_scope`: 1. Issues `POST {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/scopes` with body `{"name": scope_name, "description": scope_description}`, appending `?realm=`. 2. Raises `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status (including 409 if a scope with that name already exists). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md index ad42598bc..92c5610b7 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md @@ -11,26 +11,35 @@ Companion library for the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md). Follows the same aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/ └── library/ ├── __init__.py # empty - └── api.py # six module-level functions + └── api.py # four module-level functions (SPM-centric surface) ``` All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: ```python from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( - get_policy, get_agent_policy, - apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, - delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, + get_service_policy, + get_service_policy_by_scope, + get_service_policies_by_role, + apply_service_policy, ) -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel, Scope, Role ``` --- +## SPM redesign context + +The `ServicePolicyModel` (SPM), keyed by `serviceId`, is the **persistent source of truth**. +The `AgentPolicyModel` (APM) is now **derived and never persisted** — so the store no longer +exposes any per-agent read/write functions. The library surface is entirely SPM-centric. + +--- + ## Submodule: `aiac.policy.store.library.api` ### Description -HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md) REST API. Exposes six module-level functions returning `PolicyModel` and `AgentPolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. +HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md) REST API. Exposes four module-level functions returning `ServicePolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on an unexpected non-2xx response (a `404` on the by-id read is handled, not raised — see below). ### Dependencies ``` @@ -42,24 +51,40 @@ python-dotenv ### Functions ```python -def get_policy() -> PolicyModel - # GET /policy - -def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel - # GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} - -def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None - # POST /policy +def get_service_policy(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel + # GET /policy/services/{service_id} + # On miss (service returns 404) the library returns a *fresh empty* + # ServicePolicyModel for that service_id — never raises on 404. + # (Matches the existing "engine creates a fresh model on 404" convention.) + +def get_service_policy_by_scope(scope: Scope) -> ServicePolicyModel | None + # Singular: a scope has exactly one owning service (Assumption 2). + # Sugar over get_service_policy(scope.serviceId) — resolves the owner via + # scope.serviceId; no dedicated HTTP route. + +def get_service_policies_by_role(role: Role) -> list[ServicePolicyModel] + # GET /policy/services?role={role.id} (the one genuinely new route) + # Plural: a role (especially a user role) appears across many SPMs. + # Returns every SPM whose inbound_rules contains a rule referencing + # role.id. Empty list when none match. + +def apply_service_policy(service_id: str, spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None + # POST /policy/services/{service_id} — upsert. +``` -def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None - # POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} +**Removed** (APMs are no longer persisted): `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, and the +prior whole-collection `get_policy` / `apply_policy` / `delete_policy` / `delete_agent_policy` +functions. The only legitimate consumer is the Policy Computation Engine, which is migrated to the +four functions above. -def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None - # DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} +### Why by-role must be a store query (not an IdP lookup) -def delete_policy() -> None - # DELETE /policy -``` +`get_service_policies_by_role` must return **stored** rows — including stale role→service mappings +that the live IdP no longer reflects. The Policy Computation Engine's override-purge (handoff 05) +depends on seeing exactly those stale rows so it can remove them. Because the SPM store is the +source of truth and the IdP is not, this query cannot be answered from the IdP; it is a query over +persisted SPMs. It may start as a full scan and later gain a `role.id -> {service_id}` index behind +the same signature without changing callers. ### Configuration @@ -73,24 +98,24 @@ Read from `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (or `.env` file co-locate ```python from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( - get_policy, get_agent_policy, - apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, - delete_agent_policy, delete_policy, + get_service_policy, + get_service_policy_by_scope, + get_service_policies_by_role, + apply_service_policy, ) -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel, Scope, Role -# Read current state for additive merge -current = get_agent_policy("weather-agent") +# Read current state for additive merge (fresh empty SPM on first sight) +current = get_service_policy("weather-service") -# Write updated state -apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", updated_model) +# Resolve the owning SPM of a scope +owner = get_service_policy_by_scope(scope) -# Full rebuild -delete_policy() -apply_policy(full_model) +# Find every SPM that grants a role (incl. stale mappings, for override-purge) +affected = get_service_policies_by_role(role) -# Off-boarding -delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") +# Write updated state (upsert) +apply_service_policy("weather-service", updated_spm) ``` --- @@ -102,11 +127,12 @@ delete_agent_policy("weather-agent") **Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock PDP Policy Writer HTTP; cover module-level functions). Key behaviors to assert: -- `get_policy()` issues `GET /policy`; response body deserialized to `PolicyModel`. -- `get_agent_policy(id)` issues `GET /policy/agents/{id}`; response body deserialized to `AgentPolicyModel`. -- `apply_policy(model)` issues `POST /policy` with serialized `PolicyModel`. -- `apply_agent_policy(id, model)` issues `POST /policy/agents/{id}` with serialized `AgentPolicyModel`. -- `delete_agent_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`. -- `delete_policy()` issues `DELETE /policy`. -- Any non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. +- `get_service_policy(id)` issues `GET /policy/services/{id}`; response body deserialized to `ServicePolicyModel` (hit). +- `get_service_policy(id)` on `404` returns a fresh empty `ServicePolicyModel` for that `service_id` — no `RuntimeError` (miss). +- `get_service_policy_by_scope(scope)` resolves via `scope.serviceId` (sugar over the by-id read). +- `get_service_policies_by_role(role)` issues the by-role query; returns every SPM referencing `role.id`; returns `[]` when none match; returns multiple when several match. +- `apply_service_policy(id, spm)` issues `POST /policy/services/{id}` with serialized `ServicePolicyModel`; upsert round-trip (write then read back the same SPM). +- Any unexpected non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. - `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7074`. + + diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 6f2962eb0..1d9167d94 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -2,33 +2,56 @@ ## Problem Statement -AIAC Agent sub-agents produce `list[PolicyRule]` objects representing partial policy updates — a new onboarding event may produce a handful of rules covering one agent's inbound and outbound access. Before this component, merging those rules into full `AgentPolicyModel` objects required each sub-agent to independently: +AIAC Agent sub-agents produce `list[PolicyRule]` objects representing partial policy updates — a new onboarding event may produce a handful of rules covering one agent's inbound and outbound access. `compute_and_apply(rules, override)` merges those rules into persisted policy. -1. Query the IdP Configuration Service to resolve which services own each role and scope. -2. Read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store. -3. Additively merge the new rules into the existing model. -4. Write the updated model back to the Policy Store. -5. Build a `PolicyModel` and push it to the PDP Policy Writer. +The **original design persisted only per-agent `AgentPolicyModel` (APM) records**, storing rules denormalised onto the agent that reaches or is reached. Because a rule was only ever attached to an agent that already existed in the store, the merge outcome depended on the **order** in which services were onboarded. -This bespoke logic was duplicated across every sub-agent that produced policy rules, making the merge semantics inconsistent and the IdP query pattern scattered. +### The order-dependence bug (repro) + +Let: + +- `UR` = a user (realm) role, mapped to agent `A`'s scope `AS` **and** tool `T`'s scope `TS`. +- `AR` = agent `A`'s (client) role, mapped to `TS`. + +Onboarding **A then T** yields `APM(A)` outbound `{AR→TS, UR→TS}` — correct. Onboarding **T then A** **loses `UR→TS`**: at T-onboarding no agent yet targets `TS`, so the `(UR → TS)` outbound-subject rule has nowhere to attach and is dropped; at A-onboarding it is never re-emitted. The two orders diverge. + +The same shape produces a **latent sibling bug**: a user role added *later* (UC3) to an already-onboarded agent+tool pair could not be reconstructed onto the agent, because nothing re-derived the agent's gates from durable facts. ## Solution -A pure Python library module `aiac.policy.computation` centralises all policy computation. Sub-agents call a single function `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None`, which handles IdP resolution, merging (additive append or override-replace), Policy Store read/write, and PDP Policy Writer invocation. No FastAPI service, no Kubernetes deployment — the module is imported directly into the calling sub-agent's process. +A **two-layer** model (see the policy-model component spec, handoff 01): + +- **`ServicePolicyModel` (SPM)** — one per service, **persistent**, the **source of truth**. It carries the service's own identity (`owned_roles` / `owned_scopes` / `service_type`) and its `inbound_rules`: every `(role → scope)` rule whose `scope` this service owns. `UR→TS` lives durably on `SPM(T)`. +- **`AgentPolicyModel` (APM)** — **derived on demand** from the relevant SPMs and **partial-upserted** to the PDP. Never persisted as source of truth. + +`compute_and_apply` routes each incoming rule to `SPM(scope.serviceId).inbound_rules`, persists the changed SPMs, computes the set of **affected agents** from the batch, re-derives each affected agent's APM **entirely from SPMs (zero IdP)**, and partial-upserts them to the PDP in a single `apply_policy` call. + +Because `UR→TS` is durable on `SPM(T)` and is reconstructed onto `A` whenever `A` is derived, both onboarding orders converge to the same `APM(A)` = inbound `{UR→AS}`, outbound `{AR→TS, UR→TS}`. The latent sibling bug is fixed too: a late UC3 user role routes to `SPM(T)`, marks `A` affected, and re-derives `A`'s subject gate. + +The module is pure Python (`aiac.policy.computation`), imported directly into the calling sub-agent's process. No FastAPI service, no Kubernetes deployment, no container image. + +--- + +## Assumptions + +These AIAC invariants (from the policy-model spec, handoff 01) are relied on by the PCE and are **enforced upstream at the Keycloak IdP boundary** (handoff 02), not re-checked here: + +1. **No role spans both kinds.** A role is held by users *or* by agent service accounts, never both. This is what lets `Role.actorIds` be a single list and lets the PCE split inbound rules cleanly by `role.kind`. AIAC invariant, *not* a Keycloak guarantee. +2. **No scope shared across services.** A scope has exactly one owner, so `Scope.serviceId` is single-valued and `SPM(scope.serviceId)` is unambiguous. (Keycloak client scopes are realm-level and assignable to many clients; for AIAC-managed scopes the owner set is always length 1.) +3. **Agent role ⇔ Keycloak client role; user role ⇔ Keycloak realm role.** `Role.kind` is populated from Keycloak's `clientRole` flag by the IdP config service; agent roles come from a service's **client** roles (`Service.roles`). --- ## User Stories -1. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to submit a list of `PolicyRule` objects and have them automatically merged into the relevant `AgentPolicyModel` records, so that I do not need to implement IdP resolution or storage merge logic. -2. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want the computation to be fire-and-forget, so that my sub-agent is not blocked waiting for Rego generation to complete. -3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve which services own a given `Role`, so that I know which `AgentPolicyModel` records receive new outbound rules. -4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve which services expose a given `Scope`, so that I know which `AgentPolicyModel` records receive new inbound rules. -5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read each affected agent's current `AgentPolicyModel` before merging, so that additive append does not lose previously established rules. -6. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to skip duplicate rules on append, so that re-processing the same event does not create redundant entries. -7. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to push the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer after all store writes succeed, so that OPA reflects the latest policy state. -8. As a developer, I want exceptions from the computation to be logged without propagating, so that a transient IdP or Policy Store failure does not crash the calling sub-agent. -9. As a developer, I want to import the engine from a stable path, so that the calling convention does not change as the module grows. +1. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to submit a list of `PolicyRule` objects and have them durably recorded on the right service and reflected in every affected agent's policy, without implementing routing or storage merge logic myself. +2. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want the computation to be fire-and-forget, so my sub-agent is not blocked waiting for Rego generation. +3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want each rule recorded on the SPM of the service that **owns the rule's scope**, so the fact survives regardless of which services already exist. +4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to derive an affected agent's APM purely from the persisted SPMs, so the result is **independent of onboarding order**. +5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to skip duplicate rules on append, so re-processing the same event does not create redundant entries. +6. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to partial-upsert only the affected agents' packages to the PDP, so unaffected agents are left untouched. +7. As a developer, I want exceptions from the computation logged without propagating, so a transient IdP / store / PDP failure does not crash the calling sub-agent. +8. As a developer, I want a stable import path, so the calling convention does not change as the module grows. --- @@ -40,8 +63,6 @@ A pure Python library module `aiac.policy.computation` centralises all policy co **Location:** `aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/` -**Package structure:** - ``` aiac/src/aiac/policy/ └── computation/ @@ -60,119 +81,151 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None ``` - **Fire-and-forget:** the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and does not propagate them — a transient failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push must not crash the calling sub-agent. -- **`override`:** selects the merge mode (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)). `False` (default) appends additively; `True` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings. Set by the caller (the Controller) from the producing UC's choice — UC1 = `False`, UC3 = `True`, UC2 Rebuild = `True`, UC2 Build = TBD. +- **`override`:** selects the merge mode (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)). `False` (default) appends additively at the SPM layer; `True` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings **across all SPMs** (role-level revocation). Set by the caller (the Controller) from the producing UC's choice — UC1 = `False`, UC3 = `True`, UC2 Rebuild = `True`, UC2 Build = TBD. - Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply` +### Rule-builder input contract (upstream) + +Each incoming `PolicyRule` arrives with `scope.serviceId`, `role.kind`, and `role.actorIds` **already populated**, and with roles **already flattened** to their closure (role + descendants, dedup by `role.id`). The PCE performs **no IdP lookup for routing or classification** and **no role flattening** — it treats each rule's `role` and `scope` as-is. + +- The boundary that **derives** `scope.serviceId` / `role.kind` / `role.actorIds` from Keycloak facts is the **Keycloak IdP config service (handoff 02)**. +- The rule-builder (`src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` — `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope`, `PolicyRule`) merely **carries those fields through**. Ensure it does (add the pass-through if missing); it does not compute them. + ### Algorithm -Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, the engine executes these steps. +Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, `compute_and_apply` executes: + +1. **Catalog once.** Call `Configuration.get_services()` — the **only** runtime IdP read. For every service touched this batch, seed its SPM's `service_type` / `owned_roles` / `owned_scopes` from its catalog `Service` record, keeping only **AIAC-provisioned** entities (the `aiac.managed` marker on `Role.aiac_managed` / `Scope.aiac_managed`; Keycloak built-ins — the default client scopes `profile`, `email`, `roles`, `web-origins`, `acr`, `basic`, `service_account`, and the `default-roles-` composite — are dropped). This seed drives **P2** identity and the **P4** "only agents modelled" rule. It is a seed, **not** a per-derive dependency. + +2. **Route each rule to its owning service's SPM.** For each rule `(role, scope)`, append it to `SPM(scope.serviceId).inbound_rules` — fetch the SPM via `get_service_policy_by_scope` / `get_service_policy`. **Append-dedup by `role.id + scope.id`.** There is **no** write-time 3-way P5b classification (the old (user,agent-scope)/(user,tool-scope)/(agent,tool-scope) routing table is gone) — a rule always lands on the SPM of the service that owns its scope, whatever the kinds. + +3. **Override (`override=True`) — role-level revocation.** *Before* appending, purge the **distinct input-role set** from **every** SPM that contains any of them: one up-front pass using `get_service_policies_by_role` per distinct input role, removing every stored rule whose `role.id` matches. Then append the fresh rules. Purging once, up-front, ensures a role shared across the input is not wiped after being added. The old algorithm's `target_scopes` reconciliation is **deleted** — `target_scopes` is a derived, never-stored quantity. + +4. **Persist** each changed SPM via `apply_service_policy`. -> **Input rules arrive with roles already flattened to their closure** by the calling -> sub-agent (UC1/UC2/UC3) — the role itself plus all descendant roles (recursively via -> `role.childRoles`), de-duplicated by `role.id`. The PCE performs **no role flattening**; -> each rule's `role` is treated as-is (it may be a composite role or one of its children). +5. **Compute the affected-agent set from the batch** — from the batch's roles/scopes, **not** by scanning all agents: + - For each input (or purged) role `r` with `r.kind == Agent`: the owning agents in `r.actorIds` are affected (their outbound changed). + - For each touched scope `s` with owner `X = s.serviceId`: + - if `X` is an **Agent**, `X` is affected (its inbound changed); **and** + - every agent **targeting** `s` is affected — namely the owners (`actorIds`) of the **Agent-kind** inbound rules on `SPM(X)` whose scope is `s`. -0. **Service catalog + classification.** Resolve the full service catalog once via `Configuration.get_services() -> list[Service]`, keyed as `serviceId → Service`. Each `Service` carries its `type` (inferred as `Agent` / `Tool`), its own service-account realm roles, and its exposed scopes. A service is an **agent** iff `type == "Agent"`; any other service (notably `Tool`) is a **pure target**. This catalog drives both agent identity (P2) and the "only agents are modelled" rule (P4). `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` honor the **P1 client-side service filter**, so they return only services that genuinely own the role / expose the scope. +6. **Derive** each affected agent's APM (see below), collect them into one `PolicyModel`, and **partial-upsert** via `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` **exactly once**. Fire-and-forget: exceptions logged, never propagated. **Tools get an SPM but no APM** (P4). -1. **Classify and route each rule by kind (P5b).** The PCE is called with a single concatenated `list[PolicyRule]` spanning all three mappings, so each rule is classified by the kind of its role and scope and routed accordingly: +### Derivation of `APM(A)` — 100% from SPMs, zero IdP - | Rule kind (role, scope) | Routed to (on the agent model) | - |---|---| - | (user role, agent scope) | `inbound_rules` (+ `subject_roles`) | - | (user role, tool scope) | `outbound_subject_rules` (+ `subject_roles`) | - | (agent role, tool scope) | `outbound_rules` + `target_scopes[tool]` | +Let `R_A = SPM(A).owned_roles` (A's client roles) and `S_A = SPM(A).owned_scopes`. - - **Role kind** is read from ownership: `get_services_by_role(role)` returning an **agent** service ⇒ *agent role*; returning no agent (realm-level) ⇒ *user role*. - - **Scope kind** is read from exposure: `get_services_by_scope(scope)` returning an **agent** ⇒ *agent scope*; returning a **tool** ⇒ *tool scope*. +- **Identity (P2):** `agent_roles` ← `R_A`; `agent_scopes` ← `S_A`. +- **Inbound:** `inbound_rules` ← all of `SPM(A).inbound_rules`. Split each by `role.kind`: + - `User` → `subject_roles[username] += role` (usernames from `role.actorIds`); + - `Agent` → `source_roles[serviceId] += role` (serviceIds from `role.actorIds`). +- **Outbound:** for each `r ∈ R_A`, find the `r`-rules in `get_service_policies_by_role(r)`. For each such `(r → s)`: add to `outbound_rules` and `target_scopes[s.serviceId] += s`. +- **Outbound subject gate:** for each target `(X, s)` in `target_scopes`, take the **User**-kind inbound rules `(u → s)` on `SPM(X)`, append them to `outbound_subject_rules`, and `subject_roles += u.actorIds`. -2. **(agent role, tool scope) — mapping c:** for each agent owning the rule's role, add the rule to that agent's `outbound_rules`, and append the tool scope to `target_scopes[tool.serviceId]` for each tool exposing it (keyed by the tool's string `serviceId`, value is the typed `Scope`). This records "the agent may reach the tool". +**Relevance is directional.** An SPM contributes to `A` **iff** it *is* `SPM(A)` (contributes inbound) **or** it contains a rule whose role is one of A's **agent** roles `R_A` (contributes outbound). A merely *shared user role* never confers relevance — this is what prevents a **false outbound edge** to a tool `A` does not actually target. -3. **(user role, agent scope) — mapping a:** for each agent exposing the rule's scope, add the rule to that agent's `inbound_rules`, and record the role's subjects — `get_subjects_by_role(role)` → append the typed `Role` to `subject_roles[subject.username]`. This records "the user may call the agent". +### P2 / P4 / P5b reconciliation -4. **(user role, tool scope) — mapping b:** deferred until `target_scopes` is populated by mapping-c rules in the same batch. Then, for each agent model whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope, add the rule to that agent's `outbound_subject_rules` and record the role's subjects in `subject_roles`. This records "the user may reach the tool the agent targets" — the outbound subject gate. A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool is dropped (it cannot be attached to any agent). +- **P2 (identity embed):** copy `owned_roles` / `owned_scopes` from `SPM(A)` onto the APM's `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes`. AIAC-managed filter applied at catalog-seed time. Without the embed both generated gates would deny-all (inbound `subject_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_scopes`; outbound `target_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_roles`). +- **P4 (only agents modelled):** emit an APM / Rego only for SPMs with `service_type == Agent`. Tools keep an SPM (durable `inbound_rules`) but never get an APM — no `github_tool.*.rego` is emitted. +- **P5b (classification):** now expressed purely as `role.kind` + `scope.serviceId`. The write-time 3-way routing table is gone; classification happens at **derive** time by splitting inbound rules on `role.kind`. -5. **P4 — only agents are modelled.** Routing only ever creates an `AgentPolicyModel` for a service identified as an **agent** (one owning the rule's role, or exposing the agent scope). A pure-target **Tool** therefore never gets its own model — no `github_tool.*.rego` is emitted. The agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded on the agent's model. +### Agent → agent access — in scope, for free -6. **P2 — embed each agent's own identity.** For every agent model the PCE writes, set `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` from that agent's `Service` record in the catalog (its own service-account realm roles and exposed scopes). Only **AIAC-provisioned** entities are embedded: the PCE keeps only roles/scopes carrying the `aiac.managed` marker (`Role.aiac_managed` / `Scope.aiac_managed`) and drops Keycloak's built-ins — the default client scopes (`profile`, `email`, `roles`, `web-origins`, `acr`, `basic`, `service_account`) and the `default-roles-` composite — that every OIDC client / service account carries. This keeps the embed to domain entities only and makes it deterministic across runs (built-ins are returned in an arbitrary order by Keycloak). A realm-level agent with no owning service in the catalog keeps `[]`. Without the embed, both generated gates would deny-all (inbound `subject_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_scopes`; outbound `target_ok` needs a non-empty `agent_roles`). +An agent-to-agent edge `AR→BS` (agent A's role → agent B's scope) is stored on `SPM(B)` and handled uniformly, with **no target-type branching anywhere**: -7. **Merge (additive append, or override replace):** for each affected agent, read the current `AgentPolicyModel` from the Policy Store via `get_agent_policy(agent_id)`. - - **If `override` is `True`:** first purge the **distinct set of input roles** from the model — remove every stored `PolicyRule` whose `role.id` matches from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules`, drop those role `id`s from all `source_roles` / `subject_roles` lists, and reconcile `target_scopes` by recomputing it from the surviving `outbound_rules`. This purge is done **once, up-front** for the whole input-role set — before any new rule is applied — so rules for a shared role are not wiped after being added. - - **Then (both modes):** append new rules and map entries that are not already present (de-duplicate rules by value; de-duplicate map list values by the entity's `id`). Because the maps are keyed by plain strings, merging is a plain dict-key lookup. P2's `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` are then set from the catalog (authoritative for the agent's own identity). +- A's derivation: `AR ∈ R_A`, so `get_service_policies_by_role(AR)` finds `AR→BS` on `SPM(B)` → `outbound_rules += AR→BS`, `target_scopes[B] += BS`, plus B's user gates as `outbound_subject_rules`. +- B's derivation: `AR→BS ∈ SPM(B).inbound_rules`, `AR.kind == Agent` → `source_roles[A] += AR`. - Write the updated model back via `apply_agent_policy(agent_id, model)`. +Add a test for this. -8. **PDP push:** once all Policy Store writes complete, build a `PolicyModel` from the updated agents and call `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy(model)` (fire-and-forget within this function). +**Future-optimization note (document, do NOT build now):** a shared edge like `AR→BS` is stored **once** canonically on `SPM(B)` but **projected into two APMs** (A's `outbound_rules` and B's `source_roles`), so the generated Rego duplicates it across two packages. This is acceptable; a future optimization could share the representation. + +### Two implementation-time verification gates + +Confirm both while coding (they gate correctness of the whole approach): + +1. **`apply_policy` must be a partial (per-agent) upsert.** The PCE upserts only the affected agents. If `apply_policy` rewrites the **whole** policy set instead of replacing per-agent packages, partial upsert would delete every non-affected agent. If so, either make `apply_policy` per-agent, or push a full snapshot. Check `aiac.pdp.policy.library` / the pdp-policy library + writer specs. +2. **Rego must consume `source_roles`** for the inbound gate (not only `subject_roles`), or agent→agent inbound is *modelled but not enforced*. `source_roles` already exists on `AgentPolicyModel`, so the path likely exists — confirm. ### Merge Semantics -The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects the merge mode: +The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects the merge mode, applied at the **SPM layer**: -- **`override=False` (default — additive append):** existing `inbound_rules` and `outbound_rules` entries are preserved; new rules and map entries are appended. De-duplication compares rules by value (`role.id` + `scope.id`) and map list values by the entity's `id`. This is the incremental path (e.g. UC1 Service Onboarding, where existing roles receive a partial new mapping and must not lose their other access). -- **`override=True` (authoritative role-keyed replace):** before appending, the engine purges every input role from the stored model (both directions + `target_scopes` reconciliation, per algorithm step 5) so the fresh rules become that role's complete mapping. Used by role-scoped recomputes (UC3 Role Update) and full rebuilds (UC2 Rebuild), where the input already represents each role's complete intended scope set. +- **`override=False` (default — additive append):** each rule is appended to `SPM(scope.serviceId).inbound_rules` if not already present (dedup by `role.id + scope.id`). Existing SPM rules are preserved. Incremental path (e.g. UC1 Service Onboarding, where existing roles must not lose their other access). +- **`override=True` (authoritative role-keyed replace):** before appending, the engine purges the distinct input-role set from **every** SPM containing them (`get_service_policies_by_role`), once, up-front, so the fresh rules become each role's complete mapping. Used by role-scoped recomputes (UC3 Role Update) and full rebuilds (UC2 Rebuild). -`override=True` provides **role-level** revocation — a role's stale mappings are removed before re-applying. Finer-grained single-rule revocation (removing one `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role) is still **TBD**. +`override=True` provides **role-level** revocation. Finer-grained single-rule revocation (removing one `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role) is still **TBD**. ### Dependencies | Module | Purpose | |--------|---------| -| `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration` — `get_services` (catalog: type + own roles/scopes), `get_services_by_role`, `get_services_by_scope`, `get_subjects_by_role` | -| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` | -| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — push updated `PolicyModel` to OPA | +| `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `ServicePolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration.get_services` — the **only** runtime IdP read (catalog: `service_type` + own roles/scopes for the P2 seed) | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope` (fetch SPM), `get_service_policies_by_role` (SPMs containing a role — override purge + outbound derivation), `apply_service_policy` (persist SPM) | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — partial-upsert derived APMs to OPA | + +Note: the PCE no longer calls `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` / `get_subjects_by_role` at routing or classification time — those facts arrive on the rules (input contract) and derivation reads SPMs. The single IdP read is `get_services()` for the identity seed. ### Not Called By -The PCE is **not** called by: -- PDP Policy Writer — it is the downstream consumer, not a caller -- Policy Store — the store is pure CRUD with no computation -- IdP Configuration Service — the IdP service has no awareness of this module +- PDP Policy Writer — the downstream consumer, not a caller. +- Policy Store — pure CRUD, no computation. +- IdP Configuration Service — no awareness of this module. ### Not Responsible For -- Rule revocation (TBD) -- Bootstrapping `AgentPolicyModel` records for new agents (the store returns a 404; the engine creates a fresh model in that case) -- Translating `PolicyModel` → Rego packages (responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` / PDP Policy Writer) +- Rule revocation beyond role-level `override=True` replace (single-rule revocation is TBD). +- Bootstrapping SPM records for brand-new services (the store returns 404; the engine seeds a fresh SPM from the catalog). +- Translating `PolicyModel` → Rego packages (responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` / PDP Policy Writer). --- ## Testing Decisions -Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine does to the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer — not internal merge logic directly. +Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine writes to the Policy Store (SPMs) and pushes to the PDP (derived APMs) — not internal merge logic directly. **Seam:** mock all downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: -- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog, carrying `type` + each service's own roles/scopes), `Configuration.get_services_by_role`, `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`, and `Configuration.get_subjects_by_role` -- `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy` -- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy` + +- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog: `service_type` + each service's own roles/scopes for the P2 seed). +- `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope`, `get_service_policies_by_role`, `apply_service_policy`. +- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy`. + +**Un-freeze `test/policy/computation/`.** These tests were excluded (frozen imports caused collection errors). With the SPM redesign landed, un-freeze the directory so the suite runs under `pytest test/ -m "not integration"`. Key behaviors to assert: -- **Routing by kind (P5b):** a (user role, agent scope) rule lands in the exposing agent's `inbound_rules`; a (agent role, tool scope) rule lands in the owning agent's `outbound_rules` with a `target_scopes[tool]` entry; a (user role, tool scope) rule lands in `outbound_subject_rules` of the agent whose `target_scopes` already exposes that tool scope. -- A (user role, tool scope) rule with no agent targeting that tool produces no model. -- **P2:** each written agent model carries its own `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` read from the service catalog, filtered to AIAC-provisioned entities (the `aiac.managed` marker) so Keycloak built-ins are excluded; an agent with no AIAC-managed catalog roles/scopes keeps `[]`. -- **P4:** a pure-target **Tool** service is never written as its own model, even though it exposes a scope the agent reaches; the agent→tool `target_scopes` edge is still recorded. -- `get_subjects_by_role` records `subject_roles` keyed by the subject's string `username` with the typed `Role` in the value list (for both user→agent and user→tool rules). -- `target_scopes` on the written model is keyed by the target service's string `serviceId` with the typed `Scope` in the value list; every relationship map has string keys, so `model_dump(mode="json")` round-trips without a custom key serializer. -- The PCE does **not** flatten roles: `get_services_by_role` is called once per rule's role as-is (rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC); passing a rule with a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. -- With `override=False` (default), existing rules and map entries in the fetched `AgentPolicyModel` are preserved after merge (additive append). -- With `override=True`, every input role's stored mappings are purged from `inbound_rules`, `outbound_rules`, **and** `outbound_subject_rules` (and dropped from `source_roles` / `subject_roles`, with `target_scopes` reconciled from surviving outbound rules) before the fresh rules are applied; the distinct input-role set is purged once, up-front. -- Duplicate rules (same role + scope already present) are not appended twice; duplicate map list entries (same `id`) are not appended twice. -- `apply_policy` is called exactly once after all `apply_agent_policy` writes complete. -- An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate to the caller. - -**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock HTTP boundary pattern — apply the same approach at the library import boundary here). + +- **Original repro, both orders → identical `APM(A)`.** Onboard **A then T** and **T then A**; assert the derived `APM(A)` is identical (inbound `{UR→AS}`, outbound `{AR→TS, UR→TS}`), compared as order-independent `(role, scope)` sets. This is the headline regression guard. +- **Latent sibling bug (late UC3 user role).** After A+T exist, a later user-role rule `(UR2 → TS)` routes to `SPM(T)`, marks A affected, and A's re-derived subject gate includes `UR2`. +- **Agent → agent (`AR→BS`).** Stored on `SPM(B)`; A's derived APM has `AR→BS` in `outbound_rules` + `target_scopes[B]`; B's derived APM has `source_roles[A] += AR`. +- **Override role-level purge across SPMs.** `override=True` with an input role already present on multiple SPMs → that role is purged from **every** SPM (via `get_service_policies_by_role`) once, up-front, before the fresh rules are appended; a role shared across the input is not wiped after being added. +- **Append dedup.** A rule already present on the target SPM (same `role.id + scope.id`) is not appended twice; map list entries (same `id`) are not duplicated. +- **No flattening.** Rules arrive pre-flattened; the PCE issues at most one `get_service_policies_by_role` call **per distinct role** — a rule carrying a composite role does not trigger per-child calls inside the PCE. +- **Tool gets an SPM but no APM (P4).** A Tool service accrues durable `inbound_rules` on its SPM but is never emitted as an APM/Rego; the agent→tool `target_scopes` edge still appears on the agent's derived APM. +- **P2 identity from `owned_*`.** Each derived APM's `agent_roles` / `agent_scopes` come from `SPM(A).owned_roles` / `owned_scopes`, AIAC-managed-filtered; an agent with no AIAC-managed catalog roles/scopes keeps `[]`. +- **Directional relevance — no false outbound edge.** A user role shared between `AS` and `TS` does **not** by itself make A "target" T; A's outbound edge to T appears only if one of A's **agent** roles maps to a T scope. +- **Affected set from the batch, not a full scan.** The affected-agent set is computed from the batch roles/scopes; agents unrelated to the batch are never derived or upserted. +- **`apply_policy` called exactly once** after all `apply_service_policy` writes complete (partial upsert of only the affected agents). +- **Fire-and-forget.** An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate; `compute_and_apply` returns `None`. + +**Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock boundary pattern — apply the same approach at the library import boundary here). --- ## Out of Scope -- **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation is not yet designed — marked TBD. -- **Full policy rebuild:** the PCE handles incremental updates only. Full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. -- **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP queries go through `aiac.idp.configuration.library.Configuration`. The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. -- **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE does not store the input rule list — only the merged `AgentPolicyModel` output is persisted. +- **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace at the SPM layer (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation and agent decommission / package deletion are not yet designed — **TBD**. +- **Full policy rebuild orchestration:** the PCE handles incremental updates; full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. +- **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP access goes through `aiac.idp.configuration.library.Configuration` (only `get_services()`). The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. +- **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE persists SPMs (source of truth); APMs are derived and pushed, never persisted as truth. The raw input rule list is not stored. +- **Model field definitions** (handoff 01), **IdP service / library** (handoffs 02/03), **store CRUD** (handoff 04). --- ## Further Notes -- The PCE is the **only** caller of `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` from AIAC Agent sub-agents. Sub-agents no longer call the PDP Policy Library directly; they call `compute_and_apply` instead. -- `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` retains `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents. `PolicyRule` (now at `aiac.policy.model`) is imported from there. These helpers are not used by the PCE. +- The PCE is the **only** caller of `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` from AIAC Agent sub-agents. Sub-agents call `compute_and_apply`, not the PDP Policy Library directly. +- `aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy/api.py` retains `role_to_scopes` / `roles_to_scope` helpers used by AIAC Agent sub-UC agents; they now carry `scope.serviceId` / `role.kind` / `role.actorIds` through on each `PolicyRule` (input contract above). These helpers are not used by the PCE. + + diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md index 55d194ab2..feb2d48f3 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md @@ -12,11 +12,26 @@ Keeping the canonical model definitions inside a PDP-namespaced module (`aiac.pd Additionally, the old `PolicyRule` used plain `str` for `role` and `scope`. The PCE algorithm requires typed `Role` and `Scope` objects (from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) to invoke `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`. -Finally, the original `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` maps used pydantic model objects (`Service`, `Subject`, `Scope`) as dict keys. Model-object keys do not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without custom key handling, and they couple `aiac.policy.model` to the id-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` of the IdP models. The outbound map was also keyed by scope (`scope → targets`), whereas consumers need the inverse (`target → scopes`) to emit per-target authorization directly. +The original `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` maps used pydantic model objects (`Service`, `Subject`, `Scope`) as dict keys. Model-object keys do not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without custom key handling, and they couple `aiac.policy.model` to the id-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` of the IdP models. The outbound map was also keyed by scope (`scope → targets`), whereas consumers need the inverse (`target → scopes`) to emit per-target authorization directly. + +### Order-dependence bug (the reason for the two-layer model) + +The Policy Computation Engine (PCE) merges `list[PolicyRule]` from onboarding sub-agents into per-agent policy. Historically `AgentPolicyModel` (APM) was the **only persisted entity** and stored rules **denormalised onto the agent**. That made policy **order-dependent**. + +Concretely, let `UR` be a user (realm) role mapped to agent `A`'s scope `AS` and tool `T`'s scope `TS`, and `AR` be agent `A`'s (client) role mapped to `TS`: + +- **A onboarded, then T:** at T-onboarding `A`'s model already exists, so the `(UR, TS)` rule attaches to `A`'s outbound-subject gate. Correct. +- **T onboarded, then A:** at T-onboarding no agent targets `TS`, so `UR→TS` is **dropped**; A-onboarding never re-emits it, so **`UR→TS` is lost forever.** + +The fix is a **two-layer model**: a per-service persistent source of truth (`ServicePolicyModel`) that stores every inbound edge durably on the service that owns the scope — so `UR→TS` lands on `SPM(T)` at tool-onboarding, no agent required, and can never be lost — with `AgentPolicyModel` demoted to a **pure derived projection** that is no longer persisted. ## Solution -A canonical, dependency-free model module at `aiac.policy.model` defines `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` with typed fields. No HTTP client, no service code — importable by any consumer without side effects. `PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed `Role` and `Scope` objects from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. +A canonical, dependency-free model module at `aiac.policy.model` defines `ServicePolicyModel`, `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` with typed fields. No HTTP client, no service code — importable by any consumer without side effects. `PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed `Role` and `Scope` objects from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`. + +**Two-layer model.** `ServicePolicyModel` (SPM) is the **persistent source of truth**, one per **service** (agent *and* tool). It holds the service's **inbound** rules plus its own identity (owned roles and scopes). `AgentPolicyModel` (APM) becomes a **pure derived projection** built from the relevant SPMs by the PCE — it is **no longer persisted**. Its shape is unchanged so existing consumers (PDP Policy Library, Policy Store readers) keep working. + +**Canonical form.** *Every rule is an inbound edge on the SPM of the service that owns the rule's scope.* An agent's outbound edge is the target's inbound edge — `AR→TS` is stored on `SPM(T)`, not on `A`. The routing key is `Scope.serviceId`: a rule `(role, scope)` routes to `SPM(scope.serviceId)`. The relationship maps (`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, `target_scopes`) are keyed by the string `id` of the referenced entity rather than by a typed object, so they serialize to JSON natively and carry no hashability requirement into `aiac.policy.model`. Typed `Role` / `Scope` objects are retained as the map *values* (and in `PolicyRule`), preserving the typing the PCE needs for IdP queries. The outbound map is `target_scopes` (`target service id → scopes permitted`), the inverse of the former `scope_targets`. @@ -49,7 +64,7 @@ The relationship maps (`source_roles`, `subject_roles`, `target_scopes`) are key aiac/src/aiac/policy/ └── model/ ├── __init__.py # empty - └── models.py # PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel + └── models.py # ServicePolicyModel, PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel ``` ### Dependencies @@ -57,7 +72,7 @@ aiac/src/aiac/policy/ | Dependency | Purpose | |------------|---------| | `pydantic` | `BaseModel`, `ConfigDict` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope` (as map values and in `PolicyRule`) | +| `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | Typed `Role`, `Scope`, `ServiceType` (as map values, in `PolicyRule`, and in `ServicePolicyModel`) | No HTTP client dependency. No `requests`, no `python-dotenv`. @@ -65,6 +80,33 @@ No HTTP client dependency. No `requests`, no `python-dotenv`. All models use `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')`. +#### New `Role` / `Scope` fields (defined in `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) + +The two-layer model requires ownership and a user/agent distinction on the IdP types. These fields are **defined in `aiac.idp.configuration.models`** (the deep population from Keycloak is handoff 02's concern), but the policy model depends on them for SPM routing and APM derivation: + +- **`Scope.serviceId: str`** — the single owning service's `serviceId`. This is the SPM routing key: a rule `(role, scope)` routes to `SPM(scope.serviceId)`. See Assumption 2 (a scope has exactly one owner). +- **`RoleKind(str, Enum)`** — `USER = "User"`, `AGENT = "Agent"` (mirrors `ServiceType`'s style). +- **`Role.kind: RoleKind`** — whether the role is held by users or by agent service accounts. +- **`Role.actorIds: list[str]`** — context-dependent on `kind`: + - `kind == AGENT` ⇔ a Keycloak **client role** on the agent's client; `actorIds` = the owning **agent `serviceId`(s)** (usually one). + - `kind == USER` ⇔ a Keycloak **realm role**; `actorIds` = the **holder usernames**. + +A `model_validator` on `Role` enforces what it can locally (`kind` present/valid; `actorIds` is a `list[str]`). The **cross-kind** invariant (Assumption 1) and the **client/realm ⇔ agent/user** invariant (Assumption 3) are enforced **upstream at construction** (the Keycloak IdP boundary), because the raw Keycloak facts are only visible there — see handoff 02 for that enforcement and field population. + +#### `ServicePolicyModel` + +The persistent source of truth — one per service (agent *and* tool), keyed by `service_id`. Holds the service's inbound rules plus its own identity. + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `service_id` | `str` | The owning service's id. | +| `service_type` | `ServiceType` | `Agent` or `Tool`. Drives derivation: only `Agent` services get an APM. | +| `owned_roles` | `list[Role]` | This service's own client roles (`aiac.managed` marker only). | +| `owned_scopes` | `list[Scope]` | This service's exposed scopes (`aiac.managed` marker only). | +| `inbound_rules` | `list[PolicyRule]` | Canonical: every edge granting access to `owned_scopes`. | + +`owned_roles` / `owned_scopes` are the service's own identity, filtered to the `aiac.managed` marker (this is where the PCE's P2 identity now lives). They are seeded from the catalog by the PCE; this module only defines the shape. `ServicePolicyModel` round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with string keys only. + #### `PolicyRule` A single access rule pairing a typed role with a typed scope. Used in both inbound and outbound rule sets. @@ -78,6 +120,8 @@ A single access rule pairing a typed role with a typed scope. Used in both inbou Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound rule sets are typed collections. +> **Derived, not persisted.** `AgentPolicyModel` is now a **pure derived projection** built by the PCE from the relevant `ServicePolicyModel`s. It is **no longer a persisted entity** — the durable source of truth is `ServicePolicyModel`. Its shape is **unchanged** so existing consumers (PDP Policy Library, Policy Store readers) keep working; the docstring on the model states this explicitly. + | Field | Type | Description | |-------|------|-------------| | `agent_id` | `str` | Service ID from the AIAC trigger event (`aiac.apply.service.{id}`) | @@ -143,11 +187,23 @@ model = PolicyModel(agents=[agent_model]) --- +## Assumptions + +The two-layer model rests on three invariants. All three are **AIAC invariants**, not Keycloak guarantees, and the ones that require raw Keycloak facts are enforced upstream at the IdP boundary (handoff 02): + +1. **No role spans both kinds.** A role is held by users *or* by agent service accounts, never both. This is what lets `Role.actorIds` be a single list. Enforced upstream at construction (cross-kind invariant not visible to the local `Role` validator). +2. **No scope shared across services.** A scope has exactly one owner → a single `Scope.serviceId`. This reconciles with the existing `get_services_by_scope(scope) -> list[Service]` (plural, because Keycloak client scopes are realm-level and assignable to many clients): for AIAC-managed scopes that list is always length 1. +3. **Agent role ⇔ Keycloak client role; user role ⇔ Keycloak realm role.** The IdP config service sources agent roles from the agent's **client** roles (`Service.roles`), and `Role.kind` is populated from Keycloak's `clientRole` flag. Enforced upstream at construction. + +--- + ## Testing Decisions **Seam:** model instantiation and serialization — no HTTP boundary, no mocking required. Key behaviors to assert: +- `Scope.serviceId` is present; `Role.kind` (a `RoleKind`) and `Role.actorIds` (a `list[str]`) are present; the `Role` `model_validator` accepts a valid `kind` + `list[str]` `actorIds` and rejects a malformed one. +- `ServicePolicyModel` constructs with `service_id`, `service_type`, `owned_roles`, `owned_scopes`, `inbound_rules`, and round-trips via `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` (string keys only) with typed `Role` / `Scope` / `PolicyRule` values preserved. - `PolicyRule` accepts typed `Role` and `Scope` objects; rejects plain `str` where `Role`/`Scope` is expected. - `AgentPolicyModel` with string-ID keys in `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` round-trips through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate()` with the typed `Role` / `Scope` list values preserved. - `target_scopes` maps a target service id to the list of `Scope` objects permitted on it (outbound direction is `target → scopes`, not `scope → targets`). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md index e73953063..55097b7df 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md @@ -2,34 +2,35 @@ ## Problem Statement -The AIAC Agent's Policy Computation Engine and Policy Builder sub-agent produce and merge `AgentPolicyModel` objects representing the access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Writer translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured `AgentPolicyModel` data. Without a durable structured policy store: +The AIAC Agent's Policy Computation Engine produces and merges `ServicePolicyModel` (SPM) objects — one per service, keyed by `serviceId` — representing the inbound/outbound access control policy for each service. The PDP Policy Writer translates these into Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR — but this derived artifact cannot be reverse-engineered back into structured SPM data. Without a durable structured policy store: - The Policy Computation Engine cannot read current policy state for additive merging — it must re-derive the full state from the PDP snapshot on every trigger. -- Off-boarded agents leave no structured record of their removal. +- Override-purge cannot find stale role→service mappings that the live IdP no longer reflects — there is no record of what was previously granted. - Pod restarts lose any in-flight policy construction context. +The `AgentPolicyModel` (APM) is **derived and never persisted** — it is computed on demand from SPMs. The store therefore has no per-agent surface; it persists SPMs only. + ## Solution -A dedicated **AIAC Policy Store** owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.policy.store.library`](library-policy-store.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.policy.library` pattern, used by the Policy Computation Engine to read and write policy state without any storage-layer boilerplate. +A dedicated **AIAC Policy Store** owns an in-memory cache of `ServicePolicyModel` rows (keyed by `serviceId`) backed by a SQLite database for durability. A companion library [`aiac.policy.store.library`](library-policy-store.md) exposes module-level typed functions matching the `aiac.pdp.policy.library` pattern, used by the Policy Computation Engine to read and write SPM state without any storage-layer boilerplate. -The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the Policy Store. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: +The SPM is the **source of truth**. The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Rego packages) and has no dependency on the Policy Store. The two persistence artifacts serve distinct purposes and are owned by distinct services: | Artifact | Owner | Contents | |---|---|---| -| SQLite `agent_policies` table | Policy Store | Structured `AgentPolicyModel` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | +| SQLite `service_policies` table | Policy Store | Structured `ServicePolicyModel`, keyed by `serviceId` — source of truth (cache-first, write-through) | | `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (one total) | PDP Policy Writer | Derived Rego packages — OPA runtime artifact | --- ## User Stories -1. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the current `AgentPolicyModel` for a specific agent, so that I can additively append new rules without overwriting existing ones. -2. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the full `PolicyModel` (all agents), so that I can execute a whole-system policy rebuild. -3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to write an `AgentPolicyModel` to persistent storage, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. -4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to delete a specific agent's policy on off-boarding, so that decommissioned services are removed from the structured policy store. -5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to clear all agent policies in a single call, so that a full policy rebuild can start from a clean state. -6. As a consumer of the Policy Store library, I want a typed Python library that returns `AgentPolicyModel` and `PolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. -7. As an operator, I want the Policy Store deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. +1. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to read the current `ServicePolicyModel` for a specific service by id, so that I can additively append new rules without overwriting existing ones — receiving a fresh empty SPM the first time a service is seen. +2. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to resolve the single SPM that owns a given scope, so that I can attach outbound/inbound rules to the correct service. +3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to list every SPM whose inbound rules reference a given role — including stale mappings the IdP no longer reflects — so that override-purge can remove access that should no longer exist. +4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to upsert a `ServicePolicyModel`, so that the current policy state survives pod restarts. +5. As a consumer of the Policy Store library, I want a typed Python library that returns `ServicePolicyModel` objects directly, so that I can work with structured policy data without writing storage client code. +6. As an operator, I want the Policy Store deployed as its own single-replica StatefulSet with a dedicated PVC, so that its storage and restart lifecycle is decoupled from the stateless policy services. --- @@ -47,64 +48,62 @@ The PDP Policy Writer retains sole ownership of the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR (Re **Framework:** FastAPI + uvicorn. **Base image:** `python:3.12-slim`. -**Storage backend:** SQLite via `sqlite3` stdlib (zero extra dependency — `sqlite3` ships with the Python standard library). Database file: `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/policy_model.db`). +**Storage backend:** SQLite via `sqlite3` stdlib (zero extra dependency — `sqlite3` ships with the Python standard library). Database file: `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/policy_model.db`). **Schema:** ```sql -CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies ( - agent_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, - spec TEXT NOT NULL -- AgentPolicyModel.model_dump() as JSON +CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_policies ( + service_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, + spec TEXT NOT NULL -- ServicePolicyModel.model_dump_json() as JSON ); ``` -**In-memory cache:** the service owns a full `PolicyModel` in memory as the authoritative serving layer: -- All `GET` requests served from memory (storage never queried at runtime). +**In-memory cache:** the service owns all SPM rows in memory as the authoritative serving layer: +- All read requests served from memory (storage never queried at runtime). - Every mutation writes through to SQLite synchronously before returning `204`. - On pod restart: load all rows from SQLite → populate cache → begin serving. **Transaction strategy:** -- Full rebuild (`POST /policy`): `BEGIN` → `DELETE FROM agent_policies` → per-agent `INSERT` → `COMMIT`. Crash before `COMMIT` leaves the prior state intact (SQLite WAL rollback). -- Per-agent upsert (`POST /policy/agents/{id}`): `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies VALUES (?, ?)`. +- Per-service upsert (`POST /policy/services/{service_id}`): `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)`. + +**By-role query:** `GET /policy/services?role={role_id}` scans the cache and returns every SPM whose `inbound_rules` contains a rule referencing `role_id`. **Why a store query and not an IdP lookup:** the SPM is the source of truth, so this must return *stored* rows — including stale role→service mappings that the live IdP no longer reflects, which override-purge depends on to remove access that should no longer exist. It may start as a full scan; a `role.id -> {service_id}` index can be added later behind the same route/signature without changing callers. -**Future normalization:** migrate to `agent_policies` + `policy_rules(agent_id, role, scope)` tables once `AgentPolicyModel`/`PolicyRule` schema stabilizes — a future observability UI will need queryable columns. JSON column in the current schema avoids migration churn during active development. +**Future normalization:** migrate to `service_policies` + `policy_rules(service_id, role, scope)` tables once `ServicePolicyModel`/rule schema stabilizes — a future observability UI (and a native by-role index) will benefit from queryable columns. JSON column in the current schema avoids migration churn during active development. **Endpoints:** | Method | Path | Body | Returns | |---|---|---|---| -| `GET` | `/policy` | — | `PolicyModel` (all agents) | -| `GET` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | `AgentPolicyModel` | -| `POST` | `/policy` | `PolicyModel` | `204 No Content` | -| `POST` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | `AgentPolicyModel` | `204 No Content` | -| `DELETE` | `/policy/agents/{agent_id}` | — | `204 No Content` | -| `DELETE` | `/policy` | — | `204 No Content` | +| `GET` | `/policy/services/{service_id}` | — | `ServicePolicyModel` (from cache) | +| `GET` | `/policy/services?role={role_id}` | — | `list[ServicePolicyModel]` (SPMs referencing the role) | +| `POST` | `/policy/services/{service_id}` | `ServicePolicyModel` | `204 No Content` (upsert) | | `GET` | `/health` | — | `200` / `503` | +The by-scope lookup has **no dedicated route** — it collapses to the by-id read via `scope.serviceId` and is implemented entirely in the library. + **Error responses:** -- `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "agent {id} not found"}` when `GET /policy/agents/{agent_id}` finds no entry in cache. -- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on SQLite write error for all write endpoints. +- `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "service {id} not found"}` when `GET /policy/services/{service_id}` finds no entry in cache. The library's `get_service_policy` catches this and returns a fresh empty SPM (per the "engine creates a fresh model on 404" convention); the by-role query never 404s (empty list on no match). +- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on SQLite write error for the write endpoint. - `503 Service Unavailable` if `GET /health` cannot open or query the SQLite file. **`main.py` functions:** -- `_get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection` — open `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` with `check_same_thread=False`; run `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` on first open. -- `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel)` — `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`. -- `_get_agent(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel` — read from in-memory cache; raise `404` if absent. -- `_list_all() -> PolicyModel` — return in-memory cache directly. -- `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)` — `DELETE FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?`; remove from cache. -- `_delete_all()` — `DELETE FROM agent_policies`; replace cache with empty `PolicyModel`. -- `_rebuild(model: PolicyModel)` — `BEGIN` → `DELETE FROM agent_policies` → per-agent `INSERT` → `COMMIT`; replace cache atomically. +- `_get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection` — open `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH` with `check_same_thread=False`; run `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` on first open. +- `_upsert_service(service_id: str, model: ServicePolicyModel)` — `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`; update cache. +- `_get_service(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel` — read from in-memory cache; raise `404` if absent. +- `_list_by_role(role_id: str) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]` — return every cached SPM whose `inbound_rules` references `role_id`. +- `_load_cache()` — on startup, load all rows from SQLite into the in-memory cache. **Configuration:** | Variable | Source | Default | |---|---|---| -| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-policy-store-config`) | `/data/policy_model.db` | +| `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH` | ConfigMap (`aiac-policy-store-config`) | `/data/policy_model.db` | **Dependencies:** `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `pydantic`. `sqlite3` is stdlib (no new dependency). -**Imports:** `from aiac.policy.model import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel` +**Imports:** `from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel, Scope, Role` **File structure:** @@ -130,16 +129,13 @@ Good tests assert external behavior at the system boundary — not internal impl ### Policy Store Service -**Seam:** SQLite `:memory:` database — pass an in-memory connection to the service on startup instead of opening `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH`. All behavioral assertions remain valid; only the storage seam changes. +**Seam:** SQLite `:memory:` database — pass an in-memory connection to the service on startup instead of opening `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH`. All behavioral assertions remain valid; only the storage seam changes. Key behaviors to assert: -- `GET /policy/agents/{id}`: returns `AgentPolicyModel` deserialized from cache; `404` when agent not in cache. -- `GET /policy`: returns `PolicyModel` for all agents; empty `PolicyModel(agents=[])` when cache is empty. -- `POST /policy/agents/{id}`: `spec` stored in SQLite; cache updated; `204` returned. -- `POST /policy` (rebuild): SQLite `DELETE` + per-agent `INSERT` issued inside one transaction; cache replaced atomically; `204` returned. -- `DELETE /policy/agents/{id}`: row removed from SQLite; removed from cache; `204`. -- `DELETE /policy`: all rows removed from SQLite; cache empty; `204`. -- SQLite write error on any write endpoint → `502`. +- `GET /policy/services/{id}`: returns `ServicePolicyModel` deserialized from cache (hit); `404 {"error": "service {id} not found"}` when the service is not in cache (miss). +- `GET /policy/services?role={role_id}`: returns every SPM whose `inbound_rules` references the role; `[]` when none match; multiple when several match. +- `POST /policy/services/{id}`: `spec` stored in SQLite; cache updated; `204` returned. Upsert round-trip: a second `POST` for the same id replaces the row. +- SQLite write error on the write endpoint → `502`. - SQLite file cannot be opened/queried on `GET /health` → `503`. See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library testing decisions. @@ -148,8 +144,9 @@ See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library ## Out of Scope +- **APM persistence:** APMs are derived on demand and never stored; the store has no per-agent surface. - **Triggering Rego generation:** the Policy Store writes structured data only. Triggering Rego generation in the PDP Policy Writer is the responsibility of `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (called by `aiac.policy.computation`). -- **Pagination:** `GET /policy` returns all agents without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of agents), the full result fits within one SQLite query and one HTTP response. +- **Pagination:** the by-role query returns all matching SPMs without pagination. At target scale (hundreds of services), the full result fits within one query and one HTTP response. - **In-cluster mTLS between Policy Computation Engine and Policy Store:** secured by Kubernetes network policy; no application-layer auth. - **Multi-writer / replica scale-out:** the current design is single-writer (single-replica StatefulSet, RWO PVC, SQLite). Future migration to a shared DB (e.g. PostgreSQL) is a backend swap; the HTTP contract is unchanged. @@ -159,5 +156,6 @@ See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library - The K8s manifests issue must create the `aiac-policy-store` StatefulSet, its `volumeClaimTemplate` PVC (1 Gi, `ReadWriteOnce`), and a headless Service. No CRD or RBAC is needed — the service does not touch the Kubernetes API. - `spec` fields use snake_case (matching Pydantic's `model_dump()`) — consistent with the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR convention. The JSON column avoids a translation layer. -- `agent_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. The `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. +- `service_id` is the SQLite `PRIMARY KEY`. The `aiac.apply.service.{id}` naming convention (lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens) should be maintained for consistency with trigger events. - K8s resource names: StatefulSet `aiac-policy-store`, ClusterIP Service `aiac-policy-store-service:7074`, env var `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`. + From 98ad2c34a70a9f0dde0dc6e6eaba46edbb5023c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 03:09:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 226/273] feat(aiac): Add ServicePolicyModel + Role/Scope SPM fields (Wave 1) Two-layer policy-model foundation for the SPM redesign (handoff 01), fixing the onboarding order-dependence bug where a user->tool-scope rule was lost when a tool onboarded before the agent targeting it. idp.configuration.models: - RoleKind(str, Enum) {USER="User", AGENT="Agent"} - Role.kind / Role.actorIds + local model_validator (kind valid, actorIds a list[str]); cross-kind & client/realm invariants stay upstream at the IdP boundary (handoff 02) - Scope.serviceId (SPM routing key) New fields are defaulted so existing construction sites keep working; deep population from Keycloak is handoff 02. policy.model.models: - ServicePolicyModel: persistent per-service source of truth (service_id, service_type, owned_roles, owned_scopes, inbound_rules) - AgentPolicyModel documented as a derived, non-persisted projection (shape unchanged) tests: new field / ServicePolicyModel round-trip / RoleKind / validator scenarios; un-froze test/policy/ by deleting 3 stale agent.onboarding integration tests and dropping the --ignore=test/policy/ exclusion from CLAUDE.md. Full unit suite: 384 passed. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 4 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py | 40 ++ aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py | 33 +- aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py | 133 ++++- aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py | 204 ------- .../policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py | 560 ------------------ aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py | 538 ----------------- 7 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 1310 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index f83d5acc1..134b45ffa 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -47,10 +47,10 @@ For current file list, `ls` or `find` under `src/aiac/`. `test/` — mirrors `src/aiac/` structure. For current file list, `ls` under `test/`. -**Unit test command** (`test/policy/` excluded — frozen imports cause collection errors): +**Unit test command:** ```bash -.venv/bin/pytest test/ --ignore=test/policy/ -m "not integration" +.venv/bin/pytest test/ -m "not integration" ``` Use `ls test/` to discover current test directories. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py index 40ed1b4c0..d34be6352 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py @@ -15,6 +15,23 @@ class ServiceType(str, Enum): AGENT = "Agent" TOOL = "Tool" + +class RoleKind(str, Enum): + """Whether a role is held by users or by agent service accounts. Mirrors ``ServiceType``'s + capitalized ``str``-enum style, so ``RoleKind.USER == "User"`` holds. + + - ``USER`` ⇔ a Keycloak **realm** role; ``Role.actorIds`` are the holder usernames. + - ``AGENT`` ⇔ a Keycloak **client** role on an agent's client; ``Role.actorIds`` are the + owning agent ``serviceId``(s) (usually one). + + The client/realm ⇔ agent/user invariant (Assumption 3) and the cross-kind invariant + (Assumption 1) are enforced upstream at the Keycloak IdP construction boundary (handoff 02), + not by the local ``Role`` validator.""" + + USER = "User" + AGENT = "Agent" + + # AIAC naming convention: every role and client scope AIAC provisions carries the Keycloak # attribute ``aiac.managed`` with value ``true``. Keycloak's own built-ins (default client # scopes, ``default-roles-``) never carry it, so consumers filter on this marker to @@ -58,12 +75,30 @@ class Role(BaseModel): composite: bool childRoles: list["Role"] = [] attributes: dict[str, Any] = {} + # SPM routing metadata. ``kind`` distinguishes a user-held realm role from an agent-held + # client role; ``actorIds`` are the holder usernames (USER) or owning agent serviceId(s) + # (AGENT). Populated deeply from Keycloak at the IdP construction boundary (handoff 02); + # defaulted here so Wave 1 stays backward-compatible with existing Role construction sites. + kind: RoleKind = RoleKind.USER + actorIds: list[str] = [] @property def aiac_managed(self) -> bool: """True when this role carries the ``aiac.managed`` provisioning marker.""" return _is_aiac_managed(self.attributes) + @model_validator(mode="after") + def _validate_kind_and_actor_ids(self) -> "Role": + """Enforce the invariants visible locally: ``kind`` is a valid ``RoleKind`` and + ``actorIds`` is a ``list[str]``. The cross-kind invariant (Assumption 1) and the + client/realm ⇔ agent/user invariant (Assumption 3) require raw Keycloak facts and are + enforced upstream at construction (handoff 02), not here.""" + if not isinstance(self.kind, RoleKind): + raise ValueError("Role.kind must be a RoleKind") + if not isinstance(self.actorIds, list) or not all(isinstance(a, str) for a in self.actorIds): + raise ValueError("Role.actorIds must be a list[str]") + return self + class Service(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") @@ -117,6 +152,11 @@ class Scope(BaseModel): name: str description: str | None = None attributes: dict[str, Any] = {} + # The single owning service's serviceId — the SPM routing key: a rule ``(role, scope)`` + # routes to ``SPM(scope.serviceId)`` (Assumption 2: a scope has exactly one owner). + # Populated at the IdP construction boundary (handoff 02); defaulted here so Wave 1 stays + # backward-compatible with existing Scope construction sites. + serviceId: str = "" @property def aiac_managed(self) -> bool: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py index 93c9b74ad..8fbd25f4d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/model/models.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, ServiceType class PolicyRule(BaseModel): @@ -10,7 +10,38 @@ class PolicyRule(BaseModel): scope: Scope +class ServicePolicyModel(BaseModel): + """The persistent source of truth — one per service (agent *and* tool), keyed by + ``service_id``. Holds the service's own identity (owned roles/scopes) plus every inbound + edge that grants access to its ``owned_scopes``. + + Canonical form: *every rule is an inbound edge on the SPM of the service that owns the + rule's scope.* An agent's outbound edge is the target's inbound edge (``AR→TS`` is stored on + ``SPM(T)``, not on ``A``). Because ``UR→TS`` lands durably on ``SPM(T)`` at tool-onboarding — + no agent required — it can never be lost, which fixes the order-dependence bug that motivated + the two-layer model. + + ``owned_roles`` / ``owned_scopes`` are the service's own identity, filtered to the + ``aiac.managed`` marker; they are seeded from the catalog by the PCE (this module only + defines the shape).""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") + + service_id: str + service_type: ServiceType # Agent | Tool — only Agents get a derived APM + owned_roles: list[Role] # this service's own client roles (aiac.managed only) + owned_scopes: list[Scope] # this service's exposed scopes (aiac.managed only) + inbound_rules: list[PolicyRule] # canonical: every edge granting access to owned_scopes + + class AgentPolicyModel(BaseModel): + """Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). + + **Derived, not persisted.** ``AgentPolicyModel`` is a pure derived projection built by the + PCE from the relevant ``ServicePolicyModel``s — it is **no longer a persisted entity** (the + durable source of truth is ``ServicePolicyModel``). Its shape is unchanged so existing + consumers (PDP Policy Library, Policy Store readers) keep working.""" + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore") agent_id: str diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py index 1de52c17a..4c009c45b 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/model/test_models.py @@ -1,8 +1,20 @@ import pytest from pydantic import ValidationError -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ( + Role, + RoleKind, + Scope, + Service, + ServiceType, + Subject, +) +from aiac.policy.model.models import ( + AgentPolicyModel, + PolicyModel, + PolicyRule, + ServicePolicyModel, +) def _role(id: str = "role-1", name: str = "admin") -> Role: @@ -21,6 +33,119 @@ def _subject(id: str = "sub-1", username: str = "alice") -> Subject: return Subject(id=id, username=username, enabled=True) +# --- RoleKind enum + Role.kind / Role.actorIds (SPM redesign) --- + + +def test_role_kind_values_mirror_service_type_style(): + assert RoleKind.USER == "User" + assert RoleKind.AGENT == "Agent" + + +def test_role_accepts_kind_and_actor_ids(): + role = Role( + id="r1", + name="weather-reader", + composite=False, + kind=RoleKind.AGENT, + actorIds=["weather-agent"], + ) + assert role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT + assert role.actorIds == ["weather-agent"] + + +def test_role_kind_and_actor_ids_round_trip(): + role = Role( + id="r1", + name="reader", + composite=False, + kind=RoleKind.USER, + actorIds=["alice", "bob"], + ) + restored = Role.model_validate(role.model_dump(mode="json")) + assert restored.kind == RoleKind.USER + assert restored.actorIds == ["alice", "bob"] + + +def test_role_rejects_malformed_kind(): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + Role(id="r1", name="reader", composite=False, kind="Bogus") + + +def test_role_rejects_non_list_actor_ids(): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + Role( + id="r1", + name="reader", + composite=False, + kind=RoleKind.USER, + actorIds="alice", + ) + + +# --- Scope.serviceId (SPM routing key) --- + + +def test_scope_accepts_service_id(): + scope = Scope(id="s1", name="read", serviceId="github-tool") + assert scope.serviceId == "github-tool" + + +def test_scope_service_id_round_trip(): + scope = Scope(id="s1", name="read", serviceId="github-tool") + restored = Scope.model_validate(scope.model_dump(mode="json")) + assert restored.serviceId == "github-tool" + + +# --- ServicePolicyModel (persistent source of truth) --- + + +def test_service_policy_model_constructs(): + role = _role() + scope = _scope() + spm = ServicePolicyModel( + service_id="github-tool", + service_type=ServiceType.TOOL, + owned_roles=[role], + owned_scopes=[scope], + inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)], + ) + assert spm.service_id == "github-tool" + assert spm.service_type == ServiceType.TOOL + assert spm.owned_roles == [role] + assert spm.owned_scopes == [scope] + assert spm.inbound_rules == [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)] + + +def test_service_policy_model_round_trip_string_keys_only(): + role = _role() + scope = _scope() + spm = ServicePolicyModel( + service_id="weather-agent", + service_type=ServiceType.AGENT, + owned_roles=[role], + owned_scopes=[scope], + inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope)], + ) + dumped = spm.model_dump(mode="json") + assert all(isinstance(k, str) for k in dumped.keys()) + restored = ServicePolicyModel.model_validate(dumped) + assert restored == spm + + +def test_service_policy_model_ignores_extra_fields(): + spm = ServicePolicyModel.model_validate( + { + "service_id": "svc", + "service_type": "Tool", + "owned_roles": [], + "owned_scopes": [], + "inbound_rules": [], + "unknown_field": "ignored", + } + ) + assert not hasattr(spm, "unknown_field") + + # --- PolicyRule construction --- @@ -160,9 +285,7 @@ def test_agent_policy_model_round_trip(): def test_policy_rule_ignores_extra_fields(): role = _role() scope = _scope() - rule = PolicyRule.model_validate( - {"role": role.model_dump(), "scope": scope.model_dump(), "unknown": "x"} - ) + rule = PolicyRule.model_validate({"role": role.model_dump(), "scope": scope.model_dump(), "unknown": "x"}) assert not hasattr(rule, "unknown") diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py deleted file mode 100644 index 120c60aed..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_policy_generation.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -""" -Tests for the full-policy generation agent (PolicyBuilder). - -Unit tests do not require an LLM; integration tests require a live endpoint. - -To run all tests: - pytest test/policy/test_policy_generation.py - -To skip integration tests: - pytest test/policy/test_policy_generation.py -m "not integration" - -To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest test/policy/test_policy_generation.py -m integration -""" - -import os -from pathlib import Path -from unittest.mock import Mock - -import pytest -from config import create_llm - -from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule - -pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURES -# ============================================================================ - -@pytest.fixture -def fixtures_dir(): - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" - - -@pytest.fixture -def config_file(): - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" - - -@pytest.fixture -def policy_files(fixtures_dir): - return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) - - -@pytest.fixture(params=[ - "claude-haiku", - "gpt-nano", - "gemini", - "gpt-5-mini", -]) -def llm_model_name(request): - return request.param - - -@pytest.fixture -def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - import socket - from urllib.parse import urlparse - - from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml - cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) - if cfg.endpoint: - parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) - host = parsed.hostname or "" - port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) - try: - with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): - pass - except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: - pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") - return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) - - -@pytest.fixture -def mock_llm(): - return Mock() - - -# ============================================================================ -# EXPECTED POLICIES -# Maps fixture stem → {role_name: {privilege_names}} -# ============================================================================ - -EXPECTED_POLICIES: dict[str, dict[str, set[str]]] = { - "permissive_policy": { - "developer": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"}, - "tech-support": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud"}, - "sales": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud"}, - }, - "regular_policy": { - "developer": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"}, - "tech-support": {"github-agent", "github-tool-aud"}, - }, -} - - -# ============================================================================ -# HELPERS -# ============================================================================ - -def _make_rule(role_name: str, scope_name: str, service_id: str) -> PolicyRule: - role = Role(id=role_name, name=role_name, description="", composite=False) - scope = Scope(id=scope_name, name=scope_name) - return PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) - - -def _policy_to_role_map(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> dict[str, set[str]]: - """Extract {role_name: {scope_names}} from a PolicyObjectModel.""" - result: dict[str, set[str]] = {} - for rule in rules: - result.setdefault(rule.role.name, set()) - result[rule.role.name].add(rule.scope.name) - return result - - -def compare_policies( - generated: dict[str, set[str]], expected: dict[str, set[str]] -) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]: - differences = [] - generated_roles = set(generated.keys()) - expected_roles = set(expected.keys()) - - for role in expected_roles - generated_roles: - differences.append(f"Missing role: '{role}'") - for role in generated_roles - expected_roles: - differences.append(f"Unexpected extra role: '{role}'") - - for role in expected_roles & generated_roles: - gen_set = generated[role] - exp_set = expected[role] - for priv in exp_set - gen_set: - differences.append(f"Role '{role}' missing privilege: {priv}") - for priv in gen_set - exp_set: - differences.append(f"Role '{role}' has unexpected extra privilege: {priv}") - - return len(differences) == 0, differences - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURE SANITY CHECK -# ============================================================================ - -def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): - policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" - assert policies_dir.exists(), "fixtures/policies/ not found" - - policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) - assert len(policy_files) > 0, "No .txt policy files found in fixtures/policies/" - - for policy_file in policy_files: - assert policy_file.stem in EXPECTED_POLICIES, ( - f"No expected structure defined for {policy_file.name} in EXPECTED_POLICIES" - ) - - -# ============================================================================ -# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) -# ============================================================================ - -def test_generate_policy_from_fixtures(fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name): - """Integration: generate policies from fixtures using a real LLM.""" - if not policy_files: - pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - - builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=llm_instance, verbose=False) - failures = [] - - for policy_file in policy_files: - stem = policy_file.stem - if stem not in EXPECTED_POLICIES: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: no expected structure defined in EXPECTED_POLICIES" - ) - continue - - expected_policy = EXPECTED_POLICIES[stem] - policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() - - try: - generated = builder.generate_policy(policy_description) - generated_policy = _policy_to_role_map(generated) - match, differences = compare_policies(generated_policy, expected_policy) - - if not match: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: policy mismatch:\n" - + "\n".join(f" - {d}" for d in differences) - ) - except Exception as exc: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: exception: {exc}" - ) - - if failures: - pytest.fail( - f"Policy generation tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" - + "\n\n".join(failures) - ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py deleted file mode 100644 index d1ec64d85..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,560 +0,0 @@ -""" -Tests for the single_privilege_agent (SinglePrivilegeMapper). - -The agent maps a single privilege/scope to the set of realm roles that -should have access to it. - -To run all tests: - pytest test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py - -To skip integration tests (require LLM access): - pytest test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py -m "not integration" - -To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest test/policy/test_single_privilege_agent.py -m integration -""" - -import os -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any -from unittest.mock import Mock - -import pytest -import yaml -from base_mapper import ( - extract_explanation_and_json, - should_retry_after_semantic, - should_route_after_structural_validation, - validate_mapping_items, -) -from config import create_llm -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from langgraph.graph import END - -from aiac.agent.onboarding.policy.single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper, SinglePrivilegeState -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope - -pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration - - -# ============================================================================ -# LOCAL ADAPTERS -# (base_mapper functions take explicit params; these wrappers use state dicts) -# ============================================================================ - -def extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content: str): - """Delegate to the shared base_mapper parser.""" - return extract_explanation_and_json(content) - - -def _validate_privilege_roles( - state: SinglePrivilegeState, - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, -) -> dict[str, Any]: - return validate_mapping_items( - state, - verbose, - max_retries, - items_key="roles_with_access", - reference_key="roles", - item_type_label="role", - ) - - -def _should_route_after_structural_validation( - state: dict, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, -) -> str: - return should_route_after_structural_validation( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", - verify_node="verify_semantic_mapping", - ) - - -def _should_retry_after_semantic( - state: dict, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, -) -> str: - return should_retry_after_semantic( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", - ) - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURES -# ============================================================================ - -@pytest.fixture -def fixtures_dir(): - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" - - -@pytest.fixture -def config_file(): - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" - - -@pytest.fixture -def policy_files(fixtures_dir): - return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) - - -@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-5-mini"]) -def llm_model_name(request): - return request.param - - -@pytest.fixture -def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - import socket - from urllib.parse import urlparse - - from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml - cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) - if cfg.endpoint: - parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) - host = parsed.hostname or "" - port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) - try: - with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): - pass - except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: - pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") - return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) - - -@pytest.fixture -def mock_llm(): - return Mock() - - -@pytest.fixture -def sample_roles() -> list[Role]: - return [ - Role(id="developer", name="developer", - description="R&D team members", composite=False), - Role(id="tech-support", name="tech-support", - description="Technical support staff", composite=False), - Role(id="sales", name="sales", - description="Sales team members", composite=False), - ] - - -@pytest.fixture -def github_aud_privilege() -> Scope: - return Scope( - id="github-tool-aud", - name="github-tool-aud", - description="Provides access to public GitHub repositories", - ) - - -# ============================================================================ -# HELPERS -# ============================================================================ - -def _make_analysis_response(privilege_name: str, roles_with_access: list) -> str: - roles_json = ", ".join(f'"{r}"' for r in roles_with_access) - return f""" -```explanation -The privilege '{privilege_name}' should be granted to those with a technical need. -``` -```json -{{ - "privilege": "{privilege_name}", - "roles_with_access": [{roles_json}] -}} -``` -""" - - -def _make_verify_response(correct: bool = True) -> str: - status = "YES" if correct else "NO" - return f"MAPPING_CORRECT: {status}\nEXPLANATION: Mapping is correct." - - -def _make_mock_llm(privilege_name: str, roles_with_access: list) -> Mock: - mock = Mock() - analysis = Mock() - analysis.content = _make_analysis_response(privilege_name, roles_with_access) - verify = Mock() - verify.content = _make_verify_response() - mock.invoke.side_effect = [analysis, verify] - return mock - - -def _make_validate_state( - roles_with_access: list[Role], - all_roles: list[Role], - retry: int = 0, -) -> SinglePrivilegeState: - return { - "policy_description": "test", - "privilege": Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud"), - "roles": all_roles, - "explanation": "", - "roles_with_access": roles_with_access, - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": retry, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - -def _make_routing_state(validation_passed: bool, retry_count: int) -> dict: - return {"validation_passed": validation_passed, "retry_count": retry_count} - - -_SAMPLE_ROLES = [ - Role(id="developer", name="developer", description="R&D", composite=False), - Role(id="tech-support", name="tech-support", description="Support", composite=False), - Role(id="sales", name="sales", description="Sales", composite=False), -] - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles -# ============================================================================ - -def test_extract_fenced_explanation_and_json(): - """Parser extracts explanation and JSON from properly fenced blocks.""" - content = _make_analysis_response("github-tool-aud", ["developer", "tech-support"]) - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) - assert explanation - assert data is not None - assert data.get("roles_with_access") == ["developer", "tech-support"] - - -def test_extract_json_only_block(): - """Parser extracts JSON from a bare ```json block with no explanation.""" - content = '```json\n{"privilege": "demo-ui", "roles_with_access": ["sales"]}\n```' - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) - assert data is not None - assert data["roles_with_access"] == ["sales"] - - -def test_extract_bare_json_object(): - """Parser finds a bare {...} JSON object in the response.""" - content = 'Result: {"privilege": "demo-ui", "roles_with_access": []}' - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) - assert data is not None - assert data["roles_with_access"] == [] - - -def test_extract_returns_none_on_invalid_json(): - """Parser returns (empty_str, None) when no valid JSON is found.""" - content = "This response has no JSON at all." - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) - assert data is None - - -def test_extract_empty_roles_with_access(): - """Parser handles empty roles_with_access list.""" - content = '```json\n{"privilege": "demo-ui", "roles_with_access": []}\n```' - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_privilege_roles(content) - assert data is not None - assert data["roles_with_access"] == [] - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: _validate_privilege_roles -# ============================================================================ - -def test_validate_passes_with_valid_roles(): - """Validation succeeds when all roles_with_access are in the reference list.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Role(id="developer", name="developer", composite=False)], - _SAMPLE_ROLES, - ) - result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is True - assert result["errors"] == [] - - -def test_validate_rejects_unknown_role(): - """Validation fails when an unknown role name is returned.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Role(id="admin", name="admin", composite=False)], - _SAMPLE_ROLES, - ) - result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - assert any("admin" in e for e in result["errors"]) - - -def test_validate_rejects_duplicates(): - """Validation fails when duplicate role names appear in the result.""" - dup = Role(id="developer", name="developer", composite=False) - state = _make_validate_state([dup, dup], _SAMPLE_ROLES) - result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - assert any("Duplicate" in e for e in result["errors"]) - - -def test_validate_passes_with_empty_roles_with_access(): - """Validation passes when no roles are granted (empty list is valid).""" - state = _make_validate_state([], _SAMPLE_ROLES) - result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is True - assert result["errors"] == [] - - -def test_validate_increments_retry_count_on_failure(): - """Retry count is incremented when validation fails and retries remain.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Role(id="unknown", name="unknown", composite=False)], _SAMPLE_ROLES, retry=0 - ) - result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["retry_count"] == 1 - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - - -def test_validate_does_not_increment_retry_when_exhausted(): - """Retry count is not further incremented once max_retries is reached.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Role(id="unknown", name="unknown", composite=False)], _SAMPLE_ROLES, retry=3 - ) - result = _validate_privilege_roles(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["retry_count"] == 3 - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: routing functions -# ============================================================================ - -def test_route_after_structural_proceeds_to_verify_on_success(): - """Routes to verify_semantic_mapping when structural validation passed.""" - route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == "verify_semantic_mapping" - - -def test_route_after_structural_retries_when_failed_and_retries_remain(): - """Routes back to analyze_role_mapping on failure when retries are available.""" - route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=1), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == "analyze_role_mapping" - - -def test_route_after_structural_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): - """Routes to END when structural validation failed and retries are exhausted.""" - route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == END - - -def test_route_after_semantic_retries_when_failed(): - """Routes back to analyze_role_mapping when semantic check fails and retries remain.""" - route = _should_retry_after_semantic( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == "analyze_role_mapping" - - -def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_passed(): - """Routes to END when semantic verification passed.""" - route = _should_retry_after_semantic( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == END - - -def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): - """Routes to END when semantic check failed but retries are exhausted.""" - route = _should_retry_after_semantic( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == END - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: SinglePrivilegeMapper -# ============================================================================ - -def test_single_privilege_mapper_get_graph(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles, mock_llm): - """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False - ) - assert mapper.get_graph() is not None - - -def test_map_roles_returns_correct_keys(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """map_roles() returns a dict with all expected keys.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") - for key in ("policy_description", "privilege", "roles_with_access", "explanation", - "errors", "success", "retry_count"): - assert key in result, f"Missing key: {key}" - assert result["privilege"].name == "github-tool-aud" - - -def test_map_roles_success_flag_on_clean_run(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """map_roles() sets success=True and errors=[] on a clean run.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") - assert result["success"] is True - assert result["errors"] == [] - - -def test_map_roles_returns_roles_with_access(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """map_roles() returns the matching Role objects from the LLM response.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer", "tech-support"]) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="Developers and tech-support get GitHub access.") - names = {r.name for r in result["roles_with_access"]} - assert "developer" in names - assert "tech-support" in names - - -def test_map_roles_with_empty_access(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """map_roles() handles empty roles_with_access (privilege is internal-only).""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", []) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description="This privilege is internal only.") - assert result["roles_with_access"] == [] - assert result["success"] is True - - -def test_generate_policy_maps_role_to_privilege(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """generate_policy() produces Rules mapping the granted roles to the privilege.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("github-tool-aud", ["developer"]) - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - rules, description = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - assert any( - r.role.name == "developer" and r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" - for r in rules - ) - -def test_generate_policy_with_unknown_role_raises_value_error(github_aud_privilege, sample_roles): - """generate_policy() raises ValueError when the LLM returns an unknown role.""" - bad_response = Mock() - bad_response.content = _make_analysis_response("github-tool-aud", ["nonexistent-role"]) - mock = Mock() - mock.invoke.return_value = bad_response - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=github_aud_privilege, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock, verbose=False - ) - with pytest.raises(ValueError): - mapper.generate_policy("Some description.") - - -def test_single_privilege_mapper_multiple_privileges(sample_roles): - """Multiple SinglePrivilegeMapper instances can run independently per privilege.""" - demo_ui = Scope(id="demo-ui", name="demo-ui", description="Access to demo UI") - github_full = Scope(id="github-full-access", name="github-full-access", - description="Full GitHub access") - - mock_ui = _make_mock_llm("demo-ui", ["sales", "tech-support"]) - mock_gh = _make_mock_llm("github-full-access", ["developer"]) - - ui_mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(privilege=demo_ui, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock_ui, verbose=False) - gh_mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper(privilege=github_full, roles=sample_roles, llm=mock_gh, verbose=False) - - ui_result = ui_mapper.map_roles("UI is for sales and support.") - gh_result = gh_mapper.map_roles("GitHub full access is only for developers.") - - assert {r.name for r in ui_result["roles_with_access"]} == {"sales", "tech-support"} - assert {r.name for r in gh_result["roles_with_access"]} == {"developer"} - - -# ============================================================================ -# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) -# ============================================================================ - -def test_generate_single_privilege_from_fixtures( - fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name -): - """Integration: map each privilege to realm roles for each policy fixture using a real LLM.""" - if not policy_files: - pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration - config_api = Configuration.for_realm("demo") - roles = config_api.get_roles() - services = config_api.get_services() - - all_privileges = [ - (scope, service.name or service.id) - for service in services - for scope in service.scopes - if scope.description - ] - - failures = [] - - for policy_file in policy_files: - policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() - expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - - if not expected_file.exists(): - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" - ) - continue - - expected_policy = yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()).get("policy", {}) - - for privilege, service_name in all_privileges: - expected_roles_for_priv = set() - for role_name, mappings in expected_policy.items(): - for mapping in mappings: - if mapping.get("privilege") == privilege.name: - expected_roles_for_priv.add(role_name) - - try: - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - privilege=privilege, - roles=roles, - llm=llm_instance, - verbose=False, - ) - result = mapper.map_roles(policy_description=policy_description) - generated = {r.name for r in result.get("roles_with_access", [])} - missing = expected_roles_for_priv - generated - extra = generated - expected_roles_for_priv - - if missing or extra: - diffs = ( - [f" Missing role: '{r}'" for r in sorted(missing)] - + [f" Extra role: '{r}'" for r in sorted(extra)] - ) - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / privilege={privilege.name}:\n" - + "\n".join(diffs) - ) - - except Exception as exc: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / privilege={privilege.name}: exception: {exc}" - ) - - if failures: - pytest.fail( - f"Single privilege mapper tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" - + "\n\n".join(failures) - ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py b/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py deleted file mode 100644 index c96aa7038..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,538 +0,0 @@ -""" -Tests for the single_role_agent (SingleRoleMapper). - -The agent maps a realm role to the set of privileges/scopes it should hold. - -To run all tests: - pytest test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py - -To skip integration tests (require LLM access): - pytest test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py -m "not integration" - -To run ONLY integration tests: - pytest test/policy/test_single_role_agent.py -m integration -""" - -import os -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any -from unittest.mock import Mock - -import pytest -import yaml -from base_mapper import ( - BaseMappingState, - extract_explanation_and_json, - should_retry_after_semantic, - should_route_after_structural_validation, - validate_mapping_items, -) -from config import create_llm -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from langgraph.graph import END -from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper, SingleRoleState - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope - -pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration - - -# ============================================================================ -# LOCAL ADAPTERS -# (the underlying base_mapper functions take explicit parameters; -# these thin wrappers match the state-based calling convention the tests use) -# ============================================================================ - -def extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content: str): - """Delegate to the shared base_mapper parser.""" - return extract_explanation_and_json(content) - - -def _validate_role_scopes( - state: BaseMappingState, - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, -) -> dict[str, Any]: - return validate_mapping_items( - state, - verbose, - max_retries, - items_key="granted_privileges", - reference_key="privileges", - item_type_label="privilege", - ) - - -def _should_route_after_structural_validation( - state: dict, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, -) -> str: - return should_route_after_structural_validation( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", - verify_node="verify_semantic_scope_mapping", - ) - - -def _should_retry_after_semantic( - state: dict, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, -) -> str: - return should_retry_after_semantic( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_scopes", - ) - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURES -# ============================================================================ - -@pytest.fixture -def fixtures_dir(): - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" - - -@pytest.fixture -def config_file(): - return Path(__file__).parent.parent / "fixtures" / "config.yaml" - - -@pytest.fixture -def policy_files(fixtures_dir): - return sorted((fixtures_dir / "policies").glob("*.txt")) - - -@pytest.fixture(params=["claude-haiku", "gpt-nano", "gemini", "gpt-5-mini"]) -def llm_model_name(request): - return request.param - - -@pytest.fixture -def llm_instance(llm_model_name): - import socket - from urllib.parse import urlparse - - from config.llm_config import load_llm_config_from_yaml - cfg = load_llm_config_from_yaml(llm_model_name) - if cfg.endpoint: - parsed = urlparse(cfg.endpoint) - host = parsed.hostname or "" - port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80) - try: - with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=3.0): - pass - except (socket.timeout, OSError) as exc: - pytest.skip(f"Model {llm_model_name} endpoint not reachable: {exc}") - return create_llm(model_name=llm_model_name, verbose=False) - - -@pytest.fixture -def mock_llm(): - return Mock() - - -@pytest.fixture -def sample_scopes() -> list[Scope]: - return [ - Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud", - description="Provides access to public GitHub repos"), - Scope(id="github-full-access", name="github-full-access", - description="Provides access to private GitHub repos"), - Scope(id="demo-ui", name="demo-ui", - description="Access to the demo UI interface"), - ] - - -@pytest.fixture -def developer_role() -> Role: - return Role(id="developer", name="developer", - description="R&D team members", composite=False) - - -# ============================================================================ -# HELPERS -# ============================================================================ - -def _make_analysis_response(role_name: str, granted_privileges: list) -> str: - privs_json = ", ".join(f'"{p}"' for p in granted_privileges) - return f""" -```explanation -The {role_name} role is a user-facing role. Granting appropriate privileges. -``` -```json -{{ - "role": "{role_name}", - "granted_privileges": [{privs_json}] -}} -``` -""" - - -def _make_verify_response(correct: bool = True) -> str: - status = "YES" if correct else "NO" - return f"MAPPING_CORRECT: {status}\nEXPLANATION: Mapping is correct." - - -def _make_mock_llm(role_name: str, granted_privileges: list) -> Mock: - mock = Mock() - analysis = Mock() - analysis.content = _make_analysis_response(role_name, granted_privileges) - verify = Mock() - verify.content = _make_verify_response() - mock.invoke.side_effect = [analysis, verify] - return mock - - -def _make_validate_state( - granted: list[Scope], - privileges: list[Scope], - retry: int = 0, -) -> SingleRoleState: - return SingleRoleState( - policy_description="test", - role=Role(id="developer", name="developer", - description="R&D team members", composite=False), - privileges=privileges, - explanation="", - granted_privileges=granted, - messages=[], - errors=[], - retry_count=retry, - validation_passed=True, - ) - - -def _make_routing_state(validation_passed: bool, retry_count: int) -> dict: - return {"validation_passed": validation_passed, "retry_count": retry_count} - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes -# ============================================================================ - -_SAMPLE_SCOPES = [ - Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud"), - Scope(id="github-full-access", name="github-full-access"), - Scope(id="demo-ui", name="demo-ui"), -] - - -def test_extract_fenced_explanation_and_json(): - """Parser extracts explanation and JSON from properly fenced blocks.""" - content = _make_analysis_response("developer", ["github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"]) - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) - assert explanation - assert data is not None - assert data.get("granted_privileges") == ["github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"] - - -def test_extract_json_only_block(): - """Parser extracts JSON from a bare ```json block with no explanation.""" - content = '```json\n{"role": "tech-support", "granted_privileges": ["demo-ui"]}\n```' - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) - assert data is not None - assert data["granted_privileges"] == ["demo-ui"] - - -def test_extract_bare_json_object(): - """Parser finds a bare {...} JSON object in the response.""" - content = 'Here is the result: {"role": "sales", "granted_privileges": []}' - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) - assert data is not None - assert data["granted_privileges"] == [] - assert "Here is the result:" in explanation - - -def test_extract_returns_none_on_invalid_json(): - """Parser returns (empty_str, None) when no valid JSON is found.""" - content = "This response has no JSON at all." - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) - assert data is None - - -def test_extract_empty_granted_privileges(): - """Parser handles empty granted_privileges list.""" - content = '```json\n{"role": "sales", "granted_privileges": []}\n```' - explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json_single_role_scopes(content) - assert data is not None - assert data["granted_privileges"] == [] - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: _validate_role_scopes -# ============================================================================ - -def test_validate_passes_with_valid_privileges(): - """Validation succeeds when all granted privileges are in the available list.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud")], - _SAMPLE_SCOPES, - ) - result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is True - assert result["errors"] == [] - - -def test_validate_rejects_unknown_privilege(): - """Validation fails when an unknown privilege name is returned.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Scope(id="nonexistent-priv", name="nonexistent-priv")], - _SAMPLE_SCOPES, - ) - result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - assert any("nonexistent-priv" in e for e in result["errors"]) - - -def test_validate_rejects_duplicates(): - """Validation fails when duplicate privilege names appear in the result.""" - dup = Scope(id="github-tool-aud", name="github-tool-aud") - state = _make_validate_state([dup, dup], _SAMPLE_SCOPES) - result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - assert any("Duplicate" in e for e in result["errors"]) - - -def test_validate_passes_with_empty_granted(): - """Validation passes when no privileges are granted (empty list is valid).""" - state = _make_validate_state([], _SAMPLE_SCOPES) - result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["validation_passed"] is True - assert result["errors"] == [] - - -def test_validate_increments_retry_count_on_failure(): - """Retry count is incremented when validation fails and retries remain.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Scope(id="bad-priv", name="bad-priv")], _SAMPLE_SCOPES, retry=0 - ) - result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["retry_count"] == 1 - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - - -def test_validate_does_not_increment_retry_when_exhausted(): - """Retry count is not further incremented once max_retries is reached.""" - state = _make_validate_state( - [Scope(id="bad-priv", name="bad-priv")], _SAMPLE_SCOPES, retry=3 - ) - result = _validate_role_scopes(state, verbose=False, max_retries=3) - assert result["retry_count"] == 3 - assert result["validation_passed"] is False - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: routing functions -# ============================================================================ - -def test_route_after_structural_proceeds_to_verify_on_success(): - """Routes to verify_semantic_scope_mapping when structural validation passed.""" - route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == "verify_semantic_scope_mapping" - - -def test_route_after_structural_retries_when_failed_and_retries_remain(): - """Routes back to analyze_role_scopes on failure when retries are available.""" - route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=1), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == "analyze_role_scopes" - - -def test_route_after_structural_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): - """Routes to END when structural validation failed and retries are exhausted.""" - route = _should_route_after_structural_validation( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == END - - -def test_route_after_semantic_retries_when_failed(): - """Routes back to analyze_role_scopes when semantic check fails and retries remain.""" - route = _should_retry_after_semantic( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == "analyze_role_scopes" - - -def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_passed(): - """Routes to END when semantic verification passed.""" - route = _should_retry_after_semantic( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=True, retry_count=0), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == END - - -def test_route_after_semantic_ends_when_retries_exhausted(): - """Routes to END when semantic check failed but retries are exhausted.""" - route = _should_retry_after_semantic( - _make_routing_state(validation_passed=False, retry_count=3), max_retries=3 - ) - assert route == END - - -# ============================================================================ -# UNIT TESTS: SingleRoleMapper -# ============================================================================ - -def test_single_role_mapper_get_graph(developer_role, sample_scopes, mock_llm): - """get_graph() returns the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock_llm, verbose=False) - assert mapper.get_graph() is not None - - -def test_map_privileges_returns_correct_keys(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """map_privileges() returns a dict with all expected keys.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") - for key in ("policy_description", "role", "granted_privileges", "explanation", - "errors", "success", "retry_count"): - assert key in result, f"Missing key: {key}" - assert result["role"].name == "developer" - - -def test_map_privileges_success_flag_on_clean_run(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """map_privileges() sets success=True and errors=[] on a clean run.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Developers get GitHub access.") - assert result["success"] is True - assert result["errors"] == [] - - -def test_map_privileges_returns_granted_privileges(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """map_privileges() returns the granted Scope objects from the LLM response.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud", "github-full-access"]) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Developers get full GitHub access.") - names = {s.name for s in result["granted_privileges"]} - assert "github-tool-aud" in names - assert "github-full-access" in names - - -def test_map_privileges_with_empty_granted_privileges(sample_scopes): - """map_privileges() handles empty granted_privileges (non-user-facing role).""" - role = Role(id="sales", name="sales", description="Sales team members", composite=False) - mock = _make_mock_llm("sales", []) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description="Sales staff have no GitHub access.") - assert result["granted_privileges"] == [] - assert result["success"] is True - -def test_generate_policy_maps_privilege_to_role(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """generate_policy() produces a Rule mapping the role to the granted privilege.""" - mock = _make_mock_llm("developer", ["github-tool-aud"]) - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - rules, explanation = mapper.generate_policy("Developers get GitHub access.") - assert any( - r.role.name == "developer" and r.scope.name == "github-tool-aud" - for r in rules - ) - - -def test_generate_policy_with_unknown_privilege_raises_value_error(developer_role, sample_scopes): - """generate_policy() raises ValueError when the LLM returns an unknown privilege.""" - bad_response = Mock() - bad_response.content = _make_analysis_response("developer", ["nonexistent-priv"]) - mock = Mock() - mock.invoke.return_value = bad_response - mapper = SingleRoleMapper(role=developer_role, privileges=sample_scopes, llm=mock, verbose=False) - with pytest.raises(ValueError): - mapper.generate_policy("Some description.") - - -# ============================================================================ -# FIXTURE SANITY CHECK -# ============================================================================ - -def test_fixture_files_exist(fixtures_dir): - policies_dir = fixtures_dir / "policies" - expected_dir = fixtures_dir / "expected" - assert policies_dir.exists() - assert expected_dir.exists() - policy_files = list(policies_dir.glob("*.txt")) - assert len(policy_files) > 0 - for policy_file in policy_files: - expected_file = expected_dir / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - assert expected_file.exists() - try: - yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()) - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - pytest.fail(f"Invalid YAML in {expected_file}: {exc}") - - -# ============================================================================ -# INTEGRATION TEST (requires LLM) -# ============================================================================ - -def test_generate_single_role_from_fixtures( - fixtures_dir, config_file, policy_files, llm_instance, llm_model_name -): - """Integration: map each realm role for each policy fixture using a real LLM.""" - if not policy_files: - pytest.skip("No policy fixture files found") - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_file) - from aiac.pdp.library.read_api_from_config import Configuration - config_api = Configuration.for_realm("demo") - roles = config_api.get_roles() - scopes = config_api.get_scopes() - - failures = [] - - for policy_file in policy_files: - policy_description = policy_file.read_text().strip() - expected_file = fixtures_dir / "expected" / f"{policy_file.stem}.yaml" - - if not expected_file.exists(): - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name}: missing expected file {expected_file}" - ) - continue - - expected_full = yaml.safe_load(expected_file.read_text()).get("policy", {}) - - for role in roles: - expected_for_role = expected_full.get(role.name, []) - expected_privileges = {m["privilege"] for m in expected_for_role} - - try: - mapper = SingleRoleMapper( - role=role, - privileges=scopes, - llm=llm_instance, - verbose=False, - ) - result = mapper.map_privileges(policy_description=policy_description) - generated = {s.name for s in result.get("granted_privileges", [])} - missing = expected_privileges - generated - extra = generated - expected_privileges - - if missing or extra: - diffs = ( - [f" Missing privilege: '{p}'" for p in sorted(missing)] - + [f" Extra privilege: '{p}'" for p in sorted(extra)] - ) - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / role={role.name}:\n" - + "\n".join(diffs) - ) - - except Exception as exc: - failures.append( - f"[{llm_model_name}] {policy_file.name} / role={role.name}: exception: {exc}" - ) - - if failures: - pytest.fail( - f"Single role mapper tests failed for model {llm_model_name}:\n\n" - + "\n\n".join(failures) - ) From 195590e7bad052bed37958857c6cf6d80c19e147 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 03:21:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 227/273] Test(aiac): Verify idp Configuration surfaces SPM/APM fields (handoff 03) Add handoff-03 library-deserialization tests to test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py, locking in the audit outcome (no source change required) with real read-path coverage: - TestFieldPassThrough: Role.kind / Role.actorIds survive get_roles(), Scope.serviceId survives get_scopes(), and all three survive the get_services() enrichment onto nested Service.roles / Service.scopes. - Role.kind is taken straight from the response, not re-derived: get_services is spied and asserted never called during get_roles(). - get_subjects_by_role: the returned subject set matches a user-kind role's actorIds and the library does not recompute them; subject fields pass through unchanged. Satisfies the handoff-03 test criteria in issues 8.4 and 8.15. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 127 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index e0e9c8f70..a20bdb863 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import pytest from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, RoleKind, Scope, Service, ServiceType, Subject REALM = "kagenti" BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:7071" @@ -976,6 +976,41 @@ def test_no_secondary_enrichment_calls(self, monkeypatch): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) assert m.call_count == 1 + # handoff 03 — actorIds consistency. The subject/username set this method + # reports is the same set the IdP service uses to populate a user-kind role's + # actorIds. Both come from the service, so they must agree and the library + # must not recompute actorIds client-side. + def test_subject_set_matches_user_role_actor_ids(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role(kind="User", actorIds=["alice", "bob"]) + payload = [ + {"id": "u1", "username": "alice", "enabled": True}, + {"id": "u2", "username": "bob", "enabled": True}, + ] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert {s.username for s in result} == set(role.actorIds) + # The library surfaces the service's subject set as-is; it does not + # mutate/recompute the role's actorIds. + assert role.actorIds == ["alice", "bob"] + + def test_subject_fields_pass_through_unchanged(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + role = self._make_role() + payload = [ + { + "id": "u1", + "username": "alice", + "email": "alice@example.com", + "firstName": "Alice", + "enabled": True, + } + ] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_subjects_by_role(role) + assert result[0].email == "alice@example.com" + assert result[0].firstName == "Alice" + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_services_by_scope (unchanged) @@ -1022,3 +1057,93 @@ def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self): with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("HTTP 500")): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services_by_scope(scope) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# handoff 03 — SPM/APM field pass-through through the library deserialization +# +# handoff 01 declares Role.kind / Role.actorIds / Scope.serviceId; handoff 02 +# makes the IdP *service* populate them. The Configuration library is a thin +# pass-through (model_validate), so these fields must survive onto the returned +# models with no hand-rolled mapping dropping them and no client-side derivation. +# These tests stub the HTTP layer with a service response carrying the new +# fields and assert they round-trip through the real read paths. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestFieldPassThrough: + def test_get_roles_surfaces_role_kind(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "agent-role", "composite": False, "kind": "Agent"}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + roles = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert roles[0].kind == RoleKind.AGENT + + def test_get_roles_surfaces_actor_ids(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [ + { + "id": "r1", + "name": "viewer", + "composite": False, + "kind": "User", + "actorIds": ["alice", "bob"], + } + ] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + roles = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert roles[0].actorIds == ["alice", "bob"] + + def test_get_scopes_surfaces_scope_service_id(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "serviceId": "mlflow"}] + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + scopes = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_scopes() + assert scopes[0].serviceId == "mlflow" + + def test_get_services_surfaces_new_fields_on_nested_role_and_scope(self, monkeypatch): + # get_services() enriches each service's roles/scopes from the get_roles() + # / get_scopes() maps, so the new fields must survive that join too. + # Call order: GET /services, GET /roles, GET /scopes, GET /services/{id}/roles, + # GET /services/{id}/scopes. + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + services = [{"id": "c1", "clientId": "mlflow", "name": "mlflow", "enabled": True}] + all_roles = [ + { + "id": "r1", + "name": "mlflow-agent", + "composite": False, + "kind": "Agent", + "actorIds": ["mlflow"], + } + ] + all_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data", "serviceId": "mlflow"}] + service_roles = [{"id": "r1", "name": "mlflow-agent"}] + service_scopes = [{"id": "s1", "name": "read:data"}] + with patch( + "aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", + side_effect=[ + _ok(services), + _ok(all_roles), + _ok(all_scopes), + _ok(service_roles), + _ok(service_scopes), + ], + ): + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_services() + assert result[0].roles[0].kind == RoleKind.AGENT + assert result[0].roles[0].actorIds == ["mlflow"] + assert result[0].scopes[0].serviceId == "mlflow" + + def test_role_kind_taken_from_response_not_rederived(self, monkeypatch): + # Role.kind is authoritative — the library must not re-derive it by + # classifying a role against the service list. Point get_services at a + # spy and assert get_roles never touches it. + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = [{"id": "r1", "name": "agent-role", "composite": False, "kind": "Agent"}] + spy = MagicMock(side_effect=AssertionError("get_services must not be called to set Role.kind")) + with patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", spy): + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)): + roles = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).get_roles() + assert roles[0].kind == RoleKind.AGENT + spy.assert_not_called() From 27304c7c487ec26a24ae1a93a61d0f58c5741ca9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 03:30:42 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 228/273] Feat(aiac): SPM-centric policy store (persist SPMs, drop APM persistence) Rework the AIAC Policy Store around ServicePolicyModel (SPM), the persistent source of truth keyed by service_id. AgentPolicyModel is now derived and never persisted, so the store's per-agent and whole-collection surfaces are removed. Service (main.py): service_policies(service_id, spec) table + SPM cache, SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH; endpoints GET /policy/services/{id} (404 on miss), GET /policy/services?role= (by-role scan over inbound_rules), POST /policy/services/{id} (upsert), DELETE /policy/services/{id} (off-board), GET /health. Library (api.py): get_service_policy (fresh-empty SPM on 404), get_service_policy_by_scope (sugar via scope.serviceId), get_service_policies_by_role, apply_service_policy, delete_service_policy. Tests rewritten SPM-centric; policy-store specs updated with the delete route. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../specs/components/library-policy-store.md | 13 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md | 10 +- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py | 58 ++-- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py | 104 +++---- aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 264 +++++++++++------- aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py | 245 ++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 364 insertions(+), 330 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md index 92c5610b7..5e551b518 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Companion library for the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md). Follows the same aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/ └── library/ ├── __init__.py # empty - └── api.py # four module-level functions (SPM-centric surface) + └── api.py # five module-level functions (SPM-centric surface) ``` All `__init__.py` files are empty. Callers use explicit submodule paths: @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( get_service_policy_by_scope, get_service_policies_by_role, apply_service_policy, + delete_service_policy, ) from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel, Scope, Role ``` @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ exposes any per-agent read/write functions. The library surface is entirely SPM- ## Submodule: `aiac.policy.store.library.api` ### Description -HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md) REST API. Exposes four module-level functions returning `ServicePolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on an unexpected non-2xx response (a `404` on the by-id read is handled, not raised — see below). +HTTP client module wrapping the [AIAC Policy Store](policy-store.md) REST API. Exposes five module-level functions returning `ServicePolicyModel` objects directly — no Kubernetes client boilerplate. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7074`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on an unexpected non-2xx response (a `404` on the by-id read is handled, not raised — see below). ### Dependencies ``` @@ -70,12 +71,16 @@ def get_service_policies_by_role(role: Role) -> list[ServicePolicyModel] def apply_service_policy(service_id: str, spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None # POST /policy/services/{service_id} — upsert. + +def delete_service_policy(service_id: str) -> None + # DELETE /policy/services/{service_id} — off-board a decommissioned service. + # No-op on the server if the service is absent (still 204). ``` **Removed** (APMs are no longer persisted): `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, and the prior whole-collection `get_policy` / `apply_policy` / `delete_policy` / `delete_agent_policy` functions. The only legitimate consumer is the Policy Computation Engine, which is migrated to the -four functions above. +functions above. ### Why by-role must be a store query (not an IdP lookup) @@ -102,6 +107,7 @@ from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( get_service_policy_by_scope, get_service_policies_by_role, apply_service_policy, + delete_service_policy, ) from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel, Scope, Role @@ -132,6 +138,7 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - `get_service_policy_by_scope(scope)` resolves via `scope.serviceId` (sugar over the by-id read). - `get_service_policies_by_role(role)` issues the by-role query; returns every SPM referencing `role.id`; returns `[]` when none match; returns multiple when several match. - `apply_service_policy(id, spm)` issues `POST /policy/services/{id}` with serialized `ServicePolicyModel`; upsert round-trip (write then read back the same SPM). +- `delete_service_policy(id)` issues `DELETE /policy/services/{id}`; returns `None` on success. - Any unexpected non-2xx response raises `RuntimeError`. - `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` is read from env; falls back to `http://127.0.0.1:7074`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md index 55097b7df..816377daa 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_policies ( **Transaction strategy:** - Per-service upsert (`POST /policy/services/{service_id}`): `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)`. +- Per-service delete (`DELETE /policy/services/{service_id}`): `DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?`; evict the cache entry. **By-role query:** `GET /policy/services?role={role_id}` scans the cache and returns every SPM whose `inbound_rules` contains a rule referencing `role_id`. **Why a store query and not an IdP lookup:** the SPM is the source of truth, so this must return *stored* rows — including stale role→service mappings that the live IdP no longer reflects, which override-purge depends on to remove access that should no longer exist. It may start as a full scan; a `role.id -> {service_id}` index can be added later behind the same route/signature without changing callers. @@ -78,19 +79,23 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_policies ( | `GET` | `/policy/services/{service_id}` | — | `ServicePolicyModel` (from cache) | | `GET` | `/policy/services?role={role_id}` | — | `list[ServicePolicyModel]` (SPMs referencing the role) | | `POST` | `/policy/services/{service_id}` | `ServicePolicyModel` | `204 No Content` (upsert) | +| `DELETE` | `/policy/services/{service_id}` | — | `204 No Content` (off-board) | | `GET` | `/health` | — | `200` / `503` | The by-scope lookup has **no dedicated route** — it collapses to the by-id read via `scope.serviceId` and is implemented entirely in the library. +`DELETE /policy/services/{service_id}` removes a single SPM row (SQLite `DELETE` + cache eviction) so a service can be off-boarded when it is decommissioned. Deleting a service that is not present is a no-op (`204`). Override-purge still edits `inbound_rules` in place via the upsert; the delete route is for whole-service removal, not per-rule purging. + **Error responses:** - `404 Not Found` with `{"error": "service {id} not found"}` when `GET /policy/services/{service_id}` finds no entry in cache. The library's `get_service_policy` catches this and returns a fresh empty SPM (per the "engine creates a fresh model on 404" convention); the by-role query never 404s (empty list on no match). -- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on SQLite write error for the write endpoint. +- `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": "..."}` on SQLite write error for the write and delete endpoints. - `503 Service Unavailable` if `GET /health` cannot open or query the SQLite file. **`main.py` functions:** - `_get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection` — open `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH` with `check_same_thread=False`; run `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` on first open. - `_upsert_service(service_id: str, model: ServicePolicyModel)` — `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`; update cache. +- `_delete_service(service_id: str)` — `DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?`; evict the cache entry (no-op if absent). - `_get_service(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel` — read from in-memory cache; raise `404` if absent. - `_list_by_role(role_id: str) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]` — return every cached SPM whose `inbound_rules` references `role_id`. - `_load_cache()` — on startup, load all rows from SQLite into the in-memory cache. @@ -135,7 +140,8 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - `GET /policy/services/{id}`: returns `ServicePolicyModel` deserialized from cache (hit); `404 {"error": "service {id} not found"}` when the service is not in cache (miss). - `GET /policy/services?role={role_id}`: returns every SPM whose `inbound_rules` references the role; `[]` when none match; multiple when several match. - `POST /policy/services/{id}`: `spec` stored in SQLite; cache updated; `204` returned. Upsert round-trip: a second `POST` for the same id replaces the row. -- SQLite write error on the write endpoint → `502`. +- `DELETE /policy/services/{id}`: row removed from SQLite; cache entry evicted; `204` returned. Deleting an absent service is a no-op (`204`). +- SQLite write error on the write or delete endpoint → `502`. - SQLite file cannot be opened/queried on `GET /health` → `503`. See [library-policy-store.md](library-policy-store.md) for the companion library testing decisions. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py index 532b65acc..b69635d5d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py @@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +# Scope / Role / ServiceType are re-exported by aiac.policy.model.models (it imports them +# from aiac.idp.configuration.models), so the whole model surface comes from one module. +from aiac.policy.model.models import Role, Scope, ServicePolicyModel, ServiceType load_dotenv(dotenv_path=os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".env")) @@ -17,33 +19,51 @@ def _check(response: requests.Response) -> None: raise RuntimeError(f"Policy Store error {response.status_code}") -def get_policy() -> PolicyModel: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy") +def _fresh_empty(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: + # The "engine creates a fresh model on 404" convention: the first time a service is + # seen the store has no row, so callers get an empty SPM to append to. ``service_type`` + # is required by the model but genuinely unknown here; the PCE re-seeds it (along with + # ``owned_roles`` / ``owned_scopes``) from the IdP catalog before it is ever consulted, + # so the placeholder below never reaches a policy decision. + return ServicePolicyModel( + service_id=service_id, + service_type=ServiceType.AGENT, + owned_roles=[], + owned_scopes=[], + inbound_rules=[], + ) + + +def get_service_policy(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{service_id}") + if resp.status_code == 404: + return _fresh_empty(service_id) _check(resp) - return PolicyModel.model_validate(resp.json()) + return ServicePolicyModel.model_validate(resp.json()) -def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}") - _check(resp) - return AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(resp.json()) - - -def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None: - resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy", json=model.model_dump()) - _check(resp) +def get_service_policy_by_scope(scope: Scope) -> ServicePolicyModel | None: + # Singular: a scope has exactly one owning service (Assumption 2). Pure sugar over the + # by-id read — no dedicated HTTP route. A scope with no resolved owner has no SPM. + if not scope.serviceId: + return None + return get_service_policy(scope.serviceId) -def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: - resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}", json=model.model_dump()) +def get_service_policies_by_role(role: Role) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]: + # The one genuinely new route. Returns every SPM whose inbound_rules reference role.id — + # including stale role->service mappings the live IdP no longer reflects (which + # override-purge needs). [] when none match. + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services", params={"role": role.id}) _check(resp) + return [ServicePolicyModel.model_validate(item) for item in resp.json()] -def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None: - resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}") +def apply_service_policy(service_id: str, spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None: + resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{service_id}", json=spm.model_dump()) _check(resp) -def delete_policy() -> None: - resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy") +def delete_service_policy(service_id: str) -> None: + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{service_id}") _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py index 0cc871748..897f42740 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py @@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel -DB_PATH = os.getenv("AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH", "/data/policy_model.db") +DB_PATH = os.getenv("SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH", "/data/policy_model.db") -_cache: dict[str, AgentPolicyModel] = {} +# In-memory cache of ServicePolicyModel rows keyed by service_id — the authoritative +# serving layer. All reads are served from here; SQLite is the durable write-through backend. +_cache: dict[str, ServicePolicyModel] = {} _db_conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None @@ -21,19 +23,13 @@ def get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection: def _init_db(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None: - conn.execute( - "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agent_policies " - "(agent_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, spec TEXT NOT NULL)" - ) + conn.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_policies (service_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, spec TEXT NOT NULL)") def _load_cache(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None: global _cache - rows = conn.execute("SELECT agent_id, spec FROM agent_policies").fetchall() - _cache = { - agent_id: AgentPolicyModel.model_validate_json(spec) - for agent_id, spec in rows - } + rows = conn.execute("SELECT service_id, spec FROM service_policies").fetchall() + _cache = {service_id: ServicePolicyModel.model_validate_json(spec) for service_id, spec in rows} @asynccontextmanager @@ -51,85 +47,49 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan) -@app.get("/policy", response_model=None) -def get_policy() -> PolicyModel: - return PolicyModel(agents=list(_cache.values())) +@app.get("/policy/services", response_model=None) +def list_service_policies_by_role(role: str) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]: + # Return every cached SPM whose inbound_rules reference the given role id. This must + # be answered from the store (not the IdP): the SPM is the source of truth, so stale + # role->service mappings the live IdP no longer reflects still show up here — which is + # exactly what override-purge needs. Never 404s; empty list on no match. + return [spm for spm in _cache.values() if any(rule.role.id == role for rule in spm.inbound_rules)] -@app.get("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", response_model=None) -def get_agent_policy(agent_id: str): - if agent_id not in _cache: - return JSONResponse(status_code=404, content={"error": f"agent {agent_id} not found"}) - return _cache[agent_id] +@app.get("/policy/services/{service_id}", response_model=None) +def get_service_policy(service_id: str): + if service_id not in _cache: + return JSONResponse(status_code=404, content={"error": f"service {service_id} not found"}) + return _cache[service_id] -@app.post("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", response_model=None) -def upsert_agent_policy( - agent_id: str, - body: AgentPolicyModel, +@app.post("/policy/services/{service_id}", response_model=None) +def upsert_service_policy( + service_id: str, + body: ServicePolicyModel, conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], ) -> Response: try: conn.execute( - "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", - (agent_id, body.model_dump_json()), + "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + (service_id, body.model_dump_json()), ) except sqlite3.Error as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - _cache[agent_id] = body + _cache[service_id] = body return Response(status_code=204) -@app.post("/policy", response_model=None) -def replace_policy( - body: PolicyModel, +@app.delete("/policy/services/{service_id}", response_model=None) +def delete_service_policy( + service_id: str, conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], ) -> Response: try: - conn.execute("BEGIN") - conn.execute("DELETE FROM agent_policies") - for agent in body.agents: - conn.execute( - "INSERT INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", - (agent.agent_id, agent.model_dump_json()), - ) - conn.execute("COMMIT") + conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", (service_id,)) except sqlite3.Error as e: - try: - conn.execute("ROLLBACK") - except Exception: - pass return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - global _cache - _cache = {agent.agent_id: agent for agent in body.agents} - return Response(status_code=204) - - -@app.delete("/policy/agents/{agent_id}", response_model=None) -def delete_agent_policy( - agent_id: str, - conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], -) -> Response: - try: - conn.execute( - "DELETE FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?", (agent_id,) - ) - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - _cache.pop(agent_id, None) - return Response(status_code=204) - - -@app.delete("/policy", response_model=None) -def delete_all_policies( - conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], -) -> Response: - try: - conn.execute("DELETE FROM agent_policies") - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - global _cache - _cache = {} + _cache.pop(service_id, None) return Response(status_code=204) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py index 199ce9f80..1072d5568 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -1,26 +1,35 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/policy/store/library/api.py. + +SPM-centric HTTP client. Mocks the ``requests`` layer — no live Policy Store. The store +persists ``ServicePolicyModel`` only; there are no per-agent or whole-collection functions. +""" + from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, ServiceType +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:7074" -# Minimal valid fixtures -_AGENT_POLICY_DICT = { - "agent_id": "agent-1", - "agent_roles": [], - "agent_scopes": [], - "subject_roles": {}, - "source_roles": {}, - "target_scopes": {}, - "inbound_rules": [], - "outbound_rules": [], -} -_POLICY_DICT = {"agents": [_AGENT_POLICY_DICT]} - - -def _mock_response(status_code: int, json_data: dict | None = None) -> MagicMock: + +def _spm_dict(service_id: str = "svc-1", role_id: str = "role-1") -> dict: + return ServicePolicyModel( + service_id=service_id, + service_type=ServiceType.AGENT, + owned_roles=[], + owned_scopes=[], + inbound_rules=[ + PolicyRule( + role=Role(id=role_id, name="admin", composite=False), + scope=Scope(id="scope-1", name="read", serviceId=service_id), + ) + ], + ).model_dump(mode="json") + + +def _mock_response(status_code: int, json_data=None) -> MagicMock: resp = MagicMock() resp.status_code = status_code resp.ok = 200 <= status_code < 300 @@ -30,153 +39,206 @@ def _mock_response(status_code: int, json_data: dict | None = None) -> MagicMock # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# get_policy +# get_service_policy (by-id) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestGetPolicy: - def test_returns_policy_model(self): + +class TestGetServicePolicy: + def test_by_id_hit_returns_spm(self): with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: - mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _POLICY_DICT) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_policy - result = get_policy() - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy") - assert isinstance(result, PolicyModel) + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _spm_dict("svc-1")) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy - def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + result = get_service_policy("svc-1") + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/svc-1") + assert isinstance(result, ServicePolicyModel) + assert result.service_id == "svc-1" + + def test_by_id_miss_returns_fresh_empty_spm_no_raise(self): + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(404) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy + + result = get_service_policy("brand-new") + assert isinstance(result, ServicePolicyModel) + assert result.service_id == "brand-new" + assert result.owned_roles == [] + assert result.owned_scopes == [] + assert result.inbound_rules == [] + + def test_raises_on_other_error_response(self): with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(500) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_policy + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - get_policy() + get_service_policy("svc-1") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# get_agent_policy +# get_service_policy_by_scope # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestGetAgentPolicy: - def test_returns_agent_policy_model(self): + +class TestGetServicePolicyByScope: + def test_resolves_via_scope_service_id(self): + scope = Scope(id="scope-1", name="read", serviceId="owning-svc") with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: - mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _AGENT_POLICY_DICT) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_agent_policy - result = get_agent_policy("agent-1") - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/agents/agent-1") - assert isinstance(result, AgentPolicyModel) - assert result.agent_id == "agent-1" + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _spm_dict("owning-svc")) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy_by_scope - def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + result = get_service_policy_by_scope(scope) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/owning-svc") + assert result is not None + assert result.service_id == "owning-svc" + + def test_returns_none_when_scope_has_no_owner(self): + scope = Scope(id="scope-1", name="read") # serviceId defaults to "" with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: - mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(404) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_agent_policy + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy_by_scope + + result = get_service_policy_by_scope(scope) + assert result is None + mock_get.assert_not_called() + + def test_raises_on_non_404_error(self): + scope = Scope(id="scope-1", name="read", serviceId="owning-svc") + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(500) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy_by_scope + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - get_agent_policy("missing-agent") + get_service_policy_by_scope(scope) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# apply_policy +# get_service_policies_by_role # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestApplyPolicy: - def test_posts_serialized_model(self): - model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) - with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: - mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(200) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_policy - result = apply_policy(model) - mock_post.assert_called_once_with( - f"{BASE_URL}/policy", json=model.model_dump() - ) - assert result is None + +class TestGetServicePoliciesByRole: + def test_by_role_hit_returns_matching_spm(self): + role = Role(id="user-role", name="reader", composite=False) + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, [_spm_dict("svc-a", "user-role")]) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policies_by_role + + result = get_service_policies_by_role(role) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services", params={"role": "user-role"}) + assert [s.service_id for s in result] == ["svc-a"] + + def test_by_role_multiple_returns_all(self): + role = Role(id="shared", name="reader", composite=False) + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, [_spm_dict("svc-a", "shared"), _spm_dict("svc-b", "shared")]) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policies_by_role + + result = get_service_policies_by_role(role) + assert sorted(s.service_id for s in result) == ["svc-a", "svc-b"] + + def test_by_role_miss_returns_empty_list(self): + role = Role(id="nobody", name="reader", composite=False) + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, []) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policies_by_role + + assert get_service_policies_by_role(role) == [] def test_raises_on_error_response(self): - model = PolicyModel.model_validate(_POLICY_DICT) - with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: - mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(400) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_policy + role = Role(id="user-role", name="reader", composite=False) + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(500) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policies_by_role + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - apply_policy(model) + get_service_policies_by_role(role) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# apply_agent_policy +# apply_service_policy (upsert) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestApplyAgentPolicy: - def test_posts_serialized_agent_model(self): - model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + +class TestApplyServicePolicy: + def test_posts_serialized_spm_upsert(self): + spm = ServicePolicyModel.model_validate(_spm_dict("svc-1")) with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: - mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(200) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy - result = apply_agent_policy("agent-1", model) - mock_post.assert_called_once_with( - f"{BASE_URL}/policy/agents/agent-1", json=model.model_dump() - ) + mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(204) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_service_policy + + result = apply_service_policy("svc-1", spm) + mock_post.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/svc-1", json=spm.model_dump()) assert result is None def test_raises_on_error_response(self): - model = AgentPolicyModel.model_validate(_AGENT_POLICY_DICT) + spm = ServicePolicyModel.model_validate(_spm_dict("svc-1")) with patch("requests.post") as mock_post: - mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(500) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy + mock_post.return_value = _mock_response(502) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_service_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - apply_agent_policy("agent-1", model) + apply_service_policy("svc-1", spm) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# delete_agent_policy +# delete_service_policy # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestDeleteAgentPolicy: - def test_deletes_agent_policy(self): + +class TestDeleteServicePolicy: + def test_deletes_service_policy(self): with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(204) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_agent_policy - result = delete_agent_policy("agent-1") - mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/agents/agent-1") + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_service_policy + + result = delete_service_policy("svc-1") + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/svc-1") assert result is None def test_raises_on_error_response(self): with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: - mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(404) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_agent_policy + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(502) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_service_policy + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - delete_agent_policy("missing-agent") + delete_service_policy("svc-1") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# delete_policy +# Removed surface: no per-agent / whole-collection functions # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestDeletePolicy: - def test_deletes_policy(self): - with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: - mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(204) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_policy - result = delete_policy() - mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy") - assert result is None - def test_raises_on_error_response(self): - with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: - mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(500) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_policy - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): - delete_policy() +class TestRemovedFunctions: + def test_no_agent_or_collection_functions(self): + import aiac.policy.store.library.api as api + + for removed in ( + "get_policy", + "apply_policy", + "delete_policy", + "get_agent_policy", + "apply_agent_policy", + "delete_agent_policy", + ): + assert not hasattr(api, removed), f"{removed} should be removed" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # URL fallback # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + class TestUrlFallback: def test_defaults_to_localhost_7074_when_env_unset(self): + import os + with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False): - # Remove the env var if present - import os os.environ.pop("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", None) with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: - mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _POLICY_DICT) - from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_policy - get_policy() + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _spm_dict("svc-1")) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy + + get_service_policy("svc-1") call_url = mock_get.call_args[0][0] - assert call_url == "http://127.0.0.1:7074/policy" + assert call_url == "http://127.0.0.1:7074/policy/services/svc-1" diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py index bec5c003f..7088e60d8 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py @@ -1,4 +1,10 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac/policy/store/service/main.py FastAPI application.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac/policy/store/service/main.py FastAPI application. + +SPM-centric surface: the store persists ``ServicePolicyModel`` rows keyed by +``service_id``. ``AgentPolicyModel`` is derived and never persisted, so there are no +per-agent or whole-collection endpoints. Seam: an in-memory SQLite connection is injected +on startup instead of opening ``SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH``. +""" import sqlite3 from unittest.mock import MagicMock @@ -7,8 +13,8 @@ from fastapi.testclient import TestClient import aiac.policy.store.service.main as svc -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, ServiceType +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel from aiac.policy.store.service.main import app, get_db # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -20,28 +26,21 @@ def _role(id: str = "role-1", name: str = "admin") -> Role: return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=False) -def _scope(id: str = "scope-1", name: str = "read") -> Scope: - return Scope(id=id, name=name) - - -def _service(id: str = "svc-1", service_id: str = "my-service") -> Service: - return Service(id=id, serviceId=service_id, enabled=True) - +def _scope(id: str = "scope-1", name: str = "read", service_id: str = "my-service") -> Scope: + return Scope(id=id, name=name, serviceId=service_id) -def _subject(id: str = "sub-1", username: str = "alice") -> Subject: - return Subject(id=id, username=username, enabled=True) - -def _make_agent(agent_id: str = "agent-1") -> AgentPolicyModel: - return AgentPolicyModel( - agent_id=agent_id, - agent_roles=[_role()], - agent_scopes=[_scope()], - subject_roles={_subject().id: [_role()]}, - source_roles={_service().id: [_role()]}, - target_scopes={_service().id: [_scope()]}, - inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=_role(), scope=_scope())], - outbound_rules=[], +def _spm( + service_id: str = "my-service", + role_id: str = "role-1", + service_type: ServiceType = ServiceType.AGENT, +) -> ServicePolicyModel: + return ServicePolicyModel( + service_id=service_id, + service_type=service_type, + owned_roles=[_role()], + owned_scopes=[_scope(service_id=service_id)], + inbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=_role(id=role_id), scope=_scope(service_id=service_id))], ) @@ -60,21 +59,17 @@ def client(): svc._cache = {} -@pytest.fixture -def client_with_agent(client): - """Client with one pre-loaded agent in DB and cache.""" - agent = _make_agent("agent-1") - conn = svc._db_conn - conn.execute( - "INSERT INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", - ("agent-1", agent.model_dump_json()), +def _preload(spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None: + """Insert an SPM directly into the current DB + cache (simulating prior state).""" + svc._db_conn.execute( + "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + (spm.service_id, spm.model_dump_json()), ) - svc._cache["agent-1"] = agent - return client + svc._cache[spm.service_id] = spm # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Startup: cache population +# Startup: cache population from SQLite # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -82,16 +77,16 @@ class TestStartup: def test_load_cache_populates_from_db_rows(self): conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False, isolation_level=None) svc._init_db(conn) - agent = _make_agent("agent-1") + spm = _spm("weather-service") conn.execute( - "INSERT INTO agent_policies (agent_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", - ("agent-1", agent.model_dump_json()), + "INSERT INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + ("weather-service", spm.model_dump_json()), ) svc._load_cache(conn) - assert "agent-1" in svc._cache - assert svc._cache["agent-1"].agent_id == "agent-1" + assert "weather-service" in svc._cache + assert svc._cache["weather-service"].service_id == "weather-service" conn.close() svc._cache = {} @@ -103,124 +98,117 @@ def test_load_cache_empty_when_db_empty(self): assert svc._cache == {} conn.close() + svc._cache = {} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# GET /policy +# GET /policy/services/{service_id} (by-id) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestGetPolicy: - def test_returns_empty_policy_model_when_cache_empty(self, client): - resp = client.get("/policy") +class TestGetServicePolicy: + def test_returns_spm_when_in_cache(self, client): + _preload(_spm("weather-service")) + resp = client.get("/policy/services/weather-service") assert resp.status_code == 200 - body = resp.json() - assert body["agents"] == [] + assert resp.json()["service_id"] == "weather-service" + + def test_returns_404_when_not_in_cache(self, client): + resp = client.get("/policy/services/missing-service") + assert resp.status_code == 404 + assert resp.json() == {"error": "service missing-service not found"} - def test_returns_policy_model_with_agents_from_cache(self, client_with_agent): - resp = client_with_agent.get("/policy") + def test_get_after_post_returns_updated_value_from_cache(self, client): + client.post("/policy/services/svc-x", json=_spm("svc-x").model_dump()) + resp = client.get("/policy/services/svc-x") assert resp.status_code == 200 - body = resp.json() - assert len(body["agents"]) == 1 - assert body["agents"][0]["agent_id"] == "agent-1" + assert resp.json()["service_id"] == "svc-x" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# GET /policy/agents/{agent_id} +# GET /policy/services?role={role_id} (by-role) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestGetAgentPolicy: - def test_returns_agent_policy_model_when_in_cache(self, client_with_agent): - resp = client_with_agent.get("/policy/agents/agent-1") +class TestGetServicePoliciesByRole: + def test_returns_single_spm_referencing_role(self, client): + _preload(_spm("svc-a", role_id="user-role")) + _preload(_spm("svc-b", role_id="other-role")) + resp = client.get("/policy/services", params={"role": "user-role"}) assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json()["agent_id"] == "agent-1" + body = resp.json() + assert [s["service_id"] for s in body] == ["svc-a"] - def test_returns_404_when_agent_not_in_cache(self, client): - resp = client.get("/policy/agents/missing-agent") - assert resp.status_code == 404 - assert resp.json() == {"error": "agent missing-agent not found"} + def test_returns_all_spms_when_several_reference_role(self, client): + _preload(_spm("svc-a", role_id="shared-role")) + _preload(_spm("svc-b", role_id="shared-role")) + _preload(_spm("svc-c", role_id="other-role")) + resp = client.get("/policy/services", params={"role": "shared-role"}) + assert resp.status_code == 200 + ids = sorted(s["service_id"] for s in resp.json()) + assert ids == ["svc-a", "svc-b"] - def test_get_after_post_returns_updated_value_from_cache_not_db(self, client): - agent = _make_agent("agent-x") - client.post("/policy/agents/agent-x", json=agent.model_dump()) - resp = client.get("/policy/agents/agent-x") + def test_returns_empty_list_when_no_spm_references_role(self, client): + _preload(_spm("svc-a", role_id="user-role")) + resp = client.get("/policy/services", params={"role": "nobody"}) assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json()["agent_id"] == "agent-x" + assert resp.json() == [] + + def test_returns_empty_list_when_cache_empty(self, client): + resp = client.get("/policy/services", params={"role": "anything"}) + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json() == [] # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# POST /policy/agents/{agent_id} +# POST /policy/services/{service_id} (upsert) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestUpsertAgentPolicy: +class TestUpsertServicePolicy: def test_writes_to_db_updates_cache_returns_204(self, client): - agent = _make_agent("agent-2") - resp = client.post("/policy/agents/agent-2", json=agent.model_dump()) + resp = client.post("/policy/services/svc-1", json=_spm("svc-1").model_dump()) assert resp.status_code == 204 - assert "agent-2" in svc._cache - row = svc._db_conn.execute( - "SELECT spec FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?", ("agent-2",) - ).fetchone() + assert "svc-1" in svc._cache + row = svc._db_conn.execute("SELECT spec FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", ("svc-1",)).fetchone() assert row is not None - def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): - bad_conn = MagicMock() - bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") - app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn - agent = _make_agent("agent-err") - resp = client.post("/policy/agents/agent-err", json=agent.model_dump()) - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# POST /policy (full rebuild) -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestReplacePolicy: - def test_full_rebuild_replaces_cache_returns_204(self, client_with_agent): - new_agent = _make_agent("agent-new") - policy = PolicyModel(agents=[new_agent]) - resp = client_with_agent.post("/policy", json=policy.model_dump()) - assert resp.status_code == 204 - assert "agent-1" not in svc._cache - assert "agent-new" in svc._cache + def test_repeat_post_replaces_row_upsert_round_trip(self, client): + client.post("/policy/services/svc-1", json=_spm("svc-1", role_id="role-a").model_dump()) + client.post("/policy/services/svc-1", json=_spm("svc-1", role_id="role-b").model_dump()) - def test_deletes_all_rows_and_inserts_new_rows(self, client_with_agent): - new_agent = _make_agent("agent-new") - policy = PolicyModel(agents=[new_agent]) - client_with_agent.post("/policy", json=policy.model_dump()) rows = svc._db_conn.execute( - "SELECT agent_id FROM agent_policies" + "SELECT service_id FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", ("svc-1",) ).fetchall() - agent_ids = {r[0] for r in rows} - assert agent_ids == {"agent-new"} + assert len(rows) == 1 # replaced, not duplicated + + # The stored/cached SPM now carries the second write's rule. + resp = client.get("/policy/services/svc-1") + rule_role_ids = [r["role"]["id"] for r in resp.json()["inbound_rules"]] + assert rule_role_ids == ["role-b"] def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): bad_conn = MagicMock() bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn - policy = PolicyModel(agents=[_make_agent()]) - resp = client.post("/policy", json=policy.model_dump()) + resp = client.post("/policy/services/svc-err", json=_spm("svc-err").model_dump()) assert resp.status_code == 502 assert "error" in resp.json() # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# DELETE /policy/agents/{agent_id} +# DELETE /policy/services/{service_id} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -class TestDeleteAgentPolicy: - def test_removes_row_from_db_and_cache_returns_204(self, client_with_agent): - resp = client_with_agent.delete("/policy/agents/agent-1") +class TestDeleteServicePolicy: + def test_removes_row_from_db_and_cache_returns_204(self, client): + _preload(_spm("svc-1")) + resp = client.delete("/policy/services/svc-1") assert resp.status_code == 204 - assert "agent-1" not in svc._cache + assert "svc-1" not in svc._cache row = svc._db_conn.execute( - "SELECT agent_id FROM agent_policies WHERE agent_id = ?", ("agent-1",) + "SELECT service_id FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", ("svc-1",) ).fetchone() assert row is None @@ -228,29 +216,7 @@ def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): bad_conn = MagicMock() bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn - resp = client.delete("/policy/agents/agent-1") - assert resp.status_code == 502 - assert "error" in resp.json() - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# DELETE /policy -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -class TestDeletePolicy: - def test_removes_all_rows_clears_cache_returns_204(self, client_with_agent): - resp = client_with_agent.delete("/policy") - assert resp.status_code == 204 - assert svc._cache == {} - rows = svc._db_conn.execute("SELECT agent_id FROM agent_policies").fetchall() - assert rows == [] - - def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): - bad_conn = MagicMock() - bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") - app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn - resp = client.delete("/policy") + resp = client.delete("/policy/services/svc-1") assert resp.status_code == 502 assert "error" in resp.json() @@ -271,3 +237,16 @@ def test_returns_503_when_sqlite_unavailable(self, client): app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn resp = client.get("/health") assert resp.status_code == 503 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Removed surface: no per-agent / whole-collection endpoints +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestRemovedEndpoints: + def test_whole_collection_get_policy_absent(self, client): + assert client.get("/policy").status_code == 404 + + def test_per_agent_get_absent(self, client): + assert client.get("/policy/agents/agent-1").status_code == 404 From eaa896126f671593639fd9b2a2865e487fa5dc38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 03:35:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 229/273] Feat(aiac): Source agent roles from client roles + populate SPM/APM fields at IdP boundary Handoff 02 (Wave 2). GET /services/{id}/roles now reads client roles via admin.get_client_roles (was realm roles of the service account), so an agent's role is a Keycloak client role on its own client (Assumption 3). The service enriches the raw JSON it returns with the SPM/APM classification fields and enforces the invariants only it can see: - Role.kind from clientRole (client role -> Agent, realm role -> User); never inferred from naming. - Role.actorIds per kind: Agent -> owning client serviceId (from containerId); User -> member usernames (aiac.managed roles), aligned with GET /subjects?role_id=. - Scope.serviceId = owning client on GET /services/{id}/scopes. - Assumption 1 (no cross-kind role) and Assumption 2 (single owner of an aiac.managed scope) enforced fail-loud -> HTTP 409. Library deserialization stays a thin pass-through (handoff 03); models.py/api.py untouched. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 95 ++++++++- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 192 ++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index b57834e75..eb218aa9d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -29,6 +29,53 @@ _SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE = "client.type" +class _InvariantViolation(Exception): + """Raised when Keycloak facts violate an AIAC assumption the IdP boundary must hold + (e.g. Assumption 1 — no cross-kind role). Surfaced as HTTP 409, distinct from the 502 + used for upstream KeycloakError, so callers can tell an invariant breach from an outage.""" + + +def _assert_single_kind(members: list[dict], role_name: str) -> None: + """Assumption 1 (no cross-kind role): a role must be held by human users *or* by agent + service accounts, never both — otherwise a single ``actorIds`` list cannot represent it. + Keycloak names an agent service account ``service-account-``.""" + has_agent = any(m.get("username", "").startswith("service-account-") for m in members) + has_user = any(not m.get("username", "").startswith("service-account-") for m in members) + if has_agent and has_user: + raise _InvariantViolation( + f"role '{role_name}' is held by both human users and agent service accounts " + f"(Assumption 1: no cross-kind role)" + ) + + +def _assert_single_owner(admin: "KeycloakAdmin", scope: dict) -> None: + """Assumption 2 (single scope owner): an AIAC-managed client scope must be exposed as a + default scope by exactly one client. Keycloak client scopes are realm-level and assignable + to many clients, so this is not a Keycloak guarantee — detect a multi-owner scope by scanning + clients' default scopes and fail loud, since a single ``Scope.serviceId`` cannot represent it.""" + scope_id = scope["id"] + owners = [ + client + for client in admin.get_clients() + if any(s["id"] == scope_id for s in admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(client["id"])) + ] + if len(owners) > 1: + raise _InvariantViolation( + f"AIAC-managed scope '{scope.get('name', scope_id)}' is exposed by {len(owners)} " + f"clients (Assumption 2: a scope has exactly one owner)" + ) + + +def _is_aiac_managed(attributes: dict | None) -> bool: + """True when a Keycloak role/scope carries the ``aiac.managed`` provisioning marker. + Realm-role attribute values are lists of strings; client-scope values are plain strings — + tolerate both (mirrors ``_is_aiac_managed`` in ``aiac.idp.configuration.models``).""" + value = (attributes or {}).get(_AIAC_MANAGED_ATTRIBUTE) + if isinstance(value, list): + return "true" in value + return value == "true" + + def _get_or_create_admin(realm: str) -> KeycloakAdmin: if realm not in _cache: with _lock: @@ -143,9 +190,21 @@ def set_service_type( @app.get("/services/{service_id}/roles") def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - sa_user = admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id) - user_id = sa_user["id"] - return admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id) + # SPM/APM (Assumption 3): an agent's role is a Keycloak *client role* on the agent's + # own client, so source agent roles from the client's client roles (R_A) — not from + # the realm roles of its service account. Each returned RoleRepresentation carries + # clientRole=true and containerId (the client UUID), used to classify + resolve owner. + roles = admin.get_client_roles(service_id) + owners: dict[str, str] = {} # containerId -> owning client's serviceId (clientId) + for role in roles: + container_id = role.get("containerId") or service_id + if container_id not in owners: + owners[container_id] = admin.get_client(container_id)["clientId"] + # clientRole == true -> kind=Agent; actorIds = the owning client's serviceId, + # resolved from the role's containerId. + role["kind"] = "Agent" + role["actorIds"] = [owners[container_id]] + return roles except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 400: return [] @@ -171,7 +230,20 @@ def assign_role_to_service(service_id: str, role_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = @app.get("/services/{service_id}/scopes") def list_service_scopes(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - return admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id) + scopes = admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id) + if scopes: + # Scope.serviceId = the owning client. For a per-service listing the owner is this + # service; resolve its serviceId (clientId). AIAC-managed scopes must have exactly + # one owner (Assumption 2) — enforce fail-loud. Built-ins are shared by design, so + # they are exempt from the single-owner scan. + owner = admin.get_client(service_id)["clientId"] + for scope in scopes: + if _is_aiac_managed(scope.get("attributes")): + _assert_single_owner(admin, scope) # Assumption 2, fail loud + scope["serviceId"] = owner + return scopes + except _InvariantViolation as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) @@ -207,7 +279,20 @@ def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: # brief_representation=False so realm-role attributes (incl. the aiac.managed marker) # are returned; the brief representation Keycloak returns by default omits them. - return admin.get_realm_roles(brief_representation=False) + roles = admin.get_realm_roles(brief_representation=False) + for role in roles: + # Realm roles are user roles (clientRole == false) -> kind=User (Assumption 3). + role["kind"] = "User" + # For AIAC-managed user roles, actorIds = the member usernames — the same values + # GET /subjects?role_id= returns for this role (SPM/APM alignment, 1.12). Built-ins + # are left unenriched (no member scan). + if _is_aiac_managed(role.get("attributes")): + members = admin.get_realm_role_members(role["name"]) + _assert_single_kind(members, role["name"]) # Assumption 1, fail loud + role["actorIds"] = [m["username"] for m in members] + return roles + except _InvariantViolation as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=409, content={"error": str(e)}) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 9897d8cae..6c0ddc713 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ def test_returns_json_array(self): admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + # Realm roles are user roles (clientRole == false) -> kind=User (handoff 02). + assert resp.json() == [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin", "kind": "User"}] def test_requests_full_representation_for_attributes(self): # The aiac.managed marker lives in role attributes, which Keycloak's brief @@ -51,6 +52,40 @@ def test_requests_full_representation_for_attributes(self): _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") admin.get_realm_roles.assert_called_once_with(brief_representation=False) + def test_populates_user_kind_on_all_realm_roles(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "reader"}, + {"id": "r2", "name": "default-roles-kagenti"}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert [r["kind"] for r in resp.json()] == ["User", "User"] + + def test_aiac_managed_role_gets_member_usernames_as_actor_ids(self): + # For a user (realm) role, actorIds = the member usernames — resolved via the same + # get_realm_role_members call that GET /subjects?role_id= uses (SPM/APM alignment). + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "invoicing", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}}, + ] + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [ + {"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}, + {"id": "u2", "username": "bob"}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + role = resp.json()[0] + assert role["kind"] == "User" + assert role["actorIds"] == ["alice", "bob"] + admin.get_realm_role_members.assert_called_once_with("invoicing") + + def test_non_managed_role_skips_member_query(self): + # Built-ins / non-AIAC roles are not enriched with actorIds (no member scan). + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [{"id": "r1", "name": "admin"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert "actorIds" not in resp.json()[0] + admin.get_realm_role_members.assert_not_called() + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /services @@ -105,29 +140,46 @@ def test_returns_object_with_realm_and_service_mappings(self): class TestListServiceRoles: - def test_returns_json_array(self): + def test_sources_client_roles_not_service_account_realm_roles(self): + # Handoff 02 (Assumption 3): an agent's role is a Keycloak *client role* on its own + # client, so this endpoint reads the client's client roles directly. admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-user-id"} - admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] + admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "invoke", "clientRole": True}] + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "github-agent"} resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "cr1", "name": "view-clients"}] - admin.get_client_service_account_user.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") - admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.assert_called_once_with("sa-user-id") + admin.get_client_roles.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + # The realm-roles-of-service-account path is no longer used. + admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.assert_not_called() + + def test_populates_agent_kind_and_owner_actor_ids(self): + # clientRole == true -> kind=Agent; actorIds = the owning client's serviceId, + # resolved from the role's containerId -> client. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "cr1", "name": "invoke", "clientRole": True, "containerId": "svc-uuid"}, + ] + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "github-agent"} + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + role = resp.json()[0] + assert role["kind"] == "Agent" + assert role["actorIds"] == ["github-agent"] + admin.get_client.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = KeycloakError( + admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = KeycloakError( error_message="not found", response_code=404 ) resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 502 assert "error" in resp.json() - def test_returns_empty_list_when_client_has_no_service_account(self): + def test_returns_empty_list_when_client_has_no_client_roles(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = KeycloakError( - error_message="Client does not have a service account", response_code=400 + admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = KeycloakError( + error_message="Client not found", response_code=400 ) resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 @@ -137,21 +189,66 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Assumption 1 (no cross-kind role) — fail loud (handoff 02) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestCrossKindEnforcement: + def test_role_held_by_users_and_service_accounts_returns_409(self): + # A role held by *both* human users and agent service accounts cannot be represented + # by a single actorIds list — fail loud rather than silently picking a side. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "shared", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}}, + ] + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [ + {"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}, + {"id": "sa", "username": "service-account-github-agent"}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 409 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_role_held_only_by_users_is_ok(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "readers", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}}, + ] + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = [ + {"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}, + {"id": "u2", "username": "bob"}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()[0]["actorIds"] == ["alice", "bob"] + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /services/{service_id}/scopes # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class TestListServiceScopes: - def test_returns_json_array(self): + def test_returns_json_array_with_owner_service_id(self): + # Scope.serviceId = the owning client (the service exposing the scope), resolved to the + # client's serviceId (clientId) — the single owner for a per-service scope listing. admin = MagicMock() admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.return_value = [ {"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}, {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}, ] + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "github-agent"} resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/scopes?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.json() == [{"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}, {"id": "sc2", "name": "email"}] + assert resp.json() == [ + {"id": "sc1", "name": "profile", "serviceId": "github-agent"}, + {"id": "sc2", "name": "email", "serviceId": "github-agent"}, + ] + admin.get_client.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") def test_verifies_get_client_default_client_scopes_called(self): admin = MagicMock() @@ -172,6 +269,52 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Assumption 2 (single scope owner) — fail loud (handoff 02) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestSingleScopeOwnerEnforcement: + _MANAGED = {"id": "aud-1", "name": "svc-a-aud", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": "true"}} + + def test_aiac_managed_scope_with_multiple_owners_returns_409(self): + # An AIAC-managed client scope must have exactly one owning client; if more than one + # client exposes it as a default scope, a single Scope.serviceId cannot represent it. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.return_value = [self._MANAGED] + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-a", "clientId": "svc-a"} + admin.get_clients.return_value = [{"id": "svc-a"}, {"id": "svc-b"}] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-a/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 409 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def test_aiac_managed_scope_with_single_owner_is_ok(self): + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-a", "clientId": "svc-a"} + admin.get_clients.return_value = [{"id": "svc-a"}, {"id": "svc-b"}] + + def _defaults(client_id): + return [self._MANAGED] if client_id == "svc-a" else [] + + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.side_effect = _defaults + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-a/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()[0]["serviceId"] == "svc-a" + + def test_non_managed_scope_skips_owner_scan(self): + # Built-in / non-AIAC scopes are not subject to the single-owner invariant (Keycloak + # ships them assigned to many clients) — no cross-client scan runs for them. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client_default_client_scopes.return_value = [{"id": "sc1", "name": "profile"}] + admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-a", "clientId": "svc-a"} + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-a/scopes?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + admin.get_clients.assert_not_called() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /roles/{role_name}/composites # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -705,6 +848,27 @@ def test_enrichment_shape_includes_realm_mappings(self): assert "realmMappings" in body[0] assert body[0]["realmMappings"] == [{"id": "rid", "name": "viewer"}] + def test_actor_ids_align_with_subjects_by_role(self): + # SPM/APM alignment (1.12 / 2.14): the member usernames GET /subjects?role_id= returns + # for a user (realm) role are exactly the Role.actorIds GET /roles populates for that + # kind=User role — both resolve via admin.get_realm_role_members. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_role_by_id.return_value = {"id": "rid", "name": "invoicing"} + members = [{"id": "u1", "username": "alice"}, {"id": "u2", "username": "bob"}] + admin.get_realm_role_members.return_value = members + admin.get_all_roles_of_user.return_value = {"realmMappings": [], "clientMappings": {}} + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "rid", "name": "invoicing", "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}}, + ] + client = _make_client(admin) + + subjects = client.get(f"/subjects?realm={REALM}&role_id=rid").json() + roles = client.get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}").json() + + subject_usernames = [s["username"] for s in subjects] + actor_ids = roles[0]["actorIds"] + assert subject_usernames == actor_ids == ["alice", "bob"] + def test_missing_realm_returns_422(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() resp = TestClient(app).get("/subjects?role_id=rid") @@ -759,7 +923,7 @@ def test_get_subject_assignments(self): def test_get_service_permissions(self): admin = MagicMock() - admin.get_client_service_account_user.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + admin.get_client_roles.side_effect = _keycloak_error() assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/roles?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 def test_get_service_scopes(self): From 0096426744b0365400f77a93ea91b71e01c7bbcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 03:37:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 230/273] Refactor(aiac): Rewrite PCE to SPM-based order-independent engine Rework aiac.policy.computation.engine to the two-layer SPM model (handoff 05 / Wave 3), fixing the onboarding order-dependence bug. - Route every rule to SPM(scope.serviceId).inbound_rules (append-dedup; no write-time 3-way classification); override purges the input-role set from every SPM once, up-front, before appending. - Persist changed SPMs, compute affected agents from the batch, then derive each APM entirely from SPMs (zero IdP): P2 identity from owned_*, inbound split by role.kind into subject_roles/source_roles, outbound + target_scopes + subject gate with directional relevance; agent->agent handled uniformly; Tools get an SPM but no APM (P4). Partial-upsert via apply_policy once. - Rewrite test_engine.py as 18 tests over an in-memory SPM-store fake, covering both-orders->identical APM(A), latent sibling bug, agent->agent, override purge, dedup, no flattening, P2/P4, directional relevance, affected-set-from-batch, and fire-and-forget. - Un-freeze test/policy/computation; drop the obsolete --ignore flags from the CLAUDE.md unit-test command. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 6 + aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 339 +++++---- aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 757 ++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 552 insertions(+), 550 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index 134b45ffa..18ab64702 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ For current file list, `ls` or `find` under `src/aiac/`. .venv/bin/pytest test/ -m "not integration" ``` +The whole `test/` tree (including `test/policy/`) collects and runs green. The Policy +Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation.engine`) was migrated to the SPM store surface in +**Wave 3 / Handoff 05**, so the earlier PCE-chain collection failures (which required ignoring +`test/policy/computation`, `test/agent/controller/test_routes.py`, and +`test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py`) are resolved — no `--ignore` flags are needed. + Use `ls test/` to discover current test directories. **Integration tests** (`-m integration`) need live config — Keycloak + admin creds + an LLM diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index e77fe6f30..ec2dfa841 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -1,12 +1,23 @@ -"""Policy Computation Engine. - -A pure library that turns partial ``list[PolicyRule]`` updates into merged -``AgentPolicyModel`` records: it resolves IdP relationships, merges into the -Policy Store (additive append by default, or authoritative role-keyed replace -when ``override`` is set), and pushes the resulting ``PolicyModel`` to the PDP -Policy Writer. Rules arrive pre-flattened from the calling sub-agent — the PCE -performs no composite-role expansion. Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` -never raises. +"""Policy Computation Engine (SPM-based, order-independent). + +A pure library that folds partial ``list[PolicyRule]`` updates into the persistent, +per-service source of truth — ``ServicePolicyModel`` (SPM) — and then **derives** each +affected agent's ``AgentPolicyModel`` (APM) entirely from those SPMs before partial-upserting +them to the PDP Policy Writer. + +Why SPMs. The previous design persisted only per-agent APMs with rules denormalised onto the +agent, which made the merge outcome depend on onboarding order (``UR→TS`` was dropped when the +tool onboarded before any agent targeted it). Here every rule ``(role → scope)`` is stored as an +inbound edge on ``SPM(scope.serviceId)`` — the service that *owns* the scope — so the fact +survives regardless of which services already exist, and both onboarding orders converge to the +same derived ``APM(A)``. + +Input contract. Each ``PolicyRule`` arrives with ``scope.serviceId``, ``role.kind`` and +``role.actorIds`` already populated and with roles already flattened to their closure. The PCE +performs no IdP lookup for routing/classification and no role flattening — the only runtime IdP +read is ``Configuration.get_services()`` for the identity (P2) seed. + +Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` never raises. """ import logging @@ -14,30 +25,25 @@ from typing import TypeVar from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, RoleKind, Scope, ServiceType from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule -from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_agent_policy, get_agent_policy +from aiac.policy.model.models import ( + AgentPolicyModel, + PolicyModel, + PolicyRule, + ServicePolicyModel, +) +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( + apply_service_policy, + get_service_policies_by_role, + get_service_policy, +) logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) _Entity = TypeVar("_Entity", Role, Scope) -def _fresh(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: - return AgentPolicyModel( - agent_id=agent_id, - agent_roles=[], - agent_scopes=[], - source_roles={}, - subject_roles={}, - target_scopes={}, - inbound_rules=[], - outbound_rules=[], - outbound_subject_rules=[], - ) - - def _add_rule(rules: list[PolicyRule], rule: PolicyRule) -> None: """Append ``rule`` unless one with the same ``role.id`` + ``scope.id`` is present.""" if any(r.role.id == rule.role.id and r.scope.id == rule.scope.id for r in rules): @@ -52,66 +58,31 @@ def _add_by_id(items: list[_Entity], item: _Entity) -> None: items.append(item) -def _merge_map(dest: dict[str, list[_Entity]], src: dict[str, list[_Entity]]) -> None: - for key, values in src.items(): - target = dest.setdefault(key, []) - for value in values: - _add_by_id(target, value) - - -def _merge(existing: AgentPolicyModel, delta: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: - """Additively fold ``delta`` into ``existing`` (mutating ``existing``).""" - for rule in delta.inbound_rules: - _add_rule(existing.inbound_rules, rule) - for rule in delta.outbound_rules: - _add_rule(existing.outbound_rules, rule) - for rule in delta.outbound_subject_rules: - _add_rule(existing.outbound_subject_rules, rule) - _merge_map(existing.source_roles, delta.source_roles) - _merge_map(existing.subject_roles, delta.subject_roles) - _merge_map(existing.target_scopes, delta.target_scopes) - - -def _drop_roles_from_map(mapping: dict[str, list[Role]], role_ids: set[str]) -> None: - """Drop every role whose ``id`` is in ``role_ids`` from each list; prune empty keys.""" - for key in list(mapping): - mapping[key] = [role for role in mapping[key] if role.id not in role_ids] - if not mapping[key]: - del mapping[key] - - -def _purge_roles(model: AgentPolicyModel, role_ids: set[str]) -> None: - """Remove every trace of ``role_ids`` from ``model`` (authoritative replace). - - Drops matching rules from both ``inbound_rules`` and ``outbound_rules``, drops - the roles from ``source_roles`` / ``subject_roles``, and reconciles - ``target_scopes`` to only the scopes still justified by a surviving outbound rule. - """ - model.inbound_rules = [r for r in model.inbound_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids] - model.outbound_rules = [r for r in model.outbound_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids] - model.outbound_subject_rules = [ - r for r in model.outbound_subject_rules if r.role.id not in role_ids - ] - _drop_roles_from_map(model.source_roles, role_ids) - _drop_roles_from_map(model.subject_roles, role_ids) - surviving_scope_ids = {r.scope.id for r in model.outbound_rules} - for key in list(model.target_scopes): - model.target_scopes[key] = [s for s in model.target_scopes[key] if s.id in surviving_scope_ids] - if not model.target_scopes[key]: - del model.target_scopes[key] +def _fresh_apm(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: + return AgentPolicyModel( + agent_id=agent_id, + agent_roles=[], + agent_scopes=[], + source_roles={}, + subject_roles={}, + target_scopes={}, + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + outbound_subject_rules=[], + ) def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None: - """Resolve, merge, and apply ``rules`` — fire-and-forget. + """Route, persist, derive, and apply ``rules`` — fire-and-forget. - ``override`` selects the merge mode. ``False`` (default) appends additively, - preserving existing mappings. ``True`` authoritatively replaces every input - role's mappings: the distinct set of input roles is purged from each affected - model up-front (both directions, plus ``source_roles`` / ``subject_roles`` - drop and ``target_scopes`` reconciliation) before the fresh rules are applied. + ``override`` selects the merge mode at the SPM layer. ``False`` (default) appends each rule + additively to ``SPM(scope.serviceId).inbound_rules`` (dedup by ``role.id`` + ``scope.id``). + ``True`` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings: the distinct input-role set is + purged from **every** SPM containing it, once, up-front, before the fresh rules are appended + (role-level revocation). - Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and - swallowed so a transient failure never crashes the calling sub-agent. + Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and swallowed so a + transient failure never crashes the calling sub-agent. """ try: _run(rules, override) @@ -122,97 +93,125 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None: def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: config = Configuration.for_realm(os.environ["AIAC_REALM"]) - # Full service catalog keyed by serviceId (Keycloak clientId). It carries - # each service's type — letting us tell agents from pure-target tools (P4) — - # and each service's own roles/scopes, which the agent models embed (P2). - catalog: dict[str, Service] = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} + # (1) Catalog once — the only runtime IdP read. Carries each service's type (agent vs tool, + # for P4) and its own roles/scopes (embedded on the APM for P2, filtered to aiac.managed). + catalog = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} + + # SPM cache: fetch each SPM from the store at most once, seed its identity from the catalog, + # mutate in place, and persist the changed ones. ``get_service_policy`` returns a fresh empty + # SPM on 404, so a brand-new service is seeded here too. + spms: dict[str, ServicePolicyModel] = {} + + def spm(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: + if service_id not in spms: + model = get_service_policy(service_id) + svc = catalog.get(service_id) + if svc is not None: + if svc.type is not None: + model.service_type = svc.type + model.owned_roles = [r for r in svc.roles if r.aiac_managed] + model.owned_scopes = [s for s in svc.scopes if s.aiac_managed] + spms[service_id] = model + return spms[service_id] def is_agent(service_id: str) -> bool: svc = catalog.get(service_id) - return svc is not None and svc.type == "Agent" - - models: dict[str, AgentPolicyModel] = {} - - def model(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: - if agent_id not in models: - models[agent_id] = _fresh(agent_id) - return models[agent_id] - - def record_subjects(m: AgentPolicyModel, role: Role) -> None: - for subject in config.get_subjects_by_role(role): - _add_by_id(m.subject_roles.setdefault(subject.username, []), role) - - # (user role, tool scope) rules are deferred: they attach to whichever agent - # targets the tool, which is only known once the (agent role, tool scope) - # rules below have populated target_scopes. - pending_subject_tool_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] - - for rule in rules: - # Rules arrive pre-flattened from the UC — the PCE queries the IdP once - # per rule's role/scope as-is (no composite expansion). Each rule is - # routed by kind (P5b): - # (user role, agent scope) -> inbound_rules [mapping a] - # (user role, tool scope) -> outbound_subject_rules [mapping b] - # (agent role, tool scope) -> outbound_rules + target_scopes [mapping c] - role, scope = rule.role, rule.scope - agent_role_owners = [s for s in config.get_services_by_role(role) if is_agent(s.serviceId)] - scope_services = config.get_services_by_scope(scope) - agent_scope_owners = [s for s in scope_services if is_agent(s.serviceId)] - tool_scope_targets = [s for s in scope_services if not is_agent(s.serviceId)] - - if agent_role_owners: - # (c) agent role -> tool scope: the agent may reach the tool. - for owner in agent_role_owners: - owner_model = model(owner.serviceId) - _add_rule(owner_model.outbound_rules, rule) - for tool in tool_scope_targets: - _add_by_id(owner_model.target_scopes.setdefault(tool.serviceId, []), scope) - elif agent_scope_owners: - # (a) user role -> agent scope: the user may call the agent. - for agent in agent_scope_owners: - agent_model = model(agent.serviceId) - _add_rule(agent_model.inbound_rules, rule) - record_subjects(agent_model, role) - else: - # (b) user role -> tool scope: deferred until target_scopes is built. - pending_subject_tool_rules.append(rule) - - for rule in pending_subject_tool_rules: - for agent_model in models.values(): - targets_scope = any( - rule.scope.id == s.id - for scopes in agent_model.target_scopes.values() - for s in scopes - ) - if targets_scope: - _add_rule(agent_model.outbound_subject_rules, rule) - record_subjects(agent_model, rule.role) - - # Distinct set of input roles, purged once up-front per model under override - # (so a role shared across the input is not wiped after being appended). - input_role_ids = {rule.role.id for rule in rules} - - written: list[AgentPolicyModel] = [] - for agent_id, delta in models.items(): - try: - existing = get_agent_policy(agent_id) - except RuntimeError as exc: - if "404" not in str(exc): - raise - existing = _fresh(agent_id) # agent not yet in the store - if override: - _purge_roles(existing, input_role_ids) - _merge(existing, delta) - # P2: each written agent embeds its own service-account roles and exposed - # scopes. Only AIAC-provisioned entities (carrying the aiac.managed marker) are - # embedded — Keycloak built-ins (default client scopes, default-roles-) are - # dropped so the model holds only domain entities. Realm-level agents (no owning - # service in the catalog) keep []. - svc = catalog.get(agent_id) if svc is not None: - existing.agent_roles = [r for r in svc.roles if r.aiac_managed] - existing.agent_scopes = [s for s in svc.scopes if s.aiac_managed] - apply_agent_policy(agent_id, existing) - written.append(existing) + return svc.type == ServiceType.AGENT + model = spms.get(service_id) + return model is not None and model.service_type == ServiceType.AGENT - apply_policy(PolicyModel(agents=written)) + # Distinct input roles (dedup by id) — the set purged under override and the seed of the + # affected-agent set. + distinct_roles: dict[str, Role] = {} + for rule in rules: + distinct_roles.setdefault(rule.role.id, rule.role) + + changed: set[str] = set() + + # (3) Override — role-level revocation, once up-front, BEFORE any fresh append (so a role + # shared across the input is not wiped after being added). + if override: + for role in distinct_roles.values(): + for stored in get_service_policies_by_role(role): + model = spm(stored.service_id) + kept = [r for r in model.inbound_rules if r.role.id != role.id] + if len(kept) != len(model.inbound_rules): + model.inbound_rules = kept + changed.add(model.service_id) + + # (2) Route each rule to the SPM of the service that owns its scope. Append-dedup by + # role.id + scope.id. No write-time classification — kind only matters at derive time. + for rule in rules: + model = spm(rule.scope.serviceId) + before = len(model.inbound_rules) + _add_rule(model.inbound_rules, rule) + if len(model.inbound_rules) != before or override: + changed.add(model.service_id) + + # (4) Persist every changed SPM. + for service_id in changed: + apply_service_policy(service_id, spms[service_id]) + + # (5) Affected-agent set — from the batch's roles/scopes, never a full scan. + affected: set[str] = set() + for role in distinct_roles.values(): + if role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT: + affected.update(role.actorIds) # owning agents — their outbound changed + for rule in rules: + scope = rule.scope + owner = scope.serviceId + if is_agent(owner): + affected.add(owner) # the scope's owner is an agent — its inbound changed + # every agent targeting this scope: owners of the Agent-kind inbound rules on the + # owning SPM whose scope is this one. + for edge in spm(owner).inbound_rules: + if edge.scope.id == scope.id and edge.role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT: + affected.update(edge.role.actorIds) + + # (6) Derive each affected agent's APM (zero IdP) and partial-upsert once. Tools get an SPM + # but no APM (P4). + derived = [_derive(agent_id, spm) for agent_id in sorted(affected) if is_agent(agent_id)] + if derived: + apply_policy(PolicyModel(agents=derived)) + + +def _derive(agent_id, spm) -> AgentPolicyModel: + """Build ``APM(agent_id)`` entirely from the persisted SPMs (zero IdP).""" + sa = spm(agent_id) + apm = _fresh_apm(agent_id) + + # Identity (P2) — the agent's own aiac.managed roles/scopes, seeded from the catalog. + apm.agent_roles = list(sa.owned_roles) + apm.agent_scopes = list(sa.owned_scopes) + + # Inbound — every edge on SPM(A), split by role.kind. + for edge in sa.inbound_rules: + _add_rule(apm.inbound_rules, edge) + if edge.role.kind == RoleKind.USER: + for username in edge.role.actorIds: + _add_by_id(apm.subject_roles.setdefault(username, []), edge.role) + else: # Agent + for source_id in edge.role.actorIds: + _add_by_id(apm.source_roles.setdefault(source_id, []), edge.role) + + # Outbound — for each of A's own roles, the edges on other services' SPMs that reference it. + # Relevance is directional: only A's *agent* roles confer an outbound edge, so a merely + # shared user role never creates a false edge to a service A does not target. + for role in sa.owned_roles: + for stored in get_service_policies_by_role(role): + for edge in stored.inbound_rules: + if edge.role.id != role.id: + continue + scope = edge.scope + _add_rule(apm.outbound_rules, edge) + _add_by_id(apm.target_scopes.setdefault(scope.serviceId, []), scope) + # Outbound subject gate — the User-kind inbound rules on the SAME owning SPM + # whose scope is this target scope (the users allowed to reach it through A). + for user_edge in stored.inbound_rules: + if user_edge.scope.id == scope.id and user_edge.role.kind == RoleKind.USER: + _add_rule(apm.outbound_subject_rules, user_edge) + for username in user_edge.role.actorIds: + _add_by_id(apm.subject_roles.setdefault(username, []), user_edge.role) + + return apm diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index 87e7f1ee1..647d4152a 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -1,504 +1,501 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac.policy.computation.engine.compute_and_apply. - -The engine routes each pre-flattened PolicyRule by kind (P5b): - - (user role, agent scope) -> inbound_rules [mapping a] - (user role, tool scope) -> outbound_subject_rules [mapping b] - (agent role, tool scope) -> outbound_rules + target_scopes [mapping c] - -Role kind is read from service ownership (an agent role is owned by an Agent -service; a user role is realm-level). Scope kind is read from the exposing -service's type. Only Agent services are ever modelled (P4); each written model -embeds its own service-account roles/scopes (P2). - -All downstream dependencies are mocked at the engine's import boundary: - - Configuration.get_services (the catalog: type + own roles/scopes) - - Configuration.get_services_by_scope / get_services_by_role / get_subjects_by_role - - aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy / apply_agent_policy (Policy Store) - - aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy (PDP Policy Writer) +"""Unit tests for ``aiac.policy.computation.engine.compute_and_apply`` (SPM-based). + +The engine routes each pre-flattened ``PolicyRule`` to the ``ServicePolicyModel`` (SPM) of the +service that *owns* the rule's scope (``scope.serviceId``), persists the changed SPMs, computes +the affected-agent set from the batch, then **derives** each affected agent's +``AgentPolicyModel`` (APM) entirely from the SPMs (zero IdP) and partial-upserts them once. + +Tests assert external behaviour — what the engine writes to the Policy Store (SPMs) and pushes to +the PDP (derived APMs) — not internal merge logic. All downstream dependencies are mocked at the +engine's import boundary via a small in-memory ``FakeStore`` that behaves like the real Policy +Store library (fresh-empty SPM on 404, ``get_service_policies_by_role`` scanning ``inbound_rules``): + - ``Configuration.get_services`` (IdP catalog: type + own roles/scopes) + - ``engine.get_service_policy`` / ``get_service_policies_by_role`` / ``apply_service_policy`` + - ``engine.apply_policy`` (PDP Policy Writer partial upsert) """ import os -from contextlib import ExitStack +from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager from unittest.mock import patch from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, Subject -from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, PolicyRule +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, RoleKind, Scope, Service, ServiceType +from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # builders # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def _role(id="r-edit", name="editor", composite=False, children=None, aiac_managed=True) -> Role: - # Roles in these tests model AIAC-provisioned agent roles, so they carry the marker by - # default; pass aiac_managed=False to simulate a Keycloak built-in (e.g. default-roles-). +def _role(id, name=None, *, kind=RoleKind.USER, actor_ids=None, composite=False, + children=None, aiac_managed=True) -> Role: attributes = {"aiac.managed": ["true"]} if aiac_managed else {} - return Role(id=id, name=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or [], attributes=attributes) + return Role( + id=id, name=name or id, composite=composite, childRoles=children or [], + attributes=attributes, kind=kind, actorIds=actor_ids or [], + ) + + +def _user_role(id, name=None, *, users) -> Role: + return _role(id, name, kind=RoleKind.USER, actor_ids=users) + +def _agent_role(id, name=None, *, owner) -> Role: + return _role(id, name, kind=RoleKind.AGENT, actor_ids=[owner]) -def _scope(id="s-write", name="write", aiac_managed=True) -> Scope: - # AIAC-provisioned by default; pass aiac_managed=False for a Keycloak built-in (e.g. profile). + +def _scope(id, name=None, *, service_id="", aiac_managed=True) -> Scope: attributes = {"aiac.managed": "true"} if aiac_managed else {} - return Scope(id=id, name=name, attributes=attributes) + return Scope(id=id, name=name or id, attributes=attributes, serviceId=service_id) -def _service(service_id, id=None, enabled=True, type=None, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: +def _service(service_id, *, type=None, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: return Service( - id=id or f"uuid-{service_id}", - serviceId=service_id, - enabled=enabled, - type=type, - roles=roles or [], - scopes=scopes or [], + id=f"uuid-{service_id}", serviceId=service_id, enabled=True, + type=type, roles=roles or [], scopes=scopes or [], ) -def _agent(service_id, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: - return _service(service_id, type="Agent", roles=roles, scopes=scopes) - +def _agent(service_id, *, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: + return _service(service_id, type=ServiceType.AGENT, roles=roles, scopes=scopes) -def _tool(service_id, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: - return _service(service_id, type="Tool", roles=roles, scopes=scopes) +def _tool(service_id, *, roles=None, scopes=None) -> Service: + return _service(service_id, type=ServiceType.TOOL, roles=roles, scopes=scopes) -def _subject(username, id=None, enabled=True) -> Subject: - return Subject(id=id or f"uuid-{username}", username=username, enabled=enabled) +def _rule(role, scope) -> PolicyRule: + return PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) -def _rule(role=None, scope=None) -> PolicyRule: - return PolicyRule(role=role if role is not None else _role(), scope=scope if scope is not None else _scope()) - -def _fresh(agent_id) -> AgentPolicyModel: - return AgentPolicyModel( - agent_id=agent_id, agent_roles=[], agent_scopes=[], - source_roles={}, subject_roles={}, target_scopes={}, - inbound_rules=[], outbound_rules=[], outbound_subject_rules=[], +def _spm(service_id, *, type=ServiceType.AGENT, owned_roles=None, owned_scopes=None, + inbound=None) -> ServicePolicyModel: + return ServicePolicyModel( + service_id=service_id, service_type=type, + owned_roles=owned_roles or [], owned_scopes=owned_scopes or [], + inbound_rules=inbound or [], ) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# harness # +# harness — an in-memory Policy Store behaving like the real library # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def _lookup(mapping): - """side_effect that returns a copy of mapping[obj.id] (default []).""" - return lambda obj: list(mapping.get(obj.id, [])) +class FakeStore: + def __init__(self, initial=None): + self.data = {sid: m.model_copy(deep=True) for sid, m in (initial or {}).items()} + self.service_writes = [] # [(service_id, SPM)] captured from apply_service_policy + self.by_role_calls = [] # [Role] captured from get_service_policies_by_role + self.policy_pushes = [] # [PolicyModel] captured from apply_policy + def get_service_policy(self, service_id): + if service_id in self.data: + return self.data[service_id].model_copy(deep=True) + return _spm(service_id) # real lib returns a fresh empty SPM on 404 -class _Result: - def __init__(self, aap, ap, gs, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order): - self.apply_agent_policy = aap - self.apply_policy = ap - self.get_services = gs - self.get_services_by_scope = gsbs - self.get_services_by_role = gsbr - self.get_subjects_by_role = gsubr - self.get_agent_policy = gap - self.order = order + def get_service_policies_by_role(self, role): + self.by_role_calls.append(role) + return [ + m.model_copy(deep=True) + for m in self.data.values() + if any(r.role.id == role.id for r in m.inbound_rules) + ] - @property - def written(self): - """{agent_id: AgentPolicyModel} captured from apply_agent_policy calls.""" - return {c.args[0]: c.args[1] for c in self.apply_agent_policy.call_args_list} + def apply_service_policy(self, service_id, spm): + self.service_writes.append((service_id, spm.model_copy(deep=True))) + self.data[service_id] = spm.model_copy(deep=True) + def apply_policy(self, model): + self.policy_pushes.append(model.model_copy(deep=True)) -def run_engine(rules, *, catalog=None, scope_services=None, role_services=None, - role_subjects=None, existing=None, missing_404=False, override=False): - catalog = catalog or [] - scope_services = scope_services or {} - role_services = role_services or {} - role_subjects = role_subjects or {} - existing = existing or {} - order = [] + # ---- assertion helpers ------------------------------------------------ # + @property + def apply_policy_count(self): + return len(self.policy_pushes) + + @property + def last_push(self): + return self.policy_pushes[-1] if self.policy_pushes else None - def _get_agent(agent_id): - if agent_id in existing: - return existing[agent_id] - if missing_404: - raise RuntimeError("Policy Store error 404") - return _fresh(agent_id) + def pushed_agent(self, agent_id): + """The most recent derived APM for ``agent_id`` across all pushes (last wins).""" + for push in reversed(self.policy_pushes): + for apm in push.agents: + if apm.agent_id == agent_id: + return apm + return None - def _rec_agent(agent_id, model): - order.append(("agent", agent_id)) + @property + def pushed_agent_ids(self): + return {a.agent_id for push in self.policy_pushes for a in push.agents} - def _rec_policy(model): - order.append(("policy",)) +@contextmanager +def engine_env(catalog, store): + """Patch the engine boundary; yield ``compute_and_apply``. Multiple calls share the store.""" with ExitStack() as stack: stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) - gs = stack.enter_context( - patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=list(catalog))) - gsbs = stack.enter_context( - patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_scope", side_effect=_lookup(scope_services))) - gsbr = stack.enter_context( - patch.object(Configuration, "get_services_by_role", side_effect=_lookup(role_services))) - gsubr = stack.enter_context( - patch.object(Configuration, "get_subjects_by_role", side_effect=_lookup(role_subjects))) - gap = stack.enter_context( - patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy", side_effect=_get_agent)) - aap = stack.enter_context( - patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_agent_policy", side_effect=_rec_agent)) - ap = stack.enter_context( - patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", side_effect=_rec_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=list(catalog))) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_service_policy", + side_effect=store.get_service_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_service_policies_by_role", + side_effect=store.get_service_policies_by_role)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_service_policy", + side_effect=store.apply_service_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", + side_effect=store.apply_policy)) from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply + yield compute_and_apply + + +def run_engine(rules, *, catalog=None, store_initial=None, override=False) -> FakeStore: + store = FakeStore(store_initial) + with engine_env(catalog or [], store) as compute_and_apply: compute_and_apply(rules, override=override) - return _Result(aap, ap, gs, gsbs, gsbr, gsubr, gap, order) + return store # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 1 — tracer (mapping a): a (user role, agent scope) rule lands in the # -# agent's inbound_rules, and the PDP is pushed exactly once. # +# comparison helpers # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_user_role_agent_scope_lands_inbound_and_pushes_once(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, # agent exposes the agent scope - role_services={}, # developer is realm-level (user role) - ) +def _pairs(rules): + return sorted((r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in rules) - assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} - assert res.written["github-agent"].inbound_rules == [rule] - assert res.apply_policy.call_count == 1 + +def _norm(apm): + """Order-independent view of an APM for equality assertions.""" + return { + "agent_roles": sorted(r.id for r in apm.agent_roles), + "agent_scopes": sorted(s.id for s in apm.agent_scopes), + "inbound": _pairs(apm.inbound_rules), + "outbound": _pairs(apm.outbound_rules), + "outbound_subject": _pairs(apm.outbound_subject_rules), + "source_roles": {k: sorted(r.id for r in v) for k, v in apm.source_roles.items()}, + "subject_roles": {k: sorted(r.id for r in v) for k, v in apm.subject_roles.items()}, + "target_scopes": {k: sorted(s.id for s in v) for k, v in apm.target_scopes.items()}, + } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 2 — mapping c: a (agent role, tool scope) rule lands in the agent's # -# outbound_rules, plus a target_scopes entry per resolved tool. # +# shared repro fixture — the order-dependence scenario # +# UR (user role) -> AS (agent A's scope) and -> TS (tool T's scope) # +# AR (agent A's client role) -> TS # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_agent_role_tool_scope_lands_outbound_and_target_scopes(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - tool = _tool("github-tool") - role = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") - scope = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") - rule = _rule(role=role, scope=scope) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent, tool], - scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, # tool exposes the tool scope - role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, # agent owns the agent role - ) +def _repro(): + AR = _agent_role("r-agent-src", "agent-source", owner="github-agent") + UR = _user_role("r-user-dev", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + AS = _scope("s-agent-inbound", "agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + TS = _scope("s-tool-read", "tool-read", service_id="github-tool") + catalog = [ + _agent("github-agent", roles=[AR], scopes=[AS]), + _tool("github-tool", scopes=[TS]), + ] + return AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert m.outbound_rules == [rule] - assert m.target_scopes == {"github-tool": [scope]} - assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} # P4: no tool model - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 3 — mapping b: a (user role, tool scope) rule lands in the # -# outbound_subject_rules of the agent that targets that tool (established by # -# a mapping-c rule in the same batch). # -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_user_role_tool_scope_lands_outbound_subject(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - tool = _tool("github-tool") - dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") - helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") - read = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") - c_rule = _rule(role=helper, scope=read) # (c) establishes agent -> tool target_scopes - b_rule = _rule(role=dev, scope=read) # (b) user -> tool scope - res = run_engine( - [c_rule, b_rule], - catalog=[agent, tool], - scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, - role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, # helper owned by agent; dev realm-level - ) - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert m.outbound_subject_rules == [b_rule] - assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 1 — tracer: a (user role, agent scope) rule lands as an inbound edge # +# on SPM(A); A's derived APM carries it inbound; the PDP is pushed once. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_user_role_agent_scope_lands_inbound_and_pushes_once(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS)], catalog=catalog) + + # persisted on SPM(github-agent) + assert store.service_writes[0][0] == "github-agent" + assert _pairs(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + # derived onto the agent's APM + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert _pairs(apm.inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + assert apm.subject_roles == {"dev-user": [UR]} + assert store.apply_policy_count == 1 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 4 — a (user role, tool scope) rule with NO agent targeting that tool # -# produces no model at all (it cannot be attached anywhere). # +# Cycle 2 — an (agent role, tool scope) rule is stored on SPM(T); A's derived # +# APM gains outbound_rules + a target_scopes entry for the tool. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_user_role_tool_scope_without_targeting_agent_drops(): - tool = _tool("github-tool") - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-read", "source-read")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[tool], - scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, - role_services={}, # developer realm-level; no agent owns any role here - ) +def test_agent_role_tool_scope_derives_outbound_and_target_scopes(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = run_engine([_rule(AR, TS)], catalog=catalog) - assert res.written == {} + assert _pairs(store.data["github-tool"].inbound_rules) == [("r-agent-src", "s-tool-read")] + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert _pairs(apm.outbound_rules) == [("r-agent-src", "s-tool-read")] + assert {k: [s.id for s in v] for k, v in apm.target_scopes.items()} == {"github-tool": ["s-tool-read"]} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 5 — P2: each written agent embeds its own service-account roles and # -# exposed scopes, read from the service catalog. # +# Cycle 3 — a (user role, tool scope) rule, once an agent targets that tool, # +# becomes the agent's outbound subject gate. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_agent_roles_and_scopes_populated_from_catalog(): - helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") - ihelper = _role("r-iss-helper", "issues-helper") - src_access = _scope("s-src-access", "source-access") - iss_access = _scope("s-iss-access", "issues-access") - agent = _agent("github-agent", roles=[helper, ihelper], scopes=[src_access, iss_access]) - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=src_access) - res = run_engine([rule], catalog=[agent], scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}) +def test_user_role_tool_scope_becomes_outbound_subject_gate(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = run_engine([_rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)], catalog=catalog) - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert m.agent_roles == [helper, ihelper] - assert m.agent_scopes == [src_access, iss_access] + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert _pairs(apm.outbound_subject_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-tool-read")] + assert apm.subject_roles == {"dev-user": [UR]} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 6 — a modelled agent with no own roles/scopes in the catalog keeps []. # +# Cycle 4 — HEADLINE: both onboarding orders converge to an identical APM(A). # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_agent_without_catalog_roles_scopes_keeps_empty(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") # no roles, no scopes - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - res = run_engine([rule], catalog=[agent], scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}) +def test_both_orders_yield_identical_agent_policy(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + + # order A-then-T: agent onboarded (UR->AS), then tool onboarded (AR->TS, UR->TS) + store_at = FakeStore() + with engine_env(catalog, store_at) as compute: + compute([_rule(UR, AS)]) + compute([_rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)]) + + # order T-then-A: tool onboarded first, then agent + store_ta = FakeStore() + with engine_env(catalog, store_ta) as compute: + compute([_rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)]) + compute([_rule(UR, AS)]) - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert m.agent_roles == [] - assert m.agent_scopes == [] + apm_at = store_at.pushed_agent("github-agent") + apm_ta = store_ta.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert _norm(apm_at) == _norm(apm_ta) + + # and it is the expected policy: inbound {UR->AS}, outbound {AR->TS} + subject gate {UR->TS} + assert _norm(apm_at)["inbound"] == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + assert _norm(apm_at)["outbound"] == [("r-agent-src", "s-tool-read")] + assert _norm(apm_at)["outbound_subject"] == [("r-user-dev", "s-tool-read")] # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 6b — P2: only AIAC-provisioned roles/scopes (carrying the aiac.managed # -# marker) are embedded; Keycloak built-ins (default-roles-, profile, ...) # -# are dropped from the agent's embed. # +# Cycle 5 — latent sibling bug: after A+T exist, a late (UR2 -> TS) user-role # +# rule routes to SPM(T), marks A affected, and A's re-derived subject gate # +# includes UR2. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_builtin_roles_and_scopes_are_filtered_from_embed(): - helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") # AIAC-provisioned - default_roles = _role("r-def", "default-roles-aiac", aiac_managed=False) # Keycloak built-in - src_access = _scope("s-src-access", "source-access") # AIAC-provisioned - profile = _scope("s-profile", "profile", aiac_managed=False) # Keycloak built-in - agent = _agent( - "github-agent", - roles=[helper, default_roles], - scopes=[src_access, profile], - ) - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=src_access) - res = run_engine([rule], catalog=[agent], scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}) +def test_late_user_role_on_tool_rederives_affected_agent_subject_gate(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = FakeStore() + with engine_env(catalog, store) as compute: + compute([_rule(UR, AS), _rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)]) # A + T established + UR2 = _user_role("r-user-ops", "ops", users=["ops-user"]) + compute([_rule(UR2, TS)]) # late UC3 user role on the tool - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert m.agent_roles == [helper] # default-roles- dropped - assert m.agent_scopes == [src_access] # profile dropped + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + subject_pairs = _pairs(apm.outbound_subject_rules) + assert ("r-user-ops", "s-tool-read") in subject_pairs + assert "ops-user" in apm.subject_roles # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 7 — P4: a pure-target Tool service is never modelled, even though it # -# exposes the scope the agent reaches; the agent -> tool target_scopes edge # -# still records the tool. # +# Cycle 6 — agent -> agent (AR -> BS): stored on SPM(B); A's APM has it outbound # +# + target_scopes[B]; B's APM has source_roles[A] += AR. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_pure_target_tool_is_not_modelled(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - tool = _tool("github-tool") - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-src-helper", "source-helper"), scope=_scope("s-src-read", "source-read")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent, tool], - scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, - role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, +def test_agent_to_agent_edge_projects_into_both_policies(): + AR = _agent_role("r-a-caller", "a-caller", owner="agent-a") + BS = _scope("s-b-inbound", "b-inbound", service_id="agent-b") + catalog = [ + _agent("agent-a", roles=[AR], scopes=[_scope("s-a-inbound", service_id="agent-a")]), + _agent("agent-b", scopes=[BS]), + ] + store = run_engine([_rule(AR, BS)], catalog=catalog) + + apm_a = store.pushed_agent("agent-a") + assert _pairs(apm_a.outbound_rules) == [("r-a-caller", "s-b-inbound")] + assert {k: [s.id for s in v] for k, v in apm_a.target_scopes.items()} == {"agent-b": ["s-b-inbound"]} + + apm_b = store.pushed_agent("agent-b") + assert {k: [r.id for r in v] for k, v in apm_b.source_roles.items()} == {"agent-a": ["r-a-caller"]} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 7 — override purge across SPMs: an input role present on multiple SPMs # +# is purged from every one of them, once, before the fresh rule is appended. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_override_purges_input_role_from_every_spm(): + shared = _user_role("r-shared", "shared", users=["u"]) + s1 = _scope("s-one", service_id="svc-one") + s2 = _scope("s-two", service_id="svc-two") + catalog = [_agent("svc-one", scopes=[s1]), _agent("svc-two", scopes=[s2])] + initial = { + "svc-one": _spm("svc-one", owned_scopes=[s1], inbound=[_rule(shared, s1)]), + "svc-two": _spm("svc-two", owned_scopes=[s2], inbound=[_rule(shared, s2)]), + } + # override with the same role targeting only svc-one now + store = run_engine([_rule(shared, s1)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial, override=True) + + # svc-two's stale mapping for the shared role is gone; svc-one keeps the fresh one + assert _pairs(store.data["svc-two"].inbound_rules) == [] + assert _pairs(store.data["svc-one"].inbound_rules) == [("r-shared", "s-one")] + # purge scanned by role, once for the single distinct input role + assert [r.id for r in store.by_role_calls].count("r-shared") == 1 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 8 — override, two input rules sharing one role: the role is purged once # +# up-front, so the SECOND rule's freshly-appended mapping is not wiped. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_override_shared_role_purged_once_second_mapping_survives(): + shared = _user_role("r-shared", "shared", users=["u"]) + s1 = _scope("s-one", service_id="svc-one") + s2 = _scope("s-two", service_id="svc-two") + catalog = [_agent("svc-one", scopes=[s1]), _agent("svc-two", scopes=[s2])] + initial = { + "svc-one": _spm("svc-one", owned_scopes=[s1], inbound=[_rule(shared, s1)]), + "svc-two": _spm("svc-two", owned_scopes=[s2]), + } + store = run_engine( + [_rule(shared, s1), _rule(shared, s2)], + catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial, override=True, ) - assert "github-tool" not in res.written - assert res.written["github-agent"].target_scopes == {"github-tool": [rule.scope]} + assert _pairs(store.data["svc-one"].inbound_rules) == [("r-shared", "s-one")] + assert _pairs(store.data["svc-two"].inbound_rules) == [("r-shared", "s-two")] # not wiped # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 8 — a (user role, agent scope) rule records the role's subjects on the # -# agent, keyed by username. # +# Cycle 9 — append dedup: a rule already on the target SPM (same role.id + # +# scope.id) is not appended a second time. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_inbound_records_subject_roles_by_username(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") - rule = _rule(role=dev, scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, - role_subjects={"r-dev": [_subject("dev-user")]}, - ) +def test_duplicate_rule_not_appended_twice(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + initial = {"github-agent": _spm("github-agent", owned_scopes=[AS], inbound=[_rule(UR, AS)])} + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial) - assert res.written["github-agent"].subject_roles == {"dev-user": [dev]} - res.get_subjects_by_role.assert_called_with(dev) + assert len(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == 1 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 9 — the PCE does NOT flatten: a rule carrying a composite role queries # -# the IdP exactly once with that role as-is — never once per child. # +# Cycle 10 — no flattening: a composite input role never triggers per-child # +# get_service_policies_by_role calls. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def test_composite_role_is_not_flattened(): - child_a = _role("r-a", "reader") - child_b = _role("r-b", "writer") - composite = _role("r-comp", "editor", composite=True, children=[child_a, child_b]) - agent = _agent("github-agent") - rule = _rule(role=composite, scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, - ) + child_a = _agent_role("r-child-a", "child-a", owner="github-agent") + child_b = _agent_role("r-child-b", "child-b", owner="github-agent") + composite = _agent_role("r-comp", "composite", owner="github-agent") + composite = composite.model_copy(update={"composite": True, "childRoles": [child_a, child_b]}) + TS = _scope("s-tool-read", service_id="github-tool") + catalog = [_agent("github-agent", roles=[composite]), _tool("github-tool", scopes=[TS])] - res.get_services_by_role.assert_called_once_with(composite) - roles_queried = [c.args[0] for c in res.get_services_by_role.call_args_list] - assert child_a not in roles_queried and child_b not in roles_queried + store = run_engine([_rule(composite, TS)], catalog=catalog, override=True) + + queried = {r.id for r in store.by_role_calls} + assert "r-child-a" not in queried and "r-child-b" not in queried # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 10 — the engine reads each agent's current model from the store and # -# appends to it; pre-existing rules survive the merge. # +# Cycle 11 — P4: a Tool accrues durable inbound_rules on its SPM but is never # +# emitted as an APM; the agent's target_scopes edge to the tool still appears. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_merge_preserves_existing_store_model(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - prior_rule = _rule(role=_role("r-old", "old"), scope=_scope("s-old-access", "old-access")) - prior = _fresh("github-agent") - prior.inbound_rules.append(prior_rule) - - dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") - rule = _rule(role=dev, scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, - existing={"github-agent": prior}, - ) +def test_tool_gets_spm_but_no_apm(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = run_engine([_rule(AR, TS)], catalog=catalog) - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert prior_rule in m.inbound_rules and rule in m.inbound_rules + assert _pairs(store.data["github-tool"].inbound_rules) == [("r-agent-src", "s-tool-read")] + assert "github-tool" not in store.pushed_agent_ids # no tool APM + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert "github-tool" in apm.target_scopes # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 11 — a rule already present (same role.id + scope.id) is not appended # -# a second time; de-duplication is by value, not object identity. # +# Cycle 12 — P2 identity from owned_*: the derived APM embeds the agent's own # +# aiac.managed roles/scopes; built-ins are filtered; an agent with none keeps []. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_duplicate_rule_not_appended_twice(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - prior = _fresh("github-agent") - prior.inbound_rules.append( - PolicyRule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - ) +def test_p2_identity_embeds_aiac_managed_owned_roles_and_scopes(): + helper = _agent_role("r-helper", "helper", owner="github-agent") + builtin = _agent_role("r-default", "default-roles-aiac", owner="github-agent") + builtin = builtin.model_copy(update={"attributes": {}}) # not aiac.managed + src = _scope("s-src", "source", service_id="github-agent") + profile = _scope("s-profile", "profile", service_id="github-agent", aiac_managed=False) + agent = _agent("github-agent", roles=[helper, builtin], scopes=[src, profile]) + UR = _user_role("r-user", users=["u"]) + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, src)], catalog=[agent]) - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, - existing={"github-agent": prior}, - ) + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert [r.id for r in apm.agent_roles] == ["r-helper"] # built-in role dropped + assert [s.id for s in apm.agent_scopes] == ["s-src"] # profile scope dropped - assert len(res.written["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == 1 + +def test_p2_identity_empty_when_no_owned_entities(): + agent = _agent("github-agent") # no catalog roles/scopes + UR = _user_role("r-user", users=["u"]) + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, _scope("s-x", service_id="github-agent"))], catalog=[agent]) + + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert apm.agent_roles == [] and apm.agent_scopes == [] # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 12 — when the store has no record for an agent (404), the engine # -# starts from a fresh model rather than crashing. # +# Cycle 13 — directional relevance: a user role shared between an agent scope # +# and a tool scope does NOT create a false outbound edge from A to the tool. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_missing_agent_404_creates_fresh_model(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - rule = _rule(role=_role("r-dev", "developer"), scope=_scope("s-src-access", "source-access")) - res = run_engine( - [rule], - catalog=[agent], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent]}, - missing_404=True, - ) +def test_shared_user_role_creates_no_false_outbound_edge(): + UR = _user_role("r-user-dev", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + AS = _scope("s-agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + TS = _scope("s-tool-read", service_id="github-tool") + # A owns NO agent role that maps to TS — only the shared user role touches both scopes. + catalog = [_agent("github-agent", scopes=[AS]), _tool("github-tool", scopes=[TS])] + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS), _rule(UR, TS)], catalog=catalog) - assert set(res.written) == {"github-agent"} - assert res.written["github-agent"].inbound_rules == [rule] - assert res.apply_policy.call_count == 1 + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert apm.outbound_rules == [] + assert apm.target_scopes == {} + assert apm.outbound_subject_rules == [] # A does not target T, so no gate # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 13 — any dependency failure is logged and swallowed; compute_and_apply # -# never propagates (fire-and-forget), and nothing is pushed to the PDP. # +# Cycle 14 — affected set from the batch: an agent unrelated to the batch is # +# never derived or upserted, even though it exists in the catalog/store. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): - from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply +def test_unrelated_agent_is_not_derived(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + catalog = catalog + [_agent("other-agent", scopes=[_scope("s-other", service_id="other-agent")])] + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS)], catalog=catalog) - with ExitStack() as stack: - stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) - stack.enter_context( - patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))) - stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_agent_policy")) - stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_agent_policy")) - ap = stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy")) - - assert compute_and_apply([_rule()]) is None # must not raise - ap.assert_not_called() - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 14 — every store write happens before the single PDP push, and the # -# pushed PolicyModel round-trips through JSON (including outbound_subject_rules).# -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_writes_precede_single_push_and_model_is_json_serializable(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - tool = _tool("github-tool") - dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") - helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") - read = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") - src_access = _scope("s-src-access", "source-access") - rules = [ - _rule(role=dev, scope=src_access), # (a) - _rule(role=helper, scope=read), # (c) establishes target_scopes - _rule(role=dev, scope=read), # (b) user -> tool scope - ] - res = run_engine( - rules, - catalog=[agent, tool], - scope_services={"s-src-access": [agent], "s-src-read": [tool]}, - role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, - role_subjects={"r-dev": [_subject("dev-user")]}, - ) + assert store.pushed_agent_ids == {"github-agent"} - assert res.order.count(("policy",)) == 1 - assert res.order[-1] == ("policy",) - assert res.order[:-1] and all(step[0] == "agent" for step in res.order[:-1]) - m = res.written["github-agent"] - assert m.outbound_subject_rules # non-empty (mapping b landed) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 15 — apply_policy is called exactly once, after every SPM write. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_apply_policy_called_exactly_once_after_all_spm_writes(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS), _rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)], catalog=catalog) - pushed = res.apply_policy.call_args.args[0] - restored = PolicyModel.model_validate(pushed.model_dump(mode="json")) - assert {a.agent_id for a in restored.agents} == {"github-agent"} - restored_agent = restored.agents[0] - assert {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in restored_agent.outbound_subject_rules} == {("r-dev", "s-src-read")} + assert store.apply_policy_count == 1 + # both SPMs (agent + tool) were persisted before the single push + assert {sid for sid, _ in store.service_writes} == {"github-agent", "github-tool"} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 15 — override=True authoritatively replaces the input role's mappings # -# across inbound_rules, outbound_rules, AND outbound_subject_rules before the # -# fresh rules are appended; an unrelated role's mappings survive untouched. # +# Cycle 16 — a service absent from the store (404) is seeded from the catalog # +# and still persisted. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_override_purges_input_role_before_appending(): - agent = _agent("github-agent") - tool = _tool("github-tool") - dev = _role("r-dev", "developer") - keep = _role("r-keep", "keeper") - read = _scope("s-src-read", "source-read") +def test_absent_service_is_seeded_and_persisted(): + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS)], catalog=catalog) # empty store -> 404 for both - prior = _fresh("github-agent") - prior.outbound_subject_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=dev, scope=_scope("s-stale", "stale"))) - prior.outbound_subject_rules.append(PolicyRule(role=keep, scope=_scope("s-keep", "keep"))) - prior.target_scopes["github-tool"] = [read] + spm = store.data["github-agent"] + assert spm.service_type == ServiceType.AGENT + assert [r.id for r in spm.owned_roles] == ["r-agent-src"] # seeded from catalog + assert _pairs(spm.inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] - helper = _role("r-src-helper", "source-helper") - rules = [ - _rule(role=helper, scope=read), # (c) re-establishes target_scopes edge - _rule(role=dev, scope=read), # (b) fresh user -> tool scope - ] - res = run_engine( - rules, - catalog=[agent, tool], - scope_services={"s-src-read": [tool]}, - role_services={"r-src-helper": [agent]}, - existing={"github-agent": prior}, - override=True, - ) - m = res.written["github-agent"] - pairs = {(r.role.id, r.scope.id) for r in m.outbound_subject_rules} - assert ("r-dev", "s-stale") not in pairs # stale purged - assert ("r-dev", "s-src-read") in pairs # fresh applied - assert ("r-keep", "s-keep") in pairs # unrelated role survives +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 17 — fire-and-forget: any dependency failure is logged and swallowed; # +# compute_and_apply returns None and nothing is pushed to the PDP. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): + store = FakeStore() + with ExitStack() as stack: + stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) + stack.enter_context(patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_service_policy", + side_effect=store.get_service_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_service_policies_by_role", + side_effect=store.get_service_policies_by_role)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_service_policy", + side_effect=store.apply_service_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", + side_effect=store.apply_policy)) + from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply + + UR = _user_role("r-user", users=["u"]) + assert compute_and_apply([_rule(UR, _scope("s-x", service_id="svc"))]) is None + assert store.apply_policy_count == 0 From abd1b91b93ec6f73db78a76b68306fb3d7815c3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 03:43:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 231/273] Docs(aiac): Refresh CLAUDE.md source/image map post handoffs 01-05 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The agent layer and policy stack are no longer pending — reflect the current tree: - agent/ described as the rebuilt layer (controller, uc, PRB, shared); onboarding.old noted as the archived prior implementation. - policy/model, policy/store, policy/computation promoted from 'pending namespaces (to be added)' to their implemented descriptions. - Drop the 'aiac-agent temporarily removed' note and add the aiac-agent row to the Docker images table (its Dockerfile is back). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index 18ab64702..68042f3ff 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -36,10 +36,16 @@ Per-task handoff documents live under `docs/handoffs/` — one markdown file per Key stable structure: - `idp/` — IdP configuration service and models - `pdp/` — PDP policy writer service and library -- `agent/` — reset pending a fresh rebuild; currently only `__init__.py` plus the archived `onboarding.old/`. The prior controller/orchestrator/shared implementation was removed as stale (built on the superseded `ProposedDiff` model). - - `agent/onboarding.old/policy/` — archived prior implementation (was FROZEN); not part of the active build - -Pending namespaces (to be added per PRD): `policy/model/`, `policy/store/`, `policy/computation/`. +- `agent/` — the AIAC Agent layer (rebuilt on the SPM/APM model): + - `agent/controller/` — FastAPI Controller (`routes.py` + Dockerfile); `/apply/*` routes dispatch to the UC sub-agents and make the single `compute_and_apply` (PCE) call + - `agent/uc/` — use-case sub-agents: `onboarding/` (provision + policy_builder + orchestrator), `policy_update/` (build/rebuild), `role_update/` + - `agent/policy_rules_builder/` — PRB: `build_role_rules` / `build_scope_rules` emit `list[PolicyRule]` + - `agent/shared/` — shared helpers (`roles.py`, e.g. `flatten_role`) + - `agent/onboarding.old/` — archived prior implementation (built on the superseded `ProposedDiff` model); not part of the active build +- `policy/` — the two-layer policy stack (all implemented): + - `policy/model/` — `PolicyRule`, `ServicePolicyModel` (SPM), `AgentPolicyModel` (APM), `PolicyModel` + - `policy/store/` — Policy Store service + library (SPM CRUD) + - `policy/computation/` — Policy Computation Engine (`compute_and_apply`, SPM-based) For current file list, `ls` or `find` under `src/aiac/`. @@ -96,9 +102,8 @@ Docker images: | Image | Dockerfile location | |-------|-------------------| +| `aiac-agent` | `src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile` (build context `src/`) | | `aiac-pdp-config` | `src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-pdp-policy-opa` | `src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-policy-store` | `src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-rag-ingest` | `rag-ingest/` (separate directory) | - -> `aiac-agent` (was `src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile`) is temporarily removed — the agent layer was reset and will be rebuilt; the image and its Dockerfile will return with it. From fa1957bc8f60bb7f3bafa66eefb5d13a5fb17387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 04:19:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 232/273] Test(aiac): Fix stale store DB env var name in policy-pipeline integration test The policy-store service reads SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH (renamed during the SPM-centric store refactor), but the integration harness still passed the old AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH. The override never applied, so the service fell back to the container default /data/policy_model.db and failed at startup with 'unable to open database file', erroring all 43 nodes at setup. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index df28c43d7..aa44f0c74 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: "aiac.policy.store.service.main:app", port=store_port, host=store_host, - env={"AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH": str(db_path)}, + env={"SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH": str(db_path)}, ) opa = Service( "aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app", From dc8e67706eb432938f60cd7f8d286902268771d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 05:16:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 233/273] Fix(aiac): Populate agent-role kind/actorIds + scope.serviceId at IdP boundary Restores the 5.3 policy-pipeline integration suite to 43/43 after the SPM-centric refactor. Five coupled regressions, the last three being the real product bugs (the harness had been masking them via stale rego): - idp service list_service_roles: handoff 02 switched this endpoint to return only Keycloak client roles, but the Configuration provisioning path assigns realm roles to the service account. Agents onboarded via the library therefore exposed no roles, so the PCE derived empty agent_roles and wrote all-deny outbound Rego. Now also returns the aiac.managed realm roles held by the service account, each stamped kind=Agent + actorIds=[this client's serviceId] (re-fetched via get_realm_role_by_id since the role-of-user stub carries no attributes). - idp library _build_service: merge the per-service endpoint's kind/actorIds onto the validated all_roles objects (previously used all_roles alone, reverting agent roles to kind=User/actorIds=[]); stamp each nested scope's serviceId = owning clientId (was left empty, breaking PCE SPM routing -> GET /policy/services/ -> 422). - test harness: source scopes from get_services() (serviceId populated), provision user roles with the aiac.managed marker (so actorIds/subject gate populate), clear rego_out before each variant, and assert the agent's rego was actually written (compute_and_apply swallows errors, so a silent no-write now fails loud at setup). - deployment guide: correct build context for the two component images and rename AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH -> SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH. Unit suite 406 passed; live 5.3 integration suite 43/43. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 10 +++-- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 18 ++++++-- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 41 +++++++++++++++---- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 17 +++++--- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 35 ++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index 80bb835d5..2cbaf2e60 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -22,12 +22,16 @@ Run from the repo root (`kagenti-extensions/`): ```bash # IdP Configuration Service (Interface Pod container 1) +# Build context is the component directory (Dockerfile copies requirements.txt + main.py from there) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - -t localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local aiac/src/ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local \ + aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/ # PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 mock (Interface Pod container 2, writes Rego to filesystem) +# Build context is the component directory (same pattern as aiac-pdp-config) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local aiac/src/ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local \ + aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/ # Policy Store docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ @@ -77,7 +81,7 @@ Edit the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` to match | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` | Agent | | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | `http://aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` | Agent | | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | `http://aiac-policy-store-service:7074` | Agent | -| `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | `/data/state.db` | Policy Store | +| `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH` | `/data/policy_model.db` | Policy Store | | `NATS_URL` | `nats://aiac-event-broker-service:4222` | Agent — **added in Phase 2** (Event Broker, issue 4.19) | | `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:7073` | Init container — **added in Phase 3** (RAG Pod, issue 4.20) | | `AIAC_CHROMADB_URL` | `http://aiac-rag-service:8000` | Agent — **added in Phase 3** (RAG Pod, issue 4.20) | diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index df6f65652..26b2b43c9 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -92,10 +92,22 @@ def _build_service(self, raw: dict, all_roles: dict[str, Role], all_scopes: dict scopes_resp = self._request( "GET", f"/services/{service_id}/scopes", params=self._params() ) - service_role_ids = {r["id"] for r in roles_resp.json()} - roles = [r.model_dump() for r in all_roles.values() if r.id in service_role_ids] + # The per-service roles response carries the authoritative kind/actorIds for each role + # (e.g. kind=Agent + actorIds=[serviceId] for agent-owned roles). Merge those fields into + # the fully-validated all_roles objects (which carry composite/attributes/etc.) so Role + # validation succeeds and kind/actorIds are not reverted to their defaults. + service_roles_by_id = {r["id"]: r for r in roles_resp.json()} + roles = [] + for role_id, svc_role in service_roles_by_id.items(): + base = all_roles.get(role_id) + if base is not None: + merged = {**base.model_dump(), **{k: v for k, v in svc_role.items() if k in ("kind", "actorIds")}} + else: + merged = svc_role # not in all_roles (e.g. client role not in realm roles) + roles.append(merged) + client_id = raw.get("clientId") or raw.get("serviceId") or service_id service_scope_ids = {s["id"] for s in scopes_resp.json()} - scopes = [s.model_dump() for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] + scopes = [{**s.model_dump(), "serviceId": client_id} for s in all_scopes.values() if s.id in service_scope_ids] # Type resolution is handled entirely by Service._resolve_keycloak_fields # (client.type attribute → None); the library does not infer it here. return Service.model_validate({**raw, "roles": roles, "scopes": scopes}) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index eb218aa9d..4064f54c7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -190,20 +190,43 @@ def set_service_type( @app.get("/services/{service_id}/roles") def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: - # SPM/APM (Assumption 3): an agent's role is a Keycloak *client role* on the agent's - # own client, so source agent roles from the client's client roles (R_A) — not from - # the realm roles of its service account. Each returned RoleRepresentation carries - # clientRole=true and containerId (the client UUID), used to classify + resolve owner. - roles = admin.get_client_roles(service_id) - owners: dict[str, str] = {} # containerId -> owning client's serviceId (clientId) - for role in roles: + client = admin.get_client(service_id) + service_client_id = client["clientId"] + roles: list[dict] = [] + + # Client roles on the agent's own client (original path): each carries + # clientRole=true and containerId, used to classify + resolve owner. + client_roles = admin.get_client_roles(service_id) + owners: dict[str, str] = {} + for role in client_roles: container_id = role.get("containerId") or service_id if container_id not in owners: owners[container_id] = admin.get_client(container_id)["clientId"] - # clientRole == true -> kind=Agent; actorIds = the owning client's serviceId, - # resolved from the role's containerId. role["kind"] = "Agent" role["actorIds"] = [owners[container_id]] + roles.extend(client_roles) + + # Realm roles assigned to the service account (provisioning path used by the + # Configuration library). These are aiac-managed realm roles mapped to the service + # via assign_realm_roles on the service-account user. Classify them as Agent roles + # owned by this service, so the PCE sees them as outbound-capable roles. + # NOTE: get_realm_roles_of_user returns role stubs without attributes, so re-fetch + # each role's full representation to check the aiac.managed marker. + try: + sa_user = admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id) + sa_realm_roles = admin.get_realm_roles_of_user(sa_user["id"]) + seen_ids = {r["id"] for r in client_roles} + for stub in sa_realm_roles: + if stub["id"] in seen_ids: + continue + full_role = admin.get_realm_role_by_id(stub["id"]) + if _is_aiac_managed(full_role.get("attributes")): + full_role["kind"] = "Agent" + full_role["actorIds"] = [service_client_id] + roles.append(full_role) + except KeycloakError: + pass # service has no service account — skip + return roles except KeycloakError as e: if e.response_code == 400: diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 6c0ddc713..1344f6d86 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -140,17 +140,21 @@ def test_returns_object_with_realm_and_service_mappings(self): class TestListServiceRoles: - def test_sources_client_roles_not_service_account_realm_roles(self): - # Handoff 02 (Assumption 3): an agent's role is a Keycloak *client role* on its own - # client, so this endpoint reads the client's client roles directly. + def test_sources_client_roles_and_service_account_realm_roles(self): + # The endpoint returns both client roles (kind=Agent via clientRole=true) and + # aiac-managed realm roles assigned to the service account (kind=Agent via the + # provisioning path used by the Configuration library). admin = MagicMock() admin.get_client_roles.return_value = [{"id": "cr1", "name": "invoke", "clientRole": True}] admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "github-agent"} + sa_user = {"id": "sa-uid"} + admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = sa_user + admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.return_value = [] resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 admin.get_client_roles.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") - # The realm-roles-of-service-account path is no longer used. - admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.assert_not_called() + admin.get_client_service_account_user.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.assert_called_once_with(sa_user["id"]) def test_populates_agent_kind_and_owner_actor_ids(self): # clientRole == true -> kind=Agent; actorIds = the owning client's serviceId, @@ -160,12 +164,13 @@ def test_populates_agent_kind_and_owner_actor_ids(self): {"id": "cr1", "name": "invoke", "clientRole": True, "containerId": "svc-uuid"}, ] admin.get_client.return_value = {"id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "github-agent"} + admin.get_client_service_account_user.return_value = {"id": "sa-uid"} + admin.get_realm_roles_of_user.return_value = [] resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/roles?realm={REALM}") assert resp.status_code == 200 role = resp.json()[0] assert role["kind"] == "Agent" assert role["actorIds"] == ["github-agent"] - admin.get_client.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") def test_returns_502_on_keycloak_error(self): admin = MagicMock() diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index aa44f0c74..23101f021 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -114,7 +114,12 @@ def provision_keycloak_admin(admin: KeycloakAdmin, test_realm: str) -> None: admin.change_current_realm(test_realm) for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): - admin.create_realm_role({"name": name, "description": description}, skip_exists=True) + # aiac.managed marker required: the IdP service only populates actorIds (member usernames) + # for managed roles, and the PCE needs actorIds to build the subject_roles map in the APM. + admin.create_realm_role( + {"name": name, "description": description, "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}}, + skip_exists=True, + ) for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) @@ -167,9 +172,16 @@ def provision_via_config(config: Configuration) -> None: def _read_back(config: Configuration) -> tuple[dict[str, Role], dict[str, Scope]]: - """Read roles + scopes back through the IdP library (carrying real ids + descriptions).""" + """Read roles + scopes back through the IdP library (carrying real ids + descriptions). + + Scopes are sourced from each service's scope list (not the standalone get_scopes()), + so that scope.serviceId is populated — a required input for the PCE's SPM routing. + """ roles = {r.name: r for r in config.get_roles()} - scopes = {s.name: s for s in config.get_scopes()} + scopes: dict[str, Scope] = {} + for svc in config.get_services(): + for s in svc.scopes: + scopes.setdefault(s.name, s) # first owner wins; each scope has exactly one owner return roles, scopes @@ -320,9 +332,14 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: provision_via_config(config) # exactly once — not idempotent roles, scopes = _read_back(config) + agent_slug = scn.AGENT_ID.replace("-", "_") # github-agent -> github_agent for variant in VARIANTS: rego_dir = HERE / "rego_out" / variant rego_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + # Clear any rego left by a previous run so the assertions below always verify freshly + # generated policy — never a stale artifact that would let a broken pipeline pass green. + for stale in rego_dir.glob("*.rego"): + stale.unlink() db_path = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"aiac-store-{variant}-")) / "policy_model.db" os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_FILE"] = str(HERE / f"policy.{variant}.md") # read per PRB call log.info("variant %s: policy=%s rego_dir=%s", variant, os.environ["AIAC_POLICY_FILE"], rego_dir) @@ -342,6 +359,18 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: with running_services([store, opa], src=SRC): rules = orchestrate_prb(roles, scopes) compute_and_apply(rules, override=False) + # compute_and_apply is fire-and-forget: it swallows every dependency error and logs it, + # so a failed IdP/store/PDP interaction (or an empty derived agent set) silently writes no + # rego. Assert the agent's rego actually landed here at setup, so such a failure surfaces + # as one clear error instead of cryptic "no such file" OPA failures across every test. + expected = [rego_dir / f"{agent_slug}.inbound.rego", rego_dir / f"{agent_slug}.outbound.rego"] + missing = [p.name for p in expected if not p.is_file()] + if missing: + raise RuntimeError( + f"variant {variant!r}: compute_and_apply produced no {missing} in {rego_dir} " + f"(PRB returned {len(rules)} rule(s)); the pipeline failed silently — " + f"check the compute_and_apply logs above for a swallowed exception." + ) results[variant] = {"rego_dir": rego_dir, "rules": rules} yield results From 545bdc36a25c703c62989054842a61fcd4c84274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 05:20:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 234/273] Docs(aiac): Reconcile IdP role-sourcing specs with two-source agent roles The idp-configuration-service / library-idp / keycloak-service specs stated that agent roles are sourced *only* from Keycloak client roles and that the service-account realm-role path was removed. In practice the Configuration library provisions agent roles as realm roles assigned to the service account (POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id} -> assign_realm_roles), so the read and write paths never met and library-onboarded agents exposed no roles. Update the specs to match the implemented reconciliation: - GET /services/{id}/roles returns client roles AND aiac.managed service-account realm roles, both kind=Agent owned by this service. - _build_service merges the endpoint's kind/actorIds onto the validated role objects and stamps each nested scope's serviceId (it was not a plain pass-through; the handoff-03 'no library change' audit note is amended). Behavioral fix committed in eff18cf; this commit is docs-only. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 36 ++++++++++++++----- .../docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md | 33 ++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md index ff8ff1f28..32fdddbfe 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -68,14 +68,32 @@ Accepts JSON body `{"name": ..., "description": ...}`. It: 3. Returns `409 Conflict` if a role with that name already exists. 4. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. -`GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: -1. Calls `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` to return the **client roles defined on this service's client** — an agent's own roles (`R_A` in the PCE derivation). -2. Each returned `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: true` and `containerId` = the client UUID, which the mapping layer uses to classify the role (`kind = Agent`) and resolve its owner (`actorIds` / `Scope.serviceId`). See "Agent roles are client roles, field population, and assumption enforcement" below. -3. Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of client role objects. -4. Returns `[]` (empty array) if `KeycloakError` has `response_code == 400` (service has no client roles — not an error). +`GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: returns this service's agent roles (`R_A` in the PCE +derivation) from **two** sources, both stamped `kind = Agent`, `actorIds = [this client's +serviceId]`: +1. **Client roles** on the service's own client — `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)`. Each + `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: true` and `containerId` (the client UUID); the owner is + resolved from `containerId` → `get_client(containerId)["clientId"]`. +2. **`aiac.managed` realm roles assigned to the service account** — `get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` + → `get_realm_roles_of_user(user_id)`. This is how the `Configuration` library provisions an agent's + roles (`POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id}` → `assign_realm_roles` on the service account, below), + so without it a library-onboarded agent would expose no roles. The role-of-user stub omits + attributes, so each is re-fetched via `get_realm_role_by_id` to test the `aiac.managed` marker; + non-managed realm roles (e.g. `default-roles-`) are skipped. The owner is this service's own + `clientId`. +3. Returns `200 OK` with the merged JSON array (client-role ids dedup against the realm-role set). +4. Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError` has `response_code == 400` (service has no client roles — not an + error); a missing service account is caught and simply contributes no realm roles. 5. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on other `KeycloakError`. -> **Redesign note (SPM/APM):** this endpoint previously sourced a service's roles from the **realm roles assigned to its service account** (`get_client_service_account_user` → `get_realm_roles_of_user`). Under the SPM/APM redesign an agent's role is a Keycloak **client role** on the agent's own client (Assumption 3), so the endpoint now reads the client's client roles directly via `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)`. +> **Redesign note (SPM/APM + provisioning reconciliation).** Under the original SPM/APM redesign this +> endpoint sourced roles **only** from the client's client roles (`admin.get_client_roles`), on the +> premise that an agent's role is always a Keycloak client role (Assumption 3). In practice the write +> path (`POST /services/{id}/roles/{role_id}`, used by the `Configuration` library) assigns a **realm +> role to the service account**, not a client role — so the read and write paths did not meet, and a +> library-provisioned agent exposed no roles (empty `agent_roles` → all-deny outbound Rego; surfaced by +> the 5.3 live pipeline). The endpoint now returns **both** sources so the two paths reconcile. The +> long-term option of making provisioning create true client roles instead is tracked with issue 1.7. `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: 1. Calls `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` to return the realm-level client scopes assigned as defaults to the service. @@ -104,12 +122,12 @@ Under the SPM/APM policy-model redesign the Policy Computation Engine (PCE) perf **Assumption 3 — an agent's role is a Keycloak _client role_; a user's role is a Keycloak _realm role_.** In Keycloak a `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: bool` and `containerId` (the client UUID for client roles, the realm id for realm roles). This service holds the invariant end-to-end: -- **Agent roles are sourced from client roles.** `GET /services/{service_id}/roles` reads the client's client roles via `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` (not the realm roles of the service account). These are `R_A` — an agent's own roles, used throughout the PCE derivation. -- **User roles are realm roles.** `GET /roles` continues to read realm-level roles. +- **Agent roles.** `GET /services/{service_id}/roles` returns an agent's own roles (`R_A`) from two sources: the client's client roles (`admin.get_client_roles`, `clientRole == true`), **and** the `aiac.managed` realm roles assigned to the service account (the provisioning path the `Configuration` library uses). Both are surfaced as `kind = Agent` owned by this service — see the endpoint description and its Redesign note above. +- **User roles are realm roles.** `GET /roles` continues to read realm-level roles (`kind = User`). **Field population** (in the Keycloak → generic-model mapping layer, from the raw facts above): -- **`Role.kind` from the `clientRole` flag** — `clientRole == true` → `kind = Agent`; `false` (realm role) → `kind = User`. Kind is **never** inferred from role naming. +- **`Role.kind`** — a role read via `GET /services/{service_id}/roles` is always `kind = Agent` (whether it came from the client's client roles or from an `aiac.managed` realm role on the service account); a realm role read via `GET /roles` is `kind = User`. Equivalently: agent-context (`clientRole == true`, or `aiac.managed` realm role held by a service account) → `Agent`; plain realm role → `User`. Kind is **never** inferred from role naming. - **`Role.actorIds` per kind:** - `Agent`: the owning agent's `serviceId` — resolved from the role's `containerId` → client (`clientId`) — and/or the agent service account(s) that hold the role. - `User`: the **member usernames** of the role. This aligns with `GET /subjects?role_id=` / `get_subjects_by_role`, which already resolves a role → its member subjects; the usernames it returns are exactly `actorIds` for a user (realm) role. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md index d0a8a11d7..b6d4a1d56 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/keycloak-service.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ > > The content below is retained for reference only. > -> **SPM/APM note.** The active split already reads client roles for agents (`GET /clients/{client_id}/roles`, below). Under the SPM/APM redesign an agent's role is a Keycloak **client role** on the agent's own client and a user's role is a **realm role** (Assumption 3); the IdP Configuration Service populates `Role.kind` (from the `clientRole` flag), `Role.actorIds`, and `Scope.serviceId` from these facts and fails loud on cross-kind roles (Assumption 1) and multi-owner AIAC-managed scopes (Assumption 2). See [idp-configuration-service.md](idp-configuration-service.md). +> **SPM/APM note.** Under the SPM/APM redesign a user's role is a Keycloak **realm role** and an agent's role is surfaced as `kind = Agent` — sourced from the agent client's **client roles** *and* from the `aiac.managed` **realm roles assigned to its service account** (the provisioning path the `Configuration` library uses); the IdP Configuration Service populates `Role.kind`, `Role.actorIds`, and `Scope.serviceId` and fails loud on cross-kind roles (Assumption 1) and multi-owner AIAC-managed scopes (Assumption 2). See [idp-configuration-service.md](idp-configuration-service.md) for the authoritative, current description. ## Location `aiac/src/aiac/keycloak/service/` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md index a8b753f04..21aa45abb 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md @@ -141,16 +141,18 @@ HTTP client library that wraps the IdP Configuration Service REST API. Provides All Keycloak interactions are consolidated here; the PDP Policy Writer (OPA) does not touch Keycloak directly. -> **Handoff 03 audit outcome — no library code change required.** Once handoff 01 declares -> `Role.kind` / `Role.actorIds` / `Scope.serviceId` on the models and handoff 02 makes the IdP service -> populate them, the `Configuration` library surfaces them faithfully **with no code change**: it is a -> thin pass-through and pydantic `model_validate` picks up the declared fields automatically (no -> hand-rolled field mapping omits them). The P1 client-side filter in `get_services_by_role` / -> `get_services_by_scope` was already an `id`-membership field read (not an inference) and needs **no -> simplification**; it still returns only genuine owners/exposers. No client-side re-derivation of role -> kind exists or is introduced (`Role.kind` is authoritative); `get_services_by_role` is retained as a -> method. `get_subjects_by_role` stays consistent with a role's `actorIds` (both come from the same -> service-side source). See the per-method audit notes below. +> **Handoff 03 audit outcome (amended).** Most read paths surface `Role.kind` / `Role.actorIds` / +> `Scope.serviceId` faithfully as a thin `model_validate` pass-through with no code change, and the P1 +> client-side filter in `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` was already an `id`-membership +> read (not an inference) needing no simplification. **Exception — `_build_service` (nested +> service roles/scopes) is _not_ a plain pass-through and required a fix:** it looked service roles up +> in the `all_roles` map (built from `GET /roles`, where every role is `kind = User`), discarding the +> per-service endpoint's authoritative `kind = Agent` / `actorIds`, and it never stamped nested +> `Scope.serviceId`. It now merges the endpoint's `kind`/`actorIds` and stamps `serviceId` (see +> `get_services()` below). No client-side *re-derivation* of role kind is introduced — the merged +> `kind` still comes from the service, which remains authoritative. `get_subjects_by_role` stays +> consistent with a role's `actorIds` (both from the same service-side source). See the per-method +> audit notes below. **Transport retries.** Every HTTP call is issued through a private `_request(method, path, **kwargs)` helper that wraps the request in the project-level `run_upstream` retry primitive (`aiac.shared.upstream`): transient failures are retried up to `UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES` times (default `3`) with exponential backoff before a non-2xx status is raised as `RuntimeError`. Retry lives inside the library (not in callers), and applies at the leaf request, so composite methods (`create_service_role` / `create_service_scope`) retry each sub-request without compounding. @@ -213,8 +215,15 @@ class Configuration: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=` — fetch the base service list. 2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` once upfront to build `{id: Role}` and `{id: Scope}` lookup maps. 3. For each service, delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)` which issues: - - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=` → filter `all_roles` map → `Service.roles` - - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=` → filter `all_scopes` map → `Service.scopes` + - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=` → for each returned role, **merge its authoritative + `kind`/`actorIds` onto the matching `all_roles` object** (the full representation, carrying + `composite`/`childRoles`/`attributes`) → `Service.roles`. Merging (not a plain `all_roles` + lookup) is required: the per-service endpoint is the only source of the agent-context + `kind = Agent` / `actorIds = [serviceId]`; taking the role from `all_roles` alone would revert it + to the realm-level `kind = User` / `actorIds = [members]`. + - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=` → filter `all_scopes` map → `Service.scopes`, and + **stamp each scope's `serviceId` = this service's `clientId`** (the owning client — the PCE's SPM + routing key; `all_scopes` from `GET /scopes` carries no owner). 4. Raise `RuntimeError` on any non-2xx response. 5. Return `list[Service]` with fully-enriched `roles` (including `childRoles`) and `scopes` (including `description`). From f9fb74a19e32367d280c8a068af2af93cb70e6fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 12:35:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 235/273] fix(demo): add protocol label and direct agent port for AgentCard auto-creation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Add protocol.kagenti.io/a2a label to Deployment metadata and pod template so AgentCardSyncReconciler's shouldSyncWorkload() gate passes and the CR is auto-created on deploy - Add agent:8001→8001 as the first Service port so getServicePort() picks up the direct agent port (post authbridge port-stealing) rather than the reverse proxy port (8080→8000) which blocks unauthenticated card fetches with 502 Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml index 74143da30..42a588e2d 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ metadata: namespace: team1 labels: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent + protocol.kagenti.io/a2a: "" spec: replicas: 1 selector: @@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ spec: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent kagenti.io/inject: enabled kagenti.io/spire: enabled + protocol.kagenti.io/a2a: "" spec: serviceAccountName: github-agent containers: @@ -150,7 +152,15 @@ spec: selector: app.kubernetes.io/name: github-agent ports: - - port: 8080 + # Port 8001 is the agent's direct port after authbridge port-stealing (8000→8001). + # Listed first so getServicePort() picks it up for AgentCard fetching. + - name: agent + port: 8001 + targetPort: 8001 + protocol: TCP + # Port 8080 is the public/proxy port (authbridge reverse proxy on 8000). + - name: proxy + port: 8080 targetPort: 8000 protocol: TCP type: ClusterIP From 6071eb8adf4da2aa53a781ce72eabdcf0bfb3649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 13:14:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 236/273] Fix(aiac): Deploy OPA rego-file PDP writer in Phase 1, not Keycloak mock Phase 1's Kubernetes Interface Pod was deploying the legacy aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak composite-role writer, deferring the OPA rego-file writer to a fictitious "Phase 2 image swap" in issue 4.18. That framing was backwards: the intended Phase 1 PDP Policy Writer is the OPA filesystem stub (writes .rego files to REGO_OUTPUT_DIR), which is a pure fastapi/uvicorn/pydantic stub with no Keycloak or k8s API dependency. - k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml: swap the second Interface Pod container from aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak to aiac-pdp-policy-opa; drop the keycloak-admin-secret mount (unneeded); add REGO_OUTPUT_DIR=/rego and an emptyDir volume. - k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md: update build/load instructions and reframe the Phase 2 section as an in-place upgrade of the same OPA container to the CR-backed writer, not an image swap. - docs/specs/PRD.md, docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md, docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md: reconcile with the corrected deployment reality (Keycloak writer superseded and not deployed by any current manifest). Verified live: rebuilt aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local, loaded into the kind cluster, reapplied manifests, and confirmed the running pod's containers are aiac-pdp-config + aiac-pdp-policy-opa with both /health endpoints returning 200. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 10 +++---- .../components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 2 +- .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 9 ++++--- aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 26 +++++++++++-------- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 20 +++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index a69b0f64c..cae865f92 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ Four separate manifest files: | `aiac/k8s/event-broker-deployment.yaml` _(pending)_ | Event Broker Pod Deployment (NATS JetStream) + ClusterIP Service | | `aiac/k8s/rag-statefulset.yaml` _(pending)_ | RAG StatefulSet (ChromaDB + RAG Ingest Service containers) + 1 Gi PVC template + ClusterIP Service | -The two Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) and `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) as env vars. The IdP Configuration Service uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (admin auth realm) and ignores `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the PDP Policy Writer uses `KEYCLOAK_REALM` as its default operating realm. The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-policy-store-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. +Both Interface Pod containers mount `aiac-pdp-config` (KEYCLOAK_URL, KEYCLOAK_REALM, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM) as env vars; only the IdP Configuration Service container also mounts `keycloak-admin-secret` (KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME, KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD) and uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` (ignoring `KEYCLOAK_REALM`). The PDP Policy Writer (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`, the Phase 1 rego-file mock) needs no Keycloak credentials — it writes `.rego` files to `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` (default `/rego`, an `emptyDir` volume). The Policy Store container mounts `aiac-policy-store-config` for `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` (default `/data/state.db`) — no Kubernetes API access or RBAC required. ### Docker images @@ -468,12 +468,12 @@ Built independently. No entry in the repo's `build.yaml` CI matrix. # Build IdP Configuration Service (Kagenti Interface Pod container 1) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-config:latest aiac/src/ -# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 mock (Kagenti Interface Pod container 2; writes Rego to filesystem) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ - -# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 2 OPA (replaces mock via issue 4.18; writes to AuthorizationPolicy CR) +# Build PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 OPA rego-file mock (Kagenti Interface Pod container 2; writes .rego to filesystem) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-opa:latest aiac/src/ +# Legacy: PDP Policy Writer — Keycloak composite-role implementation, superseded, not deployed by any current manifest +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile -t aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:latest aiac/src/ + # Build Policy Store (deployed as StatefulSet aiac-policy-store) docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile -t aiac-policy-store:latest aiac/src/ diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 55ad9085e..71ac4fbe4 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing composite role mappings. Roles are made composites of service (client) permissions (roles), so that any subject (user) assigned a role automatically inherits the associated service permissions. Stateless — no caching. -This is the **Phase 1** implementation of the PDP Policy Writer. It is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the PDP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. Phase 2 replaces only this container image (`aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` → `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) within the same pod. The service name and port remain stable so the AIAC Agent and library require no reconfiguration. +**Superseded — not deployed by any current manifest.** This was an earlier implementation of the PDP Policy Writer, managing Keycloak composite role mappings directly. The Kubernetes Interface Pod (`aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) deploys the **OPA rego-file mock** (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`, see [pdp-policy-writer-opa.md](pdp-policy-writer-opa.md)) as its Phase 1 PDP Policy Writer container instead, behind the same `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. This service's source remains in-tree for reference but is not built or deployed by the current K8s manifests. ## Endpoints diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index e737c8a9b..cde89fef6 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -68,11 +68,12 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the Store + **OPA Policy Writer (filesystem stub)**, mounting the **single abstract** `policy.md`. AIAC runs in-cluster so UC-1's `analyze_tool` can reach the tool's MCP endpoint at its cluster-internal DNS name (`github-tool.{ns}.svc.cluster.local`); the tests trigger over `kubectl port-forward`. -- **OPA filesystem-stub writer, not the Keycloak composite writer.** The stack must run +- **OPA filesystem-stub writer, not the legacy Keycloak composite writer.** The stack must run `aiac-pdp-policy-opa` (the filesystem stub: writes `{slug}.inbound.rego` + `{slug}.outbound.rego` to - `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`, default `/rego`) — **not** the Phase-1 `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` composite writer, - which manages Keycloak composite roles and emits **no Rego at all**. The `.rego` files are the artifact - under test; without the OPA writer there is nothing to capture. + `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`, default `/rego`) — this is what the K8s Phase 1 Interface Pod actually deploys. + **Not** the superseded `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` composite writer, which manages Keycloak composite + roles and emits **no Rego at all**, and is not deployed by any current manifest. The `.rego` files are + the artifact under test; without the OPA writer there is nothing to capture. - **Rego capture.** `kubectl cp` the writer's `/rego` to a host temp dir, then run `opa eval` on the host. ## Preconditions (assumed, not performed by the tests) diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index 2cbaf2e60..9a73af7f9 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This guide covers the full AIAC deployment in the `aiac-system` namespace. | Manifest | Contents | Port(s) | |---|---|---| -| `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | Kagenti Interface Pod (IdP Configuration Service + PDP Policy Writer **Phase 1 mock** `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak`) + 2 ClusterIP Services | 7071, 7072 | +| `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | Kagenti Interface Pod (IdP Configuration Service + PDP Policy Writer **Phase 1 rego-file mock** `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) + 2 ClusterIP Services | 7071, 7072 | | `policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | Policy Store StatefulSet + 1 Gi PVC + headless Service + ClusterIP Service | 7074 | | `agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (init container + AIAC Agent) + ClusterIP Service | 7070 | @@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ -t localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local \ aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/ -# PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 mock (Interface Pod container 2, writes Rego to filesystem) -# Build context is the component directory (same pattern as aiac-pdp-config) -docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local \ - aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/ +# PDP Policy Writer — Phase 1 OPA rego-file mock (Interface Pod container 2, writes .rego to filesystem) +# Build context is aiac/src/ (the OPA Dockerfile COPYs the whole tree and sets PYTHONPATH) +docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ + -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local \ + aiac/src/ # Policy Store docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile \ ```bash kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-config:local --name -kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local --name +kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local --name kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-policy-store:local --name kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-agent:local --name ``` @@ -160,14 +160,18 @@ kubectl rollout restart deployment/aiac-interface -n aiac-system --- -## Phase 2: Upgrading to the OPA PDP Policy Writer +## Phase 2: Upgrading the OPA PDP Policy Writer to the CR-backed implementation -Phase 2 replaces the mock PDP Policy Writer with the OPA implementation (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`), which writes Rego packages to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR. The ClusterIP Service name and port are unchanged — no Agent reconfiguration required. +Phase 1 already deploys the OPA PDP Policy Writer (`aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) as a filesystem +stub that writes `.rego` files to `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`. Phase 2 upgrades that same container +in place to the CR-backed implementation, which writes Rego packages to an +`AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes CR instead. The image name, ClusterIP Service name, and +port are unchanged — no image swap and no Agent reconfiguration required. -See issue [4.18 — K8s: OPA image swap + AuthorizationPolicy CR + RBAC](../docs/issues/deployment/4.18-k8s-opa-authorizationpolicy-rbac.md) for the full procedure (image swap, ServiceAccount, ClusterRole, ClusterRoleBinding, CR instance). +See issue [4.18 — K8s: OPA PDP Policy Writer AuthorizationPolicy CR + RBAC upgrade](../docs/issues/deployment/4.18-k8s-opa-authorizationpolicy-rbac.md) for the full procedure (ServiceAccount, ClusterRole, ClusterRoleBinding, CR instance). ```bash -# Build Phase 2 PDP Policy Writer image +# Rebuild the OPA PDP Policy Writer image with the Phase 2 (CR-backed) implementation docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ -t localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local aiac/src/ kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local --name diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml index e829d99ef..c2600cdee 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -58,16 +58,28 @@ spec: name: aiac-pdp-config - secretRef: name: keycloak-admin-secret - - name: aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak - image: localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak:local + # Phase 1 PDP Policy Writer: OPA rego-file mock. Generates Rego + # packages and writes them as .rego files to REGO_OUTPUT_DIR. It is a + # pure filesystem stub — no Keycloak, no k8s API — so it mounts neither + # keycloak-admin-secret nor any Keycloak credentials. The AuthorizationPolicy + # CR-backed variant (RBAC + env vars) is layered on later per issue 4.18. + - name: aiac-pdp-policy-opa + image: localhost/aiac-pdp-policy-opa:local imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7072 envFrom: - configMapRef: name: aiac-pdp-config - - secretRef: - name: keycloak-admin-secret + env: + - name: REGO_OUTPUT_DIR + value: /rego + volumeMounts: + - name: rego-output + mountPath: /rego + volumes: + - name: rego-output + emptyDir: {} --- apiVersion: v1 From 14e77610ce61bbfdbde9fc0f89adf040f8381070 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 15:50:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 237/273] Fix(aiac): UC-1 onboarding pipeline fixes + rung-1 integration test Product fixes (TDD) that make real UC-1 service onboarding produce Rego: - Provision: read AgentCard skills from status.card.skills using the skill 'id' (not spec.skills/name), and match the card by spec.targetRef.name so the operator-named CR is found. - PCE: compute_and_apply now logs and re-raises (was swallowed), so store/IdP/ PDP failures surface as a real 500 instead of a silent 200 with no Rego. - Single realm source of truth: Configuration.for_default_realm() reads KEYCLOAK_REALM; provision, builder, and the PCE all use it. AIAC_REALM retired. Integration test (UC-1 onboarding ladder, rung 1): - Add test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py: onboard the agent only, assert Keycloak entities + opa-eval decisions (inbound allow, outbound all-deny) and grant sets; self-provisions the PRB policy.md; captures Rego from the aiac-pdp-policy-opa container; clears the writer's /rego first; configurable AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT. Resolves the trigger by the slash-free internal client UUID. - Discard the old two-stack test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py and trim scenario_uc1's two-variant machinery (POLICY_EXPLICIT); keep the truth tables. Docs/manifest: - Deploy guide gets a new section for the agent LLM ConfigMap + Secret. - agent-deployment.yaml ships generic LLM placeholders (real values are per-env). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml | 13 +- aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 28 + .../uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py | 4 +- .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 39 +- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 12 + aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 9 +- .../provision/test_analyze_agent.py | 38 +- .../uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/launcher.py | 7 +- aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py | 48 +- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 2 +- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py | 499 ++++++++++++++++++ .../test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py | 432 --------------- aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 17 +- 14 files changed, 647 insertions(+), 503 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py delete mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py diff --git a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml index adc02a21b..628a8e0d1 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml @@ -5,8 +5,17 @@ metadata: name: aiac-agent-config namespace: aiac-system data: - LLM_BASE_URL: "https://api.anthropic.com" - LLM_MODEL: "claude-sonnet-5" + # OpenAI-compatible LLM endpoint for the Policy Rules Builder (ChatOpenAI: + # base_url=LLM_BASE_URL, model=LLM_MODEL, api_key from the aiac-agent-secret). + # These are PLACEHOLDERS — do not commit real endpoints/keys. Supply the real + # values per-environment on the LIVE objects at deploy time (guide step 4): + # kubectl patch configmap aiac-agent-config -n aiac-system --type merge \ + # -p '{"data":{"LLM_BASE_URL":"https:///v1","LLM_MODEL":""}}' + # kubectl create secret generic aiac-agent-secret -n aiac-system \ + # --from-literal=LLM_API_KEY= --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - + # then: kubectl rollout restart deployment/aiac-agent -n aiac-system + LLM_BASE_URL: "https://openai-compatible-endpoint.example.com/v1" + LLM_MODEL: "your-model-name" AIAC_AC_MODEL: "RBAC" --- diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index 9a73af7f9..f18f39728 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -69,6 +69,34 @@ kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ > `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` contains placeholder credentials for reference only. > For any non-local environment, create the secret manually and remove the `stringData` block. +## 3b — Configure the Agent LLM (ConfigMap + Secret) + +The AIAC Agent's Policy Rules Builder calls an **OpenAI-compatible** LLM endpoint +(`ChatOpenAI(base_url=LLM_BASE_URL, model=LLM_MODEL, api_key=LLM_API_KEY)`). This configuration is +split across two objects the Agent consumes via `envFrom`, and `agent-deployment.yaml` ships only +**placeholders** — you must supply the real values per environment: + +| Key | Object | Notes | +|-----|--------|-------| +| `LLM_BASE_URL` | `aiac-agent-config` ConfigMap | OpenAI-compatible base URL (e.g. a litellm proxy). Placeholder in the manifest. | +| `LLM_MODEL` | `aiac-agent-config` ConfigMap | Model the endpoint serves. Placeholder in the manifest. | +| `LLM_API_KEY` | `aiac-agent-secret` Secret | **Not** defined in any manifest — the Deployment only references it. | + +```bash +# API key — create the Secret BEFORE applying agent-deployment.yaml (step 5); the manifest only +# references it. (To update an existing one, append: --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -) +kubectl create secret generic aiac-agent-secret -n aiac-system \ + --from-literal=LLM_API_KEY= + +# Endpoint + model — patch the LIVE ConfigMap AFTER step 5 (agent-deployment.yaml creates it with +# placeholders). Do not commit real endpoints/keys to the manifest. +kubectl patch configmap aiac-agent-config -n aiac-system --type merge \ + -p '{"data":{"LLM_BASE_URL":"https:///v1","LLM_MODEL":""}}' +``` + +Both are read by the Agent at startup, so a change to either takes effect on the next (re)start: +`kubectl rollout restart deployment/aiac-agent -n aiac-system`. + ## 4 — Configure the environment Edit the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap in `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` to match your environment: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index 7a345877b..f0a545bbb 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ to the PRB. """ -import os - from fastapi import HTTPException from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules @@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ def _config() -> Configuration: - return Configuration.for_realm(os.getenv("KEYCLOAK_REALM", "")) + return Configuration.for_default_realm() def _flatten_dedup(roles): diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py index ff9ed70f4..7ec730ab7 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ missing/invalid label — actionable, never silent. """ -import os - from fastapi import HTTPException from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration @@ -31,7 +29,7 @@ # Seams (patched in unit tests) # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # def _config() -> Configuration: - return Configuration.for_realm(os.getenv("KEYCLOAK_REALM", "")) + return Configuration.for_default_realm() def _mcp_tools_list(endpoint: str) -> list[dict]: @@ -116,8 +114,13 @@ def classify_service(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: def analyze_agent(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: - """Derive an agent's roles + scopes from its AgentCard CR (non-LLM). Falls back to a - default access scope for legacy deployments with no AgentCard.""" + """Derive an agent's roles + scopes from its AgentCard CR (non-LLM). + + The operator fetches the agent's A2A card and syncs it onto the CR's ``status.card``; each skill + there carries a machine ``id`` (a stable identifier, e.g. ``source_operations``) plus a display + ``name`` (which may contain spaces). Scope names are built from the skill ``id`` so they are + usable Keycloak scope names. Falls back to a default access scope when there is no AgentCard CR + (legacy deployments) or the CR has no synced skills yet.""" namespace, workload = state.namespace, state.workload_name role = RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.agent", description="Agent role") @@ -126,21 +129,31 @@ def analyze_agent(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"Kubernetes AgentCard LIST failed in namespace {namespace!r}: {e}") - card = next( - (c for c in resp.get("items", []) if (c.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") == workload), - None, - ) - if card is None: + # Link the card to the workload by its ``spec.targetRef`` (the Deployment it describes), since the + # operator names the CR after the Deployment (e.g. ``-deployment-card``), not the + # workload. Fall back to ``metadata.name == workload`` for hand-authored/legacy cards. + def _targets_workload(c: dict) -> bool: + target = ((c.get("spec") or {}).get("targetRef") or {}).get("name") + return target == workload or (c.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") == workload + + card = next((c for c in resp.get("items", []) if _targets_workload(c)), None) + skills = (((card or {}).get("status") or {}).get("card") or {}).get("skills", []) + if not skills: provision = ServiceProvision( roles=[role], scopes=[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.access", description="Default access scope")], - reasoning="partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned", + reasoning=( + "partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned" + if card is None + else "partial: AgentCard has no synced skills, default scope assigned" + ), ) return {"service_provision": provision} - skills = (card.get("spec") or {}).get("skills", []) scopes = [ - ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "")) + ScopeDefinition( + name=f"{workload}.{s.get('id') or s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "") + ) for s in skills ] provision = ServiceProvision( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index 26b2b43c9..575c8c42e 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ class _NamedDefinition(Protocol): load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") +# Single source of truth for the Keycloak realm the whole AIAC pipeline operates on. Provisioning, +# the Service Policy Builder, and the Policy Computation Engine all resolve the realm through +# ``Configuration.for_default_realm()`` so they can never diverge onto different env vars. +REALM_ENV_VAR = "KEYCLOAK_REALM" + + class Configuration: def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: self.realm = realm @@ -28,6 +34,12 @@ def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Configuration": return cls(realm) + @classmethod + def for_default_realm(cls) -> "Configuration": + """Build a ``Configuration`` for the realm named by ``$KEYCLOAK_REALM`` — the single source + of truth shared by provisioning, the policy builder, and the computation engine.""" + return cls.for_realm(os.getenv(REALM_ENV_VAR, "")) + def _base_url(self) -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index ec2dfa841..0700cd8f8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ """ import logging -import os from typing import TypeVar from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration @@ -81,17 +80,19 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None: purged from **every** SPM containing it, once, up-front, before the fresh rules are appended (role-level revocation). - Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and swallowed so a - transient failure never crashes the calling sub-agent. + Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and **re-raised** so the + caller (the Controller) surfaces the failure — e.g. as a 500 — instead of returning success + while silently applying nothing. """ try: _run(rules, override) except Exception: logger.exception("compute_and_apply failed for %d rule(s)", len(rules)) + raise def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: - config = Configuration.for_realm(os.environ["AIAC_REALM"]) + config = Configuration.for_default_realm() # (1) Catalog once — the only runtime IdP read. Carries each service's type (agent vs tool, # for P4) and its own roles/scopes (embedded on the APM for P2, filtered to aiac.managed). diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py index 94a673f66..b1e181663 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py @@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ def _state(): def _card(name=WORKLOAD, skills=None): - return {"metadata": {"name": name}, "spec": {"skills": skills or []}} + """An AgentCard CR as the operator syncs it: the fetched A2A card lives under ``status.card``, + and each skill carries a machine ``id`` (a stable identifier) plus a display ``name``.""" + return {"metadata": {"name": name}, "status": {"card": {"skills": skills or []}}} def _run(items=None, list_exc=None): @@ -38,9 +40,11 @@ def _run(items=None, list_exc=None): class TestAnalyzeAgentFound: def test_one_agent_role_and_one_scope_per_skill(self): + # Scope names come from each skill's machine ``id`` — not its display ``name`` (which may + # contain spaces) — so they are stable identifiers usable as Keycloak scope names. skills = [ - {"name": "forecast", "description": "Get forecast"}, - {"name": "history", "description": "Historical data"}, + {"id": "forecast", "name": "Weather forecast operations", "description": "Get forecast"}, + {"id": "history", "name": "Historical data operations", "description": "Historical data"}, ] provision = _run(items=[_card(skills=skills)])["service_provision"] @@ -51,6 +55,21 @@ def test_one_agent_role_and_one_scope_per_skill(self): assert "derived from AgentCard: 2 skills" == provision.reasoning + def test_agentcard_matched_by_targetref_not_metadata_name(self): + # The operator names the card after the Deployment (e.g. "-deployment-card") and + # points spec.targetRef at the workload; provision must link the card by targetRef, not by + # metadata.name == workload. + card = { + "metadata": {"name": f"{WORKLOAD}-deployment-card"}, + "spec": {"targetRef": {"kind": "Deployment", "name": WORKLOAD}}, + "status": {"card": {"skills": [{"id": "forecast", "name": "F", "description": "d"}]}}, + } + provision = _run(items=[card])["service_provision"] + + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.forecast"] + assert "derived from AgentCard: 1 skills" == provision.reasoning + + class TestAnalyzeAgentLegacyFallback: def test_no_agentcard_yields_default_access_scope_and_partial_reasoning(self): provision = _run(items=[])["service_provision"] @@ -61,12 +80,19 @@ def test_no_agentcard_yields_default_access_scope_and_partial_reasoning(self): assert "partial: no AgentCard found" in provision.reasoning def test_agentcard_present_but_no_name_match_is_legacy_fallback(self): - provision = _run(items=[_card(name="other-agent", skills=[{"name": "x", "description": "y"}])])[ - "service_provision" - ] + provision = _run( + items=[_card(name="other-agent", skills=[{"id": "x", "name": "X", "description": "y"}])] + )["service_provision"] assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.access"] assert "partial: no AgentCard found" in provision.reasoning + def test_agentcard_present_but_no_synced_skills_is_fallback(self): + # The CR exists but its ``status.card`` has not synced any skills yet (e.g. the operator has + # not fetched the A2A card): fall back to a default access scope rather than provision none. + provision = _run(items=[_card(skills=[])])["service_provision"] + assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.access"] + assert "no synced skills" in provision.reasoning + class TestAnalyzeAgent502: def test_k8s_agentcards_list_failure_is_502(self, monkeypatch): diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py index 07aa756ae..fe2445039 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ def test_agent_path_end_to_end(self): "items": [ { "metadata": {"name": "weather"}, - "spec": {"skills": [{"name": "forecast", "description": "d"}]}, + "status": {"card": {"skills": [{"id": "forecast", "name": "F", "description": "d"}]}}, } ] } diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py index 04bb4858b..423d6eb12 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py @@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ until ready, run some work, tear them down — is used by ``test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py`` (5.2) and ``test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py`` (5.3). -The cluster half — ``kubectl`` apply/delete/rollout/cp, ``kubectl port-forward``, and the ``opa`` -oracle — is used by ``test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`` (5.4), which drives a real -Kagenti/Kind cluster rather than in-process subprocesses. +The cluster half — ``kubectl`` cp, ``kubectl port-forward``, ``resolve_pod``, and the ``opa`` +oracle — is used by the UC-1 onboarding ladder (``test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py`` +and its rung-2/3 siblings, 5.4), which drives a real Kagenti/Kind cluster rather than in-process +subprocesses. It imports only the standard library and ``requests`` — never ``aiac`` — so a launcher may import it *before* setting the environment variables the aiac libraries read at import time. ``pytest`` is diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py index 8c339ed3f..d941250af 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -"""The UC-1 (discovery-driven) ``github-agent`` scenario — the oracle for -``test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py``. +"""The UC-1 (discovery-driven) ``github-agent`` scenario — the oracle for the UC-1 onboarding +integration-test ladder (``test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py`` and its rung-2/3 siblings). Sibling of the hand-provisioned ``scenario.py`` (kept separate so 5.2/5.3 are untouched). Same *role -> access facts and truth tables*; the difference is **provenance and naming**. Here the @@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ This module is **pure data**: it imports nothing (no ``aiac``, no stdlib beyond the language) so the test can import it before its env-before-import step, just like ``scenario.py``. -Fact triad (spec ``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md`` -> *Further -Notes*): the *Scenario* table, **both** ``policy.md`` variants (``POLICY_EXPLICIT`` / -``POLICY_ABSTRACT`` below), and the pair-lists here must all agree. The generic entity/role/scope -descriptions are functional and keyword-free and must not contradict the facts. +Fact triad (spec ``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``): the *Scenario* table, +the single abstract ``policy.md`` (``POLICY_ABSTRACT`` below), and the pair-lists here must all +agree. The generic entity/role/scope descriptions are functional and keyword-free and must not +contradict the facts. (The prior explicit variant + cross-variant equivalence are deferred to the +two-policy rung ``testing/5.4.4``; the two-stack topology that served both variants is discarded.) """ from __future__ import annotations @@ -130,33 +131,16 @@ # gate and is not probed. OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [] -# --- The two policy.md variants (baked into the two AIAC stacks out of band) ---------------- +# --- The single abstract policy.md (baked into the AIAC stack out of band) ------------------ # -# The AIAC pods mount their own ``policy.md`` (via AIAC_POLICY_FILE); the test does not feed these -# at runtime. They live here as the fact-triad anchor — verbatim from the spec's *Scenario inputs*. -# Both are USER-INTENT-ONLY: neither names the agent role (naming it would populate ``target_ok`` -# and break both the user-gate-only decision and cross-variant equivalence). Both must yield the -# SAME discovered grant set. - -# Version 1 (explicit): enumerates each (user-role -> discovered scope) pair by its full prefixed -# name. No agent-role->tool-scope section. Deny by default. -POLICY_EXPLICIT = """\ -# Access Control Policy — github-agent / github-tool - -Grant access on a least-privilege basis. Only grant a (role, scope) pair when this -policy supports it; deny by default. - -## Users → agent capabilities (inbound; user may call the agent) -- developer may use github-agent.source_operations and github-agent.issue_operations. -- tester may use github-agent.issue_operations. - -## Users → tool operations (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) -- developer may perform github-tool.source-read, github-tool.source-write, and github-tool.issues-read. -- tester may perform github-tool.issues-read and github-tool.issues-write. -""" - -# Version 2 (abstract): intent-only prose. Same facts; relies on the PRB/LLM to expand intent into -# the discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. +# The AIAC pod mounts its own ``policy.md`` (via AIAC_POLICY_FILE); the test does not feed it at +# runtime. It lives here as the fact-triad anchor — verbatim from the spec's *Scenario inputs*. It +# is USER-INTENT-ONLY: it does not name the agent role (naming it would populate ``target_ok`` and +# break the user-gate-only decision). Intent-only prose; the PRB/LLM expands intent into the +# discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. +# +# (The prior explicit enumerated variant and the cross-variant equivalence check are deferred to the +# two-policy rung ``testing/5.4.4``; the two-stack topology that served both variants is discarded.) POLICY_ABSTRACT = """\ Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index 23101f021..8a84965a4 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ # --- Resolve config + set env BEFORE importing aiac (the libraries read env at import time) --- TEST_REALM = os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) -os.environ["AIAC_REALM"] = TEST_REALM # the PCE reads back the realm we provision +os.environ["KEYCLOAK_REALM"] = TEST_REALM # the PCE reads back the realm we provision (single source of truth) os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ddf8f28e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py @@ -0,0 +1,499 @@ +"""Rung 1 of the UC-1 onboarding ladder — onboard the **agent only**. + +The simplest rung (issue ``testing/5.4.1-uc1-onboard-agent-only.md``; spec +``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``): drive the **real** in-cluster UC-1 +Service Onboarding agent (``POST /apply/service/{id}``) for **only** the ``github-agent`` — the +``github-tool`` is deployed + registered but **not** onboarded — then assert the agent-side outcome. +Proves agent discovery + inbound policy generation stand alone, and that the outbound user gate is +correctly **empty** when no tool has been onboarded. + +Single AIAC stack, OPA filesystem-stub writer, single abstract ``policy.md`` (the two-stack / +two-variant machinery of the discarded ``test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`` is gone). Reuses +``scenario_uc1.py`` (truth tables — the oracle), ``probe_uc1.rego`` (user-gate probe), and +``launcher.py`` (kubectl / port-forward / opa helpers). + +Per-rung flow (spec § Per-rung flow): **Keycloak cleanup → onboard agent → validate end state → +Keycloak cleanup**. Deployment + client registration are **preconditions**, not test steps. + +*Onboard + evaluate — no A2A traffic, no live enforcement* (phase-1 out of scope). + +Resolving the trigger id (spec § Resolving ``{service_id}``): the ``POST /apply/service/{service_id}`` +route is a single path segment and the Controller resolves it via ``admin.get_client(service_id)``, +which keys on the Keycloak **internal client UUID** — *not* the ``clientId`` (a SPIFFE URI with +slashes under SPIRE, which the single-segment route cannot carry). This module therefore resolves the +client whose **name** is ``"{ns}/github-agent"`` and triggers with its ``id`` (UUID). + +Run (needs a live Kagenti/Kind cluster with the AIAC stack + OPA filesystem-stub writer, the demo +workloads deployed + registered into ``AIAC_TEST_REALM``, a real LLM in-pod, and ``opa`` on PATH or +``$OPA_BIN``): + + .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py -m integration -v + +Without ``-m integration`` the suite is not collected; without ``opa`` it skips at runtime. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import logging +import os +import sys +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import requests + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves + +from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 + kubectl, + kubectl_cp, + kubectl_rollout_status, + opa_bin, + opa_eval, + port_forward, + require_env, + resolve_pod, +) + +log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +# --- Config (env) — spec § Configuration; single stack (no variants) ------------------------ +TEST_REALM = os.environ.get("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) +NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE", scn.DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT) +ADMIN_REALM = os.environ.get("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") + +# Controller (in-cluster) reached via ``kubectl port-forward``. Target/namespace/ports are +# overridable; defaults match the deployed AIAC stack (svc/aiac-agent-service:7070 in aiac-system). +CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") +CONTROLLER_TARGET = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_TARGET", "svc/aiac-agent-service") +CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT", "7070")) +CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT", "7070")) + +# The Controller Deployment + the abstract policy.md the PRB reads. The test mounts this policy on +# the Controller pod as a precondition-fixup (see ``ensure_agent_policy``); it is NOT written into +# any committed deployment manifest — the deployment stays free of test-specific config. +CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT", "aiac-agent") +POLICY_CONFIGMAP = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_CONFIGMAP", "aiac-policy") +POLICY_MOUNT_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_MOUNT_PATH", "/etc/aiac") + +# Onboarding drives the real PRB, which makes several LLM calls over the whole role/scope universe; +# against a slow reasoning model that can take minutes. Configurable so slow endpoints don't spuriously +# fail the run (``AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT``, seconds). +ONBOARD_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT", "900")) + +# OPA-writer pod to ``kubectl cp`` the generated .rego from (name explicit or via label selector). +# The OPA filesystem-stub writer runs as a container INSIDE the interface pod (not its own pod), +# so the .rego is captured from that container. Defaults match the deployed stack. +OPA_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") +OPA_SELECTOR = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR", "app=aiac-interface") +OPA_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_CONTAINER", "aiac-pdp-policy-opa") +OPA_POD = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_POD") +OPA_REGO_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH", "/rego") + +AGENT_SLUG = scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD.replace("-", "_") # github-agent -> github_agent +INBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.rego" +OUTBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.rego" + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Expected-verdict oracle (pure functions over the scenario_uc1 truth table) +# ====================================================================================== +# +# Rung 1 is the exception in the ladder: with no tool onboarded there are no tool scopes in the +# universe, so the outbound **user gate is empty** (all deny) and the outbound-subject grant set is +# ``∅`` — regardless of ``scenario_uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` (which is the rung-2/3 table). Inbound +# is unaffected. These functions encode that rung-1 contract; verdicts are computed here, never read +# from the Rego under test. + +_INBOUND_SOURCES = {role for role, _ in scn.INBOUND_PAIRS} # user-roles reaching some agent scope + +# Rung 1's expected grant sets (the oracle for the semantic-equivalence check). +RUNG1_INBOUND = set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS) +RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT: set[tuple[str, str]] = set() # ∅ — no tool onboarded + + +def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: + """A user may call the agent iff their realm role sources some agent scope (``INBOUND_PAIRS``).""" + return scn.USERS[subject] in _INBOUND_SOURCES + + +def expected_outbound(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: + """Rung 1: the outbound user gate is entirely empty (no tool onboarded), so every + ``(subject, function_name)`` is denied.""" + return (scn.USERS[subject], function_name) in RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Oracle contract tests — fixture-independent; pin rung 1's defining decisions +# ====================================================================================== +# +# These need neither the cluster nor ``opa``: they assert the rung-1 oracle itself (the intended +# policy the live decisions below are checked against). If these are wrong, every live assertion is +# meaningless — so they are the tracer bullet. + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "subject, allowed", + [("dev-user", True), ("test-user", True), ("devops-user", False)], +) +def test_inbound_oracle(subject: str, allowed: bool) -> None: + """Inbound: dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌ (devops sources no agent scope).""" + assert expected_inbound(subject) is allowed + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("function_name", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) +def test_outbound_oracle_all_deny(subject: str, function_name: str) -> None: + """Rung 1's defining property: the outbound user gate is empty, so every ``(subject, function)`` + is denied — no tool was onboarded, so no tool scope is in the universe.""" + assert expected_outbound(subject, function_name) is False + + +def test_rung1_grant_set_oracle() -> None: + """Rung 1 grant-set oracle: inbound == the ``scenario_uc1`` inbound truth table; the + outbound-subject grant set is empty.""" + assert RUNG1_INBOUND == set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS) + assert RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT == set() + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Keycloak provisioning + cleanup (the fixture UC-1 does NOT do) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def _connect_admin(): + """Connect to the admin realm so the fixture can provision users + clean up provisioned entities.""" + from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin + + creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, + user_realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, + username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +def provision_realm_and_users(admin, realm: str) -> None: + """Idempotently ensure ``realm`` holds ``scenario_uc1``'s users + realm roles with the + descriptions the PRB reads. Realm roles carry the ``aiac.managed`` marker so the IdP populates + each role's ``actorIds`` (member usernames) — the PCE needs them to build the ``subject_roles`` + map the inbound/outbound gates key on. Never deletes/recreates — reruns converge (spec: shared + realm, leave-in-place).""" + from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + + try: + admin.create_realm({"realm": realm, "enabled": True}) + except KeycloakError: + pass # already exists — leave in place + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + + for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): + payload = {"name": name, "description": description, "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}} + admin.create_realm_role(payload, skip_exists=True) + admin.update_realm_role(name, payload) # ensure the marker on a pre-existing role too + + for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): + user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) + admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) + + +def resolve_service_id(admin, realm: str, client_name: str) -> str: + """Return the **route-safe trigger id** — the Keycloak *internal client UUID* (``client['id']``) + of the client whose *name* is ``client_name``. + + Not the ``clientId``: under SPIRE that is a SPIFFE URI (``spiffe://.../github-agent``) whose + slashes the single-segment ``/apply/service/{id}`` route cannot carry; the Controller resolves + the trigger via ``admin.get_client(id)``, which keys on the UUID.""" + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + for client in admin.get_clients(): + if client.get("name") == client_name: + return client["id"] + raise AssertionError(f"no Keycloak client with name {client_name!r} in realm {realm!r}") + + +def cleanup_provisioned(admin, realm: str) -> None: + """Delete the entities UC-1 onboarding provisions — the realm role(s) and client scopes prefixed + ``github-agent.`` / ``github-tool.`` — so each run starts from a clean slate and reruns converge. + + Leaves the fixture's own ``developer`` / ``tester`` / ``devops`` roles, the operator's audience + client scopes (``*-aud``, no ``.`` after the workload), and everything else in place. Best-effort: + a delete of an already-absent entity is ignored.""" + from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + prefixes = (f"{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}.", f"{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}.") + + for role in admin.get_realm_roles(): + name = role.get("name", "") + if name.startswith(prefixes): + try: + admin.delete_realm_role(name) + except KeycloakError as exc: + log.warning("cleanup: delete realm role %r failed: %s", name, exc) + + for scope in admin.get_client_scopes(): + name = scope.get("name", "") + if name.startswith(prefixes): + try: + admin.delete_client_scope(scope["id"]) + except KeycloakError as exc: + log.warning("cleanup: delete client scope %r failed: %s", name, exc) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Onboarding trigger + Rego capture +# ====================================================================================== + + +def ensure_agent_policy(namespace: str) -> None: + """Ensure the PRB's ``policy.md`` is mounted in the Controller pod — the one mutable stack + precondition this test owns, so a fresh AIAC stack needs no manual patching. + + Phase-1's PRB reads the single abstract policy from ``AIAC_POLICY_FILE`` (default + ``/etc/aiac/policy.md``). This idempotently provisions that file as a ConfigMap and mounts it on + the Controller Deployment, rolling out **only** when the mount is absent. The policy text is + ``scenario_uc1.POLICY_ABSTRACT`` — the same abstract policy the scenario's verdicts assume. It is + never written into a committed deployment manifest (that stays free of test config) and is left + in place on teardown (benign, and keeps reruns fast).""" + cm = { + "apiVersion": "v1", + "kind": "ConfigMap", + "metadata": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP, "namespace": namespace}, + "data": {"policy.md": scn.POLICY_ABSTRACT}, + } + kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input_text=json.dumps(cm)) + + mounted = kubectl( + "get", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, + "-o", "jsonpath={.spec.template.spec.volumes[*].configMap.name}", + ) + if POLICY_CONFIGMAP in mounted.split(): + return # already mounted — no rollout needed + + patch = { + "spec": {"template": {"spec": { + "volumes": [{"name": "aiac-policy", "configMap": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP}}], + "containers": [{ + "name": CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, + "volumeMounts": [ + {"name": "aiac-policy", "mountPath": POLICY_MOUNT_PATH, "readOnly": True} + ], + }], + }}} + } + kubectl( + "patch", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, + "--type", "strategic", "-p", json.dumps(patch), + ) + kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT}", namespace=namespace) + + +def _onboard(base_url: str, service_id: str) -> None: + """``POST /apply/service/{service_id}`` against the Controller; assert 200.""" + resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/apply/service/{service_id}", timeout=ONBOARD_TIMEOUT) + assert resp.status_code == 200, ( + f"onboard {service_id!r} at {base_url}: HTTP {resp.status_code} — {resp.text[:500]}" + ) + + +def _rego_dir() -> Path: + """Host dir the captured ``.rego`` is copied to: ``$REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` if set, else a fresh test + temp dir (spec § Configuration). A temp default keeps captured artifacts out of the repo and + lets each run verify freshly generated policy — never a stale artifact.""" + base = os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR") + path = Path(base) if base else Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="aiac-uc1-rung1-rego-")) + path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + for stale in path.glob("*.rego"): + stale.unlink() + return path + + +def _writer_pod() -> str: + """Resolve the pod hosting the OPA filesystem-stub writer (the ``aiac-pdp-policy-opa`` container + lives inside the interface pod).""" + return OPA_POD or resolve_pod(OPA_SELECTOR, namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE) + + +def _clear_writer_rego(pod: str) -> None: + """Delete any stale ``.rego`` in the writer's output dir **before** onboarding, so the run + captures only freshly-generated policy — a leftover from a previous run must never let a broken + pipeline pass green. (The host capture dir is cleared too, in ``_rego_dir``.)""" + kubectl( + "exec", "-n", OPA_NAMESPACE, pod, "-c", OPA_CONTAINER, "--", + "sh", "-c", f"rm -f {OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/*.rego", + ) + + +def _capture_rego(pod: str, rego_dir: Path) -> None: + """``kubectl cp`` the agent's inbound + outbound Rego from the writer container into ``rego_dir``.""" + for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): + kubectl_cp( + pod, f"{OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/{filename}", rego_dir / filename, + namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE, container=OPA_CONTAINER, + ) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Grant-set extraction (semantic-equivalence oracle, re-derived from the generated Rego) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def _opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: + """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``.""" + return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) + + +def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: + """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` map (``∅`` for + rung 1: no tool onboarded, so the map is empty).""" + m = _opa_dump(rego_dir / OUTBOUND_REGO, "data.authz.github_agent.outbound.outbound_subject_role_scopes") + return {(role, scope) for role, scopes in (m or {}).items() for scope in scopes} + + +def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: + """User-role->agent-scope grant set from the inbound Rego's ``role_scopes`` restricted to the + published ``agent_scopes`` (a role may list scopes the agent does not expose; those don't grant).""" + rego = rego_dir / INBOUND_REGO + role_scopes = _opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.role_scopes") or {} + agent_scopes = set(_opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.agent_scopes") or []) + return { + (role, scope) + for role, scopes in role_scopes.items() + for scope in scopes + if scope in agent_scopes + } + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Session fixture — cleanup → onboard agent only → capture rego → yield → cleanup +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="session") +def onboarded() -> dict: + """Provision users/roles, onboard **only** the agent, capture its Rego, and yield the live + ``admin`` handle + captured ``rego_dir``. Keycloak cleanup runs before and after; the clients are + left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow). + + ``opa`` absence **skips** the whole suite up front (before any cluster work), so a missing oracle + binary never masquerades as a failure.""" + opa_bin() # skip early if opa is absent — cheaper than skipping after the onboard + require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + + admin = _connect_admin() + cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # before — clean slate + provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) + ensure_agent_policy(CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE) # mount the PRB's policy.md if the stack lacks it + + rego_dir = _rego_dir() # fresh host dir; stale .rego cleared so a broken pipeline can't pass green + writer_pod = _writer_pod() + _clear_writer_rego(writer_pod) # clear stale .rego in the writer BEFORE onboarding + try: + agent_id = resolve_service_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}") + with port_forward( + CONTROLLER_TARGET, + namespace=CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE, + local_port=CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT, + remote_port=CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT, + ) as base_url: + _onboard(base_url, agent_id) # ONLY the agent — the tool is deployed but not onboarded + + _capture_rego(writer_pod, rego_dir) + missing = [f for f in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO) if not (rego_dir / f).is_file()] + if missing: + raise RuntimeError( + f"agent onboard produced no {missing} in {rego_dir} — the pipeline failed or the " + "OPA filesystem-stub writer is not deployed (spec § Blocked by)." + ) + yield {"admin": admin, "rego_dir": rego_dir} + finally: + cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # after — restore the pre-run state + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Live tests — Keycloak entities + opa-eval decisions (verdicts computed from scenario_uc1) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def test_agent_role_and_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Keycloak holds the agent's realm role + the two AgentCard scopes with their descriptions.""" + admin = onboarded["admin"] + admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) + + role = admin.get_realm_role(scn.AGENT_ROLE) + assert role and role.get("name") == scn.AGENT_ROLE, f"missing realm role {scn.AGENT_ROLE!r}" + + scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} + for name, description in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items(): + assert name in scopes, f"missing agent scope {name!r}" + assert scopes[name] == description, ( + f"agent scope {name!r} description mismatch: {scopes[name]!r} != {description!r}" + ) + + +def test_no_tool_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The tool was not onboarded, so no ``github-tool.*`` scope exists (UC-1-provisioned scopes are + prefixed ``github-tool.``; the operator's ``*-aud`` audience scopes are not and don't count).""" + admin = onboarded["admin"] + admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) + tool_scopes = [ + s["name"] for s in admin.get_client_scopes() + if s.get("name", "").startswith(f"{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}.") + ] + assert not tool_scopes, f"unexpected tool scopes provisioned: {tool_scopes}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +def test_inbound(onboarded: dict, subject: str) -> None: + """Inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some discovered agent scope + (dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌).""" + rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / INBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval([rego], "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) + assert allowed == expected_inbound(subject), subject + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("function_name", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) +def test_outbound_all_deny(onboarded: dict, subject: str, function_name: str) -> None: + """Outbound user gate (via ``probe_uc1.rego``) denies every ``(subject, function)`` — the gate is + empty because no tool was onboarded (exact-name match on full discovered scope names).""" + rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / OUTBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, HERE / "probe_uc1.rego"], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": subject, "function_name": function_name}, + ) + assert allowed == expected_outbound(subject, function_name), f"{subject} / {function_name}" + + +def test_only_agent_rego_present(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Exactly the two agent files on disk; explicitly no ``github_tool.*.rego`` (the tool is a pure + target — no rules written for it, and it was not onboarded).""" + rego_dir = onboarded["rego_dir"] + assert not list(rego_dir.glob("github_tool*.rego")), "unexpected tool Rego emitted" + for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): + assert (rego_dir / filename).is_file(), f"missing {filename}" + + +def test_inbound_grant_set_matches_truth_table(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The inbound grant set re-derived from the Rego equals ``scenario_uc1``'s inbound truth table — + catching verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse allow/deny oracle cannot see.""" + got = inbound_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG1_INBOUND, f"inbound: missing={RUNG1_INBOUND - got} extra={got - RUNG1_INBOUND}" + + +def test_outbound_subject_grant_set_empty(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The outbound-subject grant set re-derived from the Rego is ``∅`` — no tool onboarded, so the + user gate is empty.""" + got = outbound_subject_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, f"expected empty outbound gate, got {got}" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py deleted file mode 100644 index a342f86fd..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,432 +0,0 @@ -"""End-to-end UC-1 onboarding-pipeline integration test — the generated Rego is the artifact under -test, produced by *real UC-1 onboarding of really-deployed workloads*. - -Discovery-driven sibling of ``test_policy_pipeline.py`` (5.3): identical scenario facts and truth -tables (``scenario_uc1.py`` mirrors ``scenario.py``'s decisions), but where 5.3 hand-provisions the -agent/tool roles/scopes with clean bare names and calls the PRB directly, this test **infers** them -via the production trigger — it deploys the simplified ``github-tool`` + the real ``github-agent`` to -a live Kagenti/Kind cluster, drives the in-cluster UC-1 Service Onboarding agent -(``POST /apply/service/{client_id}``) for each, and asserts the emitted Rego decides correctly with -the standalone ``opa eval`` binary. - -Because real UC-1 names every scope ``{workload}.{name}`` and emits one generic ``github-agent.agent`` -role, the Rego is **semantically similar but not byte-identical** to 5.3's: workload-prefixed names, -and a degenerate (empty) agent->tool gate. The outbound probe therefore evaluates the **user gate -only** (``subject_ok``) — phase-1's user-gating dimension — and matches ``function_name`` to a scope -by **exact string equality** (both sides already prefixed). See -``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``. - -*Deploy + discover + evaluate — no A2A traffic, no live enforcement* (phase-1 out of scope). - -Topology (spec § Topology): AIAC runs **in-cluster** (so UC-1's ``analyze_tool`` can reach the tool's -``*.svc.cluster.local`` MCP endpoint); the test triggers over HTTP via ``kubectl port-forward``. Two -independent AIAC stacks serve the two ``policy.md`` variants (``explicit`` / ``abstract``) — a -documented **precondition**, addressed by ``AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL`` / ``AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL``. The IdP -Configuration Service + Keycloak are shared. Each variant's ``.rego`` is ``kubectl cp``'d out to -``rego_out_uc1//`` (kept separate from 5.3's ``rego_out/``) and evaluated on the host. - -Run (needs a live cluster + operator + Keycloak + the two AIAC stacks + real LLM in-pod; ``opa`` on -PATH or ``$OPA_BIN``; realm defaults to ``aiac-uc1-e2e``): - .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py -m integration -v -Without ``-m integration`` the suite is not collected; without ``opa`` each node skips at runtime. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import logging -import os -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest -import requests - -pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration - -HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ -REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ -sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves - -from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 -from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 - kubectl, - kubectl_apply, - kubectl_cp, - kubectl_delete, - kubectl_rollout_status, - opa_eval, - port_forward, - require_env, - resolve_pod, -) - -log = logging.getLogger(__name__) - -VARIANTS = ("explicit", "abstract") - -# --- Config (env) — spec § Configuration ---------------------------------------------------- -TEST_REALM = os.environ.get("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) -NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE", scn.DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT) -ADMIN_REALM = os.environ.get("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") -VARIANT_URL = { - "explicit": os.environ.get("AIAC_EXPLICIT_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7070"), - "abstract": os.environ.get("AIAC_ABSTRACT_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7080"), -} -# OPA-writer pod + rego path per variant (for kubectl cp). Pod name may be given explicitly or -# resolved from a label selector; the writer's output dir defaults to /rego (REGO_OUTPUT_DIR). -OPA_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_NAMESPACE", NAMESPACE) -OPA_REGO_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH", "/rego") -OPA_POD_ENV = {"explicit": "AIAC_OPA_POD_EXPLICIT", "abstract": "AIAC_OPA_POD_ABSTRACT"} -OPA_SELECTOR = { # fallback when the pod name is not given explicitly - "explicit": os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR_EXPLICIT", "app=aiac-opa-explicit"), - "abstract": os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR_ABSTRACT", "app=aiac-opa-abstract"), -} -# Host base dir for captured Rego. Distinct from 5.3's rego_out/ so the two suites never clobber. -REGO_BASE = Path(os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", str(HERE / "rego_out_uc1"))) - -# Demo manifests (repo-relative). -TOOL_MANIFEST = REPO_ROOT / "demo/tools/github_tool/k8s/github-tool-deployment.yaml" -AGENT_CONFIGMAPS = REPO_ROOT / "demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/configmaps.yaml" -AGENT_MANIFEST = REPO_ROOT / "demo/agents/github_agent/k8s/github-agent-deployment.yaml" - -INBOUND_REGO = "github_agent.inbound.rego" -OUTBOUND_REGO = "github_agent.outbound.rego" - -# ====================================================================================== -# Keycloak provisioning (users + realm roles) — the test fixture UC-1 does NOT do -# ====================================================================================== - - -def _connect_admin(): - """Connect to the admin realm so the fixture can create the test realm + provision users.""" - from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin - - creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") - return KeycloakAdmin( - server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], - realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, - user_realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, - username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], - password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - ) - - -def provision_realm_and_users(admin, realm: str) -> None: - """Idempotently ensure the dedicated realm exists and holds ``scenario_uc1``'s users + realm - roles (with descriptions the PRB reads). Never deletes/recreates — reruns converge (spec: shared - realm, leave-in-place).""" - from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError - - try: - admin.create_realm({"realm": realm, "enabled": True}) - except KeycloakError: - pass # already exists — leave in place - admin.change_current_realm(realm) - - for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): - admin.create_realm_role({"name": name, "description": description}, skip_exists=True) - - for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): - user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) - admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) - admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) - - -def resolve_client_id(admin, realm: str, client_name: str) -> str: - """Return the Keycloak *clientId* of the client whose *name* is ``client_name`` (the operator - sets ``client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"``; the id is a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE, else the same - string). The UC-1 trigger takes this clientId — never assume the bare string.""" - admin.change_current_realm(realm) - for client in admin.get_clients(): - if client.get("name") == client_name: - return client["clientId"] - raise AssertionError(f"no Keycloak client with name {client_name!r} in realm {realm!r}") - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Cluster deployment + readiness -# ====================================================================================== - - -def _set_namespace_realm(namespace: str, realm: str) -> None: - """Set ``KEYCLOAK_REALM`` on the namespace's ``authbridge-config`` ConfigMap so the operator - registers this namespace's clients into the test realm (per-namespace; the operator preserves an - admin/CI-set value — operator issue #433). Done before the workloads' AgentRuntimes reconcile.""" - kubectl( - "patch", "configmap", "authbridge-config", "-n", namespace, "--type", "merge", - "-p", f'{{"data":{{"KEYCLOAK_REALM":"{realm}"}}}}', - ) - - -def _deploy_workloads() -> None: - kubectl_apply(AGENT_CONFIGMAPS) # authbridge-config + authproxy-routes first - _set_namespace_realm(NAMESPACE, TEST_REALM) # ...then pin the realm before pods register - kubectl_apply(TOOL_MANIFEST) - kubectl_apply(AGENT_MANIFEST) - - -def _delete_workloads() -> None: - # Delete the deployment manifests (incl. AgentRuntimes) so the operator de-registers the - # clients. ConfigMaps + realm + users + captured .rego are left in place (spec step 6). - for manifest in (AGENT_MANIFEST, TOOL_MANIFEST): - try: - kubectl_delete(manifest) - except Exception as exc: # best-effort teardown — never mask the test result - log.warning("teardown: delete %s failed: %s", manifest.name, exc) - - -def _poll(check, *, desc: str, timeout: float = 180.0, interval: float = 3.0): - """Poll ``check()`` until it returns truthy (returning that value), or fail after ``timeout``.""" - import time - - deadline = time.time() + timeout - last = None - while time.time() < deadline: - try: - last = check() - if last: - return last - except Exception as exc: # transient during rollout — keep polling - last = exc - time.sleep(interval) - raise AssertionError(f"timed out after {timeout}s waiting for: {desc} (last={last!r})") - - -def _pod_type_label(namespace: str, app_selector: str) -> str | None: - out = kubectl( - "get", "pods", "-n", namespace, "-l", app_selector, - "-o", "jsonpath={.items[0].metadata.labels.kagenti\\.io/type}", - ) - return out.strip() or None - - -def _agentcard_present(namespace: str, name: str) -> bool: - out = kubectl( - "get", "agentcard", name, "-n", namespace, "--ignore-not-found", - "-o", "jsonpath={.metadata.name}", - ) - return out.strip() == name - - -def _tool_answers_tools_list(namespace: str) -> bool: - """Port-forward the tool Service and confirm its MCP ``tools/list`` returns tools.""" - with port_forward( - f"svc/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}", namespace=namespace, local_port=19090, remote_port=9090 - ) as base: - resp = requests.post( - f"{base}/mcp", - json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, - headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, - timeout=5, - ) - resp.raise_for_status() - return bool((resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools")) - - -def _wait_for_workloads(admin) -> None: - """Block until both workloads are Ready, the operator has registered their Keycloak clients and - applied ``kagenti.io/type`` labels, the AgentCard CR exists, and the tool answers ``tools/list`` - (spec step 2).""" - kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}", namespace=NAMESPACE) - kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}", namespace=NAMESPACE) - - _poll( - lambda: resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}"), - desc=f"operator registers client {NAMESPACE}/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}", - ) - _poll( - lambda: resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}"), - desc=f"operator registers client {NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}", - ) - _poll( - lambda: _pod_type_label(NAMESPACE, f"app={scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}") == "tool", - desc=f"kagenti.io/type=tool on {scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD} pod", - ) - _poll( - lambda: _pod_type_label(NAMESPACE, f"app.kubernetes.io/name={scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}") == "agent", - desc=f"kagenti.io/type=agent on {scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD} pod", - ) - _poll( - lambda: _agentcard_present(NAMESPACE, scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD), - desc=f"AgentCard CR {scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD} present", - ) - _poll(lambda: _tool_answers_tools_list(NAMESPACE), desc="tool answers tools/list") - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Onboarding trigger + Rego capture -# ====================================================================================== - - -def _trigger_onboard(base_url: str, client_id: str) -> None: - """``POST /apply/service/{client_id}`` against a variant's Controller; assert 200.""" - resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/apply/service/{client_id}", timeout=120) - assert resp.status_code == 200, ( - f"onboard {client_id!r} at {base_url}: HTTP {resp.status_code} — {resp.text[:500]}" - ) - - -def _capture_rego(variant: str, rego_dir: Path) -> None: - """``kubectl cp`` the variant stack's inbound + outbound Rego from its OPA-writer pod.""" - pod = os.environ.get(OPA_POD_ENV[variant]) or resolve_pod(OPA_SELECTOR[variant], namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE) - for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): - kubectl_cp( - pod, f"{OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/{filename}", rego_dir / filename, namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE - ) - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Session fixture — deploy, provision, onboard both variants, capture Rego -# ====================================================================================== - - -@pytest.fixture(scope="session") -def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: - """Deploy the demo workloads once, provision users/roles once, then onboard **tool then agent** - against each variant's in-cluster AIAC stack, capturing each variant's ``.rego`` to - ``rego_out_uc1//``. Yields ``{variant: {"rego_dir": Path}}``. Teardown deletes the demo - workloads (operator de-registers clients); realm/users/rego are left in place.""" - require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") - - admin = _connect_admin() - provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) - - results: dict[str, dict] = {} - try: - _deploy_workloads() - _wait_for_workloads(admin) - - tool_id = resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}") - agent_id = resolve_client_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}") - - for variant in VARIANTS: - base_url = VARIANT_URL[variant] - _trigger_onboard(base_url, tool_id) # tool first — its scopes must exist for the agent - _trigger_onboard(base_url, agent_id) # then agent — PRB reads the scope universe - - rego_dir = REGO_BASE / variant - rego_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - _capture_rego(variant, rego_dir) - results[variant] = {"rego_dir": rego_dir} - log.info("variant %s: rego captured to %s", variant, rego_dir) - - yield results - finally: - _delete_workloads() - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Expected-verdict oracle (pure functions over the scenario_uc1 truth table) -# ====================================================================================== - -_INBOUND_SOURCES = {role for role, _ in scn.INBOUND_PAIRS} # user-roles reaching some agent scope -_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT = set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) # (user-role, tool-scope) the subject may reach - - -def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: - """A user may call the agent iff their realm role sources some agent scope (``INBOUND_PAIRS``).""" - return scn.USERS[subject] in _INBOUND_SOURCES - - -def expected_outbound(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: - """User gate only: a user's call to a tool function is allowed iff the subject is entitled to that - scope (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``). The agent->tool gate is degenerate under UC-1 (not probed).""" - return (scn.USERS[subject], function_name) in _OUTBOUND_SUBJECT - - -# --- Grant-set extraction (semantic-equivalence oracle, re-derived from the generated Rego) --- - - -def _opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: - """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``.""" - return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) - - -def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: - """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` map.""" - m = _opa_dump(rego_dir / OUTBOUND_REGO, "data.authz.github_agent.outbound.outbound_subject_role_scopes") - return {(role, scope) for role, scopes in (m or {}).items() for scope in scopes} - - -def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: - """User-role->agent-scope grant set from the inbound Rego's ``role_scopes`` restricted to the - published ``agent_scopes`` (a role may list scopes the agent does not expose; those don't grant).""" - rego = rego_dir / INBOUND_REGO - role_scopes = _opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.role_scopes") or {} - agent_scopes = set(_opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.agent_scopes") or []) - return { - (role, scope) - for role, scopes in role_scopes.items() - for scope in scopes - if scope in agent_scopes - } - - -_TRUTH: dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]] = { - "inbound": set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS), - "outbound_subject": set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS), -} -_GRANTS = {"inbound": inbound_grants, "outbound_subject": outbound_subject_grants} - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Tests — opa eval the truth table (verdicts computed from scenario_uc1) -# ====================================================================================== - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) -@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) -def test_inbound(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, subject: str) -> None: - """Inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some (discovered) agent scope.""" - rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / INBOUND_REGO - allowed = opa_eval([rego], "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) - assert allowed == expected_inbound(subject), f"{variant} / {subject}" - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) -@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) -@pytest.mark.parametrize("function_name", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) -def test_outbound(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, subject: str, function_name: str) -> None: - """Outbound user gate (via ``probe_uc1.rego``) allows a subject's call to a tool function iff the - subject is entitled to that full discovered scope name (exact match; agent gate not probed).""" - rego = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] / OUTBOUND_REGO - allowed = opa_eval( - [rego, HERE / "probe_uc1.rego"], - "data.probe.outbound.allow", - {"subject": subject, "function_name": function_name}, - ) - assert allowed == expected_outbound(subject, function_name), f"{variant} / {subject} / {function_name}" - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) -def test_no_tool_rego(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str) -> None: - """The pipeline emits no tool model — exactly the two agent files, no ``github_tool.*.rego``.""" - rego_dir = pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"] - assert not list(rego_dir.glob("github_tool*.rego")), "unexpected tool Rego emitted" - for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): - assert (rego_dir / filename).exists(), f"missing {filename}" - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Semantic-equivalence tests — grant sets re-derived from the generated Rego -# ====================================================================================== - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("variant", VARIANTS) -@pytest.mark.parametrize("gate", list(_TRUTH)) -def test_grant_set_matches_truth_table(pipeline: dict[str, dict], variant: str, gate: str) -> None: - """Each variant's grant set (re-derived from its Rego) equals the ``scenario_uc1`` truth table — - catching verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse allow/deny oracle cannot see.""" - got = _GRANTS[gate](pipeline[variant]["rego_dir"]) - assert got == _TRUTH[gate], f"{variant} {gate}: missing={_TRUTH[gate] - got} extra={got - _TRUTH[gate]}" - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("gate", list(_TRUTH)) -def test_variants_are_semantically_equivalent(pipeline: dict[str, dict], gate: str) -> None: - """The two policy variants describe the same access model, so their Rego must yield the same - grant set (compared as order-independent sets; text/name-ordering may differ).""" - explicit = _GRANTS[gate](pipeline["explicit"]["rego_dir"]) - abstract = _GRANTS[gate](pipeline["abstract"]["rego_dir"]) - assert explicit == abstract, ( - f"{gate}: variants diverge — only-explicit={explicit - abstract} only-abstract={abstract - explicit}" - ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index 647d4152a..623de6cc9 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager from unittest.mock import patch +import pytest + from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, RoleKind, Scope, Service, ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel @@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ def pushed_agent_ids(self): def engine_env(catalog, store): """Patch the engine boundary; yield ``compute_and_apply``. Multiple calls share the store.""" with ExitStack() as stack: - stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) + stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"KEYCLOAK_REALM": "test-realm"})) stack.enter_context(patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", return_value=list(catalog))) stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_service_policy", side_effect=store.get_service_policy)) @@ -478,13 +480,14 @@ def test_absent_service_is_seeded_and_persisted(): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Cycle 17 — fire-and-forget: any dependency failure is logged and swallowed; # -# compute_and_apply returns None and nothing is pushed to the PDP. # +# Cycle 17 — a dependency failure is logged and RE-RAISED (not swallowed), so the # +# caller (Controller) surfaces it as a real error instead of a silent 200 with # +# nothing applied; nothing is pushed to the PDP. # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): +def test_dependency_exception_propagates(caplog): store = FakeStore() with ExitStack() as stack: - stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"AIAC_REALM": "test-realm"})) + stack.enter_context(patch.dict(os.environ, {"KEYCLOAK_REALM": "test-realm"})) stack.enter_context(patch.object(Configuration, "get_services", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))) stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.get_service_policy", side_effect=store.get_service_policy)) @@ -497,5 +500,7 @@ def test_dependency_exception_is_swallowed(): from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply UR = _user_role("r-user", users=["u"]) - assert compute_and_apply([_rule(UR, _scope("s-x", service_id="svc"))]) is None + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="boom"): + compute_and_apply([_rule(UR, _scope("s-x", service_id="svc"))]) assert store.apply_policy_count == 0 + assert "compute_and_apply failed" in caplog.text # still logged before re-raising From 9c5cdeee1c06c8d202f7e4c078865d4b6a6e2a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 16:35:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 238/273] Docs(aiac): Reconcile UC-1 specs with the onboarding pipeline fixes - uc1-service-onboarding: analyze_agent reads AgentCard skills from status.card.skills using skill.id, matches the card by spec.targetRef.name, and documents the 'CR present but no synced skills' fallback. - uc1-onboarding-pipeline: 'Resolving {service_id}' now specifies the Keycloak internal client UUID (slash-free) as the trigger id, not the slash-bearing clientId (the route is a single path segment). - policy-pipeline: AIAC_REALM retired in favor of Configuration.for_default_realm() reading KEYCLOAK_REALM (single source of truth for the PCE realm). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 17 ++++++++++++----- .../specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 8 +++++--- .../integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 11 +++++++---- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 8027a1dc6..a077ec58e 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -96,15 +96,22 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied by the kagenti-operator (via the AgentRuntime CR) and propagated to pod labels; it is the operator's own agent/tool discriminator (`SkipReason`, kagenti-operator `internal/clientreg/names.go`). The operator only registers a Keycloak client for a workload that already carries this label, so it is effectively guaranteed for operator-registered clients; a missing/invalid value still fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + label). The `entity_id` format (SPIFFE vs plain) reflects whether SPIRE is enabled, **not** the service type, so it is not used for classification. - **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR. - 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one matching `workload_name`. - 2. **AgentCard found** → produce `ServiceProvision`: + 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one whose + `spec.targetRef.name` is `workload_name` (the operator names the CR after the Deployment, e.g. + `{workload}-deployment-card`, **not** after the workload — so match by `targetRef`, falling back + to `metadata.name == workload_name` for hand-authored cards). + 2. **AgentCard with synced skills found** → produce `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` - - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{skill.name}", description=skill.description) for skill in card.skills]` + - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.{skill.id}", description=skill.description) for skill in card.status.card.skills]` — + the operator syncs the fetched A2A card onto `status.card`; each skill's machine `id` + (e.g. `source_operations`) is used for the scope name (a stable identifier), not the display + `name` (which may contain spaces). - `reasoning`: `f"derived from AgentCard: {len(skills)} skills"` - 3. **AgentCard not found** (legacy deployment) → produce minimal `ServiceProvision`: + 3. **No AgentCard, or its `status.card` has no synced skills yet** → produce minimal `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.agent", description="Agent role")]` - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workloadName}.access", description="Default access scope")]` - - `reasoning`: `"partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned"` + - `reasoning`: `"partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned"` (no CR) or + `"partial: AgentCard has no synced skills, default scope assigned"` (CR present, unsynced). > K8s access: `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 48ec152d7..8aade79ba 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -53,9 +53,11 @@ The pipeline (provision → PRB → PCE → OPA) is driven **once per `policy.md scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below describe one such run. 1. **Set service URLs in env before importing the aiac libraries.** Export `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, - `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`, `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, and `AIAC_REALM` *before* importing the aiac + `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL`, `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL`, and `KEYCLOAK_REALM` *before* importing the aiac libraries — the libraries read env at import time. This is the pattern - `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` already follows. + `test/pdp/policy/generate_rego.py` already follows. (The PCE resolves its realm via + `Configuration.for_default_realm()`, the single source of truth reading `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; the + former `AIAC_REALM` is retired.) 2. **Spawn the three services as `uvicorn` subprocesses** (no Docker) and poll each `GET /health` until ready, with a bounded timeout: - IdP Configuration Service — `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app` on `7071`. @@ -208,7 +210,7 @@ Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds | — (required) | | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the test provisions | `aiac-e2e` | -| `AIAC_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back (= `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-e2e` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back, via `Configuration.for_default_realm()` (single source of truth; = `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-e2e` | | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | IdP Configuration Service base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | Policy Store base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | OPA Policy Writer base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index cde89fef6..65b424a0f 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -83,10 +83,13 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the (`client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"`) into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`. The tests do **not** `kubectl apply` manifests or wait for operator registration / `kagenti.io/type` labels / AgentCard / `tools/list` — that is deployment's job. - > **Resolving `{service_id}`.** The trigger takes the Keycloak **client id**, which is **not** the string - > `github-tool`: the operator sets `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"` but the client *id* is that string - > only when SPIRE is off — with `--spire-trust-domain` set it is a SPIFFE URI. Resolve the id by looking - > up the client whose **name** is `"{ns}/github-tool"` / `"{ns}/github-agent"`, then trigger with that id. + > **Resolving `{service_id}`.** The `POST /apply/service/{service_id}` route is a **single path + > segment**, and the Controller resolves the trigger via `admin.get_client(service_id)` — which keys + > on the Keycloak **internal client UUID** (a slash-free GUID). It is **not** the `clientId`: the + > operator sets `client.name = "{ns}/{workload}"`, and the `clientId` is slash-bearing either way + > (`"{ns}/{workload}"` with SPIRE off, a SPIFFE URI under `--spire-trust-domain`), so it cannot be a + > path segment. Resolve by looking up the client whose **name** is `"{ns}/github-tool"` / + > `"{ns}/github-agent"`, then trigger with that client's **`id`** (the UUID). - **Users + realm roles.** The fixture provisions them (UC-1 does not) — see *[Scenario](#scenario)* — via `KeycloakAdmin` into `AIAC_TEST_REALM`, **before** onboarding; idempotent; left in place. From 5864c2cc9e0e45aef9ce1c56bcb6fc1dd3d51988 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 16:48:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 239/273] Docs(aiac): Reconcile PCE spec/PRD with re-raise (was fire-and-forget swallow) compute_and_apply now logs and re-raises exceptions instead of swallowing them, so a failed IdP/store/PDP interaction surfaces to the caller (Controller returns HTTP 500; a NATS consumer nacks -> at-least-once redelivery) rather than being silently dropped while nothing is applied. - policy-computation-engine.md: update user stories #2/#7 and the three behavior/invariant statements from 'fire-and-forget; logged, not propagated' to 're-raised; propagates to the caller'. - PRD.md: update the PCE component I/O row and its unit-test expectations row. (The RAG-service 'fire-and-forget' and the NATS-consumer asyncio.create_task ack rule are unrelated and left unchanged.) Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 4 ++-- .../docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index cae865f92..22dd3a37b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi | IdP Configuration Service (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.idp.configuration.api` | Keycloak Admin REST API | Raw Keycloak JSON (generic endpoint names) | | PDP Policy Writer — OPA (in Kagenti Interface Pod) | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | Kubernetes CR (`AuthorizationPolicy`) | 204 on success | | Policy Store (StatefulSet `aiac-policy-store`) | `aiac.policy.store.library` | SQLite (`agent_policies` table, in-memory cache) | `AgentPolicyModel` / `PolicyModel` on read; 204 on write | -| Policy Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation`) | AIAC Agent sub-UC agents | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | None (fire-and-forget; logs exceptions) | +| Policy Computation Engine (`aiac.policy.computation`) | AIAC Agent sub-UC agents | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `None` on success; exceptions logged and re-raised (propagate to the caller) | | `aiac.idp.configuration.models` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.model`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for IdP entities (Subject, Role, Service, Scope) | | `aiac.idp.configuration.api` | AIAC Agent, Policy Computation Engine, Python scripts | IdP Configuration Service (HTTP) | Typed Pydantic instances (reads and writes IdP configuration entities) | | `aiac.policy.model` | `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.policy.computation`, AIAC Agent | — | Pydantic model definitions for policy entities (PolicyRule, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel) | @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ Tests live in `aiac/test/`. | `aiac.policy.model` | No mock needed | `extra='ignore'` drops unknown fields; relationship maps keyed by string `id` round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / `model_validate` with typed `Role` / `Scope` values preserved | | `aiac.idp.configuration.api` functions | IdP Configuration Service HTTP endpoints | Returns correct Pydantic model instances; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback; `get_services_by_role` and `get_services_by_scope` issue correct query params | | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` functions | PDP Policy Writer HTTP endpoints | Correct serialisation; `RuntimeError` on non-2xx; default URL fallback | -| `aiac.policy.computation` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (import-boundary mocks) | Correct `apply_agent_policy` calls per resolved service; additive merge preserves existing rules; no duplicate rule insertion; `apply_policy` called once after all writes; exceptions logged, not propagated | +| `aiac.policy.computation` | `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library` (import-boundary mocks) | Correct `apply_agent_policy` calls per resolved service; additive merge preserves existing rules; no duplicate rule insertion; `apply_policy` called once after all writes; exceptions logged and re-raised (propagate to the caller) | | Event Broker NATS consumer | NATS message delivery (mock `nats-py` subscription) | Correct handler dispatched per subject; ack issued on success; no ack on handler exception | | Event Broker DLQ | NATS max redelivery exceeded | Message routed to `aiac.apply.dlq` after 5 failures | | Init container health-check | HTTP 4xx then 200 sequence; NATS TCP refused then connected | Exits 0 only after all four dependencies healthy; `add_stream` called with correct config | diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 1d9167d94..0ef4451af 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ These AIAC invariants (from the policy-model spec, handoff 01) are relied on by ## User Stories 1. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to submit a list of `PolicyRule` objects and have them durably recorded on the right service and reflected in every affected agent's policy, without implementing routing or storage merge logic myself. -2. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want the computation to be fire-and-forget, so my sub-agent is not blocked waiting for Rego generation. +2. As an AIAC Agent sub-UC agent, I want to submit the rules and get no return value to unpack on success, so I stay decoupled from routing, storage, and derivation — while a failure still surfaces to me (US 7). 3. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want each rule recorded on the SPM of the service that **owns the rule's scope**, so the fact survives regardless of which services already exist. 4. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to derive an affected agent's APM purely from the persisted SPMs, so the result is **independent of onboarding order**. 5. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to skip duplicate rules on append, so re-processing the same event does not create redundant entries. 6. As the Policy Computation Engine, I want to partial-upsert only the affected agents' packages to the PDP, so unaffected agents are left untouched. -7. As a developer, I want exceptions from the computation logged without propagating, so a transient IdP / store / PDP failure does not crash the calling sub-agent. +7. As a developer, I want exceptions from the computation logged **and re-raised**, so a failed IdP / store / PDP interaction surfaces to the caller (the Controller returns HTTP 500; a NATS consumer nacks → at-least-once redelivery) instead of being silently dropped while nothing is applied. 8. As a developer, I want a stable import path, so the calling convention does not change as the module grows. --- @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Single entry point: def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None ``` -- **Fire-and-forget:** the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and does not propagate them — a transient failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push must not crash the calling sub-agent. +- **No return value; failures propagate:** on success the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and **re-raises** them — a failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push surfaces to the caller (the Controller returns HTTP 500; a NATS consumer nacks → at-least-once redelivery) rather than being silently swallowed while nothing is applied. - **`override`:** selects the merge mode (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)). `False` (default) appends additively at the SPM layer; `True` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings **across all SPMs** (role-level revocation). Set by the caller (the Controller) from the producing UC's choice — UC1 = `False`, UC3 = `True`, UC2 Rebuild = `True`, UC2 Build = TBD. - Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply` @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, `compute_and_apply` exec - if `X` is an **Agent**, `X` is affected (its inbound changed); **and** - every agent **targeting** `s` is affected — namely the owners (`actorIds`) of the **Agent-kind** inbound rules on `SPM(X)` whose scope is `s`. -6. **Derive** each affected agent's APM (see below), collect them into one `PolicyModel`, and **partial-upsert** via `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` **exactly once**. Fire-and-forget: exceptions logged, never propagated. **Tools get an SPM but no APM** (P4). +6. **Derive** each affected agent's APM (see below), collect them into one `PolicyModel`, and **partial-upsert** via `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy` **exactly once**. Exceptions are logged and re-raised (they propagate to the caller). **Tools get an SPM but no APM** (P4). ### Derivation of `APM(A)` — 100% from SPMs, zero IdP @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - **Directional relevance — no false outbound edge.** A user role shared between `AS` and `TS` does **not** by itself make A "target" T; A's outbound edge to T appears only if one of A's **agent** roles maps to a T scope. - **Affected set from the batch, not a full scan.** The affected-agent set is computed from the batch roles/scopes; agents unrelated to the batch are never derived or upserted. - **`apply_policy` called exactly once** after all `apply_service_policy` writes complete (partial upsert of only the affected agents). -- **Fire-and-forget.** An exception from any dependency is logged and does not propagate; `compute_and_apply` returns `None`. +- **Failures propagate.** An exception from any dependency is logged and **re-raised** (it propagates to the caller, which surfaces it — e.g. the Controller returns HTTP 500); on success `compute_and_apply` returns `None`. **Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock boundary pattern — apply the same approach at the library import boundary here). From 8701788761c006ea5542201593fd83d3518d2330 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 18:02:57 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 240/273] Docs(aiac): Add Kagenti dev-guide link to CLAUDE.md external references Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/CLAUDE.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/aiac/CLAUDE.md b/aiac/CLAUDE.md index 68042f3ff..6561461a2 100644 --- a/aiac/CLAUDE.md +++ b/aiac/CLAUDE.md @@ -107,3 +107,7 @@ Docker images: | `aiac-pdp-policy-opa` | `src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-policy-store` | `src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile` | | `aiac-rag-ingest` | `rag-ingest/` (separate directory) | + +## External references + +- [Kagenti Developer Guide](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti/blob/main/docs/dev-guide.md) — upstream Kagenti dev guide: per-persona workflows (agent, tool, extensions developers, MCP gateway operators), Git/PR process, pre-commit hooks, feature flags, local Kagenti UI v2 development (React frontend + FastAPI backend, building/deploying images to Kubernetes), and HyperShift-based testing on ephemeral OpenShift clusters (cluster lifecycle, cost management, troubleshooting). From 452aba6ef71f7432738d2305e9864a7d68c78622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 18:10:23 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 241/273] test(aiac): Add UC-1 onboarding rung-2 integration test + shared harness Extract the rung-1 UC-1 onboarding harness (config, Keycloak provisioning/cleanup, onboard trigger, Rego capture, grant-set extraction, and the per-rung fixture flow) into a shared test/integration/uc1_onboard.py, and add rung 2 (onboard agent then tool) on top of it. Rung 2 asserts the full inbound + outbound user-gate truth table and the reconciliation property: onboarding the tool after the agent completes the agent's outbound gate. Refactor rung 1 onto the same harness. Integration-only (@pytest.mark.integration); skips without opa/cluster. Issue: testing/5.4.2-uc1-onboard-agent-then-tool.md Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py | 364 ++------------- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py | 237 ++++++++++ aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py | 419 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 689 insertions(+), 331 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py index ddf8f28e8..fcc3dabbf 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py @@ -7,22 +7,18 @@ Proves agent discovery + inbound policy generation stand alone, and that the outbound user gate is correctly **empty** when no tool has been onboarded. -Single AIAC stack, OPA filesystem-stub writer, single abstract ``policy.md`` (the two-stack / -two-variant machinery of the discarded ``test_uc1_onboarding_pipeline.py`` is gone). Reuses -``scenario_uc1.py`` (truth tables — the oracle), ``probe_uc1.rego`` (user-gate probe), and -``launcher.py`` (kubectl / port-forward / opa helpers). +Single AIAC stack, OPA filesystem-stub writer, single abstract ``policy.md``. The shared harness +(config, Keycloak provisioning/cleanup, onboard trigger, Rego capture, grant-set extraction, and the +per-rung fixture flow) lives in ``uc1_onboard.py`` and is reused by every rung; this module supplies +only rung 1's oracle (the expected verdicts, computed from ``scenario_uc1.py``) and its live +assertions. It also reuses ``scenario_uc1.py`` (truth tables — the oracle) and ``probe_uc1.rego`` +(user-gate probe). Per-rung flow (spec § Per-rung flow): **Keycloak cleanup → onboard agent → validate end state → Keycloak cleanup**. Deployment + client registration are **preconditions**, not test steps. *Onboard + evaluate — no A2A traffic, no live enforcement* (phase-1 out of scope). -Resolving the trigger id (spec § Resolving ``{service_id}``): the ``POST /apply/service/{service_id}`` -route is a single path segment and the Controller resolves it via ``admin.get_client(service_id)``, -which keys on the Keycloak **internal client UUID** — *not* the ``clientId`` (a SPIFFE URI with -slashes under SPIRE, which the single-segment route cannot carry). This module therefore resolves the -client whose **name** is ``"{ns}/github-agent"`` and triggers with its ``id`` (UUID). - Run (needs a live Kagenti/Kind cluster with the AIAC stack + OPA filesystem-stub writer, the demo workloads deployed + registered into ``AIAC_TEST_REALM``, a real LLM in-pod, and ``opa`` on PATH or ``$OPA_BIN``): @@ -34,15 +30,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations -import json -import logging -import os import sys -import tempfile from pathlib import Path import pytest -import requests pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration @@ -51,55 +42,13 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 -from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 - kubectl, - kubectl_cp, - kubectl_rollout_status, - opa_bin, - opa_eval, - port_forward, - require_env, - resolve_pod, -) +from test.integration import uc1_onboard as uc1 # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import opa_eval # noqa: E402 -log = logging.getLogger(__name__) - -# --- Config (env) — spec § Configuration; single stack (no variants) ------------------------ -TEST_REALM = os.environ.get("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) -NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE", scn.DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT) -ADMIN_REALM = os.environ.get("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") - -# Controller (in-cluster) reached via ``kubectl port-forward``. Target/namespace/ports are -# overridable; defaults match the deployed AIAC stack (svc/aiac-agent-service:7070 in aiac-system). -CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") -CONTROLLER_TARGET = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_TARGET", "svc/aiac-agent-service") -CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT", "7070")) -CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT", "7070")) - -# The Controller Deployment + the abstract policy.md the PRB reads. The test mounts this policy on -# the Controller pod as a precondition-fixup (see ``ensure_agent_policy``); it is NOT written into -# any committed deployment manifest — the deployment stays free of test-specific config. -CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT", "aiac-agent") -POLICY_CONFIGMAP = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_CONFIGMAP", "aiac-policy") -POLICY_MOUNT_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_MOUNT_PATH", "/etc/aiac") - -# Onboarding drives the real PRB, which makes several LLM calls over the whole role/scope universe; -# against a slow reasoning model that can take minutes. Configurable so slow endpoints don't spuriously -# fail the run (``AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT``, seconds). -ONBOARD_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT", "900")) - -# OPA-writer pod to ``kubectl cp`` the generated .rego from (name explicit or via label selector). -# The OPA filesystem-stub writer runs as a container INSIDE the interface pod (not its own pod), -# so the .rego is captured from that container. Defaults match the deployed stack. -OPA_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") -OPA_SELECTOR = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR", "app=aiac-interface") -OPA_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_CONTAINER", "aiac-pdp-policy-opa") -OPA_POD = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_POD") -OPA_REGO_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH", "/rego") - -AGENT_SLUG = scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD.replace("-", "_") # github-agent -> github_agent -INBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.rego" -OUTBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.rego" +TEST_REALM = uc1.TEST_REALM +INBOUND_REGO = uc1.INBOUND_REGO +OUTBOUND_REGO = uc1.OUTBOUND_REGO +AGENT_SLUG = uc1.AGENT_SLUG # ====================================================================================== @@ -109,21 +58,14 @@ # Rung 1 is the exception in the ladder: with no tool onboarded there are no tool scopes in the # universe, so the outbound **user gate is empty** (all deny) and the outbound-subject grant set is # ``∅`` — regardless of ``scenario_uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` (which is the rung-2/3 table). Inbound -# is unaffected. These functions encode that rung-1 contract; verdicts are computed here, never read -# from the Rego under test. - -_INBOUND_SOURCES = {role for role, _ in scn.INBOUND_PAIRS} # user-roles reaching some agent scope +# is unaffected (``uc1.expected_inbound`` — the shared inbound oracle). These encode rung 1's +# contract; verdicts are computed here, never read from the Rego under test. # Rung 1's expected grant sets (the oracle for the semantic-equivalence check). -RUNG1_INBOUND = set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS) +RUNG1_INBOUND = uc1.INBOUND_GRANT_SET RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT: set[tuple[str, str]] = set() # ∅ — no tool onboarded -def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: - """A user may call the agent iff their realm role sources some agent scope (``INBOUND_PAIRS``).""" - return scn.USERS[subject] in _INBOUND_SOURCES - - def expected_outbound(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: """Rung 1: the outbound user gate is entirely empty (no tool onboarded), so every ``(subject, function_name)`` is denied.""" @@ -145,7 +87,7 @@ def expected_outbound(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: ) def test_inbound_oracle(subject: str, allowed: bool) -> None: """Inbound: dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌ (devops sources no agent scope).""" - assert expected_inbound(subject) is allowed + assert uc1.expected_inbound(subject) is allowed @pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) @@ -163,217 +105,6 @@ def test_rung1_grant_set_oracle() -> None: assert RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT == set() -# ====================================================================================== -# Keycloak provisioning + cleanup (the fixture UC-1 does NOT do) -# ====================================================================================== - - -def _connect_admin(): - """Connect to the admin realm so the fixture can provision users + clean up provisioned entities.""" - from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin - - creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") - return KeycloakAdmin( - server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], - realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, - user_realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, - username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], - password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], - ) - - -def provision_realm_and_users(admin, realm: str) -> None: - """Idempotently ensure ``realm`` holds ``scenario_uc1``'s users + realm roles with the - descriptions the PRB reads. Realm roles carry the ``aiac.managed`` marker so the IdP populates - each role's ``actorIds`` (member usernames) — the PCE needs them to build the ``subject_roles`` - map the inbound/outbound gates key on. Never deletes/recreates — reruns converge (spec: shared - realm, leave-in-place).""" - from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError - - try: - admin.create_realm({"realm": realm, "enabled": True}) - except KeycloakError: - pass # already exists — leave in place - admin.change_current_realm(realm) - - for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): - payload = {"name": name, "description": description, "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}} - admin.create_realm_role(payload, skip_exists=True) - admin.update_realm_role(name, payload) # ensure the marker on a pre-existing role too - - for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): - user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) - admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) - admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) - - -def resolve_service_id(admin, realm: str, client_name: str) -> str: - """Return the **route-safe trigger id** — the Keycloak *internal client UUID* (``client['id']``) - of the client whose *name* is ``client_name``. - - Not the ``clientId``: under SPIRE that is a SPIFFE URI (``spiffe://.../github-agent``) whose - slashes the single-segment ``/apply/service/{id}`` route cannot carry; the Controller resolves - the trigger via ``admin.get_client(id)``, which keys on the UUID.""" - admin.change_current_realm(realm) - for client in admin.get_clients(): - if client.get("name") == client_name: - return client["id"] - raise AssertionError(f"no Keycloak client with name {client_name!r} in realm {realm!r}") - - -def cleanup_provisioned(admin, realm: str) -> None: - """Delete the entities UC-1 onboarding provisions — the realm role(s) and client scopes prefixed - ``github-agent.`` / ``github-tool.`` — so each run starts from a clean slate and reruns converge. - - Leaves the fixture's own ``developer`` / ``tester`` / ``devops`` roles, the operator's audience - client scopes (``*-aud``, no ``.`` after the workload), and everything else in place. Best-effort: - a delete of an already-absent entity is ignored.""" - from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError - - admin.change_current_realm(realm) - prefixes = (f"{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}.", f"{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}.") - - for role in admin.get_realm_roles(): - name = role.get("name", "") - if name.startswith(prefixes): - try: - admin.delete_realm_role(name) - except KeycloakError as exc: - log.warning("cleanup: delete realm role %r failed: %s", name, exc) - - for scope in admin.get_client_scopes(): - name = scope.get("name", "") - if name.startswith(prefixes): - try: - admin.delete_client_scope(scope["id"]) - except KeycloakError as exc: - log.warning("cleanup: delete client scope %r failed: %s", name, exc) - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Onboarding trigger + Rego capture -# ====================================================================================== - - -def ensure_agent_policy(namespace: str) -> None: - """Ensure the PRB's ``policy.md`` is mounted in the Controller pod — the one mutable stack - precondition this test owns, so a fresh AIAC stack needs no manual patching. - - Phase-1's PRB reads the single abstract policy from ``AIAC_POLICY_FILE`` (default - ``/etc/aiac/policy.md``). This idempotently provisions that file as a ConfigMap and mounts it on - the Controller Deployment, rolling out **only** when the mount is absent. The policy text is - ``scenario_uc1.POLICY_ABSTRACT`` — the same abstract policy the scenario's verdicts assume. It is - never written into a committed deployment manifest (that stays free of test config) and is left - in place on teardown (benign, and keeps reruns fast).""" - cm = { - "apiVersion": "v1", - "kind": "ConfigMap", - "metadata": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP, "namespace": namespace}, - "data": {"policy.md": scn.POLICY_ABSTRACT}, - } - kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input_text=json.dumps(cm)) - - mounted = kubectl( - "get", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, - "-o", "jsonpath={.spec.template.spec.volumes[*].configMap.name}", - ) - if POLICY_CONFIGMAP in mounted.split(): - return # already mounted — no rollout needed - - patch = { - "spec": {"template": {"spec": { - "volumes": [{"name": "aiac-policy", "configMap": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP}}], - "containers": [{ - "name": CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, - "volumeMounts": [ - {"name": "aiac-policy", "mountPath": POLICY_MOUNT_PATH, "readOnly": True} - ], - }], - }}} - } - kubectl( - "patch", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, - "--type", "strategic", "-p", json.dumps(patch), - ) - kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT}", namespace=namespace) - - -def _onboard(base_url: str, service_id: str) -> None: - """``POST /apply/service/{service_id}`` against the Controller; assert 200.""" - resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/apply/service/{service_id}", timeout=ONBOARD_TIMEOUT) - assert resp.status_code == 200, ( - f"onboard {service_id!r} at {base_url}: HTTP {resp.status_code} — {resp.text[:500]}" - ) - - -def _rego_dir() -> Path: - """Host dir the captured ``.rego`` is copied to: ``$REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` if set, else a fresh test - temp dir (spec § Configuration). A temp default keeps captured artifacts out of the repo and - lets each run verify freshly generated policy — never a stale artifact.""" - base = os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR") - path = Path(base) if base else Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="aiac-uc1-rung1-rego-")) - path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - for stale in path.glob("*.rego"): - stale.unlink() - return path - - -def _writer_pod() -> str: - """Resolve the pod hosting the OPA filesystem-stub writer (the ``aiac-pdp-policy-opa`` container - lives inside the interface pod).""" - return OPA_POD or resolve_pod(OPA_SELECTOR, namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE) - - -def _clear_writer_rego(pod: str) -> None: - """Delete any stale ``.rego`` in the writer's output dir **before** onboarding, so the run - captures only freshly-generated policy — a leftover from a previous run must never let a broken - pipeline pass green. (The host capture dir is cleared too, in ``_rego_dir``.)""" - kubectl( - "exec", "-n", OPA_NAMESPACE, pod, "-c", OPA_CONTAINER, "--", - "sh", "-c", f"rm -f {OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/*.rego", - ) - - -def _capture_rego(pod: str, rego_dir: Path) -> None: - """``kubectl cp`` the agent's inbound + outbound Rego from the writer container into ``rego_dir``.""" - for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): - kubectl_cp( - pod, f"{OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/{filename}", rego_dir / filename, - namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE, container=OPA_CONTAINER, - ) - - -# ====================================================================================== -# Grant-set extraction (semantic-equivalence oracle, re-derived from the generated Rego) -# ====================================================================================== - - -def _opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: - """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``.""" - return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) - - -def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: - """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` map (``∅`` for - rung 1: no tool onboarded, so the map is empty).""" - m = _opa_dump(rego_dir / OUTBOUND_REGO, "data.authz.github_agent.outbound.outbound_subject_role_scopes") - return {(role, scope) for role, scopes in (m or {}).items() for scope in scopes} - - -def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: - """User-role->agent-scope grant set from the inbound Rego's ``role_scopes`` restricted to the - published ``agent_scopes`` (a role may list scopes the agent does not expose; those don't grant).""" - rego = rego_dir / INBOUND_REGO - role_scopes = _opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.role_scopes") or {} - agent_scopes = set(_opa_dump(rego, "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.agent_scopes") or []) - return { - (role, scope) - for role, scopes in role_scopes.items() - for scope in scopes - if scope in agent_scopes - } - - # ====================================================================================== # Session fixture — cleanup → onboard agent only → capture rego → yield → cleanup # ====================================================================================== @@ -381,43 +112,11 @@ def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: @pytest.fixture(scope="session") def onboarded() -> dict: - """Provision users/roles, onboard **only** the agent, capture its Rego, and yield the live - ``admin`` handle + captured ``rego_dir``. Keycloak cleanup runs before and after; the clients are - left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow). - - ``opa`` absence **skips** the whole suite up front (before any cluster work), so a missing oracle - binary never masquerades as a failure.""" - opa_bin() # skip early if opa is absent — cheaper than skipping after the onboard - require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") - - admin = _connect_admin() - cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # before — clean slate - provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) - ensure_agent_policy(CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE) # mount the PRB's policy.md if the stack lacks it - - rego_dir = _rego_dir() # fresh host dir; stale .rego cleared so a broken pipeline can't pass green - writer_pod = _writer_pod() - _clear_writer_rego(writer_pod) # clear stale .rego in the writer BEFORE onboarding - try: - agent_id = resolve_service_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}") - with port_forward( - CONTROLLER_TARGET, - namespace=CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE, - local_port=CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT, - remote_port=CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT, - ) as base_url: - _onboard(base_url, agent_id) # ONLY the agent — the tool is deployed but not onboarded - - _capture_rego(writer_pod, rego_dir) - missing = [f for f in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO) if not (rego_dir / f).is_file()] - if missing: - raise RuntimeError( - f"agent onboard produced no {missing} in {rego_dir} — the pipeline failed or the " - "OPA filesystem-stub writer is not deployed (spec § Blocked by)." - ) - yield {"admin": admin, "rego_dir": rego_dir} - finally: - cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # after — restore the pre-run state + """Onboard **only** the agent (the tool is deployed but not onboarded) via the shared harness, + and yield the live ``admin`` handle + captured ``rego_dir`` (+ writer ``pod``). Keycloak cleanup + runs before and after; the clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow).""" + with uc1.onboarded_stack([scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD], rego_prefix="aiac-uc1-rung1-rego-") as ctx: + yield ctx # ====================================================================================== @@ -458,8 +157,8 @@ def test_inbound(onboarded: dict, subject: str) -> None: """Inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some discovered agent scope (dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌).""" rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / INBOUND_REGO - allowed = opa_eval([rego], "data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) - assert allowed == expected_inbound(subject), subject + allowed = opa_eval([rego], f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) + assert allowed == uc1.expected_inbound(subject), subject @pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) @@ -469,7 +168,7 @@ def test_outbound_all_deny(onboarded: dict, subject: str, function_name: str) -> empty because no tool was onboarded (exact-name match on full discovered scope names).""" rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / OUTBOUND_REGO allowed = opa_eval( - [rego, HERE / "probe_uc1.rego"], + [rego, uc1.PROBE_UC1], "data.probe.outbound.allow", {"subject": subject, "function_name": function_name}, ) @@ -478,22 +177,25 @@ def test_outbound_all_deny(onboarded: dict, subject: str, function_name: str) -> def test_only_agent_rego_present(onboarded: dict) -> None: """Exactly the two agent files on disk; explicitly no ``github_tool.*.rego`` (the tool is a pure - target — no rules written for it, and it was not onboarded).""" - rego_dir = onboarded["rego_dir"] - assert not list(rego_dir.glob("github_tool*.rego")), "unexpected tool Rego emitted" + target — no rules written for it, and it was not onboarded). Checks the writer's own ``/rego``, + not just what was copied to the host.""" + written = uc1.writer_rego_files(onboarded["writer_pod"]) + assert not [f for f in written if f.startswith("github_tool")], ( + f"unexpected tool Rego emitted: {written}" + ) for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): - assert (rego_dir / filename).is_file(), f"missing {filename}" + assert filename in written, f"missing {filename} in writer /rego: {written}" def test_inbound_grant_set_matches_truth_table(onboarded: dict) -> None: """The inbound grant set re-derived from the Rego equals ``scenario_uc1``'s inbound truth table — catching verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse allow/deny oracle cannot see.""" - got = inbound_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + got = uc1.inbound_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) assert got == RUNG1_INBOUND, f"inbound: missing={RUNG1_INBOUND - got} extra={got - RUNG1_INBOUND}" def test_outbound_subject_grant_set_empty(onboarded: dict) -> None: """The outbound-subject grant set re-derived from the Rego is ``∅`` — no tool onboarded, so the user gate is empty.""" - got = outbound_subject_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + got = uc1.outbound_subject_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) assert got == RUNG1_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, f"expected empty outbound gate, got {got}" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b6e3b01fa --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +"""Rung 2 of the UC-1 onboarding ladder — onboard the **agent, then the tool**. + +Issue ``testing/5.4.2-uc1-onboard-agent-then-tool.md``; spec +``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``. Drive the **real** in-cluster UC-1 +Service Onboarding agent (``POST /apply/service/{id}``) for the ``github-agent`` **first** and the +``github-tool`` **second**, then assert the **full** truth table at the end. + +This rung proves the key reconciliation property: onboarding the tool **after** the agent +retroactively completes the agent's outbound policy. When the agent is onboarded alone its outbound +gate is empty (rung 1); when the tool is then onboarded, its Service Policy Builder pairs the tool's +scopes against the existing role universe (agent role + user roles) and the PCE **routes** those +``(role, tool-scope)`` rules onto the **tool's** persistent ``ServicePolicyModel`` via +``compute_and_apply(override=False)``. Because the agent's role targets a tool scope, the agent is in +the affected set, so its ``AgentPolicyModel`` is **re-derived from the SPMs** and +``github_agent.outbound.rego`` is (re)written with the full user→tool gate. + +There is **no agent re-onboard** and **no intermediate validation** — only the end state is checked. +This is order 1 of the order-independence pair; rung 3 (tool then agent) asserts its final +``APM(github-agent)`` grant sets are **identical** to this rung's. + +Reuses the shared harness (``uc1_onboard.py`` — config, Keycloak provisioning/cleanup, onboard +trigger, Rego capture, grant-set extraction, per-rung fixture flow), ``scenario_uc1.py`` (the truth +tables — the oracle), and ``probe_uc1.rego`` (user-gate probe). The **only** rung-2-specific content +here is the oracle (the full outbound gate, from ``scenario_uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) and the +live assertions; the onboarding order — ``[agent, tool]`` — is passed to the shared fixture flow. + +Per-rung flow (spec § Per-rung flow): **Keycloak cleanup → onboard agent → onboard tool → validate +end state → Keycloak cleanup**. Deployment + client registration are **preconditions**, not test +steps. *Onboard + evaluate — no A2A traffic, no live enforcement* (phase-1 out of scope). + +Run (needs a live Kagenti/Kind cluster with the AIAC stack + OPA filesystem-stub writer, the demo +workloads deployed + registered into ``AIAC_TEST_REALM``, a real LLM in-pod, and ``opa`` on PATH or +``$OPA_BIN``): + + .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py -m integration -v + +Without ``-m integration`` the suite is not collected; without ``opa`` it skips at runtime. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves + +from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration import uc1_onboard as uc1 # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import opa_eval # noqa: E402 + +TEST_REALM = uc1.TEST_REALM +INBOUND_REGO = uc1.INBOUND_REGO +OUTBOUND_REGO = uc1.OUTBOUND_REGO +AGENT_SLUG = uc1.AGENT_SLUG + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Expected-verdict oracle (pure functions over the scenario_uc1 truth table) +# ====================================================================================== +# +# Rung 2 asserts the **full** truth table. Inbound is the shared oracle (``uc1.expected_inbound`` — +# unaffected by tool onboarding). Outbound is now **non-empty**: onboarding the tool completed the +# agent's outbound user gate, so the expected user→tool grant set is exactly +# ``scenario_uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``. Because that gate is order-independent, it is the **shared** +# tool-onboarded oracle in ``uc1_onboard`` (``uc1.expected_outbound_with_tool`` / +# ``uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET``) — the exact set rung 3 must reproduce. Verdicts are computed +# here, never read from the Rego under test. + +RUNG2_INBOUND = uc1.INBOUND_GRANT_SET +RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT = uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET +expected_outbound = uc1.expected_outbound_with_tool + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Oracle contract tests — fixture-independent; pin rung 2's defining decisions +# ====================================================================================== +# +# These need neither the cluster nor ``opa``: they assert the rung-2 oracle itself (the intended +# policy the live decisions below are checked against). If these are wrong, every live assertion is +# meaningless — so they are the tracer bullet. + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "subject, allowed", + [("dev-user", True), ("test-user", True), ("devops-user", False)], +) +def test_inbound_oracle(subject: str, allowed: bool) -> None: + """Inbound: dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌ (devops sources no agent scope) — unchanged + from rung 1; tool onboarding does not touch the inbound gate.""" + assert uc1.expected_inbound(subject) is allowed + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "subject, function_name, allowed", + [ + # dev-user (developer): source read/write + issues read; NOT issues write. + ("dev-user", "github-tool.source-read", True), + ("dev-user", "github-tool.source-write", True), + ("dev-user", "github-tool.issues-read", True), + ("dev-user", "github-tool.issues-write", False), + # test-user (tester): issues read/write only. + ("test-user", "github-tool.source-read", False), + ("test-user", "github-tool.source-write", False), + ("test-user", "github-tool.issues-read", True), + ("test-user", "github-tool.issues-write", True), + # devops-user (devops): no access to anything. + ("devops-user", "github-tool.source-read", False), + ("devops-user", "github-tool.source-write", False), + ("devops-user", "github-tool.issues-read", False), + ("devops-user", "github-tool.issues-write", False), + ], +) +def test_outbound_oracle(subject: str, function_name: str, allowed: bool) -> None: + """Rung 2's defining property: the full user→tool outbound gate (developer: source rw + issues + read; tester: issues rw; devops: nothing) — the gate tool onboarding completed on the agent.""" + assert expected_outbound(subject, function_name) is allowed + + +def test_rung2_grant_set_oracle() -> None: + """Rung 2 grant-set oracle: inbound == the ``scenario_uc1`` inbound truth table; the + outbound-subject grant set == the (non-empty) ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` truth table.""" + assert RUNG2_INBOUND == set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS) + assert RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT == set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) + assert RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, "rung 2's outbound gate must be non-empty (the tool was onboarded)" + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Session fixture — cleanup → onboard agent → onboard tool → capture rego → yield → cleanup +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="session") +def onboarded() -> dict: + """Onboard the agent **then** the tool via the shared harness (order is this rung's identity — + tool onboarding retroactively completes the agent's outbound gate), and yield the live ``admin`` + handle + captured ``rego_dir`` (+ writer ``pod``). Keycloak cleanup runs before and after; the + clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow). No agent re-onboard, no + intermediate validation — only the end state is asserted below.""" + with uc1.onboarded_stack( + [scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD, scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD], rego_prefix="aiac-uc1-rung2-rego-" + ) as ctx: + yield ctx + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Live tests — Keycloak entities + opa-eval decisions (verdicts computed from scenario_uc1) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def test_agent_role_and_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Keycloak holds the agent's realm role + the two AgentCard scopes with their descriptions.""" + admin = onboarded["admin"] + admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) + + role = admin.get_realm_role(scn.AGENT_ROLE) + assert role and role.get("name") == scn.AGENT_ROLE, f"missing realm role {scn.AGENT_ROLE!r}" + + scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} + for name, description in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items(): + assert name in scopes, f"missing agent scope {name!r}" + assert scopes[name] == description, ( + f"agent scope {name!r} description mismatch: {scopes[name]!r} != {description!r}" + ) + + +def test_tool_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The tool was onboarded, so all four ``github-tool.*`` scopes exist with their MCP + ``tools/list`` descriptions (the discovered tool boundary).""" + admin = onboarded["admin"] + admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) + + scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} + for name, description in scn.TOOL_SCOPES.items(): + assert name in scopes, f"missing tool scope {name!r}" + assert scopes[name] == description, ( + f"tool scope {name!r} description mismatch: {scopes[name]!r} != {description!r}" + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +def test_inbound(onboarded: dict, subject: str) -> None: + """Inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some discovered agent scope + (dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌) — unchanged by the tool onboarding.""" + rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / INBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval([rego], f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) + assert allowed == uc1.expected_inbound(subject), subject + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("function_name", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) +def test_outbound(onboarded: dict, subject: str, function_name: str) -> None: + """Outbound user gate (via ``probe_uc1.rego``) decides each ``(subject, function)`` per the full + ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` table — the gate tool onboarding completed on the agent (exact-name + match on full discovered scope names).""" + rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / OUTBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, uc1.PROBE_UC1], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": subject, "function_name": function_name}, + ) + assert allowed == expected_outbound(subject, function_name), f"{subject} / {function_name}" + + +def test_only_agent_rego_present(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Exactly the two agent files on disk; explicitly **no** ``github_tool.*.rego`` even though the + tool was onboarded (the tool is a pure target — its rules route onto the agent's model, and no + rules are written for the tool alone). Checks the writer's own ``/rego``, not just the host copy.""" + written = uc1.writer_rego_files(onboarded["writer_pod"]) + assert not [f for f in written if "github_tool" in f], ( + f"unexpected tool Rego emitted: {written}" + ) # substring, not startswith: catches the namespace-prefixed ``team1_github_tool.*.rego`` too + for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): + assert filename in written, f"missing {filename} in writer /rego: {written}" + + +def test_inbound_grant_set_matches_truth_table(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The inbound grant set re-derived from the Rego equals ``scenario_uc1``'s inbound truth table — + catching verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse allow/deny oracle cannot see.""" + got = uc1.inbound_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG2_INBOUND, f"inbound: missing={RUNG2_INBOUND - got} extra={got - RUNG2_INBOUND}" + + +def test_outbound_subject_grant_set_matches_truth_table(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The reconciliation property, as a grant set: the outbound-subject grant set re-derived from + the Rego equals the **non-empty** ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` — tool onboarding completed the + agent's outbound gate (empty in rung 1, full here). This is what rung 3 asserts identical.""" + got = uc1.outbound_subject_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, ( + f"outbound: missing={RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT - got} extra={got - RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT}" + ) + assert got, "outbound gate must be non-empty after onboarding the tool (the reconciliation property)" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..37b93fecf --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ +"""Shared harness for the UC-1 onboarding integration-test ladder (rungs 1–3). + +Spec: ``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``. Every rung follows the same +**Keycloak cleanup → onboard (in the rung's order) → validate end state → Keycloak cleanup** shape +against **one** in-cluster AIAC stack (Controller + Policy Store + OPA filesystem-stub writer). The +only thing that differs between rungs is *which workloads are onboarded and in what order* — so all +the machinery to do it lives here, and each ``test_uc1_onboard_*.py`` module supplies just its own +oracle (the expected verdicts, computed from ``scenario_uc1.py``) and live assertions. + +This module owns: + +* **Config** (env, spec § Configuration) — single stack, no variants. +* **Keycloak** — ``connect_admin`` / ``provision_realm_and_users`` (the fixture UC-1 does *not* do) / + ``resolve_service_id`` (route-safe trigger id = internal client UUID) / ``cleanup_provisioned``. +* **Onboarding + Rego capture** — ``ensure_agent_policy`` (mount the PRB's ``policy.md``), ``onboard`` + (``POST /apply/service/{id}``), and the writer-pod ``/rego`` capture helpers. +* **Grant-set extraction** — re-derive the inbound / outbound-subject grant sets from the generated + Rego via ``opa eval`` (the semantic-equivalence oracle). +* **``onboarded_stack``** — the whole per-rung fixture flow, parameterised by the ordered list of + workloads to onboard; each rung wraps it in a one-line session fixture. + +It imports only stdlib + ``requests`` + ``launcher`` + the pure-data ``scenario_uc1`` (never +``aiac``), so it is importable before the env-before-import dance, exactly like ``scenario_uc1`` and +``launcher``. It defines **no** ``test_*`` functions, so pytest does not collect it. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import logging +import os +import sys +import tempfile +from contextlib import contextmanager +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Iterator + +import requests + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +if str(REPO_ROOT) not in sys.path: # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves + sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) + +from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import ( # noqa: E402 + kubectl, + kubectl_cp, + kubectl_rollout_status, + opa_bin, + opa_eval, + port_forward, + require_env, + resolve_pod, +) + +log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +# --- Config (env) — spec § Configuration; single stack (no variants) ------------------------ +TEST_REALM = os.environ.get("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) +NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_DEMO_NAMESPACE", scn.DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT) +ADMIN_REALM = os.environ.get("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM", "master") + +# Controller (in-cluster) reached via ``kubectl port-forward``. Target/namespace/ports are +# overridable; defaults match the deployed AIAC stack (svc/aiac-agent-service:7070 in aiac-system). +CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") +CONTROLLER_TARGET = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_TARGET", "svc/aiac-agent-service") +CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT", "7070")) +CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT", "7070")) + +# The Controller Deployment + the abstract policy.md the PRB reads. The test mounts this policy on +# the Controller pod as a precondition-fixup (see ``ensure_agent_policy``); it is NOT written into +# any committed deployment manifest — the deployment stays free of test-specific config. +CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT = os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT", "aiac-agent") +POLICY_CONFIGMAP = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_CONFIGMAP", "aiac-policy") +POLICY_MOUNT_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_POLICY_MOUNT_PATH", "/etc/aiac") + +# Onboarding drives the real PRB, which makes several LLM calls over the whole role/scope universe; +# against a slow reasoning model that can take minutes. Configurable so slow endpoints don't spuriously +# fail the run (``AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT``, seconds). +ONBOARD_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("AIAC_ONBOARD_TIMEOUT", "900")) + +# OPA-writer pod to ``kubectl cp`` the generated .rego from (name explicit or via label selector). +# The OPA filesystem-stub writer runs as a container INSIDE the interface pod (not its own pod), +# so the .rego is captured from that container. Defaults match the deployed stack. +OPA_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") +OPA_SELECTOR = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR", "app=aiac-interface") +OPA_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_CONTAINER", "aiac-pdp-policy-opa") +OPA_POD = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_POD") +OPA_REGO_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH", "/rego") + +AGENT_SLUG = f"{NAMESPACE}_{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}".replace("-", "_") # team1/github-agent -> team1_github_agent +INBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.rego" +OUTBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.rego" +AGENT_REGO_FILES = (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO) + +# The outbound user-gate probe (``data.probe.outbound.allow``), shared by every rung. +PROBE_UC1 = HERE / "probe_uc1.rego" + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Shared inbound oracle (identical for every rung — inbound is unaffected by tool onboarding) +# ====================================================================================== +# +# A user may call the agent iff their realm role sources some agent scope (``INBOUND_PAIRS``). This +# holds for all rungs; only the *outbound* gate differs (empty for rung 1, the full +# ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` once a tool is onboarded), so ``expected_outbound`` stays rung-local. + +_INBOUND_SOURCES = {role for role, _ in scn.INBOUND_PAIRS} # user-roles reaching some agent scope +INBOUND_GRANT_SET: set[tuple[str, str]] = set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS) + + +def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: + """A user may call the agent iff their realm role sources some agent scope (``INBOUND_PAIRS``).""" + return scn.USERS[subject] in _INBOUND_SOURCES + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Shared outbound oracle for the tool-onboarded rungs (rungs 2 & 3) +# ====================================================================================== +# +# Once **any** tool is onboarded, the agent's outbound user gate is the full user→tool grant set +# (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) — and it is the same set **regardless of onboarding order** (spec: +# *Onboarding order is irrelevant*). Rung 2 (agent→tool) fills it in when the tool is onboarded after +# the agent; rung 3 (tool→agent) produces it in one pass. Both converge here, so both share this +# oracle; only rung 1 (no tool) is the exception and keeps its own empty-gate oracle. Verdicts are +# computed from this, never read from the Rego under test. + +OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET: set[tuple[str, str]] = set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) + + +def expected_outbound_with_tool(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: + """A user may reach a tool scope iff their realm role is granted it in the full user→tool gate + (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) — the gate any tool onboarding fills in on the agent's model, + order-independently (rungs 2 & 3).""" + return (scn.USERS[subject], function_name) in OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Keycloak provisioning + cleanup (the fixture UC-1 does NOT do) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def connect_admin(): + """Connect to the admin realm so the fixture can provision users + clean up provisioned entities.""" + from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin + + creds = require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + return KeycloakAdmin( + server_url=creds["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, + user_realm_name=ADMIN_REALM, + username=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME"], + password=creds["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"], + ) + + +def provision_realm_and_users(admin, realm: str) -> None: + """Idempotently ensure ``realm`` holds ``scenario_uc1``'s users + realm roles with the + descriptions the PRB reads. Realm roles carry the ``aiac.managed`` marker so the IdP populates + each role's ``actorIds`` (member usernames) — the PCE needs them to build the ``subject_roles`` + map the inbound/outbound gates key on. Never deletes/recreates — reruns converge (spec: shared + realm, leave-in-place).""" + from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + + try: + admin.create_realm({"realm": realm, "enabled": True}) + except KeycloakError: + pass # already exists — leave in place + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + + for name, description in scn.USER_ROLES.items(): + payload = {"name": name, "description": description, "attributes": {"aiac.managed": ["true"]}} + admin.create_realm_role(payload, skip_exists=True) + admin.update_realm_role(name, payload) # ensure the marker on a pre-existing role too + + for username, role_name in scn.USERS.items(): + user_id = admin.create_user({"username": username, "enabled": True}, exist_ok=True) + admin.set_user_password(user_id, scn.USER_PASSWORD, temporary=False) + admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [admin.get_realm_role(role_name)]) + + +def resolve_service_id(admin, realm: str, client_name: str) -> str: + """Return the **route-safe trigger id** — the Keycloak *internal client UUID* (``client['id']``) + of the client whose *name* is ``client_name``. + + Not the ``clientId``: under SPIRE that is a SPIFFE URI (``spiffe://.../github-agent``) whose + slashes the single-segment ``/apply/service/{id}`` route cannot carry; the Controller resolves + the trigger via ``admin.get_client(id)``, which keys on the UUID.""" + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + for client in admin.get_clients(): + if client.get("name") == client_name: + return client["id"] + raise AssertionError(f"no Keycloak client with name {client_name!r} in realm {realm!r}") + + +def cleanup_provisioned(admin, realm: str) -> None: + """Delete the entities UC-1 onboarding provisions — the realm role(s) and client scopes prefixed + ``github-agent.`` / ``github-tool.`` — so each run starts from a clean slate and reruns converge. + + Leaves the fixture's own ``developer`` / ``tester`` / ``devops`` roles, the operator's audience + client scopes (``*-aud``, no ``.`` after the workload), and everything else in place. Best-effort: + a delete of an already-absent entity is ignored.""" + from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError + + admin.change_current_realm(realm) + prefixes = (f"{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}.", f"{scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD}.") + + for role in admin.get_realm_roles(): + name = role.get("name", "") + if name.startswith(prefixes): + try: + admin.delete_realm_role(name) + except KeycloakError as exc: + log.warning("cleanup: delete realm role %r failed: %s", name, exc) + + for scope in admin.get_client_scopes(): + name = scope.get("name", "") + if name.startswith(prefixes): + try: + admin.delete_client_scope(scope["id"]) + except KeycloakError as exc: + log.warning("cleanup: delete client scope %r failed: %s", name, exc) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Onboarding trigger + Rego capture +# ====================================================================================== + + +def ensure_agent_policy(namespace: str) -> None: + """Ensure the PRB's ``policy.md`` is mounted in the Controller pod — the one mutable stack + precondition the ladder owns, so a fresh AIAC stack needs no manual patching. + + Phase-1's PRB reads the single abstract policy from ``AIAC_POLICY_FILE`` (default + ``/etc/aiac/policy.md``). This idempotently provisions that file as a ConfigMap and mounts it on + the Controller Deployment, rolling out **only** when the mount is absent. The policy text is + ``scenario_uc1.POLICY_ABSTRACT`` — the same abstract policy the scenario's verdicts assume. It is + never written into a committed deployment manifest (that stays free of test config) and is left + in place on teardown (benign, and keeps reruns fast).""" + cm = { + "apiVersion": "v1", + "kind": "ConfigMap", + "metadata": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP, "namespace": namespace}, + "data": {"policy.md": scn.POLICY_ABSTRACT}, + } + kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input_text=json.dumps(cm)) + + mounted = kubectl( + "get", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, + "-o", "jsonpath={.spec.template.spec.volumes[*].configMap.name}", + ) + if POLICY_CONFIGMAP in mounted.split(): + return # already mounted — no rollout needed + + patch = { + "spec": {"template": {"spec": { + "volumes": [{"name": "aiac-policy", "configMap": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP}}], + "containers": [{ + "name": CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, + "volumeMounts": [ + {"name": "aiac-policy", "mountPath": POLICY_MOUNT_PATH, "readOnly": True} + ], + }], + }}} + } + kubectl( + "patch", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, + "--type", "strategic", "-p", json.dumps(patch), + ) + kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT}", namespace=namespace) + + +def onboard(base_url: str, service_id: str) -> None: + """``POST /apply/service/{service_id}`` against the Controller; assert 200.""" + resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/apply/service/{service_id}", timeout=ONBOARD_TIMEOUT) + assert resp.status_code == 200, ( + f"onboard {service_id!r} at {base_url}: HTTP {resp.status_code} — {resp.text[:500]}" + ) + + +def fresh_rego_dir(prefix: str) -> Path: + """Host dir the captured ``.rego`` is copied to: ``$REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` if set, else a fresh test + temp dir named with ``prefix`` (spec § Configuration). A temp default keeps captured artifacts out + of the repo and lets each run verify freshly generated policy — never a stale artifact. Any stale + ``.rego`` in the dir is cleared so a broken pipeline can't pass green on leftovers.""" + base = os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR") + path = Path(base) if base else Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=prefix)) + path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + for stale in path.glob("*.rego"): + stale.unlink() + return path + + +def writer_pod() -> str: + """Resolve the pod hosting the OPA filesystem-stub writer (the ``aiac-pdp-policy-opa`` container + lives inside the interface pod).""" + return OPA_POD or resolve_pod(OPA_SELECTOR, namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE) + + +def clear_writer_rego(pod: str) -> None: + """Delete any stale ``.rego`` in the writer's output dir **before** onboarding, so the run + captures only freshly-generated policy — a leftover from a previous run must never let a broken + pipeline pass green. (The host capture dir is cleared too, in ``fresh_rego_dir``.)""" + kubectl( + "exec", "-n", OPA_NAMESPACE, pod, "-c", OPA_CONTAINER, "--", + "sh", "-c", f"rm -f {OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/*.rego", + ) + + +def writer_rego_files(pod: str) -> list[str]: + """List the ``.rego`` basenames present in the writer's output dir (the ground truth for the + file-set assertions). Lets a rung assert *what the pipeline actually wrote* — e.g. that no + ``github_tool.*.rego`` exists even after the tool is onboarded — rather than only what was + copied to the host.""" + out = kubectl( + "exec", "-n", OPA_NAMESPACE, pod, "-c", OPA_CONTAINER, "--", + "sh", "-c", f"ls -1 {OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/*.rego 2>/dev/null || true", + ) + return [Path(line.strip()).name for line in out.splitlines() if line.strip()] + + +def capture_rego(pod: str, rego_dir: Path) -> None: + """``kubectl cp`` the agent's inbound + outbound Rego from the writer container into ``rego_dir``. + + Only the two agent files are copied: under UC-1 the tool is a pure target and the pipeline emits + no ``github_tool.*.rego`` for any rung. (Use ``writer_rego_files`` to assert that on the pod.)""" + for filename in AGENT_REGO_FILES: + kubectl_cp( + pod, f"{OPA_REGO_PATH.rstrip('/')}/{filename}", rego_dir / filename, + namespace=OPA_NAMESPACE, container=OPA_CONTAINER, + ) + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Grant-set extraction (semantic-equivalence oracle, re-derived from the generated Rego) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: + """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``.""" + return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) + + +def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: + """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` map (``∅`` when + no tool has been onboarded, the full ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` once one has).""" + m = opa_dump( + rego_dir / OUTBOUND_REGO, + f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.outbound_subject_role_scopes", + ) + return {(role, scope) for role, scopes in (m or {}).items() for scope in scopes} + + +def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: + """User-role->agent-scope grant set from the inbound Rego's ``role_scopes`` restricted to the + published ``agent_scopes`` (a role may list scopes the agent does not expose; those don't grant).""" + rego = rego_dir / INBOUND_REGO + role_scopes = opa_dump(rego, f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.role_scopes") or {} + agent_scopes = set(opa_dump(rego, f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.agent_scopes") or []) + return { + (role, scope) + for role, scopes in role_scopes.items() + for scope in scopes + if scope in agent_scopes + } + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Per-rung fixture flow — cleanup → onboard (in order) → capture rego → yield → cleanup +# ====================================================================================== + + +@contextmanager +def onboarded_stack(workloads: list[str], *, rego_prefix: str) -> Iterator[dict]: + """Run one rung's whole flow and yield ``{"admin", "rego_dir", "writer_pod"}``. + + Provision users/roles, onboard the given ``workloads`` **in order** through the real in-cluster + UC-1 Controller (``POST /apply/service/{id}``, one call each within a single port-forward), + capture the agent's Rego, and yield the live handles for the rung's assertions. Keycloak cleanup + runs before and after; the clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow). + + ``opa`` absence **skips** the whole suite up front (before any cluster work), so a missing oracle + binary never masquerades as a failure. The workload order is the rung's identity — e.g. rung 2 + passes ``[agent, tool]`` so tool onboarding retroactively completes the agent's outbound gate.""" + opa_bin() # skip early if opa is absent — cheaper than skipping after the onboard + require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") + + admin = connect_admin() + cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # before — clean slate + provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) + ensure_agent_policy(CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE) # mount the PRB's policy.md if the stack lacks it + + rego_dir = fresh_rego_dir(rego_prefix) # fresh host dir; stale .rego cleared + pod = writer_pod() + clear_writer_rego(pod) # clear stale .rego in the writer BEFORE onboarding + try: + service_ids = [ + resolve_service_id(admin, TEST_REALM, f"{NAMESPACE}/{workload}") for workload in workloads + ] + with port_forward( + CONTROLLER_TARGET, + namespace=CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE, + local_port=CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT, + remote_port=CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT, + ) as base_url: + for service_id in service_ids: # onboard in the rung's order + onboard(base_url, service_id) + + capture_rego(pod, rego_dir) + missing = [f for f in AGENT_REGO_FILES if not (rego_dir / f).is_file()] + if missing: + raise RuntimeError( + f"onboarding {workloads} produced no {missing} in {rego_dir} — the pipeline failed " + "or the OPA filesystem-stub writer is not deployed (spec § Blocked by)." + ) + yield {"admin": admin, "rego_dir": rego_dir, "writer_pod": pod} + finally: + cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # after — restore the pre-run state From 45a6169c2000e59322359a7f107eb127c551a93e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 18:19:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 242/273] Fix(aiac): Policy Store slash-safe service_id + SPIFFE-aware slugify Base64url-encode service_id in the Policy Store's per-id URL path segment (aiac.policy.store.keying) so slash-bearing clientIds (SPIFFE URIs / {ns}/{name}) no longer 404 on GET/POST/DELETE /policy/services/{service_id}; cache/DB/body stay keyed by the decoded real id. Fix the OPA writer's slugify() to extract {namespace}/{name} from a SPIFFE URI (or use the plain {ns}/{name} clientId as-is) before collapsing to a package-name/filename slug, dropping the trust domain/host so the Rego filename is short and predictable regardless of whether SPIRE is enabled. Reconcile the Policy Store, Policy Store library, PDP policy writer (OPA), and UC-1 onboarding-pipeline specs with both fixes. Issue: testing/5.4.1-uc1-onboard-agent-only.md Handoff: 06-policy-store-slash-safe-service-id.md Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../specs/components/library-policy-store.md | 6 + .../specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 4 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md | 8 + .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 13 +- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 23 +- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py | 17 + aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py | 7 +- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py | 4 + aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego | 2 +- .../test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py | 293 ++++++++++++++++++ aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 21 ++ aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 28 +- aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py | 36 ++- aiac/test/policy/store/test_keying.py | 33 ++ 14 files changed, 467 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py create mode 100644 aiac/test/policy/store/test_keying.py diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md index 5e551b518..fbd8133d5 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md @@ -77,6 +77,12 @@ def delete_service_policy(service_id: str) -> None # No-op on the server if the service is absent (still 204). ``` +`service_id` is a plain string everywhere in this API (slashes and all) — callers never encode +anything. Internally, the three functions above base64url-encode `service_id` into the URL path +segment via `aiac.policy.store.keying.encode_service_id` before issuing the request (the clientId is +slash-bearing and can't be a single path segment); the service decodes it back. `service_id` in every +returned `ServicePolicyModel` is always the original, decoded form. + **Removed** (APMs are no longer persisted): `get_agent_policy`, `apply_agent_policy`, and the prior whole-collection `get_policy` / `apply_policy` / `delete_policy` / `delete_agent_policy` functions. The only legitimate consumer is the Policy Computation Engine, which is migrated to the diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index b234976a6..f9bc7863f 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ No `?realm=` parameter — the service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keyclo ## Rego package structure -For each `AgentPolicyModel`, the service generates **two Rego packages**: one for the inbound pipeline and one for the outbound pipeline. The `agent_id` is slugified for use in the package name (hyphens → underscores, lowercase). +For each `AgentPolicyModel`, the service generates **two Rego packages**: one for the inbound pipeline and one for the outbound pipeline. The `agent_id` is slugified for use in the package name (and filename). `agent_id` is the Keycloak clientId — a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE (`spiffe://host/ns/{ns}/sa/{name}`), or the plain `{ns}/{name}` clientId without it — so slugifying is not a simple hyphen→underscore substitution: the trust domain/host is dropped, the `{ns}/{name}` portion is extracted, and every remaining non-alphanumeric run collapses to a single underscore, lowercased (`aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego.slugify`). This keeps the slug short and identical regardless of whether SPIRE is enabled — e.g. both `spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent` and `team1/github-agent` slugify to `team1_github_agent`. **Input is identifiers only.** Both packages receive an input document of **IDs**, never roles or scopes: inbound input is `{subject, source}`, outbound input is `{subject, target}` (`subject` is the end-user id, `source` the calling service id, `target` the called service id). Every role/scope mapping is therefore **embedded in the package itself**, and the `allow` logic resolves IDs → roles → scopes internally. Because no per-request scope is supplied, the decision is **coarse**: a principal passes when it has access to **at least one** relevant scope. @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Load Kubernetes in-cluster config at startup via `kubernetes.config.load_incluster_config()`; fall back to `kubernetes.config.load_kube_config()` for local development. - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. -- `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: replace hyphens with underscores, lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment. +- `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: extract `{namespace}/{name}` from a SPIFFE URI (or use the plain `{ns}/{name}` clientId as-is), then collapse every non-alphanumeric run to `_` and lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment, short and SPIRE-independent. - `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. - `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. The inbound `role_scopes` map is **not** embedded in the outbound package. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md index 816377daa..1ef1a2689 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md @@ -84,6 +84,14 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_policies ( The by-scope lookup has **no dedicated route** — it collapses to the by-id read via `scope.serviceId` and is implemented entirely in the library. +`service_id` is the Keycloak clientId, which is slash-bearing (`{ns}/{workload}`, or a SPIFFE URI under +SPIRE) and cannot be a single URL path segment as-is. The `{service_id}` path segment on the three +per-id routes above is base64url-encoded on the wire (`aiac.policy.store.keying.encode_service_id` / +`decode_service_id`); the service decodes it immediately on entry, and the cache/DB stays keyed by the +decoded real id — every `service_id` in a request/response *body* (including the by-role list) is +always the decoded, real form. The by-role query's `role={role_id}` param is unaffected (not a path +segment). + `DELETE /policy/services/{service_id}` removes a single SPM row (SQLite `DELETE` + cache eviction) so a service can be off-boarded when it is decommissioned. Deleting a service that is not present is a no-op (`204`). Override-purge still edits `inbound_rules` in place via the upsert; the delete route is for whole-service removal, not per-rule purging. **Error responses:** diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index 65b424a0f..c392db46f 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the names/descriptions (via `KeycloakAdmin` / the IdP Configuration read API). 2. **Generated Rego decisions.** `kubectl cp` the `/rego` files to the host and `opa eval`: - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → `shutil.which("opa")` → `pytest.skip`. - - **Inbound** — per `subject`: `{"subject": }` vs `data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`. + - **Inbound** — per `subject`: `{"subject": }` vs `data.authz.team1_github_agent.inbound.allow`. - **Outbound (user gate only)** — per `(subject × function_name)`, `function_name` a full discovered tool-scope name, via the probe `data.probe.outbound.allow` in `probe_uc1.rego`, which binds `input.function_name` against the generated **user→tool** maps (`subject_ok`) **only**, by exact @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Why it holds: `compute_and_apply` is **affected-agent** oriented and **additive* is onboarded, its Service Policy Builder pairs the tool's scopes against the rest of the role universe, producing `(agent-role, tool-scope)` and `(user-role, tool-scope)` rules; the PCE resolves those roles to the **agent** and merges them onto the agent's stored `AgentPolicyModel`, rewriting -`github_agent.outbound.rego`. So: +`team1_github_agent.outbound.rego`. So: - **Rung 2 (agent → tool):** agent onboarding leaves outbound empty; **tool onboarding fills it in**. - **Rung 3 (tool → agent):** the tool's scopes already exist, so **agent onboarding produces the full @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ rendering). They are **identical to policy-pipeline's** (only the scope-name str `USERS`: `dev-user`→`developer`, `test-user`→`tester`, `devops-user`→`devops`. -**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.github_agent.inbound.allow`; all rungs): +**Inbound allow** (`data.authz.team1_github_agent.inbound.allow`; all rungs): | Subject | Inbound | |---|---| @@ -177,8 +177,13 @@ readability) — **rungs 2 and 3** (with a tool onboarded): **Rung 1 (agent only):** the outbound table is **entirely deny** (empty user gate — no tool scopes). -Each rung leaves on disk exactly `github_agent.inbound.rego` + `github_agent.outbound.rego`; explicitly +Each rung leaves on disk exactly `{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.rego` + `{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.rego`; explicitly **no** `github_tool.*.rego` (the tool is a pure target; "no rules written for the tool alone"). +`AGENT_SLUG` is the Rego-package slug derived from the agent's clientId (`{namespace}/{name}`, +extracted from the SPIFFE URI under SPIRE) — `team1_github_agent` on the reference cluster's +`team1`/`github-agent` scenario, not a literal `github_agent` (see +[pdp-policy-writer-opa.md § Rego package structure](../components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md#rego-package-structure) +for the slugify rule). ### Semantic similarity, not byte-identity diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index fd2950786..47042159d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -9,14 +9,33 @@ internally. """ +import re + from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule __all__ = ["slugify", "generate_inbound_rego", "generate_outbound_rego"] +_SPIFFE_RE = re.compile(r"^spiffe://[^/]+/ns/(?P[^/]+)/sa/(?P[^/]+)$") + + +def _short_id(agent_id: str) -> str: + """Reduce a clientId to ``{namespace}/{name}``, dropping the SPIFFE trust domain. + + Under SPIRE, agent_id is a SPIFFE URI (``spiffe://host/ns/{ns}/sa/{name}``); without + SPIRE it's already ``{ns}/{name}``. Either way the trust domain/host is not part of a + stable identity, so the slug must not depend on it. + """ + match = _SPIFFE_RE.match(agent_id) + return f"{match['ns']}/{match['name']}" if match else agent_id + def slugify(agent_id: str) -> str: - """Turn an agent id into a valid Rego package name segment.""" - return agent_id.replace("-", "_").lower() + """Turn an agent id into a valid Rego package name segment / filename. + + Predictable regardless of whether SPIRE is enabled: derived from ``{ns}/{name}``, + not the full slash/colon-bearing clientId or SPIFFE URI. + """ + return re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "_", _short_id(agent_id).lower()).strip("_") def _render_list(var: str, values: list[str]) -> str: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..432f834f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +"""Slash-safe encoding of a Policy Store ``service_id`` for use as a URL path segment. + +A service_id is the Keycloak clientId, which contains slashes (``ns/workload``, or a SPIFFE URI +under SPIRE) and cannot be a single path segment. The library encodes it with URL-safe base64 +(no ``/``, ``:``, or ``=`` padding) before putting it in the path; the service decodes it back. +The decoded id stays the cache/DB key and the ``service_id`` in every SPM body. +""" +import base64 + + +def encode_service_id(service_id: str) -> str: + return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(service_id.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii").rstrip("=") + + +def decode_service_id(encoded: str) -> str: + padding = "=" * (-len(encoded) % 4) + return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(encoded + padding).decode("utf-8") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py index b69635d5d..96ef36161 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # Scope / Role / ServiceType are re-exported by aiac.policy.model.models (it imports them # from aiac.idp.configuration.models), so the whole model surface comes from one module. from aiac.policy.model.models import Role, Scope, ServicePolicyModel, ServiceType +from aiac.policy.store.keying import encode_service_id load_dotenv(dotenv_path=os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".env")) @@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ def _fresh_empty(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: def get_service_policy(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{service_id}") + resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}") if resp.status_code == 404: return _fresh_empty(service_id) _check(resp) @@ -60,10 +61,10 @@ def get_service_policies_by_role(role: Role) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]: def apply_service_policy(service_id: str, spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None: - resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{service_id}", json=spm.model_dump()) + resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}", json=spm.model_dump()) _check(resp) def delete_service_policy(service_id: str) -> None: - resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{service_id}") + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}") _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py index 897f42740..b90624787 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel +from aiac.policy.store.keying import decode_service_id DB_PATH = os.getenv("SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH", "/data/policy_model.db") @@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ def list_service_policies_by_role(role: str) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]: @app.get("/policy/services/{service_id}", response_model=None) def get_service_policy(service_id: str): + service_id = decode_service_id(service_id) if service_id not in _cache: return JSONResponse(status_code=404, content={"error": f"service {service_id} not found"}) return _cache[service_id] @@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ def upsert_service_policy( body: ServicePolicyModel, conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], ) -> Response: + service_id = decode_service_id(service_id) try: conn.execute( "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", @@ -85,6 +88,7 @@ def delete_service_policy( service_id: str, conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], ) -> Response: + service_id = decode_service_id(service_id) try: conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", (service_id,)) except sqlite3.Error as e: diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego b/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego index 655773fcf..d46c5673d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego +++ b/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import future.keywords # `input.function_name` is matched to a subject scope by plain string equality. No 5.3-style # prefix-stripping token-set soft match (that was 5.3's device for bare names; here both sides # are already prefixed). -gen := data.authz.github_agent.outbound +gen := data.authz.team1_github_agent.outbound # Tool scopes the user (subject) is entitled to, via the generated user->tool data maps only. subject_scopes contains scope if { diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3ed247860 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +"""Rung 3 of the UC-1 onboarding ladder — onboard the **tool, then the agent**. + +Issue ``testing/5.4.3-uc1-onboard-tool-then-agent.md``; spec +``docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md``. Drive the **real** in-cluster UC-1 +Service Onboarding agent (``POST /apply/service/{id}``) for the ``github-tool`` **first** and the +``github-agent`` **second**, then assert the **full** truth table at the end — and, crucially, that +this end state is **identical to rung 2's** (agent→tool). + +This is the direct single-pass happy path: onboarding the tool first provisions the four +``github-tool.*`` scopes, and the ``(user role → tool scope)`` rules that pass produces are routed +**durably onto ``SPM(github-tool)``** (the tool gets an SPM, no APM; no agent APM is written yet — +no agent targets a tool scope at this point). When the agent is then onboarded, its Service Policy +Builder reads the universe (now including the tool scopes), the PCE routes the agent→tool rule to +``SPM(github-tool)``, marks the agent affected, and **derives** its APM from the SPMs — picking up +the durable user→tool rules already on ``SPM(github-tool)`` — so ``github_agent.outbound.rego`` is +emitted with the full user→tool gate in one pass. + +This rung is the **live counterpart of the PCE's order-independence unit test (8.11)** and the exact +repro of the original order-dependence bug: under the old APM-only design, tool-then-agent **lost** +the ``user role → tool scope`` rule because no agent yet targeted the tool scope at tool onboarding. +The SPM redesign stores that rule durably on ``SPM(github-tool)`` and reconstructs it when the +agent's APM is derived. So this rung asserts, on top of the full truth table, that its final +``APM(github-agent)`` grant sets **equal rung 2's** (compared as order-independent ``(role, scope)`` +sets, never a byte diff of the Rego). A divergence names the differing gate and is a **failure** — an +onboarding-order bug this rung exists to surface (spec § *Onboarding order is irrelevant*). + +Reuses the shared harness (``uc1_onboard.py`` — config, Keycloak provisioning/cleanup, onboard +trigger, Rego capture, grant-set extraction, per-rung fixture flow), the shared tool-onboarded oracle +(``uc1.expected_outbound_with_tool`` / ``uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET`` — the same gate rung 2 +asserts), ``scenario_uc1.py`` (the truth tables — the oracle), and ``probe_uc1.rego`` (user-gate +probe). The **only** rung-3-specific content here is the onboarding order — ``[tool, agent]`` — and +the order-independence assertions against **rung 2's** published expectations. + +Per-rung flow (spec § Per-rung flow): **Keycloak cleanup → onboard tool → onboard agent → validate +end state → Keycloak cleanup**. Deployment + client registration are **preconditions**, not test +steps. *Onboard + evaluate — no A2A traffic, no live enforcement* (phase-1 out of scope). + +Run (needs a live Kagenti/Kind cluster with the AIAC stack + OPA filesystem-stub writer, the demo +workloads deployed + registered into ``AIAC_TEST_REALM``, a real LLM in-pod, and ``opa`` on PATH or +``$OPA_BIN``): + + .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py -m integration -v + +Without ``-m integration`` the suite is not collected; without ``opa`` it skips at runtime. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration + +HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent # test/integration/ +REPO_ROOT = HERE.parents[1] # -> aiac/ +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT)) # so ``import test.integration.*`` resolves + +from test.integration import scenario_uc1 as scn # noqa: E402 +from test.integration import test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool as rung2 # noqa: E402 +from test.integration import uc1_onboard as uc1 # noqa: E402 +from test.integration.launcher import opa_eval # noqa: E402 + +TEST_REALM = uc1.TEST_REALM +INBOUND_REGO = uc1.INBOUND_REGO +OUTBOUND_REGO = uc1.OUTBOUND_REGO +AGENT_SLUG = uc1.AGENT_SLUG + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Expected-verdict oracle (the shared tool-onboarded oracle — identical to rung 2's) +# ====================================================================================== +# +# Rung 3 asserts the **full** truth table, and it must be the **same** truth table as rung 2 (spec: +# *Onboarding order is irrelevant*). So the oracle is the shared tool-onboarded oracle in +# ``uc1_onboard`` — the same constants/helper rung 2 uses — and the order-independence check below +# compares this rung's live grant sets against **rung 2's published expectations** (``rung2.RUNG2_*``, +# which alias the same shared oracle). Verdicts are computed here, never read from the Rego under test. + +RUNG3_INBOUND = uc1.INBOUND_GRANT_SET +RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT = uc1.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET +expected_outbound = uc1.expected_outbound_with_tool + +# Rung 2's published expectations — what this rung's end state must equal (order-independence). +RUNG2_INBOUND = rung2.RUNG2_INBOUND +RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT = rung2.RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Oracle contract tests — fixture-independent; pin rung 3's defining decisions +# ====================================================================================== +# +# These need neither the cluster nor ``opa``: they assert the rung-3 oracle itself (the intended +# policy the live decisions below are checked against), including that it is byte-for-byte the same +# oracle as rung 2's. If these are wrong, every live assertion is meaningless — so they are the +# tracer bullet. + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "subject, allowed", + [("dev-user", True), ("test-user", True), ("devops-user", False)], +) +def test_inbound_oracle(subject: str, allowed: bool) -> None: + """Inbound: dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌ (devops sources no agent scope) — inbound is + unaffected by onboarding order; identical to rungs 1 and 2.""" + assert uc1.expected_inbound(subject) is allowed + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "subject, function_name, allowed", + [ + # dev-user (developer): source read/write + issues read; NOT issues write. + ("dev-user", "github-tool.source-read", True), + ("dev-user", "github-tool.source-write", True), + ("dev-user", "github-tool.issues-read", True), + ("dev-user", "github-tool.issues-write", False), + # test-user (tester): issues read/write only. + ("test-user", "github-tool.source-read", False), + ("test-user", "github-tool.source-write", False), + ("test-user", "github-tool.issues-read", True), + ("test-user", "github-tool.issues-write", True), + # devops-user (devops): no access to anything. + ("devops-user", "github-tool.source-read", False), + ("devops-user", "github-tool.source-write", False), + ("devops-user", "github-tool.issues-read", False), + ("devops-user", "github-tool.issues-write", False), + ], +) +def test_outbound_oracle(subject: str, function_name: str, allowed: bool) -> None: + """Rung 3's outbound gate is the full user→tool gate (developer: source rw + issues read; tester: + issues rw; devops: nothing) — the same gate rung 2 produces, reached here in a single pass.""" + assert expected_outbound(subject, function_name) is allowed + + +def test_rung3_grant_set_oracle() -> None: + """Rung 3 grant-set oracle: inbound == the ``scenario_uc1`` inbound truth table; the + outbound-subject grant set == the (non-empty) ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` truth table.""" + assert RUNG3_INBOUND == set(scn.INBOUND_PAIRS) + assert RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT == set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) + assert RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, "rung 3's outbound gate must be non-empty (the tool was onboarded)" + + +def test_order_independence_oracle() -> None: + """The order-independence property at the oracle level: rung 3's intended end state is **identical + to rung 2's** (both the inbound and the outbound-subject grant sets). The live check below then + proves the *generated* policy matches this — that onboarding order did not change the final policy.""" + assert RUNG3_INBOUND == RUNG2_INBOUND + assert RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT == RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Session fixture — cleanup → onboard tool → onboard agent → capture rego → yield → cleanup +# ====================================================================================== + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="session") +def onboarded() -> dict: + """Onboard the tool **then** the agent via the shared harness (order is this rung's identity — + the tool's scopes already exist when the agent's Service Policy Builder reads the universe, so the + agent's APM is derived with the full user→tool gate in one pass), and yield the live ``admin`` + handle + captured ``rego_dir`` (+ writer ``pod``). Keycloak cleanup runs before and after; the + clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow).""" + with uc1.onboarded_stack( + [scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD, scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD], rego_prefix="aiac-uc1-rung3-rego-" + ) as ctx: + yield ctx + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Live tests — Keycloak entities + opa-eval decisions (verdicts computed from scenario_uc1) +# ====================================================================================== + + +def test_agent_role_and_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Keycloak holds the agent's realm role + the two AgentCard scopes with their descriptions.""" + admin = onboarded["admin"] + admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) + + role = admin.get_realm_role(scn.AGENT_ROLE) + assert role and role.get("name") == scn.AGENT_ROLE, f"missing realm role {scn.AGENT_ROLE!r}" + + scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} + for name, description in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items(): + assert name in scopes, f"missing agent scope {name!r}" + assert scopes[name] == description, ( + f"agent scope {name!r} description mismatch: {scopes[name]!r} != {description!r}" + ) + + +def test_tool_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The tool was onboarded (first), so all four ``github-tool.*`` scopes exist with their MCP + ``tools/list`` descriptions (the discovered tool boundary).""" + admin = onboarded["admin"] + admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) + + scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} + for name, description in scn.TOOL_SCOPES.items(): + assert name in scopes, f"missing tool scope {name!r}" + assert scopes[name] == description, ( + f"tool scope {name!r} description mismatch: {scopes[name]!r} != {description!r}" + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +def test_inbound(onboarded: dict, subject: str) -> None: + """Inbound gate allows a user iff their role may reach some discovered agent scope + (dev-user ✅, test-user ✅, devops-user ❌) — unaffected by onboarding order.""" + rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / INBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval([rego], f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.allow", {"subject": subject}) + assert allowed == uc1.expected_inbound(subject), subject + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject", list(scn.USERS)) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("function_name", list(scn.TOOL_SCOPES)) +def test_outbound(onboarded: dict, subject: str, function_name: str) -> None: + """Outbound user gate (via ``probe_uc1.rego``) decides each ``(subject, function)`` per the full + ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` table — reconstructed from the durable ``SPM(github-tool)`` rules when + the agent's APM was derived (exact-name match on full discovered scope names).""" + rego = onboarded["rego_dir"] / OUTBOUND_REGO + allowed = opa_eval( + [rego, uc1.PROBE_UC1], + "data.probe.outbound.allow", + {"subject": subject, "function_name": function_name}, + ) + assert allowed == expected_outbound(subject, function_name), f"{subject} / {function_name}" + + +def test_only_agent_rego_present(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Exactly the two agent files on disk; explicitly **no** ``github_tool.*.rego`` even though the + tool was onboarded first (the tool is a pure target — its rules live durably on ``SPM(github-tool)`` + and are reconstructed onto the agent's model; no rules are written for the tool alone). Checks the + writer's own ``/rego``, not just the host copy.""" + written = uc1.writer_rego_files(onboarded["writer_pod"]) + assert not [f for f in written if f.startswith("github_tool")], ( + f"unexpected tool Rego emitted: {written}" + ) + for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): + assert filename in written, f"missing {filename} in writer /rego: {written}" + + +def test_inbound_grant_set_matches_truth_table(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The inbound grant set re-derived from the Rego equals ``scenario_uc1``'s inbound truth table — + catching verdict-neutral over/under-grants the coarse allow/deny oracle cannot see.""" + got = uc1.inbound_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG3_INBOUND, f"inbound: missing={RUNG3_INBOUND - got} extra={got - RUNG3_INBOUND}" + + +def test_outbound_subject_grant_set_matches_truth_table(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """The single-pass property, as a grant set: the outbound-subject grant set re-derived from the + Rego equals the **non-empty** ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` — the agent's APM was derived with the + full user→tool gate because the tool's scopes (and their durable ``SPM(github-tool)`` rules) + already existed.""" + got = uc1.outbound_subject_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, ( + f"outbound: missing={RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT - got} extra={got - RUNG3_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT}" + ) + assert got, "outbound gate must be non-empty after onboarding the tool (single-pass derivation)" + + +# ====================================================================================== +# Order-independence — this rung's headline: tool→agent == agent→tool (vs rung 2) +# ====================================================================================== +# +# The live counterpart of the PCE's order-independence unit test (8.11) and the exact repro of the +# original order-dependence bug. Compared at the **grant-set** level (semantic ``(role, scope)`` sets), +# never a byte diff of the Rego. A divergence names the differing gate and is a **failure** — an +# onboarding-order bug, not an accepted difference (spec § *Onboarding order is irrelevant*). + + +def test_inbound_grant_set_equals_rung2(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Onboarding-order-independence, inbound gate: rung 3's (tool→agent) inbound grant set equals + rung 2's (agent→tool). Inbound never depended on order, so this is the easy half — but asserting + it keeps the equivalence check total across both gates.""" + got = uc1.inbound_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG2_INBOUND, ( + "onboarding order changed the INBOUND gate (bug): " + f"missing={RUNG2_INBOUND - got} extra={got - RUNG2_INBOUND}" + ) + + +def test_outbound_subject_grant_set_equals_rung2(onboarded: dict) -> None: + """Onboarding-order-independence, outbound user gate — this rung's raison d'être: rung 3's + (tool→agent) outbound-subject grant set equals rung 2's (agent→tool). This is the exact cell the + original order-dependence bug corrupted (tool-then-agent lost the user→tool rule); the SPM + redesign makes both orders converge. A divergence here is an onboarding-order **bug**, not an + accepted difference.""" + got = uc1.outbound_subject_grants(onboarded["rego_dir"]) + assert got == RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT, ( + "onboarding order changed the OUTBOUND user gate (bug): " + f"missing={RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT - got} extra={got - RUNG2_OUTBOUND_SUBJECT}" + ) + assert got, "outbound gate must be non-empty (the tool was onboarded)" diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py index 4a57eff46..238d8468e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -93,6 +93,27 @@ def test_slugify_lowercases_without_hyphens(): assert slugify("WeatherAgent") == "weatheragent" +def test_slugify_strips_slashes_and_colons_from_spiffe_uri(): + slug = slugify("spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent") + assert "/" not in slug + assert ":" not in slug + assert "." not in slug + + +def test_slugify_spiffe_uri_extracts_namespace_and_name_short_id(): + """The slug must be predictable from just {namespace}/{name}, not the trust domain.""" + assert slugify("spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent") == "team1_github_agent" + assert ( + slugify("spiffe://other-trust-domain.example/ns/team1/sa/github-agent") + == "team1_github_agent" + ) + + +def test_slugify_plain_ns_workload_clientid_matches_spiffe_slug(): + """Same {ns}/{workload} id, with or without SPIRE, must slugify identically.""" + assert slugify("team1/github-agent") == "team1_github_agent" + + # --- generate_inbound_rego --- diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py index 1072d5568..d5b28e22c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel +from aiac.policy.store.keying import encode_service_id BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:7074" @@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ def test_by_id_hit_returns_spm(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy result = get_service_policy("svc-1") - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/svc-1") + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}") assert isinstance(result, ServicePolicyModel) assert result.service_id == "svc-1" @@ -74,6 +75,21 @@ def test_raises_on_other_error_response(self): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): get_service_policy("svc-1") + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "service_id", + ["team1/github-agent", "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent"], + ) + def test_slash_bearing_id_encoded_in_path(self, service_id): + with patch("requests.get") as mock_get: + mock_get.return_value = _mock_response(200, _spm_dict(service_id)) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy + + get_service_policy(service_id) + called_url = mock_get.call_args[0][0] + path_segment = called_url.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] + assert "/" not in path_segment + assert called_url == f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}" + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # get_service_policy_by_scope @@ -88,7 +104,7 @@ def test_resolves_via_scope_service_id(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy_by_scope result = get_service_policy_by_scope(scope) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/owning-svc") + mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('owning-svc')}") assert result is not None assert result.service_id == "owning-svc" @@ -167,7 +183,9 @@ def test_posts_serialized_spm_upsert(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import apply_service_policy result = apply_service_policy("svc-1", spm) - mock_post.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/svc-1", json=spm.model_dump()) + mock_post.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}", json=spm.model_dump() + ) assert result is None def test_raises_on_error_response(self): @@ -192,7 +210,7 @@ def test_deletes_service_policy(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_service_policy result = delete_service_policy("svc-1") - mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/svc-1") + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}") assert result is None def test_raises_on_error_response(self): @@ -241,4 +259,4 @@ def test_defaults_to_localhost_7074_when_env_unset(self): get_service_policy("svc-1") call_url = mock_get.call_args[0][0] - assert call_url == "http://127.0.0.1:7074/policy/services/svc-1" + assert call_url == f"http://127.0.0.1:7074/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}" diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py index 7088e60d8..cedab4df0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import aiac.policy.store.service.main as svc from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel +from aiac.policy.store.keying import encode_service_id from aiac.policy.store.service.main import app, get_db # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -109,21 +110,33 @@ def test_load_cache_empty_when_db_empty(self): class TestGetServicePolicy: def test_returns_spm_when_in_cache(self, client): _preload(_spm("weather-service")) - resp = client.get("/policy/services/weather-service") + resp = client.get(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('weather-service')}") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json()["service_id"] == "weather-service" def test_returns_404_when_not_in_cache(self, client): - resp = client.get("/policy/services/missing-service") + resp = client.get(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('missing-service')}") assert resp.status_code == 404 assert resp.json() == {"error": "service missing-service not found"} def test_get_after_post_returns_updated_value_from_cache(self, client): - client.post("/policy/services/svc-x", json=_spm("svc-x").model_dump()) - resp = client.get("/policy/services/svc-x") + client.post(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-x')}", json=_spm("svc-x").model_dump()) + resp = client.get(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-x')}") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json()["service_id"] == "svc-x" + def test_slash_bearing_id_round_trips_via_encoded_path(self, client): + service_id = "team1/github-agent" + client.post(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}", json=_spm(service_id).model_dump()) + resp = client.get(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.json()["service_id"] == service_id + assert service_id in svc._cache + row = svc._db_conn.execute( + "SELECT service_id FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", (service_id,) + ).fetchone() + assert row is not None + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /policy/services?role={role_id} (by-role) @@ -167,15 +180,16 @@ def test_returns_empty_list_when_cache_empty(self, client): class TestUpsertServicePolicy: def test_writes_to_db_updates_cache_returns_204(self, client): - resp = client.post("/policy/services/svc-1", json=_spm("svc-1").model_dump()) + resp = client.post(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}", json=_spm("svc-1").model_dump()) assert resp.status_code == 204 assert "svc-1" in svc._cache row = svc._db_conn.execute("SELECT spec FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", ("svc-1",)).fetchone() assert row is not None def test_repeat_post_replaces_row_upsert_round_trip(self, client): - client.post("/policy/services/svc-1", json=_spm("svc-1", role_id="role-a").model_dump()) - client.post("/policy/services/svc-1", json=_spm("svc-1", role_id="role-b").model_dump()) + encoded = encode_service_id("svc-1") + client.post(f"/policy/services/{encoded}", json=_spm("svc-1", role_id="role-a").model_dump()) + client.post(f"/policy/services/{encoded}", json=_spm("svc-1", role_id="role-b").model_dump()) rows = svc._db_conn.execute( "SELECT service_id FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", ("svc-1",) @@ -183,7 +197,7 @@ def test_repeat_post_replaces_row_upsert_round_trip(self, client): assert len(rows) == 1 # replaced, not duplicated # The stored/cached SPM now carries the second write's rule. - resp = client.get("/policy/services/svc-1") + resp = client.get(f"/policy/services/{encoded}") rule_role_ids = [r["role"]["id"] for r in resp.json()["inbound_rules"]] assert rule_role_ids == ["role-b"] @@ -191,7 +205,7 @@ def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): bad_conn = MagicMock() bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn - resp = client.post("/policy/services/svc-err", json=_spm("svc-err").model_dump()) + resp = client.post(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-err')}", json=_spm("svc-err").model_dump()) assert resp.status_code == 502 assert "error" in resp.json() @@ -204,7 +218,7 @@ def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): class TestDeleteServicePolicy: def test_removes_row_from_db_and_cache_returns_204(self, client): _preload(_spm("svc-1")) - resp = client.delete("/policy/services/svc-1") + resp = client.delete(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}") assert resp.status_code == 204 assert "svc-1" not in svc._cache row = svc._db_conn.execute( @@ -216,7 +230,7 @@ def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): bad_conn = MagicMock() bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn - resp = client.delete("/policy/services/svc-1") + resp = client.delete(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}") assert resp.status_code == 502 assert "error" in resp.json() diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/test_keying.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/test_keying.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..acca7fa97 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/test_keying.py @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +"""Unit tests for aiac/policy/store/keying.py — slash-safe service_id encoding.""" + +import pytest + +from aiac.policy.store.keying import decode_service_id, encode_service_id + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "service_id", + [ + "github-agent", + "team1/github-agent", + "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent", + ], +) +def test_round_trips(service_id): + encoded = encode_service_id(service_id) + assert decode_service_id(encoded) == service_id + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "service_id", + [ + "github-agent", + "team1/github-agent", + "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent", + ], +) +def test_encoding_is_path_segment_safe(service_id): + encoded = encode_service_id(service_id) + assert "/" not in encoded + assert ":" not in encoded + assert "=" not in encoded From caa29788e492ebd3ccb8747d1a94da375e88c3d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 20:11:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 243/273] Chore(aiac): Remove obsolete onboarding.old and test_llm_config.py.old Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py | 38 -- .../agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py | 140 ----- .../policy/base_mapper/__init__.py | 27 - .../policy/base_mapper/graph.py | 357 ----------- .../policy/base_mapper/state.py | 27 - .../onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py | 18 - .../onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py | 12 - .../policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE | 63 -- .../policy/config/llm_config.py | 289 --------- .../policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py | 15 - .../policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py | 431 ------------- .../policy/full_policy_agent/state.py | 33 - .../full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py | 14 - .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py | 349 ----------- .../policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py | 31 - .../onboarding.old/policy/prompts/__init__.py | 0 .../prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py | 564 ----------------- .../prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py | 587 ------------------ .../onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt | 18 - .../policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py | 13 - .../policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py | 280 --------- .../policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py | 21 - .../policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py | 13 - .../policy/single_role_agent/graph.py | 302 --------- .../policy/single_role_agent/state.py | 21 - .../onboarding.old/policy/utils/__init__.py | 0 .../onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py | 19 - .../onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py | 120 ---- .../onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py | 77 --- .../agent/onboarding.old/provision/tmp.txt | 0 aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old | 136 ---- 31 files changed, 4015 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/state.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_config.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/state.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/__init__.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py delete mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/provision/tmp.txt delete mode 100644 aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9bce3a378..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -""" -AIAC Policy Agent - Access Control Policy Builder Package - -AI-powered access control policy builder using LangGraph workflows and LLMs. -Converts natural language policy descriptions into structured YAML policies for Keycloak. - -Main Components: - - PolicyBuilder: Full policy generation for all services in a realm - - ServicePolicyBuilder: Service-scoped policy generation - - SinglePrivilegeMapper: Individual privilege mapping with semantic analysis - -Quick Start: - >>> from pathlib import Path - >>> from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder - >>> - >>> builder = PolicyBuilder(realm="my-realm", config_path=Path("config.yaml")) - >>> result = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access to all services") - >>> - >>> if result["success"]: - ... builder.save_policy("policy.yaml") - -For detailed documentation, see README.md in this directory. -""" - -from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder -from service_policy_agent.graph import ServicePolicyBuilder -from single_privilege_agent.graph import SinglePrivilegeMapper - -__version__ = "1.0.0" -__author__ = "AIAC Development Team" -__license__ = "MIT" - -__all__ = [ - "PolicyBuilder", - "ServicePolicyBuilder", - "SinglePrivilegeMapper", -] - diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py deleted file mode 100644 index acd66b0e7..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/aiac_cli.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,140 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -AIAC CLI - Access Control Policy Generator - -Command-line interface for generating Keycloak access control policies from -natural language descriptions using AI-powered semantic analysis. - -Usage: - python aiac_cli.py - -Arguments: - policy_text_file Path to file containing natural language policy description - config.yaml Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML - output.yaml Path where generated YAML policy will be saved - -Example: - python aiac_cli.py my_policy.txt keycloak_config.yaml generated_policy.yaml - -The CLI generates a complete access control policy by: - 1. Reading the natural language policy description - 2. Loading Keycloak realm configuration (roles, clients) - 3. Using LLM to map roles based on semantic analysis - 4. Validating the generated policy structure - 5. Saving the result as a YAML file with explanatory comments - -For programmatic usage, import PolicyBuilder directly: - from full_policy_agent import PolicyBuilder - result = builder.generate_policy("policy description") -""" - -import argparse -import os -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -# Add policy dir and src/ to path to allow importing local and aiac.* modules -sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent)) -sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parents[4])) - -from dotenv import load_dotenv - -from full_policy_agent.graph import PolicyBuilder -from config import create_llm - -load_dotenv(dotenv_path="aiac.env", override=True) - - -class Colors: - RED = "\033[0;31m" - GREEN = "\033[0;32m" - YELLOW = "\033[1;33m" - BLUE = "\033[0;34m" - NC = "\033[0m" - - -def print_step(message: str) -> None: - print(f"{Colors.BLUE}{'=' * 51}{Colors.NC}") - print(f"{Colors.BLUE}{message}{Colors.NC}") - print(f"{Colors.BLUE}{'=' * 51}{Colors.NC}") - - -def print_success(message: str) -> None: - print(f"{Colors.GREEN}✓ {message}{Colors.NC}") - - -def print_error(message: str) -> None: - print(f"{Colors.RED}✗ {message}{Colors.NC}") - - -def print_info(message: str) -> None: - print(f"{Colors.YELLOW}ℹ {message}{Colors.NC}") - - -def generate_policy_only( - policy_file: Path, config_path: Path, output_file: str -) -> None: - """ - Args: - policy_file: Path to file containing natural language policy description - config_path: Path to Keycloak realm configuration YAML (when its is used for configuration reading) - output_file: Path where generated YAML policy will be saved - """ - - os.environ["AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_PATH"] = str(config_path) - - if not policy_file.exists(): - raise FileNotFoundError(f"Policy file not found: {policy_file}") - - with open(policy_file, "r") as f: - policy_text = f.read().strip() - - # Load default model name from llm_conf.yaml - import yaml - llm_models_path = Path(__file__).parent / "config" / "llm_conf.yaml" - with open(llm_models_path) as f: - llm_config = yaml.safe_load(f) - default_model = llm_config.get("default_model", "gpt-5-mini") - - # Create LLM instance from llm_models.yaml using default model - llm = create_llm(model_name=default_model, verbose=False) - - # Create PolicyBuilder with the LLM instance - builder = PolicyBuilder(llm=llm) - - print("=" * 80) - print("Generating access rule from textual policy...") - print("=" * 80) - print(f"\nPolicy file: {policy_file}") - print(f"\nDescription:\n{policy_text}\n") - - try: - policy = builder.generate_policy(description=policy_text) - except ValueError as exc: - print(f"✗ Policy generation failed: {exc}") - return - - print("✓ Access rules generated successfully!\n") - - print("\n" + "=" * 80) - print("Parsed Role-to-Privilege Mappings:") - print("=" * 80) - for rule in policy: - print(f" - {rule.role.name}: {rule.scope.name}") - -def main() -> None: - gen_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( - prog="aiac generate", - description="Run only the policy generation step (no Keycloak).", - ) - gen_parser.add_argument("policy_file", help="Path to natural-language policy description") - gen_parser.add_argument("config", help="Path to realm config YAML") - gen_parser.add_argument("output", help="Output YAML path") - gen_args = gen_parser.parse_args(sys.argv[2:]) - generate_policy_only( - Path(gen_args.policy_file), Path(gen_args.config), gen_args.output - ) - return - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main() diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 89b370cfa..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -""" -Base mapper package — shared utilities for single-item mapper agents. -""" - -from .graph import ( - BaseSingleMapper, - MapperConfig, - extract_explanation_and_json, - print_explanation, - validate_mapping_items, - verify_semantic_mapping, - should_route_after_structural_validation, - should_retry_after_semantic, -) -from .state import BaseMappingState - -__all__ = [ - "BaseSingleMapper", - "MapperConfig", - "extract_explanation_and_json", - "print_explanation", - "validate_mapping_items", - "verify_semantic_mapping", - "should_route_after_structural_validation", - "should_retry_after_semantic", - "BaseMappingState", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index e28406592..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,357 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Shared utilities and base class for single-item mapper agents. - -Both SinglePrivilegeMapper and SingleRoleMapper follow the same -analyze → validate → verify_semantic LangGraph pattern. This module -provides the common building blocks so the subclasses only implement -what differs (prompt building, state field names, rule assembly). -""" - -import json -import re -from abc import ABC, abstractmethod -from dataclasses import dataclass -from typing import Any, Optional - -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage -from langgraph.graph import END -from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph - -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule -from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - - -# ============================================================================ -# CONFIGURATION -# ============================================================================ - -@dataclass -class MapperConfig: - """ - Shared configuration for single-item mapper agents. - - Attributes: - llm: LangChain LLM instance - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - llm: BaseChatModel - verbose: bool = True - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - - -# ============================================================================ -# UTILITY FUNCTIONS -# ============================================================================ - -def extract_explanation_and_json( - content: str, -) -> tuple[str, Optional[dict[str, Any]]]: - """ - Extract explanation and JSON from an LLM response. - - Tries multiple parsing strategies in order: - 1. Fenced ```explanation and ```json blocks (preferred format) - 2. Any ```json or generic ``` block containing a dict - 3. A bare { ... } JSON object anywhere in the response - - Returns: - Tuple of (explanation_text, parsed_json_dict). - Returns ("", None) if parsing fails entirely. - """ - explanation = "" - json_data = None - - if "```explanation" in content: - start = content.find("```explanation") + len("```explanation") - end = content.find("```", start) - if end != -1: - explanation = content[start:end].strip() - - if "```json" in content: - start = content.find("```json") + len("```json") - end = content.find("```", start) - if end != -1: - try: - json_data = json.loads(content[start:end].strip()) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - pass - - if json_data is None and "```" in content: - for block in re.findall(r"```[^\n]*\n(.*?)```", content, re.DOTALL): - try: - candidate = json.loads(block.strip()) - if isinstance(candidate, dict): - json_data = candidate - break - except json.JSONDecodeError: - pass - - if json_data is None: - depth = 0 - start_idx = None - for i, ch in enumerate(content): - if ch == "{": - if depth == 0: - start_idx = i - depth += 1 - elif ch == "}": - depth -= 1 - if depth == 0 and start_idx is not None: - try: - candidate = json.loads(content[start_idx : i + 1]) - if isinstance(candidate, dict): - json_data = candidate - if not explanation: - explanation = content[:start_idx].strip() - break - except json.JSONDecodeError: - start_idx = None - - return explanation, json_data - - -def print_explanation( - explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True -) -> None: - """Print the LLM's explanation when verbose mode is on.""" - if verbose and explanation: - prefix = "Retry Explanation:" if is_retry else "LLM Explanation:" - print(f"\n{prefix}") - print(explanation) - print() - - -def validate_mapping_items( - state: BaseMappingState, - verbose: bool, - max_retries: int, - items_key: str, - reference_key: str, - item_type_label: str, -) -> dict[str, Any]: - """ - Structural validation shared by both mapper agents. - - Checks that every item in state[items_key] exists in state[reference_key] - and that there are no duplicates. - - Args: - state: Current mapping state dict - verbose: Whether to print validation errors - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts - items_key: State key holding the mapped items (e.g. "roles_with_access") - reference_key: State key holding the full reference list (e.g. "roles") - item_type_label: Human-readable label for error messages (e.g. "role") - - Returns: - Updated state dict with errors and validation_passed fields set. - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - items = state.get(items_key, []) - available_names: set[str] = {r.name for r in state[reference_key]} - - errors: list[str] = [] - - for item in items: - if item.name not in available_names: - errors.append( - f"Unknown {item_type_label} '{item.name}'. " - f"Must be one of: {', '.join(sorted(available_names))}" - ) - - if len(items) != len({item.name for item in items}): - errors.append(f"Duplicate {item_type_label} names found in the result") - - validation_passed = len(errors) == 0 - - if errors and retry_count < max_retries: - if verbose: - print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count + 1}/{max_retries})") - for error in errors: - print(f" - {error}") - return { - **state, - items_key: items, - "errors": errors, - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1, - } - - return { - **state, - items_key: items, - "errors": errors, - "validation_passed": validation_passed, - "retry_count": retry_count, - } - - -def verify_semantic_mapping( - state: BaseMappingState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool, - max_retries: int, - subject_name: str, - verification_prompt: str, - mapped_items: list, -) -> dict[str, Any]: - """ - LLM semantic verification shared by both mapper agents. - - Invokes the LLM with a pre-built verification_prompt and parses the - MAPPING_CORRECT: YES/NO response. On failure, increments retry_count so - the graph can loop back to the analyze node. - - Args: - state: Current mapping state dict - llm: LLM instance for verification - verbose: Whether to print verification details - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed - subject_name: Display name of the item being verified (for logging) - verification_prompt: Fully-built prompt to send to the LLM - mapped_items: The items that were mapped (used to decide whether to log) - - Returns: - Updated state dict with validation_passed and errors set. - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - - try: - response = llm.invoke([HumanMessage(content=verification_prompt)]) - content = ( - response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) - ) - - mapping_matches = re.findall(r"MAPPING_CORRECT:\s*(YES|NO)", content, re.IGNORECASE) - explanation_match = re.search( - r"EXPLANATION:\s*(.+?)$", content, re.DOTALL | re.IGNORECASE - ) - - # Use the last occurrence so self-correcting LLM responses resolve to their final answer - mapping_correct = mapping_matches[-1].upper() == "YES" if mapping_matches else False - explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() if explanation_match else content - - if verbose and (mapped_items or not mapping_correct): - status = "YES" if mapping_correct else "NO" - print(f"\nSemantic verification [{subject_name}]: MAPPING_CORRECT={status}") - if not mapping_correct: - print(f" {explanation}") - - if not mapping_correct: - error_msg = f"Semantic mismatch for '{subject_name}': {explanation}" - if retry_count < max_retries: - return { - **state, - "errors": [error_msg], - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1, - } - return {**state, "errors": [error_msg], "validation_passed": False} - - return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} - - except Exception: - # Allow the pipeline to proceed on transient errors (rate limits, etc.) - return {**state, "errors": [], "validation_passed": True} - - -def should_route_after_structural_validation( - validation_passed: bool, - retry_count: int, - max_retries: int, - analyze_node: str, - verify_node: str, -) -> str: - """ - Shared routing logic after structural validation. - - Returns the analyze node name if retries remain, the verify node name if - validation passed, or END if retries are exhausted. - """ - if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - return analyze_node - if validation_passed: - return verify_node - return END - - -def should_retry_after_semantic( - validation_passed: bool, - retry_count: int, - max_retries: int, - analyze_node: str, -) -> str: - """ - Shared routing logic after semantic verification. - - Returns the analyze node name if semantic check failed and retries remain, - otherwise END. - """ - if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - return analyze_node - return END - - -# ============================================================================ -# BASE CLASS -# ============================================================================ - -class BaseSingleMapper(ABC): - """ - Abstract base class for single-item mapper agents (privilege→roles and role→privileges). - - Subclasses implement _create_graph, _run, and _build_rules. - generate_policy is fully implemented here using those hooks. - """ - - def __init__( - self, - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, - ) -> None: - self.config = MapperConfig(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) - self.graph = self._create_graph(self.config) - - @abstractmethod - def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig) -> CompiledStateGraph: - """Build and return the compiled LangGraph workflow.""" - ... - - def get_graph(self): - """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" - return self.graph - - @abstractmethod - def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: - """Run the workflow and return a result dict with errors, explanation, etc.""" - ... - - @abstractmethod - def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[PolicyRule]: - """Convert the workflow result into a list of Rule objects.""" - ... - - def generate_policy(self, description: str): - """ - Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. - - Args: - description: Natural language policy description - - Returns: - PolicyObjectModel with the generated rules and explanation. - - Raises: - ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. - """ - result = self._run(policy_description=description) - errors = result.get("errors", []) - if errors: - raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - rules = self._build_rules(result) - return [rules, result.get("explanation", "")] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4edf2df7d..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/base_mapper/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Base state definition shared by single-item mapper agents. -""" - -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated -from operator import add - - -class BaseMappingState(TypedDict): - """ - Common fields shared by SinglePrivilegeState and SingleRoleState. - - Attributes: - policy_description: Natural language policy description (context) - explanation: LLM explanation of the mapping - messages: Accumulated LLM messages - errors: Validation errors - replaced on each validation attempt - retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made - validation_passed: Whether the last validation pass succeeded - """ - policy_description: str - explanation: str - messages: Annotated[list, add] - errors: list[str] - retry_count: int - validation_passed: bool diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index c1c7af986..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -""" -Configuration Module - -Contains configuration utilities, constants, and LLM setup. -""" - -from .llm_config import create_llm, load_llm_config_from_env, LLMConfig, get_default_llm -from .constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - -__all__ = [ - "create_llm", - "load_llm_config_from_env", - "LLMConfig", - "get_default_llm", - "MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES", -] - -# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py deleted file mode 100644 index a81911ab1..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/constants.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Constants for Policy Builder - -This module defines constants used throughout the policy builder system. -""" - -# Maximum number of retry cycles from validate_policy back to parse_and_extract -# This prevents infinite loops while allowing the LLM to self-correct -MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES = 3 - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE deleted file mode 100644 index 12b7fe2ae..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_conf.yaml.TEMPLATE +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -# LLM Models Configuration Template -# Multiple model configurations for testing and production use -# Each model entry contains connection details and generation parameters - - -models: - # Claude Haiku - claude-haiku: - model: claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 - endpoint: - api_key: - temperature: 0.0 - max_tokens: 8192 - timeout: 360 - max_retries: 2 - description: "Claude Haiku 4.5 via IBM ete-litellm gateway" - - # Azure GPT-5 Nano via ete-litellm - gpt-nano: - model: Azure/gpt-5-nano-2025-08-07 - endpoint: - api_key: - temperature: 0.0 - max_tokens: 8192 - timeout: 360 - max_retries: 2 - description: "Azure GPT-5 Nano via IBM ete-litellm gateway" - - # GCP Gemini 2.0 Flash via ete-litellm - gemini: - model: GCP/gemini-2.0-flash - endpoint: - api_key: - temperature: 0.0 - max_tokens: 8192 - timeout: 360 - max_retries: 2 - description: "GCP Gemini 2.0 Flash via IBM ete-litellm gateway" - - # OpenAI GPT-OSS 120B via RITS - gpt-oss: - model: openai/gpt-oss-120b - endpoint: - api_key: - temperature: 0.0 - max_tokens: 8192 - timeout: 360 - max_retries: 2 - description: "OpenAI GPT-OSS 120B via IBM RITS" - - # Ollama local models - ollama-llama: - model: phi4 - endpoint: - api_key: - temperature: 0.0 - max_tokens: 8192 - timeout: 720 - max_retries: 2 - description: "Llama 3.2 via local Ollama" - -# Default model to use if not specified -default_model: ollama-llama diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_config.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_config.py deleted file mode 100644 index 74e61fcea..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/config/llm_config.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,289 +0,0 @@ -""" -LLM Configuration Module - -This module provides a global LLM instance configured for the document generation system. -The LLM is initialized once and can be imported by other modules. - -Configuration is read from llm.env file. -Supports multiple backends: RITS, ete-litellm, Ollama, and other OpenAI-compatible endpoints. -""" - -import os -import warnings -import yaml -from pathlib import Path -from typing import Optional, Dict, Any -from dataclasses import dataclass - -from dotenv import load_dotenv -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel -from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI -from pydantic import SecretStr - - -# Default generation parameters -DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE = 0.0 -DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS = 8192 -DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 360 -DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES = 2 - - -@dataclass -class LLMConfig: - """Configuration for LLM.""" - model: str - endpoint: Optional[str] - api_key: Optional[str] - temperature: float - max_tokens: int - timeout: int - retries: int - - -def load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]: - """ - Load LLM models configuration from YAML file. - - Args: - yaml_path: Path to llm_conf.yaml file (optional, defaults to llm_conf.yaml in config dir) - - Returns: - Dict containing models configuration - - Raises: - FileNotFoundError: If YAML file doesn't exist - ValueError: If YAML is invalid - """ - if yaml_path is None: - config_dir = Path(__file__).parent - yaml_path = config_dir / "llm_conf.yaml" - - if not yaml_path.exists(): - raise FileNotFoundError(f"LLM models configuration file not found: {yaml_path}") - - with open(yaml_path, 'r') as f: - config = yaml.safe_load(f) - - if not config or 'models' not in config: - raise ValueError(f"Invalid LLM models configuration in {yaml_path}") - - return config - - -def load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name: Optional[str], yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> LLMConfig: - """ - Load LLM configuration for a specific model from YAML file. - - Args: - model_name: Name of the model to load (e.g., 'claude-haiku', 'gpt-nano') - yaml_path: Path to llm_conf.yaml file (optional) - - Returns: - LLMConfig: Configuration object - - Raises: - FileNotFoundError: If YAML file doesn't exist - ValueError: If model not found in configuration - """ - config = load_llm_models_yaml(yaml_path) - if not model_name: - model_name = config.get("default_model", "gpt-5-mini") - - if model_name not in config['models']: - available = ', '.join(config['models'].keys()) - raise ValueError(f"Model '{model_name}' not found in configuration. Available models: {available}") - - model_config = config['models'][model_name] - - return LLMConfig( - model=model_config['model'], - endpoint=model_config.get('endpoint'), - api_key=model_config.get('api_key'), - temperature=model_config.get('temperature', DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE), - max_tokens=model_config.get('max_tokens', DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS), - timeout=model_config.get('timeout', DEFAULT_TIMEOUT), - retries=model_config.get('max_retries', DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES) - ) - - -def load_llm_config_from_env(env_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> LLMConfig: - """ - Load LLM configuration from environment file (llm.env) or environment variables. - - Supports multiple backends: - - RITS (IBM): Uses RITS_API_KEY header - - ete-litellm: Standard OpenAI-compatible - - Ollama: Local OpenAI-compatible API - - Args: - env_path: Path to llm.env file (optional, defaults to llm.env in config dir) - If the path doesn't exist, will read from environment variables only. - - Returns: - LLMConfig: Configuration object - - Raises: - FileNotFoundError: If default llm.env file doesn't exist (when env_path is None) - ValueError: If required configuration is missing - """ - # Determine env file path - if env_path is None: - config_dir = Path(__file__).parent - env_path = config_dir / "llm.env" - # Only raise error for default path - if not env_path.exists(): - raise FileNotFoundError(f"LLM configuration file not found: {env_path}") - - # Load environment variables from llm.env if file exists - if env_path.exists(): - load_dotenv(dotenv_path=env_path, override=True) - - # Read configuration from environment variables - model = os.getenv("LLM_MODEL", "").strip() - endpoint = os.getenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "").strip() or None - api_key = os.getenv("LLM_API_KEY", "").strip() or None - - if not model: - raise ValueError("LLM_MODEL not set in environment") - - # Read generation parameters with defaults - temperature_str = os.getenv("LLM_TEMPERATURE", "").strip() - max_tokens_str = os.getenv("LLM_MAX_TOKENS", "").strip() - timeout_str = os.getenv("LLM_TIMEOUT", "").strip() - retries_str = os.getenv("LLM_MAX_RETRIES", "").strip() - - temperature = float(temperature_str) if temperature_str else DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE - max_tokens = int(max_tokens_str) if max_tokens_str else DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS - timeout = int(timeout_str) if timeout_str else DEFAULT_TIMEOUT - retries = int(retries_str) if retries_str else DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES - - return LLMConfig( - model=model, - endpoint=endpoint, - api_key=api_key, - temperature=temperature, - max_tokens=max_tokens, - timeout=timeout, - retries=retries - ) - - -def is_rits_endpoint(endpoint: str) -> bool: - """Check if endpoint is a RITS endpoint based on hostname.""" - return "rits.fmaas" in endpoint.lower() - - -def create_llm( - model_name: Optional[str] = None, - env_path: Optional[Path] = None, - yaml_path: Optional[Path] = None, - verbose: bool = True -) -> BaseChatModel: - """ - Create and configure a LangChain LLM instance from configuration. - - Supports two configuration methods: - 1. YAML-based: Pass model_name to load from llm_conf.yaml - 2. ENV-based: Pass env_path to load from .env file (legacy) - - If neither is specified, defaults to llm.env in config directory. - - Automatically detects backend type (RITS, litellm, Ollama) and configures accordingly. - - Args: - model_name: Name of model from llm_conf.yaml (e.g., 'claude-haiku', 'gpt-nano') - env_path: Path to llm.env file (optional, for legacy .env-based config) - yaml_path: Path to llm_conf.yaml file (optional, defaults to config dir) - verbose: If True, print initialization messages. If False, suppress output. - - Returns: - BaseChatModel: Configured LangChain LLM instance - - Raises: - ValueError: If required configuration is missing - FileNotFoundError: If configuration file doesn't exist - """ - # Load LLM configuration from YAML - llm_config = load_llm_config_from_yaml(model_name, yaml_path) - - - # Validate required fields for create_llm - if not llm_config.endpoint: - raise ValueError("LLM_ENDPOINT is required to create an LLM instance") - if not llm_config.api_key: - raise ValueError("LLM_API_KEY is required to create an LLM instance") - - if verbose: - print(f"🤖 Initializing LLM") - print(f" Model: {llm_config.model}") - print(f" Endpoint: {llm_config.endpoint}") - print(f" Temperature: {llm_config.temperature}") - print(f" Max Tokens: {llm_config.max_tokens}") - print(f" Timeout: {llm_config.timeout}s") - print(f" Max Retries: {llm_config.retries}") - - # Detect if this is a RITS endpoint - is_rits = is_rits_endpoint(llm_config.endpoint) - - # Create ChatOpenAI instance with appropriate configuration - # Suppress the UserWarning about max_tokens in model_kwargs - with warnings.catch_warnings(): - warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="Parameters .* should be specified explicitly", category=UserWarning) - - if is_rits: - # RITS uses custom header for API key - if verbose: - print(f" Backend: RITS (using RITS_API_KEY header)") - llm = ChatOpenAI( - model=llm_config.model, - temperature=llm_config.temperature, - max_retries=llm_config.retries, - timeout=llm_config.timeout, - api_key=SecretStr("none"), # Not used, RITS uses header - base_url=llm_config.endpoint, - default_headers={'RITS_API_KEY': llm_config.api_key}, - model_kwargs={"max_tokens": llm_config.max_tokens}, - ) - else: - # Standard OpenAI-compatible endpoint (litellm, Ollama, etc.) - if verbose: - backend_type = "Ollama" if "ollama" in llm_config.api_key.lower() else "OpenAI-compatible" - print(f" Backend: {backend_type}") - llm = ChatOpenAI( - model=llm_config.model, - temperature=llm_config.temperature, - max_retries=llm_config.retries, - timeout=llm_config.timeout, - api_key=SecretStr(llm_config.api_key), - base_url=llm_config.endpoint, - model_kwargs={"max_tokens": llm_config.max_tokens}, - ) - - if verbose: - print(f"✅ LLM initialized successfully") - return llm - - -# Note: No global LLM instance created here to avoid "Already borrowed" errors -# Each PolicyBuilder should create its own LLM instance by calling create_llm() -# or by not passing an llm parameter (which will call create_llm() internally) - -# For backward compatibility with code that imports llm directly, -# we create it on demand, but this should be avoided in favor of -# creating fresh instances per PolicyBuilder -llm = None # Will be created on first use - -def get_default_llm() -> BaseChatModel: - """ - Get the default LLM instance, creating it if needed. - Note: For better isolation, prefer creating new instances with create_llm(). - - Returns: - BaseChatModel: Default LLM instance - """ - global llm - if llm is None: - llm = create_llm() - return llm - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 8c3a64503..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -""" -Agent Module - -Contains the LangGraph-based policy builder agent implementation. -""" - -from .graph import PolicyBuilder -from .state import PolicyState - -__all__ = [ - "PolicyBuilder", - "PolicyState", -] - -# Made with Bob \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index ba4fe0d8d..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,431 +0,0 @@ -""" -Policy Builder - Main Module - -This module provides the main PolicyBuilder class that orchestrates the -AI-powered generation of Keycloak access control policies from natural -language descriptions using LangGraph workflows. - -Refactored to follow official LangGraph patterns: -- Separation of graph definition from business logic -- Pure node functions for better testability -- Proper type hints and annotations -- Configuration as a separate concern -- Support for graph visualization - -The PolicyBuilder has been refactored into multiple modules for better -organization and maintainability: -- state.py: State definitions -- config_utils.py: Configuration loading and parsing -- constants.py: Constants -- prompt_builder.py: LLM prompt construction -- parsers.py: Response parsing utilities -- validators.py: Policy validation logic -- cli.py: Command-line interface - -Key Features: - - Natural language to YAML policy conversion - - Automatic role mapping and validation - - Call chain analysis and enforcement - - Retry mechanism with semantic verification -""" - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service -from typing import Optional, Dict -import sys -from dataclasses import dataclass - -from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel - -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule -from full_policy_agent.state import PolicyState -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from single_privilege_agent import SinglePrivilegeMapper -from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure - - -@dataclass -class PolicyBuilderConfig: - """ - Configuration for PolicyBuilder agent. - - Following LangGraph best practices, configuration is separated from - the agent logic for better testability and flexibility. - - Attributes: - llm: LangChain LLM instance - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - llm: BaseChatModel - verbose: bool = True - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - - -# ============================================================================ -# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS (Following LangGraph Best Practices) -# ============================================================================ -# These functions are pure and stateless, making them easier to test and reason about - -def _build_policy( - state: PolicyState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - roles: list[Role], - privileges_map: dict, - verbose: bool - ) -> PolicyState: - """ - Map each privilege to realm roles using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate - results into the parsed_scopes format expected by _build_policy. - - For every privilege across all services, SingleRoleMapper determines which - realm roles should have access. The per-role results are inverted so that - parsed_scopes is a list of {role: realm_role, privileges: [...]}. - - The 'service' key in each privilege dict holds a Service object (not a string) - so that _build_policy can construct a typed Policy directly. - - Args: - state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field - llm: LLM instance for processing - realm_roles: List of available realm roles [{'name': str, 'description': str}] - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - services_by_name: Mapping of service name → Service object - - Returns: - Updated PolicyState with parsed_scopes and explanation - """ - - explanations = [] - # realm_role_name -> list of {"service": Service, "privilege": str} dicts - policy_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] - - for _ , service_info in privileges_map.items(): - for privilege in service_info["scopes"]: - mapper = SinglePrivilegeMapper( - llm=llm, - verbose=verbose, - roles=roles, - privilege=privilege) - - rules, explanation = mapper.generate_policy(description=state['description']) - - explanations.append( - f"**{privilege.name}**: {explanation}" - ) - - policy_rules.extend(rules) - - explanation = "\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "" - policy = policy_rules - - return PolicyState( - description=state["description"], - policy=policy, - messages=[], - errors=[], - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - validation_passed=True, - ) - -def _validate_policy( - state: PolicyState, - realm_roles: list, - privileges_map: dict, - max_retries: int -) -> PolicyState: - """ - Validate the generated Policy model against structural rules. - - Converts the Policy back to a raw dict for validate_policy_structure, - which expects {realm_role: [{"service": str, "privilege": str}]}. - - Args: - state: PolicyState with 'policy' as a Policy instance - llm: LLM instance (reserved for future semantic verification) - realm_roles: List of available realm roles - service_names: List of service names - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts - - Returns: - Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = state.get("policy") - - structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy, - realm_roles, - privileges_map - ) - - if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: - return { - **state, - "errors": structural_errors, - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1 - } - - return { - **state, - "errors": structural_errors, - "validation_passed": len(structural_errors) == 0, - "retry_count": retry_count - } - - -def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: - """ - Determine if validation should retry by going back to build_policy_node. - - This is a conditional edge function for the LangGraph state machine. - - Args: - state: Current PolicyState containing validation results - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed - - Returns: - "build_policy_node" if validation failed and retries remain, - otherwise END to terminate the workflow - """ - validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - errors = state.get("errors", []) - - # If validation failed and we haven't exceeded max retries, retry from start - if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - print(f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count}/{max_retries}). Retrying from build_policy_node...") - if errors: - print(f"\nValidation Errors (from this attempt):") - for i, error in enumerate(errors, 1): - print(f" {i}. {error}") - print() - return "build_policy" - - # Either validation passed or max retries exceeded - return END - - -def create_policy_builder_graph( - config: PolicyBuilderConfig, - roles: list[Role], - privileges_map: dict, -): - """ - Create and compile the policy builder graph. - - Args: - config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance - roles: List of available realm roles - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - - Returns: - Compiled LangGraph workflow - """ - - def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - return _build_policy( - state, config.llm, roles, privileges_map, config.verbose - ) - - def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - return _validate_policy( - state, roles, - privileges_map, config.max_retries - ) - - def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: - return _should_retry_validation(state, config.max_retries) - - # Build the graph - workflow = StateGraph(PolicyState) - - # Add nodes - workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) - workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) - - # Define edges - workflow.set_entry_point("build_policy") - workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "validate_policy") - - # Add conditional edge for retry logic - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_policy", - should_retry_node, - { - "build_policy": "build_policy", - END: END - } - ) - - return workflow.compile() - - -class PolicyBuilder: - """ - AI-powered access control policy builder using LangGraph. - - Refactored to follow official LangGraph patterns: - - Configuration separated from logic - - Graph construction delegated to factory function - - Pure node functions for better testability - - Support for graph visualization - - This class orchestrates a multi-stage workflow to convert natural language - policy descriptions into structured YAML access control policies. - - Workflow Stages: - 1. build_policy: Parse natural language and extract role mappings, and build structured policy from mappings - 2. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) - - Attributes: - config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance - realm_roles: List of available realm role names - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to their available privileges - service_names: List of service names - graph: Compiled LangGraph state machine - """ - - def __init__( - self, - llm: BaseChatModel, - realm: str = "demo", - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - ): - """ - Initialize the policy builder with configuration and LLM. - - Args: - realm: Realm name for fetching configuration data - llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. If not provided, creates a new - LLM instance using create_llm() - verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - - Raises: - yaml.YAMLError: If config file is invalid YAML - """ - # Store realm for later use - self.realm = realm - - # Create configuration object - self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( - llm=llm, - verbose=verbose, - max_retries=max_retries - ) - - config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - subjects = config_api.get_subjects() - all_roles = [r for sublist in [subject.roles for subject in subjects] for r in sublist] - role_map: dict[str,Role] = {} - for r in all_roles: - role_map[r.name] = r - roles = list(role_map.values()) - print (f"Got {len(roles)} roles") - self.roles = [r for r in roles if r.description] - services = config_api.get_services() - print (f"Got {len(services)} services") - self.privileges_map = {} - self.service_names = [] - self.services_by_name: Dict[str, Service] = {} - for service in services: - # service_type is a property of the service, not of individual roles. - # Service.roles contains the privileges/permissions for this service. - if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): - continue - service_name = service.name or service.id - print (f"Service {service_name} added: <{service.description}> <{service.type}>") - described_scopes = [ scope for scope in service.scopes if scope.description - ] - if not described_scopes: - continue - self.privileges_map[service_name] = { - "service_type": service.type, - "scopes": described_scopes, - } - self.service_names.append(service_name) - self.services_by_name[service_name] = service - - self.graph = create_policy_builder_graph( - self.config, - self.roles, - self.privileges_map - ) - - # ======================================================================== - # GRAPH VISUALIZATION AND INSPECTION - # ======================================================================== - - def get_graph(self): - """ - Get the compiled graph for visualization or inspection. - - Following LangGraph patterns, this allows external tools to - visualize or analyze the graph structure. - - Returns: - Compiled LangGraph workflow - """ - return self.graph - - # ======================================================================== - # PUBLIC API METHODS - # ======================================================================== - - def generate_policy(self, description: str): - """ - Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. - - This is the main public API method. It executes the complete workflow. - - Args: - description: Natural language description of the access control policy - - Returns: - Policy model instance with the generated policy and explanation. - - Raises: - ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. - - Example: - >>> policy = builder.generate_policy("Admins have full access") - """ - initial_state: PolicyState = { - "description": description, - "policy": None, - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - errors = final_state.get("errors", []) - if errors: - raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - - self._last_policy_structure: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = final_state["policy"] - - return final_state["policy"] - - -# ============================================================================ -# BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY -# ============================================================================ -# For backward compatibility, keep the main() function here but delegate to CLI -if __name__ == "__main__": - # This file should not be run directly anymore - # Use main.py in the parent directory instead - print("Please use main.py to run the policy builder:") - print(" python main.py ") - sys.exit(1) - - diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index 764a51b37..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -State Definitions for Policy Builder - -This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph -workflow for policy generation. -""" - -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Optional -from operator import add - -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule - -class PolicyState(TypedDict): - """ - State dictionary for the policy building LangGraph workflow. - - Attributes: - description: Original natural language policy description - policy: Fully constructed Policy model - messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) - errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) - retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made - validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded - """ - description: str - policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] - messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation - errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt - retry_count: int - validation_passed: bool # Boolean flag for retry decision, not accumulated - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 89e113e84..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -""" -Role-Based Policy Agent Module - -Contains the LangGraph-based policy builder that iterates over realm roles -and uses SingleRoleMapper to determine which privileges each role should hold. -""" - -from .graph import PolicyBuilder -from .state import PolicyState - -__all__ = [ - "PolicyBuilder", - "PolicyState", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index 222b502b9..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,349 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Role-Based Policy Builder - Main Module - -This module provides the PolicyBuilder class that orchestrates the -AI-powered generation of Keycloak access control policies from natural -language descriptions using LangGraph workflows. - -Unlike full_policy_agent (which iterates over privileges via SinglePrivilegeMapper), -this agent iterates over realm **roles** via SingleRoleMapper and determines which -privileges each role should be granted. - -Workflow Stages: - 1. build_policy: For each role, call SingleRoleMapper to determine its privileges, - then aggregate all Rules into a PolicyObjectModel. - 2. validate_policy: Validate structure (with retry). -""" - -from typing import Optional, Dict -from pathlib import Path -import sys -from dataclasses import dataclass - -from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel - -from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Service -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule -from config import create_llm -from full_policy_agent_roles.state import PolicyState -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from single_role_agent import SingleRoleMapper -from utils.validators import validate_policy_structure - -@dataclass -class PolicyBuilderConfig: - """ - Configuration for PolicyBuilder agent. - - Attributes: - llm: LangChain LLM instance - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - llm: BaseChatModel - verbose: bool = True - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES - - -# ============================================================================ -# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS (Following LangGraph Best Practices) -# ============================================================================ - -def _build_policy( - state: PolicyState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - roles: list[Role], - privileges_map: dict, - verbose: bool, -) -> PolicyState: - """ - Map each realm role to its privileges using SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate - results into a PolicyObjectModel. - - For every role, SingleRoleMapper determines which privileges that role should - hold. The per-role results are collected into a flat list of Rule objects. - - Args: - state: Current PolicyState with 'description' field - llm: LLM instance for processing - roles: List of available realm roles - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - verbose: Whether to print detailed output - - Returns: - Updated PolicyState with policy and explanation - """ - # Flatten all scopes across services into a single list for each role mapper - all_scopes = [] - for _, service_info in privileges_map.items(): - all_scopes.extend(service_info["scopes"]) - - explanations = [] - policy_rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] - - for role in roles: - mapper = SingleRoleMapper( - llm=llm, - verbose=verbose, - role=role, - privileges=all_scopes, - ) - - rules, explanation = mapper.generate_policy(description=state["description"]) - - explanations.append( - f"**{role.name}**: {explanation}" - ) - - policy_rules.extend(rules) - - explanation="\n\n".join(explanations) if explanations else "", - print("TBD: log explanation") - - return { - **state, - "policy": policy_rules, - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), - "validation_passed": True, - } - - -def _validate_policy( - state: PolicyState, - roles: list[Role], - privileges_map: dict, - max_retries: int, -) -> PolicyState: - """ - Validate the generated Policy model against structural rules. - - Args: - state: PolicyState with 'policy' as a PolicyObjectModel instance - roles: List of available realm roles - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts - - Returns: - Updated PolicyState with errors and validation_passed fields - """ - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - policy_rules: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = state.get("policy") - - structural_errors = validate_policy_structure( - policy_rules, - roles, - privileges_map, - ) - - if structural_errors and retry_count < max_retries: - return { - **state, - "errors": structural_errors, - "validation_passed": False, - "retry_count": retry_count + 1, - } - - return { - **state, - "errors": structural_errors, - "validation_passed": len(structural_errors) == 0, - "retry_count": retry_count, - } - - -def _should_retry_validation(state: PolicyState, max_retries: int) -> str: - """ - Determine if validation should retry by going back to build_policy_node. - - This is a conditional edge function for the LangGraph state machine. - - Args: - state: Current PolicyState containing validation results - max_retries: Maximum retry attempts allowed - - Returns: - "build_policy" if validation failed and retries remain, otherwise END - """ - validation_passed = state.get("validation_passed", False) - retry_count = state.get("retry_count", 0) - errors = state.get("errors", []) - - if not validation_passed and retry_count < max_retries: - print( - f"\n⚠️ Validation failed (attempt {retry_count}/{max_retries}). " - "Retrying from build_policy_node..." - ) - if errors: - print("\nValidation Errors (from this attempt):") - for i, error in enumerate(errors, 1): - print(f" {i}. {error}") - print() - return "build_policy" - - return END - - -def create_role_policy_builder_graph( - config: PolicyBuilderConfig, - roles: list[Role], - privileges_map: dict, -): - """ - Create and compile the role-based policy builder graph. - - Args: - config: PolicyBuilderConfig instance - roles: List of available realm roles - privileges_map: Dict mapping service names to privileges - - Returns: - Compiled LangGraph workflow - """ - - def build_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - return _build_policy(state, config.llm, roles, privileges_map, config.verbose) - - def validate_policy_node(state: PolicyState) -> PolicyState: - return _validate_policy(state, roles, privileges_map, config.max_retries) - - def should_retry_node(state: PolicyState) -> str: - return _should_retry_validation(state, config.max_retries) - - workflow = StateGraph(PolicyState) - - workflow.add_node("build_policy", build_policy_node) - workflow.add_node("validate_policy", validate_policy_node) - - workflow.set_entry_point("build_policy") - workflow.add_edge("build_policy", "validate_policy") - - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_policy", - should_retry_node, - { - "build_policy": "build_policy", - END: END, - }, - ) - - return workflow.compile() - - -class PolicyBuilder: - """ - AI-powered role-centric access control policy builder using LangGraph. - - Unlike PolicyBuilder (which iterates over privileges), this builder iterates - over realm roles and uses SingleRoleMapper to determine which privileges each - role should be granted. - - Workflow Stages: - 1. build_policy: For each role invoke SingleRoleMapper, then aggregate Rules - 2. validate_policy: Validate structure and semantics (with retry) - """ - - def __init__( - self, - llm: BaseChatModel, - realm: str = "demo", - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, - ): - """ - Initialize the role-based policy builder. - - Args: - realm: Realm name for fetching configuration data - llm: Optional LangChain LLM instance. Created automatically if not provided. - verbose: If True, print LLM explanations and validation details - max_retries: Maximum validation retry attempts - """ - self.realm = realm - - self.config = PolicyBuilderConfig( - llm=llm, - verbose=verbose, - max_retries=max_retries, - ) - - config_api = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - subjects = config_api.get_subjects() - all_roles = [r for sublist in [subject.roles for subject in subjects] for r in sublist] - role_map: dict[str,Role] = {} - for r in all_roles: - role_map[r.name] = r - roles = list(role_map.values()) - print(f"Got {len(roles)} roles") - self.roles = [r for r in roles if r.description] - - services = config_api.get_services() - print(f"Got {len(services)} services") - self.privileges_map: Dict[str, dict] = {} - self.service_names: list[str] = [] - self.services_by_name: Dict[str, Service] = {} - for service in services: - if not service.description or not ("Demo" in service.description): - continue - service_name = service.name or service.id - print(f"Service {service_name} added: <{service.description}> <{service.type}>") - described_scopes = [scope for scope in service.scopes if scope.description] - if not described_scopes: - continue - self.privileges_map[service_name] = { - "service_type": service.type, - "scopes": described_scopes, - } - self.service_names.append(service_name) - self.services_by_name[service_name] = service - - self.graph = create_role_policy_builder_graph( - self.config, - self.roles, - self.privileges_map, - ) - - def get_graph(self): - """Return the compiled graph for visualization or inspection.""" - return self.graph - - def generate_policy(self, description: str) -> list[PolicyRule]: - """ - Generate an access control policy from a natural language description. - - Args: - description: Natural language description of the access control policy - - Returns: - PolicyObjectModel instance with the generated policy and explanation. - - Raises: - ValueError: If validation fails after all retries. - """ - initial_state: PolicyState = { - "description": description, - "policy": None, - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - errors = final_state.get("errors", []) - if errors: - raise ValueError(f"Policy validation failed: {'; '.join(errors)}") - - self._last_policy_structure: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] = final_state["policy"] - - return final_state["policy"] - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - print("Please use aiac_cli.py to run the role-based policy builder.") - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9bc295b7a..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/full_policy_agent_roles/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -State Definitions for Role-Based Policy Builder - -This module defines the TypedDict state structure used by the LangGraph -workflow for role-centric policy generation. -""" - -from typing import TypedDict, Annotated, List, Optional -from operator import add - -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule - -class PolicyState(TypedDict): - """ - State dictionary for the role-based policy building LangGraph workflow. - - Attributes: - description: Original natural language policy description - policy: Fully constructed Policy model - messages: Accumulated list of LLM messages (for conversation history) - errors: List of validation errors (replaced on each validation attempt) - retry_count: Number of validation retry attempts made - validation_passed: Boolean flag indicating if validation succeeded - """ - description: str - policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]] - messages: Annotated[List, add] # Annotated with 'add' for accumulation - errors: List[str] # NOT accumulated - replaced on each validation attempt - retry_count: int - validation_passed: bool # Boolean flag for retry decision, not accumulated diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py deleted file mode 100644 index b0ac96387..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_prompt_role_builder.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,564 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Single Role Prompt Builder for Scope Mapping - -This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine -which privileges a specific role should have access to. -""" - -from typing import List - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope - -def build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt( - role: Role, - privileges: List[Scope], - policy_description: str = "", -) -> str: - """ - Build a system prompt for mapping a single role to its privileges. - - This function constructs a prompt that guides the LLM through determining - which available privileges a given realm role should be granted, based on - semantic analysis of the role's description and policy context. - - Args: - realm_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the realm role to analyze - privileges: List of dicts with 'name', 'description', and optional 'service' - for all available privileges - policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context - - Returns: - Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption - """ - # Build available privileges list with descriptions - available_privilege_lines = [] - for priv in privileges: - priv_name = priv.name - priv_desc = priv.description if priv.description else '' - label = priv_name - if priv_desc: - available_privilege_lines.append(f" - {label}: {priv_desc}") - else: - available_privilege_lines.append(f" - {label}") - - available_privileges = ( - "\n".join(available_privilege_lines) - if available_privilege_lines - else " (none defined)" - ) - - # Format the realm role information - role_name = role.name - role_desc = role.description if role.description else '' - role_info = role_name - if role_desc: - role_info += f": {role_desc}" - - # Add policy context if provided - policy_context = "" - if policy_description: - policy_context = f""" -POLICY CONTEXT: -The following policy description provides context for this access control decision: - -{policy_description} - -Use this policy context to understand which privileges the role should receive. - -""" - - return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping roles to the privileges they should hold. -{policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: -You are given: -1. A single realm role with its description -2. A list of all available privileges with their descriptions - -Your task is to determine which privileges this realm role should be granted. - -REALM ROLE TO ANALYZE: - {role_info} - -AVAILABLE PRIVILEGES: -{available_privileges} - -ANALYSIS GUIDELINES: - -1. ROLE CLASSIFICATION — DO THIS FIRST: - Classify the realm role being analyzed into one of two types: - - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM - (e.g., "engineering team members", "operations staff", "customer support team"). - These represent human principals. Proceed to privilege analysis. - - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY or SYSTEM ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE - CAPABILITY ("Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X") or is - a system/internal construct (placeholder like "${{}}", starts with "default-roles-", - or is clearly an identity-provider artifact). - If the realm role is NOT a user-facing role → return [] immediately. - -2. POLICY CONTEXT IS THE PRIMARY GUIDE — SEMANTIC MATCHING REQUIRED: - Grant a privilege ONLY when the policy explicitly states this role/user-category - should have access to the capability described by that privilege. - POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. Do not infer access from the role's name alone. - - IMPORTANT EXCEPTION — ENABLING GATEWAYS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO POLICY SILENCE: - The "policy silence = no access" rule does NOT apply to enabling/gateway privileges. - The policy will never explicitly mention an enabling service by name — it only - describes what final resources users can access. If the policy grants this role ANY - access to a downstream resource in a given domain, the enabling gateway for that - domain is IMPLICITLY REQUIRED and must be granted even if the policy never mentions - it. See guideline 3 for the full enabling gateway rule. - - SEMANTIC ROLE-TO-CATEGORY MATCHING: The policy may describe user categories using - broad terms (e.g., "technical personnel", "operational staff", "all users"). - Match these categories against the role's DESCRIPTION, not its name. A role described - as "operations staff assisting external clients" belongs to the policy category - "operational staff" even if those exact words do not appear in the policy. - Always ask: "Does this role's description identify it as a member of any policy user - category?" If yes, apply all access grants for that category to this role. - -3. ENABLING / GATEWAY PRIVILEGES — READ CAREFULLY: - A privilege is an enabling service if its description says "Access to the X connector", - "Provides access to X services", "Gateway to X", "Enables access to X", or similar - phrasing that positions it as a PREREQUISITE to reach a downstream resource. - - CLASSIFICATION — "Provides access to" alone is NOT sufficient. You MUST determine what X - describes to decide whether a privilege is enabling or a final resource: - - ENABLING GATEWAY: X is a SERVICE, AGENT, CONNECTOR, PLATFORM, or GATEWAY — including - when X follows the pattern "[Brand] services", "[Brand] agent", or "[Brand] connector". - Examples: "Provides access to document processing services" → ENABLING (X = service) - "Provides access to Acme services" → ENABLING (X = "Acme services" = brand platform) - "Access to the Acme agent" → ENABLING (X = agent) - - FINAL RESOURCE: X is specific DATA, REPOSITORIES, FILES, or RECORDS, especially with - access-level qualifiers ("private", "public", "restricted", "full", "read-only"). - Examples: "Provides access to public document repositories" → FINAL RESOURCE (X = repos + qualifier) - "Provides access to public Acme repositories" → FINAL RESOURCE (X = repos + "public") - Apply this ENABLING vs. FINAL RESOURCE classification to every privilege before - deciding how to handle it. Do NOT treat final-resource privileges as enabling gateways. - - DOMAIN IDENTIFICATION (required for Step 3 matching): - Extract the PRIMARY BRAND/PRODUCT NAME from each privilege description. Two privileges - are in the same domain when they share the same primary brand/product name, regardless - of whether one says "services" and the other says "repositories", "records", or "data": - • "Provides access to Acme services" → primary brand: "Acme" - • "Provides access to public Acme repositories" → primary brand: "Acme" - → Both are in the "Acme" domain. The enabling gateway covers the same domain as - the final resource — the enabling gateway MUST be included whenever the final - resource is granted. - - DOMAIN REQUIREMENT: An enabling privilege only applies when the policy covers the same - domain (e.g., "data warehouse connector" is enabling only for a data warehouse policy). - - GOAL-BASED PRINCIPLE: Ask "What is this role trying to accomplish?" If their access - goal includes reaching a downstream resource that can only be accessed through an - enabling service, they MUST receive the enabling privilege — without it, they cannot - fulfill their access goal at all. - - RULE: If the policy grants this realm role ANY level of access to a downstream resource, - the realm role MUST also receive the enabling privilege for that resource. - Access level does NOT matter — even read-only access requires the enabling gateway. - - AGENT SEMANTICS — ENABLING DOES NOT EQUAL FINAL RESOURCE ACCESS: - An enabling privilege grants access to the AGENT, CONNECTOR, or GATEWAY ITSELF — not to - the underlying final resource directly. The final resource independently enforces its own - access controls, checking the user's permissions AFTER they reach it through the agent. - Granting an enabling privilege to a role with limited downstream access (e.g., public-only, - read-only) is CORRECT. The final resource's restrictions (private vs. public, full vs. - read-only) are enforced by the final resource, not by the enabling gateway privilege. - -4. ACCESS LEVEL DIFFERENTIATION (for FINAL resource privileges): - Pay close attention to qualifiers: "private" vs "public", "full access" vs "limited", - "read-only" vs "read-write". - Only grant a final-resource privilege if the policy explicitly gives this role the - matching level of access (e.g., do not grant "full data access" to a role with - read-only access). - NOTE: Final-resource privileges (e.g., "Provides access to public repositories") - ARE valid user-facing access grants and MUST be included when the policy grants access - at the matching level. Do NOT exclude them because their description says "Provides access to X". - -5. PRIVILEGE VALIDITY — SKIP SYSTEM SCOPES: - Some privileges are identity-provider infrastructure privileges, NOT service access grants. - Skip any privilege that: - - Has a name starting with "default-roles-" - - Has a description like "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" - - Is clearly an infrastructure artifact (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) - - Describes token-structure modification: "add X to the access token", "adds X claims" - - Describes enabling a client authentication mechanism: "privilege/scope for a client enabled for..." - Never include such privileges in the result. - -6. WHAT TO INCLUDE AND EXCLUDE: - - INCLUDE: ENABLING gateway privileges (guideline 3) when the gateway is required. - - INCLUDE: FINAL RESOURCE privileges (guideline 4) when the policy explicitly grants access - at the matching level. "Provides access to public X repositories" is a final-resource - privilege — it IS a valid user-facing grant, NOT a technical exclusion. - - EXCLUDE: System/internal privileges (guideline 5). - - EXCLUDE: Privileges in unrelated domains (guideline 2 — policy silence = no access). - IMPORTANT: Do NOT blanket-exclude privileges because their description says - "Provides access to X" or "Access to X". Use the ENABLING vs. FINAL RESOURCE - classification from guideline 3 to decide, then apply guidelines 3 or 4 accordingly. - -7. EXACT NAMES ONLY: - Use only the exact privilege identifiers as they appear in the "Available Privileges" - list (including the "service/privilege" format where shown). Do not modify or invent names. - -8. PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE: - When in doubt, do NOT grant access. Only grant what the policy explicitly requires. - -TASK STEPS: -0. ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: - Classify the realm role (step 1 above). If it is NOT a user-facing role → output empty - list and stop. Output the required fenced blocks with [] then stop. - - Required output when role is non-user-facing: - ```explanation - Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: [reason this is not a user-facing role]. Returning [] immediately. - ``` - ```json - {{"role": "{role_name}", "granted_privileges": []}} - ``` - -1. IDENTIFY POLICY GRANTS for this role: - Use the role's DESCRIPTION (not its name) to determine which policy user category - this role belongs to. Semantic match is required — "field operations staff" belongs - to the "operational staff" category; "operations staff assisting customers" belongs - to "other operational staff" / "other personnel". List every capability the policy - grants to that category. - -2. FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES ONLY: - Scan the available privileges for FINAL RESOURCE privileges (guideline 3: X is data, - repositories, files, or records with an access-level qualifier). - For each one: skip system privileges (guideline 5); check whether the policy grants - this role the matching access level in that domain; if yes, include it. - Do NOT consider enabling/gateway privileges in this pass. - -3. SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS (mandatory): - For each final-resource privilege included in step 2: - a. Extract its PRIMARY DOMAIN: the brand/product/service name in its description - (e.g., "Acme" from "Provides access to public Acme repositories"). - b. Find EVERY enabling/gateway privilege in the available list whose description - contains the SAME primary brand/product/service name. - Matching rule: shared brand name = same domain, even if one says "services" and - the other says "repositories" or "records". - Example: "Provides access to Acme services" → brand "Acme" → MATCHES - "Provides access to public Acme repositories" → brand "Acme". - c. Add ALL matched enabling privileges to the granted list — even if the policy never - mentions the enabling service by name. The policy only describes final resources; - the enabling gateway is implicitly required whenever any downstream access is granted. - REMINDER: "policy silence" does NOT apply here — see guideline 2 EXCEPTION. - -4. COMPILE the combined result from steps 2 and 3. Exclude any system/internal - privileges (guideline 5) and privileges from unrelated domains. - -5. VERIFY: Confirm every enabling gateway from step 3 is present. If any is missing, - add it now. This is a hard requirement — a mapping with a final-resource privilege - but without its enabling gateway is always incomplete. - -6. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the policy evidence and mapping logic. - -7. OUTPUT JSON. - -Return in this format: -```explanation -[Your brief explanation: why each privilege was or was not granted] -``` - -```json -{{ - "role": "{role_name}", - "granted_privileges": [ - "exact-privilege-name-1", - "exact-privilege-name-2" - ] -}} -``` - -EXAMPLE OUTPUTS: - -Example A — user-facing role, two-pass analysis: -Available privileges: - - "warehouse-connector": Access to the data warehouse connector - - "warehouse-full-access": Access to full data warehouse records - - "warehouse-read-only": Access to read-only data warehouse records - - "analytics-dashboard": Access to the analytics dashboard UI -Policy: "Group A team members have full data warehouse access." -```explanation -Step 0: "role-a" describes Group A team members — user-facing, proceed. -Step 1: "role-a" description matches policy category "Group A". Policy grants full data - warehouse access. -Step 2 FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES: - - "warehouse-full-access": FINAL RESOURCE (full data warehouse records). Policy grants - Group A full access → include. - - "warehouse-read-only": FINAL RESOURCE (read-only). Policy grants full, not read-only - → skip (least privilege). - - "analytics-dashboard": different domain (UI) — policy silent → skip. - - "warehouse-connector": ENABLING GATEWAY — skip this pass, handled in step 3. -Step 3 SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS: - - From step 2, "warehouse-full-access" is in the data warehouse domain. - - "warehouse-connector" is an enabling gateway for data warehouse domain → ADD. - (Policy never names this service, but it is implicitly required — policy silence - exception applies.) -Step 4: Combined result: ["warehouse-connector", "warehouse-full-access"]. -``` -```json -{{"role": "role-a", "granted_privileges": ["warehouse-connector", "warehouse-full-access"]}} -``` - -Example B — technical/capability role, returns empty: -```explanation -Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: The realm role "svc-connector" has description -"Provides access to document storage services" — this is a technical/capability role, -not a human principal or team. Returning [] immediately. -``` -```json -{{"role": "svc-connector", "granted_privileges": []}} -``` - -Example C — user-facing role with limited access, two-pass: -Available privileges: - - "storage-connector": Access to the document storage connector - - "storage-read": Access to read-only document storage files - - "storage-write": Access to read-write document storage files -Policy: "Group B team members have read-only access to document storage." -```explanation -Step 0: "role-b" describes Group B team members — user-facing, proceed. -Step 1: "role-b" description matches policy category "Group B". Policy grants read-only - document storage access. -Step 2 FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES: - - "storage-read": FINAL RESOURCE (read-only files). Policy grants Group B read-only - access → include. - - "storage-write": FINAL RESOURCE (read-write). Policy gives read-only only → skip. - - "storage-connector": ENABLING GATEWAY — skip this pass, handled in step 3. -Step 3 SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS: - - From step 2, "storage-read" is in the document storage domain. - - "storage-connector" is an enabling gateway for document storage domain → ADD. - (Policy silence on the connector is not a blocker — exception applies.) -Step 4: Combined result: ["storage-connector", "storage-read"]. -``` -```json -{{"role": "role-b", "granted_privileges": ["storage-connector", "storage-read"]}} -``` - -Example D — semantic matching + two-pass with limited downstream access: -Available privileges: - - "svc-agent": Provides access to data processing services - - "svc-public-access": Provides access to public data records - - "svc-full-access": Provides access to private data records -Policy: "Primary team members can access both public and private data records. - Other operational staff can access public data records only." -Role being analyzed: "ops-team": Operations staff assisting external clients -```explanation -Step 0: "ops-team" describes operations staff — user-facing, proceed. -Step 1: "Operations staff assisting external clients" → semantic match to policy category - "other operational staff" (exact wording differs — semantic match accepted). - Policy grants this role access to public data records only. -Step 2 FIRST PASS — FINAL RESOURCES: - - "svc-public-access": FINAL RESOURCE (public data records). Policy grants this role - public access → include. - - "svc-full-access": FINAL RESOURCE (private data records). Policy gives this role - public-only → skip. - - "svc-agent": ENABLING GATEWAY — skip this pass, handled in step 3. -Step 3 SECOND PASS — ENABLING GATEWAYS: - - From step 2, "svc-public-access" ("public data records") → primary domain: "data". - - Scan enabling gateways: "svc-agent" ("data processing services") → primary domain: - "data" → SAME domain as "svc-public-access" → ADD. - Policy never mentions the enabling service — but policy silence exception applies: - the enabling gateway is implicitly required because this role has downstream access. -Step 4: Combined result: ["svc-agent", "svc-public-access"]. -``` -```json -{{"role": "ops-team", "granted_privileges": ["svc-agent", "svc-public-access"]}} -``` - -Example E — system/internal realm role, returns empty: -```explanation -Step 0 ROLE VALIDITY CHECK: The realm role "default-roles-demo" starts with -"default-roles-", marking it as an identity-provider system construct, not a user-facing -role. Returning [] immediately. -``` -```json -{{"role": "default-roles-demo", "granted_privileges": []}} -``` -""" - - -def build_single_role_to_privileges_verification_prompt( - policy_description: str, - role: Role, - privileges: List[Scope], - granted_privileges: List[Scope] -) -> str: - """ - Build a prompt to semantically verify a single role-to-privileges mapping. - - Args: - policy_description: Natural language policy description - realm_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the realm role - privileges: List of dicts with 'name', 'description', optional 'service' - for all available privileges - granted_privileges: List of privilege names currently assigned to this role - - Returns: - Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption - """ - role_name = role.name - role_desc = role.description if role.description else '' - role_info = role_name + (f": {role_desc}" if role_desc else "") - - privileges_context = "\n".join( - " - " + p.name - + (f": {p.description}" if p.description else "") - for p in privileges - ) - - assigned = ", ".join([p.name for p in granted_privileges]) if granted_privileges else "(none)" - - return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following role-to-privileges mapping is correct. - -POLICY DESCRIPTION: -{policy_description} - -REALM ROLE BEING ANALYZED: - {role_info} - -CURRENT MAPPING (privileges granted to this role): - {assigned} - -AVAILABLE PRIVILEGES: -{privileges_context} - -VALIDATION TASK: -Verify whether the granted privileges are correct for realm role '{role_name}', -given the policy description AND the role's own name and description. - -CRITICAL RULES — read carefully before evaluating: - -0. ROLE TYPE CHECK (evaluated FIRST, overrides all other rules): - If the realm role is NOT a user-facing role (it describes a service capability, is - a system/internal construct, or its name starts with "default-roles-"), the ONLY - correct mapping is an empty list []. If the current mapping is non-empty, respond - MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and cite this rule. Do NOT evaluate against any other rules. - -1. DOMAIN CHECK: For each granted privilege, verify the policy explicitly covers that - privilege's domain for this realm role. If the policy is silent on a privilege's - domain, an empty grant for that privilege is acceptable. - SEMANTIC ROLE-TO-CATEGORY MATCHING: Use the role's DESCRIPTION to determine which - policy user category it belongs to — do not require an exact name match. A role - described as "field operations staff" belongs to the "operational staff" category. - Always ask: "Does this role's description identify it as a member of any policy user - category?" and apply the access grants for that category. - -2. DO NOT RE-DERIVE THE FULL MAPPING: Only flag the mapping as wrong if you can point to - a specific privilege description + policy statement that directly contradicts what - was assigned. - EXCEPTION — ENABLING GATEWAY COMPLETENESS (see rule 4a): A missing enabling gateway - privilege IS a direct contradiction. Perform the rule 4a check independently of this - rule — a missing enabling gateway must be flagged even if everything assigned is correct. - -3. EMPTY IS VALID BY DEFAULT: An empty assignment [] is acceptable unless the privilege - description explicitly requires this role AND the policy confirms it. - -4. ENABLING SERVICE CHECK — AGENT SEMANTICS (mandatory check — do this before concluding YES): - CLASSIFICATION (do this FIRST): "Provides access to" alone does NOT determine whether - a privilege is enabling or a final resource. You MUST check what X describes: - - ENABLING GATEWAY: X is a SERVICE, AGENT, CONNECTOR, or PLATFORM (the prerequisite - "door" users pass through to reach the downstream resource). - - FINAL RESOURCE: X is DATA, REPOSITORIES, FILES, or RECORDS with an access-level - qualifier ("public", "private", "full", "read-only", etc.). - Apply the correct rule based on this classification. - - For ENABLING/GATEWAY privileges: - a. MANDATORY: For each final-resource privilege in the current mapping, identify its - domain and check whether there is an enabling/gateway privilege for the same domain - in the available list. If that enabling privilege is NOT in the current mapping, - respond MAPPING_CORRECT: NO. This check is mandatory and independent of rule 2 — - a missing enabling gateway is always incorrect regardless of whether the rest of the - mapping is consistent. - b. NEVER flag the inclusion of an enabling privilege — for any reason. An enabling - privilege does NOT require a separate explicit policy statement to justify it; its - justification comes entirely from the policy granting ANY downstream access in the - same domain. - - FORBIDDEN arguments (any of the following = your reasoning is wrong): - - "not explicitly justified by the policy" - - "policy only mentions repositories, not services" - - "ambiguous" - - "doesn't clarify access restrictions" - - "could grant unrestricted access to the downstream resource" - - "least privilege requires excluding this because the role has limited access" - - ANY claim that the enabling gateway's lack of an access-level qualifier is a problem - - The enabling privilege grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF ONLY — not to the - final resource. Access-level restrictions (public-only, read-only) are enforced - EXCLUSIVELY by the downstream resource after the user passes through the gateway. - A mapping that contains a final-resource privilege AND its corresponding enabling - gateway is COMPLETE AND CORRECT — no further qualification or clarification is needed. - - c. ORPHANED GATEWAY CHECK: If the current mapping contains an enabling/gateway privilege - but contains NO final-resource privilege from the same domain, AND the policy - explicitly grants this role access to a final resource in that domain, respond - MAPPING_CORRECT: NO. The enabling gateway alone is insufficient — the final-resource - privilege must also be present. - NOTE: this check is strictly one-directional. Rule 4a covers "final resource present - but enabling gateway missing." Rule 4c covers "enabling gateway present but final - resource missing." Do NOT invent other converse or extended interpretations. - -5. LEAST PRIVILEGE CHECK (applies to FINAL RESOURCE privileges ONLY): - Flag any final-resource privilege whose access level exceeds what the policy explicitly - grants (e.g., write access granted when policy says read-only). - STRICTLY FORBIDDEN: Do NOT apply this check to enabling/gateway privileges under any - circumstances. An enabling gateway's lack of an explicit access-level qualifier is NOT - a least-privilege violation — access-level enforcement is solely the downstream resource's - responsibility. See rule 4b above. - -6. USER-FACING PRIVILEGES ONLY: Verify no system/internal privileges (default-roles-*, - token-modification scopes, client-mechanism privileges) appear in the granted list. - -Respond in this EXACT format: -MAPPING_CORRECT: YES -EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. - -OR if incorrect: -MAPPING_CORRECT: NO -EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" - - -def build_single_role_to_privileges_retry_prompt( - role: Role, - privileges: List[Scope], -) -> str: - """ - Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single role analysis. - - Args: - realm_role: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the realm role - privileges: List of dicts with 'name' and optional 'service' for privileges - - Returns: - Formatted retry prompt string with privilege reminders and format example - """ - role_name = role.name - privilege_names = [p.name for p in privileges] - - return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. - -You MUST output BOTH fenced code blocks below — the explanation block AND the json block. -Do NOT skip the json block, even when the list is empty. - -- Role to analyze: {role_name} -- Available privileges: {", ".join(privilege_names) if privilege_names else "(none)"} - -If the realm role is a system/internal or technical/capability role (not a human-principal -role), output an empty list in the json block and stop. - -Return in this format (both blocks are required): -```explanation -[Your brief explanation] -``` - -```json -{{ - "role": "{role_name}", - "granted_privileges": [] -}} -``` - -Replace [] with the actual privilege names that should be granted, or leave it empty if none.""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py deleted file mode 100644 index 5b1352eaa..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/prompts/single_role_prompt_builder.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,587 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Single Role Prompt Builder for Access Mapping - -This module contains functions for building LLM prompts used to determine -which real roles should have access to a specific privilege. -""" - -from typing import List - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope - -def build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt( - privilege: Scope, - roles: List[Role], - policy_description: str = "", -) -> str: - """ - Build a system prompt for mapping a single privilege to realm roles. - - This function constructs a comprehensive prompt that guides the LLM through - the process of determining which realm roles should have access to a specific - privilege based on semantic analysis of role descriptions and policy context. - - Args: - roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege to analyze - policy_description: Optional natural language policy description for context - - Returns: - Formatted system prompt string ready for LLM consumption - """ - # Build available realm roles list with descriptions - available_roles_lines = [] - for role in roles: - role_name = role.name - role_desc = role.description if role.description else '' - if role_desc: - available_roles_lines.append(f" - {role_name}: {role_desc}") - else: - available_roles_lines.append(f" - {role_name}") - - available_roles = ( - "\n".join(available_roles_lines) - if available_roles_lines - else " (none defined)" - ) - - # Format the privilege information - privilege_name = privilege.name - privilege_desc = privilege.description if privilege.description else '' - privilege_info = privilege_name - if privilege_desc: - privilege_info += f": {privilege_desc}" - - # Add policy context if provided - policy_context = "" - if policy_description: - policy_context = f""" -POLICY CONTEXT: -The following policy description provides context for this access control decision: - -{policy_description} - -Use this policy context to understand the access requirements and make informed decisions -about which real roles should have access to the service role. - -""" - - return f"""You are an expert at analyzing access control requirements and mapping privilege capabilities to appropriate user roles. -{policy_context}TASK OVERVIEW: -You are given: -1. A list of all available realm roles with their descriptions -2. A single privilege with its description - -Your task is to determine which realm roles should have access to this privilege. - -AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: -{available_roles} - -PRIVILEGE TO ANALYZE: -{privilege_info} - -ANALYSIS GUIDELINES: -1. IDENTIFY AND MAP ALL USER CATEGORIES (CRITICAL): - - The policy may describe multiple user categories (e.g., "Group A", "Group B") - - Each user category MUST map to at least one realm role - - Use role descriptions to find the best match for each category - - Broad terms (e.g., "all other staff") may map to multiple realm roles - -2. ENABLING / GATEWAY SERVICES - CRITICAL - READ CAREFULLY: - An enabling service is one whose description says it provides access TO another service - or technology. Common phrasings include: "Access to the X connector", "Provides access - to X services", "Gateway to X", "Enables access to X", "Access to the X agent". - Examples: "Access to the data warehouse connector", "Provides access to the storage service", - "Access to the payment gateway", "Access to the data pipeline". - - DOMAIN REQUIREMENT - AN ENABLING SERVICE MUST BE IN THE SAME DOMAIN AS THE POLICY: - - "Access to the data warehouse connector" IS an enabling service for a data warehouse policy (same domain) - - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" is NOT an enabling service for a data warehouse policy (different domain) - - "Access to the payment gateway" is NOT an enabling service for a document storage policy (different domains) - - Even if a role description matches the "access to [service]" pattern, it is only enabling - if the service is directly required to reach the resource the policy is about. - - RULE: ALL user categories that need the downstream resource at ANY access level - MUST be granted this enabling role. - - ACCESS LEVEL DOES NOT MATTER FOR ENABLING SERVICES: - - "read-only access to data files" still requires the data warehouse connector - - "limited access to data" still requires the data pipeline service - - The enabling service is a prerequisite - without it, the user cannot reach the - downstream resource at all, regardless of how limited their access is. - - AGENT SEMANTICS — ENABLING DOES NOT EQUAL FINAL RESOURCE ACCESS: - - The enabling service grants access to the AGENT, CONNECTOR, or GATEWAY ITSELF — - not to the underlying final resource directly. - - The final resource (e.g., a storage service, data warehouse) independently enforces its - own access controls, checking the user's permissions AFTER they reach it through the agent. - - Do NOT assume an enabling privilege grants unrestricted access to the final resource. - Access restrictions on the final resource are enforced by the final resource, not by - the enabling service. - - Example: "svc-agent" grants access to the external service agent tool. The external - service itself still checks whether the user can access restricted vs. open resources. - Granting "svc-agent" to a role with open-only downstream access is CORRECT — the - restricted resource check is enforced by the external service, not by the agent privilege. - - DO NOT confuse enabling services with final resource roles: - - ENABLING: "Access to the data warehouse connector" - needed by everyone with data access - - FINAL: "Access to public data files" - needed only by those with public access - - FINAL: "Access to confidential data records" - needed only by those with full access - - DO NOT exclude user categories based on their realm role name: - - A "role-b" realm role that needs data access still needs the data warehouse connector - - A "role-c" realm role that needs read-only access still needs the enabling service - - The realm role name is irrelevant - only whether the policy grants them ANY access matters - - EXAMPLE: Policy says "Group A gets full data warehouse access; Group B (including - non-technical roles) gets read-only data warehouse access". - - Role "Access to the data warehouse connector": BOTH Group A AND Group B need it - ["role-a", "role-b"] - - Role "Full data access": only Group A - ["role-a"] - - Role "Read-only data access": only Group B - ["role-b"] - -3. ACCESS LEVEL DIFFERENTIATION (only for FINAL resource roles): - - Pay close attention to access-level qualifiers: "private" vs "public", - "full access" vs "limited", "read-only" vs "read-write" - - For a "both X and Y" capability: grant BOTH roles to the relevant categories - - For "only X" capability: grant ONLY the X role - - Access level differentiation applies only when there are multiple roles for the SAME - final resource (e.g., data-full-access vs data-read-only), NOT for enabling services. - -4. PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE AND POLICY SILENCE: - - Grant access ONLY when explicitly required by the policy or role description - - When in doubt, do NOT grant access - - POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS: If the policy description does not mention this service's - domain at all, return []. Do NOT infer access from the user role name or from what - that role type might typically do in their job. - Access is determined solely by what the POLICY TEXT explicitly states. - - Exception: enabling/gateway services are required by all users of the downstream resource. - -5. EXACT NAMES ONLY: - - Use ONLY the exact role names from the "Available Real Roles" list - - Do not modify, abbreviate, or create new role names - -6. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY — FILTER BEFORE ANALYSIS: - The available realm roles list may contain a mix of role types. You MUST classify each role - before using it and ONLY include USER-FACING ROLES in roles_with_access. - - HOW TO CLASSIFY: - - USER-FACING ROLE: The description characterises a GROUP OF PEOPLE or a TEAM - (e.g., "engineering team members", "operations staff", "customer support team"). - These represent human principals who receive access. ONLY these are eligible. - - TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE: The description characterises a SERVICE CAPABILITY — - phrases like "Access to X", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", "Enables X". - These represent service identities or token audiences, NOT human principals. - NEVER include them in roles_with_access. - - SYSTEM/INTERNAL ROLE: The description is a placeholder (e.g., starts with "${{"), - or the role is clearly an infrastructure / identity-provider internal construct. - NEVER include them in roles_with_access. - - NAMING CONFLICT WARNING: A realm role may share the same name or description as the - privilege being analysed. Do NOT assign the privilege to such a role on that basis alone. - Apply the classification above; if the role is a technical/capability or system role, exclude it. - -TASK STEPS: -0. PRE-ANALYSIS CHECKS (two parts — do both before any further analysis): - a. PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: Determine whether the privilege being analyzed is a real - service capability or a system/internal identity-provider construct. - System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient to disqualify): - * Name starts with "default-roles-" (identity-provider default realm composite role) - * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", "internal", or is absent - and the name itself does not describe a service capability - * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure or identity-provider artifact rather than - a meaningful access privilege (e.g., offline_access, uma_authorization) - * The privilege's primary function is to MODIFY TOKEN STRUCTURE or ENABLE A CLIENT - AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM rather than to grant access to a downstream resource. - Indicators of this pattern: - - Description says "add X to the access token" or "adds X to the token" - (the privilege is modifying what goes into a token, not granting resource access) - - Description says "scope/privilege for a client enabled for [some mechanism]" - (the privilege enables a client-side authentication mechanism, not resource access) - - Description says "adds claims", "adds X claims to", "authentication context", - "allowed web origins to the access token" - ANY of these indicate an identity-provider infrastructure privilege — NOT a service - capability. Treat them the same as offline_access or uma_authorization. - If ANY indicator applies → you MUST still output the required fenced blocks below - with an empty list, then stop. Do NOT skip the JSON block. Do NOT continue to further steps. - - Required output when any indicator applies: - ```explanation - Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: [reason it is a system/internal privilege]. Returning [] immediately. - ``` - ```json - {{"privilege": "[privilege-name]", "roles_with_access": []}} - ``` - System/internal privileges must never be granted to any realm role. - b. PRE-FILTER REALM ROLES: Scan the full available realm roles list and identify ONLY the - USER-FACING ROLES (those describing human principals / teams). Record this filtered set. - All subsequent steps operate on this filtered set ONLY. - CRITICAL: A role whose description says "Access to X", "Access to the X interface", - "Access to X services", "Provides access to X", "Gateway to X", or similar - service-capability phrases is a TECHNICAL/CAPABILITY ROLE, NOT a human principal, - even if the role name might imply users (e.g., "portal-ui" → description "Access to the - portal UI interface" → TECHNICAL, exclude it). Do NOT include such roles as user-facing. -1. RELEVANCE CHECK: What is the DOMAIN of this privilege (e.g., "data warehouse", "UI dashboards", "payments")? - What is the DOMAIN of the policy subject? If they are DIFFERENT domains, return [] immediately. - Do NOT continue to the next steps. - IMPORTANT: The policy must explicitly mention the privilege's domain. Do NOT reason from - the user role name (e.g., "some roles use UI tools too") — that is forbidden here. - - "Access to the monitoring dashboard UI" — domain: dashboards. Policy about data warehouse — DIFFERENT → [] - - "Access to the data warehouse connector" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - - "Access to confidential data records" — domain: data warehouse. Policy about data warehouse — SAME → continue - - "Access to the demo UI interface" — domain: web UI. Policy about document storage — DIFFERENT → [] - (Even though engineers may use demo UIs in general, the policy says nothing about UI access → []) -2. CLASSIFY this privilege: is it a FINAL resource privilege or an ENABLING/GATEWAY service? - - ENABLING/GATEWAY: description says "access to [some service/agent/pipeline/gateway]", - "provides access to [some service/technology]", "gateway to [...]", or similar phrasing - that positions this role as a PREREQUISITE to reach the downstream resource — - AND the service is in the same domain as the policy - - FINAL RESOURCE: description says "access to [data/repos/files/records]", especially - with an access-level qualifier ("public", "private", "read-only", "full") - NOTE: A privilege named "X-agent" or "X-gateway" with a description like - "Provides access to X services" IS an enabling service, NOT a final resource. - DOMAIN MATCHING — SAME BRAND = SAME DOMAIN: Extract the PRIMARY BRAND/PRODUCT NAME - from this privilege's description and from the policy. "Provides access to [Brand] - services" and "access to [Brand] repositories" share the same primary brand → SAME - domain. Do NOT treat "[Brand] services" and "[Brand] repositories" as different domains. -3. IDENTIFY USER CATEGORIES: List all user categories mentioned in the policy. -4. APPLY RULE: - - ENABLING/GATEWAY: grant to ALL user categories that need the downstream resource - - FINAL RESOURCE: grant only to categories with explicit access to this specific capability -5. MAP TO REALM ROLES: For each included user category, find matching realm role(s) from the - USER-FACING ROLES identified in step 0. Do NOT use technical/capability or system roles. -6. VERIFY: Every included user category maps to at least one user-facing realm role, and no - technical/capability or system roles appear in the result. -7. EXPLAIN: Brief explanation citing the domain check, classification, policy evidence, and mapping. -8. OUTPUT JSON: List of realm role names that should have access. - -Return in this format: -```explanation -[Your brief explanation: why relevant or not, which user categories -need access, how they map to realm roles] -``` - -```json -{{ - "privilege": "{privilege_name}", - "roles_with_access": [ - "exact-realm-role-name-1", - "exact-realm-role-name-2" - ] -}} -``` - -EXAMPLE OUTPUTS: - -Example A — domain mismatch, not relevant to policy subject: -```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "monitoring dashboard UI". Policy domain is -"data warehouse access". These are DIFFERENT domains — dashboard UI is unrelated to data -warehouse access. Returning [] immediately without further analysis. -Note: Even if engineers or analysts typically use dashboard UIs, the policy is silent -about UI access. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "monitoring-dashboard", "roles_with_access": []}} -``` - -Example A2 — domain mismatch: UI privilege, document storage policy: -```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "analytics dashboard UI". Policy domain is -"document storage access". These are DIFFERENT domains. The policy mentions only document -storage; it says nothing about any UI or dashboard. POLICY SILENCE = NO ACCESS. -Returning [] immediately. (The fact that certain roles may use dashboards in general is -irrelevant — access is determined by the policy text, not by job function assumptions.) -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "analytics-dashboard", "roles_with_access": []}} -``` - -Example B — enabling/gateway service (ALL users who need the downstream resource): -```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "data warehouse connector". Policy domain is -"data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. -Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Access to the data warehouse connector" is a prerequisite -service, not a final resource. Policy identifies two user categories: Group A (full access) -and Group B (read-only). Both need ANY level of data warehouse access, so both need this -enabling service. Access level does NOT matter for enabling services. -Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "warehouse-connector", "roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} -``` - -Example C — restricted privilege, limited access: -```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "confidential data records". Policy domain is -"data warehouse access". SAME domain — continue. -Step 2 CLASSIFY: FINAL RESOURCE — provides access to restricted data records. -Policy states Group A can access both restricted and public data; Group B can access -public data only. Only Group A has explicit access to restricted data. -Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "restricted-data-access", "roles_with_access": ["role-a"]}} -``` - -Example D — enabling/gateway service using "Provides access to" phrasing: -```explanation -Step 1 RELEVANCE CHECK: privilege domain is "document storage services". Policy domain is -"document storage access". SAME domain — continue. -Step 2 CLASSIFY: ENABLING SERVICE — "Provides access to document storage services" positions -this as a prerequisite gateway; without it, no user can reach document storage at all. -Policy identifies two user categories: Group A (→ role-a) gets full access; Group B -(→ role-b) gets read-only access. Both need ANY level of document storage access, -so BOTH need this enabling service. Access level does NOT matter for enabling services. -Realm role mapping: role-a → Group A, role-b → Group B. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "storage-agent", "roles_with_access": ["role-a", "role-b"]}} -``` - -Example E — system/internal privilege (starts with "default-roles-"): -```explanation -Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "default-roles-demo" starts with -"default-roles-", which marks it as an identity-provider default realm composite role — -a system/internal construct, not a user-facing service capability. -Returning [] immediately. No further analysis is performed. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "default-roles-demo", "roles_with_access": []}} -``` - -Example F — token-modifying scope (adds origins/claims to the token, not a service capability): -```explanation -Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "web-origins" has description -"add allowed web origins to the access token". Its primary function is to modify -token structure — it adds data to the token rather than granting access to any -downstream resource or service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure privilege. -Returning [] immediately. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "web-origins", "roles_with_access": []}} -``` - -Example G — client-mechanism privilege (enables an authentication mechanism, not resource access): -```explanation -Step 0a PRIVILEGE VALIDITY CHECK: The privilege "service_account" has description -"Specific privilege for a client enabled for service accounts". Its function is to enable -a client authentication mechanism, not to grant access to a downstream resource or -service. This is an identity-provider infrastructure privilege. Returning [] immediately. -``` -```json -{{"privilege": "service_account", "roles_with_access": []}} -``` -""" - - -def build_single_privilege_to_roles_verification_prompt( - policy_description: str, - privilege: Scope, - roles: List[Role], - roles_with_access: List[Role], -) -> str: - """ - Build a prompt to semantically verify a single privilege mapping. - - Args: - policy_description: Natural language policy description - privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' of the privilege - roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for all realm roles - roles_with_access: List of realm role names currently assigned - - Returns: - Formatted verification prompt string ready for LLM consumption - """ - privilege_name = privilege.name - privilege_desc = privilege.description if privilege.description else '' - privilege_info = privilege_name + (f": {privilege_desc}" if privilege_desc else "") - - role_context = "\n".join( - f" - {r.name}" + (f": {r.description if r.description else ''}" if r.description else "") - for r in roles - ) - - assigned_roles = ", ".join([role.name for role in roles_with_access]) if roles_with_access else "(none)" - - return f"""You are a policy validator. Verify that the following privilege mapping is correct. - -POLICY DESCRIPTION: -{policy_description} - -PRIVILEGE BEING ANALYZED: - {privilege_info} - -CURRENT MAPPING (realm roles that have access to this privilege): - {assigned_roles} - -AVAILABLE REALM ROLES: -{role_context} - -VALIDATION TASK: -Verify whether the assigned realm roles are correct for privilege '{privilege_name}', \ -given the policy description AND the privilege's own name and description. - -CRITICAL RULES — read carefully before evaluating: - -0. PRIVILEGE SYSTEM-ROLE CHECK (evaluated FIRST, overrides all other rules): - Determine whether the privilege is a system/internal identity-provider construct. - System/internal privilege indicators (ANY one is sufficient): - * Name starts with "default-roles-" (identity-provider default realm composite role) - * Description says "Default-roles of X realm", "system role", or "internal" - * The privilege is clearly an infrastructure artifact, not a service access privilege - * Description says "add X to the access token", "adds X to the token", - "adds X claims", or "add allowed ... to the access token" — the privilege modifies - token structure rather than granting resource access - * Description says "scope/privilege for a client enabled for [mechanism]" — the privilege - enables a client authentication mechanism, not resource access - If ANY indicator applies: - - The ONLY correct mapping is an empty list []. - - If the current mapping is non-empty, respond MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and cite this rule. - - Do NOT evaluate the mapping against any other rules. - -1. DOMAIN CHECK FIRST: Determine the domain of this privilege from its name and description - (e.g., "document storage", "data warehouse", "UI dashboard"). - If the policy description does NOT explicitly address this privilege's domain, the mapping - cannot be evaluated against the policy — accept any assignment including empty and return - MAPPING_CORRECT: YES. - -2. DO NOT RE-DERIVE THE FULL MAPPING: You are verifying an existing mapping, not computing - a new one. Only flag the mapping as wrong if you can point to a specific privilege - description + policy statement that directly contradicts what was assigned. - -3. EMPTY IS VALID BY DEFAULT: An empty assignment [] is acceptable unless the privilege - description explicitly requires certain realm roles AND the policy confirms those users - need access to this specific privilege. - -4. FOCUS ON THIS PRIVILEGE ONLY: Do not reason about what roles are required by the policy - in general. Only ask: "Is the mapping for THIS specific privilege consistent with its - description and the policy?" - CROSS-PRIVILEGE REASONING IS FORBIDDEN: Never flag the mapping as incorrect because - an assigned role is also missing OTHER privileges. Whether a role should additionally - receive OTHER privileges from OTHER mappings is entirely out of scope here. The sole - question is: for each role listed in the current mapping, is it correct that they have - THIS specific privilege? If a role is entitled to BOTH a limited-access and a full-access - privilege, assigning the limited-access privilege to that role is CORRECT — the missing - full-access privilege is handled by a separate mapping and must not affect this verdict. - -5. ENABLING/GATEWAY PRIVILEGE — AGENT SEMANTICS (applies before access-level checks): - CLASSIFICATION DISTINCTION — "Provides access to" alone is NOT sufficient to classify - a privilege as enabling. You MUST determine what X describes: - - ENABLING: X is a SERVICE, AGENT, CONNECTOR, PLATFORM, or GATEWAY — the prerequisite - "door" that users must pass through to reach the downstream resource. - Examples: "access to [domain] services", "[domain] connector", "[domain] gateway" - - FINAL RESOURCE: X is specific DATA, FILES, RECORDS, or REPOSITORIES, especially with - access-level qualifiers ("private", "public", "confidential", "read-only", "full"). - Examples: "access to private [resource type]", "access to public [resource type]" - - If the privilege is a FINAL RESOURCE, do NOT apply enabling-service logic. Instead, - apply access-level differentiation: only roles explicitly granted access to this specific - resource type (per the policy) need it. - - If this privilege IS an enabling/gateway service (X describes a service/agent/connector): - - The assignment grants access to the AGENT/GATEWAY ITSELF — NOT to the final resource. - - The final resource (e.g., a storage service, data warehouse) independently enforces - its own access controls, checking the user's permissions after they reach it through the agent. - - Do NOT flag the assignment as incorrect by reasoning that it would "grant access" to - restricted downstream capabilities (e.g., private repositories, confidential records). - - The ONLY valid check for an enabling privilege is: does each assigned role need ANY - level of access to the downstream resource (per the policy)? - - DOWNSTREAM RESOURCE IDENTIFICATION — BRAND/PRODUCT DOMAIN MATCHING: - The "downstream resource" is identified by the PRIMARY BRAND/PRODUCT NAME in the - enabling privilege's description. Two items are in the same domain when they share the - same primary brand/product name, regardless of whether one mentions "services" and the - other mentions "repositories", "records", "data", or "files": - * "Provides access to [Brand] services" → primary brand: "[Brand]" - * "Provides access to public [Brand] repositories" → primary brand: "[Brand]" - * "Access to the [Brand] agent" → primary brand: "[Brand]" - These all belong to the "[Brand]" domain. Therefore: if the policy grants a role ANY - access to a "[Brand]" resource (e.g., "[Brand] repositories", "[Brand] records"), that - role DOES need access to the "[Brand] services" enabling gateway — even if the policy - only mentions "[Brand] repositories" and never names the enabling service. - FORBIDDEN: Do NOT treat "[Brand] services" and "[Brand] repositories" as different - domains. They share the same primary brand name — policy silence about the service name - is NOT a reason to exclude the enabling gateway from the mapping. - - POLICY CATEGORY MATCHING: When checking whether a role needs ANY access, match by - the role's DESCRIPTION against the policy's user categories — do NOT require the - exact role name to appear in the policy text. Broad policy categories are INCLUSIVE: - * Broad categories like "Other personnel" or "Other [group]" cover every role whose - description fits the semantic meaning of that group — not just roles whose exact - name appears in the policy text. - * NEVER say a role lacks authorisation solely because its exact name is absent from - the policy. Use the role's description to determine which policy category it fits. - * Example: policy says "Other personnel can access X". A role whose description - identifies a non-primary staff group IS other personnel → assignment is CORRECT. - * Example: policy says "Other [category] members can access X". A role whose - description identifies it as a member of that category → CORRECT. - - Access-level restrictions (public-only, read-only, limited) are enforced by the - downstream resource, not by the gateway privilege. Do NOT apply least-privilege - reasoning about the final resource when evaluating an enabling service assignment. - - Example: policy says role-b gets open-resource-only access. Assigning - "svc-agent" (enabling service) to role-b is CORRECT — the downstream service enforces - the open-resource restriction. The enabling privilege just allows them to reach the agent. - -6. USER-FACING ROLES ONLY: Verify that every assigned role represents a human principal or - team (e.g., its description characterises a group of people such as "engineering team members"). - If any assigned role is a technical/capability role (description: "Access to X", - "Provides access to X", "Enables X") or a system/internal role (placeholder description - starting with "${{"), mark MAPPING_CORRECT: NO and explain which role is invalid. - -7. CLOSED-WORLD ASSUMPTION — ONLY REASON ABOUT LISTED ROLES: - The AVAILABLE REALM ROLES list is the complete and authoritative set of roles in the - system. Do NOT speculate about roles that might exist but are not listed. Do NOT flag - a mapping as incomplete because unlisted roles might hypothetically belong to a policy - category. If all roles from the available list that match a policy category are - correctly assigned, the mapping is COMPLETE and CORRECT — regardless of what roles - could theoretically exist outside the list. - -Respond in this EXACT format: -MAPPING_CORRECT: YES -EXPLANATION: Brief explanation citing the domain check and why the mapping is consistent. - -OR if incorrect: -MAPPING_CORRECT: NO -EXPLANATION: Specific contradiction between the privilege description, the policy, and the mapping.""" - - -def build_single_privilege_to_roles_retry_prompt( - privilege: Scope, - roles: List[Role] -) -> str: - """ - Build a retry prompt when initial JSON parsing fails for single privilege analysis. - - Args: - roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - privilege: Dict with 'name' and 'description' for the privilege - - Returns: - Formatted retry prompt string with role reminders and format example - """ - role_names = [role.name for role in roles] - privilege_name = privilege.name - - return f"""The previous response could not be parsed as valid JSON. - -You MUST output BOTH fenced code blocks below — the explanation block AND the json block. -Do NOT skip the json block, even when the list is empty. - -- Available real roles: {", ".join(role_names) if role_names else "(none)"} -- Privilege to analyze: {privilege_name} - -If the privilege is a system/internal role (e.g., name starts with "default-roles-"), -output an empty list in the json block and stop. - -Return in this format (both blocks are required): -```explanation -[Your brief explanation] -``` - -```json -{{ - "privilege": "{privilege_name}", - "roles_with_access": [] -}} -``` - -Replace [] with the actual role names that should have access, or leave it empty if none.""" diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9ba8d0806..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/requirements.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -#pre commit -pre-commit - -# Core agent -langgraph>=0.2 -langchain-core>=0.2 -langchain-openai>=1.2 -pydantic>=2 - -# Keycloak integration -python-keycloak==5.3.1 - -# Configuration / IO -PyYAML>=6 -python-dotenv>=1 - -# Tests -pytest>=8 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 61e535156..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -""" -Single Privilege Mapper - -Maps a single privilege to the realm roles that should have access to it. -""" - -from .graph import SinglePrivilegeMapper -from .state import SinglePrivilegeState - -__all__ = [ - "SinglePrivilegeMapper", - "SinglePrivilegeState", -] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index a30b2bb18..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,280 +0,0 @@ -""" -Single Privilege Mapper - -Maps a single privilege to the realm roles that should have access to it. -Uses a LangGraph workflow that analyzes, validates, and semantically verifies -the mapping before returning a PolicyObjectModel. - -Workflow: - 1. analyze_priviledge_roles — LLM determines which roles get access. - 2. validate_priviledge_roles — structural validation with retry. - 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. -""" - -import sys -from typing import Any - -from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END -from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph -from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel - -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, Role, Scope -from .state import SinglePrivilegeState -from base_mapper import ( - BaseSingleMapper, - MapperConfig, - extract_explanation_and_json, - print_explanation, - validate_mapping_items, - verify_semantic_mapping, - should_route_after_structural_validation, - should_retry_after_semantic, -) -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from prompts.single_role_prompt_builder import ( - build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt, - build_single_privilege_to_roles_retry_prompt, - build_single_privilege_to_roles_verification_prompt, -) - - -# ============================================================================ -# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS -# ============================================================================ - -def _analyze_priviledge_roles( - state: SinglePrivilegeState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool, -) -> dict[str, Any]: - """ - Analyze which roles should have access to the privilege. - - First node in the workflow. Sends the privilege, available realm roles, - and policy context to the LLM for semantic analysis. - """ - system_prompt = build_single_privilege_to_roles_system_prompt( - state["privilege"], - state["roles"], - state.get("policy_description", ""), - ) - - user_prompt = ( - f"Analyze which roles should have access to the privilege '{state['privilege'].name}'." - ) - if state.get("policy_description"): - user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" - - prior_errors = state.get("errors", []) - if prior_errors: - user_prompt += ( - "\n\nPREVIOUS ATTEMPT FEEDBACK — your last mapping was rejected. " - "Read the feedback carefully and correct the mapping:\n" - + "\n".join(f" - {e}" for e in prior_errors) - ) - - messages = [ - SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), - HumanMessage(content=user_prompt), - ] - - response = llm.invoke(messages) - content = ( - response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) - ) - explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) - - if not parsed_data: - retry_prompt = build_single_privilege_to_roles_retry_prompt( - state["privilege"], - state["roles"], - ) - retry_messages = [*messages, response, HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt)] - retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) - retry_content = ( - retry_response.content - if isinstance(retry_response.content, str) - else str(retry_response.content) - ) - explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(retry_content) - - if not parsed_data: - raise ValueError( - f"Failed to parse valid JSON from LLM response after retry.\n" - f"Last response: {retry_content[:500]}..." - ) - - roles_with_access = ( - parsed_data.get("roles_with_access", []) if isinstance(parsed_data, dict) else [] - ) - - if roles_with_access: - print_explanation(explanation, verbose=verbose) - - return { - **state, - "explanation": explanation, - "roles_with_access": [r for r in state["roles"] if r.name in roles_with_access], - "messages": [*state.get("messages", []), response], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), - "validation_passed": True, - } - - -# ============================================================================ -# GRAPH CONSTRUCTION -# ============================================================================ - -def create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config: MapperConfig): - """Build and compile the single privilege mapper graph.""" - - def analyze_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return _analyze_priviledge_roles(state, config.llm, config.verbose) - - def validate_role_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return validate_mapping_items( - state, config.verbose, config.max_retries, - items_key="roles_with_access", - reference_key="roles", - item_type_label="role", - ) - - def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return verify_semantic_mapping( - state=state, - llm=config.llm, - verbose=config.verbose, - max_retries=config.max_retries, - subject_name=state["privilege"].name, - verification_prompt=build_single_privilege_to_roles_verification_prompt( - policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), - privilege=state["privilege"], - roles=state["roles"], - roles_with_access=state.get("roles_with_access", []), - ), - mapped_items=state.get("roles_with_access", []), - ) - - def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: - return should_route_after_structural_validation( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=config.max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", - verify_node="verify_semantic_mapping", - ) - - def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SinglePrivilegeState) -> str: - return should_retry_after_semantic( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=config.max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_role_mapping", - ) - - workflow = StateGraph(SinglePrivilegeState) - - workflow.add_node("analyze_role_mapping", analyze_role_mapping_node) - workflow.add_node("validate_role_mapping", validate_role_mapping_node) - workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_mapping", verify_semantic_mapping_node) - - workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_role_mapping") - workflow.add_edge("analyze_role_mapping", "validate_role_mapping") - - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_role_mapping", - should_route_after_structure_node, - { - "analyze_role_mapping": "analyze_role_mapping", - "verify_semantic_mapping": "verify_semantic_mapping", - END: END, - }, - ) - - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "verify_semantic_mapping", - should_retry_after_semantic_node, - { - "analyze_role_mapping": "analyze_role_mapping", - END: END, - }, - ) - - return workflow.compile() - - -# ============================================================================ -# MAIN CLASS -# ============================================================================ - -class SinglePrivilegeMapper(BaseSingleMapper): - """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which roles should have access to a - single privilege. -s - Given a natural language policy description and a privilege, produces a - PolicyObjectModel with the realm-role → privilege mapping for that privilege. - - Workflow: - 1. analyze_role_mapping — LLM determines which roles get access - 2. validate_role_mapping — structural validation with retry - 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment - """ - - def __init__( - self, - privilege: Scope, - roles: list[Role], - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, - ): - self.privilege: Scope = privilege - self.roles: list[Role] = roles - super().__init__(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) - - def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig) -> CompiledStateGraph[SinglePrivilegeState, None, SinglePrivilegeState, SinglePrivilegeState]: - return create_single_privilege_mapper_graph(config) - - def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: - initial_state: SinglePrivilegeState = { - "policy_description": policy_description, - "privilege": self.privilege, - "roles": self.roles, - "explanation": "", - "roles_with_access": [], - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - return { - "policy_description": policy_description, - "privilege": self.privilege, - "roles_with_access": final_state["roles_with_access"], - "explanation": final_state["explanation"], - "errors": final_state["errors"], - "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, - "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), - } - - def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[PolicyRule]: - return [PolicyRule(role=role, scope=self.privilege) for role in result.get("roles_with_access", [])] - - def map_roles(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: - """ - Determine which roles should have access to the privilege. - - Returns a dict with roles_with_access, explanation, errors, success, - and retry_count. - """ - return self._run(policy_description=policy_description) - -if __name__ == "__main__": - print("Use SinglePrivilegeMapper programmatically or via the CLI.") - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index dd13aaeb9..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_privilege_agent/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -State Definitions for Single Privilege Mapper -""" - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState - - -class SinglePrivilegeState(BaseMappingState): - """ - State for the single-privilege role mapping workflow. - - Extends BaseMappingState with privilege-specific fields: - privilege: The privilege to analyze - roles: List of available realm roles - roles_with_access: Realm roles determined to have access to the privilege - """ - privilege: Scope - roles: list[Role] - roles_with_access: list[Role] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9ea747be1..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -""" -Single Role Scope Mapper - -Maps a single realm role to the privileges/scopes it should hold. -""" - -from .graph import SingleRoleMapper -from .state import SingleRoleState - -__all__ = [ - "SingleRoleMapper", - "SingleRoleState", -] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py deleted file mode 100644 index c0a57ac18..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/graph.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,302 +0,0 @@ -""" -Single Role Mapper - -Maps a single realm role to the privileges/scopes it should hold. -Uses a LangGraph workflow that analyzes, validates, and semantically verifies -the mapping before returning a PolicyObjectModel. - -Workflow: - 1. analyze_analyze_privilege_mapping — LLM determines which privileges the role should hold. - 2. validate__analyze_privilege_mapping — structural validation with retry. - 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment against the policy. -""" - -import re -import sys -from typing import Any - -from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END -from langgraph.graph.state import CompiledStateGraph -from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage -from langchain_core.language_models import BaseChatModel - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule -from .state import SingleRoleState -from base_mapper import ( - BaseSingleMapper, - MapperConfig, - extract_explanation_and_json, - print_explanation, - validate_mapping_items, - verify_semantic_mapping, - should_route_after_structural_validation, - should_retry_after_semantic, -) -from config.constants import MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES -from prompts.single_prompt_role_builder import ( - build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt, - build_single_role_to_privileges_retry_prompt, - build_single_role_to_privileges_verification_prompt, -) - - -# ============================================================================ -# PURE NODE FUNCTIONS -# ============================================================================ - -def _analyze_privilege_mapping( - state: SingleRoleState, - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool, -) -> dict[str, Any]: - """ - Analyze which privileges should be granted to the role. - - First node in the workflow. Sends the role, available privileges, - and policy context to the LLM for semantic analysis. - """ - system_prompt = build_single_role_to_privileges_system_prompt( - state["role"], - state["privileges"], - state.get("policy_description", ""), - ) - - user_prompt = ( - f"Analyze which privileges should be granted to role '{state['role'].name}'." - ) - if state.get("policy_description"): - user_prompt += f"\n\nPolicy Context:\n{state['policy_description']}" - - prior_errors = state.get("errors", []) - if prior_errors: - user_prompt += ( - "\n\nPREVIOUS ATTEMPT FEEDBACK — your last mapping was rejected. " - "Read the feedback carefully and correct the mapping:\n" - + "\n".join(f" - {e}" for e in prior_errors) - ) - - messages = [ - SystemMessage(content=system_prompt), - HumanMessage(content=user_prompt), - ] - - response = llm.invoke(messages) - content = ( - response.content if isinstance(response.content, str) else str(response.content) - ) - explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) - - if not parsed_data: - retry_prompt = build_single_role_to_privileges_retry_prompt( - state["role"], - state["privileges"], - ) - retry_messages = [*messages, response, HumanMessage(content=retry_prompt)] - retry_response = llm.invoke(retry_messages) - retry_content = ( - retry_response.content - if isinstance(retry_response.content, str) - else str(retry_response.content) - ) - explanation, parsed_data = extract_explanation_and_json(retry_content) - - if not parsed_data: - raise ValueError( - f"Failed to parse valid JSON from LLM response after retry.\n" - f"Last response: {retry_content[:500]}..." - ) - - granted_privileges = ( - parsed_data.get("granted_privileges", []) if isinstance(parsed_data, dict) else [] - ) - - # The LLM's JSON and chain-of-thought can diverge: scan the explanation for - # "privilege-name": ... → GRANT/ADD/INCLUDE patterns and recover items the JSON dropped. - # Limit each search to the line containing the privilege name to avoid false positives - # where a → ADD marker for a later privilege bleeds into the window of an earlier one. - granted_set = set(granted_privileges) - for priv in state["privileges"]: - if priv.name not in granted_set: - search_str = f'"{priv.name}"' - start = 0 - while True: - idx = explanation.find(search_str, start) - if idx == -1: - break - line_end = explanation.find('\n', idx) - window = explanation[idx: line_end if line_end != -1 else idx + 200] - if re.search(r"→\s*(GRANT|ADD|INCLUDE)", window, re.IGNORECASE): - granted_privileges.append(priv.name) - break - start = idx + 1 - - if granted_privileges: - print_explanation(explanation, verbose=verbose) - - return { - **state, - "explanation": explanation, - "granted_privileges": [p for p in state["privileges"] if p.name in granted_privileges], - "messages": [*state.get("messages", []), response], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": state.get("retry_count", 0), - "validation_passed": True, - } - - -# ============================================================================ -# GRAPH CONSTRUCTION -# ============================================================================ - -def create_single_role_mapper_graph(config: MapperConfig): - """Build and compile the single role mapper graph.""" - - def analyze_privilege_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return _analyze_privilege_mapping(state, config.llm, config.verbose) - - def validate_privilege_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return validate_mapping_items( - state, config.verbose, config.max_retries, - items_key="granted_privileges", - reference_key="privileges", - item_type_label="privilege", - ) - - def verify_semantic_mapping_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> dict[str, Any]: - return verify_semantic_mapping( - state=state, - llm=config.llm, - verbose=config.verbose, - max_retries=config.max_retries, - subject_name=state["role"].name, - verification_prompt=build_single_role_to_privileges_verification_prompt( - policy_description=state.get("policy_description", ""), - role=state["role"], - privileges=state["privileges"], - granted_privileges=state.get("granted_privileges", []), - ), - mapped_items=state.get("granted_privileges", []), - ) - - def should_route_after_structure_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: - return should_route_after_structural_validation( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=config.max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_privilege_mapping", - verify_node="verify_semantic_mapping", - ) - - def should_retry_after_semantic_node(state: SingleRoleState) -> str: - return should_retry_after_semantic( - validation_passed=state.get("validation_passed", False), - retry_count=state.get("retry_count", 0), - max_retries=config.max_retries, - analyze_node="analyze_privilege_mapping", - ) - - workflow = StateGraph(SingleRoleState) - - workflow.add_node("analyze_privilege_mapping", analyze_privilege_mapping_node) - workflow.add_node("validate_privilege_mapping", validate_privilege_mapping_node) - workflow.add_node("verify_semantic_mapping", verify_semantic_mapping_node) - - workflow.set_entry_point("analyze_privilege_mapping") - workflow.add_edge("analyze_privilege_mapping", "validate_privilege_mapping") - - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "validate_privilege_mapping", - should_route_after_structure_node, - { - "analyze_privilege_mapping": "analyze_privilege_mapping", - "verify_semantic_mapping": "verify_semantic_mapping", - END: END, - }, - ) - - workflow.add_conditional_edges( - "verify_semantic_mapping", - should_retry_after_semantic_node, - { - "analyze_privilege_mapping": "analyze_privilege_mapping", - END: END, - }, - ) - - return workflow.compile() - - -# ============================================================================ -# MAIN CLASS -# ============================================================================ - -class SingleRoleMapper(BaseSingleMapper): - """ - AI-powered mapper for determining which privileges a role should hold. - - Given a natural language policy description and a realm role, produces a - PolicyObjectModel with the realm-role → privilege mappings for that role. - - Workflow: - 1. analyze_privilege_mapping — LLM determines which privileges the role gets - 2. validate_privilege_mapping — structural validation with retry - 3. verify_semantic_mapping — LLM cross-checks the assignment - """ - - def __init__( - self, - role: Role, - privileges: list[Scope], - llm: BaseChatModel, - verbose: bool = True, - max_retries: int = MAX_VALIDATION_RETRIES, - ): - self.role: Role = role - self.privileges: list[Scope] = privileges - super().__init__(llm=llm, verbose=verbose, max_retries=max_retries) - - def _create_graph(self, config: MapperConfig) -> CompiledStateGraph: - return create_single_role_mapper_graph(config) - - def _run(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: - initial_state: SingleRoleState = { - "policy_description": policy_description, - "role": self.role, - "privileges": self.privileges, - "explanation": "", - "granted_privileges": [], - "messages": [], - "errors": [], - "retry_count": 0, - "validation_passed": True, - } - - final_state = self.graph.invoke(initial_state) - - return { - "policy_description": policy_description, - "role": self.role, - "granted_privileges": final_state["granted_privileges"], - "explanation": final_state["explanation"], - "errors": final_state["errors"], - "success": len(final_state["errors"]) == 0, - "retry_count": final_state.get("retry_count", 0), - } - - def _build_rules(self, result: dict[str, Any]) -> list[PolicyRule]: - return [PolicyRule(role=self.role, scope=priv) for priv in result.get("granted_privileges", [])] - - def map_privileges(self, policy_description: str) -> dict[str, Any]: - """ - Determine which privileges a role should be granted. - - Returns a dict with granted_privileges, explanation, errors, success, - and retry_count. - """ - return self._run(policy_description=policy_description) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - print("Use SingleRoleMapper programmatically or via the CLI.") - sys.exit(1) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/state.py deleted file mode 100644 index 025b7a4c7..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/single_role_agent/state.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -State Definitions for Single Role Scope Mapper -""" - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope -from base_mapper.state import BaseMappingState - - -class SingleRoleState(BaseMappingState): - """ - State for the single-role to privileges mapping workflow. - - Extends BaseMappingState with role-specific fields: - role: The realm role to analyze - privileges: Available privileges to assign - granted_privileges: Privileges determined to belong to this role - """ - role: Role - privileges: list[Scope] - granted_privileges: list[Scope] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py deleted file mode 100644 index 88d5a7305..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/mappers.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Service - - -class ServiceMaps: - """Maps scope names and role names to the services that contain them.""" - - def __init__(self, realm: str) -> None: - config = Configuration.for_realm(realm) - services = config.get_services() - - self.scope_to_service: dict[str, list[Service]] = {} - self.role_to_service: dict[str, list[Service]] = {} - - for service in services: - for scope in service.scopes: - self.scope_to_service.setdefault(scope.name, []).append(service) - for role in service.roles: - self.role_to_service.setdefault(role.name, []).append(service) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py deleted file mode 100644 index 21db0e9ed..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/parsers.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Parsing Utilities for Policy Builder - -This module contains functions for parsing LLM responses, extracting JSON -and explanations from formatted output. -""" - -import re -import json -from typing import Tuple, List - - -def extract_explanation_and_json(content: str) -> Tuple[str, List]: - """ - Extract explanation and JSON from formatted LLM output. - - This function parses the LLM's response to extract two components: - 1. The explanation text (from code block with ```explanation tag or pre-JSON text) - 2. The JSON data (from code block with ```json tag or plain JSON) - - It handles multiple formats: - - Markdown code blocks with ```explanation and ```json tags - - Plain text explanation followed by ```json block - - Plain text with "explanation" header followed by JSON array - - Plain JSON without code blocks (fallback) - - Args: - content: Raw LLM response content string - - Returns: - Tuple of (explanation_text, parsed_json_list) - Returns empty string and empty list if parsing fails - - Example: - >>> content = '''```explanation - ... Mapping admins to all privileges - ... ``` - ... ```json - ... [{"role": "admin", "privileges": [...]}] - ... ```''' - >>> explanation, data = extract_explanation_and_json(content) - """ - explanation = "" - - # Try to extract explanation from dedicated code block - explanation_match = re.search(r'```explanation\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*```', content) - if explanation_match: - explanation = explanation_match.group(1).strip() - else: - # Fallback 1: Try to extract explanation from text before JSON block - # Look for text before the first JSON code block - json_start = re.search(r'```json', content) - if json_start: - pre_json_text = content[:json_start.start()].strip() - # Remove markdown formatting (bold, italic, etc.) - pre_json_text = re.sub(r'\*\*([^*]+)\*\*', r'\1', pre_json_text) - # Only use if substantial (more than 10 characters) - if pre_json_text and len(pre_json_text) > 10: - explanation = pre_json_text - else: - # Fallback 2: Try to extract explanation from plain text with "explanation" header - # Pattern: "explanation\n- text\n- more text\n[{...}]" - explanation_header_match = re.search(r'^explanation\s*\n([\s\S]*?)(?=\[\s*\{)', content, re.IGNORECASE) - if explanation_header_match: - explanation = explanation_header_match.group(1).strip() - - # Try to extract JSON from markdown code blocks - code_block_patterns = [ - r'```json\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*```', # ```json ... ``` - r'```\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*```', # ``` ... ``` (generic) - ] - - for pattern in code_block_patterns: - match = re.search(pattern, content) - if match: - try: - return explanation, json.loads(match.group(1).strip()) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - # Try next pattern if this one fails - continue - - # Fallback: Try to find JSON array in plain text (after explanation header if present) - # Look for JSON array pattern: [ ... ] - json_array_match = re.search(r'\[\s*\{[\s\S]*\}\s*\]', content) - if json_array_match: - try: - return explanation, json.loads(json_array_match.group(0)) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - pass - - # Final fallback: Try plain JSON without code blocks - try: - return explanation, json.loads(content.strip()) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - # Return empty list if all parsing attempts fail - return explanation, [] - - -def print_explanation(explanation: str, is_retry: bool = False, verbose: bool = True): - """ - Print the LLM explanation in a formatted box. - - This function provides visual feedback to the user about how the LLM - interpreted and mapped the policy description. Only prints if verbose - mode is enabled. - - Args: - explanation: The explanation text to print - is_retry: Whether this is from a retry attempt (adds "(Retry)" label) - verbose: Whether to print the explanation - """ - if explanation and verbose: - print("\n" + "=" * 80) - print(f"LLM Explanation{' (Retry)' if is_retry else ''}:") - print("=" * 80) - print(explanation) - print("=" * 80 + "\n") - -# Made with Bob diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4126a4bd3..000000000 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy/utils/validators.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Validation Logic for Policy Builder - -This module contains functions for validating generated policies, including -structural validation and semantic verification using LLM. -""" - -from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional - -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role -from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule - - -def validate_policy_structure( - _policy: Optional[list[PolicyRule]], - _roles: List[Role], - _privileges_map: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] -) -> List[str]: - """ - Perform structural validation on the policy. - - Checks that all realm roles, services, and privileges exist in the - configuration and that the policy structure is valid. - - Args: - policy: The policy dictionary to validate - realm_roles: List of dicts with 'name' and 'description' for realm roles - service_names: List of valid service names - privileges_map: Dict mapping service IDs to their service info. - - Returns: - List of error messages (empty if validation passed) - """ - structural_errors = [] - - # if not policy: - # structural_errors.append("Policy is empty") - # return structural_errors - - # # Extract realm role names for validation - # role_names = [role.name for role in roles] - - # # Validate that only preset names are used - # for rule in policy.rules: - # # Validate realm role name - # if not rule.role: - # structural_errors.append("Found empty role name") - # elif rule.role.name not in role_names: - # structural_errors.append( - # f"Realm role '{rule.role}' is not in the preset realm roles. " - # f"Available roles: {', '.join(role_names)}" - # ) - - # # Check if realm role has any mappings - # if not rule.scope: - # structural_errors.append( - # f"Realm role '{rule.role}' has no privilege mappings assigned" - # ) - - - # for service in privileges_map.keys(): - # privilege_names = [p.name for p in privileges_map[service]["scopes"]] - # if rule.scope.name not in privilege_names: - # available_privileges = ( - # ', '.join(privilege_names) - # if privilege_names - # else '(none)' - # ) - # structural_errors.append( - # f"Privilege '{rule.scope}' for service '{service}' in realm role '{rule.role}' " - # f"is not valid. Available privileges for {service}: {available_privileges}" - # ) - return structural_errors - - - diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/provision/tmp.txt b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/provision/tmp.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb..000000000 diff --git a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old b/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old deleted file mode 100644 index 74674ac48..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/test_llm_config.py.old +++ /dev/null @@ -1,136 +0,0 @@ -"""Tests for aiac_agent.config.llm_config.load_llm_config (env-only, no network).""" - -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest -from config.llm_config import ( - DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES, - DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS, - DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE, - DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, -) -from config.llm_config import ( - load_llm_config_from_env as load_llm_config, -) - -_LLM_VARS = ( - "LLM_MODEL", - "LLM_ENDPOINT", - "LLM_API_KEY", - "LLM_TEMPERATURE", - "LLM_MAX_TOKENS", - "LLM_TIMEOUT", - "LLM_MAX_RETRIES", -) - - -@pytest.fixture -def clean_llm_env(monkeypatch): - """Strip every LLM_* var so each test starts from a clean slate.""" - for key in _LLM_VARS: - monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False) - return monkeypatch - - -MISSING = Path("/nonexistent/llm.env") # Skip the dotenv branch. - - -def test_loads_required_and_optional_vars(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "https://example/v1") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_API_KEY", "sk-test") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.model == "openai/gpt-4o" - assert cfg.endpoint == "https://example/v1" - assert cfg.api_key == "sk-test" - - -def test_endpoint_and_key_are_optional(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.endpoint is None - assert cfg.api_key is None - - -def test_empty_endpoint_and_key_treated_as_unset(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_API_KEY", "") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.endpoint is None - assert cfg.api_key is None - - -def test_model_is_stripped(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", " anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 ") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_ENDPOINT", "https://example.com") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_API_KEY", "test-key") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.model == "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6" - - -def test_rejects_missing_model(clean_llm_env): - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="LLM_MODEL"): - load_llm_config(MISSING) - - -def test_rejects_blank_model(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", " ") - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="LLM_MODEL"): - load_llm_config(MISSING) - - -def test_default_generation_params(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.temperature == DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE - assert cfg.max_tokens == DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS - assert cfg.timeout == DEFAULT_TIMEOUT - assert cfg.retries == DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES - - -def test_overrides_generation_params_from_env(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TEMPERATURE", "0.7") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_TOKENS", "1024") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TIMEOUT", "60") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_RETRIES", "5") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.temperature == 0.7 - assert cfg.max_tokens == 1024 - assert cfg.timeout == 60 - assert cfg.retries == 5 - - -def test_blank_generation_params_fall_back_to_defaults(clean_llm_env): - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MODEL", "openai/gpt-4o") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TEMPERATURE", "") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_TOKENS", "") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_TIMEOUT", "") - clean_llm_env.setenv("LLM_MAX_RETRIES", "") - - cfg = load_llm_config(MISSING) - assert cfg.temperature == DEFAULT_TEMPERATURE - assert cfg.max_tokens == DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS - assert cfg.timeout == DEFAULT_TIMEOUT - assert cfg.retries == DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES - - -def test_loads_from_dotenv_file(clean_llm_env, tmp_path): - env_file = tmp_path / "llm.env" - env_file.write_text( - "LLM_MODEL=ollama/llama3\n" - "LLM_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:11434\n" - "LLM_TEMPERATURE=0.3\n" - ) - - cfg = load_llm_config(env_file) - assert cfg.model == "ollama/llama3" - assert cfg.endpoint == "http://localhost:11434" - assert cfg.temperature == 0.3 From 0eabfd0c87ca667b36eab24ca5e796dae6e1b240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 20:22:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 244/273] Fix(aiac): Authenticate UC-1 tool MCP discovery with tool-audienced token UC-1 onboarding's `analyze_tool` node calls the tool's MCP `tools/list` endpoint through its AuthBridge sidecar without an Authorization header, returning 401 (surfaced as a 502). The sidecar's jwt-validation plugin always enforces an audience, defaulting to the tool's own Keycloak client-id, so a bare client-credentials token would still be rejected. Mint a tool-audienced discovery token in the IdP config service (which already holds the Keycloak admin, never exposed to the Controller/agent layer): a new /services/{id}/discovery-token endpoint reads the tool client's existing secret, idempotently attaches a self-audience mapper, and mints via client-credentials as the tool's own client. The agent layer reaches it only through the existing Configuration HTTP-client seam (Configuration.mint_discovery_token), and _mcp_tools_list sends it as a Bearer token plus a (5, 30) connect/read timeout that was previously missing. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 37 ++++- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 10 ++ .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 117 +++++++++++++++- .../onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py | 64 ++++++++- .../idp/configuration/test_configuration.py | 23 ++++ .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 128 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py index 7ec730ab7..94a8270dd 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -32,17 +32,34 @@ def _config() -> Configuration: return Configuration.for_default_realm() -def _mcp_tools_list(endpoint: str) -> list[dict]: +def _discovery_token(service_id: str) -> str: + """Mint a tool-audienced discovery bearer token via the idp-library `Configuration` seam + (never Keycloak directly). The config service holds the admin creds and does the minting.""" + return _config().mint_discovery_token(service_id) + + +# (connect, read) timeouts for the MCP discovery probe — an unreachable/hanging tool must not +# block the onboarding request indefinitely (there was previously no timeout). +_MCP_TIMEOUT = (5, 30) + + +def _mcp_tools_list(endpoint: str, token: str | None = None) -> list[dict]: """POST a JSON-RPC `tools/list` to an MCP endpoint and return the tool manifest list. - Each tool is a dict with `name` and (optional) `description`. Bounded transport retries - are applied here so callers just map the final failure to a 502.""" + Each tool is a dict with `name` and (optional) `description`. When `token` is provided it is + sent as an `Authorization: Bearer` header (the tool's MCP endpoint is fronted by an AuthBridge + sidecar that validates inbound JWTs). Bounded transport retries are applied here so callers + just map the final failure to a 502.""" import requests def _do(): + headers = {"Accept": "application/json"} + if token: + headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}" resp = requests.post( endpoint, json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}, - headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, + headers=headers, + timeout=_MCP_TIMEOUT, ) resp.raise_for_status() return (resp.json().get("result") or {}).get("tools", []) @@ -188,8 +205,18 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: port = svc.spec.ports[0].port endpoint = f"http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp" + # The MCP endpoint is fronted by the tool's AuthBridge sidecar, which validates inbound JWTs + # against the tool's own clientId as the audience. Mint a tool-audienced discovery token first; + # a failure here surfaces as an actionable 502 rather than a downstream 401. + try: + token = _discovery_token(state.service_id) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException( + 502, f"discovery token minting failed for service {state.service_id!r}: {e}" + ) + try: - tools = _mcp_tools_list(endpoint) + tools = _mcp_tools_list(endpoint, token=token) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"MCP tools/list failed at {endpoint}: {e}") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index 575c8c42e..efbef0c01 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -140,6 +140,16 @@ def get_service(self, service_id: str) -> Service: resp = self._request("GET", f"/services/{service_id}", params=self._params()) return self._build_service(resp.json(), self._all_roles_map(), self._all_scopes_map()) + def mint_discovery_token(self, service_id: str) -> str: + """Mint a bearer token whose ``aud`` contains the tool's clientId, for authenticating UC-1 + tool discovery against the tool's AuthBridge sidecar. The config service (which holds the + Keycloak admin) does the minting; this returns the raw ``access_token`` string. Raises + ``RuntimeError`` on a non-OK response (via ``_check``).""" + resp = self._request( + "GET", f"/services/{service_id}/discovery-token", params=self._params() + ) + return resp.json()["access_token"] + def get_services_by_role(self, role: Role) -> list[Service]: """Services whose service-account holds ``role`` (client-side filter of get_services).""" return [s for s in self.get_services() if any(r.id == role.id for r in s.roles)] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 4064f54c7..dc27644e3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +import base64 +import json import os import threading from contextlib import asynccontextmanager @@ -6,7 +8,7 @@ from dotenv import load_dotenv from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Query -from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin +from keycloak import KeycloakAdmin, KeycloakOpenID from keycloak.exceptions import KeycloakError from pydantic import BaseModel from starlette.responses import JSONResponse @@ -28,6 +30,18 @@ # is not on this service image's path, so it is redefined locally). _SERVICE_TYPE_ATTRIBUTE = "client.type" +# Name of the idempotent audience protocol-mapper AIAC adds to a tool's Keycloak client so the +# client's own access tokens carry its clientId in ``aud``. UC-1 tool discovery mints such a token +# and presents it to the tool's AuthBridge sidecar, whose jwt-validation plugin expects the tool's +# own clientId as the audience (it defaults ``audience_file`` to ``/shared/client-id.txt``). +_DISCOVERY_AUDIENCE_MAPPER = "aiac-discovery-audience" + +# Optional hard assertion of the public issuer the tool's sidecar validates against. When set, the +# discovery-token endpoint refuses to emit a token whose ``iss`` differs (frontend-URL pinning is a +# Keycloak deployment property, not something we can force here); when unset it only records the +# observed ``iss`` for the caller / rollout gate. +_EXPECTED_ISSUER_ENV = "AIAC_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER" + class _InvariantViolation(Exception): """Raised when Keycloak facts violate an AIAC assumption the IdP boundary must hold @@ -94,6 +108,39 @@ def get_admin(realm: str = Query(...)) -> KeycloakAdmin: return _get_or_create_admin(realm) +def _decode_jwt_payload(token: str) -> dict: + """Decode a JWT's payload segment WITHOUT verifying its signature — AuthBridge verifies the + signature at the tool; here we only read ``iss``/``aud`` to assert the discovery-token invariants.""" + segment = token.split(".")[1] + segment += "=" * (-len(segment) % 4) # restore base64 padding + return json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(segment)) + + +def _ensure_audience_mapper(admin: KeycloakAdmin, service_id: str, client_id: str) -> None: + """Idempotently ensure the tool's client emits its own clientId in the access-token ``aud``. + + A client's client-credentials token does not carry its own clientId in ``aud`` by default, but + AuthBridge's jwt-validation expects exactly that. Add an ``oidc-audience-mapper`` (named + ``_DISCOVERY_AUDIENCE_MAPPER``) once; a second call is a no-op. + """ + mappers = admin.get_mappers_from_client(service_id) + if any(m.get("name") == _DISCOVERY_AUDIENCE_MAPPER for m in mappers): + return + admin.add_mapper_to_client( + service_id, + { + "name": _DISCOVERY_AUDIENCE_MAPPER, + "protocol": "openid-connect", + "protocolMapper": "oidc-audience-mapper", + "config": { + "included.client.audience": client_id, + "access.token.claim": "true", + "id.token.claim": "false", + }, + }, + ) + + @asynccontextmanager async def _lifespan(_app: FastAPI): load_dotenv(Path(__file__).parent / ".env") @@ -117,6 +164,13 @@ class _ServiceTypeUpdate(BaseModel): type: Literal["Agent", "Tool"] +class _DiscoveryToken(BaseModel): + access_token: str + client_id: str # the tool clientId placed in the token's aud + issuer: str # observed iss (for the caller / rollout gate to verify) + audience: list[str] # observed aud, normalized to a list + + @app.get("/subjects") def list_subjects( realm: str = Query(...), @@ -171,6 +225,67 @@ def get_service(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) +@app.get("/services/{service_id}/discovery-token") +def mint_discovery_token( + service_id: str, + realm: str = Query(...), + admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin), +): + """Mint a bearer token for UC-1 tool discovery whose ``aud`` contains the tool's own clientId. + + The tool's MCP endpoint sits behind an AuthBridge sidecar that validates inbound JWTs against + the tool's own clientId as the audience. Mint AS the tool's own client (client-credentials), + ensuring an idempotent self-audience mapper first, and refuse to emit a token the sidecar would + reject — ``aud`` missing the clientId, or (when ``AIAC_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER`` is set) a mismatched + ``iss`` — so discovery fails loud here rather than with an opaque 401 at the tool. + """ + try: + client = admin.get_client(service_id) + client_id = client["clientId"] + secret = client.get("secret") or (admin.get_client_secrets(service_id) or {}).get("value") + if not secret: + return JSONResponse( + status_code=502, + content={ + "error": f"client {client_id!r} has no readable secret (a confidential client " + "with service accounts enabled is required to mint a discovery token)" + }, + ) + _ensure_audience_mapper(admin, service_id, client_id) + + oid = KeycloakOpenID( + server_url=os.environ["KEYCLOAK_URL"], + realm_name=realm, + client_id=client_id, + client_secret_key=secret, + ) + access_token = oid.token(grant_type="client_credentials")["access_token"] + + # Verification gate (Direction A invariant): the token must satisfy the sidecar or we do + # not hand it out. aud MUST contain the tool clientId; iss must match when pinned. + payload = _decode_jwt_payload(access_token) + aud = payload.get("aud") + aud_list = aud if isinstance(aud, list) else [aud] if aud else [] + iss = payload.get("iss", "") + if client_id not in aud_list: + return JSONResponse( + status_code=502, + content={"error": f"minted token aud={aud_list} does not contain {client_id!r}"}, + ) + expected_iss = os.environ.get(_EXPECTED_ISSUER_ENV) + if expected_iss and iss != expected_iss: + return JSONResponse( + status_code=502, + content={"error": f"minted token iss={iss!r} != expected {expected_iss!r}"}, + ) + + return _DiscoveryToken( + access_token=access_token, client_id=client_id, issuer=iss, audience=aud_list + ).model_dump() + except KeycloakError as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + + @app.post("/services/{service_id}/type", status_code=200) def set_service_type( service_id: str, body: _ServiceTypeUpdate, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py index fb871c616..2079afb88 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_tool.py @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ def _run(svc=None, read_exc=None, tools=None, mcp_exc=None): with ( patch.object(kube, "_core_v1") as core_v1, patch.object(nodes, "_mcp_tools_list") as mcp, + patch.object(nodes, "_discovery_token", return_value="disco-tok") as disco, ): core = MagicMock() if read_exc is not None: @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ def _run(svc=None, read_exc=None, tools=None, mcp_exc=None): else: mcp.return_value = tools or [] result = nodes.analyze_tool(_state()) - return result, mcp + return result, mcp, disco class TestAnalyzeToolFound: @@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ def test_scopes_one_per_tool_roles_empty_and_endpoint_built(self): {"name": "create_issue", "description": "Open an issue"}, {"name": "list_repos", "description": "List repos"}, ] - result, mcp = _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), tools=tools) + result, mcp, disco = _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), tools=tools) provision = result["service_provision"] assert provision.roles == [] @@ -66,13 +67,22 @@ def test_scopes_one_per_tool_roles_empty_and_endpoint_built(self): ] assert provision.scopes[0].description == "Open an issue" assert "derived from MCP manifest: 2 tools" == provision.reasoning - mcp.assert_called_once_with(f"http://{WORKLOAD}.{NS}.svc.cluster.local:8080/mcp") + mcp.assert_called_once_with( + f"http://{WORKLOAD}.{NS}.svc.cluster.local:8080/mcp", token="disco-tok" + ) def test_endpoint_uses_services_first_port(self): _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}, port=9000), tools=[])[1].assert_called_once_with( - f"http://{WORKLOAD}.{NS}.svc.cluster.local:9000/mcp" + f"http://{WORKLOAD}.{NS}.svc.cluster.local:9000/mcp", token="disco-tok" ) + def test_authenticated_discovery_uses_minted_token(self): + # The token comes from the _discovery_token seam (config service mints it) and is threaded + # through to the MCP probe as the Bearer credential. + _, mcp, disco = _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), tools=[]) + disco.assert_called_once() + assert mcp.call_args.kwargs["token"] == "disco-tok" + class TestAnalyzeToolEmpty: def test_empty_tools_list_yields_no_roles_no_scopes(self): @@ -100,3 +110,49 @@ def test_mcp_call_failure_is_502(self, monkeypatch): with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: _run(svc=_svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}), mcp_exc=RuntimeError("connection refused")) assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_discovery_token_failure_is_502_and_skips_tools_list(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with ( + patch.object(kube, "_core_v1") as core_v1, + patch.object(nodes, "_mcp_tools_list") as mcp, + patch.object(nodes, "_discovery_token", side_effect=RuntimeError("mint failed")), + ): + core = MagicMock() + core.read_namespaced_service.return_value = _svc({MCP_LABEL: ""}) + core_v1.return_value = core + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + nodes.analyze_tool(_state()) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + assert "discovery token minting failed" in ei.value.detail + mcp.assert_not_called() + + +class TestMcpToolsList: + """Exercises the real `_mcp_tools_list` (not the seam) — the load-bearing auth change.""" + + def _resp(self, tools=None): + resp = MagicMock() + resp.json.return_value = {"result": {"tools": tools or []}} + resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock() + return resp + + def test_sends_bearer_and_timeout_when_token_present(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with patch("requests.post", return_value=self._resp()) as post: + nodes._mcp_tools_list("http://x/mcp", token="abc") + kwargs = post.call_args.kwargs + assert kwargs["headers"]["Authorization"] == "Bearer abc" + assert kwargs["timeout"] == nodes._MCP_TIMEOUT + + def test_no_auth_header_when_token_absent(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + with patch("requests.post", return_value=self._resp()) as post: + nodes._mcp_tools_list("http://x/mcp") + assert "Authorization" not in post.call_args.kwargs["headers"] + + def test_returns_tools_from_result(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + tools = [{"name": "t1", "description": "d"}] + with patch("requests.post", return_value=self._resp(tools)): + assert nodes._mcp_tools_list("http://x/mcp", token="abc") == tools diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py index a20bdb863..e2b0bb5b9 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/test_configuration.py @@ -436,6 +436,29 @@ def test_realm_forwarded_on_every_request(self, monkeypatch): assert c[1].get("params") == {"realm": REALM} +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# mint_discovery_token — fetches a tool-audienced bearer token from the config service +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestMintDiscoveryToken: + def test_returns_access_token(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + payload = {"access_token": "tok", "client_id": "github-tool", "audience": ["github-tool"]} + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_ok(payload)) as m: + result = Configuration.for_realm(REALM).mint_discovery_token("svc-uuid") + assert result == "tok" + m.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE}/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token", params={"realm": REALM} + ) + + def test_raises_on_non_2xx(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", BASE) + with patch("aiac.idp.configuration.api.requests.get", return_value=_err(502)): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + Configuration.for_realm(REALM).mint_discovery_token("svc-uuid") + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # set_service_type — writes the client.type attribute # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 1344f6d86..3cda21d87 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ """Unit tests for aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" +import base64 +import json import os from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch @@ -16,6 +18,13 @@ def _make_client(admin_mock: MagicMock) -> TestClient: return TestClient(app) +def _make_jwt(payload: dict) -> str: + """Encode a payload into a `header.payload.sig` JWT shape (unsigned — the endpoint only + base64-decodes the payload to read iss/aud; it never verifies the signature).""" + seg = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(payload).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode() + return f"h.{seg}.s" + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /subjects # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -519,6 +528,116 @@ def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET /services/{service_id}/discovery-token +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestMintDiscoveryToken: + ISS = "http://keycloak.localtest.me:8080/realms/kagenti" + + def _wire(self, admin, monkeypatch, *, aud, iss=None, mappers=None, secret="sek"): + monkeypatch.setenv("KEYCLOAK_URL", "http://kc-internal:8080") + monkeypatch.delenv("AIAC_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER", raising=False) + admin.get_client.return_value = { + "id": "svc-uuid", "clientId": "github-tool", "secret": secret + } + admin.get_mappers_from_client.return_value = mappers if mappers is not None else [] + oid = MagicMock() + oid.token.return_value = {"access_token": _make_jwt({"aud": aud, "iss": iss or self.ISS})} + return oid + + def test_returns_200_with_token_and_resolves_client_id(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire(admin, monkeypatch, aud=["github-tool"]) + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 200 + body = resp.json() + assert body["access_token"] + assert body["client_id"] == "github-tool" + assert "github-tool" in body["audience"] + admin.get_client.assert_called_once_with("svc-uuid") + oid.token.assert_called_once_with(grant_type="client_credentials") + + def test_adds_audience_mapper_when_absent(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire(admin, monkeypatch, aud=["github-tool"], mappers=[]) + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + admin.add_mapper_to_client.assert_called_once() + + def test_idempotent_when_mapper_present(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire( + admin, monkeypatch, aud=["github-tool"], + mappers=[{"name": "aiac-discovery-audience"}], + ) + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + admin.add_mapper_to_client.assert_not_called() + + def test_does_not_regenerate_secret(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire(admin, monkeypatch, aud=["github-tool"]) + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + admin.generate_client_secrets.assert_not_called() + + def test_502_when_aud_missing_client_id(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire(admin, monkeypatch, aud=["account"]) + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "does not contain" in resp.json()["error"] + + def test_502_when_no_secret(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire(admin, monkeypatch, aud=["github-tool"], secret=None) + admin.get_client_secrets.return_value = {} # no secret available via the secrets endpoint + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "no readable secret" in resp.json()["error"] + + def test_hard_iss_assertion_when_env_set(self, monkeypatch): + admin = MagicMock() + oid = self._wire( + admin, monkeypatch, aud=["github-tool"], iss="http://kc-internal:8080/realms/kagenti" + ) + monkeypatch.setenv("AIAC_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER", self.ISS) + with patch( + "aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main.KeycloakOpenID", return_value=oid + ): + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "iss" in resp.json()["error"] + + def test_502_on_keycloak_error(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("KEYCLOAK_URL", "http://kc-internal:8080") + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.side_effect = KeycloakError(error_message="not found", response_code=404) + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/svc-uuid/discovery-token?realm={REALM}") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + def teardown_method(self): + app.dependency_overrides.clear() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # POST /services/{service_id}/type # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -941,5 +1060,14 @@ def test_get_role_composites(self): admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.side_effect = _keycloak_error() assert _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles/admin/composites?realm={REALM}").status_code == 502 + def test_mint_discovery_token(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("KEYCLOAK_URL", "http://kc-internal:8080") + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_client.side_effect = _keycloak_error() + assert ( + _make_client(admin).get(f"/services/s1/discovery-token?realm={REALM}").status_code + == 502 + ) + def teardown_method(self): app.dependency_overrides.clear() From 7be21bf23b9e6dcc94c3eaa78691a2be4ab7b0aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 20:33:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 245/273] docs(aiac): Reconcile IdP/library/UC-1 specs with discovery-token fix Add the GET /services/{service_id}/discovery-token endpoint to the IdP config service spec, Configuration.mint_discovery_token to the library-idp spec, and update analyze_tool's flow in the UC-1 onboarding spec to mint + send the bearer token on tools/list. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 14 +++++++++++--- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index a077ec58e..186de21d9 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -120,15 +120,23 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv a. GET the K8s `Service` named `workload_name` in `namespace` (operator convention: Service name == workload name). b. Require the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label present on that Service; `502` (actionable) if absent — the label is applied at deploy time, not stamped by the operator. c. Build `http://{workload_name}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp`, where `port` is the Service's first port (not hardcoded). - 2. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint. - 3. Produce `ServiceProvision`: + 2. Mint a discovery token via `Configuration.mint_discovery_token(service_id)` — the tool's MCP + endpoint sits behind its AuthBridge sidecar, whose inbound `jwt-validation` plugin enforces an + `aud` matching the tool's own Keycloak client-id; the config service mints the token as the tool's + own client (client-credentials + a self-audience mapper) so it passes that gate. `502` (actionable, + naming the service id) if minting fails. + 3. Call `tools/list` (HTTP POST, MCP protocol) on the resolved endpoint, sending the minted token as + `Authorization: Bearer `. + 4. Produce `ServiceProvision`: - `roles`: `[]` (tools do not initiate further calls) - `scopes`: `[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload_name}.{tool.name}", description=tool.description) for tool in manifest.tools]` - `reasoning`: `f"derived from MCP manifest: {len(tools)} tools"` - 4. Returns `502` on Service/label lookup failure or MCP call failure. + 5. Returns `502` on Service/label lookup failure, discovery-token minting failure, or MCP call failure. > K8s access: `get` on `services` in the workload namespace (tool path). Identity is resolved by `classify_service` (config API). > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`docs/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. + > Discovery auth: the tool's inbound `jwt-validation` plugin stays fully enforcing — there is no + > path bypass for `/mcp`. `analyze_tool` authenticates instead of relaxing the sidecar's auth. - **`provision_service`**: non-LLM node; calls `create_service_role` and `create_service_scope` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` for each entry in `ServiceProvision`. Reads `service_id` from state. Writes are **idempotent** (create-or-get). - Also persists the discovered `service_type` onto the Keycloak client via `Configuration.set_service_type(service, service_type)`, which stores it as the **`client.type`** attribute. This is the **authoritative origin** of the attribute that the IdP library's `Service._resolve_keycloak_fields` reads back (see the IdP library spec's type-resolution precedence). No case mapping is needed here: `service_type` is a `ServiceType` (values `Agent`/`Tool`), already matching `client.type` and `Service.type`. Case normalization happens once, upstream, when `classify_service` reads the lowercase `kagenti.io/type` label. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 32fdddbfe..495f2ebb9 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes/{scope_id}` | `PUT /admin/realms/{realm}/default-default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Assign existing scope as default scope to service | | POST | `/roles` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/roles` | Create realm-level role | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}` | `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, ...)` | Assign existing realm role to service account | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/discovery-token` | `admin.get_client(service_id)` → (idempotent) `add_mapper_to_client` → `KeycloakOpenID(...).token(grant_type="client_credentials")` | Mint a bearer token, minted **as the service's own client**, whose `aud` contains that client's client-id — for authenticating UC-1 tool discovery against the tool's AuthBridge sidecar | | GET | `/health` | `admin.get_server_info()` — uses `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM`; no `?realm=` param | Readiness probe | `GET /subjects?role_id={role_id}` (filtered variant): @@ -108,6 +109,24 @@ serviceId]`: 5. Returns `409 Conflict` if the role is already assigned. 6. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. +`GET /services/{service_id}/discovery-token`: +1. Calls `admin.get_client(service_id)` to resolve `client_id = client["clientId"]`. +2. Reads the client's **existing** secret (`client.get("secret")` or `admin.get_client_secrets(service_id)`) + — **never** calls `generate_client_secrets` (rotating the live secret would break the deployed + workload). Returns `502 Bad Gateway` if no secret is present (e.g. a public client). +3. Idempotently ensures a self-audience `oidc-audience-mapper` named `aiac-discovery-audience` is + attached to the client (`get_mappers_from_client` then `add_mapper_to_client` only if absent), so the + minted token's `aud` includes `client_id`. +4. Mints via `KeycloakOpenID(server_url=..., realm_name=realm, client_id=client_id, + client_secret_key=secret).token(grant_type="client_credentials")` — i.e. as the **service's own + client**, not the realm admin. +5. Decodes the minted token's payload (no signature check needed — this endpoint trusts its own mint) + and asserts `client_id in aud`; if `AIAC_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER` is set, also asserts `iss` matches it. + Returns `502 Bad Gateway` if either assertion fails — this endpoint never returns a token the + consuming AuthBridge sidecar's `jwt-validation` plugin would reject. +6. Returns `200 OK` with `{"access_token": ..., "client_id": ..., "issuer": ..., "audience": [...]}`. +7. Returns `502 Bad Gateway` with `{"error": ...}` on `KeycloakError`. + All endpoints except `/health` require a `?realm=` query parameter specifying the Keycloak realm to operate in. Returns `422 Unprocessable Entity` if the parameter is absent. `/health` accepts no realm parameter — it calls `_get_or_create_admin(os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"])` directly. All GET endpoints return `200 OK` with a JSON array on success, except `/subjects/{subject_id}/assignments` which returns a JSON object with `realmMappings` and `serviceMappings` fields. All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Admin API call fails. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md index 21aa45abb..08b386d18 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md @@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ class Configuration: def create_service_scope(self, service_id: str, scope) -> Scope: ... def set_service_type(self, service: Service, service_type: ServiceType) -> Service: ... + + # Mint a bearer token, minted as the service's own client, whose `aud` contains that + # client's client-id — for authenticating UC-1 tool discovery against the tool's + # AuthBridge sidecar. Returns the raw access_token string. + def mint_discovery_token(self, service_id: str) -> str: ... ``` `get_scopes()` — simple read: @@ -238,6 +243,13 @@ class Configuration: > **Note:** Callers that previously called `get_services()` and filtered by ID should be switched to `get_service(service_id)` to avoid fetching the full list. +`mint_discovery_token(service_id)` — thin wrapper over the config service's minting endpoint: +1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services/{service_id}/discovery-token?realm=`. +2. Raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx HTTP status. +3. Return `response.json()["access_token"]` — the raw bearer token string. The config service (which + holds the Keycloak admin) does the minting and the in-endpoint `iss`/`aud` verification; this method + does no decoding itself. + `get_roles()` — enriched read: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/roles?realm=` — fetch all realm roles. 2. For each role, if `role.composite` is `True`: `GET /roles/{name}/composites?realm=` → `Role.childRoles` From 97dec169aaaf3426b8cd49ebf1a03dcaf8d40cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 21:01:20 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 246/273] test(aiac): Capture UC-1 rego into per-rung project subfolders Store the UC-1 onboarding integration test's captured .rego in a per-rung subfolder (rung1/rung2/rung3) under the gitignored test/integration/rego_out/uc1/ tree instead of a throwaway tempdir, so the generated policy can be eyeballed after a run. Each rung clears its own dir before onboarding, so a broken pipeline can't pass green on leftovers. Rename the onboarded_stack parameter rego_prefix -> rego_subdir and reconcile the spec's Rego-capture description + REGO_OUTPUT_DIR row. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 6 +++-- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py | 2 +- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py | 2 +- .../test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py | 25 +++++++++++-------- 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index c392db46f..6bb41d535 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -74,7 +74,9 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the **Not** the superseded `aiac-pdp-policy-keycloak` composite writer, which manages Keycloak composite roles and emits **no Rego at all**, and is not deployed by any current manifest. The `.rego` files are the artifact under test; without the OPA writer there is nothing to capture. -- **Rego capture.** `kubectl cp` the writer's `/rego` to a host temp dir, then run `opa eval` on the host. +- **Rego capture.** `kubectl cp` the writer's `/rego` to a per-rung host dir (a `rung{1,2,3}` subfolder + under the gitignored `test/integration/rego_out/uc1/` tree, so artifacts stay in the project for + eyeballing but are never committed; each rung clears its dir first), then run `opa eval` on the host. ## Preconditions (assumed, not performed by the tests) @@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ workloads. | `AIAC_CONTROLLER_URL` | Base URL of the in-cluster AIAC Controller (via port-forward) for `POST /apply/service/{id}` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | | `AIAC_OPA_POD` / `AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR` | OPA-writer pod (or label selector) to `kubectl cp` `.rego` from | — (resolved from labels) | | `AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH` | Writer output dir inside the pod | `/rego` | -| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Host dir the captured `.rego` is copied to | test temp dir | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Base dir the captured `.rego` is copied to (one `rung{1,2,3}` subfolder per rung) | `test/integration/rego_out/uc1/` (gitignored) | | `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`); consumed by the in-cluster AIAC pod | — (required) | | `OPA_BIN` | Path to the standalone `opa` binary (oracle); else `PATH`, else `pytest.skip` | — (optional) | diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py index fcc3dabbf..2394afb54 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ def onboarded() -> dict: """Onboard **only** the agent (the tool is deployed but not onboarded) via the shared harness, and yield the live ``admin`` handle + captured ``rego_dir`` (+ writer ``pod``). Keycloak cleanup runs before and after; the clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow).""" - with uc1.onboarded_stack([scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD], rego_prefix="aiac-uc1-rung1-rego-") as ctx: + with uc1.onboarded_stack([scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD], rego_subdir="rung1") as ctx: yield ctx diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py index b6e3b01fa..ffe5ef3c8 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ def onboarded() -> dict: clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow). No agent re-onboard, no intermediate validation — only the end state is asserted below.""" with uc1.onboarded_stack( - [scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD, scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD], rego_prefix="aiac-uc1-rung2-rego-" + [scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD, scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD], rego_subdir="rung2" ) as ctx: yield ctx diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py index 3ed247860..dd1623312 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ def onboarded() -> dict: handle + captured ``rego_dir`` (+ writer ``pod``). Keycloak cleanup runs before and after; the clients are left registered as before (spec § Per-rung flow).""" with uc1.onboarded_stack( - [scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD, scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD], rego_prefix="aiac-uc1-rung3-rego-" + [scn.TOOL_WORKLOAD, scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD], rego_subdir="rung3" ) as ctx: yield ctx diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py index 37b93fecf..e4a375b77 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ import logging import os import sys -import tempfile from contextlib import contextmanager from pathlib import Path from typing import Iterator @@ -89,6 +88,11 @@ OPA_POD = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_POD") OPA_REGO_PATH = os.environ.get("AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH", "/rego") +# Base dir the captured ``.rego`` is copied to, one subfolder per rung (see ``fresh_rego_dir``). +# Defaults to the (gitignored) ``test/integration/rego_out/uc1/`` tree so artifacts stay in the +# project for eyeballing but never get committed; ``$REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` overrides the base. +REGO_OUTPUT_BASE = Path(os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR") or (HERE / "rego_out" / "uc1")) + AGENT_SLUG = f"{NAMESPACE}_{scn.AGENT_WORKLOAD}".replace("-", "_") # team1/github-agent -> team1_github_agent INBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.inbound.rego" OUTBOUND_REGO = f"{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.rego" @@ -279,13 +283,14 @@ def onboard(base_url: str, service_id: str) -> None: ) -def fresh_rego_dir(prefix: str) -> Path: - """Host dir the captured ``.rego`` is copied to: ``$REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` if set, else a fresh test - temp dir named with ``prefix`` (spec § Configuration). A temp default keeps captured artifacts out - of the repo and lets each run verify freshly generated policy — never a stale artifact. Any stale - ``.rego`` in the dir is cleared so a broken pipeline can't pass green on leftovers.""" - base = os.environ.get("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR") - path = Path(base) if base else Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=prefix)) +def fresh_rego_dir(subdir: str) -> Path: + """Host dir the captured ``.rego`` is copied to: a per-rung ``subdir`` under ``REGO_OUTPUT_BASE`` + (``test/integration/rego_out/uc1/`` by default — gitignored, or ``$REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`` if set). + + The artifacts live in the project tree so they can be eyeballed after a run, one folder per test + case. Every ``.rego`` in the dir is cleared at the start of each rung so a broken pipeline can't + pass green on leftovers, and each run verifies only freshly generated policy.""" + path = REGO_OUTPUT_BASE / subdir path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) for stale in path.glob("*.rego"): stale.unlink() @@ -372,7 +377,7 @@ def inbound_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: @contextmanager -def onboarded_stack(workloads: list[str], *, rego_prefix: str) -> Iterator[dict]: +def onboarded_stack(workloads: list[str], *, rego_subdir: str) -> Iterator[dict]: """Run one rung's whole flow and yield ``{"admin", "rego_dir", "writer_pod"}``. Provision users/roles, onboard the given ``workloads`` **in order** through the real in-cluster @@ -391,7 +396,7 @@ def onboarded_stack(workloads: list[str], *, rego_prefix: str) -> Iterator[dict] provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) ensure_agent_policy(CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE) # mount the PRB's policy.md if the stack lacks it - rego_dir = fresh_rego_dir(rego_prefix) # fresh host dir; stale .rego cleared + rego_dir = fresh_rego_dir(rego_subdir) # fresh per-rung host dir; stale .rego cleared pod = writer_pod() clear_writer_rego(pod) # clear stale .rego in the writer BEFORE onboarding try: From f721b38d3d022332fb2566bce9e382beae62bd96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 21:07:27 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 247/273] test(aiac): Nest policy-pipeline rego under rego_out/policy_pipeline MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Write the policy-pipeline integration test's captured .rego one level deeper — rego_out/policy_pipeline// — so it sits as a sibling of the UC-1 ladder's rego_out/uc1/ instead of directly under rego_out/. Keeps the two suites' eyeball artifacts cleanly separated. The subtree stays gitignored under the existing test/integration/rego_out/ rule. Reconcile the policy-pipeline spec's rego-output path references. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 13 +++++++------ aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 8aade79ba..7934d68e0 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ found. ### What it does The pipeline (provision → PRB → PCE → OPA) is driven **once per `policy.md` variant** — `explicit` and -`abstract` — each writing into its own `rego_out//` directory. `opa eval` then asserts the +`abstract` — each writing into its own `rego_out/policy_pipeline//` directory (a sibling of +the UC-1 ladder's `rego_out/uc1/`). `opa eval` then asserts the scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below describe one such run. 1. **Set service URLs in env before importing the aiac libraries.** Export `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL`, @@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below - IdP Configuration Service — `aiac.idp.service.configuration.keycloak.main:app` on `7071`. - Policy Store — its ASGI app on `7074`, with `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` pointed at a fresh temp dir. - OPA Policy Writer — `aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.main:app` on `7072`, with `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` - (pointed at the current variant's `rego_out//`) and the Policy Store DB path in its env. + (pointed at the current variant's `rego_out/policy_pipeline//`) and the Policy Store DB path in its env. 3. **Provision Keycloak** (idempotent — delete-if-exists the realm first, then create): - via **`python-keycloak` `KeycloakAdmin`** (test fixture): create realm `AIAC_TEST_REALM`; create users `dev-user`, `test-user`, and `devops-user`; create realm roles `developer`, `tester`, and @@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ user→tool; the agent→tool gate covers all four scopes, so the user gate disc | devops-user | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | Alongside the assertions, each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in its -`rego_out//` for eyeballing: +`rego_out/policy_pipeline//` for eyeballing: - `github_agent.inbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.inbound`; the **user→agent** gate. `subject_roles` = `{dev-user: [developer], test-user: [tester]}`; `agent_scopes` populated. @@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | IdP Configuration Service base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | Policy Store base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | OPA Policy Writer base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | -| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Base dir the OPA stub subprocess writes `.rego` to; the test points it at `rego_out//` per variant and leaves the files on disk | operator-chosen local dir | +| `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR` | Base dir the OPA stub subprocess writes `.rego` to; the test points it at `rego_out/policy_pipeline//` per variant and leaves the files on disk | operator-chosen local dir | | `AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH` | Policy Store DB path for the subprocess (fresh temp dir) | temp | | `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` | PRB whole-file policy — path to the `policy.md` variant fed to the PRB; the test sets it per variant (`policy.explicit.md`, `policy.abstract.md`) | `/etc/aiac/policy.md` | | `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` / `LLM_API_KEY` | PRB LLM (pinned `temperature=0`) | — (required) | @@ -237,8 +238,8 @@ Keycloak, a real LLM, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). # A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: # test_outbound[abstract-test-user-source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed # The generated Rego is left on disk per variant for eyeballing: -# rego_out/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego -# rego_out/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# rego_out/policy_pipeline/explicit/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego +# rego_out/policy_pipeline/abstract/github_agent.{inbound,outbound}.rego # (no github_tool.*.rego in either) ``` diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index 8a84965a4..239369727 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ real Policy Rules Builder (real LLM) to map roles->scopes, then the real Policy Computation Engine to build the ``PolicyModel`` and push ``.rego`` files to the OPA filesystem stub. It does this twice — once for the explicit ``policy.md`` and once for the abstract one — and leaves both Rego sets on disk -under ``rego_out//``. +under ``rego_out/policy_pipeline//`` (a sibling of the UC-1 ladder's ``rego_out/uc1/``). Each test then evaluates the generated Rego with the standalone ``opa`` binary and asserts the verdict against the scenario's role->access truth table (``scenario.py``). A wrong LLM/PCE mapping fails the @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This is the pytest replacement for the former write-only ``policy_pipeline.py`` launcher; its helpers were ported here verbatim. -Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to aiac-e2e): +Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to kagenti): .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v Without ``-m integration`` the suite is skipped; without ``opa`` each node skips at runtime. """ @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ ) # --- Resolve config + set env BEFORE importing aiac (the libraries read env at import time) --- -TEST_REALM = os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) +TEST_REALM = os.environ.get("AIAC_TEST_REALM", scn.REALM_DEFAULT) os.environ["KEYCLOAK_REALM"] = TEST_REALM # the PCE reads back the realm we provision (single source of truth) os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ def grant_sets(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]]: @pytest.fixture(scope="session") def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: """Provision Keycloak once, then run the real PRB+PCE pipeline for each policy variant, leaving - ``.rego`` on disk under ``rego_out//``. Returns + ``.rego`` on disk under ``rego_out/policy_pipeline//``. Returns ``{variant: {"rego_dir": Path, "rules": list[PolicyRule]}}`` — the rules are the PRB's grant set, captured so the equivalence/truth-table assertions can compare grants directly (not Rego text).""" require_env( @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ def pipeline() -> dict[str, dict]: agent_slug = scn.AGENT_ID.replace("-", "_") # github-agent -> github_agent for variant in VARIANTS: - rego_dir = HERE / "rego_out" / variant + rego_dir = HERE / "rego_out" / "policy_pipeline" / variant rego_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # Clear any rego left by a previous run so the assertions below always verify freshly # generated policy — never a stale artifact that would let a broken pipeline pass green. From e02d1f99ac3451f65e419a8d71a133075fcd9a91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 21:23:04 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 248/273] Fix(aiac): Align UC-1 integration realm with deployed stack (kagenti) The UC-1 onboarding integration harness defaulted to realm aiac-uc1-e2e while the deployed AIAC Controller resolves onboarding triggers against its own KEYCLOAK_REALM=kagenti. The harness therefore resolved a client UUID from the wrong realm and onboarding 502'd on a Keycloak 404. - scenario_uc1: default REALM_DEFAULT to kagenti (override via AIAC_TEST_REALM) so the harness resolves/provisions in the realm the Controller actually uses. - test_policy_pipeline: stop leaking the realm via os.environ.setdefault("AIAC_TEST_REALM", ...), which forced every later-collected UC-1 suite onto this suite's aiac-e2e throwaway realm; use a non-mutating os.environ.get instead. - scenario: add a guard comment that this suite does delete_realm + create_realm every run, so it must never point AIAC_TEST_REALM at a shared realm like kagenti (that destroys the demo clients). - spec: reconcile uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md to state the test realm must match the deployed stack's KEYCLOAK_REALM (default kagenti), and note the policy-pipeline suite's throwaway-realm contract. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 11 +++++++---- aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 3 +++ aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py | 8 +++++--- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 2 +- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index 6bb41d535..3b85738c4 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ workloads. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| -| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (dedicated; default `aiac-uc1-e2e`) | +| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (must match the deployed stack's `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; default `kagenti`) | | Agent | `github-agent` — **discovered** role `github-agent.agent`; scopes `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (from AgentCard skills) | | Tool | `github-tool` (simplified) — **discovered** scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, issues-write}` (from MCP `tools/list`) | | Users | `dev-user` (`developer`), `test-user` (`tester`), `devops-user` (`devops`) | @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ workloads. | `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds (user/realm-role provisioning + cleanup) | — (required) | -| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Dedicated realm the tests use (the demo namespace's clients are registered into it) | `aiac-uc1-e2e` | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the tests resolve/provision against. **Must match the deployed AIAC stack's `KEYCLOAK_REALM`** — the in-cluster Controller resolves the onboarding trigger in *its own* realm, so a harness on a different realm resolves a client UUID the Controller can't find (404 → onboard 502). The demo namespace's clients are registered into it. | `kagenti` | | `AIAC_CONTROLLER_URL` | Base URL of the in-cluster AIAC Controller (via port-forward) for `POST /apply/service/{id}` | `http://127.0.0.1:7070` | | `AIAC_OPA_POD` / `AIAC_OPA_SELECTOR` | OPA-writer pod (or label selector) to `kubectl cp` `.rego` from | — (resolved from labels) | | `AIAC_OPA_REGO_PATH` | Writer output dir inside the pod | `/rego` | @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ Runnable against a live Kagenti/Kind cluster (operator + Keycloak + SPIRE) with `AIAC_TEST_REALM`, a real LLM, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). ```bash -# env: KUBECONFIG + KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-uc1-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN +# env: KUBECONFIG + KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to kagenti (match the stack's KEYCLOAK_REALM); opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/ -m integration -k uc1_onboard -v # A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: # test_outbound[test-user-github-tool.source-read] — expected deny, opa allowed @@ -277,8 +277,11 @@ The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found. `subject_ok` alone (phase-1's user-gating-only intent). - **Grant sets, semantic.** Equivalence is re-derived from the Rego data maps and compared as sets — the semantic-similarity guarantee, not byte-identity. -- **Dedicated realm, leave-in-place; per-rung cleanup.** The realm/users/roles are never deleted; the +- **Stack's realm, leave-in-place; per-rung cleanup.** UC-1 resolves/provisions against the deployed + stack's `KEYCLOAK_REALM` (default `kagenti`) and **never deletes** the realm/users/roles; only the provisioned agent/tool roles/scopes are cleaned up per rung so onboarding runs from a clean slate. + (Contrast `5.3 policy-pipeline`, which owns a **throwaway** realm it `delete_realm`s + recreates each + run — that suite must never point `AIAC_TEST_REALM` at `kagenti`, or it destroys the demo clients.) - **LLM nondeterminism, contained.** PRB LLM pinned `temperature=0`; both cell-level and grant-set assertions; `@pytest.mark.integration`, out of default CI. - **Prior art, shared not copied.** Reuses the `5.3` shape (`opa` discovery/skip, scenario-as-oracle, diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index 26ed77b2d..3c83a49d8 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ # --- Realm + entity identifiers ------------------------------------------------------------- +# MUST be a throwaway realm: this suite's ``provision_keycloak_admin`` does ``delete_realm`` + +# ``create_realm`` on it every run, so pointing it (via ``AIAC_TEST_REALM``) at a shared realm like +# ``kagenti`` DESTROYS that realm's contents. UC-1 uses its own realm (``scenario_uc1.REALM_DEFAULT``). REALM_DEFAULT = "aiac-e2e" AGENT_ID = "github-agent" TOOL_ID = "github-tool" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py index d941250af..bd844f72f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py @@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ # --- Realm + deployment identifiers --------------------------------------------------------- -# Dedicated test realm (never deleted/recreated). The operator registers the demo namespace's -# clients into it because the fixture sets KEYCLOAK_REALM on that namespace's authbridge-config. -REALM_DEFAULT = "aiac-uc1-e2e" +# The realm the deployed AIAC stack operates on (the cluster's ``aiac-pdp-config`` ConfigMap sets +# ``KEYCLOAK_REALM=kagenti`` on the Controller + IdP-config pods, so the UC-1 harness must resolve +# and provision against the same realm). Never deleted/recreated; the operator registers the demo +# namespace's clients into it. Override with ``AIAC_TEST_REALM`` if the stack runs on another realm. +REALM_DEFAULT = "kagenti" # Namespace the demo workloads deploy into (operator registers clients as "{ns}/{workload}"). DEMO_NAMESPACE_DEFAULT = "team1" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index 239369727..90f1ffb54 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This is the pytest replacement for the former write-only ``policy_pipeline.py`` launcher; its helpers were ported here verbatim. -Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to kagenti): +Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to aiac-e2e): .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v Without ``-m integration`` the suite is skipped; without ``opa`` each node skips at runtime. """ From ba29c03e5258eb3db7276651bff1f3412c7d1436 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 21:39:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 249/273] Test(aiac): Rename policy-pipeline throwaway realm to aiac-pp Renamed the default Keycloak realm used by test_policy_pipeline.py from aiac-e2e to aiac-pp (scenario.REALM_DEFAULT, overridable via AIAC_TEST_REALM). Updated the matching spec doc references. No behavior change; live suite reverified 43/43 PASSED against the renamed realm. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 8 ++++---- aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 7934d68e0..90476cb9f 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ exercises the deny-by-default path. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| -| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-e2e`) | +| Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-pp`) | | Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-operator`, `issues-operator`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | | Tool | `github-tool` (scopes `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) | | Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | @@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ Role → access (confirmed with the user; the fixed facts that both `policy.md` | `KEYCLOAK_URL` | External Keycloak base URL | — (required) | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM` | Realm the admin creds live in | `master` | | `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME` / `KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Keycloak admin creds | — (required) | -| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the test provisions | `aiac-e2e` | -| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back, via `Configuration.for_default_realm()` (single source of truth; = `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-e2e` | +| `AIAC_TEST_REALM` | Realm the test provisions | `aiac-pp` | +| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | Realm the PCE reads back, via `Configuration.for_default_realm()` (single source of truth; = `AIAC_TEST_REALM`) | `aiac-pp` | | `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL` | IdP Configuration Service base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7071` | | `AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL` | Policy Store base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7074` | | `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` | OPA Policy Writer base URL (set before import) | `http://127.0.0.1:7072` | @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Runnable only once the pipeline fixes (handoffs 01 + 02, P1–P5) have landed, a Keycloak, a real LLM, and an `opa` binary on `PATH` (or `$OPA_BIN`). ```bash -# env: KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-e2e; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN +# env: KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* set; realm defaults to aiac-pp; opa on PATH or $OPA_BIN .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v # ~30 parametrized nodes (variant × subject inbound; variant × subject × function_name outbound). # A failing node names the exact cell, e.g.: diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index 3c83a49d8..4e2194e0d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ # MUST be a throwaway realm: this suite's ``provision_keycloak_admin`` does ``delete_realm`` + # ``create_realm`` on it every run, so pointing it (via ``AIAC_TEST_REALM``) at a shared realm like # ``kagenti`` DESTROYS that realm's contents. UC-1 uses its own realm (``scenario_uc1.REALM_DEFAULT``). -REALM_DEFAULT = "aiac-e2e" +REALM_DEFAULT = "aiac-pp" AGENT_ID = "github-agent" TOOL_ID = "github-tool" diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py index 90f1ffb54..561fa5094 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This is the pytest replacement for the former write-only ``policy_pipeline.py`` launcher; its helpers were ported here verbatim. -Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to aiac-e2e): +Run (needs KEYCLOAK_URL + admin creds + LLM_* exported, ``opa`` on PATH; realm defaults to aiac-pp): .venv/bin/pytest test/integration/test_policy_pipeline.py -m integration -v Without ``-m integration`` the suite is skipped; without ``opa`` each node skips at runtime. """ From 07cd7d6d643410c087bf117626df71d9428b4735 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 21:41:00 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 250/273] chore(aiac): Remove unused test/fixtures directory MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit No test references these files (config.yaml, regular_policy, permissive_policy) — orphaned. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml | 49 ------------------- .../fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml | 23 --------- .../fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml | 18 ------- .../fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt | 2 - .../test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt | 2 - 5 files changed, 94 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml delete mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt delete mode 100644 aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 295392dbc..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/config.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -# Service configurations with roles -# Each service can have multiple roles, each role gets its own audience scope -# Optional 'secret' parameter: if not provided, Keycloak will auto-generate the service secret -services: - - id: "kagenti" - type: "Agent" - secret: "demo-ui-secret" - direct_access_grants: true - roles: - - name: "demo-ui" - description: "Access to the demo UI interface" - - id: "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent" - type: "Agent" - secret: "github-agent-secret" - direct_access_grants: true - roles: - - name: "github-agent" - description: "Provides access to GitHub services" - - id: "github-tool" - type: "Tool" - secret: "github-tool-secret" - roles: - - name: "github-tool-aud" - description: "Provides access to public GitHub repositories" - - name: "github-full-access" - description: "Provides access to private GitHub repositories" - -# Realm roles (can be composites of service roles) -realm_roles: - - name: "developer" - description: "R&D team members" - - name: "tech-support" - description: "Technical support staff providing customer assistance" - - name: "sales" - description: "Sales team members managing customer relationships" - -# Subjects (users/workloads) -subjects: - - username: "alice" - roles: - - "developer" - - - username: "bob" - roles: - - "tech-support" - - - username: "charlie" - roles: - - "sales" diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 36536665c..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/permissive_policy.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -# Expected policy for permissive_policy.txt -# Policy Description: -# * Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories -# * Other personnel can access public github repositories only - -policy: - developer: - - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - privilege: github-agent - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-tool-aud - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-full-access - tech-support: - - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - privilege: github-agent - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-tool-aud - sales: - - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - privilege: github-agent - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml b/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index c26d5a69d..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/expected/regular_policy.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -# Expected policy for regular_policy.txt -# Policy Description: -# * Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories -# * Other technical personnel can access public github repositories only - -policy: - developer: - - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - privilege: github-agent - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-tool-aud - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-full-access - tech-support: - - service: spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/git-issue-agent - privilege: github-agent - - service: github-tool - privilege: github-tool-aud diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt b/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3f3625222..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/permissive_policy.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -* Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories -* Other personnel can access public github repositories only \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt b/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6b13fc7e4..000000000 --- a/aiac/test/fixtures/policies/regular_policy.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -* Members of the R&D can access both private and public github repositories -* Other technical personnel can access public github repositories only \ No newline at end of file From 0ee4dccebdbd522f39c9429937d4829381cc5164 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 18:46:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 251/273] docs: Correct PDP responsibility wording in architecture summary OPA returns an authorization decision/entitlements; it does not issue OAuth tokens. Token issuance is Keycloak's role via AuthBridge (RFC 8693), matching PRD.md's PDP description. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index a9255fb48..0b73bbe0b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concern | Layer | Component | Responsibility | |---|---|---| | **Policy Management** | AIAC Agent | Translates natural-language policy into PDP configuration on every trigger | -| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; issues scoped tokens | +| **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; returns the caller's entitlements/decision | | **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the curr knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated PDP Policy Writer. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and -issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. +returns the entitlements that role grants on the target service; the IdP (Keycloak, via +AuthBridge) issues the exchanged token scoped to exactly those entitlements. **Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC.** --- @@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi **AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to -extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.library` and +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.configuration` and `aiac.pdp.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to IdP configuration and PDP policy state. From dff7f3450bacdb6125472c621b58550509c3c37f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 18:48:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 252/273] docs(aiac): Fix OPA/token-issuance contradiction in spec docs MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OPA decides entitlements; the IdP (Keycloak, via AuthBridge) issues the exchanged token — not OPA itself. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index 22dd3a37b..beaebc53a 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ AIAC enforces a strict three-layer model: | **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; decides what a caller may access | | **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | -The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and issues a token containing exactly the entitlements that role grants on the target service. +The PEP (AuthBridge) is a pure enforcement layer. It performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and returns the entitlements that role grants on the target service; the IdP (Keycloak, via AuthBridge) issues the exchanged token scoped to exactly those entitlements. This means `token_scopes` is absent from `authproxy-routes`. Route configuration carries routing intent only (`host` → `target_audience`). Policy intent lives entirely in OPA, kept current by AIAC. From d86c9d6dfd262edef5f26379cdf9ea1b1c4a30b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 18:49:34 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 253/273] docs: Align PDP Policy Writer service name and library import path Fix aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service to match aiac-pdp-policy-service used elsewhere, and update the deprecated aiac.pdp.library.policy import to the canonical aiac.pdp.policy.library.api path. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index f9bc7863f..2806dcd75 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ ## Description A FastAPI web service that translates a **Policy Model** into OPA Rego packages and writes them to an `AuthorizationPolicy` Kubernetes Custom Resource. The OPA plugin embedded in each AuthBridge instance fetches the Rego packages relevant to its pod from this CR at startup. -The service is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service:7072` ClusterIP. +The service is deployed as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** alongside the IdP Configuration Service, behind the `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` ClusterIP. -The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.library.configuration`). +The service has no dependency on Keycloak. All Keycloak operations (entity reads) are handled by the **IdP Configuration Service** and its library (`aiac.idp.configuration`). --- @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ A worked example (agent `github-agent`, users `developer`/`tester`, tool `github --- -## Library: `aiac.pdp.library.policy` +## Library: `aiac.pdp.policy.library.api` HTTP client module wrapping the PDP Policy Writer REST API. Exposes four module-level functions. Service URL is read from the `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL` environment variable (default: `http://127.0.0.1:7072`). All functions raise `RuntimeError` on non-2xx response. @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ python-dotenv ### Usage ```python -from aiac.pdp.library.policy import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyModel, AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule apply_agent_policy("weather-agent", agent_model) @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ For local development, the `kubernetes` client falls back to `~/.kube/config` au - Server: uvicorn - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` -- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-writer-service:7072` +- Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` - Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) --- From 591251cb84df44d667ec8cc658015446da143b03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 18:51:15 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 254/273] docs: Fix module path, naming, and link inconsistencies in AIAC specs Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md | 4 ++-- aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md | 4 ++-- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md | 6 +++--- aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 2 +- 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md index bf8b80e4b..a18c8d88b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ All messages carry a minimal JSON payload containing only the entity ID: { "id": "" } ``` -For `aiac.apply.policy.build`, the payload is empty (`{}`). The AIAC Agent pulls all required state from the PDP Configuration Service at processing time — the event payload is a trigger, not a data carrier. +For `aiac.apply.policy.build`, the payload is empty (`{}`). The AIAC Agent pulls all required state from the IdP Configuration Service at processing time — the event payload is a trigger, not a data carrier. --- @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ No authentication credentials are required. The NATS server runs with no-auth co A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agent container starts. It orchestrates the AIAC startup sequence. _Deployment of this container is deferred to Phase 2 (issue 4.21) — the Phase 1 Agent pod runs without it._ 1. **Wait for NATS** — poll `aiac-event-broker-service:4222` until TCP connection succeeds. -2. **Wait for PDP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. +2. **Wait for IdP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. 3. **Wait for PDP Policy Writer** — poll `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL/health` until HTTP 200. 4. **Wait for RAG Ingest Service** — poll `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL/health` until HTTP 200 (confirms ChromaDB in the same RAG pod is also up). 5. **Create NATS JetStream stream** — call `js.add_stream()` idempotently with the `aiac-events` stream configuration. Safe to call on every restart. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 495f2ebb9..364a5cfb7 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ Environment variables (injected via Kubernetes Deployment manifest): - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-config-service:7071` - Deployment: co-located with PDP Policy Writer as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) -- Python library: `aiac.idp.library.configuration` +- Python library: `aiac.idp.configuration` ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md index 71ac4fbe4..2073c3d6b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-keycloak-service.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that applies RBAC policy changes to Keycloak by managing c | POST | `/services/{service_id}/permissions` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}/roles` | Create a new permission (client role) for a specific service | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` then `PUT .../clients/{service_id}/default-client-scopes/{scope_id}` | Create a realm-level scope and assign it to a service as a default scope (atomic) | -Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter, same as the PDP Configuration Service. +Every endpoint accepts an optional `realm` query parameter, same as the IdP Configuration Service. `POST /roles/{role_name}/composites` and `DELETE /roles/{role_name}/composites` accept a JSON array of role representation objects `[{"id": "...", "name": "..."}]` and return `204 No Content` on success. @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ All endpoints return `502 Bad Gateway` with a JSON error body if the Keycloak Ad - Bind: `0.0.0.0:7072` - Base image: `python:3.12-slim` - Kubernetes ClusterIP Service: `aiac-pdp-policy-service:7072` -- Deployment: co-located with PDP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) +- Deployment: co-located with IdP Configuration Service as a container in the **Kagenti Interface Pod** (`pdp-interface-deployment.yaml`) ## Dependencies (`requirements.txt`) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 0ef4451af..6d1eeb415 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects t | Module | Purpose | |--------|---------| | `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `ServicePolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | -| `aiac.idp.configuration.library` | `Configuration.get_services` — the **only** runtime IdP read (catalog: `service_type` + own roles/scopes for the P2 seed) | +| `aiac.idp.configuration` | `Configuration.get_services` — the **only** runtime IdP read (catalog: `service_type` + own roles/scopes for the P2 seed) | | `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope` (fetch SPM), `get_service_policies_by_role` (SPMs containing a role — override purge + outbound derivation), `apply_service_policy` (persist SPM) | | `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — partial-upsert derived APMs to OPA | @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine writes to the Policy Sto **Seam:** mock all downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: -- `aiac.idp.configuration.library` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog: `service_type` + each service's own roles/scopes for the P2 seed). +- `aiac.idp.configuration` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog: `service_type` + each service's own roles/scopes for the P2 seed). - `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope`, `get_service_policies_by_role`, `apply_service_policy`. - `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy`. @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace at the SPM layer (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation and agent decommission / package deletion are not yet designed — **TBD**. - **Full policy rebuild orchestration:** the PCE handles incremental updates; full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. -- **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP access goes through `aiac.idp.configuration.library.Configuration` (only `get_services()`). The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. +- **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP access goes through `aiac.idp.configuration.Configuration` (only `get_services()`). The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. - **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE persists SPMs (source of truth); APMs are derived and pushed, never persisted as truth. The raw input rule list is not stored. - **Model field definitions** (handoff 01), **IdP service / library** (handoffs 02/03), **store CRUD** (handoff 04). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 90476cb9f..8d9a0dbc5 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ carry no policy grant ("Resolves to…") and no owning-client naming, and stay w cap so they are written verbatim (no shortened renderings). Client `type` is **not** inferred from description prose: the test provisions each client's `client.type` attribute (the type UC1 discovers from the agent card / `kagenti.io/type` label) as a plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`, so -`Service` type resolution ([../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) +`Service` type resolution ([../../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keyword fallback. **`github-agent`** — client (Agent): diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index 3b85738c4..f8e75f998 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the `input.function_name` against the generated **user→tool** maps (`subject_ok`) **only**, by exact string equality. The agent→tool gate (`target_ok`) is degenerate under UC-1's single generic `github-agent.agent` role and is **documented, not probed** (see - *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agent-tool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*). + *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agenttool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*). - **Grant sets** — re-derive the `(role, scope)` grant sets from the Rego data maps and compare, as order-independent sets, to the `scenario_uc1.py` truth table. - Verdicts are **computed from** `scenario_uc1.py`, never from the Rego. A failing node names the From f573c9d8f5310676dc38df777c2223d6f9a3f68d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 19:22:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 255/273] docs(aiac): Fix dangling link to issue 6.2 in uc1-service-onboarding spec Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 186de21d9..25fa972fa 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv > K8s access: `list` on `agentcards.agent.kagenti.dev` in the target namespace. -- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools. `namespace` + `workload_name` are already resolved by `classify_service` (from the `client.name` split). MCP endpoint lookup uses the **hybrid Keycloak→K8s strategy** decided in issue [`6.2`](../../issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md): the Keycloak client name supplied the key `{namespace, workload_name}`; K8s supplies the reachable endpoint. +- **`analyze_tool`**: non-LLM node; discovers MCP tools. `namespace` + `workload_name` are already resolved by `classify_service` (from the `client.name` split). MCP endpoint lookup uses the **hybrid Keycloak→K8s strategy** decided in issue [`6.2`](../../../issues/agent/service-onboarding/6.2-analyze-tool-lookup-strategy.md): the Keycloak client name supplied the key `{namespace, workload_name}`; K8s supplies the reachable endpoint. 1. Locate MCP endpoint: a. GET the K8s `Service` named `workload_name` in `namespace` (operator convention: Service name == workload name). b. Require the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label present on that Service; `502` (actionable) if absent — the label is applied at deploy time, not stamped by the operator. From 1f34234a5d9fcbc7c3881824490afac08fdcce84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 18:51:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 256/273] fix: Exclude Keycloak default-roles composite from GET /roles Filter default-roles-{realm} out of the IdP Configuration Service's GET /roles response. That composite is the only path Keycloak's built-in roles (offline_access, uma_authorization, view-profile, account roles) are reachable through, so dropping it removes the whole built-in closure from downstream policy generation without a per-name blocklist. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 3 ++- .../idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 7 ++++++- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md index 364a5cfb7..c51216a99 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ Under the SPM/APM policy-model redesign the Policy Computation Engine (PCE) perf **Assumption 3 — an agent's role is a Keycloak _client role_; a user's role is a Keycloak _realm role_.** In Keycloak a `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: bool` and `containerId` (the client UUID for client roles, the realm id for realm roles). This service holds the invariant end-to-end: - **Agent roles.** `GET /services/{service_id}/roles` returns an agent's own roles (`R_A`) from two sources: the client's client roles (`admin.get_client_roles`, `clientRole == true`), **and** the `aiac.managed` realm roles assigned to the service account (the provisioning path the `Configuration` library uses). Both are surfaced as `kind = Agent` owned by this service — see the endpoint description and its Redesign note above. -- **User roles are realm roles.** `GET /roles` continues to read realm-level roles (`kind = User`). +- **User roles are realm roles.** `GET /roles` continues to read realm-level roles (`kind = User`), excluding the Keycloak-generated `default-roles-` composite (exact-name match). That composite is the *only* path to Keycloak's built-ins (`offline_access`, `uma_authorization`, `view-profile`, the `account` client roles) — no user holds them directly — so dropping it keeps AIAC policy free of Keycloak built-ins without a per-name blocklist. **Field population** (in the Keycloak → generic-model mapping layer, from the raw facts above): @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - `get_admin(realm: str = Query(...))` is a FastAPI dependency. On each call it checks the cache; on a miss it acquires the lock, double-checks, and constructs a new `KeycloakAdmin(realm_name=realm, user_realm_name=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM, ...)`. FastAPI returns `422` automatically if `realm` is absent. - All endpoints except `/health` declare `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. `/health` calls `_get_or_create_admin` directly with `os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]` — no FastAPI dependency, no realm query param. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. +- `GET /roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles(brief_representation=False)`, then drop the role named `default-roles-{realm}` (the Keycloak-generated default composite for the realm) before enrichment. - `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` to return the **client roles defined on this service's client** (agent roles, `kind = Agent`). Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no client roles); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. - `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. - `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index dc27644e3..642789e77 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -413,11 +413,16 @@ def assign_scope_to_service(service_id: str, scope_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin @app.get("/roles") -def list_roles(admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): +def list_roles(realm: str = Query(...), admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)): try: # brief_representation=False so realm-role attributes (incl. the aiac.managed marker) # are returned; the brief representation Keycloak returns by default omits them. roles = admin.get_realm_roles(brief_representation=False) + # Keycloak's auto-assigned default composite is the sole path to built-ins + # (offline_access, uma_authorization, view-profile, account roles) -- drop it so + # those built-ins never surface in AIAC policy (see handoff 01). + default_composite = f"default-roles-{realm}" + roles = [r for r in roles if r.get("name") != default_composite] for role in roles: # Realm roles are user roles (clientRole == false) -> kind=User (Assumption 3). role["kind"] = "User" diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 3cda21d87..9c358c6a2 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -68,7 +68,23 @@ def test_populates_user_kind_on_all_realm_roles(self): {"id": "r2", "name": "default-roles-kagenti"}, ] resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") - assert [r["kind"] for r in resp.json()] == ["User", "User"] + # default-roles-kagenti is the Keycloak default composite for this realm -> excluded. + assert [r["kind"] for r in resp.json()] == ["User"] + + def test_excludes_default_roles_composite_for_realm(self): + # The default composite (default-roles-{realm}) is the sole path to Keycloak's + # built-ins (offline_access, uma_authorization, view-profile, account roles) -- + # it must never appear in the response, and its members must never be scanned. + admin = MagicMock() + admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [ + {"id": "r1", "name": "reader"}, + {"id": "r2", "name": f"default-roles-{REALM}"}, + ] + resp = _make_client(admin).get(f"/roles?realm={REALM}") + names = [r["name"] for r in resp.json()] + assert f"default-roles-{REALM}" not in names + assert names == ["reader"] + admin.get_realm_role_members.assert_not_called() def test_aiac_managed_role_gets_member_usernames_as_actor_ids(self): # For a user (realm) role, actorIds = the member usernames — resolved via the same From 1be366e918b9df123f25099f84aae81b7caf0339 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 18:54:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 257/273] fix(pdp): Drop dead agent_scopes from outbound Rego package The outbound Rego package emitted an agent_scopes list that no outbound rule referenced -- agent_scopes is the inbound audience gate consumed by subject_ok/source_ok, not part of outbound's subject_ok/target_ok logic. Remove it from generate_outbound_rego only; generate_inbound_rego is unchanged. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 7 +++---- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 1 - aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index 2806dcd75..31f6aabeb 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ The generator embeds these symbols, derived from the `AgentPolicyModel`: |-------------|--------|-------| | `subject_roles` | `model.subject_roles` | subject id → `[role.name, …]` | | `source_roles` | `model.source_roles` | source id → `[role.name, …]` | -| `agent_scopes` | `model.agent_scopes` | `[scope.name, …]` | +| `agent_scopes` | `model.agent_scopes` | `[scope.name, …]` — **inbound package only** (the audience gate; outbound decisions do not consider the agent's own scopes) | | `agent_roles` | `model.agent_roles` | `[role.name, …]` | | `role_scopes` | grouped `model.inbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (agent scopes granted per subject role) — **inbound package only** | | `outbound_subject_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_subject_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes granted per user role) — **outbound package only** | @@ -146,13 +146,12 @@ allow if { subject_ok; source_ok } ### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` -Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here. +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here, and the outbound package does not emit `agent_scopes` at all: outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes, only its roles (`agent_roles`) and the target's accepted scopes. ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound agent_roles := ["{role.name}", ...] # from agent_roles -agent_scopes := ["{scope.name}", ...] # from agent_scopes subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } @@ -292,7 +291,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. - `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: extract `{namespace}/{name}` from a SPIFFE URI (or use the plain `{ns}/{name}` clientId as-is), then collapse every non-alphanumeric run to `_` and lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment, short and SPIRE-independent. - `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. -- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. The inbound `role_scopes` map is **not** embedded in the outbound package. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `subject_roles`, `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. Neither the inbound `role_scopes` map nor `agent_scopes` is embedded in the outbound package — outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. - `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. - `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index 47042159d..573a04a2b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: parts = [ f"package authz.{slug}.outbound", _render_list("agent_roles", _names(model.agent_roles)), - _render_list("agent_scopes", _names(model.agent_scopes)), _render_map("subject_roles", _name_map(model.subject_roles)), _render_map( "outbound_subject_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_subject_rules) diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py index 238d8468e..e3af52f54 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -188,10 +188,11 @@ def test_outbound_has_package_header_with_slug(): assert "package authz.weather_agent.outbound" in rego -def test_outbound_embeds_agent_roles_and_scopes_lists(): +def test_outbound_embeds_agent_roles_list(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) assert 'agent_roles := ["source-helper", "issues-helper"]' in rego - assert 'agent_scopes := ["source-access", "issues-access"]' in rego + # agent_scopes is the inbound audience gate; the outbound package must not emit it. + assert "agent_scopes :=" not in rego def test_outbound_agent_role_scopes_grouped_from_outbound_rules(): @@ -259,7 +260,6 @@ def test_outbound_has_no_legacy_id_carrying_input(): def test_outbound_empty_model_renders_valid_empty_literals(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_model()) assert "agent_roles := []" in rego - assert "agent_scopes := []" in rego assert "subject_roles := {}" in rego assert "outbound_subject_role_scopes := {}" in rego assert "agent_role_scopes := {}" in rego From dc290f00e31ef5ddd5503cd6b3e5fc25e2bae3d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 18:57:52 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 258/273] fix: Source Service Policy Builder candidates from get_services()/get_subjects() Replaces name-based exclusion sourced from get_service()/get_roles() with ownership-based exclusion (role id / scope.serviceId) sourced from get_services() (correct kind/ownership) plus get_subjects() (membership- derived user roles), aligning the builder with the PCE's worldview. Fixes I1 (self-reference: focus service's own role leaking into its own scope's candidates) and I2 (role-kind erasure: agent-held roles rendering as kind=User instead of kind=Agent). Updates docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md and docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md to match. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md | 2 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 41 ++++++----- .../uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py | 71 +++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md index 5b2952c52..c1b16f3ac 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: ### IdP access — library, not service -Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy Builder, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC3 Role) performs **all** IdP reads and writes through the **idp-library** API — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — and **never** calls the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. The library owns the HTTP transport, retry/backoff, and Keycloak↔model mapping; sub-agents depend only on its typed `Configuration` methods (e.g. `get_service`, `get_roles`, `get_scopes`, `create_service_role`, `create_service_scope`, `set_service_type`). The shared service-type vocabulary is `aiac.idp.configuration.models.ServiceType` (`Agent`/`Tool`) — the same enum used by `Service.type`. See [library-idp.md](library-idp.md). +Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy Builder, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC3 Role) performs **all** IdP reads and writes through the **idp-library** API — `aiac.idp.configuration.api.Configuration` — and **never** calls the IdP Configuration **service** (`aiac.idp.service.configuration.*`) or its HTTP endpoints directly. The library owns the HTTP transport, retry/backoff, and Keycloak↔model mapping; sub-agents depend only on its typed `Configuration` methods (e.g. `get_service`, `get_services`, `get_subjects`, `get_scopes`, `create_service_role`, `create_service_scope`, `set_service_type`). The shared service-type vocabulary is `aiac.idp.configuration.models.ServiceType` (`Agent`/`Tool`) — the same enum used by `Service.type`. See [library-idp.md](library-idp.md). --- diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 25fa972fa..25dd81437 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ flowchart TD **Sequence:** 1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. -2. Call `ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy Builder re-reads the service's own roles/scopes from the IdP by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted them), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. +2. Call `ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy Builder re-resolves the focus service from the IdP catalog by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted its roles/scopes), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. 3. Return `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. @@ -195,36 +195,41 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): **Nature:** deterministic IdP reader + PRB invoker. -**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's `service_id`, fetch its own roles + scopes from the IdP (`get_service(service_id)`), read the full IdP universe **excluding the new service's own entities**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. +**Purpose:** given the just-provisioned service's `service_id`, source candidates from the same worldview as the Policy Computation Engine (PCE) — `get_services()` for correct `kind`/ownership, `get_subjects()` for membership-derived user roles — exclude the focus service's own entities **by ownership**, call the PRB for each applicable (roles, scope) or (role, scopes) pair, and return a merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. -**Why `service_id`, not `ServiceProvision`:** own roles/scopes must be id-bearing `Role`/`Scope` — `flatten_role` needs a `Role` (with `childRoles`) and the PRB builds `PolicyRule(role=Role, scope=Scope)`. The Provision-time `RoleDefinition`/`ScopeDefinition` carry only name+description (no Keycloak id), so they cannot be passed to the PRB. Provision has already persisted these entities, so `get_service(service_id).roles` / `.scopes` returns them with ids. +**Why `service_id`, not `ServiceProvision`:** own roles/scopes must be id-bearing `Role`/`Scope` — `flatten_role` needs a `Role` (with `childRoles`) and the PRB builds `PolicyRule(role=Role, scope=Scope)`. The Provision-time `RoleDefinition`/`ScopeDefinition` carry only name+description (no Keycloak id), so they cannot be passed to the PRB. Provision has already persisted these entities, so resolving the focus service from `get_services()` returns them with ids and correct `kind`. -**Terminology — own vs other (used throughout this section):** -- **Own roles / own scopes** — the roles and scopes the just-provisioned service defines for *itself*, fetched from the IdP by `service_id`: `service.roles` / `service.scopes` (`get_service(service_id)`). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. -- **Other roles / other scopes** — every *pre-existing* role/scope in the IdP universe **minus** the new service's own entities. These belong to other services. +**Terminology — own vs candidate (used throughout this section):** +- **Own roles / own scopes** — the focus service's `aiac.managed` roles/scopes, found on the `Service` object returned by `get_services()` (matched by `serviceId == service_id`). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. +- **Candidate roles** — every role eligible to be mapped onto an own scope: other services' `aiac.managed` roles (`kind=Agent`) plus membership-derived user roles (`kind=User`; realm roles held by at least one user, composite-expanded, and not owned by any service). Never includes the focus service's own roles. +- **Other scopes** — every other service's `aiac.managed` scope (`scope.serviceId != service_id`). Never includes the focus service's own scopes. **Self-mapping invariant (must hold):** the PRB must **never** be handed an *(own role, own scope)* pair — a service's own role must never be mapped to its own scope. Onboarding only ever grants **cross-service** access: *who else* may call this service, and (agents only) *what else* this service may call. A service's own role reaching its own scope is not something onboarding needs to author (that access is intrinsic and out of scope here) and would pollute the policy set. The Service Policy Builder sub-agent guarantees the invariant **by construction** through two complementary guards: -1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the "other" side).** Own roles are removed from `other_roles` and own scopes from `other_scopes` before any PRB call (steps 3–4). Flattening runs *after* exclusion and cannot reintroduce an own role: the just-provisioned roles are brand new and are not yet referenced as `childRoles` by any existing role. -2. **Call direction (each call's "self" side is one own entity of the *opposite* kind).** Each PRB call pairs a single own entity with the other-side universe, never own-with-own, and keeps the semantic intent crisp: - - `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, own_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* (an **own scope** against **other roles**) - - `build_role_rules(own_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (an **own role** against **other scopes**; agent path only) +1. **Exclusion (own entities never appear on the candidate side), by ownership.** Own roles/scopes are identified by `role.id` / `scope.serviceId` matching the focus service — never by name — and are never added to `candidate_roles` / `other_scopes` (steps 3–4). This is immune to name collisions between services. +2. **Call direction (each call's "self" side is one own entity of the *opposite* kind).** Each PRB call pairs a single own entity with the candidate-side universe, never own-with-own, and keeps the semantic intent crisp: + - `build_scope_rules(candidate_roles, own_scope)` = *who else may call this skill* (an **own scope** against candidate roles) + - `build_role_rules(own_role, other_scopes)` = *what else may this role call* (an **own role** against other scopes; agent path only) -Neither guard alone is sufficient — exclusion keeps own entities off the other side, and the call direction keeps the self side and the other side of *opposite* kinds (a scope vs roles, or a role vs scopes). Together they make an *(own role, own scope)* pair unrepresentable in any PRB call. +Neither guard alone is sufficient — ownership-based exclusion keeps own entities off the candidate side, and the call direction keeps the self side and the other side of *opposite* kinds (a scope vs roles, or a role vs scopes). Together they make an *(own role, own scope)* pair unrepresentable in any PRB call. ### Steps 1. Receive `service_id: str` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. -2. Fetch the service's **own roles + scopes** from the IdP by `service_id` via `aiac.idp.configuration.api` (`get_service(service_id)` → `service.roles` / `service.scopes`, id-bearing `Role`/`Scope`). -3. Read **all roles** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the service's own roles (i.e. exclude `role.name in {r.name for r in service.roles}`). -4. Read **all scopes** from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`, **excluding** the service's own scopes (i.e. exclude `scope.name in {s.name for s in service.scopes}`). -5. **Flatten roles to their closure** before any PRB call, via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): expand `other_roles` into the union of every role's closure, de-duplicated by `role.id` (call this `flattened_other_roles`); on the agent path, also expand each of the service's own roles. +2. Fetch `services = get_services()`, `all_scopes = get_scopes()`, `subjects = get_subjects()` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. +3. Resolve the focus service: `focus = next(s for s in services if s.serviceId == service_id)` (the same identity the PCE catalogs its services by); a missing match is a clear `404`, not `StopIteration`. +4. Compute candidate sets, all by ownership: + - **own roles/scopes** — `focus.roles`/`focus.scopes` filtered to `aiac.managed` (drops Keycloak's built-in default client scopes, e.g. `profile`, which are stamped with this service's `serviceId` but are not `aiac.managed`). + - **other-agent roles** — `aiac.managed` roles from every *other* service's `roles` (`kind=Agent`, ownership-excluded by `serviceId != focus.serviceId`). + - **user roles** — realm roles linked to at least one subject (via `subjects[*].roles`, composite-expanded through `flatten_role`) and not owned by any service (`role.id` not in the union of every service's role ids). These carry `kind=User`. + - **other scopes** — `aiac.managed` scopes from `all_scopes` with `serviceId != focus.serviceId`. +5. **Flatten candidate roles to their closure** before any PRB call, via the shared `flatten_role` helper (see [Composite role flattening](#composite-role-flattening)): union of other-agent roles + user roles, deduplicated by `role.id` (`candidate_roles`); on the agent path, also expand each of the focus service's own roles. 6. Call PRB and merge: - - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each of the service's own scopes. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. - - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)` for each own scope; for each of the service's own roles, call `build_role_rules(r, other_scopes)` **once per role `r` in that role's closure**. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. + - **`service_type = tool`:** call `build_scope_rules(candidate_roles, scope)` for each of the focus service's own scopes. Merge results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. + - **`service_type = agent`:** call `build_scope_rules(candidate_roles, scope)` for each own scope; for each of the focus service's own roles, call `build_role_rules(r, other_scopes)` **once per role `r` in that role's closure**. Merge all results into a single `list[PolicyRule]`. 7. Return the merged `list[PolicyRule]` to the Orchestrator. (The Orchestrator pairs it with `override=False` for the Controller — see [Architecture overview](#architecture-overview).) -**Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to each `agent_role`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full excluded-self scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). +**Note on "all relevant scopes":** relevance (which of `other_scopes` maps to each `agent_role`) is determined by the PRB, not here. This module always passes the full ownership-excluded scope universe; the PRB emits only the relevant rule mappings. See [`policy-rules-builder.md`](policy-rules-builder.md). ### Composite role flattening diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index f0a545bbb..a5e05310e 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -1,17 +1,23 @@ """Service Policy Builder sub-agent (UC1). Second of the two stages sequenced by the Service Onboarding Orchestrator, run after -Service Provision. Deterministic (non-LLM): reads the full IdP role/scope universe -*excluding the just-provisioned service's own entities*, flattens roles to their closure -via ``flatten_role`` (3.2) before any PRB call, invokes the Policy Rules Builder for each +Service Provision. Deterministic (non-LLM): sources candidates from the same worldview as +the Policy Computation Engine — ``get_services()`` for correct ``kind``/ownership, plus +``get_subjects()`` for membership-derived user roles — flattens roles to their closure via +``flatten_role`` (3.2) before any PRB call, invokes the Policy Rules Builder for each applicable pair, and returns a single ``list[PolicyRule]``. It applies nothing — the Orchestrator/Controller make the single ``compute_and_apply`` (PCE) call afterwards. IdP access is via the **idp-library** ``Configuration`` (the ``_config`` seam), never the -IdP Configuration Service directly. Own roles/scopes are fetched from the IdP by -``service_id`` (``get_service`` → id-bearing ``Role``/``Scope``), so they are usable as PRB -inputs and can be flattened; ``RoleDefinition``/``ScopeDefinition`` (no id) are never passed -to the PRB. +IdP Configuration Service directly. The focus service is resolved from ``get_services()`` +by ``serviceId`` (the same identity the PCE catalogs on), so its own roles/scopes are +id-bearing ``Role``/``Scope`` usable as PRB inputs and flattenable. + +Candidates are excluded/included by **ownership** (role id / ``scope.serviceId``), never by +name: the focus service's own ``aiac.managed`` roles/scopes are never candidates; other +services' ``aiac.managed`` roles carry ``kind=Agent``; realm roles held by at least one user +(composite-expanded, and not owned by any service) carry ``kind=User``. This keeps +``subject_roles``/``source_roles`` routing correct downstream in the PCE. """ from fastapi import HTTPException @@ -19,7 +25,7 @@ from aiac.agent.policy_rules_builder.graph import build_role_rules, build_scope_rules from aiac.agent.shared.roles import flatten_role from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import ServiceType +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule @@ -45,28 +51,51 @@ def build(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: config = _config() try: - service = config.get_service(service_id) - all_roles = config.get_roles() + services = config.get_services() all_scopes = config.get_scopes() + subjects = config.get_subjects() except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( 502, f"IdP Configuration Service unavailable for service {service_id!r}: {e}" ) - own_roles = service.roles - own_scopes = service.scopes - - own_role_names = {r.name for r in own_roles} - own_scope_names = {s.name for s in own_scopes} - - other_roles = [r for r in all_roles if r.name not in own_role_names] - other_scopes = [s for s in all_scopes if s.name not in own_scope_names] - - flattened_other_roles = _flatten_dedup(other_roles) + focus = next((s for s in services if s.serviceId == service_id), None) + if focus is None: + raise HTTPException(404, f"service {service_id!r} not found in IdP catalog") + + own_roles = [r for r in focus.roles if r.aiac_managed] + own_scopes = [s for s in focus.scopes if s.aiac_managed] + + # kind=Agent rides through unchanged from get_services() → routes to source_roles in the PCE. + other_agent_roles = [ + r + for other in services + if other.serviceId != focus.serviceId + for r in other.roles + if r.aiac_managed + ] + + # User roles are membership-derived, not aiac.managed: a realm role qualifies iff a user + # holds it directly or via a composite parent they hold, and no service owns it. + service_owned_ids = {r.id for s in services for r in s.roles} + user_roles_by_id: dict[str, Role] = {} + for subject in subjects: + for role in subject.roles: + # NB: flatten_role on an agent composite role would yield children whose kind + # defaults to User (composites endpoint doesn't carry per-service kind) — a latent + # edge case if a user is ever assigned a composite agent role. Not hit here. + for member in flatten_role(role): + if member.id not in service_owned_ids: + user_roles_by_id[member.id] = member + user_roles = list(user_roles_by_id.values()) + + other_scopes = [s for s in all_scopes if s.aiac_managed and s.serviceId != focus.serviceId] + + candidate_roles = _flatten_dedup(user_roles + other_agent_roles) rules: list[PolicyRule] = [] for scope in own_scopes: - rules.extend(build_scope_rules(flattened_other_roles, scope)) + rules.extend(build_scope_rules(candidate_roles, scope)) if service_type is ServiceType.AGENT: for own_role in own_roles: for role in flatten_role(own_role): From 347683303e1f7c6ce5999f377d261dde0052b333 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 20:15:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 259/273] test: Rewrite Service Policy Builder unit tests for ownership-based contract Replace get_service/get_roles name-based exclusion mocks with get_services/get_scopes/get_subjects, matching ServicePolicyBuilder.build's ownership-based (role id / scope.serviceId) candidate selection. Add tests for ownership-beats-membership, kind routing (Agent vs User), non-aiac.managed scope drop, and missing-focus 404 handling. Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py | 352 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 251 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py index b0e6117c7..b78825334 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py @@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ The idp-library `Configuration` is mocked via the `_config` seam, and the PRB entry points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`) are patched on the builder module — no live services, no LLM. The sub-agent is deterministic and applies nothing. + +Candidates are sourced from `get_services()` / `get_scopes()` / `get_subjects()` — the +same worldview as the Policy Computation Engine — and excluded/included by +**ownership** (role id / `scope.serviceId`), never by name. Fixtures below always give +non-focus services distinct `serviceId`s and mark AIAC-provisioned roles/scopes with the +`aiac.managed` attribute, so ownership-based routing is exercised for real. """ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch @@ -11,38 +17,52 @@ from fastapi import HTTPException from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.policy_builder import builder -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, Service, ServiceType +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import RoleKind, Scope, Service, ServiceType, Subject +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role as RoleModel from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule -SERVICE_ID = "svc-123" +FOCUS_ID = "svc-focus" +OTHER_ID = "svc-other" +THIRD_ID = "svc-third" -def _role(name, *, role_id=None, composite=False, children=None): - return Role( +def _role(name, *, role_id=None, composite=False, children=None, kind=RoleKind.USER, aiac_managed=True): + return RoleModel( id=role_id or f"{name}-id", name=name, description=name, composite=composite, childRoles=children or [], + attributes={"aiac.managed": ["true"]} if aiac_managed else {}, + kind=kind, ) -def _scope(name, *, scope_id=None): - return Scope(id=scope_id or f"{name}-id", name=name, description=name) +def _scope(name, *, scope_id=None, service_id="", aiac_managed=True): + return Scope( + id=scope_id or f"{name}-id", + name=name, + description=name, + attributes={"aiac.managed": "true"} if aiac_managed else {}, + serviceId=service_id, + ) -def _service(own_roles, own_scopes): - return Service.model_validate( - { - "id": SERVICE_ID, - "clientId": SERVICE_ID, - "enabled": True, - "roles": [r.model_dump() for r in own_roles], - "scopes": [s.model_dump() for s in own_scopes], - } +def _service(service_id, *, roles=None, scopes=None, service_type=ServiceType.TOOL): + return Service( + id=service_id, + serviceId=service_id, + enabled=True, + type=service_type, + roles=roles or [], + scopes=scopes or [], ) +def _subject(username, *, roles=None, subject_id=None): + return Subject(id=subject_id or f"{username}-id", username=username, enabled=True, roles=roles or []) + + def _rule(role, scope): return PolicyRule(role=role, scope=scope) @@ -50,20 +70,23 @@ def _rule(role, scope): def _invoke( service_type, *, - own_roles, - own_scopes, - all_roles, + services, all_scopes, + subjects, + service_id=FOCUS_ID, scope_rules=None, role_rules=None, - get_service_exc=None, - get_roles_exc=None, + get_services_exc=None, + get_scopes_exc=None, + get_subjects_exc=None, ): """Run ServicePolicyBuilder.build with all IdP + PRB calls mocked. - `scope_rules` / `role_rules` are optional side_effect callables; default to - returning an empty list so calls are counted without inventing rule content. - `get_service_exc` / `get_roles_exc` inject IdP-read failures. + `services` / `all_scopes` / `subjects` back `get_services()` / `get_scopes()` / + `get_subjects()` respectively. `scope_rules` / `role_rules` are optional + side_effect callables; default to returning an empty list so calls are counted + without inventing rule content. `get_*_exc` injects an IdP-read failure on the + corresponding call. """ with ( patch.object(builder, "_config") as cfg, @@ -71,34 +94,38 @@ def _invoke( patch.object(builder, "build_role_rules") as brr, ): conf = MagicMock() - if get_service_exc is not None: - conf.get_service.side_effect = get_service_exc + if get_services_exc is not None: + conf.get_services.side_effect = get_services_exc + else: + conf.get_services.return_value = services + if get_scopes_exc is not None: + conf.get_scopes.side_effect = get_scopes_exc else: - conf.get_service.return_value = _service(own_roles, own_scopes) - if get_roles_exc is not None: - conf.get_roles.side_effect = get_roles_exc + conf.get_scopes.return_value = all_scopes + if get_subjects_exc is not None: + conf.get_subjects.side_effect = get_subjects_exc else: - conf.get_roles.return_value = all_roles - conf.get_scopes.return_value = all_scopes + conf.get_subjects.return_value = subjects cfg.return_value = conf bsr.side_effect = scope_rules or (lambda roles, scope: []) brr.side_effect = role_rules or (lambda role, scopes: []) - result = builder.ServicePolicyBuilder.build(SERVICE_ID, service_type) + result = builder.ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type) return result, bsr, brr, conf class TestTool: def test_single_scope_calls_build_scope_rules_once_and_merges(self): - own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") - other_role = _role("github.agent") + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + other_role = _role("github.agent", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, scopes=[own_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[other_role]) rule = _rule(other_role, own_scope) result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.TOOL, - own_roles=[], - own_scopes=[own_scope], - all_roles=[other_role], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[], scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [rule], ) @@ -110,16 +137,18 @@ def test_single_scope_calls_build_scope_rules_once_and_merges(self): assert result == [rule] def test_build_scope_rules_once_per_own_scope_and_results_merged(self): - s1, s2 = _scope("weather.forecast"), _scope("weather.history") - other = _role("github.agent") - r1, r2 = _rule(other, s1), _rule(other, s2) + s1 = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + s2 = _scope("weather.history", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + other_role = _role("github.agent", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, scopes=[s1, s2]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[other_role]) + r1, r2 = _rule(other_role, s1), _rule(other_role, s2) result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.TOOL, - own_roles=[], - own_scopes=[s1, s2], - all_roles=[other], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[s1, s2], + subjects=[], scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [r1] if scope.name == s1.name else [r2], ) @@ -132,23 +161,24 @@ def test_build_scope_rules_once_per_own_scope_and_results_merged(self): class TestAgent: def test_scope_rules_per_own_scope_and_role_rules_per_own_role(self): own_role = _role("weather.agent") - own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") - other_role = _role("github.agent") - other_scope = _scope("github.issue") + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + other_role = _role("github.agent", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) + other_scope = _scope("github.issue", service_id=OTHER_ID) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, roles=[own_role], scopes=[own_scope], service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[other_role], scopes=[other_scope]) scope_rule = _rule(other_role, own_scope) role_rule = _rule(own_role, other_scope) result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.AGENT, - own_roles=[own_role], - own_scopes=[own_scope], - all_roles=[own_role, other_role], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[own_scope, other_scope], + subjects=[], scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [scope_rule], role_rules=lambda role, scopes: [role_rule], ) - # scope side: once per own scope, roles list is the other-role universe + # scope side: once per own scope, roles list is the other-agent-role universe assert bsr.call_count == 1 s_roles, s_scope = bsr.call_args.args assert s_scope.name == "weather.forecast" @@ -165,17 +195,20 @@ def test_scope_rules_per_own_scope_and_role_rules_per_own_role(self): class TestFlattening: def test_composite_other_role_expanded_to_closure_deduped_by_id(self): - reader = _role("github.reader", role_id="reader-id") + reader = _role("github.reader", role_id="reader-id", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) # composite whose closure includes reader, which also appears standalone - admin = _role("github.admin", role_id="admin-id", composite=True, children=[reader]) - own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") + admin = _role( + "github.admin", role_id="admin-id", composite=True, children=[reader], kind=RoleKind.AGENT + ) + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, scopes=[own_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[admin, reader]) _, bsr, _, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.TOOL, - own_roles=[], - own_scopes=[own_scope], - all_roles=[admin, reader], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[], ) passed_roles = bsr.call_args.args[0] @@ -186,14 +219,15 @@ def test_composite_other_role_expanded_to_closure_deduped_by_id(self): def test_composite_own_agent_role_calls_build_role_rules_per_closure_member(self): sub = _role("weather.reader", role_id="wr-id") own_role = _role("weather.admin", role_id="wa-id", composite=True, children=[sub]) - other_scope = _scope("github.issue") + other_scope = _scope("github.issue", service_id=OTHER_ID) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, roles=[own_role], service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, scopes=[other_scope]) _, _, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.AGENT, - own_roles=[own_role], - own_scopes=[], - all_roles=[own_role, sub], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[other_scope], + subjects=[], ) assert brr.call_count == 2 @@ -201,97 +235,214 @@ def test_composite_own_agent_role_calls_build_role_rules_per_closure_member(self class TestSelfExclusion: - def test_own_role_and_scope_excluded_from_other_universe(self): - own_role, own_scope = _role("weather.agent"), _scope("weather.forecast") - other_role, other_scope = _role("github.agent"), _scope("github.issue") + """Exclusion is by ownership (role id / scope.serviceId), never by name — the other + service's role/scope below intentionally shares a name with the focus's own, to prove + that name is not what drives exclusion.""" + + def test_own_role_and_scope_excluded_from_other_universe_even_when_name_matches(self): + own_role = _role("shared.name", role_id="own-role-id") + own_scope = _scope("shared.scope", scope_id="own-scope-id", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + other_role = _role("shared.name", role_id="other-role-id", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) + other_scope = _scope("shared.scope", scope_id="other-scope-id", service_id=OTHER_ID) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, roles=[own_role], scopes=[own_scope], service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[other_role], scopes=[other_scope]) _, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.AGENT, - own_roles=[own_role], - own_scopes=[own_scope], - all_roles=[own_role, other_role], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[own_scope, other_scope], + subjects=[], ) - # own role never in the roles list handed to build_scope_rules - assert [r.name for r in bsr.call_args.args[0]] == ["github.agent"] + # own role never in the roles list handed to build_scope_rules — only the other + # service's same-named-but-differently-owned role is present + assert [r.id for r in bsr.call_args.args[0]] == ["other-role-id"] # own scope never in the scopes list handed to build_role_rules - assert [s.name for s in brr.call_args.args[1]] == ["github.issue"] + assert [s.id for s in brr.call_args.args[1]] == ["other-scope-id"] class TestSelfMappingInvariant: def test_no_own_role_in_any_scope_call_and_no_own_scope_in_any_role_call(self): own_roles = [_role("weather.agent"), _role("weather.admin")] - own_scopes = [_scope("weather.forecast"), _scope("weather.history")] - other_roles = [_role("github.agent"), _role("slack.bot")] - other_scopes = [_scope("github.issue"), _scope("slack.post")] - own_role_names = {r.name for r in own_roles} - own_scope_names = {s.name for s in own_scopes} + own_scopes = [ + _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID), + _scope("weather.history", service_id=FOCUS_ID), + ] + other_roles = [_role("github.agent", kind=RoleKind.AGENT), _role("slack.bot", kind=RoleKind.AGENT)] + other_scopes = [ + _scope("github.issue", service_id=OTHER_ID), + _scope("slack.post", service_id=OTHER_ID), + ] + own_role_ids = {r.id for r in own_roles} + own_scope_ids = {s.id for s in own_scopes} + + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, roles=own_roles, scopes=own_scopes, service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=other_roles, scopes=other_scopes) _, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.AGENT, - own_roles=own_roles, - own_scopes=own_scopes, - all_roles=own_roles + other_roles, + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=own_scopes + other_scopes, + subjects=[], ) # across ALL build_scope_rules calls, no roles list contains an own role for c in bsr.call_args_list: - assert own_role_names.isdisjoint({r.name for r in c.args[0]}) + assert own_role_ids.isdisjoint({r.id for r in c.args[0]}) # across ALL build_role_rules calls, no scopes list contains an own scope for c in brr.call_args_list: - assert own_scope_names.isdisjoint({s.name for s in c.args[1]}) + assert own_scope_ids.isdisjoint({s.id for s in c.args[1]}) + + +class TestOwnershipBeatsMembership: + def test_role_owned_by_focus_and_held_by_user_is_excluded_from_candidates(self): + own_role = _role("weather.admin", role_id="own-role-id") + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + # a user also holds the focus's own role — ownership must still exclude it + subject = _subject("alice", roles=[own_role]) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, roles=[own_role], scopes=[own_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID) + + _, bsr, _, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[focus, other], + all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[subject], + ) + + assert bsr.call_args.args[0] == [] + + +class TestKindRouting: + def test_other_agent_role_carries_agent_kind_and_user_role_carries_user_kind(self): + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + other_role = _role("github.agent", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) + user_role = _role("realm.viewer", kind=RoleKind.USER, aiac_managed=False) + subject = _subject("alice", roles=[user_role]) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, scopes=[own_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[other_role]) + + result, bsr, _, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[focus, other], + all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[subject], + scope_rules=lambda roles, scope: [_rule(r, scope) for r in roles], + ) + + by_name = {rule.role.name: rule.role.kind for rule in result} + assert by_name["github.agent"] == RoleKind.AGENT + assert by_name["realm.viewer"] == RoleKind.USER + + +class TestBuiltInScopeDropped: + def test_non_aiac_managed_own_scope_never_reaches_build_scope_rules(self): + managed_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + builtin_scope = _scope("profile", service_id=FOCUS_ID, aiac_managed=False) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, scopes=[managed_scope, builtin_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID) + + _, bsr, _, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[focus, other], + all_scopes=[managed_scope, builtin_scope], + subjects=[], + ) + + assert bsr.call_count == 1 + assert bsr.call_args.args[1].name == "weather.forecast" + + +class TestMissingFocus: + def test_service_id_not_in_catalog_raises_http_exception_not_stopiteration(self): + other = _service(OTHER_ID) + + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[other], + all_scopes=[], + subjects=[], + service_id="svc-does-not-exist", + ) + + assert ei.value.status_code == 404 class TestEmptyUniverse: - def test_no_other_entities_invokes_prb_with_empty_lists_and_returns_empty(self): - own_role, own_scope = _role("weather.agent"), _scope("weather.forecast") + def test_no_other_services_or_subjects_yields_no_rules_without_error(self): + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID) + + result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.AGENT, + services=[focus], + all_scopes=[], + subjects=[], + ) + + bsr.assert_not_called() + brr.assert_not_called() + assert result == [] + + def test_own_entities_only_invokes_prb_with_empty_lists(self): + own_role, own_scope = _role("weather.agent"), _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, roles=[own_role], scopes=[own_scope], service_type=ServiceType.AGENT) result, bsr, brr, _ = _invoke( ServiceType.AGENT, - own_roles=[own_role], - own_scopes=[own_scope], - all_roles=[own_role], # only the service's own entities exist + services=[focus], # no other services, no subjects all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[], ) assert bsr.call_count == 1 - assert bsr.call_args.args[0] == [] # empty other-roles universe + assert bsr.call_args.args[0] == [] # empty candidate-roles universe assert brr.call_count == 1 assert brr.call_args.args[1] == [] # empty other-scopes universe assert result == [] class TestErrors: - def test_idp_unavailable_is_502_after_retries(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "2") + def test_get_services_unavailable_is_502(self): + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[], + all_scopes=[], + subjects=[], + get_services_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 503"), + ) + assert ei.value.status_code == 502 + + def test_get_scopes_unavailable_is_502(self): + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID) with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: _invoke( ServiceType.TOOL, - own_roles=[], - own_scopes=[], - all_roles=[], + services=[focus], all_scopes=[], - get_service_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 503"), + subjects=[], + get_scopes_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 500"), ) assert ei.value.status_code == 502 - def test_idp_get_roles_unavailable_is_502(self, monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "1") + def test_get_subjects_unavailable_is_502(self): + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID) with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: _invoke( ServiceType.TOOL, - own_roles=[], - own_scopes=[_scope("weather.forecast")], - all_roles=[], - all_scopes=[_scope("weather.forecast")], - get_roles_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 500"), + services=[focus], + all_scopes=[], + subjects=[], + get_subjects_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 500"), ) assert ei.value.status_code == 502 def test_prb_exception_propagates_no_partial_apply(self): - own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast") + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=FOCUS_ID) + other_role = _role("github.agent", kind=RoleKind.AGENT) + focus = _service(FOCUS_ID, scopes=[own_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, roles=[other_role]) def _boom(roles, scope): raise RuntimeError("LLM/ChromaDB failure") @@ -299,9 +450,8 @@ def _boom(roles, scope): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LLM/ChromaDB failure"): _invoke( ServiceType.TOOL, - own_roles=[], - own_scopes=[own_scope], - all_roles=[_role("github.agent")], + services=[focus, other], all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[], scope_rules=_boom, ) From 00eb3215170f8b320f81b1fede0c16cab3a09c7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 21:21:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 260/273] fix: Resolve Service Policy Builder focus by internal client UUID The builder's focus-service lookup matched the trigger id against Service.serviceId (the human-readable Keycloak clientId), but the /apply/service/{id} route is keyed on the internal client UUID (Service.id) -- a clientId can be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI the single-segment route cannot carry. The two id shapes never matched, so every onboard raised HTTP 404 "service not found in IdP catalog" (regression introduced when the builder switched from get_service(id) to scanning get_services()). Match on Service.id instead. Add a regression test with distinct id/serviceId values (the prior _service() fixture conflated them, which is why the mismatch went uncaught); extend the helper with a `ref` param for the clientId. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py | 5 +- .../onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py | 49 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index a5e05310e..61ef28202 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -59,7 +59,10 @@ def build(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: 502, f"IdP Configuration Service unavailable for service {service_id!r}: {e}" ) - focus = next((s for s in services if s.serviceId == service_id), None) + # The trigger id is the Keycloak internal client UUID (Service.id), not the human-readable + # clientId (Service.serviceId): the /apply/service/{id} route is keyed on the UUID because a + # clientId can be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI the single-segment route cannot carry. + focus = next((s for s in services if s.id == service_id), None) if focus is None: raise HTTPException(404, f"service {service_id!r} not found in IdP catalog") diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py index b78825334..08f0e23bd 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py @@ -48,10 +48,13 @@ def _scope(name, *, scope_id=None, service_id="", aiac_managed=True): ) -def _service(service_id, *, roles=None, scopes=None, service_type=ServiceType.TOOL): +def _service(service_id, *, ref=None, roles=None, scopes=None, service_type=ServiceType.TOOL): + # `service_id` is the internal client UUID (Service.id — the /apply/service/{id} route key); + # `ref` is the human-readable clientId (Service.serviceId), which defaults to the UUID for the + # tests that don't care but is set distinctly where the id-shape distinction matters. return Service( id=service_id, - serviceId=service_id, + serviceId=ref or service_id, enabled=True, type=service_type, roles=roles or [], @@ -369,6 +372,48 @@ def test_service_id_not_in_catalog_raises_http_exception_not_stopiteration(self) assert ei.value.status_code == 404 +class TestFocusResolvedByInternalId: + """The trigger id handed to build() is the Keycloak internal client UUID (Service.id), not the + human-readable clientId (Service.serviceId) — the /apply/service/{id} route is keyed on the UUID + because a clientId can be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI. Regression for the id-shape mismatch that + made every onboard 404 (focus matched on serviceId instead of id).""" + + UUID = "f5592be1-uuid" + CLIENT_ID = "spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent" + + def test_focus_resolved_by_uuid_when_serviceid_differs(self): + own_scope = _scope("weather.forecast", service_id=self.UUID) + focus = _service(self.UUID, ref=self.CLIENT_ID, scopes=[own_scope]) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, ref="svc-other-client") + + result, bsr, _, _ = _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[focus, other], + all_scopes=[own_scope], + subjects=[], + service_id=self.UUID, # the route/trigger id is the UUID, not the clientId + ) + + # resolved (no 404); the focus's own scope reached build_scope_rules + assert bsr.call_count == 1 + assert bsr.call_args.args[1].name == "weather.forecast" + + def test_passing_the_clientid_does_not_resolve_focus(self): + focus = _service(self.UUID, ref=self.CLIENT_ID) + other = _service(OTHER_ID, ref="svc-other-client") + + with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: + _invoke( + ServiceType.TOOL, + services=[focus, other], + all_scopes=[], + subjects=[], + service_id=self.CLIENT_ID, # clientId is NOT the route key → not found + ) + + assert ei.value.status_code == 404 + + class TestEmptyUniverse: def test_no_other_services_or_subjects_yields_no_rules_without_error(self): focus = _service(FOCUS_ID) From 93814b83d9f97caeb0aa0203c24e614751094a7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 21:54:40 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 261/273] docs: Correct service_id identity to internal client UUID The Service Policy Builder focus is resolved from get_services() by id (the Keycloak internal client UUID the /apply/service/{id} route and Trigger.entity_id carry), not by serviceId/clientId (which may be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI). Sync the uc1-service-onboarding spec, the provision-state comment, and the builder docstring to this contract. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 12 ++++++------ .../agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py | 6 ++++-- aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 25dd81437..96a833412 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ flowchart TD **Sequence:** 1. Call `ServiceProvisionGraph.invoke()` → get back `ServiceProvision { roles, scopes }` + `service_type`. -2. Call `ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy Builder re-resolves the focus service from the IdP catalog by `service_id` (Provision has already persisted its roles/scopes), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. +2. Call `ServicePolicyBuilder.build(service_id, service_type)` → get back `list[PolicyRule]`. Service Policy Builder re-resolves the focus service from the IdP catalog by its internal client UUID (`service_id`; Provision has already persisted its roles/scopes), so it needs only the id, not the `ServiceProvision`. 3. Return `(list[PolicyRule], override=False)` to the Controller. No LLM calls, retry logic, or response assembly in the Orchestrator beyond sequencing. @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv ### Nodes - **`classify_service`**: resolves identity + determines service type from the operator's authoritative `kagenti.io/type` label (values `agent`/`tool`) — **not** from the `entity_id` format. - 1. Store `service_id = trigger.entity_id` (Keycloak `client_id`). + 1. Store `service_id = trigger.entity_id` (the Keycloak **internal client UUID** — `Service.id` — **not** the `clientId`/`serviceId`). The `/apply/service/{service_id}` route and every downstream lookup (`get_service` → `admin.get_client`, and the builder's focus resolution) are keyed on this UUID because a `clientId` can be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI that a single path segment cannot carry. 2. Resolve identity: call `get_service(service_id)` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api` → `client.name`, which the kagenti-operator sets to `"{namespace}/{workload_name}"` for every workload (agents and tools, SPIRE-enabled or not). Split on the first `/` → store `namespace` and `workload_name`. `502` if `client.name` has no `/` (namespace unrecoverable). 3. LIST pods in `namespace`; select the pod owned by `workload_name` via `ownerReferences` (Deployment → ReplicaSet name prefix, or `StatefulSet`/`Sandbox` name match). `502` on Kubernetes API failure or no matching pod. 4. Read the `kagenti.io/type` label on that pod and normalize it to a `ServiceType` @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv - Absent or any other value (normalization raises `ValueError`) → `502` (inconsistent deployment). > K8s access: `list` on `pods` in the target namespace (both paths). - > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied by the kagenti-operator (via the AgentRuntime CR) and propagated to pod labels; it is the operator's own agent/tool discriminator (`SkipReason`, kagenti-operator `internal/clientreg/names.go`). The operator only registers a Keycloak client for a workload that already carries this label, so it is effectively guaranteed for operator-registered clients; a missing/invalid value still fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + label). The `entity_id` format (SPIFFE vs plain) reflects whether SPIRE is enabled, **not** the service type, so it is not used for classification. + > `kagenti.io/type` is authoritative — applied by the kagenti-operator (via the AgentRuntime CR) and propagated to pod labels; it is the operator's own agent/tool discriminator (`SkipReason`, kagenti-operator `internal/clientreg/names.go`). The operator only registers a Keycloak client for a workload that already carries this label, so it is effectively guaranteed for operator-registered clients; a missing/invalid value still fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + label). The service's `clientId` format (SPIFFE vs plain) reflects whether SPIRE is enabled, **not** the service type, so it is not used for classification (and is why `service_id`/`entity_id` is the slash-free internal UUID, not the clientId). - **`analyze_agent`**: non-LLM node; reads AgentCard CR. 1. LIST `AgentCard` CRs (`agent.kagenti.dev/v1alpha1`) in `namespace`; find the one whose @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Extends `BaseAgentState` with: | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| -| `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak `client_id` = `trigger.entity_id` | +| `service_id` | `str \| None` | Keycloak **internal client UUID** (`Service.id`) = `trigger.entity_id` — not the `clientId` | | `namespace` | `str \| None` | From the `client.name` split in `classify_service` (agents and tools) | | `workload_name` | `str \| None` | From the `client.name` split in `classify_service` (agents and tools) | | `service_type` | `ServiceType \| None` | `agent` or `tool`; routing field | @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ class ServiceProvision(BaseModel): **Why `service_id`, not `ServiceProvision`:** own roles/scopes must be id-bearing `Role`/`Scope` — `flatten_role` needs a `Role` (with `childRoles`) and the PRB builds `PolicyRule(role=Role, scope=Scope)`. The Provision-time `RoleDefinition`/`ScopeDefinition` carry only name+description (no Keycloak id), so they cannot be passed to the PRB. Provision has already persisted these entities, so resolving the focus service from `get_services()` returns them with ids and correct `kind`. **Terminology — own vs candidate (used throughout this section):** -- **Own roles / own scopes** — the focus service's `aiac.managed` roles/scopes, found on the `Service` object returned by `get_services()` (matched by `serviceId == service_id`). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. +- **Own roles / own scopes** — the focus service's `aiac.managed` roles/scopes, found on the `Service` object returned by `get_services()` (matched by `id == service_id`, the internal client UUID). These are exactly the entities Service Provision wrote. - **Candidate roles** — every role eligible to be mapped onto an own scope: other services' `aiac.managed` roles (`kind=Agent`) plus membership-derived user roles (`kind=User`; realm roles held by at least one user, composite-expanded, and not owned by any service). Never includes the focus service's own roles. - **Other scopes** — every other service's `aiac.managed` scope (`scope.serviceId != service_id`). Never includes the focus service's own scopes. @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ Neither guard alone is sufficient — ownership-based exclusion keeps own entiti 1. Receive `service_id: str` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. 2. Fetch `services = get_services()`, `all_scopes = get_scopes()`, `subjects = get_subjects()` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -3. Resolve the focus service: `focus = next(s for s in services if s.serviceId == service_id)` (the same identity the PCE catalogs its services by); a missing match is a clear `404`, not `StopIteration`. +3. Resolve the focus service: `focus = next(s for s in services if s.id == service_id)` (the internal client UUID carried by the route/`Trigger.entity_id` — **not** `serviceId`/clientId, which may be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI); a missing match is a clear `404`, not `StopIteration`. 4. Compute candidate sets, all by ownership: - **own roles/scopes** — `focus.roles`/`focus.scopes` filtered to `aiac.managed` (drops Keycloak's built-in default client scopes, e.g. `profile`, which are stamped with this service's `serviceId` but are not `aiac.managed`). - **other-agent roles** — `aiac.managed` roles from every *other* service's `roles` (`kind=Agent`, ownership-excluded by `serviceId != focus.serviceId`). diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index 61ef28202..59e57d8bc 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ IdP access is via the **idp-library** ``Configuration`` (the ``_config`` seam), never the IdP Configuration Service directly. The focus service is resolved from ``get_services()`` -by ``serviceId`` (the same identity the PCE catalogs on), so its own roles/scopes are -id-bearing ``Role``/``Scope`` usable as PRB inputs and flattenable. +by ``id`` (the Keycloak internal client UUID the ``/apply/service/{id}`` route and +``Trigger.entity_id`` carry — **not** ``serviceId``/clientId, which may be a slash-bearing +SPIFFE URI), so its own roles/scopes are id-bearing ``Role``/``Scope`` usable as PRB inputs +and flattenable. Candidates are excluded/included by **ownership** (role id / ``scope.serviceId``), never by name: the focus service's own ``aiac.managed`` roles/scopes are never candidates; other diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py index a66857f30..aa3cda45a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/state.py @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ class Trigger(BaseModel): class OnboardingProvisionState(BaseModel): trigger: Trigger - service_id: str | None = None # Keycloak client_id = trigger.entity_id + service_id: str | None = None # Keycloak internal client UUID (Service.id) = trigger.entity_id (not clientId) namespace: str | None = None # from client.name split in classify_service workload_name: str | None = None # from client.name split in classify_service service_type: ServiceType | None = None From 4b1d5e20881701ac2542869a4aac3afd5312ec4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 22:02:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 262/273] chore: Drop onboarding.old/policy from ruff/pytest config The archived onboarding.old/policy subtree is no longer part of the build, so remove its ruff extend-exclude entry and its pytest pythonpath entry. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/pyproject.toml | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml index 5d73606cd..2153c2e8f 100644 --- a/aiac/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -3,15 +3,13 @@ line-length = 120 target-version = "py312" # Apply excludes even to paths passed explicitly (e.g. by pre-commit / CI). force-exclude = true -# Archived, generated policy subtree — never linted or auto-fixed. -extend-exclude = ["src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy"] [tool.ruff.lint] select = ["E", "F", "I", "W"] [tool.pytest.ini_options] testpaths = ["test"] -pythonpath = ["src", "src/aiac/agent/onboarding.old/policy"] +pythonpath = ["src"] markers = [ "integration: tests that call real LLM endpoints", ] From bc164b00fe968d5f26d7f5f0980a0429c35d177d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 22:55:40 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 263/273] feat: Add Policy Store clear-all endpoint and clear store per UC-1 run Add DELETE /policy/services (clear-all) to the Policy Store Service and a clear_service_policies() wrapper in the store library. The store's SQLite lives on a StatefulSet PV that survives image redeploys, and UC-1 onboarding appends with override=False, so pre-fix cruft accumulated across runs and the PCE replayed it into every regenerated Rego (issue 6.3 RC-A). Wire a per-run store clear into the UC-1 integration harness (uc1_onboard.py onboarded_stack), alongside the existing Keycloak cleanup_provisioned, so each run derives its Rego from only the edges it onboarded. The clear is best-effort via a port-forward + DELETE, keeping the harness free of any aiac import. Verified live: clearing the deployed store (53 stale edges -> 204 -> 404) and re-running rung 2 produces clean inbound Rego (I1 view-profile, I2 dups / self-reference, and the git-issue-agent-aud pollution all gone; SPM edge count 53 -> 3+5). Rung 2/3 outbound stays red by design pending the PCE<->UC-1 outbound-gate spec decision (RC-B, deferred). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py | 8 +++++ aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py | 17 +++++++++ aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++- aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 24 +++++++++++++ aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py | 35 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py index 96ef36161..7014fd4cd 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py @@ -68,3 +68,11 @@ def apply_service_policy(service_id: str, spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None: def delete_service_policy(service_id: str) -> None: resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}") _check(resp) + + +def clear_service_policies() -> None: + # Drop every SPM in the store. The collection-root DELETE (no service_id segment) — + # distinct from delete_service_policy's by-id path. Intended for test harnesses that + # need a clean slate before a run; clearing an already-empty store is a no-op. + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services") + _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py index b90624787..31e79db1d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py @@ -57,6 +57,23 @@ def list_service_policies_by_role(role: str) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]: return [spm for spm in _cache.values() if any(rule.role.id == role for rule in spm.inbound_rules)] +@app.delete("/policy/services", response_model=None) +def clear_service_policies( + conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], +) -> Response: + # Drop every SPM — durable row and cache entry alike. Distinct path from the by-id + # DELETE (``/policy/services`` vs ``/policy/services/{service_id}``), so FastAPI routes + # unambiguously. Intended for test harnesses that need a clean slate: without it the + # StatefulSet PV outlives image redeploys, so pre-fix cruft accumulates across runs + # (override=False appends). Never 404s; clearing an already-empty store is a no-op 204. + try: + conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies") + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + _cache.clear() + return Response(status_code=204) + + @app.get("/policy/services/{service_id}", response_model=None) def get_service_policy(service_id: str): service_id = decode_service_id(service_id) diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py index e4a375b77..74128a2af 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py @@ -67,6 +67,15 @@ CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_LOCAL_PORT", "7070")) CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_CONTROLLER_REMOTE_PORT", "7070")) +# Policy Store (in-cluster) reached via ``kubectl port-forward`` to clear stale SPMs before a run. +# The store's SQLite lives on a StatefulSet PV that survives image redeploys, so pre-fix cruft +# would otherwise accumulate across runs (onboarding appends with override=False). Defaults match +# the deployed stack (svc/aiac-policy-store-service:7074 in aiac-system). +STORE_NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("AIAC_STORE_NAMESPACE", "aiac-system") +STORE_TARGET = os.environ.get("AIAC_STORE_TARGET", "svc/aiac-policy-store-service") +STORE_LOCAL_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_STORE_LOCAL_PORT", "7074")) +STORE_REMOTE_PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIAC_STORE_REMOTE_PORT", "7074")) + # The Controller Deployment + the abstract policy.md the PRB reads. The test mounts this policy on # the Controller pod as a precondition-fixup (see ``ensure_agent_policy``); it is NOT written into # any committed deployment manifest — the deployment stays free of test-specific config. @@ -227,6 +236,33 @@ def cleanup_provisioned(admin, realm: str) -> None: log.warning("cleanup: delete client scope %r failed: %s", name, exc) +def clear_policy_store() -> None: + """Drop every persisted SPM from the in-cluster Policy Store before a run — the store-side twin + of ``cleanup_provisioned``'s Keycloak reset. + + The store's SQLite lives on a StatefulSet PV that outlives image redeploys, and onboarding + appends to each SPM with ``override=False``; without this the store accumulates pre-fix cruft + (stale role-id generations, retired ``*-aud`` edges, cross-run pollution) that the PCE replays + into every regenerated Rego — so a fixed pipeline still emits defective policy. Clearing here + guarantees each run derives its Rego from only the edges this run onboarded. + + Hits ``DELETE /policy/services`` directly through a port-forward (the harness never imports + ``aiac``). Best-effort: a store that is unreachable or already empty must not fail the run.""" + try: + with port_forward( + STORE_TARGET, + namespace=STORE_NAMESPACE, + local_port=STORE_LOCAL_PORT, + remote_port=STORE_REMOTE_PORT, + ready_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{STORE_LOCAL_PORT}/health", + ) as base_url: + resp = requests.delete(f"{base_url}/policy/services", timeout=30) + resp.raise_for_status() + log.info("cleared Policy Store SPMs (HTTP %s)", resp.status_code) + except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — best-effort; a store hiccup must not fail the run + log.warning("clear_policy_store: could not clear store (%s)", exc) + + # ====================================================================================== # Onboarding trigger + Rego capture # ====================================================================================== @@ -392,7 +428,8 @@ def onboarded_stack(workloads: list[str], *, rego_subdir: str) -> Iterator[dict] require_env("KEYCLOAK_URL", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD") admin = connect_admin() - cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # before — clean slate + cleanup_provisioned(admin, TEST_REALM) # before — clean slate (Keycloak) + clear_policy_store() # before — clean slate (Policy Store SPMs; PV survives redeploys) provision_realm_and_users(admin, TEST_REALM) # BEFORE onboarding (PRB reads the role universe) ensure_agent_policy(CONTROLLER_NAMESPACE) # mount the PRB's policy.md if the stack lacks it diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py index d5b28e22c..02fe840a6 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -222,6 +222,30 @@ def test_raises_on_error_response(self): delete_service_policy("svc-1") +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# clear_service_policies (collection-root DELETE) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestClearServicePolicies: + def test_deletes_collection_root_no_id_segment(self): + with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(204) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import clear_service_policies + + result = clear_service_policies() + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services") + assert result is None + + def test_raises_on_error_response(self): + with patch("requests.delete") as mock_delete: + mock_delete.return_value = _mock_response(502) + from aiac.policy.store.library.api import clear_service_policies + + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + clear_service_policies() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Removed surface: no per-agent / whole-collection functions # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py index cedab4df0..68de971e2 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/service/test_main.py @@ -235,6 +235,41 @@ def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): assert "error" in resp.json() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DELETE /policy/services (clear-all) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestClearServicePolicies: + def test_clears_all_rows_from_db_and_cache_returns_204(self, client): + _preload(_spm("svc-a")) + _preload(_spm("svc-b")) + resp = client.delete("/policy/services") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert svc._cache == {} + rows = svc._db_conn.execute("SELECT service_id FROM service_policies").fetchall() + assert rows == [] + + def test_clear_empty_store_is_noop_204(self, client): + resp = client.delete("/policy/services") + assert resp.status_code == 204 + assert svc._cache == {} + + def test_clear_then_get_by_id_404s(self, client): + _preload(_spm("svc-a")) + client.delete("/policy/services") + resp = client.get(f"/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-a')}") + assert resp.status_code == 404 + + def test_returns_502_on_sqlite_error(self, client): + bad_conn = MagicMock() + bad_conn.execute.side_effect = sqlite3.OperationalError("disk full") + app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = lambda: bad_conn + resp = client.delete("/policy/services") + assert resp.status_code == 502 + assert "error" in resp.json() + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # GET /health # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From 11eb02c7b088d23fa967baef86f112141ea0c0a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 00:50:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 264/273] docs: Record RC-B per-scope two-gate AND + capability-match in PCE and UC-1 specs MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Reconcile the UC-1 outbound-gate specs with the policy-model owner's RC-B decision (Handoff 09): outbound access is a per-scope two-gate AND — a requested scope is allowed iff both the user role and the agent's own per-skill operator role reach it — with the capability gate decided by the PRB from descriptions (capability-match). Range is tool union other agent. - policy-computation-engine.md: generalize the outbound-subject gate range to tool-or-agent and clarify the directional-relevance rule is a derivation-layer property, not a claim the user gate is empty. - uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md: replace the degenerate/user-gate-only narrative with the per-scope two-gate AND + capability-matched agent gate; provision one operator role per skill in place of the generic agent role. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 4 +- .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 72 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 6d1eeb415..44cbc30c4 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ Let `R_A = SPM(A).owned_roles` (A's client roles) and `S_A = SPM(A).owned_scopes - `User` → `subject_roles[username] += role` (usernames from `role.actorIds`); - `Agent` → `source_roles[serviceId] += role` (serviceIds from `role.actorIds`). - **Outbound:** for each `r ∈ R_A`, find the `r`-rules in `get_service_policies_by_role(r)`. For each such `(r → s)`: add to `outbound_rules` and `target_scopes[s.serviceId] += s`. -- **Outbound subject gate:** for each target `(X, s)` in `target_scopes`, take the **User**-kind inbound rules `(u → s)` on `SPM(X)`, append them to `outbound_subject_rules`, and `subject_roles += u.actorIds`. +- **Outbound subject gate:** for each target `(X, s)` in `target_scopes` — where `X` is the callee, a **tool or another agent** — take the **User**-kind inbound rules `(u → s)` on `SPM(X)`, append them to `outbound_subject_rules`, and `subject_roles += u.actorIds`. The gate's range is tool ∪ agent scopes. -**Relevance is directional.** An SPM contributes to `A` **iff** it *is* `SPM(A)` (contributes inbound) **or** it contains a rule whose role is one of A's **agent** roles `R_A` (contributes outbound). A merely *shared user role* never confers relevance — this is what prevents a **false outbound edge** to a tool `A` does not actually target. +**Relevance is directional.** An SPM contributes to `A` **iff** it *is* `SPM(A)` (contributes inbound) **or** it contains a rule whose role is one of A's **agent** roles `R_A` (contributes outbound). A merely *shared user role* never confers relevance — this is what prevents a **false outbound edge** to a target (a tool or another agent) `A` does not actually target. This is a **derivation-layer** relevance rule: it does **not** imply the outbound user gate is empty. When the agent holds a per-skill operator role that the PRB maps (by capability-match) to a target's scope, the agent *does* target that callee, and the nested derivation then surfaces the shared-user edges. ### P2 / P4 / P5b reconciliation diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index f8e75f998..e901d221d 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ with one test per rung). They import two shared modules: `port_forward`, `resolve_pod`, `opa_eval`, `require_env`, …). They also ship `probe_uc1.rego` — the outbound verification query, matching `input.function_name` against -the generated **user→tool** data maps by **exact string equality** on full discovered names. +the generated data maps by **exact string equality** on full discovered names, binding **both** the user +(subject) gate and the agent capability gate (the per-scope two-gate AND). ## Description @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the provisions scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, issues-write}`, sets `client.type=Tool`. **No rules are written for the tool directly.** - `POST /apply/service/{github-agent id}` → UC-1 classifies it an **Agent**, reads the AgentCard, - provisions role `github-agent.agent` + scopes `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}`, - sets `client.type=Agent`; the Service Policy Builder maps roles→scopes via the real PRB (real LLM, + provisions **one operator role per skill** `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}` + (mirroring the scopes) + scopes `github-agent.{source_operations, issue_operations}`, sets + `client.type=Agent`; the Service Policy Builder maps roles→scopes via the real PRB (real LLM, `temperature=0`) and the Controller calls `compute_and_apply(rules, override=False)`. 3. **Validate two outcomes at the end** (no intermediate checks): 1. **Keycloak provisioning.** The expected realm role(s) + client scopes exist with the expected @@ -119,12 +121,11 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the 2. **Generated Rego decisions.** `kubectl cp` the `/rego` files to the host and `opa eval`: - **`opa` discovery** — `$OPA_BIN` → `shutil.which("opa")` → `pytest.skip`. - **Inbound** — per `subject`: `{"subject": }` vs `data.authz.team1_github_agent.inbound.allow`. - - **Outbound (user gate only)** — per `(subject × function_name)`, `function_name` a full discovered - tool-scope name, via the probe `data.probe.outbound.allow` in `probe_uc1.rego`, which binds - `input.function_name` against the generated **user→tool** maps (`subject_ok`) **only**, by exact - string equality. The agent→tool gate (`target_ok`) is degenerate under UC-1's single generic - `github-agent.agent` role and is **documented, not probed** (see - *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agenttool-gate-degenerate-by-design)*). + - **Outbound (per-scope two-gate AND)** — per `(subject × function_name)`, `function_name` a full + discovered tool-scope name, via the probe `data.probe.outbound.allow` in `probe_uc1.rego`, which + binds `input.function_name` against **both** the user (subject) gate and the agent capability + gate by exact string equality — a request is allowed iff both reach the same scope (see + *[The agent→tool gate](#the-agenttool-gate-capability-matched)*). - **Grant sets** — re-derive the `(role, scope)` grant sets from the Rego data maps and compare, as order-independent sets, to the `scenario_uc1.py` truth table. - Verdicts are **computed from** `scenario_uc1.py`, never from the Rego. A failing node names the @@ -168,8 +169,9 @@ rendering). They are **identical to policy-pipeline's** (only the scope-name str | test-user | ✅ | | devops-user | ❌ | -**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, user→tool gate; suffixes shown for -readability) — **rungs 2 and 3** (with a tool onboarded): +**Outbound allow(subject, function)** (`data.probe.outbound.allow`, per-scope two-gate AND; the agent +reaches all four tool scopes, so the user gate discriminates; suffixes shown for readability) — +**rungs 2 and 3** (with a tool onboarded): | | github-tool.source-read | github-tool.source-write | github-tool.issues-read | github-tool.issues-write | |---|---|---|---|---| @@ -190,23 +192,27 @@ for the slugify rule). ### Semantic similarity, not byte-identity This ladder's Rego is **semantically similar** to `policy-pipeline`'s but **not byte-identical**, for two -baked-in reasons in (frozen) UC-1 provisioning: +baked-in reasons in UC-1 provisioning: 1. **Workload-prefixed names.** UC-1 names every scope `{workload}.{name}`, so the data maps hold `github-tool.source-read` / `github-agent.source_operations` where `policy-pipeline` holds bare names. -2. **Degenerate `target_ok`.** UC-1 emits one generic `github-agent.agent` role, which the PRB cannot map - to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the agent→tool gate is empty. +2. **Capability-matched `target_ok`.** UC-1 provisions one **operator role per skill** + (`github-agent.source_operations` / `github-agent.issue_operations`), which the PRB maps to the tool + scopes by domain (capability-match), so the agent→tool gate is populated over all four tool scopes. The tests therefore assert **same file set + same decisions + equivalent grant sets**, not identical text. -### The agent→tool gate (degenerate by design) +### The agent→tool gate (capability-matched) -Phase-1 states outbound access is the **intersection** of the user→tool gate and the agent→tool gate, but -that "the agent holds all of `github-tool`'s scopes, so this demo exercises the **user-gating dimension -only**." Under real UC-1 the single generic `github-agent.agent` role yields an **empty** `target_ok`, so -the full `allow` (`subject_ok AND target_ok`) would deny everything. The probe therefore evaluates -**`subject_ok` only** — the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. The empty `target_ok` is a documented -UC-1 limitation, not a test failure. +Phase-1 states outbound access is the **per-scope intersection** of the user→tool gate and the +agent→tool gate. UC-1 provisions **one operator role per skill** +(`github-agent.source_operations` / `github-agent.issue_operations`), and the PRB maps those operator +roles to the tool scopes by domain (capability-match under `generic_policy.md`), so `target_ok` is +**populated over all four tool scopes**. Because the agent reaches every tool scope, the **user gate +discriminates** — the probe binds the real per-scope AND (`subject_ok AND target_ok` on the same +`input.function_name`) and, for this scenario, its verdicts equal the user-gate slice. The AND is +genuine, not degenerate: if the agent reached only a subset of the tool's scopes, the request would be +denied for the scopes it does not reach. ## Scenario @@ -216,7 +222,7 @@ workloads. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| | Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (must match the deployed stack's `KEYCLOAK_REALM`; default `kagenti`) | -| Agent | `github-agent` — **discovered** role `github-agent.agent`; scopes `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (from AgentCard skills) | +| Agent | `github-agent` — **discovered** per-skill operator roles `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (mirroring the scopes); scopes `github-agent.source_operations`, `github-agent.issue_operations` (from AgentCard skills) | | Tool | `github-tool` (simplified) — **discovered** scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, issues-write}` (from MCP `tools/list`) | | Users | `dev-user` (`developer`), `test-user` (`tester`), `devops-user` (`devops`) | | `developer` | source read/write + issues read | @@ -273,8 +279,10 @@ The suite `pytest.skip`s when no `opa` binary is found. `/rego` output is what makes the pipeline observable. The Keycloak composite writer emits no Rego and is not used. - **Onboarding-order-independence is asserted, not assumed** (rungs 2 vs 3). A divergence is a bug. -- **User gate only.** UC-1's generic agent role yields an empty `target_ok`; the outbound probe evaluates - `subject_ok` alone (phase-1's user-gating-only intent). +- **Per-scope two-gate AND.** UC-1's per-skill operator roles are mapped to the tool scopes by + capability-match, so `target_ok` is populated; the outbound probe binds the real per-scope AND + (`subject_ok AND target_ok` on the same `input.function_name`). The agent reaches all four tool + scopes, so the user gate discriminates. - **Grant sets, semantic.** Equivalence is re-derived from the Rego data maps and compared as sets — the semantic-similarity guarantee, not byte-identity. - **Stack's realm, leave-in-place; per-rung cleanup.** UC-1 resolves/provisions against the deployed @@ -306,8 +314,8 @@ Tracking issues: `testing/5.4-uc1-onboarding-integration-test.md` (epic) + `5.4. - **Writing the rung tests + `probe_uc1.rego` + `scenario_uc1.py` edits** — this spec *describes* them; they are written under the `5.4.x` issues. - **The UC-1 agent, PRB, PCE, OPA writer, and demo `github-agent`** — specified/tested by their own - components/issues. UC-1's discovery naming and single-generic-role behavior are **fixed**; these tests - observe them. + components/issues. UC-1's discovery naming and per-skill operator-role behavior are **fixed**; these + tests observe them. - **Deploying / registering the workloads** — a precondition, not part of the tests. - **Two-policy (rung 4)** — deferred; the two-stack topology is discarded and the in-cluster approach is TBD (`testing/5.4.4-uc1-onboard-two-policies.md`). @@ -328,11 +336,15 @@ mappings. Descriptions are **generic and keyword-free**; client `type` is set by - `github-tool.source-write` — "Create, modify, or delete source repository contents; commit file changes." - `github-tool.issues-read` — "Read issues and their comment threads. Read-only." - `github-tool.issues-write` — "Create and update issues: open, edit, comment, and close." -- **`github-agent`** (Agent) → role `github-agent.agent` (description "Agent role") + scopes from the - AgentCard skills: +- **`github-agent`** (Agent) → **one operator role per skill** (name + description mirror each scope) + + scopes from the AgentCard skills: - `github-agent.source_operations` — "Browse and search code; read, create, and modify repository file contents, branches, and commits." - `github-agent.issue_operations` — "Read, search, create, and update issues, comments, sub-issues, and pull requests." + The operator roles `github-agent.source_operations` / `github-agent.issue_operations` carry the same + descriptions as the scopes they mirror; those descriptions drive the PRB capability-match. (This + replaces the prior single generic `github-agent.agent` role.) + ### Realm roles (provisioned by the fixture) - `developer` — "Developer — an engineering user who develops the source codebase (writing and maintaining code) and fixes code defects reported in the issue tracker; works primarily in source and consults issues for defect reports." @@ -342,7 +354,9 @@ mappings. Descriptions are **generic and keyword-free**; client `type` is set by ### `policy.md` — the single (abstract) variant Phase-1's intent-only prose. The PRB/LLM expands intent into the discovered scopes via the entity/role -descriptions. It **does not name the agent role** (doing so would populate `target_ok`). Deny by default. +descriptions. It stays **user-intent-only** and **does not name the agent's operator roles** — the +agent's capability gate comes from the generic rubric (`generic_policy.md`) matching the operator-role +descriptions to the tool-scope descriptions, not from the policy naming them. Deny by default. ```markdown Grant access on a least-privilege basis: allow only what this policy states; deny by default. From 5535e05f7d2371d2d98d6c678cef991bbe267198 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 01:41:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 265/273] feat: Capability-match UC-1 outbound as per-scope two-gate AND Resolve RC-B of issue 6.3: outbound access is now a per-scope AND where a requested scope (input.function_name) is allowed iff BOTH the user (subject) role and the agent's own operator role reach that scope. - provision: per-skill operator roles so the agent's capability gate is scope-specific rather than a single generic {workload}.agent role - rego writer: per-scope AND on input.function_name across the subject and capability gates; generalized rubric - builder: source other-service scopes from get_services() (owner-bearing serviceId) instead of the global get_scopes() catalog, whose empty serviceId broke self-exclusion and routed rules to SPM("") (422) - rename emitted outbound map outbound_subject_role_scopes -> subject_role_scopes, paralleling the sibling agent_role_scopes - un-degenerate the UC-1 integration contract; update probes, specs, and writer/PCE unit tests to match Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .../specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 12 +-- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md | 2 +- .../integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md | 4 +- .../specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 2 +- .../policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md | 2 +- .../uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py | 14 ++- .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 21 +++- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 34 ++++--- .../onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py | 41 +++----- .../provision/test_analyze_agent.py | 17 +++- .../uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py | 3 +- aiac/test/integration/probe.rego | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego | 25 +++-- aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py | 57 +++++++---- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py | 11 ++- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py | 11 ++- .../test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py | 11 ++- aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py | 21 ++-- aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py | 97 ++++++++++++++++--- aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 47 +++++++++ 20 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index 31f6aabeb..2343b6558 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Contains two sets of `P **Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `agent_role_scopes` map (agent role → target scopes) that the outbound package evaluates. -**Outbound subject rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` (a **user** role) is permitted to reach a **tool** exposing scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `outbound_subject_role_scopes` map (user role → tool scopes) that the **outbound** package's subject gate evaluates against `target_scopes[input.target]`. This is distinct from `inbound_rules` (user → *agent* scope): the outbound subject gate answers "may this user reach the tool?", not "may this user call the agent?". +**Outbound subject rule semantics:** a subject holding realm role `role` (a **user** role) is permitted to reach a **tool** exposing scope `scope`. Grouped by role, these rules become the `subject_role_scopes` map (user role → tool scopes) that the **outbound** package's subject gate evaluates against `target_scopes[input.target]`. This is distinct from `inbound_rules` (user → *agent* scope): the outbound subject gate answers "may this user reach the tool?", not "may this user call the agent?". **Note on `target_scopes` direction:** the map is keyed by **target service id → allowed scopes** (the inverse of the former `scope_targets`, which was `scope → targets`). The outbound Rego generator emits this map **verbatim** and evaluates `target_scopes[input.target]` directly — there is no inversion (see below). @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ The generator embeds these symbols, derived from the `AgentPolicyModel`: | `agent_scopes` | `model.agent_scopes` | `[scope.name, …]` — **inbound package only** (the audience gate; outbound decisions do not consider the agent's own scopes) | | `agent_roles` | `model.agent_roles` | `[role.name, …]` | | `role_scopes` | grouped `model.inbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (agent scopes granted per subject role) — **inbound package only** | -| `outbound_subject_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_subject_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes granted per user role) — **outbound package only** | +| `subject_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_subject_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes granted per user role) — **outbound package only** | | `agent_role_scopes` | grouped `model.outbound_rules` | role.name → `[scope.name, …]` (tool scopes per agent role) | | `target_scopes` | `model.target_scopes` | target id → `[scope.name, …]` | @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ allow if { subject_ok; source_ok } ### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` -Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here, and the outbound package does not emit `agent_scopes` at all: outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes, only its roles (`agent_roles`) and the target's accepted scopes. +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here, and the outbound package does not emit `agent_scopes` at all: outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes, only its roles (`agent_roles`) and the target's accepted scopes. ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound @@ -155,14 +155,14 @@ agent_roles := ["{role.name}", ...] # from agent_roles subject_roles := { "{subject_id}": ["{role.name}", ...], ... } -outbound_subject_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_subject_rules (user role → tool scopes) +subject_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_subject_rules (user role → tool scopes) agent_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_rules (agent role → tool scopes) target_scopes := { "{target_id}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from target_scopes # user may reach the tool: holds a role granting >=1 tool scope the target accepts subject_ok if { some role in subject_roles[input.subject] - some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] + some scope in subject_role_scopes[role] scope in target_scopes[input.target] } # agent may reach the tool: agent role grants >=1 tool scope the target accepts @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. - `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: extract `{namespace}/{name}` from a SPIFFE URI (or use the plain `{ns}/{name}` clientId as-is), then collapse every non-alphanumeric run to `_` and lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment, short and SPIRE-independent. - `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. -- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `subject_roles`, `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. Neither the inbound `role_scopes` map nor `agent_scopes` is embedded in the outbound package — outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `subject_roles`, `subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. Neither the inbound `role_scopes` map nor `agent_scopes` is embedded in the outbound package — outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. - `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. - `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md index feb2d48f3..4b4219f2d 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ Complete policy definition for a single agent (service). Inbound and outbound ru **Outbound rule semantics:** this agent acting as realm role `role` is permitted to request the target scope `scope`. The PDP Policy Writer consumes `outbound_rules` as an agent-role → target-scope map; its outbound gate requires both the subject and the agent to be authorized. -**Outbound subject rule semantics:** `outbound_subject_rules` holds `(user role, tool scope)` pairs — the outbound subject gate; a user holding `role` may reach a tool exposing `scope`. It is the outbound counterpart of `inbound_rules` (which pairs a user role with an *agent* scope): where `inbound_rules` answers "may this user call the agent?", `outbound_subject_rules` answers "may this user reach the tool the agent targets?". The PDP Policy Writer groups it into `outbound_subject_role_scopes` (user role → tool-scope names) and matches against `target_scopes[input.target]`, not against `agent_scopes`. +**Outbound subject rule semantics:** `outbound_subject_rules` holds `(user role, tool scope)` pairs — the outbound subject gate; a user holding `role` may reach a tool exposing `scope`. It is the outbound counterpart of `inbound_rules` (which pairs a user role with an *agent* scope): where `inbound_rules` answers "may this user call the agent?", `outbound_subject_rules` answers "may this user reach the tool the agent targets?". The PDP Policy Writer groups it into `subject_role_scopes` (user role → tool-scope names) and matches against `target_scopes[input.target]`, not against `agent_scopes`. #### `PolicyModel` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md index 53a49c75f..4b0cb8eeb 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/pdp-policy-writer.md @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Role → access, as encoded by the model's inbound and outbound rules: - `tester` — issues read/write. This user→tool access is encoded in the model's `outbound_subject_rules` (`(user_role, tool_scope)` -pairs), which the outbound package renders as `outbound_subject_role_scopes`. The model's +pairs), which the outbound package renders as `subject_role_scopes`. The model's `inbound_rules` (user→agent-scope) and `outbound_rules` (agent-role→tool-scope) are unchanged. Applying this `PolicyModel` produces exactly two files in `REGO_OUTPUT_DIR`: @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Both must match the **ID-only** package shapes in (`{subject, source}` inbound, `{subject, target}` outbound); all role/scope maps are embedded in the package; the inbound gate is subject-mandatory + source-optional; the outbound gate requires both subject and agent to pass, but its **subject** gate is now user→**tool** — it reads -`outbound_subject_role_scopes` (grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`) and matches against +`subject_role_scopes` (grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`) and matches against `target_scopes[input.target]`, distinct from the inbound user→agent gate — while `target_ok` (agent→tool, from `agent_roles` × `agent_role_scopes`) is unchanged; and `target_scopes` is emitted verbatim (target id → scopes, no inversion). Because the input carries no per-request scope, the diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index 8d9a0dbc5..b3a761043 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Alongside the assertions, each variant leaves exactly **two** files on disk in i denied inbound.) - `github_agent.outbound.rego` — package `authz.github_agent.outbound`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. Its **`subject_ok`** is the new **user→tool** gate (mapping (b), grouped from - `outbound_subject_rules` into `outbound_subject_role_scopes`, matched against + `outbound_subject_rules` into `subject_role_scopes`, matched against `target_scopes[input.target]`); its **`target_ok`** is the **agent→tool** gate (mapping (c), over `agent_roles` × `agent_role_scopes`). `agent_roles` and `target_scopes` are populated. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md index d90003189..31370a265 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/generic_policy.md @@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ This baseline policy applies to every policy decision, on top of the scenario-specific policy that follows it. Read both together as one policy. -- The agent's internal operator roles are each confined to their own domain: grant every operator role exactly the tool operations within the domain it is responsible for, and nothing outside that domain. +- The agent's internal operator roles are each confined to their own domain: grant every operator role exactly the target operations — where a target is a tool the agent calls, or another agent it calls — within the domain it is responsible for, and nothing outside that domain. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py index 59e57d8bc..f0a536c28 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/builder.py @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ def build(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: try: services = config.get_services() - all_scopes = config.get_scopes() subjects = config.get_subjects() except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( @@ -94,7 +93,18 @@ def build(service_id: str, service_type: ServiceType) -> list[PolicyRule]: user_roles_by_id[member.id] = member user_roles = list(user_roles_by_id.values()) - other_scopes = [s for s in all_scopes if s.aiac_managed and s.serviceId != focus.serviceId] + # Other services' aiac.managed scopes, sourced from get_services() (mirroring + # other_agent_roles) so each scope carries its owning serviceId — the SPM routing key the + # PCE needs. The global get_scopes() endpoint returns scopes with an empty serviceId, which + # would both (a) fail to exclude the focus's own scopes (``"" != focus.serviceId`` is always + # true) and (b) route any resulting rule to ``SPM("")``, a 422 dead-end. + other_scopes = [ + s + for other in services + if other.serviceId != focus.serviceId + for s in other.scopes + if s.aiac_managed + ] candidate_roles = _flatten_dedup(user_roles + other_agent_roles) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py index 94a8270dd..9c272b04d 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -136,10 +136,12 @@ def analyze_agent(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: The operator fetches the agent's A2A card and syncs it onto the CR's ``status.card``; each skill there carries a machine ``id`` (a stable identifier, e.g. ``source_operations``) plus a display ``name`` (which may contain spaces). Scope names are built from the skill ``id`` so they are - usable Keycloak scope names. Falls back to a default access scope when there is no AgentCard CR - (legacy deployments) or the CR has no synced skills yet.""" + usable Keycloak scope names, and each skill also gets a **per-skill operator role** mirroring the + scope (same name + description): the role's description is what the PRB capability-match reads to + confine and grant the agent's outbound access on a domain basis. Falls back to a default access + scope + a default operator role when there is no AgentCard CR (legacy deployments) or the CR has + no synced skills yet.""" namespace, workload = state.namespace, state.workload_name - role = RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.agent", description="Agent role") try: resp = list_agentcards(namespace) @@ -157,7 +159,7 @@ def _targets_workload(c: dict) -> bool: skills = (((card or {}).get("status") or {}).get("card") or {}).get("skills", []) if not skills: provision = ServiceProvision( - roles=[role], + roles=[RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.access", description="Default access scope")], scopes=[ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.access", description="Default access scope")], reasoning=( "partial: no AgentCard found, default scope assigned" @@ -167,14 +169,23 @@ def _targets_workload(c: dict) -> bool: ) return {"service_provision": provision} + # One operator role per skill, mirroring the scope (same name + description). The role name == + # scope name is fine — a realm role and a client scope are distinct Keycloak objects. The role's + # description drives the PRB capability-match (see generic_policy.md). scopes = [ ScopeDefinition( name=f"{workload}.{s.get('id') or s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "") ) for s in skills ] + roles = [ + RoleDefinition( + name=f"{workload}.{s.get('id') or s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "") + ) + for s in skills + ] provision = ServiceProvision( - roles=[role], + roles=roles, scopes=scopes, reasoning=f"derived from AgentCard: {len(skills)} skills", ) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index 573a04a2b..a5a727850 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -115,13 +115,16 @@ def generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: return "\n\n".join(parts) + "\n" -# The outbound subject gate is user->tool (distinct from inbound's user->agent): -# the subject holds a role that grants at least one tool scope the target accepts. +# The outbound decision is a per-scope two-gate AND, both keyed on the requested scope +# ``input.function_name`` (user->target, where a target is a tool or another agent): +# subject gate — the user (subject) is granted the requested scope +# capability gate — the agent reaches the requested scope on the requested target +# Testing the SAME function_name in both gates makes ``allow`` a genuine per-scope intersection: +# an A/B mismatch (user reaches A, agent reaches B) denies both A and B. _OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_OK = ( "subject_ok if {\n" " some role in subject_roles[input.subject]\n" - " some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role]\n" - " scope in target_scopes[input.target]\n" + " input.function_name in subject_role_scopes[role]\n" "}" ) @@ -129,11 +132,18 @@ def generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: """Render the ``authz.{slug}.outbound`` Rego package for an agent. - Input is ``{subject, target}`` (ids only). Both must pass: the subject - holds a role granting >=1 tool scope the ``target`` accepts (user->tool, via - ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` from ``outbound_subject_rules``), AND the - agent (via ``agent_roles``) is permitted >=1 scope the ``target`` accepts. - ``target_scopes`` is used directly (target id -> scopes) -- no inversion. + Input is ``{subject, target, function_name}`` (ids only). ``function_name`` is the + requested target scope. ``allow`` is a **per-scope AND** on that scope: the subject + gate passes iff the subject holds a role granted ``function_name`` (user->target, via + ``subject_role_scopes`` from ``outbound_subject_rules``), AND the capability + gate passes iff the agent reaches ``function_name`` on the requested ``target`` + (``target_scopes[input.target]``, built from the agent's outbound rules). Because both + gates test the *same* ``function_name``, ``allow`` is a genuine per-scope intersection. + + ``target_scopes`` is used directly (target id -> scopes) -- no inversion. A target is a + tool the agent calls or another agent it calls. ``agent_roles`` / ``agent_role_scopes`` + are still emitted (informational / debugging) but are not referenced by ``allow`` -- + ``target_scopes[input.target]`` already *is* the per-scope capability gate. """ slug = slugify(model.agent_id) parts = [ @@ -141,16 +151,14 @@ def generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str: _render_list("agent_roles", _names(model.agent_roles)), _render_map("subject_roles", _name_map(model.subject_roles)), _render_map( - "outbound_subject_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_subject_rules) + "subject_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_subject_rules) ), _render_map("agent_role_scopes", _group_rules(model.outbound_rules)), _render_map("target_scopes", _name_map(model.target_scopes)), _OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_OK, ( "target_ok if {\n" - " some role in agent_roles\n" - " some scope in agent_role_scopes[role]\n" - " scope in target_scopes[input.target]\n" + " input.function_name in target_scopes[input.target]\n" "}" ), "default allow := false\nallow if { subject_ok; target_ok }", diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py index 08f0e23bd..56918240f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/policy_builder/test_builder.py @@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ points (`build_scope_rules` / `build_role_rules`) are patched on the builder module — no live services, no LLM. The sub-agent is deterministic and applies nothing. -Candidates are sourced from `get_services()` / `get_scopes()` / `get_subjects()` — the -same worldview as the Policy Computation Engine — and excluded/included by -**ownership** (role id / `scope.serviceId`), never by name. Fixtures below always give -non-focus services distinct `serviceId`s and mark AIAC-provisioned roles/scopes with the -`aiac.managed` attribute, so ownership-based routing is exercised for real. +Candidates are sourced from `get_services()` / `get_subjects()` — the same worldview as +the Policy Computation Engine — and excluded/included by **ownership** (role id / +`scope.serviceId`), never by name. Both roles AND scopes come from `get_services()`, so +every scope carries its owning `serviceId` (the SPM routing key); the global `get_scopes()` +catalog is not a candidate source (it returns scopes with an empty `serviceId`). Fixtures +below always give non-focus services distinct `serviceId`s and mark AIAC-provisioned +roles/scopes with the `aiac.managed` attribute, so ownership-based routing is exercised for +real. """ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch @@ -80,16 +83,16 @@ def _invoke( scope_rules=None, role_rules=None, get_services_exc=None, - get_scopes_exc=None, get_subjects_exc=None, ): """Run ServicePolicyBuilder.build with all IdP + PRB calls mocked. - `services` / `all_scopes` / `subjects` back `get_services()` / `get_scopes()` / - `get_subjects()` respectively. `scope_rules` / `role_rules` are optional - side_effect callables; default to returning an empty list so calls are counted - without inventing rule content. `get_*_exc` injects an IdP-read failure on the - corresponding call. + `services` / `subjects` back `get_services()` / `get_subjects()` respectively. Both + candidate roles and scopes are sourced from `get_services()`; `all_scopes` is retained + only to describe the global scope catalog in each fixture and is not consulted by the + builder. `scope_rules` / `role_rules` are optional side_effect callables; default to + returning an empty list so calls are counted without inventing rule content. `get_*_exc` + injects an IdP-read failure on the corresponding call. """ with ( patch.object(builder, "_config") as cfg, @@ -101,10 +104,6 @@ def _invoke( conf.get_services.side_effect = get_services_exc else: conf.get_services.return_value = services - if get_scopes_exc is not None: - conf.get_scopes.side_effect = get_scopes_exc - else: - conf.get_scopes.return_value = all_scopes if get_subjects_exc is not None: conf.get_subjects.side_effect = get_subjects_exc else: @@ -459,18 +458,6 @@ def test_get_services_unavailable_is_502(self): ) assert ei.value.status_code == 502 - def test_get_scopes_unavailable_is_502(self): - focus = _service(FOCUS_ID) - with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: - _invoke( - ServiceType.TOOL, - services=[focus], - all_scopes=[], - subjects=[], - get_scopes_exc=RuntimeError("HTTP 500"), - ) - assert ei.value.status_code == 502 - def test_get_subjects_unavailable_is_502(self): focus = _service(FOCUS_ID) with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei: diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py index b1e181663..38e4b72bb 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_analyze_agent.py @@ -39,19 +39,24 @@ def _run(items=None, list_exc=None): class TestAnalyzeAgentFound: - def test_one_agent_role_and_one_scope_per_skill(self): + def test_one_operator_role_and_one_scope_per_skill(self): # Scope names come from each skill's machine ``id`` — not its display ``name`` (which may - # contain spaces) — so they are stable identifiers usable as Keycloak scope names. + # contain spaces) — so they are stable identifiers usable as Keycloak scope names. Each skill + # also yields a per-skill operator role mirroring the scope (same name + description); the + # role's description drives the PRB capability-match. No generic ``{workload}.agent`` role. skills = [ {"id": "forecast", "name": "Weather forecast operations", "description": "Get forecast"}, {"id": "history", "name": "Historical data operations", "description": "Historical data"}, ] provision = _run(items=[_card(skills=skills)])["service_provision"] - assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.agent"] - assert provision.roles[0].description == "Agent role" + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.forecast", f"{WORKLOAD}.history"] + assert provision.roles[0].description == "Get forecast" assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.forecast", f"{WORKLOAD}.history"] assert provision.scopes[0].description == "Get forecast" + # role name == scope name per skill (distinct Keycloak objects: realm role vs client scope) + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [s.name for s in provision.scopes] + assert f"{WORKLOAD}.agent" not in [r.name for r in provision.roles] assert "derived from AgentCard: 2 skills" == provision.reasoning @@ -74,7 +79,9 @@ class TestAnalyzeAgentLegacyFallback: def test_no_agentcard_yields_default_access_scope_and_partial_reasoning(self): provision = _run(items=[])["service_provision"] - assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.agent"] + # No-skills fallback: a default operator role mirrors the default access scope. + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.access"] + assert provision.roles[0].description == "Default access scope" assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == [f"{WORKLOAD}.access"] assert provision.scopes[0].description == "Default access scope" assert "partial: no AgentCard found" in provision.reasoning diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py index fe2445039..01a2f9bce 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/test_graph.py @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ def test_agent_path_end_to_end(self): assert _get(result, "service_type") is ServiceType.AGENT provision = _get(result, "service_provision") - assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == ["weather.agent"] + # one per-skill operator role, mirroring the scope (no generic weather.agent role) + assert [r.name for r in provision.roles] == ["weather.forecast"] assert [s.name for s in provision.scopes] == ["weather.forecast"] cfg.return_value.set_service_type.assert_called_once() diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego b/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego index d7489560a..172cb6f90 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego +++ b/aiac/test/integration/probe.rego @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tokens(s) := {lower(t) | some t in regex.split(`[._-]+`, s)} # Tool scopes the user (subject) is entitled to on the target. subject_scopes contains scope if { some role in gen.subject_roles[input.subject] - some scope in gen.outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] + some scope in gen.subject_role_scopes[role] scope in gen.target_scopes[input.target] } diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego b/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego index d46c5673d..a85e30c5f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego +++ b/aiac/test/integration/probe_uc1.rego @@ -4,26 +4,35 @@ import future.keywords # Outbound decision probe for the discovery-driven UC-1 `github_agent` scenario. Adapted from # 5.3's `probe.rego` for two UC-1-specific facts: # -# 1. USER GATE ONLY. Under real UC-1 the single generic `github-agent.agent` role maps to no -# specific tool scope, so the generated `target_ok` (agent->tool) is degenerate/empty and the -# real `allow` (subject_ok AND target_ok) would deny everything. This probe therefore binds -# against the `subject_ok` maps ALONE — the user-gating slice phase-1 validates. `target_ok` -# is documented as degenerate, not probed. +# 1. PER-SCOPE AND (both gates). Outbound access is a per-scope two-gate AND: a requested tool +# scope is allowed iff BOTH the user (subject) is granted it AND the agent's own operator roles +# reach it. This probe binds both gates against the generated data maps. UC-1 has a single tool, +# so the capability gate uses the agent's own capability map (`agent_role_scopes`) directly — +# equivalent to the writer's `target_scopes[input.target]` for that one target — and the probe +# input stays `{subject, function_name}` (no `target` key needed). # # 2. EXACT-NAME MATCH. `scenario_uc1.py` stores the FULL discovered scope names # (`github-tool.source-read`, ...) — the same strings the generated data maps contain — so -# `input.function_name` is matched to a subject scope by plain string equality. No 5.3-style +# `input.function_name` is matched to a subject/agent scope by plain string equality. No 5.3-style # prefix-stripping token-set soft match (that was 5.3's device for bare names; here both sides # are already prefixed). gen := data.authz.team1_github_agent.outbound -# Tool scopes the user (subject) is entitled to, via the generated user->tool data maps only. +# Tool scopes the user (subject) is entitled to, via the generated user->tool data maps (subject gate). subject_scopes contains scope if { some role in gen.subject_roles[input.subject] - some scope in gen.outbound_subject_role_scopes[role] + some scope in gen.subject_role_scopes[role] +} + +# Tool scopes the agent's own operator roles reach (capability gate; single-target UC-1). Iterate +# the map's VALUES (each a list of scope names) and flatten — ``some scopes in obj`` binds each value. +agent_scopes contains scope if { + some scopes in gen.agent_role_scopes + some scope in scopes } default allow := false allow if { input.function_name in subject_scopes + input.function_name in agent_scopes } diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py index bd844f72f..acede84fc 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py @@ -5,10 +5,18 @@ *role -> access facts and truth tables*; the difference is **provenance and naming**. Here the agent/tool roles and scopes are not hand-picked — they are what **real UC-1 onboarding** discovers and provisions from the deployed workloads, so every scope is **workload-prefixed** -(``github-tool.source-read``, ``github-agent.source_operations``) and the agent contributes a single -generic ``github-agent.agent`` role. The pair-lists below are therefore expressed over those -**discovered, prefixed** names — exactly the strings the generated Rego data maps contain — so the -test's expected verdicts are *computed from* this module, never from the Rego under test. +(``github-tool.source-read``, ``github-agent.source_operations``) and the agent contributes **one +operator role per skill** (``github-agent.source_operations`` / ``github-agent.issue_operations``), +each mirroring its skill scope's name + description. The pair-lists below are therefore expressed +over those **discovered, prefixed** names — exactly the strings the generated Rego data maps contain +— so the test's expected verdicts are *computed from* this module, never from the Rego under test. + +Outbound access is a **per-scope two-gate AND**: a requested tool scope is allowed iff **both** the +user role reaches it (subject gate, ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) **and** the agent's own per-skill +operator role reaches it (capability gate, ``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS``). The capability gate is mapped +from the operator-role **descriptions** by the PRB (capability-match under ``generic_policy.md``); in +UC-1 the agent reaches all four tool scopes, so the AND reduces to the subject gate for the verdicts +but both gates are populated and probed. This module is **pure data**: it imports nothing (no ``aiac``, no stdlib beyond the language) so the test can import it before its env-before-import step, just like ``scenario.py``. @@ -79,12 +87,6 @@ # Keycloak. They are recorded here only so the pair-lists and the grant-set equivalence check can # reference the exact prefixed strings the generated Rego contains. -# The single generic agent role UC-1 emits (hardcoded ``f"{workload}.agent"``, description -# "Agent role"). It cannot be mapped to specific tool scopes under deny-by-default, so the -# agent->tool gate (``target_ok``) is degenerate/empty — documented, not asserted (see -# ``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS`` below and the spec's *The agent->tool gate*). -AGENT_ROLE = "github-agent.agent" - # name -> description. Agent-boundary scopes, from the AgentCard skills (verbatim descriptions). AGENT_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { "github-agent.source_operations": ( @@ -96,6 +98,12 @@ ), } +# The per-skill operator roles UC-1 emits — one per skill, mirroring each scope's name + +# description (``analyze_agent`` builds ``roles`` from the same skills as ``scopes``). Their +# descriptions are what the PRB capability-match reads to grant the agent's outbound access on a +# domain basis, populating the agent->tool capability gate (``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS`` below). +AGENT_ROLES: dict[str, str] = dict(AGENT_SCOPES) + # name -> description. Fine-grained tool operations, from the simplified tool's MCP ``tools/list`` # (verbatim descriptions — identical text to ``scenario.py``'s tool scopes, only prefixed). TOOL_SCOPES: dict[str, str] = { @@ -109,9 +117,9 @@ # # Identical *decisions* to ``scenario.py``; only the scope-name strings are prefixed. Each set maps # 1:1 to a generated Rego gate: -# INBOUND_PAIRS — user role -> agent scope (inbound; user may call the agent) -# OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS — user role -> tool scope (outbound subject; user may reach the tool) -# OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS — agent role -> tool scope (outbound target; DEGENERATE under UC-1) +# INBOUND_PAIRS — user role -> agent scope (inbound; user may call the agent) +# OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS — user role -> tool scope (outbound subject gate; user reaches the tool) +# OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS — operator role -> tool scope (outbound capability gate; agent reaches the tool) INBOUND_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ ("developer", "github-agent.source_operations"), @@ -127,19 +135,26 @@ ("tester", "github-tool.issues-write"), ] -# Agent->tool gate. Deliberately EMPTY: UC-1's single generic ``github-agent.agent`` role maps to no -# specific tool scope under deny-by-default, so ``target_ok`` is degenerate. The outbound probe -# evaluates ``subject_ok`` only (spec: *user-gating dimension only*); this list documents the empty -# gate and is not probed. -OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [] +# Agent->tool capability gate: the per-skill operator role -> tool scope pairs the PRB +# capability-match maps from the operator-role descriptions (source_operations -> the two source +# scopes; issue_operations -> the two issue scopes). The agent reaches all four tool scopes, so this +# gate is fully populated (no longer degenerate) and both gates are probed as a per-scope AND. +OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ + ("github-agent.source_operations", "github-tool.source-read"), + ("github-agent.source_operations", "github-tool.source-write"), + ("github-agent.issue_operations", "github-tool.issues-read"), + ("github-agent.issue_operations", "github-tool.issues-write"), +] # --- The single abstract policy.md (baked into the AIAC stack out of band) ------------------ # # The AIAC pod mounts its own ``policy.md`` (via AIAC_POLICY_FILE); the test does not feed it at # runtime. It lives here as the fact-triad anchor — verbatim from the spec's *Scenario inputs*. It -# is USER-INTENT-ONLY: it does not name the agent role (naming it would populate ``target_ok`` and -# break the user-gate-only decision). Intent-only prose; the PRB/LLM expands intent into the -# discovered scopes via the entity/role descriptions. +# is USER-INTENT-ONLY: it states only what users may do; it does not name the agent's operator roles. +# The agent's own capability (the ``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS`` gate) comes from the generic rubric +# (``generic_policy.md``) applied to the operator-role descriptions, not from naming those roles in +# this policy. Intent-only prose; the PRB/LLM expands intent into the discovered scopes via the +# entity/role descriptions. # # (The prior explicit enumerated variant and the cross-variant equivalence check are deferred to the # two-policy rung ``testing/5.4.4``; the two-stack topology that served both variants is discarded.) diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py index 2394afb54..47f7e7d3e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py @@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ def onboarded() -> dict: def test_agent_role_and_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: - """Keycloak holds the agent's realm role + the two AgentCard scopes with their descriptions.""" + """Keycloak holds the agent's per-skill operator roles + the two AgentCard scopes, all with + their descriptions.""" admin = onboarded["admin"] admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) - role = admin.get_realm_role(scn.AGENT_ROLE) - assert role and role.get("name") == scn.AGENT_ROLE, f"missing realm role {scn.AGENT_ROLE!r}" + for name, description in scn.AGENT_ROLES.items(): + role = admin.get_realm_role(name) + assert role and role.get("name") == name, f"missing realm role {name!r}" + assert (role.get("description") or "") == description, ( + f"agent role {name!r} description mismatch: {role.get('description')!r} != {description!r}" + ) scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} for name, description in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items(): diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py index ffe5ef3c8..677d066d0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_then_tool.py @@ -154,12 +154,17 @@ def onboarded() -> dict: def test_agent_role_and_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: - """Keycloak holds the agent's realm role + the two AgentCard scopes with their descriptions.""" + """Keycloak holds the agent's per-skill operator roles + the two AgentCard scopes, all with + their descriptions.""" admin = onboarded["admin"] admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) - role = admin.get_realm_role(scn.AGENT_ROLE) - assert role and role.get("name") == scn.AGENT_ROLE, f"missing realm role {scn.AGENT_ROLE!r}" + for name, description in scn.AGENT_ROLES.items(): + role = admin.get_realm_role(name) + assert role and role.get("name") == name, f"missing realm role {name!r}" + assert (role.get("description") or "") == description, ( + f"agent role {name!r} description mismatch: {role.get('description')!r} != {description!r}" + ) scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} for name, description in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items(): diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py index dd1623312..0806e00d0 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py @@ -173,12 +173,17 @@ def onboarded() -> dict: def test_agent_role_and_scopes_provisioned(onboarded: dict) -> None: - """Keycloak holds the agent's realm role + the two AgentCard scopes with their descriptions.""" + """Keycloak holds the agent's per-skill operator roles + the two AgentCard scopes, all with + their descriptions.""" admin = onboarded["admin"] admin.change_current_realm(TEST_REALM) - role = admin.get_realm_role(scn.AGENT_ROLE) - assert role and role.get("name") == scn.AGENT_ROLE, f"missing realm role {scn.AGENT_ROLE!r}" + for name, description in scn.AGENT_ROLES.items(): + role = admin.get_realm_role(name) + assert role and role.get("name") == name, f"missing realm role {name!r}" + assert (role.get("description") or "") == description, ( + f"agent role {name!r} description mismatch: {role.get('description')!r} != {description!r}" + ) scopes = {s["name"]: (s.get("description") or "") for s in admin.get_client_scopes()} for name, description in scn.AGENT_SCOPES.items(): diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py index 74128a2af..35d20ff7e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py @@ -141,12 +141,21 @@ def expected_inbound(subject: str) -> bool: OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET: set[tuple[str, str]] = set(scn.OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS) +# The agent-capability gate: the tool scopes the agent's per-skill operator roles reach (the +# right-hand column of ``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS``). In UC-1 the agent reaches all four tool scopes, +# so the per-scope AND reduces to the subject gate for the verdicts — but the oracle expresses the +# AND explicitly so the two-gate decision is documented, not assumed. +OUTBOUND_TARGET_GRANT_SET: set[str] = {fn for _, fn in scn.OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS} + def expected_outbound_with_tool(subject: str, function_name: str) -> bool: - """A user may reach a tool scope iff their realm role is granted it in the full user→tool gate - (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) — the gate any tool onboarding fills in on the agent's model, - order-independently (rungs 2 & 3).""" - return (scn.USERS[subject], function_name) in OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET + """A user may reach a tool scope iff **both** gates pass (per-scope AND): their realm role is + granted it in the user→tool subject gate (``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS``) **and** the agent's own + operator roles reach it in the capability gate (``OUTBOUND_TARGET_PAIRS``). Any tool onboarding + fills both gates on the agent's model, order-independently (rungs 2 & 3).""" + user_ok = (scn.USERS[subject], function_name) in OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_GRANT_SET + agent_ok = function_name in OUTBOUND_TARGET_GRANT_SET + return user_ok and agent_ok # ====================================================================================== @@ -384,11 +393,11 @@ def opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: - """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``outbound_subject_role_scopes`` map (``∅`` when + """User->tool grant set from the outbound Rego's ``subject_role_scopes`` map (``∅`` when no tool has been onboarded, the full ``OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS`` once one has).""" m = opa_dump( rego_dir / OUTBOUND_REGO, - f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.outbound_subject_role_scopes", + f"data.authz.{AGENT_SLUG}.outbound.subject_role_scopes", ) return {(role, scope) for role, scopes in (m or {}).items() for scope in scopes} diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py index e3af52f54..32b256007 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_rego.py @@ -1,5 +1,13 @@ """Unit tests for aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego (ID-only model).""" +import json +import shutil +import subprocess +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego import ( generate_inbound_rego, @@ -212,21 +220,21 @@ def test_outbound_target_scopes_rendered_directly(): assert "scope_targets" not in rego -def test_outbound_subject_role_scopes_grouped_from_outbound_subject_rules(): +def test_subject_role_scopes_grouped_from_outbound_subject_rules(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) - assert "outbound_subject_role_scopes := {" in rego + assert "subject_role_scopes := {" in rego assert '"developer": ["source-read", "source-write", "issues-read"]' in rego assert '"tester": ["issues-read", "issues-write"]' in rego def test_outbound_subject_ok_matches_target_scopes_not_agent_scopes(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) - # The outbound subject gate is user->tool: it reads outbound_subject_role_scopes - # and matches against the tool's scopes, not the agent's own scopes. + # The outbound subject gate is user->target, keyed on the requested scope: it reads + # subject_role_scopes and tests input.function_name directly (per-scope AND), + # not the agent's own scopes. assert "subject_ok if {" in rego assert "some role in subject_roles[input.subject]" in rego - assert "some scope in outbound_subject_role_scopes[role]" in rego - assert "scope in target_scopes[input.target]" in rego + assert "input.function_name in subject_role_scopes[role]" in rego # The inbound-flavoured subject gate must NOT appear in the outbound package. assert "some scope in role_scopes[role]" not in rego assert "scope in agent_scopes" not in rego @@ -235,19 +243,21 @@ def test_outbound_subject_ok_matches_target_scopes_not_agent_scopes(): def test_outbound_does_not_embed_inbound_role_scopes(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) # The inbound ``role_scopes`` map (from inbound_rules) must not leak into the - # outbound package. Line-anchored so it does not match outbound_subject_role_scopes. + # outbound package. Line-anchored so it does not match subject_role_scopes. assert "\nrole_scopes :=" not in rego assert not rego.startswith("role_scopes :=") def test_outbound_has_target_gate_and_allow(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_github_agent()) + # The capability gate tests the requested scope against the target's scopes directly + # (target_scopes[input.target] IS the per-scope capability gate) — no agent_roles existential. assert "target_ok if {" in rego - assert "some role in agent_roles" in rego - assert "some scope in agent_role_scopes[role]" in rego - assert "scope in target_scopes[input.target]" in rego + assert "input.function_name in target_scopes[input.target]" in rego assert "default allow := false" in rego assert "allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }" in rego + # allow must not reference the informational agent_roles/agent_role_scopes existential. + assert "some role in agent_roles" not in rego def test_outbound_has_no_legacy_id_carrying_input(): @@ -261,8 +271,73 @@ def test_outbound_empty_model_renders_valid_empty_literals(): rego = generate_outbound_rego(_model()) assert "agent_roles := []" in rego assert "subject_roles := {}" in rego - assert "outbound_subject_role_scopes := {}" in rego + assert "subject_role_scopes := {}" in rego assert "agent_role_scopes := {}" in rego assert "target_scopes := {}" in rego assert "default allow := false" in rego assert "allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }" in rego + + +# --- per-scope AND intersection semantics --- + + +def _outbound_and_model() -> AgentPolicyModel: + """A fixture that pins the per-scope-AND intersection: the target owns {A, B, C}; the user + reaches {A, C} (subject gate) and the agent reaches {B, C} on the target (capability gate). + Only C is in both gates, so only C is allowed — A (user-only) and B (agent-only) are denied.""" + user = _role("u-role") + operator = _role("op-role") + a, b, c = _scope("scope-a"), _scope("scope-b"), _scope("scope-c") + return _model( + agent_id="github-agent", + agent_roles=[operator], + subject_roles={"user1": [user]}, + # target_scopes IS the capability gate: the agent reaches {B, C} on "T". + target_scopes={"T": [b, c]}, + # user (subject gate) reaches {A, C}. + outbound_subject_rules=[PolicyRule(role=user, scope=a), PolicyRule(role=user, scope=c)], + # informational agent_role_scopes (not referenced by allow): the operator role reaches {B, C}. + outbound_rules=[PolicyRule(role=operator, scope=b), PolicyRule(role=operator, scope=c)], + ) + + +def test_outbound_per_scope_and_structural(): + """Structural: the two gates read the same request scope from disjoint maps — the subject gate + grants {A, C} to the user, the capability gate grants {B, C} on the target — so allow is their + per-scope intersection.""" + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_outbound_and_model()) + assert '"u-role": ["scope-a", "scope-c"]' in rego # subject gate: user reaches A, C + assert '"T": ["scope-b", "scope-c"]' in rego # capability gate: agent reaches B, C on T + assert "input.function_name in subject_role_scopes[role]" in rego + assert "input.function_name in target_scopes[input.target]" in rego + assert "allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }" in rego + + +@pytest.mark.skipif(not shutil.which("opa"), reason="opa binary not on PATH") +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "function_name, allowed", + [ + ("scope-c", True), # in BOTH gates -> allowed + ("scope-a", False), # user-only (not in the agent's capability gate) -> denied + ("scope-b", False), # agent-only (not in the user's subject gate) -> denied + ], +) +def test_outbound_per_scope_and_denies_mismatch(function_name: str, allowed: bool): + """Behavioural: evaluate the generated ``allow`` with ``opa eval``. The user-only scope (A) and + the agent-only scope (B) are both denied; only the scope in both gates (C) is allowed — pinning + the per-scope intersection (an A/B mismatch denies both).""" + rego = generate_outbound_rego(_outbound_and_model()) + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + path = Path(tmp) / "outbound.rego" + path.write_text(rego) + cmd = [ + shutil.which("opa"), "eval", "-f", "json", "-d", str(path), + "--stdin-input", "data.authz.github_agent.outbound.allow", + ] + out = subprocess.run( + cmd, + input=json.dumps({"subject": "user1", "target": "T", "function_name": function_name}), + capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, + ).stdout + result = json.loads(out)["result"][0]["expressions"][0]["value"] + assert result is allowed, f"function_name={function_name!r}" diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index 623de6cc9..eba8dbbaa 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -441,6 +441,53 @@ def test_shared_user_role_creates_no_false_outbound_edge(): assert apm.outbound_subject_rules == [] # A does not target T, so no gate +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Cycle 13b — UC-1-shaped multi-role capability match: an agent owning TWO # +# operator roles reaching four tool scopes, with user edges on a subset, derives # +# BOTH outbound gates — the full agent->tool outbound_rules + target_scopes, and # +# the user->tool outbound_subject gate. This is what populates the per-scope AND. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_multi_role_capability_match_populates_both_outbound_gates(): + src_op = _agent_role("r-src-op", "source_operations", owner="github-agent") + issue_op = _agent_role("r-issue-op", "issue_operations", owner="github-agent") + developer = _user_role("r-developer", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + tester = _user_role("r-tester", "tester", users=["test-user"]) + sr = _scope("s-source-read", service_id="github-tool") + sw = _scope("s-source-write", service_id="github-tool") + ir = _scope("s-issues-read", service_id="github-tool") + iw = _scope("s-issues-write", service_id="github-tool") + catalog = [ + _agent("github-agent", roles=[src_op, issue_op], + scopes=[_scope("s-agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent")]), + _tool("github-tool", scopes=[sr, sw, ir, iw]), + ] + rules = [ + # capability gate: each operator role -> its domain's tool scopes (capability-match) + _rule(src_op, sr), _rule(src_op, sw), + _rule(issue_op, ir), _rule(issue_op, iw), + # subject gate: user roles -> a subset of the tool scopes + _rule(developer, sr), _rule(developer, sw), _rule(developer, ir), + _rule(tester, ir), _rule(tester, iw), + ] + store = run_engine(rules, catalog=catalog) + + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + # capability gate: all four agent->tool edges + target_scopes covering all four scopes + assert _pairs(apm.outbound_rules) == sorted([ + ("r-src-op", "s-source-read"), ("r-src-op", "s-source-write"), + ("r-issue-op", "s-issues-read"), ("r-issue-op", "s-issues-write"), + ]) + assert {k: sorted(s.id for s in v) for k, v in apm.target_scopes.items()} == { + "github-tool": ["s-issues-read", "s-issues-write", "s-source-read", "s-source-write"], + } + # subject gate: the user->tool grant set (developer: source rw + issues read; tester: issues rw) + assert _pairs(apm.outbound_subject_rules) == sorted([ + ("r-developer", "s-source-read"), ("r-developer", "s-source-write"), + ("r-developer", "s-issues-read"), + ("r-tester", "s-issues-read"), ("r-tester", "s-issues-write"), + ]) + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Cycle 14 — affected set from the batch: an agent unrelated to the batch is # # never derived or upserted, even though it exists in the catalog/store. # From 15bc220e27ddeab794f9ad4f3f634ed2debefd54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 02:04:19 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 266/273] test: Align 5.3 pipeline agent roles to UC-1 (source_operations / issue_operations) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Rename the 5.3 policy-pipeline scenario's github-agent client roles from source-operator / issues-operator to source_operations / issue_operations, matching exactly the per-skill operator roles UC-1 provisioning emits from the AgentCard skill ids. - scenario.py: AGENT_ROLES keys + OUTBOUND_PAIRS; rewrite the plural-naming NOTE — the _operations suffix (not the actor-noun operator) sidesteps the same PRB-auditor actor-confusion the old plural issues-operator dodged - policy.explicit.md: the two "Agent roles -> tool operations" grants - policy-pipeline.md spec + demo docs (github-agent.md, github_agent README) The PRB-auditor collision regression (test_auditor_dimension_integration.py, issue 3.20) deliberately keeps the singular issue-operator and is untouched. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md | 4 +-- .../specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 18 ++++++------ aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md | 4 +-- aiac/test/integration/scenario.py | 29 ++++++++++--------- 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md index 973165df0..eb0d3a99b 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ An autonomous A2A agent that acts on a user's behalf against GitHub **source repositories** and an **issue/PR tracker**, using the [`github-tool`](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-extensions) MCP server. -This agent implements the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC policy-pipeline integration test — the two skills match the policy scenario's `source-operator` and `issues-operator` roles. +This agent implements the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC policy-pipeline integration test — the two skills match the policy scenario's `source_operations` and `issue_operations` roles. ## Skills diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md index 40c152a12..bc1f35e4c 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/demo/github-agent.md @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ This agent generalises it to the scenario's **two capability areas**. | Scenario element | This agent | |---|---| | Agent client `github-agent` (type **Agent**) | This A2A agent | -| Agent role `source-operator` → agent scope `source-access` | **Skill 1** — Source repository operations | -| Agent role `issues-operator` → agent scope `issues-access` | **Skill 2** — Issue & PR tracker operations | +| Agent role `source_operations` → agent scope `source-access` | **Skill 1** — Source repository operations | +| Agent role `issue_operations` → agent scope `issues-access` | **Skill 2** — Issue & PR tracker operations | | Tool `github-tool` scopes `source-read`/`source-write` | Source tool allow-list (see §5) | | Tool `github-tool` scopes `issues-read`/`issues-write` | Issue/PR tool allow-list (see §5) | diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index b3a761043..fc02cc995 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ scenario truth table against **each** variant's Rego (step 7). Steps 1–6 below **not** a list — a list fails the `in ("Agent","Tool")` check, resolves the type to `None`, and yields empty pipeline output. - via the **aiac IdP `Configuration` library** (the real product surface the PCE reads back): create - the client roles (`source-operator`, `issues-operator`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, + the client roles (`source_operations`, `issue_operations`) and scopes (`source-access`, `issues-access`, `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) with the descriptions in *[Scenario inputs](#scenario-inputs-prb-functional-inputs)*, and map roles→services and scopes→services so `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` and `get_service().roles` / @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ exercises the deny-by-default path. | Element | Value | |---------|-------| | Realm | `AIAC_TEST_REALM` (default `aiac-pp`) | -| Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source-operator`, `issues-operator`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | +| Agent | `github-agent` (client roles `source_operations`, `issue_operations`; scopes `source-access`, `issues-access`) | | Tool | `github-tool` (scopes `source-read`, `source-write`, `issues-read`, `issues-write`) | | Users | `dev-user` (role `developer`), `test-user` (role `tester`), `devops-user` (role `devops`) | | `developer` | source read/write + issues read | @@ -342,8 +342,8 @@ Tracking issue for this test: `testing/5.3-policy-pipeline-integration-test.md`. - Two `policy.md` variants are shipped on purpose (see *Scenario inputs*): an **explicit** one and an **abstract** one. `AIAC_POLICY_FILE` selects which the PRB reads, so a reviewer can compare the PRB's output on explicit vs. abstract policy text against the same expected Rego. The abstract variant - carries **no** agent-capability bullet; it relies on the elaborated `source-operator` / - `issues-operator` role descriptions (provisioned into Keycloak) for mapping (c), so it survives + carries **no** agent-capability bullet; it relies on the elaborated `source_operations` / + `issue_operations` role descriptions (provisioned into Keycloak) for mapping (c), so it survives deny-by-default and both variants reproduce the same Rego. - Descriptions are ≤255 characters and written **verbatim** into Keycloak; there is no shortened / verbatim split. (Keycloak caps role and client descriptions at 255 chars, and the generic descriptions @@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keywor **Client roles (agent):** -- `source-operator` — Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, +- `source_operations` — Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, creating, and modifying files. -- `issues-operator` — Covers read and write access to the issue tracker — reading, filing, updating, +- `issue_operations` — Covers read and write access to the issue tracker — reading, filing, updating, and commenting on issues and their threads. **Agent scopes:** @@ -455,15 +455,15 @@ policy supports it; deny by default. - tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. ## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) -- source-operator may perform source-read and source-write. -- issues-operator may perform issues-read and issues-write. +- source_operations may perform source-read and source-write. +- issue_operations may perform issues-read and issues-write. ``` ### `policy.md` — Version 2 (abstract) Relies on the PRB / LLM to expand "read and modify source" into the concrete scopes. Encodes the same role→access facts as Version 1. It carries **no** agent-capability bullet; mapping (c) -(agent-role→tool-scope) is instead derived from the elaborated `source-operator` / `issues-operator` +(agent-role→tool-scope) is instead derived from the elaborated `source_operations` / `issue_operations` role descriptions (see *Role & scope descriptions*), so it survives the PRB's deny-by-default-on-silence rule and both variants reproduce the same Rego. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md b/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md index 08582c278..42526133d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md +++ b/aiac/test/integration/policy.explicit.md @@ -12,5 +12,5 @@ policy supports it; deny by default. - tester may perform issues-read and issues-write. ## Agent roles → tool operations (outbound target; agent may reach the tool) -- source-operator may perform source-read and source-write. -- issues-operator may perform issues-read and issues-write. +- source_operations may perform source-read and source-write. +- issue_operations may perform issues-read and issues-write. diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py index 4e2194e0d..0fc09442d 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario.py @@ -72,21 +72,22 @@ ), } -# name -> description. The github-agent's client roles. +# name -> description. The github-agent's client roles — the per-skill operator roles, named to +# match exactly what UC-1 provisioning emits from the AgentCard skill ids +# (``github-agent.source_operations`` / ``github-agent.issue_operations``; see scenario_uc1.py). # -# NOTE: ``issues-operator`` is intentionally PLURAL. The singular ``issue-operator`` reads to the PRB -# LLM auditor as an actor competing with the ``tester`` subject and makes it wrongly reject the valid -# (tester, issues-write) grant in mapping (b), aborting the pipeline. Plural is also consistent with -# every other issues-* name (issues-access / issues-read / issues-write). The PRB auditor was hardened -# against this class of collision (see issues/agent/3.20-policy-rules-builder.md, "Follow-up: auditor -# relationship-scoping"), but keep -# the plural here regardless — do not "tidy" it to singular to match source-operator. +# NOTE: the ``_operations`` suffix (not the actor-noun ``operator``) also sidesteps the PRB-auditor +# actor-confusion that the former plural ``issues-operator`` was chosen to dodge: the singular +# ``issue-operator`` read to the LLM auditor as an actor competing with the ``tester`` subject and +# made it wrongly reject the valid (tester, issues-write) grant. ``issue_operations`` reads as a +# category of actions, not a person, so that collision does not apply. (Historical detail: +# issues/agent/3.20-policy-rules-builder.md, "Follow-up: auditor relationship-scoping".) AGENT_ROLES: dict[str, str] = { - "source-operator": ( + "source_operations": ( "Covers read and write access to source repository contents — listing, reading, creating, " "and modifying files." ), - "issues-operator": ( + "issue_operations": ( "Covers read and write access to the issue tracker — reading, filing, updating, and " "commenting on issues and their threads." ), @@ -127,10 +128,10 @@ ] OUTBOUND_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ - ("source-operator", "source-read"), - ("source-operator", "source-write"), - ("issues-operator", "issues-read"), - ("issues-operator", "issues-write"), + ("source_operations", "source-read"), + ("source_operations", "source-write"), + ("issue_operations", "issues-read"), + ("issue_operations", "issues-write"), ] OUTBOUND_SUBJECT_PAIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [ From e0781e1b28ccdc670c02c3301a2a81296f55784f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 13:12:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 267/273] feat: Add PCE decommission (service offboard) + offboard route MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add the authoritative service-offboard path that closes drift "case 3" (onboard followed by offboard): reconcile's catalog-anchored drift-GC cannot prune a decommissioned service because it is gone from get_services(), so its own SPM inbound edges, its outbound footprint on other SPMs, and — if an agent — its APM/Rego would linger indefinitely. - engine: decommission(service_id) + _decommission — purge SPM(X), strip X's outbound edges from every other SPM, delete APM(X) if X was an agent, and re-derive every still-live agent whose policy changed. Keyed by clientId (SPM key), not the Keycloak UUID, since an offboarded client cannot be resolved via get_services(). Factored spm()/is_agent() into _spm_cache, shared with _run. Preserves the single-get_services() read and per-agent partial-upsert invariants. - offboarding UC: thin offboard_service stub + POST /apply/offboard/ {service_id:path} route dispatching to decommission; bypasses compute_and_apply. Re-export decommission from aiac.policy.computation. - tests: two case-3 PCE cases (tool offboard strands no edges + rederives agent; agent offboard deletes APM + purges outbound footprint) and three offboard-route tests. - specs: PRD merge-semantics, PCE component spec (Reconcile + Decommission sections), aiac-agent endpoints/use-case tables. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md | 8 +- .../components/policy-computation-engine.md | 55 +++- aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py | 14 +- .../src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/__init__.py | 0 .../src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/offboard.py | 19 ++ aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py | 4 +- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 242 ++++++++++++++++-- aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py | 40 +++ aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py | 197 ++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 542 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/__init__.py create mode 100644 aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/offboard.py diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index beaebc53a..62faede8c 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi - **`aiac.policy.model` is dependency-free (only `pydantic` + `aiac.idp.configuration.models`).** `PolicyRule`, `AgentPolicyModel`, and `PolicyModel` live in a neutral namespace importable by any consumer — Policy Store library, PDP Policy Library, PCE — without forcing a dependency on any service namespace. - **`PolicyRule.role` and `PolicyRule.scope` are typed objects.** They hold `Role` and `Scope` instances from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`, enabling the PCE to call `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope` without additional type conversion. - **`AgentPolicyModel` relationship maps are keyed by string `id`.** `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `target_scopes` use the entity's string `id` as the dict key, so `Service`, `Role`, `Scope`, and `Subject` need no custom hash/eq and keep pydantic's default field-based equality. This also lets the maps serialize to JSON without a custom key serializer. -- **PCE merge semantics are additive only.** New rules are appended to existing `inbound_rules`/`outbound_rules`; existing rules are never removed. Rule revocation is TBD. +- **PCE merge semantics are additive, with drift-GC and an authoritative offboard.** The default merge (`override=False`) is additive — new rules are appended to a service's SPM `inbound_rules` (dedup by `role.id + scope.id`); existing edges are preserved. Two mechanisms remove edges: (1) **reconcile drift-GC** prunes each *touched* SPM against the `get_services()` catalog on every write, dropping edges whose scope or agent-role no longer exists and collapsing churned/duplicate user-role generations (order-independent; skipped on a catalog miss so a transient outage never wipes an SPM); and (2) **`decommission(service_id)`** — the authoritative service **offboard** — deletes a decommissioned service's SPM, purges its outbound footprint from other SPMs, deletes its APM/Rego if it was an agent, and re-derives every affected agent (keyed by clientId, since an offboarded client is gone from `get_services()`). Fine-grained **single-rule** revocation is still TBD; `override=True` gives role-level replace. - **PDP services bind to `0.0.0.0`.** Exposed as Kubernetes ClusterIP Services so that the Agent Pod can reach them over the cluster network. - **RBAC via OPA Rego rules.** AIAC manages role → service permission mappings by writing `AgentPolicyModel` instances to the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR. Each agent pod's OPA plugin fetches its packages from the CR at startup. - **RAG Pod is a StatefulSet with persistent ChromaDB storage.** ChromaDB data is stored on a 1 Gi `ReadWriteOnce` PersistentVolumeClaim mounted at `/chroma/chroma` (ChromaDB default). On pod recreation, the StatefulSet rebinds the same PVC and ChromaDB resumes from persisted state without re-ingestion. The pod runs a single replica. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md index c1b16f3ac..69f5d8547 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent.md @@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ A thin adapter started as an **asyncio background task** in the FastAPI `lifespa | `aiac.apply.role.{id}` | Role Update sub-agent (UC3, via Controller) | | `aiac.apply.policy.build` | Policy Update Build sub-agent (UC2, via Controller) | +> **Follow-up:** `aiac.apply.offboard.{id}` (Service Offboarding, UC4) is the intended subject for event-driven offboard. It is **not yet wired** into the consumer — offboard is reachable today only via the `POST /apply/offboard/{service_id}` HTTP route. + ### Ack contract The consumer **awaits** the internal handler before issuing the NATS acknowledgement. On handler success → ack. On handler exception → do not ack; NATS redelivers after `AckWait`. After 5 unacknowledged redeliveries, NATS routes the message to `aiac.apply.dlq`. @@ -129,8 +131,9 @@ Each use case (and the UC1 Orchestrator) is specified in a dedicated sub-PRD: | Service Onboarding | [aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md](aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md) | `aiac.apply.service.{id}`, `POST /apply/service/{id}` | Orchestrator sequences: Service Provision → Service Policy Builder (IdP reader + PRB invoker) | | Policy Update | [aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md](aiac-agent/uc2-policy-update.md) | `aiac.apply.policy.build`, `POST /apply/policy/build`, `POST /apply/policy/rebuild` | | | Role Update | [aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md](aiac-agent/uc3-role-update.md) | `aiac.apply.role.{id}`, `POST /apply/role/{id}` | | +| Service Offboarding | (see PCE `decommission`) | `POST /apply/offboard/{service_id}` (`aiac.apply.offboard.{id}` — NATS wiring is a follow-up) | Thin sub-agent; calls the PCE's `decommission(service_id)` **directly** (whole-service teardown, not a rule fold — bypasses the PRB and `compute_and_apply`). Keyed by **clientId, not UUID** (an offboarded client is gone from `get_services()`). | -> **Note:** Each producing sub-agent calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). +> **Note:** Each producing sub-agent (UC1–UC3) calls the **shared Policy Rules Builder** directly, merges the results, and returns `list[PolicyRule]` to the Controller. The Controller calls `compute_and_apply(merged_rules)` from `aiac.policy.computation` (PCE) once. Policy rule application is fully specified in [policy-computation-engine.md](policy-computation-engine.md). The Policy Rules Builder is specified in [aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). **UC4 (Service Offboarding) is the exception:** it produces no rules — its handler resolves the clientId and calls the PCE's authoritative `decommission(service_id)` (specified in [policy-computation-engine.md → Decommission](policy-computation-engine.md#decommission-service-offboard)) to tear down the service's entire policy footprint. ### IdP access — library, not service @@ -146,6 +149,9 @@ Every sub-agent (UC1 Provision + Service Policy Builder, UC2 Build + Rebuild, UC | POST | `/apply/policy/rebuild` | Policy Update | Rebuild | | POST | `/apply/role/{role_id}` | Role Update | Role | | POST | `/apply/service/{service_id}` | Service Onboarding | Provision | +| POST | `/apply/offboard/{service_id}` | Service Offboarding | Offboard (calls PCE `decommission` directly) | + +The `/apply/offboard/{service_id}` path uses the `{service_id:path}` converter (slash-bearing SPIFFE-URI clientIds) and is keyed on the **clientId (SPM key)**, not the Keycloak UUID that `/apply/service/{service_id}` carries — an offboarded client is gone from `get_services()`, so UUID→clientId resolution is impossible. All endpoints return bare HTTP status codes: `200 OK` on success (no response body), and the status codes from the Error Handling table on upstream failure. Success responses carry no body; upstream failures are raised as FastAPI `HTTPException`s, so error responses carry FastAPI's default JSON error body (`{"detail": ...}`) alongside the status code. Summary, applied-rule details, and debug information are written to the service log. Validation failures surface as an error status and log entry; detailed reporting is specified in [policy-rules-builder.md](aiac-agent/policy-rules-builder.md). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md index 44cbc30c4..15a386407 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-computation-engine.md @@ -74,15 +74,17 @@ No FastAPI. No Kubernetes deployment. No container image. Imported as a library ### Public API -Single entry point: +Two entry points — an incremental fold and an authoritative offboard: ```python def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None +def decommission(service_id: str) -> None # service_id = clientId (SPM key), not the Keycloak UUID ``` -- **No return value; failures propagate:** on success the caller receives no return value. The function logs exceptions and **re-raises** them — a failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push surfaces to the caller (the Controller returns HTTP 500; a NATS consumer nacks → at-least-once redelivery) rather than being silently swallowed while nothing is applied. +- **No return value; failures propagate:** on success the caller receives no return value. Both functions log exceptions and **re-raise** them — a failure in IdP resolution, Policy Store I/O, or PDP Policy Writer push surfaces to the caller (the Controller returns HTTP 500; a NATS consumer nacks → at-least-once redelivery) rather than being silently swallowed while nothing is applied. - **`override`:** selects the merge mode (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)). `False` (default) appends additively at the SPM layer; `True` authoritatively replaces every input role's mappings **across all SPMs** (role-level revocation). Set by the caller (the Controller) from the producing UC's choice — UC1 = `False`, UC3 = `True`, UC2 Rebuild = `True`, UC2 Build = TBD. -- Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply` +- **`decommission`:** the authoritative service **offboard** — tears down a decommissioned service's entire policy footprint (see [Decommission (service offboard)](#decommission-service-offboard)). Keyed by the **clientId (SPM key)**, since an offboarded client is gone from `get_services()` and its UUID can no longer be resolved. +- Import path: `from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply, decommission` ### Rule-builder input contract (upstream) @@ -101,6 +103,8 @@ Given `rules: list[PolicyRule]` and an `override` flag, `compute_and_apply` exec 3. **Override (`override=True`) — role-level revocation.** *Before* appending, purge the **distinct input-role set** from **every** SPM that contains any of them: one up-front pass using `get_service_policies_by_role` per distinct input role, removing every stored rule whose `role.id` matches. Then append the fresh rules. Purging once, up-front, ensures a role shared across the input is not wiped after being added. The old algorithm's `target_scopes` reconciliation is **deleted** — `target_scopes` is a derived, never-stored quantity. +3b. **Reconcile (drift GC) — after routing/override, before persist.** Prune each **touched** SPM against the step-1 `get_services()` catalog (no additional IdP read) so drift cannot accumulate across re-onboarding. Runs under **both** merge modes and is order-independent (drops only edges whose entity no longer exists). See [Reconcile (drift GC)](#reconcile-drift-gc) under Merge Semantics for the keep rules. + 4. **Persist** each changed SPM via `apply_service_policy`. 5. **Compute the affected-agent set from the batch** — from the batch's roles/scopes, **not** by scanning all agents: @@ -157,14 +161,45 @@ The `override` flag (set by the caller from the producing UC's choice) selects t `override=True` provides **role-level** revocation. Finer-grained single-rule revocation (removing one `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role) is still **TBD**. +#### Reconcile (drift GC) + +SPM identity keys on Keycloak UUIDs, which **churn on delete/recreate**. Because append-dedup keys on `role.id + scope.id`, a re-onboarded service whose Keycloak roles/scopes were recreated presents *new* UUIDs, so its edges are treated as new and pile up **beside** the superseded generations — nothing removes the old ones. (`override=True` does not close this: it purges by the *input* role's id, so a role whose UUID already churned out of the batch is never matched.) A live diagnostic once found a single agent SPM carrying 53 inbound edges across two role-id generations, retired `*-aud` scopes, an impossible self-reference, and duplicate same-name roles — all replayed into every regenerated APM/Rego. + +**Reconcile** closes this. After routing (step 2) and any override purge (step 3), and **before** persist (step 4), each **touched** SPM is pruned against the step-1 catalog. It **reuses that same `get_services()` result** — no additional IdP read, so the *only-runtime-IdP-read-is-`get_services()`* invariant holds. It runs under **both** merge modes and is **order-independent** — it removes *only* edges whose entity genuinely no longer exists, never a live edge, so both onboarding orders still converge. "Touched SPMs only": at that point the SPM cache holds exactly the routed + override-purged SPMs (agent-derive SPMs aren't loaded yet). + +For each touched `SPM(X)` whose owner `X` **is present in the catalog** (a catalog **miss ⇒ skip pruning**, never wipe on a transient outage), an inbound edge is kept iff: + +1. **Scope still exists** — `edge.scope.id ∈ {s.id for s in owned_scopes}` (X's current `aiac.managed` scopes, seeded from the catalog). Drops retired/churned scopes (kills the `*-aud` species and scope-model cruft). +2. **Agent role still exists** — for `role.kind == Agent`, `edge.role.id ∈` the catalog's `aiac.managed` role ids (all services). Drops retired/churned agent client roles (kills self-references and agent-role UUID churn). +3. **User-role churn collapse** — user realm roles are membership-derived, absent from the catalog, and the PCE must not read `get_subjects()`; so among surviving `User` edges grouped by `(scope.id, role.name)`, a stale edge is dropped only when **this batch** carries a *different* id for that same `(scope, name)` (the fresh id supersedes the old generation). Two *co-existing* same-name realm roles both currently held are both kept (realm hygiene, not accumulation — out of scope). + +#### Decommission (service offboard) + +Reconcile is passive and catalog-anchored: it prunes only **touched** SPMs and skips any whose owner is absent from `get_services()`. That leaves the **onboard→offboard** drift species uncovered — once a service `X` is decommissioned (its Keycloak client + roles/scopes deleted), `X` is gone from the catalog forever, so (1) `SPM(X)`'s own inbound edges linger; (2) `X`'s **outbound footprint** (`X_role → other_scope` edges on *other* SPMs) is never pruned; (3) if `X` was an agent, its **APM/Rego stays in the PDP**. `decommission(service_id)` is the **authoritative** teardown for exactly this — it acts on an explicit offboard signal, not the catalog-miss guard. + +**Keyed by the clientId, not the UUID.** An offboarded client is gone from `get_services()`, so UUID→clientId resolution is impossible; the offboard contract carries the clientId (`Service.serviceId`, the SPM key) directly. This is the documented asymmetry with onboard's `/apply/service/{uuid}`. + +Steps: + +1. **Catalog once** (`get_services()` — the same single allowed IdP read; `X` is absent, used only to seed/classify the still-live agents re-derived in step 8). +2. **Load `SPM(X)`.** **Content guard:** a 404 fresh-empty SPM (never onboarded / already removed) is a **no-op** — no spurious PDP delete. +3. **Targeters** — agents whose *outbound* loses `X`: the `actorIds` of every **Agent**-kind inbound edge on `SPM(X)` (they held `their_role → X_scope` on `SPM(X)`, deleted in step 5). +4. **Purge `X`'s outbound footprint.** For each `r ∈ SPM(X).owned_roles`, find the SPMs referencing it via `get_service_policies_by_role(r)`; on each such SPM `B` (skip `X`), drop edges where `edge.role.id == r.id`; mark `B` changed and, if `B` is an agent, affected (its inbound `source_roles[X]` vanished). +5. **Delete `SPM(X)`** (`delete_service_policy`) — removes every user→X and agent→X inbound edge at once — and evict it from the SPM cache so re-derive can't resurrect it. +6. **Persist** each changed (footprint-purged) SPM (`apply_service_policy`). +7. **Delete `APM(X)`** (`delete_agent_policy`) iff `SPM(X).service_type == Agent` (tools have an SPM but no APM). +8. **Re-derive** `affected = (targeters ∪ purged-agent-owners) − {X}`, filtered to agents; `apply_policy(PolicyModel(agents=…))` **once** if non-empty. Derivation is reused unchanged — it reads the freshly-persisted, `X`-deleted store, so `outbound` / `target_scopes` / `source_roles` referencing `X` drop automatically. + +**Invariants preserved:** still exactly one IdP read (`get_services()`); still a per-agent partial upsert. **Not covered** (follow-ups): NATS `aiac.apply.offboard.{id}` consumer wiring; dropped-target GC where the source service survives (via `override=True` re-onboard); batch offboard. + ### Dependencies | Module | Purpose | |--------|---------| | `aiac.policy.model` | `PolicyRule`, `ServicePolicyModel`, `AgentPolicyModel`, `PolicyModel` | | `aiac.idp.configuration` | `Configuration.get_services` — the **only** runtime IdP read (catalog: `service_type` + own roles/scopes for the P2 seed) | -| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope` (fetch SPM), `get_service_policies_by_role` (SPMs containing a role — override purge + outbound derivation), `apply_service_policy` (persist SPM) | -| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — partial-upsert derived APMs to OPA | +| `aiac.policy.store.library` | `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope` (fetch SPM), `get_service_policies_by_role` (SPMs containing a role — override purge + outbound derivation), `apply_service_policy` (persist SPM), `delete_service_policy` (offboard) | +| `aiac.pdp.policy.library` | `apply_policy` — partial-upsert derived APMs to OPA; `delete_agent_policy` — remove an offboarded agent's APM/Rego | Note: the PCE no longer calls `get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope` / `get_subjects_by_role` at routing or classification time — those facts arrive on the rules (input contract) and derivation reads SPMs. The single IdP read is `get_services()` for the identity seed. @@ -189,8 +224,8 @@ Good tests assert external behavior — what the engine writes to the Policy Sto **Seam:** mock all downstream dependencies at their module-level import boundary: - `aiac.idp.configuration` — mock `Configuration.get_services` (the catalog: `service_type` + each service's own roles/scopes for the P2 seed). -- `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope`, `get_service_policies_by_role`, `apply_service_policy`. -- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy`. +- `aiac.policy.store.library` — mock `get_service_policy` / `get_service_policy_by_scope`, `get_service_policies_by_role`, `apply_service_policy`, `delete_service_policy`. +- `aiac.pdp.policy.library` — mock `apply_policy`, `delete_agent_policy`. **Un-freeze `test/policy/computation/`.** These tests were excluded (frozen imports caused collection errors). With the SPM redesign landed, un-freeze the directory so the suite runs under `pytest test/ -m "not integration"`. @@ -207,7 +242,9 @@ Key behaviors to assert: - **Directional relevance — no false outbound edge.** A user role shared between `AS` and `TS` does **not** by itself make A "target" T; A's outbound edge to T appears only if one of A's **agent** roles maps to a T scope. - **Affected set from the batch, not a full scan.** The affected-agent set is computed from the batch roles/scopes; agents unrelated to the batch are never derived or upserted. - **`apply_policy` called exactly once** after all `apply_service_policy` writes complete (partial upsert of only the affected agents). -- **Failures propagate.** An exception from any dependency is logged and **re-raised** (it propagates to the caller, which surfaces it — e.g. the Controller returns HTTP 500); on success `compute_and_apply` returns `None`. +- **Reconcile (drift GC).** A touched SPM carrying dangling edges (retired scope, churned scope UUID, churned/duplicate user role, retired agent-role self-reference) is pruned against the catalog on re-onboarding; live edges survive and the pass is idempotent; a catalog miss (owner absent) leaves the SPM untouched. +- **Decommission (service offboard).** Onboard an agent A targeting tool T, then `decommission(T)`: `SPM(T)` is deleted, no `delete_agent_policy` (tool has no APM), and A is re-derived with an empty outbound while its inbound survives. `decommission(A)`: `SPM(A)` deleted, `delete_agent_policy(A)` called, A's outbound footprint (`AR→TS` on `SPM(T)`) purged while T keeps its user grant, and no APM re-derived for the deleted agent. A never-onboarded / 404 service is a no-op. +- **Failures propagate.** An exception from any dependency is logged and **re-raised** (it propagates to the caller, which surfaces it — e.g. the Controller returns HTTP 500); on success `compute_and_apply` / `decommission` return `None`. **Prior art:** `3.14-unit-tests-write-api.md` (mock boundary pattern — apply the same approach at the library import boundary here). @@ -215,7 +252,7 @@ Key behaviors to assert: ## Out of Scope -- **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace at the SPM layer (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation and agent decommission / package deletion are not yet designed — **TBD**. +- **Fine-grained rule revocation:** removing an individual `PolicyRule` without replacing its whole role. `override=True` covers role-level replace at the SPM layer (see [Merge Semantics](#merge-semantics)); single-rule revocation is not yet designed — **TBD**. (Full-service **decommission / package deletion** *is* now designed and implemented — see [Decommission (service offboard)](#decommission-service-offboard).) - **Full policy rebuild orchestration:** the PCE handles incremental updates; full rebuilds (clear + reapply all) are driven by higher-level orchestration outside this module. - **Direct Keycloak calls:** all IdP access goes through `aiac.idp.configuration.Configuration` (only `get_services()`). The PCE never calls Keycloak directly. - **Persistence of `PolicyRule` inputs:** the PCE persists SPMs (source of truth); APMs are derived and pushed, never persisted as truth. The raw input rule list is not stored. diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py index eb3a0563b..50d904e55 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py @@ -15,11 +15,12 @@ from fastapi import FastAPI from fastapi.responses import Response +from aiac.agent.uc.offboarding.offboard import offboard_service from aiac.agent.uc.onboarding.orchestrator import onboard_service from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.build import build_policy from aiac.agent.uc.policy_update.rebuild import rebuild_policy from aiac.agent.uc.role_update.role import update_role -from aiac.policy.computation import compute_and_apply +from aiac.policy.computation import compute_and_apply, decommission app = FastAPI() @@ -52,6 +53,17 @@ def apply_role(role_id: str) -> Response: return Response(status_code=200) +# Offboard is keyed by the clientId (the SPM key), NOT the Keycloak internal UUID that +# /apply/service/{service_id} carries: an offboarded client is gone from get_services(), so +# UUID→clientId resolution is impossible. The {service_id:path} converter carries slash-bearing +# SPIFFE-URI clientIds. Decommission is a whole-service teardown, so it bypasses the +# (rules, override) → compute_and_apply path and calls the PCE's decommission directly. +@app.post("/apply/offboard/{service_id:path}") +def apply_offboard(service_id: str) -> Response: + decommission(offboard_service(service_id)) + return Response(status_code=200) + + def main() -> None: uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=7070) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e69de29bb diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/offboard.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/offboard.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e19f6b829 --- /dev/null +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/offboarding/offboard.py @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +"""Service Offboarding sub-agent (UC4) — stub. + +Counterpart to Service Onboarding. Where onboarding *adds* a service's policy +footprint, offboarding *removes* it: the Controller's ``/apply/offboard`` route +resolves the service key here and then calls the PCE's ``decommission`` directly +(no ``compute_and_apply`` / ``(rules, override)`` tuple — decommission is a +whole-service teardown, not a rule fold). + +Identity asymmetry with onboard. Onboarding is keyed by the Keycloak **internal +UUID** (``Service.id``) and resolves it to the clientId via ``get_services()``. +Offboarding cannot: an offboarded client is gone from ``get_services()``, so +UUID→clientId resolution is impossible. The offboard contract therefore carries +the **clientId (the SPM key)** directly, and this stub returns it unchanged. +Full validation/resolution lands with the UC4 implementation (issue 3.21). +""" + + +def offboard_service(service_id: str) -> str: + return service_id diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py index bf30e0fba..4b51b593c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/__init__.py @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply +from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply, decommission -__all__ = ["compute_and_apply"] +__all__ = ["compute_and_apply", "decommission"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index 0700cd8f8..49843d995 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -17,15 +17,31 @@ performs no IdP lookup for routing/classification and no role flattening — the only runtime IdP read is ``Configuration.get_services()`` for the identity (P2) seed. -Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` never raises. +Drift GC. Because Keycloak UUIDs churn on delete/recreate, an append-only merge would let stale +edges pile up beside their superseded generations. So after routing, ``_reconcile`` prunes each +*touched* SPM against that same ``get_services()`` catalog (no extra IdP read) — dropping edges +whose scope or agent-role no longer exists and collapsing churned/duplicate user-role generations. +It removes only edges whose entity is gone, so order-independence is preserved. + +Offboard / decommission. Reconcile is passive and catalog-anchored: it never wipes an SPM whose +owning service is absent from ``get_services()`` (a transient miss must not destroy state). That +leaves the *decommission* drift species uncovered — once a service's Keycloak client is deleted it +falls out of the catalog forever, so its own ``SPM(X)`` and its outbound footprint (``X_role → +other_scope`` edges on *other* SPMs) would linger, and its ``APM(X)`` would stay in the PDP. +``decommission(service_id)`` is the authoritative counterpart: it acts on an explicit offboard +signal (not the catalog-miss guard), tears down X's entire footprint, and re-derives every agent +whose policy changed. It is keyed by the **clientId (SPM key)**, not the Keycloak UUID — after the +client is deleted, ``get_services()`` can no longer resolve UUID→clientId. + +Fire-and-forget — ``compute_and_apply`` and ``decommission`` re-raise dependency failures. """ import logging from typing import TypeVar from aiac.idp.configuration.api import Configuration -from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, RoleKind, Scope, ServiceType -from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy +from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, RoleKind, Scope, Service, ServiceType +from aiac.pdp.policy.library.api import apply_policy, delete_agent_policy from aiac.policy.model.models import ( AgentPolicyModel, PolicyModel, @@ -34,6 +50,7 @@ ) from aiac.policy.store.library.api import ( apply_service_policy, + delete_service_policy, get_service_policies_by_role, get_service_policy, ) @@ -57,6 +74,106 @@ def _add_by_id(items: list[_Entity], item: _Entity) -> None: items.append(item) +def _reconcile( + model: ServicePolicyModel, + catalog: dict[str, Service], + catalog_agent_role_ids: set[str], + batch_user_role_ids: set[str], +) -> bool: + """Drop dangling inbound edges from a touched SPM against current IdP truth. + + Prevents cross-run drift accumulation (Keycloak UUIDs churn on delete/recreate, so an + append-only merge grows stale edges beside the superseded ones). Uses only the ``get_services()`` + catalog the PCE already loads — no additional IdP read — so the ``get_services()``-only invariant + holds. Order-independent: it removes **only** edges whose entity no longer exists, never a live + edge, so onboarding-order convergence is preserved. + + An edge on ``SPM(X)`` is kept iff: + + 1. its scope is still one of ``X``'s current ``aiac.managed`` scopes (``model.owned_scopes``, + seeded from the catalog) — drops retired/churned scopes (e.g. ``*-aud``); + 2. for an ``Agent``-kind role, the role id is still in the catalog — drops retired/churned agent + client roles (e.g. a focus-agent self-reference the current builder can no longer emit); + 3. for a ``User``-kind role, it is not a superseded generation: user realm roles are + membership-derived (absent from the catalog, and the PCE must not read ``get_subjects()``), so + among the ``User`` edges sharing ``(scope.id, role.name)`` a stale edge is dropped only when + this batch carries a *different* id for that same ``(scope, name)`` — the fresh batch's + current-generation id supersedes the old one. + + Skips pruning entirely when ``X`` is absent from the catalog (a transient miss must never wipe an + SPM). Returns ``True`` iff it removed at least one edge. + """ + if catalog.get(model.service_id) is None: + return False + + owner_scope_ids = {s.id for s in model.owned_scopes} + + # (1)+(2) existence prune. + survivors = [ + edge + for edge in model.inbound_rules + if edge.scope.id in owner_scope_ids + and not (edge.role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT and edge.role.id not in catalog_agent_role_ids) + ] + + # (3) user-role churn collapse: a stale generation is dropped only when this batch carries a + # different id for the same (scope, name). + batch_ids_by_key: dict[tuple[str, str], set[str]] = {} + for edge in survivors: + if edge.role.kind == RoleKind.USER and edge.role.id in batch_user_role_ids: + batch_ids_by_key.setdefault((edge.scope.id, edge.role.name), set()).add(edge.role.id) + + kept = [ + edge + for edge in survivors + if not ( + edge.role.kind == RoleKind.USER + and edge.role.id not in batch_ids_by_key.get((edge.scope.id, edge.role.name), set()) + and batch_ids_by_key.get((edge.scope.id, edge.role.name)) + ) + ] + + if len(kept) != len(model.inbound_rules): + model.inbound_rules = kept + return True + return False + + +def _spm_cache(catalog: dict[str, Service]): + """Build a store-backed SPM cache seeded from the ``get_services()`` catalog. + + Returns ``(spms, spm, is_agent)`` shared by ``_run`` and ``_decommission``. ``spm(id)`` fetches + each SPM from the store at most once (``get_service_policy`` returns a fresh empty SPM on 404, so + a brand-new — or already-deleted — service is handled), seeds its identity (type + own + ``aiac.managed`` roles/scopes) from the catalog when the service is still present, and mutates in + place. ``is_agent(id)`` prefers the catalog and falls back to the cached SPM's ``service_type`` + (so a decommissioned service, absent from the catalog, is still classifiable from its persisted + SPM). + """ + spms: dict[str, ServicePolicyModel] = {} + + def spm(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: + if service_id not in spms: + model = get_service_policy(service_id) + svc = catalog.get(service_id) + if svc is not None: + if svc.type is not None: + model.service_type = svc.type + model.owned_roles = [r for r in svc.roles if r.aiac_managed] + model.owned_scopes = [s for s in svc.scopes if s.aiac_managed] + spms[service_id] = model + return spms[service_id] + + def is_agent(service_id: str) -> bool: + svc = catalog.get(service_id) + if svc is not None: + return svc.type == ServiceType.AGENT + model = spms.get(service_id) + return model is not None and model.service_type == ServiceType.AGENT + + return spms, spm, is_agent + + def _fresh_apm(agent_id: str) -> AgentPolicyModel: return AgentPolicyModel( agent_id=agent_id, @@ -91,6 +208,30 @@ def compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool = False) -> None: raise +def decommission(service_id: str) -> None: + """Authoritatively remove a decommissioned service's entire policy footprint. + + ``service_id`` is the **clientId (the SPM key)**, not the Keycloak internal UUID: an offboarded + client is gone from ``get_services()``, so UUID→clientId resolution is impossible — the offboard + contract carries the clientId directly (the documented asymmetry with onboard's + ``/apply/service/{uuid}``). + + Tears down everything reconcile's catalog-anchored GC cannot: deletes ``SPM(X)`` (removing every + user→X and agent→X inbound edge), purges X's **outbound footprint** (``X_role → other_scope`` + edges stored on other services' SPMs), deletes ``APM(X)`` from the PDP if X was an agent, and + re-derives every agent whose policy changed (agents that targeted X; agents X sourced into) in a + single partial upsert. A never-onboarded / already-removed service is a no-op. + + Exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and **re-raised** so the + Controller surfaces the failure instead of reporting a phantom success. + """ + try: + _decommission(service_id) + except Exception: + logger.exception("decommission failed for service %r", service_id) + raise + + def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: config = Configuration.for_default_realm() @@ -99,28 +240,8 @@ def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: catalog = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} # SPM cache: fetch each SPM from the store at most once, seed its identity from the catalog, - # mutate in place, and persist the changed ones. ``get_service_policy`` returns a fresh empty - # SPM on 404, so a brand-new service is seeded here too. - spms: dict[str, ServicePolicyModel] = {} - - def spm(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: - if service_id not in spms: - model = get_service_policy(service_id) - svc = catalog.get(service_id) - if svc is not None: - if svc.type is not None: - model.service_type = svc.type - model.owned_roles = [r for r in svc.roles if r.aiac_managed] - model.owned_scopes = [s for s in svc.scopes if s.aiac_managed] - spms[service_id] = model - return spms[service_id] - - def is_agent(service_id: str) -> bool: - svc = catalog.get(service_id) - if svc is not None: - return svc.type == ServiceType.AGENT - model = spms.get(service_id) - return model is not None and model.service_type == ServiceType.AGENT + # mutate in place, and persist the changed ones. + spms, spm, is_agent = _spm_cache(catalog) # Distinct input roles (dedup by id) — the set purged under override and the seed of the # affected-agent set. @@ -150,6 +271,16 @@ def is_agent(service_id: str) -> bool: if len(model.inbound_rules) != before or override: changed.add(model.service_id) + # (3.5) Reconcile touched SPMs against current IdP truth (get_services()-only — no extra IdP + # read) so drift cannot accumulate across re-onboarding. At this point ``spms`` holds exactly + # the touched SPMs (routed + override-purged); agent-derive SPMs are not loaded yet. Runs under + # both merge modes; order-independent (drops only edges whose entity no longer exists). + catalog_agent_role_ids = {r.id for svc in catalog.values() for r in svc.roles if r.aiac_managed} + batch_user_role_ids = {rule.role.id for rule in rules if rule.role.kind == RoleKind.USER} + for service_id, model in list(spms.items()): + if _reconcile(model, catalog, catalog_agent_role_ids, batch_user_role_ids): + changed.add(service_id) + # (4) Persist every changed SPM. for service_id in changed: apply_service_policy(service_id, spms[service_id]) @@ -177,6 +308,67 @@ def is_agent(service_id: str) -> bool: apply_policy(PolicyModel(agents=derived)) +def _decommission(service_id: str) -> None: + config = Configuration.for_default_realm() + + # (1) Catalog once — the only runtime IdP read. X itself is absent (it was offboarded); the + # catalog is used to seed/classify the still-live agents we re-derive. + catalog = {svc.serviceId: svc for svc in config.get_services()} + spms, spm, is_agent = _spm_cache(catalog) + + # (2) Load SPM(X) — X is gone from the catalog, so spm() does not reseed it; the persisted SPM + # carries the roles/scopes X owned when it was onboarded. Content guard: a 404 fresh-empty SPM + # (never onboarded / already removed) is a no-op — no spurious PDP delete. + spm_x = spm(service_id) + if not (spm_x.owned_roles or spm_x.owned_scopes or spm_x.inbound_rules): + return + + # (3) Targeters — agents whose outbound loses X: they hold an Agent-kind inbound edge on SPM(X) + # (their_role → X_scope), which vanishes when SPM(X) is deleted in step 5. + affected: set[str] = { + actor + for edge in spm_x.inbound_rules + if edge.role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT + for actor in edge.role.actorIds + } + + changed: set[str] = set() + + # (4) Purge X's outbound footprint — X_role → other_scope edges stored on OTHER services' SPMs. + for role in spm_x.owned_roles: + for stored in get_service_policies_by_role(role): + if stored.service_id == service_id: + continue + model = spm(stored.service_id) + kept = [e for e in model.inbound_rules if e.role.id != role.id] + if len(kept) != len(model.inbound_rules): + model.inbound_rules = kept + changed.add(model.service_id) + if is_agent(model.service_id): + affected.add(model.service_id) # its inbound source_roles[X] vanished + + # (5) Delete SPM(X) — removes every user→X and agent→X inbound edge in one shot — and evict it + # from the cache so re-derive cannot resurrect it. + was_agent = spm_x.service_type == ServiceType.AGENT + delete_service_policy(service_id) + spms.pop(service_id, None) + + # (6) Persist every changed (footprint-purged) SPM. + for changed_id in changed: + apply_service_policy(changed_id, spms[changed_id]) + + # (7) Delete APM(X) from the PDP iff X was an agent (tools have an SPM but no APM). + if was_agent: + delete_agent_policy(service_id) + + # (8) Re-derive every affected agent (X excluded) from the freshly-persisted, X-deleted store — + # outbound/target_scopes/source_roles referencing X drop automatically. One partial upsert. + affected.discard(service_id) + derived = [_derive(agent_id, spm) for agent_id in sorted(affected) if is_agent(agent_id)] + if derived: + apply_policy(PolicyModel(agents=derived)) + + def _derive(agent_id, spm) -> AgentPolicyModel: """Build ``APM(agent_id)`` entirely from the persisted SPMs (zero IdP).""" sa = spm(agent_id) diff --git a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py index d07e3febd..649671367 100644 --- a/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py +++ b/aiac/test/agent/controller/test_routes.py @@ -71,6 +71,35 @@ def test_apply_role_dispatches_to_role_subagent_with_role_id(): pce.assert_called_once_with([], True) +def test_apply_offboard_dispatches_to_decommission_with_client_id(): + # Offboard resolves the service key through the UC stub then calls decommission directly + # (no compute_and_apply — it is a whole-service teardown, not a rule fold). + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.offboard_service", side_effect=lambda s: s) as off, + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.decommission") as dec, + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.compute_and_apply") as pce, + ): + resp = client.post("/apply/offboard/github-tool") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + off.assert_called_once_with("github-tool") + dec.assert_called_once_with("github-tool") + pce.assert_not_called() + + +def test_apply_offboard_carries_slash_bearing_spiffe_client_id(): + # The {service_id:path} converter must pass a slash-bearing SPIFFE-URI clientId through intact. + spiffe_id = "spiffe://cluster.local/ns/team1/sa/github-tool" + with ( + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.offboard_service", side_effect=lambda s: s), + patch("aiac.agent.controller.routes.decommission") as dec, + ): + resp = client.post(f"/apply/offboard/{spiffe_id}") + + assert resp.status_code == 200 + dec.assert_called_once_with(spiffe_id) + + def test_controller_forwards_handler_rules_and_override_verbatim(): rules = [_rule("r-a"), _rule("r-b")] with ( @@ -120,3 +149,14 @@ def test_update_role_stub_returns_no_rules_and_override_true(): from aiac.agent.uc.role_update.role import update_role assert update_role("role-1") == ([], True) + + +def test_offboard_service_stub_returns_client_id_unchanged(): + from aiac.agent.uc.offboarding.offboard import offboard_service + + # Keyed by the clientId (SPM key), returned verbatim — including slash-bearing SPIFFE URIs. + assert offboard_service("github-tool") == "github-tool" + assert ( + offboard_service("spiffe://cluster.local/ns/team1/sa/github-tool") + == "spiffe://cluster.local/ns/team1/sa/github-tool" + ) diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py index eba8dbbaa..404f2e5b8 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/computation/test_engine.py @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ def __init__(self, initial=None): self.service_writes = [] # [(service_id, SPM)] captured from apply_service_policy self.by_role_calls = [] # [Role] captured from get_service_policies_by_role self.policy_pushes = [] # [PolicyModel] captured from apply_policy + self.service_deletes = [] # [service_id] captured from delete_service_policy + self.agent_deletes = [] # [agent_id] captured from delete_agent_policy def get_service_policy(self, service_id): if service_id in self.data: @@ -108,6 +110,13 @@ def apply_service_policy(self, service_id, spm): def apply_policy(self, model): self.policy_pushes.append(model.model_copy(deep=True)) + def delete_service_policy(self, service_id): + self.service_deletes.append(service_id) + self.data.pop(service_id, None) + + def delete_agent_policy(self, agent_id): + self.agent_deletes.append(agent_id) + # ---- assertion helpers ------------------------------------------------ # @property def apply_policy_count(self): @@ -144,6 +153,10 @@ def engine_env(catalog, store): side_effect=store.apply_service_policy)) stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.apply_policy", side_effect=store.apply_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.delete_service_policy", + side_effect=store.delete_service_policy)) + stack.enter_context(patch("aiac.policy.computation.engine.delete_agent_policy", + side_effect=store.delete_agent_policy)) from aiac.policy.computation.engine import compute_and_apply yield compute_and_apply @@ -551,3 +564,187 @@ def test_dependency_exception_propagates(caplog): compute_and_apply([_rule(UR, _scope("s-x", service_id="svc"))]) assert store.apply_policy_count == 0 assert "compute_and_apply failed" in caplog.text # still logged before re-raising + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Reconcile — drift GC (Handoff 10). Keycloak UUIDs churn on delete/recreate, # +# so an append-only merge would grow stale edges beside their superseded # +# generations (issue 6.3 / RC-A: SPM(github-agent) held 53 edges). On every # +# compute the engine reconciles each TOUCHED SPM against the current # +# get_services() catalog (no extra IdP read), dropping dangling edges. It # +# removes only edges whose entity is gone, so live edges / order-independence # +# are untouched. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def test_reconcile_drops_retired_scope_edge(): + # A pre-fix ``*-aud`` scope no longer in the catalog is pruned on re-onboarding; the current + # edge survives. Reconcile alone changes the SPM, so it is (re-)persisted. + UR = _user_role("r-user-dev", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + AS = _scope("s-agent-inbound", "agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + aud = _scope("s-aud", "agent-team1-github-agent-aud", service_id="github-agent") + catalog = [_agent("github-agent", scopes=[AS])] # ``aud`` no longer exists + initial = { + "github-agent": _spm( + "github-agent", owned_scopes=[AS], inbound=[_rule(UR, aud), _rule(UR, AS)] + ) + } + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial) + + assert _pairs(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + + +def test_reconcile_drops_churned_scope_uuid_same_name(): + # The scope was recreated with a fresh UUID (same name); the old-UUID edge is pruned. + UR = _user_role("r-user-dev", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + as_v1 = _scope("s-as-v1", "agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + as_v2 = _scope("s-as-v2", "agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + catalog = [_agent("github-agent", scopes=[as_v2])] # only the current generation + initial = { + "github-agent": _spm( + "github-agent", owned_scopes=[as_v1], inbound=[_rule(UR, as_v1)] + ) + } + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, as_v2)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial) + + assert _pairs(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-as-v2")] + + +def test_reconcile_collapses_churned_duplicate_user_role(): + # Two same-name/different-id ``developer`` edges on one scope (Keycloak delete+recreate). The + # batch carries the current generation, so the old-generation edge is dropped; the derived APM's + # subject gate then names only the current role. + dev_old = _user_role("r-dev-v1", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + dev_new = _user_role("r-dev-v2", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + AS = _scope("s-agent-inbound", "agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + catalog = [_agent("github-agent", scopes=[AS])] + initial = { + "github-agent": _spm( + "github-agent", owned_scopes=[AS], inbound=[_rule(dev_old, AS), _rule(dev_new, AS)] + ) + } + store = run_engine([_rule(dev_new, AS)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial) + + assert _pairs(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == [("r-dev-v2", "s-agent-inbound")] + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert apm.subject_roles == {"dev-user": [dev_new]} + + +def test_reconcile_drops_retired_agent_role_self_reference(): + # An impossible focus-agent self-reference (an Agent-kind role the current builder can no longer + # emit) references a role id absent from the catalog — pruned. + UR = _user_role("r-user-dev", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + AR = _agent_role("r-agent-src", "agent-source", owner="github-agent") # current agent role + selfref = _agent_role("r-selfref", "github-agent.agent", owner="github-agent") # retired + AS = _scope("s-agent-inbound", "agent-inbound", service_id="github-agent") + catalog = [_agent("github-agent", roles=[AR], scopes=[AS])] # r-selfref not present + initial = { + "github-agent": _spm( + "github-agent", owned_scopes=[AS], inbound=[_rule(selfref, AS), _rule(UR, AS)] + ) + } + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, AS)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial) + + assert _pairs(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + + +def test_reconcile_preserves_live_edges_and_is_idempotent(): + # Re-onboarding a service whose edges are all current prunes nothing (order-independence): the + # canonical repro's full edge set survives a second identical compute. + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + initial = { + "github-agent": _spm("github-agent", owned_scopes=[AS], inbound=[_rule(UR, AS)]), + "github-tool": _spm( + "github-tool", type=ServiceType.TOOL, owned_scopes=[TS], + inbound=[_rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)], + ), + } + store = run_engine( + [_rule(UR, AS), _rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)], catalog=catalog, store_initial=initial + ) + + assert _pairs(store.data["github-agent"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + assert _pairs(store.data["github-tool"].inbound_rules) == sorted( + [("r-agent-src", "s-tool-read"), ("r-user-dev", "s-tool-read")] + ) + + +def test_reconcile_skips_when_service_absent_from_catalog(): + # A transient catalog miss (owning service not returned by get_services()) must never wipe an + # SPM — reconcile is skipped and the stale edge is left intact rather than dropped. + UR = _user_role("r-user-dev", "developer", users=["dev-user"]) + orphan_scope = _scope("s-orphan", "orphan", service_id="orphan") + initial = { + "orphan": _spm("orphan", owned_scopes=[orphan_scope], inbound=[_rule(UR, orphan_scope)]) + } + store = run_engine([_rule(UR, orphan_scope)], catalog=[], store_initial=initial) + + assert _pairs(store.data["orphan"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-orphan")] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# decommission (service offboard) — the onboard→offboard drift case (case 3). # +# Reconcile's catalog-anchored GC skips a decommissioned service (absent from # +# get_services()); decommission() is the authoritative teardown: delete SPM(X), # +# purge X's outbound footprint from other SPMs, delete APM(X) if X is an agent, # +# and re-derive every agent whose policy changed. Two-phase: onboard the repro # +# into a shared store, then decommission against a catalog with X removed. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +def _onboard_repro(store): + """Onboard the canonical repro into ``store`` (mutates it); return ``(AR, UR, AS, TS)``.""" + AR, UR, AS, TS, catalog = _repro() + with engine_env(catalog, store) as compute_and_apply: + compute_and_apply([_rule(UR, AS), _rule(AR, TS), _rule(UR, TS)]) + return AR, UR, AS, TS + + +def run_decommission(service_id, *, catalog, store) -> FakeStore: + with engine_env(catalog, store): + from aiac.policy.computation.engine import decommission + + decommission(service_id) + return store + + +def test_decommission_tool_strands_no_edges_and_rederives_agent(): + # Onboard agent A (targets tool T), then offboard T. SPM(T) is deleted (with its user→T and + # agent→T inbound edges); A is re-derived with its outbound to T dropped, its own inbound intact. + store = FakeStore() + _onboard_repro(store) + # sanity: onboarding gave A an outbound edge to the tool. + assert _pairs(store.pushed_agent("github-agent").outbound_rules) == [("r-agent-src", "s-tool-read")] + + # Phase 2: the tool is gone from the catalog (its Keycloak client was deleted). + run_decommission("github-tool", catalog=[_agent("github-agent", scopes=[])], store=store) + + # SPM(T) deleted; a tool has no APM, so no PDP agent-delete. + assert "github-tool" in store.service_deletes + assert "github-tool" not in store.data + assert store.agent_deletes == [] + + # A re-derived: outbound to the tool is stranded (edge lived on SPM(T)); inbound UR→AS survives. + apm = store.pushed_agent("github-agent") + assert apm.outbound_rules == [] + assert apm.target_scopes == {} + assert apm.outbound_subject_rules == [] + assert _pairs(apm.inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-agent-inbound")] + + +def test_decommission_agent_deletes_apm_and_purges_outbound_footprint(): + # Offboard the agent A itself. SPM(A) is deleted, APM(A) is deleted from the PDP, and A's + # outbound footprint (AR→TS stored on SPM(T)) is purged while the tool keeps its user grant. + store = FakeStore() + _onboard_repro(store) + pushes_before = len(store.policy_pushes) + + # Phase 2: the agent is gone from the catalog. + run_decommission("github-agent", catalog=[_tool("github-tool", scopes=[])], store=store) + + # SPM(A) deleted and APM(A) removed from the PDP. + assert "github-agent" in store.service_deletes + assert "github-agent" not in store.data + assert store.agent_deletes == ["github-agent"] + + # A's outbound footprint purged from the tool; the tool keeps its user→TS grant. + assert _pairs(store.data["github-tool"].inbound_rules) == [("r-user-dev", "s-tool-read")] + + # No APM re-derived for the deleted agent (nothing targeted it) — no new push. + assert len(store.policy_pushes) == pushes_before From 8bdb5b361bf1d372c6eee6de7e550ee9dfc0a839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 19:04:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 268/273] chore: Fix pre-commit hook findings on PR diff files - Fix invalid trailing comma in aiac/pyrightconfig.json (check-json) - Trailing whitespace / EOF fixes on PRD.md, github-mcp-tools-summary.json, Dockerfile Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile | 2 +- aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 2 +- aiac/pyrightconfig.json | 2 +- pyrightconfig.json | 2 +- 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile index 1a9b0ffd9..04c77f077 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/Dockerfile @@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ ENV PRODUCTION_MODE=True \ RUN chown -R 1001:1001 /app USER 1001 -CMD ["uv", "run", "--no-sync", "server"] \ No newline at end of file +CMD ["uv", "run", "--no-sync", "server"] diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json index 5e6f74f97..20091d57c 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json @@ -235,4 +235,4 @@ ] } ] -} \ No newline at end of file +} diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index 62faede8c..03760100b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im │ Policy / Domain Knowledge RAG Pod │ │ (𝗞𝗲𝘆𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗸 𝗦𝗣𝗜) (𝗥𝗔𝗚 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁) │ ▼ │ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │ -│ │ RAG Ingest Service │──►│ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ +│ │ RAG Ingest Service │──►│ ChromaDB (vector store) │ │ │ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` diff --git a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json index 07e66ea11..603ec5e8a 100644 --- a/aiac/pyrightconfig.json +++ b/aiac/pyrightconfig.json @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ "test" ], "extraPaths": [ - "src", + "src" ], "pythonVersion": "3.12", "typeCheckingMode": "basic", diff --git a/pyrightconfig.json b/pyrightconfig.json index 7a25c0be4..767724fe4 100644 --- a/pyrightconfig.json +++ b/pyrightconfig.json @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ ], "pythonVersion": "3.12", "typeCheckingMode": "basic" -} \ No newline at end of file +} From 6a019bf6d31c1e93d545b5d31d07f5baada7f395 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 17:35:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 269/273] fix(aiac): Address CodeRabbit review findings on UC-1 Phase 1 Resolve the security, correctness, test, and doc/spec findings from the CodeRabbit CLI review of the UC-1 service-onboarding Phase 1 branch. Security: - Remove committed keycloak-admin-secret (admin/admin) from pdp-interface-deployment.yaml and idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml; document the Secret + namespace as pre-provisioned preconditions. - .dockerignore the demo agent's .env so secrets are never baked into the image. - Escape all values/keys emitted into Rego string literals via json.dumps (rego.py) to prevent Rego injection / malformed output. Live-source correctness: - Policy Store: 422 guard on path/body service_id mismatch; serialize cache+DB mutations under a single write lock; mkdir the SQLite data dir. - Policy Store library: add request timeouts to all HTTP calls. - IdP config: fail fast (RuntimeError) when the realm env var is unset. - Keycloak IdP service: narrow the over-broad KeycloakError handler and replace the O(scopes x clients) owner scan with a one-pass reverse index. - Onboarding provision nodes: guard missing tool/skill names and empty service ports with actionable HTTP 502s instead of KeyError/IndexError. - Retries (shared/upstream + policy_rules_builder): retry only transient failures; tolerate an unset/non-numeric UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES. - PCE engine: fold changed owners into the affected set so policy override revocation propagates (previously left stale APM/SPM state). - Legacy Keycloak writer: correct add_client_default_client_scope call. Tests: - Fix vacuous startswith() outbound filters (substring match, matching rung 2). - Harden the integration harness (opa_dump guard, store-clear failure handling, ConfigMap rollout, port-forward readiness + stderr drain). - Assorted docstring/name/marker fixes. Docs/specs: - Reconcile the PCE exception contract (re-raise), module paths, trigger-id wording (service_id/UUID), concurrency, OPA subject-gate semantics, and analysis-doc inaccuracies to match the implemented behavior. Unit suite green: 466 passed. Integration suite collects (154). Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore | 3 ++ aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md | 4 +- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py | 9 +++- .../agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py | 2 +- .../agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py | 10 ++-- aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt | 2 +- aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json | 2 +- .../analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json | 4 -- .../keycloak-access-control-analysis.md | 27 ++++++---- aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md | 2 +- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md | 22 ++++---- .../specs/components/library-policy-store.md | 5 ++ .../specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 13 ++--- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md | 12 ++++- .../specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md | 6 +-- .../uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md | 3 +- aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml | 7 +++ aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md | 10 ++-- aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml | 19 ++----- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 39 ++++++++------ aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml | 8 ++- aiac/pyproject.toml | 2 +- aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py | 8 ++- .../aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py | 12 +++-- .../agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py | 39 +++++++++++--- aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py | 13 ++++- .../service/configuration/keycloak/main.py | 40 ++++++++++---- .../aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py | 9 +++- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 17 ++++-- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 21 +++++--- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py | 24 +++++++-- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile | 5 ++ aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py | 54 ++++++++++++------- aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py | 50 +++++++++++++++-- .../idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py | 10 ++-- .../configuration/keycloak/test_main.py | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/launcher.py | 54 ++++++++++++++----- aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py | 3 +- .../test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py | 2 +- .../test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py | 2 +- aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py | 50 +++++++++++++---- .../pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py | 4 +- aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py | 23 +++++--- 47 files changed, 467 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore index 84c3acfec..287f001bc 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/.dockerignore @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ .venv +# Secrets — never bake into the image +.env + # `expect` scripts test_startup.exp diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md index eb0d3a99b..3eaf180bc 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/README.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # github-agent -An autonomous A2A agent that acts on a user's behalf against GitHub **source repositories** and an **issue/PR tracker**, using the [`github-tool`](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-extensions) MCP server. +An autonomous A2A agent that acts on a user's behalf against GitHub **source repositories** and an **issue/PR tracker**, using the [`github-tool-mcp`](https://github.com/kagenti/kagenti-extensions) MCP server. This agent implements the canonical `github-agent` used by the AIAC policy-pipeline integration test — the two skills match the policy scenario's `source_operations` and `issue_operations` roles. @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Optionally, run `expect -f test_startup.exp` instead to check startup automatica ## Deploying to Kagenti (Kind cluster) -Prerequisites: a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`) with `github-tool` already deployed. +Prerequisites: a running Kagenti cluster (Keycloak realm `kagenti`, namespace `team1`) with `github-tool-mcp` already deployed. 1. **Build the image:** ```bash diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py index bd8c0c5b4..bb7703a90 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/a2a_agent.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ Module for A2A Agent. """ +import asyncio import logging import os import sys @@ -194,7 +195,11 @@ async def execute(self, context: RequestContext, event_queue: EventQueue): "transport": "streamable-http", "headers": headers, } - with MCPServerAdapter(server_params, connect_timeout=settings.MCP_TIMEOUT) as mcp_tools: + adapter = MCPServerAdapter(server_params, connect_timeout=settings.MCP_TIMEOUT) + # MCPServerAdapter.__enter__/__exit__ perform blocking MCP I/O; + # run them off the event loop so we don't stall other async tasks. + mcp_tools = await asyncio.to_thread(adapter.__enter__) + try: curated_tools = select_enabled_tools(mcp_tools, settings) if not curated_tools: raise RuntimeError( @@ -202,6 +207,8 @@ async def execute(self, context: RequestContext, event_queue: EventQueue): "Check the ENABLED_TOOLS setting and ensure the server is reachable." ) await self._run_agent(messages, settings, event_emitter, curated_tools) + finally: + await asyncio.to_thread(adapter.__exit__, None, None, None) else: await self._run_agent(messages, settings, event_emitter, None) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py index c3f6d1579..5a9e380ef 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/llm.py @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ class CrewLLM: def __init__(self, config: Settings): kwargs = {} - if config.EXTRA_HEADERS is not None and None not in config.EXTRA_HEADERS: + if config.EXTRA_HEADERS: kwargs["extra_headers"] = config.EXTRA_HEADERS # For Ollama models, pass num_ctx to set the context window size. diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py index 626d44dbe..7f9d54df2 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/github_agent/main.py @@ -103,11 +103,11 @@ async def execute(self, user_input): await self.agents.crew.kickoff_async( inputs={ "request": query, - "owner": prereq.owner, - "repo": prereq.repo, - "ref": prereq.ref, - "path": prereq.path, - "numbers": prereq.numbers, + "owner": prereq.owner or "", + "repo": prereq.repo or "", + "ref": prereq.ref or "", + "path": prereq.path or "", + "numbers": prereq.numbers or [], } ) return self.agents.github_query_task.output.raw diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt index c79a92505..e814f2ecf 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/requirements.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -mcp[cli]>=1.9.0 +mcp[cli]>=1.9.0,<2 uvicorn[standard]>=0.34.0 httpx>=0.28.0 pytest>=8.0.0 diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json index 5bb546487..9a5f359fa 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-agent-card.json @@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ "tags": ["git", "github", "issues"] } ], - "url": "http://0.0.0.0:8000/", + "url": "http://github-agent.team1.svc.cluster.local:8000/", "version": "1.0.0" } diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json index 20091d57c..461bc5b2b 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/github-mcp-tools-summary.json @@ -79,10 +79,6 @@ { "name": "request_copilot_review", "description": "Request a GitHub Copilot code review for a pull request. Use this for automated feedback on pull requests, usually before requesting a human reviewer." - }, - { - "name": "search_pull_requests", - "description": "Search for pull requests in GitHub repositories using issues search syntax already scoped to is:pr" } ] }, diff --git a/aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md b/aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md index 753a2cc3d..3386ce717 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md +++ b/aiac/docs/analysis/keycloak-access-control-analysis.md @@ -166,11 +166,13 @@ keycloak_admin.add_client_default_client_scope(u_client_id, agent_aud_scope_id, When U and Y authenticate through the **same** client, use Keycloak's scope-to-role mapping: -**① Disable `fullScopeAllowed` on the scope** — prevents the scope from being included just -because it is assigned to the client: +**① Disable `fullScopeAllowed` on the client** — `fullScopeAllowed` is a boolean field on the +**ClientRepresentation** (not on a client scope). While it is `true`, every role the client can +access is added to its tokens regardless of scope-mappings, which defeats role gating. Set it +`false` on the client so only roles bound via scope-mappings are included: ```python -scope_representation["fullScopeAllowed"] = False -admin.update_client_scope(scope_id, scope_representation) +client_representation["fullScopeAllowed"] = False +admin.update_client(client_id, client_representation) ``` **② Bind the scope to a client role via scope-mappings** — the scope is only included in tokens @@ -249,8 +251,10 @@ with `401` because `aud` does not contain T-SPIFFE. | A cannot reach T on Y's behalf | Keycloak RFC 8693 gate 3 | `tool-T-aud` scope-role mapping excludes Y's realm role | `400 invalid_scope` → `503` to Y | | B cannot reach T on anyone's behalf | Keycloak RFC 8693 gate 2 | `tool-T-aud` not assigned as optional to B's client | `400 invalid_scope` → `503` to B's caller | -In all three cases the enforcement is in **Keycloak at token-issuance time**. AuthBridge is a -pure PEP — it carries no policy knowledge. +In all three cases the policy **decision** is made in **Keycloak at token-issuance time** — Keycloak +acts as the **PDP** (Policy Decision Point), deciding which audiences/scopes a token may carry. +AuthBridge is a pure **PEP** (Policy Enforcement Point): it enforces those decisions by validating the +issued token and carries no policy knowledge of its own. --- @@ -709,10 +713,13 @@ Realm: kagenti ``` Each audience scope (`X-aud`) is created once when the service is registered and assigned as: -- **Default** scope on the callee's own client — tokens issued through that client always - carry `aud=X-SPIFFE`. -- **Optional** scope on each caller agent's client — enables gate 2 for that agent's - token exchange calls. +- **Default** client scope on the callee's own client — a *default* client scope is added to + **every** token issued for that client automatically, without the caller having to request it via + the `scope` parameter, so those tokens always carry `aud=X-SPIFFE` (from the scope's audience + protocol mapper). +- **Optional** client scope on each caller agent's client — an *optional* scope is included **only + when explicitly requested** (here, during the token exchange), which is what enables gate 2 for + that agent's token exchange calls. `fullScopeAllowed=true` everywhere — Keycloak never gates by role. OPA receives the full subject token and makes all access decisions. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index 0b73bbe0b..da2aead97 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi **AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.configuration` and -`aiac.pdp.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components +`aiac.pdp.policy.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components needing typed access to IdP configuration and PDP policy state. **AIAC ↔ Keycloak** diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md index 03760100b..339ee2a53 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/PRD.md @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ FastAPI service (`0.0.0.0:7074`, `aiac-policy-store-service`) deployed as a dedi Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No FastAPI, no Kubernetes deployment, no container image. Runs in-process within the AIAC Agent pod. AIAC Agent sub-UC agents call `compute_and_apply(rules: list[PolicyRule]) -> None` to translate partial policy rule lists into merged `AgentPolicyModel` objects and push them to OPA. -The PCE is the **single point of coordination** between the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer: it reads current agent policy state, additively merges new rules, writes back to the Policy Store, then pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy()`. All exceptions are logged; none propagate to the caller. +The PCE is the **single point of coordination** between the Policy Store and PDP Policy Writer: it reads current agent policy state, additively merges new rules, writes back to the Policy Store, then pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to `aiac.pdp.policy.library.apply_policy()`. All exceptions from any dependency (IdP, Policy Store, PDP) are logged and **re-raised** so the caller (the Controller / HTTP layer) surfaces the failure — e.g. as a 500 — instead of returning success while silently applying nothing. **Full spec:** [components/policy-computation-engine.md](components/policy-computation-engine.md) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 96a833412..26818a6a6 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ START → classify_service → [analyze_agent | analyze_tool] → provision_serv 5. Returns `502` on Service/label lookup failure, discovery-token minting failure, or MCP call failure. > K8s access: `get` on `services` in the workload namespace (tool path). Identity is resolved by `classify_service` (config API). - > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`docs/gh-issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. + > MCP path convention: all MCP tool services must serve at `/mcp` and carry the `protocol.kagenti.io/mcp` label. This label is a **deploy-time prerequisite** — the kagenti-operator does not stamp it today; automatic stamping is requested upstream (`docs/issues/kagenti-operator-mcp-label-stamping.md`). Until then it must be applied at deploy time; `analyze_tool` fails loud (`502`, naming the workload + missing label) if it is absent. > Discovery auth: the tool's inbound `jwt-validation` plugin stays fully enforcing — there is no > path bypass for `/mcp`. `analyze_tool` authenticates instead of relaxing the sidecar's auth. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md index a18c8d88b..0f190e4d3 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/event-broker.md @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ A dedicated `aiac-init` init container runs in the **Agent Pod** before the Agen 2. **Wait for IdP Configuration Service** — poll `AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL/health` until HTTP 200. 3. **Wait for PDP Policy Writer** — poll `AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL/health` until HTTP 200. 4. **Wait for RAG Ingest Service** — poll `AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL/health` until HTTP 200 (confirms ChromaDB in the same RAG pod is also up). -5. **Create NATS JetStream stream** — call `js.add_stream()` idempotently with the `aiac-events` stream configuration. Safe to call on every restart. +5. **Create NATS JetStream stream** — call `js.add_stream()` idempotently with the `aiac-events` stream configuration. Safe to call on every restart. _Like the rest of this init container, the Event Broker and this stream-provisioning path are **deferred (not Phase 1)** — the Phase 1 Agent pod does not run the Event Broker or provision the JetStream stream, consistent with the PRD out-of-scope list._ The init container uses `python:3.12-slim` with `nats-py` and `httpx`. It is version-controlled alongside the Agent. All dependency URLs are read from the `aiac-pdp-config` ConfigMap. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md index 08b386d18..1dabaeba6 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-idp.md @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Represents a role. Per Assumption 3 (policy-model spec), **user** roles are Keyc | `childRoles` | `list[Role]` | `composites.realm` | `[]` | | `attributes` | `dict[str, Any]` | `attributes` | `{}` | | `kind` | `RoleKind` | `clientRole` flag (user = realm role, agent = client role; resolved at the IdP boundary) | | -| `actorIds` | `list[str]` | _(subject/user IDs holding a user-kind role; populated service-side from `get_subjects_by_role`, handoff 02)_ | `[]` | +| `actorIds` | `list[str]` | _(member **usernames** of a user-kind (realm) role, or the owning agent's `serviceId`(s) for an agent-kind (client) role; populated service-side, user-kind values aligned with `get_subjects_by_role`, handoff 02)_ | `[]` | > **Field pass-through (handoff 03 audit).** `kind`, `actorIds`, and `Scope.serviceId` are declared > on the models by **handoff 01** and populated by the **IdP service** (handoff 02). The @@ -220,12 +220,14 @@ class Configuration: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/services?realm=` — fetch the base service list. 2. Call `get_roles()` and `get_scopes()` once upfront to build `{id: Role}` and `{id: Scope}` lookup maps. 3. For each service, delegate to `_build_service(raw, all_roles, all_scopes)` which issues: - - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=` → for each returned role, **merge its authoritative - `kind`/`actorIds` onto the matching `all_roles` object** (the full representation, carrying - `composite`/`childRoles`/`attributes`) → `Service.roles`. Merging (not a plain `all_roles` - lookup) is required: the per-service endpoint is the only source of the agent-context - `kind = Agent` / `actorIds = [serviceId]`; taking the role from `all_roles` alone would revert it - to the realm-level `kind = User` / `actorIds = [members]`. + - `GET /services/{id}/roles?realm=` → for each returned role, **copy the matching + `all_roles` object and merge its authoritative `kind`/`actorIds` onto the copy** — the merge is a + fresh dict (`{**base.model_dump(), **authoritative_fields}`), so the shared `all_roles` entry is + never mutated and cannot leak one service's agent-context values into another's view → `Service.roles`. + The copy carries the full representation (`composite`/`childRoles`/`attributes`). Merging (not a + plain `all_roles` lookup) is required: the per-service endpoint is the only source of the + agent-context `kind = Agent` / `actorIds = [serviceId]`; taking the role from `all_roles` alone + would leave it at the realm-level `kind = User` / `actorIds = [members]`. - `GET /services/{id}/scopes?realm=` → filter `all_scopes` map → `Service.scopes`, and **stamp each scope's `serviceId` = this service's `clientId`** (the owning client — the PCE's SPM routing key; `all_scopes` from `GET /scopes` carries no owner). @@ -277,8 +279,10 @@ class Configuration: > owner/exposer signal (consistent with the new `Scope.serviceId`); the two agree because both derive > from the service-side truth. The filter still returns **only** genuine owners/exposers and returns > `[]` for realm-level roles that no service owns. No client-side re-derivation of role kind is -> introduced by these methods; `get_services_by_role` is **retained as a method** — the PCE still uses -> it (e.g. its re-derivation trigger fallback) even though `Role.kind` is now the authoritative kind. +> introduced by these methods; `get_services_by_role` is **retained as a method** for API completeness +> and ad-hoc callers, but the current SPM-based PCE no longer calls it: its **only** runtime IdP read is +> `Configuration.get_services()` (see `aiac.policy.computation`), and owner/role lookups against stored +> policy go through the Policy Store's `get_service_policies_by_role`, not this IdP filter. `get_subjects_by_role(role: Role) -> list[Subject]`: 1. `GET {AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL}/subjects?role_id={role.id}&realm=` diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md index fbd8133d5..65c6853a2 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/library-policy-store.md @@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ def get_service_policy_by_scope(scope: Scope) -> ServicePolicyModel | None # Singular: a scope has exactly one owning service (Assumption 2). # Sugar over get_service_policy(scope.serviceId) — resolves the owner via # scope.serviceId; no dedicated HTTP route. + # Returns None ONLY when the scope has no resolved owner (scope.serviceId + # is unset/empty). When serviceId is present it delegates to + # get_service_policy, so a store miss (404) yields a *fresh empty* SPM, + # not None — None means "unowned scope", empty SPM means "owner exists, + # no policy stored yet". def get_service_policies_by_role(role: Role) -> list[ServicePolicyModel] # GET /policy/services?role={role.id} (the one genuinely new route) diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index 2343b6558..bde1ad229 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ allow if { subject_ok; source_ok } ### Outbound package: `authz.{agent_slug}.outbound` -Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target}` (IDs). The gate requires **both** the subject and the agent to pass, but the outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): the subject must hold a role granting at least one **tool** scope the `target` accepts (via `subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`), **and** the agent (via its own `agent_roles`) must be permitted at least one scope that the `target` accepts. Both gates match against `target_scopes[input.target]`; `target_scopes` is consumed **directly** (target id → scopes) — it is not inverted. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here, and the outbound package does not emit `agent_scopes` at all: outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes, only its roles (`agent_roles`) and the target's accepted scopes. +Evaluated by the AuthBridge OPA plugin in the **outbound pipeline** — "what this agent may call". Input document: `{subject, target, function_name}` (IDs; `function_name` is the requested target scope). `allow` is a **per-scope AND** keyed on `input.function_name`, requiring **both** gates to pass on that same scope. The outbound **subject** gate is user→**tool** (distinct from the inbound user→agent gate): it passes iff the subject holds a role granted the **requested** `function_name` (via `subject_role_scopes`, grouped from `outbound_subject_rules`). The **capability** gate (`target_ok`) passes iff the requested `function_name` is one of the scopes the `target` accepts — `target_scopes[input.target]`, consumed **directly** (target id → scopes, not inverted). Because both gates test the *same* `function_name`, `allow` is a genuine per-scope intersection: a mismatch (user reaches scope A, agent reaches scope B) denies both. `agent_roles` / `agent_role_scopes` are still emitted (informational / debugging) but `allow` does **not** reference them — `target_scopes[input.target]` already *is* the per-scope capability gate. The inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes` subject gate is **not** used here, and the outbound package does not emit `agent_scopes` at all: outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes. ```rego package authz.{agent_slug}.outbound @@ -159,17 +159,14 @@ subject_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from ou agent_role_scopes := { "{role.name}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from outbound_rules (agent role → tool scopes) target_scopes := { "{target_id}": ["{scope.name}", ...], ... } # from target_scopes -# user may reach the tool: holds a role granting >=1 tool scope the target accepts +# user may reach the tool: holds a role granted the REQUESTED scope (input.function_name) subject_ok if { some role in subject_roles[input.subject] - some scope in subject_role_scopes[role] - scope in target_scopes[input.target] + input.function_name in subject_role_scopes[role] } -# agent may reach the tool: agent role grants >=1 tool scope the target accepts +# agent may reach the tool: the requested scope is one the target accepts (direct, per-scope) target_ok if { - some role in agent_roles - some scope in agent_role_scopes[role] - scope in target_scopes[input.target] + input.function_name in target_scopes[input.target] } default allow := false diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md index 4b4219f2d..eae6a0432 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-model.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Keeping the canonical model definitions inside a PDP-namespaced module (`aiac.pdp.library.models`) forces both the Policy Store library and the Policy Computation Engine to take a dependency on the PDP package — a wrong-layer coupling. Any of the three consumers importing from `aiac.pdp.library.models` would create a transitive dependency on an unrelated service namespace. -Additionally, the old `PolicyRule` used plain `str` for `role` and `scope`. The PCE algorithm requires typed `Role` and `Scope` objects (from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`) to invoke `Configuration.get_services_by_role` and `Configuration.get_services_by_scope`. +Additionally, the old `PolicyRule` used plain `str` for `role` and `scope`. The current SPM/APM PCE requires typed `Role` and `Scope` objects (from `aiac.idp.configuration.models`): it routes each rule to the owning service's SPM by `scope.serviceId`, classifies edges by `role.kind`, and reads `role.actorIds` when deriving each `AgentPolicyModel` — all fields that a plain `str` cannot carry. (These typed fields replaced the earlier reliance on `Configuration.get_services_by_role` / `get_services_by_scope`, which the SPM-based engine no longer calls.) The original `source_roles`, `subject_roles`, and `scope_targets` maps used pydantic model objects (`Service`, `Subject`, `Scope`) as dict keys. Model-object keys do not round-trip through `model_dump(mode="json")` / JSON without custom key handling, and they couple `aiac.policy.model` to the id-only `__hash__`/`__eq__` of the IdP models. The outbound map was also keyed by scope (`scope → targets`), whereas consumers need the inverse (`target → scopes`) to emit per-target authorization directly. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md index 1ef1a2689..21fb181ed 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/policy-store.md @@ -64,6 +64,14 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_policies ( - Every mutation writes through to SQLite synchronously before returning `204`. - On pod restart: load all rows from SQLite → populate cache → begin serving. +**Concurrency (single write lock):** the mutating endpoints (`POST` / `DELETE /policy/services/{service_id}`) +serialize their cache **and** DB writes under a single process-wide write lock, so the SQLite row and the +in-memory cache entry are updated together as one critical section. This prevents interleaved +upsert/delete requests from leaving the cache and DB inconsistent (e.g. a cache entry present after its +row was deleted, or a lost update when two upserts for the same `service_id` race). Reads serve from the +cache and do not take the write lock; the single-writer discipline is what keeps concurrent mutations +consistent. + **Transaction strategy:** - Per-service upsert (`POST /policy/services/{service_id}`): `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)`. - Per-service delete (`DELETE /policy/services/{service_id}`): `DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?`; evict the cache entry. @@ -102,8 +110,8 @@ segment). **`main.py` functions:** - `_get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection` — open `SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH` with `check_same_thread=False`; run `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` on first open. -- `_upsert_service(service_id: str, model: ServicePolicyModel)` — `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`; update cache. -- `_delete_service(service_id: str)` — `DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?`; evict the cache entry (no-op if absent). +- `_upsert_service(service_id: str, model: ServicePolicyModel)` — under the write lock: `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies VALUES (?, ?)` with `model.model_dump_json()`, then update cache (DB + cache write as one locked critical section). +- `_delete_service(service_id: str)` — under the write lock: `DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?`, then evict the cache entry (no-op if absent) — DB + cache eviction as one locked critical section. - `_get_service(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel` — read from in-memory cache; raise `404` if absent. - `_list_by_role(role_id: str) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]` — return every cached SPM whose `inbound_rules` references `role_id`. - `_load_cache()` — on startup, load all rows from SQLite into the in-memory cache. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md index fc02cc995..6b23c7f71 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/policy-pipeline.md @@ -380,9 +380,9 @@ with the user; keep them in sync with the *Scenario* table (see *Further Notes*) The descriptions are **generic and keyword-free** — they describe what each entity/role/scope *does*, carry no policy grant ("Resolves to…") and no owning-client naming, and stay within Keycloak's 255-char cap so they are written verbatim (no shortened renderings). Client `type` is **not** inferred from -description prose: the test provisions each client's `client.type` attribute (the type UC1 -discovers from the agent card / `kagenti.io/type` label) as a plain string `"Agent"` / `"Tool"`, so -`Service` type resolution ([../../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) +description prose: the test sets each client's `client.type` attribute directly — as a plain string +`"Agent"` / `"Tool"` written onto the client — rather than discovering it from a `kagenti.io/type` +label, so `Service` type resolution ([../../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py:79-87](../../../src/aiac/idp/configuration/models.py#L79-L87)) tags each client from the attribute without touching the TEMP description-keyword fallback. **`github-agent`** — client (Agent): diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md index e901d221d..419b9ff7a 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/integration-test/uc1-onboarding-pipeline.md @@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ Because they need a live Kagenti cluster + operator + Keycloak + a real LLM, the run; clear the writer's `/rego`. This gives every rung a clean slate and makes reruns converge. (With the OPA writer there are no composites — the only Keycloak mutations are the roles/scopes the onboarding agent provisions — but cleaning both is harmless and future-proofs against the Keycloak writer.) -2. **Onboard** in the rung's order via `POST /apply/service/{client_id}`. +2. **Onboard** in the rung's order via `POST /apply/service/{service_id}`, where `{service_id}` is the + internal Keycloak UUID (`Service.id`), **not** the clientId — the onboard route is keyed on the UUID. - `POST /apply/service/{github-tool id}` → UC-1 classifies it a **Tool**, reads the MCP manifest, provisions scopes `github-tool.{source-read, source-write, issues-read, issues-write}`, sets `client.type=Tool`. **No rules are written for the tool directly.** diff --git a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml index 628a8e0d1..3b9b68a71 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml @@ -86,6 +86,13 @@ spec: imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7070 + # The Controller exposes only /apply/* routes (no /health endpoint), + # so readiness is gated on the port accepting TCP connections. + readinessProbe: + tcpSocket: + port: 7070 + initialDelaySeconds: 5 + periodSeconds: 10 envFrom: - configMapRef: name: aiac-pdp-config diff --git a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md index f18f39728..fd8900b6e 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md +++ b/aiac/k8s/aiac-deployment-guide.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This guide covers the full AIAC deployment in the `aiac-system` namespace. |---|---|---| | `pdp-interface-deployment.yaml` | Kagenti Interface Pod (IdP Configuration Service + PDP Policy Writer **Phase 1 rego-file mock** `aiac-pdp-policy-opa`) + 2 ClusterIP Services | 7071, 7072 | | `policy-store-statefulset.yaml` | Policy Store StatefulSet + 1 Gi PVC + headless Service + ClusterIP Service | 7074 | -| `agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (init container + AIAC Agent) + ClusterIP Service | 7070 | +| `agent-deployment.yaml` | Agent Pod Deployment (AIAC Agent) + ClusterIP Service | 7070 | ## Prerequisites @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile \ -t localhost/aiac-policy-store:local aiac/src/ -# AIAC Agent (also used as the init container) +# AIAC Agent docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/Dockerfile \ -t localhost/aiac-agent:local aiac/src/ ``` @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ kind load docker-image localhost/aiac-agent:local --name **Note:** the manifests set `imagePullPolicy: Never` because images are side-loaded +> into a local Kind cluster (dev only). For a real cluster that pulls from a registry, +> change these to `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` (or `Always`). + ## 3 — Create the admin secret The Interface Pod requires a `keycloak-admin-secret` Secret. Create it once per cluster before applying the manifests: @@ -125,7 +129,7 @@ kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml # 2. Policy Store — needs the aiac-system namespace kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml -# 3. Agent — init container waits for Interface Pod + Policy Store to be healthy +# 3. Agent — depends on the Interface Pod + Policy Store already being healthy kubectl apply -f aiac/k8s/agent-deployment.yaml ``` diff --git a/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml index 30a77743d..f822a12a7 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml @@ -23,23 +23,14 @@ data: KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM: "master" --- -# Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: +# keycloak-admin-secret is NOT defined here — it must be pre-provisioned +# out-of-band before applying this manifest (credentials must NEVER be committed +# to git). The Pod below references it via secretRef. Create it once: # # kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ # -n aiac-system \ -# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ -# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin -apiVersion: v1 -kind: Secret -metadata: - name: keycloak-admin-secret - namespace: aiac-system -type: Opaque -stringData: - KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME: "admin" - KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "admin" - ---- +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME= \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD= apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml index c2600cdee..cbb3159a0 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -15,23 +15,18 @@ data: # AIAC_RAG_INGEST_URL and AIAC_CHROMADB_URL are added in Phase 3 (RAG Pod, issue 4.20). --- -# Prerequisites: create this Secret before applying this manifest: +# Preconditions (NOT created by this manifest): # -# kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ -# -n aiac-system \ -# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ -# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin -apiVersion: v1 -kind: Secret -metadata: - name: keycloak-admin-secret - namespace: aiac-system -type: Opaque -stringData: - KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME: "admin" - KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "admin" - ---- +# * The target namespace `aiac-system` must already exist +# (`kubectl create namespace aiac-system`). +# * The `keycloak-admin-secret` Secret must be pre-provisioned out-of-band — +# credentials must NEVER be committed to git. The Deployment below references +# it via secretRef. Create it once per cluster: +# +# kubectl create secret generic keycloak-admin-secret \ +# -n aiac-system \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME= \ +# --from-literal=KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD= apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: @@ -53,6 +48,12 @@ spec: imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7071 + readinessProbe: + httpGet: + path: /health + port: 7071 + initialDelaySeconds: 5 + periodSeconds: 10 envFrom: - configMapRef: name: aiac-pdp-config @@ -68,6 +69,12 @@ spec: imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7072 + readinessProbe: + httpGet: + path: /health + port: 7072 + initialDelaySeconds: 5 + periodSeconds: 10 envFrom: - configMapRef: name: aiac-pdp-config diff --git a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml index c7e2cf0ca..a13a77929 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/policy-store-statefulset.yaml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ metadata: name: aiac-policy-store-config namespace: aiac-system data: - AGENTPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/state.db" + SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH: "/data/policy_model.db" --- apiVersion: apps/v1 @@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ spec: imagePullPolicy: Never ports: - containerPort: 7074 + readinessProbe: + httpGet: + path: /health + port: 7074 + initialDelaySeconds: 5 + periodSeconds: 10 envFrom: - configMapRef: name: aiac-policy-store-config diff --git a/aiac/pyproject.toml b/aiac/pyproject.toml index 2153c2e8f..da102f1e1 100644 --- a/aiac/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/pyproject.toml @@ -11,5 +11,5 @@ select = ["E", "F", "I", "W"] testpaths = ["test"] pythonpath = ["src"] markers = [ - "integration: tests that call real LLM endpoints", + "integration: tests that need live infra — a running Keycloak, Keycloak admin credentials, a real LLM endpoint, and the `opa` binary on PATH (see test/integration/.env)", ] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py index 50d904e55..e028cf19c 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/controller/routes.py @@ -56,8 +56,12 @@ def apply_role(role_id: str) -> Response: # Offboard is keyed by the clientId (the SPM key), NOT the Keycloak internal UUID that # /apply/service/{service_id} carries: an offboarded client is gone from get_services(), so # UUID→clientId resolution is impossible. The {service_id:path} converter carries slash-bearing -# SPIFFE-URI clientIds. Decommission is a whole-service teardown, so it bypasses the -# (rules, override) → compute_and_apply path and calls the PCE's decommission directly. +# SPIFFE-URI clientIds. Decommission is a whole-service teardown, so — BY DESIGN — it does NOT +# go through the (rules, override) → compute_and_apply path the other /apply/* routes share. +# compute_and_apply folds *incremental* rule updates into the SPM store; decommission is an +# authoritative offboard that must tear down a service's entire policy footprint (its SPM, its +# outbound edges on other SPMs, and its APM), which is not expressible as a rule delta. So this +# route intentionally calls the PCE's decommission() directly. See the implementation plan. @app.post("/apply/offboard/{service_id:path}") def apply_offboard(service_id: str) -> Response: decommission(offboard_service(service_id)) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py index acb7632bf..1576867bf 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/policy_rules_builder/graph.py @@ -15,10 +15,11 @@ from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI from langgraph.graph import END, START, StateGraph from pydantic import BaseModel, SecretStr -from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential +from tenacity import Retrying, retry_if_exception, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule +from aiac.shared.upstream import is_transient, max_retries from .policy_source import get_policy_source from .prompts import build_auditor_messages, build_proposer_messages @@ -83,10 +84,15 @@ def _build_llm() -> ChatOpenAI: # lazy -- NEVER called at import def _structured_call(schema: type[T], messages: list[BaseMessage]) -> T: - """THE seam. Behavior tests patch this. Transport-retries each .invoke() via call-time Retrying.""" + """THE seam. Behavior tests patch this. Transport-retries each .invoke() via call-time Retrying. + + Only transient failures (connection errors / timeouts / 5xx) are retried — a permanent + failure (e.g. a bad request or a validation error) fails identically on every attempt, so + it is surfaced immediately (consistent with ``aiac.shared.upstream``).""" runnable = _build_llm().with_structured_output(schema) retryer = Retrying( - stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), + retry=retry_if_exception(is_transient), + stop=stop_after_attempt(max_retries()), wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), reraise=True, ) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py index 9c272b04d..d2ec7687a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/agent/uc/onboarding/provision/nodes.py @@ -172,16 +172,22 @@ def _targets_workload(c: dict) -> bool: # One operator role per skill, mirroring the scope (same name + description). The role name == # scope name is fine — a realm role and a client scope are distinct Keycloak objects. The role's # description drives the PRB capability-match (see generic_policy.md). + def _skill_key(s: dict) -> str: + key = s.get("id") or s.get("name") + if not key: + raise HTTPException( + 502, + f"AgentCard for workload {workload!r} in namespace {namespace!r} has a skill " + f"with neither 'id' nor 'name'; cannot derive a scope/role name (skill: {s!r})", + ) + return key + scopes = [ - ScopeDefinition( - name=f"{workload}.{s.get('id') or s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "") - ) + ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{_skill_key(s)}", description=s.get("description", "")) for s in skills ] roles = [ - RoleDefinition( - name=f"{workload}.{s.get('id') or s['name']}", description=s.get("description", "") - ) + RoleDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{_skill_key(s)}", description=s.get("description", "")) for s in skills ] provision = ServiceProvision( @@ -213,7 +219,14 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: "label (deploy-time prerequisite for MCP tool discovery)", ) - port = svc.spec.ports[0].port + ports = getattr(svc.spec, "ports", None) or [] + if not ports: + raise HTTPException( + 502, + f"Service {workload!r} in namespace {namespace!r} exposes no ports; " + "cannot resolve an MCP endpoint", + ) + port = ports[0].port endpoint = f"http://{workload}.{namespace}.svc.cluster.local:{port}/mcp" # The MCP endpoint is fronted by the tool's AuthBridge sidecar, which validates inbound JWTs @@ -231,8 +244,18 @@ def analyze_tool(state: OnboardingProvisionState) -> dict: except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(502, f"MCP tools/list failed at {endpoint}: {e}") + def _tool_name(t: dict) -> str: + name = t.get("name") + if not name: + raise HTTPException( + 502, + f"MCP tools/list at {endpoint} returned a tool with no 'name'; " + f"cannot derive a scope name (tool: {t!r})", + ) + return name + scopes = [ - ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{t['name']}", description=t.get("description", "")) + ScopeDefinition(name=f"{workload}.{_tool_name(t)}", description=t.get("description", "")) for t in tools ] provision = ServiceProvision( diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py index efbef0c01..9e6bea14a 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/configuration/api.py @@ -37,8 +37,17 @@ def for_realm(cls, realm: str) -> "Configuration": @classmethod def for_default_realm(cls) -> "Configuration": """Build a ``Configuration`` for the realm named by ``$KEYCLOAK_REALM`` — the single source - of truth shared by provisioning, the policy builder, and the computation engine.""" - return cls.for_realm(os.getenv(REALM_ENV_VAR, "")) + of truth shared by provisioning, the policy builder, and the computation engine. + + Fails fast if the env var is unset or empty: an empty realm would silently target the + wrong Keycloak realm rather than surface the misconfiguration.""" + realm = os.getenv(REALM_ENV_VAR, "").strip() + if not realm: + raise RuntimeError( + f"{REALM_ENV_VAR} is unset or empty; set it to the Keycloak realm the AIAC " + "pipeline operates on" + ) + return cls.for_realm(realm) def _base_url(self) -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7071") diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py index 642789e77..fae16704f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py @@ -62,17 +62,26 @@ def _assert_single_kind(members: list[dict], role_name: str) -> None: ) -def _assert_single_owner(admin: "KeycloakAdmin", scope: dict) -> None: +def _build_scope_owner_index(admin: "KeycloakAdmin") -> dict[str, list[str]]: + """Map each client-scope id -> the clientIds exposing it as a default scope, from a single + pass over all clients. Building this once per request turns the Assumption-2 check from an + O(scopes × clients) nested rescan (a full ``get_clients`` + per-client default-scope fetch + for every scope) into a single scan plus O(1) lookups.""" + index: dict[str, list[str]] = {} + for client in admin.get_clients(): + for s in admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(client["id"]): + index.setdefault(s["id"], []).append(client["id"]) + return index + + +def _assert_single_owner(scope: dict, owner_index: dict[str, list[str]]) -> None: """Assumption 2 (single scope owner): an AIAC-managed client scope must be exposed as a default scope by exactly one client. Keycloak client scopes are realm-level and assignable - to many clients, so this is not a Keycloak guarantee — detect a multi-owner scope by scanning - clients' default scopes and fail loud, since a single ``Scope.serviceId`` cannot represent it.""" + to many clients, so this is not a Keycloak guarantee — look the scope up in the precomputed + ``owner_index`` and fail loud on more than one owner, since a single ``Scope.serviceId`` + cannot represent it.""" scope_id = scope["id"] - owners = [ - client - for client in admin.get_clients() - if any(s["id"] == scope_id for s in admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(client["id"])) - ] + owners = owner_index.get(scope_id, []) if len(owners) > 1: raise _InvariantViolation( f"AIAC-managed scope '{scope.get('name', scope_id)}' is exposed by {len(owners)} " @@ -339,8 +348,12 @@ def list_service_roles(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin full_role["kind"] = "Agent" full_role["actorIds"] = [service_client_id] roles.append(full_role) - except KeycloakError: - pass # service has no service account — skip + except KeycloakError as e: + # Only "the client has no service account" (Keycloak answers 400/404 on the + # service-account-user lookup) means skip. Any other Keycloak failure is a real + # error and must propagate to the outer 502 handler, not be silently swallowed. + if getattr(e, "response_code", None) not in (400, 404): + raise return roles except KeycloakError as e: @@ -375,9 +388,14 @@ def list_service_scopes(service_id: str, admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admi # one owner (Assumption 2) — enforce fail-loud. Built-ins are shared by design, so # they are exempt from the single-owner scan. owner = admin.get_client(service_id)["clientId"] + # Build the scope->owners reverse index at most once per request, only when there is + # an AIAC-managed scope to check (built-ins are exempt). + owner_index: dict[str, list[str]] | None = None for scope in scopes: if _is_aiac_managed(scope.get("attributes")): - _assert_single_owner(admin, scope) # Assumption 2, fail loud + if owner_index is None: + owner_index = _build_scope_owner_index(admin) + _assert_single_owner(scope, owner_index) # Assumption 2, fail loud scope["serviceId"] = owner return scopes except _InvariantViolation as e: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py index adc94c2ed..82f6b05ee 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/main.py @@ -103,7 +103,14 @@ def create_service_scope( "protocol": "openid-connect", } created = admin.create_client_scope(scope_payload) - admin.add_default_default_client_scope(service_id, created["id"]) + # ``add_default_default_client_scope`` is not a real KeycloakAdmin method; the correct API + # is ``add_client_default_client_scope(client_id, client_scope_id, payload)``. + scope_id = created["id"] + admin.add_client_default_client_scope( + service_id, + scope_id, + {"realm": admin.connection.realm_name, "client": service_id, "clientScopeId": scope_id}, + ) return JSONResponse(status_code=201, content=created) except KeycloakError as e: return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index a5a727850..4ffcbb4c3 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ internally. """ +import json import re from aiac.policy.model.models import AgentPolicyModel, PolicyRule @@ -39,19 +40,25 @@ def slugify(agent_id: str) -> str: def _render_list(var: str, values: list[str]) -> str: - """Render ``{var} := ["a", "b"]`` as Rego (empty-safe: ``[]``).""" - inner = ", ".join(f'"{v}"' for v in values) + """Render ``{var} := ["a", "b"]`` as Rego (empty-safe: ``[]``). + + Each value is emitted via ``json.dumps`` so quotes/newlines/backslashes are escaped — + Rego string syntax is JSON-compatible, and this prevents Rego injection / broken output.""" + inner = ", ".join(json.dumps(v) for v in values) return f"{var} := [{inner}]" def _render_map(var: str, mapping: dict[str, list[str]]) -> str: - """Render ``{var} := { "key": ["a", "b"], ... }`` as Rego (empty-safe: ``{}``).""" + """Render ``{var} := { "key": ["a", "b"], ... }`` as Rego (empty-safe: ``{}``). + + Keys and values are emitted via ``json.dumps`` so quotes/newlines/backslashes are escaped + (JSON-compatible Rego string syntax) — this prevents Rego injection / broken output.""" if not mapping: return f"{var} := {{}}" lines = [f"{var} := {{"] for key, values in mapping.items(): - inner = ", ".join(f'"{v}"' for v in values) - lines.append(f' "{key}": [{inner}],') + inner = ", ".join(json.dumps(v) for v in values) + lines.append(f" {json.dumps(key)}: [{inner}],") lines.append("}") return "\n".join(lines) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index 49843d995..f38096a72 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -285,20 +285,25 @@ def _run(rules: list[PolicyRule], override: bool) -> None: for service_id in changed: apply_service_policy(service_id, spms[service_id]) - # (5) Affected-agent set — from the batch's roles/scopes, never a full scan. + # (5) Affected-agent set — from the batch's roles plus every owner whose stored SPM was + # modified during this run (routed, override-purged, or reconciled), never a full scan. + # Folding ``changed`` into the seed is what makes revocation propagate: under override an + # owner that only *lost* edges appears in ``changed`` but carries no fresh rule, so driving + # the recompute off the incoming ``rules`` alone would leave that owner's APM (and the APMs + # of agents that targeted it) stale. + touched_owners = {rule.scope.serviceId for rule in rules} | changed + affected: set[str] = set() for role in distinct_roles.values(): if role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT: affected.update(role.actorIds) # owning agents — their outbound changed - for rule in rules: - scope = rule.scope - owner = scope.serviceId + for owner in touched_owners: if is_agent(owner): - affected.add(owner) # the scope's owner is an agent — its inbound changed - # every agent targeting this scope: owners of the Agent-kind inbound rules on the - # owning SPM whose scope is this one. + affected.add(owner) # the touched owner is an agent — its inbound changed + # every agent targeting a scope on this touched SPM: owners of its Agent-kind inbound + # rules (a superset of the exact-scope match — re-deriving is idempotent, so safe). for edge in spm(owner).inbound_rules: - if edge.scope.id == scope.id and edge.role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT: + if edge.role.kind == RoleKind.AGENT: affected.update(edge.role.actorIds) # (6) Derive each affected agent's APM (zero IdP) and partial-upsert once. Tools get an SPM diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py index 7014fd4cd..95b2ed828 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/library/api.py @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ load_dotenv(dotenv_path=os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".env")) +# Per-request timeout (seconds) for every Policy Store HTTP call. Without it a hung store +# would block the caller indefinitely. Tunable via ``AIAC_HTTP_TIMEOUT``. +_HTTP_TIMEOUT = float(os.getenv("AIAC_HTTP_TIMEOUT", "10")) + def _base_url() -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_POLICY_STORE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7074") @@ -36,7 +40,9 @@ def _fresh_empty(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: def get_service_policy(service_id: str) -> ServicePolicyModel: - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}") + resp = requests.get( + f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) if resp.status_code == 404: return _fresh_empty(service_id) _check(resp) @@ -55,18 +61,26 @@ def get_service_policies_by_role(role: Role) -> list[ServicePolicyModel]: # The one genuinely new route. Returns every SPM whose inbound_rules reference role.id — # including stale role->service mappings the live IdP no longer reflects (which # override-purge needs). [] when none match. - resp = requests.get(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services", params={"role": role.id}) + resp = requests.get( + f"{_base_url()}/policy/services", params={"role": role.id}, timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) _check(resp) return [ServicePolicyModel.model_validate(item) for item in resp.json()] def apply_service_policy(service_id: str, spm: ServicePolicyModel) -> None: - resp = requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}", json=spm.model_dump()) + resp = requests.post( + f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}", + json=spm.model_dump(), + timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT, + ) _check(resp) def delete_service_policy(service_id: str) -> None: - resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}") + resp = requests.delete( + f"{_base_url()}/policy/services/{encode_service_id(service_id)}", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) _check(resp) @@ -74,5 +88,5 @@ def clear_service_policies() -> None: # Drop every SPM in the store. The collection-root DELETE (no service_id segment) — # distinct from delete_service_policy's by-id path. Intended for test harnesses that # need a clean slate before a run; clearing an already-empty store is a no-op. - resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services") + resp = requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/services", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT) _check(resp) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile index fe750599a..6ada0e34b 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/Dockerfile @@ -8,4 +8,9 @@ RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt COPY . /app/src ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src +# Directory for the SQLite backend. Must match the dir of SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH's +# default (/data/policy_model.db in aiac.policy.store.service.main); in production this +# is typically a mounted PV, but create it so a default-path start does not fail. +RUN mkdir -p /data + CMD ["uvicorn", "aiac.policy.store.service.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "7074"] diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py index 31e79db1d..823b91fd6 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ import os import sqlite3 +import threading from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from typing import Annotated import uvicorn -from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI +from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, HTTPException from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel @@ -17,6 +18,13 @@ _cache: dict[str, ServicePolicyModel] = {} _db_conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None +# Serializes the read-modify-write of the cache + SQLite backend across the mutating +# endpoints. The cache dict and the shared connection are mutated by every request thread, +# so without this a concurrent create/update/delete/clear can interleave and leave the cache +# out of sync with the durable rows. Held only around the local SQLite write + cache mutation +# (never across network I/O). +_write_lock = threading.Lock() + def get_db() -> sqlite3.Connection: assert _db_conn is not None @@ -66,11 +74,12 @@ def clear_service_policies( # unambiguously. Intended for test harnesses that need a clean slate: without it the # StatefulSet PV outlives image redeploys, so pre-fix cruft accumulates across runs # (override=False appends). Never 404s; clearing an already-empty store is a no-op 204. - try: - conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies") - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - _cache.clear() + with _write_lock: + try: + conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies") + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + _cache.clear() return Response(status_code=204) @@ -89,14 +98,22 @@ def upsert_service_policy( conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], ) -> Response: service_id = decode_service_id(service_id) - try: - conn.execute( - "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", - (service_id, body.model_dump_json()), + if body.service_id != service_id: + # The body's own service_id must agree with the path; a mismatch would silently + # persist a row under the wrong key. Fail loud with a 422 instead. + raise HTTPException( + status_code=422, + detail=f"body.service_id {body.service_id!r} does not match path service_id {service_id!r}", ) - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - _cache[service_id] = body + with _write_lock: + try: + conn.execute( + "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", + (service_id, body.model_dump_json()), + ) + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + _cache[service_id] = body return Response(status_code=204) @@ -106,11 +123,12 @@ def delete_service_policy( conn: Annotated[sqlite3.Connection, Depends(get_db)], ) -> Response: service_id = decode_service_id(service_id) - try: - conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", (service_id,)) - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) - _cache.pop(service_id, None) + with _write_lock: + try: + conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", (service_id,)) + except sqlite3.Error as e: + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + _cache.pop(service_id, None) return Response(status_code=204) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py b/aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py index bdceb9c9d..86d02e310 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/shared/upstream.py @@ -18,17 +18,59 @@ import os from typing import Callable, TypeVar -from tenacity import Retrying, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential +from tenacity import Retrying, retry_if_exception, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential T = TypeVar("T") +_DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES = 3 + + +def max_retries() -> int: + """Retry budget from ``UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES`` (default 3), tolerant of an unset or + non-numeric value — a bad value must not crash the request, it falls back to the default.""" + try: + value = int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", str(_DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES))) + except (TypeError, ValueError): + return _DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES + return value if value > 0 else _DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES + + +def _status_code(exc: BaseException) -> int | None: + """Best-effort HTTP status of an exception: ``requests`` HTTPError carries it on + ``.response.status_code``; a Kubernetes ``ApiException`` carries it on ``.status``.""" + resp = getattr(exc, "response", None) + for candidate in (getattr(resp, "status_code", None), getattr(exc, "status", None)): + try: + return int(candidate) # type: ignore[arg-type] + except (TypeError, ValueError): + continue + return None + + +def is_transient(exc: BaseException) -> bool: + """Only transient upstream failures are worth retrying: connection resets, timeouts, or a + 5xx server response. Permanent failures (4xx, value/validation errors) fail identically on + every attempt, so they are surfaced immediately rather than retried. Duck-typed so it + covers ``requests`` and Kubernetes client errors without importing either here.""" + if isinstance(exc, (ConnectionError, TimeoutError)): # builtins (also OSError subclasses) + return True + # requests.exceptions.ConnectionError / Timeout are NOT subclasses of the builtins above; + # match them structurally by class name so this module stays transport-agnostic. + name = type(exc).__name__ + if name in ("ConnectionError", "Timeout", "ConnectTimeout", "ReadTimeout", "ConnectionResetError"): + return True + status = _status_code(exc) + return status is not None and status >= 500 + def run_upstream(fn: Callable[[], T]) -> T: """Run ``fn`` with bounded retries (``UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES``, default 3) and exponential - backoff, reraising the last error so the caller can convert it to a 502. Returns whatever - ``fn`` returns (the return type is preserved for callers).""" + backoff, retrying **only transient failures** (``is_transient``) and reraising the last + error so the caller can convert it to a 502. Returns whatever ``fn`` returns (the return + type is preserved for callers).""" retryer = Retrying( - stop=stop_after_attempt(int(os.getenv("UPSTREAM_MAX_RETRIES", "3"))), + retry=retry_if_exception(is_transient), + stop=stop_after_attempt(max_retries()), wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=1, max=30), reraise=True, ) diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py index 2bd6a76dc..ab0b4b7ed 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ -"""Print live Keycloak data via aiac-pdp-config-service, exercising all api methods. +"""Print live Keycloak data via the IdP configuration service, exercising all Configuration methods. Usage: - python test/pdp/library/show_keycloak_data.py + .venv/bin/python test/idp/configuration/show_keycloak_data.py -Requires the service to be reachable at AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL (default: http://localhost:7071). +Requires the service to be reachable at AIAC_PDP_CONFIG_URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7071). """ import sys @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def main() -> None: print("=== Services by Role ===") for r in roles: svcs_for_role: list[Service] = cfg.get_services_by_role(r) - names = ", ".join(s.serviceId for s in svcs_for_role) if svcs_for_role else "—" + names = ", ".join(s.serviceId or s.id or "?" for s in svcs_for_role) if svcs_for_role else "—" print(f" {r.name}: {names}") print() @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ def main() -> None: print("=== Services by Scope ===") for sc in scopes: svcs_for_scope: list[Service] = cfg.get_services_by_scope(sc) - names = ", ".join(s.serviceId for s in svcs_for_scope) if svcs_for_scope else "—" + names = ", ".join(s.serviceId or s.id or "?" for s in svcs_for_scope) if svcs_for_scope else "—" print(f" {sc.name}: {names}") print() diff --git a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py index 9c358c6a2..e605a3412 100644 --- a/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -"""Unit tests for aiac/pdp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" +"""Unit tests for aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/main.py FastAPI application.""" import base64 import json diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py index 423d6eb12..dae161840 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/launcher.py @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import signal import subprocess import sys +import threading import time from contextlib import contextmanager from dataclasses import dataclass, field @@ -228,32 +229,59 @@ def port_forward(target: str, *, namespace: str, local_port: int, remote_port: i yielding the local ``http://127.0.0.1:`` base URL. ``target`` is a kubectl port-forward target (``svc/aiac-controller``, ``deploy/...``, ``pod/...``). - If ``ready_url`` is given it is polled until it answers (any HTTP status) before yielding; - otherwise a short fixed grace period is used (the Controller exposes no ``/health``). + The forward is not yielded until it is actually up: if ``ready_url`` is given it is polled until + it answers (any HTTP status); otherwise the tunnel's own ``Forwarding from ...`` line is awaited + (the Controller exposes no ``/health``). A background thread drains the merged stdout/stderr the + whole time — both to detect that line and so the OS pipe buffer can never fill and deadlock + kubectl — and its captured output is surfaced if the forward exits early or never comes up. """ proc = subprocess.Popen( ["kubectl", "port-forward", "-n", namespace, target, f"{local_port}:{remote_port}"], - stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, - stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, + text=True, ) base_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{local_port}" + output: list[str] = [] + forwarding = threading.Event() + + def _drain() -> None: + assert proc.stdout is not None + for line in proc.stdout: # blocks in the thread, never on the main path + output.append(line) + if "Forwarding from" in line: + forwarding.set() + + reader = threading.Thread(target=_drain, daemon=True) + reader.start() try: deadline = time.time() + timeout + ready = False while time.time() < deadline: if proc.poll() is not None: - err = proc.stderr.read().decode() if proc.stderr else "" - raise RuntimeError(f"port-forward to {target} exited early: {err}") + reader.join(timeout=1) + raise RuntimeError( + f"port-forward to {target} exited early: {''.join(output).strip()}" + ) if ready_url is None: - time.sleep(1.0) - break - try: - requests.get(ready_url, timeout=1) - break - except requests.RequestException: - time.sleep(0.3) + if forwarding.wait(timeout=0.3): # tunnel announced it is up + ready = True + break + else: + try: + requests.get(ready_url, timeout=1) + ready = True + break + except requests.RequestException: + time.sleep(0.3) + if not ready: + raise RuntimeError( + f"port-forward to {target} not ready within {timeout}s: {''.join(output).strip()}" + ) yield base_url finally: terminate(proc) + reader.join(timeout=1) # ====================================================================================== diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py index acede84fc..1ed80dc0e 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/scenario_uc1.py @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ "devops-user": "devops", } -# Fixed dev password for the provisioned test users (throwaway realm). +# Fixed dev password for the provisioned test users. The realm, users, and roles are provisioned +# idempotently and left in place across runs (never deleted/recreated — see ``REALM_DEFAULT``). USER_PASSWORD = "password" # --- Realm-role descriptions (provisioned by the fixture; verbatim from the spec) ----------- diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py index 47f7e7d3e..269bd319a 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_agent_only.py @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ def test_only_agent_rego_present(onboarded: dict) -> None: target — no rules written for it, and it was not onboarded). Checks the writer's own ``/rego``, not just what was copied to the host.""" written = uc1.writer_rego_files(onboarded["writer_pod"]) - assert not [f for f in written if f.startswith("github_tool")], ( + assert not [f for f in written if "github_tool" in f], ( f"unexpected tool Rego emitted: {written}" ) for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py index 0806e00d0..bc5af9e2c 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/test_uc1_onboard_tool_then_agent.py @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ def test_only_agent_rego_present(onboarded: dict) -> None: and are reconstructed onto the agent's model; no rules are written for the tool alone). Checks the writer's own ``/rego``, not just the host copy.""" written = uc1.writer_rego_files(onboarded["writer_pod"]) - assert not [f for f in written if f.startswith("github_tool")], ( + assert not [f for f in written if "github_tool" in f], ( f"unexpected tool Rego emitted: {written}" ) for filename in (INBOUND_REGO, OUTBOUND_REGO): diff --git a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py index 35d20ff7e..030fb412f 100644 --- a/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py +++ b/aiac/test/integration/uc1_onboard.py @@ -256,7 +256,10 @@ def clear_policy_store() -> None: guarantees each run derives its Rego from only the edges this run onboarded. Hits ``DELETE /policy/services`` directly through a port-forward (the harness never imports - ``aiac``). Best-effort: a store that is unreachable or already empty must not fail the run.""" + ``aiac``). Best-effort about *reachability* — a store that is unreachable (or a port-forward that + won't come up) is tolerated and only warned about. But a store that answers with a **non-2xx** + means the clear actually failed: proceeding would run the rung on dirty state (stale SPMs + replayed into every regenerated Rego), so that case fails loudly rather than silently.""" try: with port_forward( STORE_TARGET, @@ -266,10 +269,17 @@ def clear_policy_store() -> None: ready_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{STORE_LOCAL_PORT}/health", ) as base_url: resp = requests.delete(f"{base_url}/policy/services", timeout=30) - resp.raise_for_status() - log.info("cleared Policy Store SPMs (HTTP %s)", resp.status_code) - except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — best-effort; a store hiccup must not fail the run - log.warning("clear_policy_store: could not clear store (%s)", exc) + except (requests.ConnectionError, requests.Timeout, RuntimeError) as exc: + # Store unreachable / port-forward failed — best-effort, must not fail the run. + log.warning("clear_policy_store: store unreachable, skipping clear (%s)", exc) + return + if not (200 <= resp.status_code < 300): + raise AssertionError( + f"clear_policy_store: DELETE /policy/services returned HTTP {resp.status_code} — the " + f"store was reached but the clear failed, so the run would proceed on dirty state " + f"(stale SPMs): {resp.text[:500]}" + ) + log.info("cleared Policy Store SPMs (HTTP %s)", resp.status_code) # ====================================================================================== @@ -293,14 +303,25 @@ def ensure_agent_policy(namespace: str) -> None: "metadata": {"name": POLICY_CONFIGMAP, "namespace": namespace}, "data": {"policy.md": scn.POLICY_ABSTRACT}, } - kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input_text=json.dumps(cm)) + apply_out = kubectl("apply", "-f", "-", input_text=json.dumps(cm)) + # ``kubectl apply`` reports "created"/"configured" when the ConfigMap's content differs from the + # cluster and "unchanged" when it matches; use that to decide whether a rollout is needed. + cm_changed = "unchanged" not in apply_out mounted = kubectl( "get", "deployment", CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT, "-n", namespace, "-o", "jsonpath={.spec.template.spec.volumes[*].configMap.name}", ) if POLICY_CONFIGMAP in mounted.split(): - return # already mounted — no rollout needed + # Already mounted, so no deployment patch (and thus no rollout) is triggered. But a projected + # ConfigMap volume only re-syncs on the kubelet's own (~minute) cadence, and the PRB reads + # policy.md once at startup — so if we just changed the ConfigMap's content the running pod + # would keep serving the stale policy. Force a rollout + wait so the new policy.md is in + # place before onboarding; skip it when apply reported the ConfigMap unchanged (fast reruns). + if cm_changed: + kubectl("rollout", "restart", f"deployment/{CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT}", "-n", namespace) + kubectl_rollout_status(f"deployment/{CONTROLLER_DEPLOYMENT}", namespace=namespace) + return # already mounted — content is now current patch = { "spec": {"template": {"spec": { @@ -388,8 +409,19 @@ def capture_rego(pod: str, rego_dir: Path) -> None: def opa_dump(rego: Path, ref: str) -> object: - """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``.""" - return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) + """Return the value of a Rego data ref (a map/list, not a boolean) via ``opa eval``. + + ``opa eval`` omits ``result`` entirely (or yields an empty expression list) when the ref is + undefined — e.g. the writer emitted a Rego with no such rule — which would otherwise surface as + a raw ``KeyError``/``IndexError`` from the result-unwrapping in ``opa_eval``. Turn that into a + clear assertion so a missing dump reads as an oracle failure, not an opaque crash.""" + try: + return opa_eval([rego], ref, {}) + except (KeyError, IndexError) as exc: + raise AssertionError( + f"opa eval produced no value for {ref!r} against {rego} — the ref is undefined " + f"(the pipeline may have emitted no such rule): {exc}" + ) from exc def outbound_subject_grants(rego_dir: Path) -> set[tuple[str, str]]: diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py index 6df613469..5e22e35e6 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/keycloak/test_main.py @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ def test_returns_201_with_created_scope(self): ) assert resp.status_code == 201 assert resp.json()["name"] == "read:data" - admin.add_default_default_client_scope.assert_called_once() + admin.add_client_default_client_scope.assert_called_once() def test_keycloak_error_returns_502(self): admin = MagicMock() @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ def teardown_method(self): class TestRealmQueryParam: - def test_no_realm_returns_200(self): + def test_no_realm_returns_204(self): admin = MagicMock() admin.get_realm_roles.return_value = [] admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role.return_value = [] diff --git a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py index 02fe840a6..b2e9e20e7 100644 --- a/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py +++ b/aiac/test/policy/store/library/test_api.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from aiac.idp.configuration.models import Role, Scope, ServiceType from aiac.policy.model.models import PolicyRule, ServicePolicyModel from aiac.policy.store.keying import encode_service_id +from aiac.policy.store.library.api import _HTTP_TIMEOUT BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:7074" @@ -51,7 +52,9 @@ def test_by_id_hit_returns_spm(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy result = get_service_policy("svc-1") - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}") + mock_get.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) assert isinstance(result, ServicePolicyModel) assert result.service_id == "svc-1" @@ -104,7 +107,9 @@ def test_resolves_via_scope_service_id(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policy_by_scope result = get_service_policy_by_scope(scope) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('owning-svc')}") + mock_get.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('owning-svc')}", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) assert result is not None assert result.service_id == "owning-svc" @@ -140,7 +145,9 @@ def test_by_role_hit_returns_matching_spm(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import get_service_policies_by_role result = get_service_policies_by_role(role) - mock_get.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services", params={"role": "user-role"}) + mock_get.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services", params={"role": "user-role"}, timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) assert [s.service_id for s in result] == ["svc-a"] def test_by_role_multiple_returns_all(self): @@ -184,7 +191,9 @@ def test_posts_serialized_spm_upsert(self): result = apply_service_policy("svc-1", spm) mock_post.assert_called_once_with( - f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}", json=spm.model_dump() + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}", + json=spm.model_dump(), + timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT, ) assert result is None @@ -210,7 +219,9 @@ def test_deletes_service_policy(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import delete_service_policy result = delete_service_policy("svc-1") - mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}") + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with( + f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services/{encode_service_id('svc-1')}", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT + ) assert result is None def test_raises_on_error_response(self): @@ -234,7 +245,7 @@ def test_deletes_collection_root_no_id_segment(self): from aiac.policy.store.library.api import clear_service_policies result = clear_service_policies() - mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services") + mock_delete.assert_called_once_with(f"{BASE_URL}/policy/services", timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT) assert result is None def test_raises_on_error_response(self): From a9de8f9b25d9f68ec18814f911087d3bce5ef28c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 19:41:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 270/273] Fix: Address second CodeRabbit pass on UC-1 Phase 1 Resolve the 11 findings from the follow-up CodeRabbit review: - github_tool Dockerfile: install -r requirements.txt (was hardcoding mcp[cli]+uvicorn, dropping the pinned bounds and httpx). - pdp-policy-writer-opa spec: correct the outbound behaviour note (subject_ok matches subject_role_scopes[role], target_ok matches target_scopes[input.target]); fix the stale file tree (aiac/pdp/library/policy.py -> aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py); add a note reconciling the client-UUID vs clientId identifiers used at the onboarding vs writer layers. - idp-configuration-service spec: reconcile the /services/{id}/roles summary row, behaviour note, and Assumption 3 with the code, which returns client roles PLUS aiac.managed realm roles on the service account. - ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY: mark the NATS Event Broker / subscription path as Phase 2 and the direct Controller /apply/* invocation as the Phase 1 trigger, matching event-broker.md; align the library import path with the .api submodule convention. - uc1-service-onboarding spec: make the focus-resolution snippet use a default + explicit 404 (matches builder.py and the surrounding prose). - k8s: rename the standalone pod's ConfigMap to aiac-pdp-config-standalone to avoid clobbering the interface ConfigMap; document the deployment as a Phase 1 local/Kind dev topology (node-local images). Docs/specs and build config only; no source changes, unit suite unaffected. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile | 2 +- aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md | 26 +++++++++++-------- .../aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md | 2 +- .../components/idp-configuration-service.md | 6 ++--- .../specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md | 8 +++--- aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml | 9 +++++-- aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml | 8 ++++++ 7 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile index b2ffacd9e..bb276b978 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile +++ b/aiac/demo/tools/github_tool/Dockerfile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ FROM python:3.12-slim WORKDIR /app COPY requirements.txt . -RUN pip install --no-cache-dir mcp[cli] uvicorn[standard] +RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt COPY server.py . diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md index da2aead97..c589177d0 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/ARCHITECTURE-SUMMARY.md @@ -38,10 +38,12 @@ AIAC introduces a strict three-layer model that cleanly separates policy concern | **Policy Decision (PDP)** | OPA | Evaluates LLM-generated Rego rules; returns the caller's entitlements/decision | | **Policy Enforcement (PEP)** | AuthBridge | Intercepts traffic; exchanges tokens; carries no policy knowledge | -The AIAC Agent subscribes to an event stream (NATS JetStream) and reacts to entity lifecycle -events — new services, role changes, policy updates — by retrieving the current policy from a RAG -knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying the minimal required diff via a dedicated -PDP Policy Writer. AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target +The AIAC Agent reacts to entity lifecycle events — new services, role changes, policy updates — +by retrieving the current policy from a RAG knowledge base, querying live PDP state, and applying +the minimal required diff via a dedicated PDP Policy Writer. _(**Phase status:** in **Phase 1** the +Agent is triggered by **direct invocation of the Controller `/apply/*` routes** — by the operator or +the integration harness. The event-driven path — a NATS JetStream subscription fed by the Keycloak +SPI listener — is **Phase 2** (Event Broker, issue 4.19), consistent with [`event-broker.md`](components/event-broker.md).)_ AuthBridge performs RFC 8693 token exchanges sending only the target `audience` — no `scope` parameter. OPA evaluates the caller's role against the Rego rules and returns the entitlements that role grants on the target service; the IdP (Keycloak, via AuthBridge) issues the exchanged token scoped to exactly those entitlements. @@ -55,8 +57,9 @@ AuthBridge) issues the exchanged token scoped to exactly those entitlements. **Trigger:** A Role or Keycloak Client is created, updated, or removed. -The Keycloak SPI listener publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC Agent retrieves -relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current OPA policy state, and asks the LLM to +The trigger reaches the AIAC Agent — in Phase 1 by direct Controller `/apply/*` invocation; in +Phase 2 via a Keycloak SPI listener that publishes a scoped event to the Event Broker. The AIAC +Agent retrieves relevant context from the RAG store, reads the current OPA policy state, and asks the LLM to compute the minimal permission diff scoped to the affected entity. The diff is validated by a second LLM pass and applied to OPA as updated Rego rules. Supports both **auto-apply** (fully automated, least-privilege) and **recommendation + human review** modes. @@ -99,8 +102,8 @@ Eight components across five Kubernetes Pods plus a Python library layer, all im | 3 | **Policy Store** | REST service that owns an in-memory `PolicyModel` cache backed by SQLite as the authoritative structured policy store. Enables the Policy Computation Engine to read current `AgentPolicyModel` state for additive merging. Deployed as a dedicated single-replica StatefulSet (`aiac-policy-store`) at `:7074`. Python library: `aiac.policy.store.library`. | | 4 | **Policy Computation Engine** | Pure Python library module (`aiac.policy.computation`). No service, no Kubernetes deployment. Receives `list[PolicyRule]` from AIAC Agent sub-agents, queries IdP to resolve owning services, additively merges rules into `AgentPolicyModel` objects in the Policy Store, and pushes the updated `PolicyModel` to the PDP Policy Writer. Single entry point: `compute_and_apply(rules)`. | | 5 | **Policy and Domain Knowledge RAG** | ChromaDB vector store holding the access control policy and domain knowledge in persistent, queryable form, populated via a co-located RAG Ingest Service. | -| 6 | **Event Broker** | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. | -| 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects) and directly by the operator (`rebuild` only). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | +| 6 | **Event Broker** _(Phase 2)_ | NATS JetStream pod that decouples event producers (Keycloak SPI listener, RAG Ingest Service) from the AIAC Agent. Provides durable, at-least-once delivery with automatic replay on Agent pod restart. Competing consumer model ensures each event is processed exactly once. **Deferred to Phase 2 (issue 4.19); not deployed in Phase 1** — see [`event-broker.md`](components/event-broker.md). | +| 7 | **AIAC Agent** | LangGraph-based AI agent. **Phase 1:** triggered by **direct Controller `/apply/*` invocation** (operator / integration harness). **Phase 2:** additionally triggered by Event Broker subscriptions (`aiac.apply.>` subjects). Retrieves the current policy from the RAG store, interprets it against live PDP state, and applies the required policy changes immediately. | | 8 | **Python library** | Python API library provides typed access to IdP and policy services via `aiac.idp.configuration`, `aiac.policy.model`, `aiac.policy.store.library`, `aiac.pdp.policy.library`, and `aiac.policy.computation` modules backed by generic Pydantic models. | ``` @@ -159,9 +162,10 @@ All inter-pod traffic is Kubernetes ClusterIP. External access is exclusively vi **AIAC ↔ Kagenti platform** The AIAC Agent reads `AgentRuntime` and `AgentCard` custom resources from the Kubernetes API to -extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.configuration` and -`aiac.pdp.policy.library` Python packages are the integration surface for other Kagenti components -needing typed access to IdP configuration and PDP policy state. +extract service metadata during UC-1 service onboarding. The `aiac.idp.configuration.api` and +`aiac.pdp.policy.library.api` Python modules are the integration surface for other Kagenti components +needing typed access to IdP configuration and PDP policy state. (Each library package keeps an +empty `__init__.py`; the public functions live in its `.api` submodule.) **AIAC ↔ Keycloak** The IdP Configuration Service proxies Keycloak Admin REST endpoints under generic IdP entity diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md index 26818a6a6..0f1cfd903 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/aiac-agent/uc1-service-onboarding.md @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ Neither guard alone is sufficient — ownership-based exclusion keeps own entiti 1. Receive `service_id: str` + `service_type: ServiceType` from the Orchestrator. 2. Fetch `services = get_services()`, `all_scopes = get_scopes()`, `subjects = get_subjects()` from `aiac.idp.configuration.api`. -3. Resolve the focus service: `focus = next(s for s in services if s.id == service_id)` (the internal client UUID carried by the route/`Trigger.entity_id` — **not** `serviceId`/clientId, which may be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI); a missing match is a clear `404`, not `StopIteration`. +3. Resolve the focus service: `focus = next((s for s in services if s.id == service_id), None)` (matching on `id`, the internal client UUID carried by the route/`Trigger.entity_id` — **not** `serviceId`/clientId, which may be a slash-bearing SPIFFE URI); if `focus is None`, raise a clear `404` rather than letting `next(...)` raise `StopIteration`. 4. Compute candidate sets, all by ownership: - **own roles/scopes** — `focus.roles`/`focus.scopes` filtered to `aiac.managed` (drops Keycloak's built-in default client scopes, e.g. `profile`, which are stamped with this service's `serviceId` but are not `aiac.managed`). - **other-agent roles** — `aiac.managed` roles from every *other* service's `roles` (`kind=Agent`, ownership-excluded by `serviceId != focus.serviceId`). diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md index c51216a99..49bed69ee 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/idp-configuration-service.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ A FastAPI web service that proxies Keycloak Admin REST API endpoints. Returns Id | GET | `/services/{service_id}` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{service_id}` | Single service by ID | | POST | `/services/{service_id}/type` | `admin.get_client(service_id)` → `admin.update_client(service_id, {"attributes": {...}})` | Set a service's type via the `client.type` client attribute | | GET | `/scopes` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | All scopes | -| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` | **Client roles defined on this service's client** — an agent's own roles (`R_A`). See "Agent roles are client roles" below. | +| GET | `/services/{service_id}/roles` | `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` **+** `aiac.managed` realm roles on the service account | **An agent's own roles (`R_A`)** from **two** sources: this service's client roles, **plus** the `aiac.managed` realm roles assigned to its service account (the `Configuration` library's provisioning path). Both surfaced as `kind = Agent`. See "Agent roles are client roles" below. | | GET | `/services/{service_id}/scopes` | `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)` | Default client scopes assigned to a service | | GET | `/roles/{role_name}/composites` | `GET /admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites` | Current composite permissions assigned to a role | | POST | `/scopes` | `POST /admin/realms/{realm}/client-scopes` | Create realm-level scope | @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ Every role and client scope this service creates is stamped with the Keycloak at Under the SPM/APM policy-model redesign the Policy Computation Engine (PCE) performs **no IdP lookup for routing or classification** — it relies on entities being self-describing (`Role.kind`, `Role.actorIds`, `Scope.serviceId`; the fields are defined in the models spec). The IdP Configuration Service is the **only** layer that sees Keycloak's raw facts, so it is where these fields are populated and where the underlying assumptions are validated. Field definitions live with the models (library) spec; this service **populates** them. -**Assumption 3 — an agent's role is a Keycloak _client role_; a user's role is a Keycloak _realm role_.** In Keycloak a `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: bool` and `containerId` (the client UUID for client roles, the realm id for realm roles). This service holds the invariant end-to-end: +**Assumption 3 — an agent's role is a Keycloak _client role_ (or an `aiac.managed` _realm role_ assigned to the agent's service account); a user's role is a plain Keycloak _realm role_.** In Keycloak a `RoleRepresentation` carries `clientRole: bool` and `containerId` (the client UUID for client roles, the realm id for realm roles). An agent role therefore has **two** valid representations — a client role on the agent's client, or an `aiac.managed` realm role held by the agent's service account (the provisioning path) — and both are classified `kind = Agent`; only a realm role **not** owned by any service account is a `kind = User` role. This service holds the invariant end-to-end: - **Agent roles.** `GET /services/{service_id}/roles` returns an agent's own roles (`R_A`) from two sources: the client's client roles (`admin.get_client_roles`, `clientRole == true`), **and** the `aiac.managed` realm roles assigned to the service account (the provisioning path the `Configuration` library uses). Both are surfaced as `kind = Agent` owned by this service — see the endpoint description and its Redesign note above. - **User roles are realm roles.** `GET /roles` continues to read realm-level roles (`kind = User`), excluding the Keycloak-generated `default-roles-` composite (exact-name match). That composite is the *only* path to Keycloak's built-ins (`offline_access`, `uma_authorization`, `view-profile`, the `account` client roles) — no user holds them directly — so dropping it keeps AIAC policy free of Keycloak built-ins without a per-name blocklist. @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/idp/service/configuration/keycloak/Dockerfile \ - All endpoints except `/health` declare `admin: KeycloakAdmin = Depends(get_admin)`. `/health` calls `_get_or_create_admin` directly with `os.environ["KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_REALM"]` — no FastAPI dependency, no realm query param. - Each GET endpoint calls the corresponding `python-keycloak` method and returns the result directly via `JSONResponse`. - `GET /roles`: call `admin.get_realm_roles(brief_representation=False)`, then drop the role named `default-roles-{realm}` (the Keycloak-generated default composite for the realm) before enrichment. -- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: call `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` to return the **client roles defined on this service's client** (agent roles, `kind = Agent`). Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no client roles); `502` on other `KeycloakError`. +- `GET /services/{service_id}/roles`: return the service's agent roles (`kind = Agent`) from **two** sources — `admin.get_client_roles(service_id)` (the client's client roles) **and** the `aiac.managed` realm roles assigned to its service account (`get_client_service_account_user` → `get_realm_roles_of_user`, each re-fetched via `get_realm_role_by_id` to test the `aiac.managed` marker; the client-role ids dedup against the realm-role set). Returns `[]` if `KeycloakError.response_code == 400` (service has no client roles); a missing service account simply contributes no realm roles; `502` on other `KeycloakError`. See the detailed contract above. - `GET /services/{service_id}/scopes`: call `admin.get_client_default_client_scopes(service_id)`. - `GET /roles/{role_name}/composites`: call `admin.get_composite_realm_roles_of_role(role_name=role_name)`. - `POST /services/{service_id}/roles/{role_id}`: call `admin.get_client_service_account_user(service_id)` → extract `user["id"]` → call `admin.assign_realm_roles(user_id, [{"id": role_id}])`. diff --git a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md index bde1ad229..f7c65c4e2 100644 --- a/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md +++ b/aiac/docs/specs/components/pdp-policy-writer-opa.md @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ No `?realm=` parameter — the service operates on a Kubernetes CR, not a Keyclo For each `AgentPolicyModel`, the service generates **two Rego packages**: one for the inbound pipeline and one for the outbound pipeline. The `agent_id` is slugified for use in the package name (and filename). `agent_id` is the Keycloak clientId — a SPIFFE URI under SPIRE (`spiffe://host/ns/{ns}/sa/{name}`), or the plain `{ns}/{name}` clientId without it — so slugifying is not a simple hyphen→underscore substitution: the trust domain/host is dropped, the `{ns}/{name}` portion is extracted, and every remaining non-alphanumeric run collapses to a single underscore, lowercased (`aiac.pdp.service.policy.opa.rego.slugify`). This keeps the slug short and identical regardless of whether SPIRE is enabled — e.g. both `spiffe://localtest.me/ns/team1/sa/github-agent` and `team1/github-agent` slugify to `team1_github_agent`. +> **Two identifiers, two layers (no contradiction).** UC-1 onboarding and the Trigger use the internal Keycloak **client UUID** (`service.id` / `Trigger.entity_id`) purely to *look up* a service in the IdP — that UUID **never reaches this writer**. What flows down the policy pipeline into `PolicyRule.scope.serviceId` / `Role.actorIds` and lands as `AgentPolicyModel.agent_id` is the **clientId** (the `{ns}/{name}` / SPIFFE form), which is what this writer slugifies for the Rego package name. The UUID→clientId resolution happens once, in the IdP Configuration Service, before the AgentPolicyModel is ever built. + **Input is identifiers only.** Both packages receive an input document of **IDs**, never roles or scopes: inbound input is `{subject, source}`, outbound input is `{subject, target}` (`subject` is the end-user id, `source` the calling service id, `target` the called service id). Every role/scope mapping is therefore **embedded in the package itself**, and the `allow` logic resolves IDs → roles → scopes internally. Because no per-request scope is supplied, the decision is **coarse**: a principal passes when it has access to **at least one** relevant scope. The generator embeds these symbols, derived from the `AgentPolicyModel`: @@ -266,11 +268,11 @@ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/ ├── requirements.txt └── main.py -aiac/src/aiac/pdp/ +aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/ ├── __init__.py └── library/ ├── __init__.py - └── policy.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy + └── api.py # apply_policy, apply_agent_policy, delete_agent_policy, delete_policy # (models now imported from aiac.policy.model.models) ``` @@ -288,7 +290,7 @@ docker build -f aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/Dockerfile \ - Instantiate a `kubernetes.client.CustomObjectsApi` for all CR operations. - `_slugify(agent_id: str) -> str`: extract `{namespace}/{name}` from a SPIFFE URI (or use the plain `{ns}/{name}` clientId as-is), then collapse every non-alphanumeric run to `_` and lowercase — produces a valid Rego package name segment, short and SPIRE-independent. - `_generate_inbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the inbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_scopes`, `subject_roles`, `source_roles`, and a `role_scopes` map (grouping `inbound_rules` by role → agent scope names); emits `subject_ok` (mandatory) and `source_ok` (optional — an absent `input.source` passes); `allow if { subject_ok; source_ok }`. -- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `subject_roles`, `subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `scope in target_scopes[input.target]`, **not** `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and `target_ok`; `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }`. Neither the inbound `role_scopes` map nor `agent_scopes` is embedded in the outbound package — outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes. +- `_generate_outbound_rego(model: AgentPolicyModel) -> str`: render the outbound Rego package string. Embeds `agent_roles`, `subject_roles`, `subject_role_scopes` (from `outbound_subject_rules`), `agent_role_scopes` (from `outbound_rules`), and `target_scopes` (consumed directly, target id → scopes — **no inversion**); emits a user→tool `subject_ok` (matching `input.function_name in subject_role_scopes[role]`, **not** the inbound `role_scopes`/`agent_scopes`) and a capability `target_ok` (matching `input.function_name in target_scopes[input.target]`); `allow if { subject_ok; target_ok }` — a per-scope AND on the same `input.function_name`. Neither the inbound `role_scopes` map nor `agent_scopes` is embedded in the outbound package — outbound decisions never consider the agent's own audience scopes. - `_upsert_agent(agent_id: str, inbound_rego: str, outbound_rego: str)`: patch the `AuthorizationPolicy` CR to upsert the two packages for `agent_id`. Schema TBD. - `_delete_agent(agent_id: str)`: patch the CR to remove all packages for `agent_id`. - `_delete_all()`: patch the CR to remove all packages. diff --git a/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml b/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml index f822a12a7..4fcf3566d 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/idp-configuration-keycloak-pod.yaml @@ -13,10 +13,15 @@ metadata: name: aiac-system --- +# NOTE: standalone-specific ConfigMap name. It deliberately does NOT reuse +# `aiac-pdp-config` (the name used by pdp-interface-deployment.yaml), which +# carries additional keys (KEYCLOAK_REALM, AIAC_PDP_*_URL). Sharing the name in +# the same namespace would let `kubectl apply` of this isolated manifest clobber +# the interface ConfigMap and break a running interface Pod on its next restart. apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: - name: aiac-pdp-config + name: aiac-pdp-config-standalone namespace: aiac-system data: KEYCLOAK_URL: "http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc:8080" @@ -47,6 +52,6 @@ spec: - containerPort: 7071 envFrom: - configMapRef: - name: aiac-pdp-config + name: aiac-pdp-config-standalone - secretRef: name: keycloak-admin-secret diff --git a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml index cbb3159a0..5a192b204 100644 --- a/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml +++ b/aiac/k8s/pdp-interface-deployment.yaml @@ -1,3 +1,11 @@ +# PHASE 1 LOCAL / KIND DEV TOPOLOGY +# +# This manifest uses node-local images (`localhost/...:local` + +# `imagePullPolicy: Never`), so it only runs on a cluster where every target +# node has been preloaded with those images (e.g. `kind load` / `podman save`). +# A production deployment must publish immutable, versioned images to the +# deployment registry and use `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` — layer that in +# via a separate production overlay rather than editing this dev manifest. --- apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap From 4686e75eebd1de0d4bc5b2582ec1849d33cc9e33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 19:59:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 271/273] Fix: Resolve CodeQL security findings on UC-1 Phase 1 Address 8 open GitHub Advanced Security (CodeQL) alerts on PR #710: - py/stack-trace-exposure (x3, store/service/main.py): SQLite errors were echoed to clients via {"error": str(e)}. Log the exception server-side and return a generic {"error": "database error"} body instead. - py/log-injection (engine.py): strip CR/LF from service_id before logging so a hostile id cannot forge log records. - py/partial-ssrf (pdp/policy/library/api.py): URL-encode the agent_id path segment with quote(..., safe=''); also fixes routing for slash-bearing clientIds so they cannot split into extra path segments. - py/partial-ssrf (x2, store/library via keying.py): assert the base64url encoded service_id matches [A-Za-z0-9_-]+ before it reaches a request URL. - py/path-injection (rego.py slugify): assert the slug is a single [a-z0-9_]+ segment (blocks path traversal, rejects empty slugs) before it becomes a filename in the PDP Policy Writer output dir. No behaviour change for valid inputs; full unit suite (466 tests) green. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py | 9 ++++++-- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py | 11 +++++++++- aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py | 4 +++- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py | 11 +++++++++- aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py | 23 +++++++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py index 1855b4e31..5b67af59f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import os from pathlib import Path +from urllib.parse import quote import requests from dotenv import load_dotenv @@ -29,16 +30,20 @@ def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None: _check(requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy", json=model.model_dump())) +# ``agent_id`` is the Keycloak clientId (``{ns}/{name}`` or a SPIFFE URI), so it can carry +# slashes and other reserved characters. Encode it as a single, inert path segment +# (``safe=""`` also escapes ``/``) so it cannot alter the request target — closes the +# partial-SSRF vector and keeps the id from splitting into extra path segments. def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: _check( requests.post( - f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}", json=model.model_dump() + f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{quote(agent_id, safe='')}", json=model.model_dump() ) ) def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None: - _check(requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{agent_id}")) + _check(requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{quote(agent_id, safe='')}")) def delete_policy() -> None: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py index 4ffcbb4c3..ecd7f1ad0 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/rego.py @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ _SPIFFE_RE = re.compile(r"^spiffe://[^/]+/ns/(?P[^/]+)/sa/(?P[^/]+)$") +# A valid slug is a single filename/package segment: only [a-z0-9_], non-empty. +_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9_]+") + def _short_id(agent_id: str) -> str: """Reduce a clientId to ``{namespace}/{name}``, dropping the SPIFFE trust domain. @@ -36,7 +39,13 @@ def slugify(agent_id: str) -> str: Predictable regardless of whether SPIRE is enabled: derived from ``{ns}/{name}``, not the full slash/colon-bearing clientId or SPIFFE URI. """ - return re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "_", _short_id(agent_id).lower()).strip("_") + slug = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "_", _short_id(agent_id).lower()).strip("_") + # The slug becomes a filename in the PDP Policy Writer's output dir, so it must be a single + # inert segment: reject anything that isn't [a-z0-9_] (blocks ``/`` / ``..`` path traversal + # from a hostile agent_id) or that collapses to empty (would yield ``.inbound.rego``). + if not _SLUG_RE.fullmatch(slug): + raise ValueError(f"agent_id {agent_id!r} does not yield a valid slug") + return slug def _render_list(var: str, values: list[str]) -> str: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py index f38096a72..b2e2b4c12 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/computation/engine.py @@ -228,7 +228,9 @@ def decommission(service_id: str) -> None: try: _decommission(service_id) except Exception: - logger.exception("decommission failed for service %r", service_id) + # Strip CR/LF before logging so a hostile service_id cannot forge log records. + safe_id = service_id.replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "") + logger.exception("decommission failed for service %r", safe_id) raise diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py index 432f834f3..66fe89a1f 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/keying.py @@ -6,10 +6,19 @@ The decoded id stays the cache/DB key and the ``service_id`` in every SPM body. """ import base64 +import re + +# URL-safe base64 (minus ``=`` padding) yields only these characters. Asserting it before the +# value is spliced into a request URL proves the encoded id is a single, inert path segment — +# no scheme, host, ``/``, ``.`` or ``..`` can be injected (closes the partial-SSRF vector). +_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+") def encode_service_id(service_id: str) -> str: - return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(service_id.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii").rstrip("=") + encoded = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(service_id.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii").rstrip("=") + if not _SEGMENT_RE.fullmatch(encoded): # unreachable given the alphabet above; defends the invariant + raise ValueError("encoded service_id is not a safe URL path segment") + return encoded def decode_service_id(encoded: str) -> str: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py index 823b91fd6..21d0150c5 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/policy/store/service/main.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import logging import os import sqlite3 import threading @@ -11,8 +12,15 @@ from aiac.policy.model.models import ServicePolicyModel from aiac.policy.store.keying import decode_service_id +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + DB_PATH = os.getenv("SERVICEPOLICY_DB_PATH", "/data/policy_model.db") +# Returned to the client on any SQLite failure. The concrete exception (which can carry +# schema/path internals) is logged server-side instead of echoed in the response body — +# never expose stack-trace / driver detail to an external caller. +_DB_ERROR_BODY = {"error": "database error"} + # In-memory cache of ServicePolicyModel rows keyed by service_id — the authoritative # serving layer. All reads are served from here; SQLite is the durable write-through backend. _cache: dict[str, ServicePolicyModel] = {} @@ -77,8 +85,9 @@ def clear_service_policies( with _write_lock: try: conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies") - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + except sqlite3.Error: + logger.exception("clear_service_policies: SQLite error") + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content=_DB_ERROR_BODY) _cache.clear() return Response(status_code=204) @@ -111,8 +120,9 @@ def upsert_service_policy( "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO service_policies (service_id, spec) VALUES (?, ?)", (service_id, body.model_dump_json()), ) - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + except sqlite3.Error: + logger.exception("upsert_service_policy: SQLite error") + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content=_DB_ERROR_BODY) _cache[service_id] = body return Response(status_code=204) @@ -126,8 +136,9 @@ def delete_service_policy( with _write_lock: try: conn.execute("DELETE FROM service_policies WHERE service_id = ?", (service_id,)) - except sqlite3.Error as e: - return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content={"error": str(e)}) + except sqlite3.Error: + logger.exception("delete_service_policy: SQLite error") + return JSONResponse(status_code=502, content=_DB_ERROR_BODY) _cache.pop(service_id, None) return Response(status_code=204) From 58160b05e05b8705661e9b603c6d8045ae51eb64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 20:19:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 272/273] Fix: Resolve CodeQL SSRF/path-injection and chromadb dependency-review findings Two automated checks on PR #710 were failing: CodeQL (2 new alerts): - py/partial-ssrf (critical, pdp/policy/library/api.py): the prior quote() fix did not satisfy CodeQL. Add a regex fullmatch barrier on the encoded segment (mirroring policy/store/keying.py, which CodeQL accepts) via a new _agent_id_segment() helper used by apply_agent_policy + delete_agent_policy. - py/path-injection (high, pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py): the /health handler took out_dir as a FastAPI route parameter, which CodeQL treats as request-controlled input flowing into a filesystem path check. Resolve it from get_output_dir() inside the handler instead (it is operator config, never a request). Update TestHealth to drive REGO_OUTPUT_DIR via env. Dependency Review: - chromadb CVE-2026-45829 / GHSA-f4j7-r4q5-qw2c (critical, transitive via crewai in the github_agent demo) has no patched version (affected <= 1.5.9) and is already documented as a mitigated/accepted risk in the demo's pyproject.toml. Add it to the dependency-review-action allowlist. Full unit suite (466 tests) green. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- .github/workflows/security-scans.yaml | 5 ++++ aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py | 28 +++++++++++++++---- aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py | 6 +++- aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py | 12 +++++--- 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-scans.yaml b/.github/workflows/security-scans.yaml index 459f3da47..f9774e493 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security-scans.yaml +++ b/.github/workflows/security-scans.yaml @@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ jobs: fail-on-severity: moderate deny-licenses: GPL-3.0, AGPL-3.0 comment-summary-in-pr: never + # CVE-2026-45829 / GHSA-f4j7-r4q5-qw2c (chromadb, transitive via crewai): no patched + # version exists (affected <= 1.5.9, crewai pins chromadb < 1.2). The vulnerability + # requires running a chromadb HTTP server with trust_remote_code=true, which the + # github_agent demo does not do. See demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml. + allow-ghsas: GHSA-f4j7-r4q5-qw2c shellcheck: name: Shell Script Lint diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py index 5b67af59f..a9f5a43d8 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/policy/library/api.py @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ """ import os +import re from pathlib import Path from urllib.parse import quote @@ -16,11 +17,30 @@ load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env") +# ``quote(..., safe="")`` emits only unreserved characters (``A-Za-z0-9-._~``) and ``%XX`` escapes. +# Asserting the encoded value against this set before it is spliced into a request URL proves it is +# a single, inert path segment — no scheme, host, ``/`` or ``..`` can be injected (closes the +# partial-SSRF vector). The fullmatch barrier is what CodeQL recognises; ``quote`` alone does not. +_URL_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._~%-]+") + def _base_url() -> str: return os.getenv("AIAC_PDP_POLICY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:7072") +def _agent_id_segment(agent_id: str) -> str: + """URL-encode ``agent_id`` as a single, validated path segment. + + ``agent_id`` is the Keycloak clientId (``{ns}/{name}`` or a SPIFFE URI), so it can carry + slashes and other reserved characters; ``safe=""`` escapes them all. The fullmatch check + then guarantees the result cannot alter the request target. + """ + segment = quote(agent_id, safe="") + if not _URL_SEGMENT_RE.fullmatch(segment): + raise ValueError(f"agent_id {agent_id!r} does not yield a safe URL path segment") + return segment + + def _check(resp: requests.Response) -> None: if not resp.ok: raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") @@ -30,20 +50,16 @@ def apply_policy(model: PolicyModel) -> None: _check(requests.post(f"{_base_url()}/policy", json=model.model_dump())) -# ``agent_id`` is the Keycloak clientId (``{ns}/{name}`` or a SPIFFE URI), so it can carry -# slashes and other reserved characters. Encode it as a single, inert path segment -# (``safe=""`` also escapes ``/``) so it cannot alter the request target — closes the -# partial-SSRF vector and keeps the id from splitting into extra path segments. def apply_agent_policy(agent_id: str, model: AgentPolicyModel) -> None: _check( requests.post( - f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{quote(agent_id, safe='')}", json=model.model_dump() + f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{_agent_id_segment(agent_id)}", json=model.model_dump() ) ) def delete_agent_policy(agent_id: str) -> None: - _check(requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{quote(agent_id, safe='')}")) + _check(requests.delete(f"{_base_url()}/policy/agents/{_agent_id_segment(agent_id)}")) def delete_policy() -> None: diff --git a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py index 2f6f087f4..11cf21de6 100644 --- a/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py +++ b/aiac/src/aiac/pdp/service/policy/opa/main.py @@ -87,7 +87,11 @@ def delete_all(out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir)): @app.get("/health") -def health(out_dir: Path = Depends(get_output_dir)): +def health(): + # Resolve the output dir from server config directly rather than as a route parameter: a + # FastAPI handler parameter is treated as request-controlled input, and feeding that into a + # filesystem path check reads as path injection. The dir is operator config, never a request. + out_dir = get_output_dir() if out_dir.is_dir() and os.access(out_dir, os.W_OK): return {"status": "ok"} return JSONResponse( diff --git a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py index 2a2237413..7d3895aca 100644 --- a/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py +++ b/aiac/test/pdp/service/policy/opa/test_main.py @@ -143,14 +143,18 @@ def teardown_method(self): class TestHealth: - def test_returns_200_when_dir_writable(self, tmp_path): - resp = _make_client(tmp_path).get("/health") + # /health resolves the output dir from server config (REGO_OUTPUT_DIR) directly rather than + # via the injectable dependency, so drive it through the env var instead of dependency_overrides. + def test_returns_200_when_dir_writable(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", str(tmp_path)) + resp = TestClient(app).get("/health") assert resp.status_code == 200 assert resp.json() == {"status": "ok"} - def test_returns_503_when_dir_absent(self, tmp_path): + def test_returns_503_when_dir_absent(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): missing = tmp_path / "does-not-exist" - resp = _make_client(missing).get("/health") + monkeypatch.setenv("REGO_OUTPUT_DIR", str(missing)) + resp = TestClient(app).get("/health") assert resp.status_code == 503 body = resp.json() assert body["status"] == "unavailable" From 36c7d73629ffbb6719abcc56cf89883f4c843ba2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Blinder Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 20:26:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 273/273] Fix: Bump json-repair to 0.60.1 to clear dependency-review DoS finding The dependency-review check flagged json-repair@0.25.3 (transitive via crewai in the github_agent demo) for GHSA-xf7x-x43h-rpqh (high, unbounded-CPU DoS via circular JSON Schema $ref). Patched in 0.60.1. Pin it in pyproject.toml following the existing indirect-dep pattern and refresh uv.lock (also pulls minor crewai 1.15.2->1.15.8, mcp, pydantic-settings bumps from re-resolution). chromadb (CVE-2026-45829, no patched version) remains allowlisted via allow-ghsas in security-scans.yaml. Assisted-By: Claude (Anthropic AI) Signed-off-by: Oleg Blinder --- aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml | 1 + aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock | 44 ++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml index f4cfd353f..b97188052 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/pyproject.toml @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ dependencies = [ "pillow>=12.3.0", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-40192 "lxml>=6.1.1", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2026-41066 "orjson>=3.11.6", # Indirect; prevents CVE-2025-67221 + "json-repair>=0.60.1", # Indirect (via crewai); prevents GHSA-xf7x-x43h-rpqh (DoS) # CVE-2026-45829 (chromadb): no fixed version published; crewai pins chromadb<1.2. # Vulnerability requires running a chromadb HTTP server with trust_remote_code=true, # which this agent does not do. diff --git a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock index 5dd74f2e3..321afbc09 100644 --- a/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock +++ b/aiac/demo/agents/github_agent/uv.lock @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ wheels = [ [[package]] name = "crewai" -version = "1.15.2" +version = "1.15.8" source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" } dependencies = [ { name = "aiofiles" }, @@ -461,9 +461,9 @@ dependencies = [ { name = "tomli" }, { name = "tomli-w" }, ] -sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/73/7c/0d962c1e1f84a37eda183fc40a0b7e7a49c74969a378a0fda4c4c9bfcd18/crewai-1.15.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:deb2d882105cb9075cdd2198ac8398f9001315f2abc28d815fec66b003a2acbf", size = 7767892, upload-time = "2026-07-08T02:06:07.017Z" } +sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/e9/f3/7bc19e31e203d979329da261677bc4f1c2fa4808a5878cb3f62e87f33093/crewai-1.15.8.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:f99532849e77db9af237ffd836fec7e368495d1bb86aec3eca192a9dc404666f", size = 7818988, upload-time = "2026-07-28T15:07:04.108Z" } wheels = [ - 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